ML20059H584

Annual Rept of Changes,Tests & Experiments Performed Under 10CFR50.59 for 920701-930630

ML20059H584
Person / Time
Site:	Oregon State University
Issue date:	06/30/1993
From:	Andrea Johnson Oregon State University, CORVALLIS, OR
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9311100132
Download: ML20059H584 (15)

Text

. .

RADIA11oN CENTTR

, )

. J November 4,1993 i

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTENTION: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

Annual Report of Changes, Tests and Experiments Performed

@OREcoN Under the Provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 for the Oregon State University TRIGA Reactor (OSTR), License No. R-106, Docket No. 50-243.

The following report is submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10 STATE CFR 50.59(b) and 10 CFR 50.4, and covers the OSTR's annual reporting UNivEns:Tv period of July 1,1992 through June 30,1993. The information in this report is compiled annually and is submitted to the USNRC in this specific 10 CFR 50.59(b) report, as well as in a special section of the OSTR annual i report, which was submitted on October 29,1993.

I Radiation Center A100 e nams. we " During the specified reporting period there were five changes to the reactor facility and four changes to reactor procedures conducted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59. There were no changes to reactor experiments, no tests, and no new experiments performed under the provisions of 10 CFR 50_59 during the current reporting period.

The individual changes being reported are listed below by category and by title, and are described in more detail in Attachment A. Regarding this attachment, you will note that it includes a brief description of each change followed by a summary of the safety evaluation conducted for the o'escribed change. As required, none of the changes performed under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 necessitated a change in the OSTR Technical Specifica-tions or involved an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59(a)(2). 3

1. Chanaes to the Reector Facility:

a. Replacement and Relocation of Selecteo Area Radiation Monitors i Telephone 503 737-2341 b. Replacement Relays for the Left-Hand Drawer of the OSTR Console {

Vux 503 737-04s0 Replacement of the Detector in the Stack Monitor Particu-c.

late Channel

d. Change to the Hold Up Tank (HUT) Water Level Indictor System

e. CLICIT Cap Modification nona10 i ,

9311100132 930630 I y//p' )y PDR R

ADOCK 05000243 ff l PDR _li 1.

}

~USNRC November 4,1993

2. 10 CFR 50.59 Chanaes to Reactor Procedures

a. Minor Revisions to the Radiation Center and TRIGA Reactor Emergency Response Plan

b. Revision to OSTROP 6 Concerning the Reactor Bay Access Policy for Persons Under the Age of 18 Years

c. Revision of OSTROP 6

d. Reactor Operation with a Reduced Number of Area Radiation Monitors

3. 10 CFR 50.59 Chanaes to Reactor Experiments There were no changes to reactor experiments during this reporting period.

We trust that you will find this year's report to be in good order. However, should you require more information or have questions regarding our report, please let me know.

Yours sincerely, k -

JA.m)G. Jphns;pn DirectoWiation Center AGJ:jrsVe\5059rept.let Enclosure I

cc: Regional Administrator, Region V, USNRC, Walnut Creek, California Mr. Leroy Norderhaug, Region V, USNRC, Walnut Creek, California ,

Mr. Phil Qualls, Region V, USNRC, Walnut Creek, California Mr. Al Adams, OSTR Project Manager, USNRC, Washington, D.C.

Mr. David Stewart-Smith, Oregon Department of Energy, Salem, Oregon T. V. Anderson, Reactor Supervisor, OSTR S. E. Binney, Chairman, Reactor Operations Committee, OSTR ,

B. Dodd, Reactor Administrator, OSTR J. F. Higginbotham, Senior Health Physicist, OSTR q

i l

ATTACHMENT A Chances to the OSTR Facility, to Reactor Procedures, and to Reactor Experiments Performed Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59 The information contained in this section of the report provides a summary of the changes performed during the reporting period under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59. For each item listed, we have included a brief description of the action taken and a summary of the applicable safety evaluation. Although it may not be specifically stated in each of the following safety evaluations, all actions taken under 10 CFR 50.59 were implemented only ,

af ter it was established by the OSTR Reactor Operations Committee (ROC) that the proposed activity did not require a change in the facility's Technical Specifications and did not introduce or create an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59(a)(2).

