ML20059F107

Amends 86 & 85 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively, Revising Second Level Undervoltage Trip Setpoint & Allowable Values in TS Section 3/4.3.2, ESFAS Instrumentation

ML20059F107
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	01/06/1994
From:	Quay T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20059F110	List: ML20059F107 ML20059F112
References
NUDOCS 9401130153
Download: ML20059F107 (19)

Text

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• [e neog$'o, UNITED STATES y ')"ef g

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g

E WASHINGTON D. C. 20555 t

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%, -.....s PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-275 plABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT. UNIT N0. 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 86 License No. DPR-80 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Pacific Gas & Electric Company (the licensee) dated December 22, 1992, as supplemented July 19, 1993, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the 4

Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment,-

and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-80 is hereby amended to read as follows:

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9401130153 940106 PDR ADOCK 05000275 P

PDR l

-g-(2)

Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 86

, are hereb,v incorporated in the license.

Pacific Gas & Electric Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the i

Environmental Protection Plan, except where otherwise stated in specific license conditions.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of 60 days from the date of its issuance.

j FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION zf s $ M c" l

Theodore R. Quay, Director Project Directorate V Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V

.j l

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical l

Specifications Date of Issuance: January 6,1994

t

/

'o UNITED STATES E'

'E,j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3.f, E

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 o

5 k.... /

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-323 DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT. UNIT NO. 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 85 License No. DPR-82 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Pacific Gas & Electric Company (the licensee) dated December 22, 1992, as supplemented July 19, 1993, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and otragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-82 is hereby ainended to read as follows:

(2)

Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 85, are hereby incorporated in the license.

Pacific Gas & Electric Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan, except where otherwise stated in specific license conditions.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of 60 days from the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION MN h. hpi Theodore R. Quay, Director i

Project Directorate V i

Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:

January 6, 1994

)

~..

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENTS AMENDMENT NO. 86 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-80 AND AMENDMENT NO. 85 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-82 DOCKET NOS. 50-275 AND 50-323 i

Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages.

The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the arer of change.

Overleaf pages are also included, as appropriate.

REMOVE INSERT 3/4 3-27*

3/4 3-27*

3/4 8-3 3/4 8-3 3/4 8-4 3/4 8-4 3/4 8-5 3/4 8-5 i

B 3/4 3-la B 3/4 3-la B 3/4 8-2 B 3/4 8-2 B 3/4 8-3 S 3/4 8-3

{

B 3/4 8-3a B 3/4 8-3a 1

• Due to Amendment Nos. 84 and 83, which become effective after the Eagle 21 reactor protection system upgrade, two versions of page 3/4 3-27 have been provided in this amendment. The page marked "before Eagle 21 installation,"

i should be inserted and not removed until both units have completed the subject modification.

The second page 3/4 3-27 provided in this amendment should be i

used after Eagle 21 installation, in lieu of the same page provided in Amendment Hos. 84 and 83 dated October 7, 1993.

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i i

i i

w

TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS o

FUNCTIONAL UNIT TRIP SETPOINT ALLOWABLE VALUES

~

E 7.

Loss of Power o

(4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage) 9 a.

First Level 1)

Diesel Start 2 0 volts with a 2 0 volts with a z

s 0.8 second time delay s 0.8 second time delay e

and and g

2 2583 volts with a

> 2583 volts with a s 10 second time delay s 10 second time delay 2)

Initiation of Load Shed One relay One relay w

2 0 volts with a 2 0 volts with a 9-s 4 second time delay s 4 second time delay no and and 2 2583 volts with a

> 2583 volts with a s 25 second time delay 5 25 second time delay with one relay with one relay 2 2870 volts, instantaneous 2 2870 volts, instantaneous R

b.

Second Level 1)

Diesel Start 2 3785 volts with a 2 3785 volts with a l

T' s 10 second time delay s 10 second time delay C*,

2)

Initiation of load Shed 2 3785 volts with a 2 3785 volts with a l

s 20 second time delay s 20 second time delay

[

8.

Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Interlocks g

2 a.

Pressurizer Pressure, P-ll s 1915 psig s 1920.6 psig a

b.

DELETED c.

Reactor Trip, P-4 N.A.

N.A.

g NOTE 1: Time constants utilized in the lead-lag controller for Steam Pressure - Low are ri - 50 seconds and r-5 seconds.

o SkeamGe

[

NOTE 2:TD - [B1(P)perator Water Level Low-Low Trip Time Delay

+ B2(P)2 + B3(P) + B4][0.99]

m m

Where: P

= RCS loop AT Equivalent to Power (%RTP), P s 50% RTP j

TD - Time Delay for Steam Generator Water Level Low-low Reactor Trip (in seconds) gpi Generators affected j

%,s B1 - -0.0072 m%, 3 B2 - +0.8181

_w -

83 - -31.72 B4 - +468.8 i

TABLE 3.3-5 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS

/

1.