1. 10 CFR 50.59 Chanaes to the Reactor Facility There were five changes to the reactor facility which were reviewed, approved, and performed under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 during the reporting period.

a. REPLACEMENT AND RELOCATION OF SELECTED AREA RADIATION MON'70R5 t (1) Description ,

The reactor operations staff and health physics staff removed all of the existing Tracerlab area radiation monitors (ARMS), relocated one of the Nuclear Measurements Corporation (NMC) ARMS, and installed five new Eberline ARMS. The locations, ranges, alarm set points and new identification numbers for the ARMS are given in Table 1. ,

The old Tracerlab ARMS were removed completely as they had approached the end of their usefullifetime.

An NMC ARM which was located near the sample handling area in the  !

reactor bay was moved to a point midway between beam port #2 (BP2) and the thermal column. Detector mounts were installed over BP2 and on the wall just to the north of the thermal column door. The detector is positioned

I 2

. j Table 1 Locations, Ranges, Alarm Set Points and New Numbers for the ARM System ,

4 l

Intermed. High l a e No. Type Location Alarm Alarm  !

(mR/h) (mR/h) 1 NMC Beam Port #1 0-10,000 50 100 )

2 NMC 0-10,000 50 100 f Column 3 NMC Beam Port #3 0-10,000 50 100 4 Eberline Beam Port #4 0-10,000 50 100 5 Eberline Control Room 0-10,000 10 100 l 6 NMC Reactor Top 0-10,000 750 1000 l 7 Eberline Reactor Top 0-10,000 750 1000 l 8 NMC Fuel Storage Pits 0-10,000 10 20 9 Eberline Sample Handling Area 0-10,000 50 100 l 10 NMC 0-10,000 50 100 na 11 Eberline Demin. System Filter 0-10,000 50 100 i 12 NMC Demineralizer Column 0-10,000 50 100 Eberline Spare 0-10,000 ,

i t

e i

t y 9v - . . - - . - - p.-.- -.. - - , w.~ . . . . . - . -__ __.r m_r____ - =

in one of these two mounts depending on the work being performed. Due [

to the higher level of use currently associated with the thermal column, the  !

4 detector was initially placed by the thermal column door. A new Eberline ARM was located near the sample handling area. ,

i A new Eberline ARM was also positioned outside the control room on the south reactor bay wall to the west of the third floor bridge. An additional .

readout for this ARM was located in A100, which provides a dose rate ,

• indication only, i.e., it does not have any alarms associated with it.

i Other new Eberline ARMS replaced the old Tracerlab ARMS near beam port I

1. 4, on the reactor top, and near the demineralizer system filter. Finally, one  !

Eberline ARM was kept as a spare to enable quick response to any future ,

ARM failures. All other ARMS remained unchanged.

Several procedures required changing as a result of the removal of the f Tracerlab ARMS and the installation of the Eberline ARMS. Most of the changes were minor and merely allowed for differences between the .j Tracerlab ARMS and the Eberline ARMS and the revised ARM numbers and locations. However, one change was more significant, and arose because  !

the Eberline ARMS do not have an electronic method for testing their audible  :

and visual alarms. Therefore, the quarterly functional check procedure was  !

changed to add the use of an actual radiation source to initiate the alarms. l t

This new method is now used for both the NMC and Eberline ARMS.  ;

(2) Safety Evaluation i

The Tracerlab ARMS had reached the end of their useful lifetime and were i i

replaced by the new Eberline ARMS. This willincrease reliability and thereby increase radiation safety.

The opportunity was taken to rearrange some of the ARMS in order to

~

position them in locations consistent with current uses of the reactor and its facilities; however, all of the previous locations are still covered.

1

- r-- - - . ~ - , - - , , - . _ - -, . -n. ~.n,. ., --- -~,.-w, -~e-,n,~+,wm

i 1

Additional areas are covered by the new ARM arrangement and increase radiological safety by monitoring dose rates in locations which may be occupied by Radiation Center staff. These locations include: (a) the thermal -

column near the controls for opening its door; and (b) accessible areas just -

outside the reactor control room.

}

The addition of a new ARM outside the control room with a dose rate readout in A100 will be very usefulin the event of an emergency requiring i evacuation of the reactor building. With the new A100 ARM readout capability, it will be possible to determine the dose rate in the reactor bay near the control room without sending in an entry team. This remote ARM ,

i readout will also provide necessary information to help determine whether i or not the EOC could be relocated to the reactor control room. In view of f the above, we believe that this measure increases radiological safety by (

reducing potential personnel exposure.

l The Technical Specifications for the OSTR require only one ARM and, therefore, the new ARM arrangement more than adequately meets this need. j The use of an actual radiation source for the quarterly alarm checks of the I

ARMS will potentially involve a small increment of personnel dose, but it is felt that such a check is necessary to assure proper operability of these alarms. The source activity will be in tne low millicurie range and the source l, itself will be attached to a long rod in order to minimize personnel exposure.  !

b. REPLACEMENT RELAYS FOR THE LEFT-H AND DRAWER OF THE OSTR CONSOLE l e

(1) Description l

i Occasionally, some of the dry-reed relays in the left-hand drawer of the 1 reactor console fail, or become erratic, and require replacement. The relays of concern here are used for many of the ranging functions on the console.