Manual Initiation a.

SafetyInjection(ECCS)

N.A.

1)

Feedwater Isolation N.A.

2)

Reactor Trip N.A.

3)

Phase "A" Isolation N.A.

4)

Containment Ventilation Isolation N.A.

5)

Auxiliary Feedwater N.A.

6)

Component Cooling Water N.A.

7)

Containment Fan Cooler Units N.A.

8)

Auxiliary Saltwater Pumps N.A.

b.

Phase "B" Isolation 1)

Containment Spray (Coincident with SI Signal)

N.A.

2)

Containment Ventilation Isolation N.A.

c.

Phase "A" Isolation 1)

Containment Ventilation Isolation N.A.

d.

Steam Line Isolation N.A.

2.

Containment Pressure-High a.

Safety Injection (ECCS) s 27'"/25

1)

Reactor Trip s2 2)

Feedwater Isolation s 63 l

3)

Phase "A" Isolation s 18"'/28

4)

Containment Ventilation Isolation N.A.

5)

Auxiliary Feedwater s 60'8' s 40/48

s 38"'

6)

Component Cooling Water 7)

Containment Fan Cooler Units 8)

Auxiliary Saltwater Pumps s 48"'/58

3.

Pressurizer Pressure-Low l

a.

Safety Injection (ECCS) s 27'"/25/35

1)

Reactor Trip s2 2)

Feedwater Isolation s 63

'l 3)

Phase "A" Isolation s 18"'

4)

Containment Ventilation Isolation N.A.

5)

Auxiliary Feedwater s 60

6)

Component Cooling Water s 48/38"'

7)

Containment Fan Cooler Units s 40

8)

Auxiliary Saltwater Pumps s 58/48"'

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 3-28 Amendment Nos. +i- & % M & M, 77 & 7 FMRI 61993

TABLE 3.3-6 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS o

5 FUNCTIONAL UNIT TRIP SETPOINT ALLOWABLE VALUES

[

5 7.

Loss of Power n>$

(4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage)

[

a.

First level za 1)

Diesel Start 2 0 volts with a 2 0 volts with a s 0.8 second time delay s 0.8 second time delay

~

and and 2 2583 volts with a

> 2583 volts with a s 10 second time delay s 10 second time delay 2)

Initiation of Load Shed One relay One relay 2 0 volts with a 2 0 volts with a R

s 4 second time delay s 4 second time delay and and

^

2 2583 v01ts with a

> 2583 volts with a Y'

s 25 secono time delay 5 25 second time delay with one relay with one relay c

> 2870 volts, instantaneous 2 2870 volts, instantaneous b.

Second Level 1)

Diesel Start 2 3785 volts with a 2 3785 volts with a I

s 10 second time delay

.s 10 second time delay 2)

Initiation of load Shed 2 3785 volts with a 2 3785 volts with a j

s 20 second time delay 5 20 second time delay 8.

Engineered Safety Features Actuation l

{

System Interlocks m

a.

Pressurizer Pressure, P-11 s 1915 psig s 1925 psig*

z 8

• b.

Low-Low Tm, P-12 increasing 543*F 1 545.8'F decreasing 543*F 2 540.2*F cn c4 c.

Reactor Trip, P-4 N.A.

N.A.

I

• Before Eagle 21 installation.

a TABLE 3.3-5 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS l

/

1.

Manual Initiation a.

Safety Injection (ECCS)

N.A.

1)

Feedwater Isolation N.A.

2)

Reactor Trip N.A.

3)

Phase "A" Isolation N.A.

4)

Containment Ventilation Isolation N.A.

5)

Auxiliary Feedwater N.A.

6)' Component Cooling Water N.A.

7)

Containment Fan Cooler Units N.A.

8)

Auxiliary Saltwater Pumps N.A.

b.

Phase "8" Isolation 1)

Containment Spray (Coincident with SI Signal)

H.A.

2)

Containment Ventilation Isolation N.A.

c.

Phase "A" Isolation 1)

Containment Ventilation Isolation N.A.

d.

Steam Line Isolation N.A.

2.

Containment Pressure-High a.

Safety Injection (ECCS) s 27 */25*

1)

Peactor Trip s2 2)

Feedwater Isolation s 63 1

3)

Phase "A" Isolation s 18"'/28'8' 4)

Containment Ventilation Isolation N.A.

5)

Auxiliary Feedwater s 60'*

6)

Component Cooling Water s 38"'/48

7)

Containment Fan Cooler Units s 4 0 '88 8)

Auxiliary Saltwater Pumps s 48"8/58*

[

3.