In the past, these relays have been replaced by identical relays supplied by the console manuf acturer, General Atomics; however, these can no longer I

i

-.;l

i i

be obtained. The Scientific Instrument Technician determined that the relay 1 manuf acturer (Magnacraft) makes a replacement relay which is electrically equivalent. In the future, as the original dry-reed relays fail, they will be replaced by the new type. This 50.59 safety evaluation is necessary due to i the fact that the new relays are not identical to the original equipment. ,

(2) Safety Evaluation

.l The new relays have identicat electrical characteristics when compared to the  :

original relays and are recommended as replacements by the manufacturer.

The only difference between the old and new relays is in the mounting and ,

appearance. The different mounting will not cause a problem dunng ,

replacement. It is expected that the new relays will perform at least as well i as the old ones and will likely have a lifetime equal to or longer than the  ;

original equipment. Typically, newer designs are more reliable than old and, f

therefore, it is expected that failures will be few. Therefore, replacing the  ;

old relays with the new ones on an as-needed basis will not introduce any l r

unreviewed safety questions.  ;

~!

c. REPLACEMENT OF THE DETECTOR IN THE STACK MONITOR PARTICULATE

{

CHANNEL i t

(1) Description  ;

,l The GM tube detector in the particulate channel of the stack monitor reached :i the end of its useful life. Because it was becoming very difficult to find l 4

equivalent replacement GM tubes, the staff replaced the GM detector with i a new detector using a beta scintillator and photo-multiplier tube. No- -j modifications to the detector power supply were required because the high '

]

voltage is fully adjustable and was easily set to the appropriate voltage for l the new detector. However, it was necessary to make some changes to the detector housing in order to make the new detector fit.

i s

I i

1

6-(2) Safety Evaluation Beta scintillators are often used as detectors for air particulate monitoring -

channels, and in f act function better than GM tubes because the sensitivity to background gamma radiation is reduced and the beta counting efficiency is usually much higher than that obtainable with GM tubes. Therefore, this ,

change increases safety by replacing an aging detector with a more modern, more sensitive, and more ef ficient detector. The new detector system was fully tested and calibrated prior to use.

d. CHANGE TO THE HOLD UP TANK (HUT) WATER LEVEL INDICATOR SYSTEM J (1) Description The Scientific Instrument Technician changed the water level indicator  !

system for the HUT. The HUT's original water levelindicator was based on a float and rod mechanism which was designed to trip a series of four micro-switches as the float rose. As each microswitch was tripped, it turned on j a water level indicating light located on the right hand side-cabinet of the  !

reactor console. Manual switches were associated with these level indicating lights which could be set to either an on or off position. If a .

switch was set on, then as that light illuminated audible and visual alarms l

would occur on the reactor control room annunciator panel indicating "high  ;

water level in the HUT" and " green light off."

i The modified system provides a more modern method for monitoring the  ;

HUT water level. One specific design improvement was to include a direct - i readout of the HUT water levelin inches. The existing float is still used, b'ut it is now attached to a thin wire which passes around a pulley system and -  ;

rotates a multi-turn potentiometer. The resulting voltage signal (which is proportional to the water level) is amplified, converted to a digital signal, and displayed in the control room. Adjustments in the amplifier enable the signal  ;

to display digits which correspond to the inches of water in the HUT (to the .

nearest tenth of an inch).

t i

~

7-The high water alarm setpoint is adjusted in the control room by dialing in a j digital value on a thumb-wheel unit. A comparator is used to monitor the l water level signal and the alarm set point. If the water level signal becomes greater than the set point, then the high water level alarm is activated. This l alarm includes audible and visual alarms on the control room annunciator i

panel exactly the same as the old one. In addition, the old back-up high 1 water level float and alarm system was slightly modified to enable it to also j give audible and visual alarms on the control room annunciator panel. These  ;

alarms are the same as the alarms initiated by the primary level indicator for the HUT. ,

3 (2) Safety Evaluation l The circuitry for the new HUT water level indicator system is completely separate from reactor console and reactor safety circuits, and therefore there are no unf avorable safety implications from this standpoint. The control -

room part of the system is located in the right hand side cabinet.  !

The new level indicating system increases safety by providing a more accurate indication of the water levelin the HUT. With the old system, the water level indicated in the control room at any given time would be j somewhere between two points about 18 inches apart. Although a reasonable approximation of the water level could be made by looking at the  ;

P float level in the HUT room, a much more precise indication will now be l

available in the control room. Furthermore, the new digital HUT high water i level alarm can easily be set to any value and will normally be only a few inches above the actual current water level. In this way, any inadvertent filling of the HUT (such as from a water tap left running) will soon be j detected.  ;

As indicated, the new digital readout shows the water level down to a tenth  !

of an inch. Tenths of inches were included on the digital readout to provide an indication that the system is functioning correctly. This function check I

is based on the fact that the tenth-inch digit will normally fluctuate due to  !

i

~

8-wave action, especially when water is draining into the tank. If, for some reason, the drive wire for the potentiometer should break or the float should become separated from the drive wire then the digital readout would become steady and unchanging. The reactor operator would notice this reading abnormality when making the normal log entries. In addition, safety has been further enhanced by attaching the back-up float alarm (which is not dependent on the drive wire mechanism) to the same alarm circuits as the primary level system. There are now two separate systems available to provide warning of a filling HUT at any time of the day or night.

Corrosion is not a problem in the HUT building due to the thermostatically controlled heaters in the building. They seem to keep the room acceptably dry.

e. CLICIT CAP MODIFICATION (1) Description The reactor operations staff modified the cap of the cadmium-lined in-core irradiation tube (CLICIT). The modification involved boring and tapping a hole in the top of the cap. The hole is large enough to allow thermocouple leads to exit the CLICIT. When leads are used with the cap, a seal around the leads is maintained with material such as duct seal. When the hole is not needed, then it is sealed by screwing in a short bolt with a recessed head for an allen wrench.

(2) Safety Evaluation The modification does not change the existing safety considerations for the CLICIT. As before, the tube remains sealed with a slight suction on it during operation. It is just the method of obtaining the seal which has changed in order to allow greater flexibility in the use of the CLICIT.

1

.g.

2. 10 CFR 50.b9 Chances to Reactor Procedures t

There were four changes to reactor procedures which were reviewed, approved, and performed under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 during the reporting period.

[

a. MINOR REVISIONS TO THE RADIATION CENTER AND TRIGA REACTOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN (1) Description As a result of the annual emergency response drill and emergency plan '

review, a number of minor changes to the emergency plan were made. i These changes are detailed below:

2.0 DEFINITIONS The following definitions were added:

ANNUAL Every 12 months, with an interval not exceeding 15 months.

BIENNIAL 4 Every 24 months, with an interval not exceeding 30 months.

MONTHLY Every four weeks, with an interval not to exceed six weeks.

QUARTERLY Every three months, with an interval not exceeding four months.

SEMI-ANNUAL Every six months, with an interval not exceeding seven and one-half months.

8.2.1.b.iii: ,

"The 14-channelarea radiation monitoring system ....." was changed to "The j multi-channel area radiation monitoring system .... "  ;

8.4.b. l l

The typographical error in the spelling of " communication" was corrected.

Figure A-2 j The map was updated by adding the new Corvallis bypass.

Figure A-3 The map of the Radiation Center floor plan was updated.  ;

10 Appendix B  !

B.2.b. ,

This was changed to: l b) Corvallis Fire Department (HAZMAT Team #5 Vehicle), Boxes

]

Numbered 1 - 5 {

t The inventory Checklists were replaced with new, updated ones.

{

(2) Safety Evaluation  ;

i Adding the definitions with respect to frequencies made the emergency l 3

response plan consistent with the OSTR Technical Specifications and '[

ANSI /ANS 15.1. It further clarified exactly what is meant by annual, etc., j in the emergency plan, and provides the operational flexibility necessary to j schedule routine actions required by the plan.  ;

I Changing the very specific "14-channel" ARMS description to the more l

general " multi-channel" concept allows for the fact that the ARM systems  ;

I were replaced by newer, more up-to-date equipment, and accommodates the f fact that the exact number of ARMS will change from time to time. There

, are still about 10-12 systems operational, which more than adequately provides good area coverage. Safety will be increased because the new l t

ARMS will be more reliable than the old ones. l 1

f Correction of typographical errors and updating the maps and floor plan have . l

[

no reactor safety significance. They just keep the plan current and correct.