Pressurizer Pressure-Low a.

Safety Injection (ECCS) s 27 */25*/35*

1)

Reactor Trip s2 2)

Feedwater Isolation s 63 l

3)

Phase "A" Isolation s 18"'

4)

Containment Ventilation Isolation N.A.

5)

Auxiliary Feedwater s 60*

s 48'* 38"'

s 40'g 6)

Component Cooling Water 7)

Containment Fan Cooler Units 8)

Auxiliary Saltwater Pumps s 58*/48"'

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 3-28 Amendment Nos. 4F & W, M & M, 77 & 7(

UEP.1 81933

~

. ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.8.1.1.1 Each of the above required independent circuits between the offsite transmission network and the Onsite Class IE Distribution System shall be:

a.

Determined OPERABLE at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignments, indicated power availability, and b.

Demonstrated OPEPABLE at least once per 18 months during shutdown by:

1)

Transferring 4 kV vital bus power supply from the normal circuit to the alternate circuit (manually and automatically) and to the delayed access circuit (manually),_ and 2)

Verifying that on a Safety Injection test signal, without loss of offsite power, the preferred, immediate access offsite power source energizes the emergency busses with permanently connected loads and energizes the auto-connected emergency (accident) loads through sequencing timers.

4.8.1.1.2 Each diesel generator

• shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

In accordance with the frequency specified in Table 4.8-1 on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by:**

1)

Verifying the fuel level in the engine-mounted fuel tank, 2)

Verifying the diesel starts from ambient condition and accelerates to at least 900 rpm in less than or equal to 10 seconds.

The generator voltage and frequency shall be 4160 +

240/-375 volts and 60

• 1.2 Hz within 13 seconds after the start signal. The diesel generator shall be started Mr this test by using one of the following signals:

a)

Manual, or b)

Simulated loss of offsite power by itself (Startup bus undervoltage), or c)

A Safety Injection actuation test signal by itself.

• For a five diesel generator configuration, tests of Diesel Generator 3 to satisfy the frequency specified in Table 4.8-1 and in Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2b for one unit may be counted in determining whether the frequency specified in Table 4.8-1 and in Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2b for the other unit is satisfied. Unit-specific portions of _this Surveillance Requirement for Diesel Generator 3 shall be performed on an alternating schedule with ' signals from Units 1 and 2.

• • All diesel generator starts for the purpose of this surveillance test may be preceded by an engine prelube period.

Further, all surveillance tests, with the exception of once per 184 days, may also be preceded by warmup procedures (e.g., gradual acceleration and/or gradual loading > 150 sec) as recommended by the manufacturer so that the mechanical stress and wear on the diesel engine is minimized.

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 8-3 Amendment Nos. 86 & 85

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 3)

Verifying the generator is synchronized, loaded to greater than or equal to 2484 kW in less than or equal to 60 seconds, and operates for greater than or equal to 60 minutes, 4)

Verifying the diesel generator is aligned to provide standby power to the associated emergency busses,* and P

5)

Verifying the diesel engine protective relay trip cutout switch is returned to the cutout position following each diesel generator test.

b.

At least once per 18 months during shutdown **, by:

1)

Subjecting the diesel to an inspection in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations for this class of standby service; 2)

Verifying that the load sequence timers are OPERABLE with each load sequence timer within the limits specified in Table 4.8-2; 3)

Verifying the generator capability to reject a load of greater than or equal to 508 kW while maintaining voltage at 4160 +

240/-375 volts and frequency at 60 1 3 Hz; 4)

Verifying the generator capability to reject a load of greater than or equal to 2484 kW without tripping. The generator voltage shall not exceed 4580 volts during and following the load rejection; 5)

Simulating a loss of offsite power by itself, and:

a)

Verifying de-energization of the emergency busses and load shedding from the emergency busses, and b)

Verifying the diesel starts on the auto-start signal, energizes the emergency busses with permanently connected loads within 10 seconds, energizes the required auto-connected loads through sequencing timers and operates for greater than or equal to 5 minutes while its generato.' is loaded with the permanent and auto-connected loads. After energization of these loads, the steady state voltage and frequency of the emergency busses shall be maintained at 4160 + 240/-375 volts and 60

• 1.2 Hz during this test.

l

• For a five diesel generator configuration, this may be the associated bus in the other unit if that unit is in MODE 1, 2, 3 or 4.

• • For a five diesel generator configuration, these surveillance requirements can be performed on the third (common) diesel generator with only one unit shutdown.