I l The Corvallis Fire Department is now the lead department in HAZMAT Region t

1. 5 in Oregon. They have a new HAZMAT vehicle and the opportunity was h taken to revise and repack Radiation Center emergency equipment and i supplies normally kept at the fire department. The new system allows l equipment to be accessed more easily and, therefore, increases safety. +

t i

l 1

i

_11 t

The inventory Checklists are revised from time to time to keep them current.  !

Replacing them with the latest lists just keeps the plan up-to-date. There 'f were no safety-related changes to the inventories. f i

b. REVISION TO OSTROP 6 CONCERNING THE REACTOR BAY ACCESS POLICY FOR -

PERSONS UNDER THE AGE OF 18 YEARS l (1) Description l The previous reactor bay access policy for minors, as stated in OSTROP 6,- j prohibited all access to the reactor bay for persons under the age of 18. ,

Occasionally, a freshman member of the nuclear engineering orientation class f or a student intern at the Radiation Center is not quite 18 but has a need to enter the reactor bay. The staff of the OSTR could see no reason to prevent j such people from entering the reactor bay; therefore, the Senior Health i

Physicist revised section 6.7.B.6of OSTROP 6, Administrative and Personnel l Procedures. The amended section now reads as follows:

i

" Access to the reactor bay will be kept to a minimum. No persons l

under 18 years of age will be admitted to the reactor bay unless such  ;

access is required as a part of the activities of an OSU class or access  ;

is specifically approved by a person on Access List A.

l r

l it is also the policy of the OSU Radiation Center to prohibit access to j the reactor bay for the purpose of routine tours unless access is  !

specifically approved by a person on Access List A."

(2) Safety Evaluation While the reactor bay access policy was relaxed slightly, it was because the I previous policy was ur'necessarily restrictive. From a regulatory viewpoint, persons under the age of 18 are subject to the same radiation dose limits as members of the general public, and members of the public are allowed into the reactor bay with specific permission. Therefore, this does not represent .

a new situation with respect to dose limitation. It is highly unlikely that

1 l

anyone entering the reactor bay will receive a dose approaching the public f

dose limit. Even doses received by occupationa//y exposed workers who routinely enter thc reactor bay are significantly below the limits for members I of the general public.

i All existing access control procedures remain in place, thus ensuring appropriate authorization and escort of all personnel entering the reactor bay.

c. REVISION OF OSTROP 6 (1) Description ,

The Radiation Center Director revised the job descriptions of the Senior ,

Health Physicist and Health Physicist which are included in OSTROP 6. i (2) Safety Evaluation The revisions involved changes of detail, language and layout only. There were no actual changes in the duties, responsibilities or authorities I associated with these two positions, and therefore, there is no impact on  ;

reactor safety. This safety analysis is necessary only because OSTROP 6  ;

states that all changes to this procedure will be reviewed in this manner.  !

d. REACTOR OPERATION WITH A REDUCED NUMBER OF AREA RADIATION MONITORS i

(1) Description l

In order to implement part of a previously approved 10 CFR 50.59 safety {

analysis which addressed an upgrade to the OSTR area radiation monitors  ;

(ARMS),it was necessary to disconnect the wiring for all of the old Tracerlab  !

ARMS and the one Nuclear Measurements Corporation (NMC) ARM channel  ;

located near the sample handling area. The length of time required to  !

i remove the old ARMS and install the new Eberline ARMS was such that it  !

was necessary to operate the reactor with only the remaining six NMC ARMS in an operational state. These were positioned at the following locations:

reactor top,. beam port #1, beam port #3, fuel storage pits, pneumatic l transfer terminal, and the demineralizer column.  !

i (2) Safety Evaluation l l i While there were fewer ARMS in operation for a short period of time, this did not constitute an unreviewed safety question. First of all, a number of the l Tracerlab ARMS being removed were duplicated by the NMC ARMS. In~

eddition, all of the areas of potential high radiation associated with reactor ,

operations were still covered by the NMC ARMS. Finally, .the OSTR l

. Tecnnical Specifications require only one ARM on the reactor top. Thus, I there were no safety issues and no conflicts with the Technical .i 4 -

Specific:ations.

{

i

3. 10 CFR 50.59 Chances to Reactor Experiments t

There were no changes to reactor experiments during this reporting period.  !

t f

i i

f I

i I

a N

. .