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 8-4 Amendment Nos. 86 8 85

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS (Continued) 6)

Verifying that on a Safety Injection test signal without loss of offsite power, the diesel generator starts on the auto-start signal and operates on standby for greater than or equal to 5 minutes. The generator voltage and frequency shall be 4160 + 240/-375 volts and 60

• 1.2 Hz within 13 seconds after l

the auto-start signal; the steady state generator voltage and frequency shall be maintained within these limits during this test; 7)

Simulating a loss of offsite power in conjunction with a Safety Injection test signal, and:

a)

Verifying de-energization of the emergency busses and load shedding from the emergency busses; b)

Verifying the diesel starts on the auto-start signal, energizes the emergency busses with permanently connect 4 loads within 10 seconds, energizes the auto-connected emergency (accident) loads through sequencing timers and operates for greater than or equal to 5 minutes while its generator is loaded with the emergency loads. After energization of these loads, the steady state voltage and frequency of the emergency busses shall be maintained at 4160 + 240/-375 volts and 60

• 1.2 Hz during this test; j

and c)

Verifying that all automatic diesel generator trips, except engine overspeed, low lube oil pressure and generator differential, are bypassed when the diesel engine trip cutout switch is in the cutout position and the diesel is aligned for automatic operation.

8)

Verifying the diesel generator operates for at least 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

During the first 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> of this test, the diesel generator shall be loaded to greater than or equal to 2750 kW and during the remaining 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> of this test, the-diesel generator shall be loaded to greater than or equal to 2484 kW.

The generator voltage and frequency shall be 4160 + 240/-375 volts and 60

• 1.2 Hz within 13 seconds after the start signal. Within 5 minutes after completing this 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> test, perform Specification 4.8.1.1.2b.5)b);*

9)

Verifying that the auto-connected loads to each diesel generator do not exceed the maximum rating of 2750 kW;

10) Verifying the diesel generator's capability to:

• If Specification 4.8.1.1.2b.5)b) is not satisfactorily completed, it is not necessary to repeat the preceding 24-hour test.

Instead the diesel generator may be operated at 2484 kW for I hour or until operating temperature has stabilized.

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 8-5 Amendment Nos. 86 & 85

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) a)

Synchronize its isolated bus with the offsite power source while the generator is loaded with its emergency loads upon a simulated restoration of offsite power, b)

Transfer its loads to the offsite power source, and c)

Be restored to its standby status.

11) Verifying that with the diesel generator operating in a test mode, connected to its bus, a simulated Safety Injection signal opens the auxiliary transformer breaker and automatically sequences the emergency loads onto the diesel generator; and

12) Verifying that the shutdown relay lockout feature prevents diesel generator starting only when required:

a) tienerator differential current-high, or b)

Engine lube oil pressure-low, or c)

Emergency stop button actuated, or d)

Overspeed trip actuated.

c.

At least once per 10 years or after any modifications which could affect diesel generator interdependence by starting all diesel generators simultaneously, during shutdown, and verifying that all diesel generators accelerate to at least 900 rpm in less than or equal to 10 seconds.

d.

At least once per 31 days and after each operation of the diesel where the period of operation was greater than or equal to I hour by checking for and removing accumulated water from the day tank.

4.8.1.1.3 The Diesel Fuel OH Storage and Transfer System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 31 days by:

1)

Verifying the fuel level in the fuel storage tank, and 2)

Verifying that each fuel transfer pump starts and transfers fuel from the storage system to each engine-mounted tank via installed lines.

b.

At least once per 31 days by checking for and removing accumulated water from the fuel oil storage tanks; c.

By sampling new fuel oil in accordance with ASTM-D4057 prior to addition to the storage tanks and:

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 8-6 Amendment Nos.15 and 14 Ju

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 4

BASES 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM and ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUAT ON SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the Reactor Trip System and Engineered Safety Features Actuation System instrumentation and interlocks ensure that:

(1) the associated ACTION and/or Reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combina-tion thereof reaches its Setpoint. (2) the specified coincidence logic and sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service for testing or main-tenance consistent with maintaining an appropriate level of reliability of the Reactor Protection and Engineered Safety Features instrumentation, and (3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service for testing or maintenance, and (4) sufficient system functional capability is available from diverse parameters.

The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy, and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions.

The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

The Surveillance Requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards.

The periodic surveillance tests performed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability. Specified surveillance intervals and surveillance and maintenance outage times have been determined in accordance with WCAP 10271. " Evaluation of Surveillance Frequencies and Out of Service Times for the Reactor Protection Ir..tru-mentation System.' and supplements to that report. Surveillance intervals and out-of-of the Reactor Protection System. service times were determined based on maintaining an app The Process Protection System is designed to permit any one channel to be tested and eatntained at power in a bypassed mode, if a channel has been bypassed for any purpose. the bypass is continuously indicated in the control room as required by applicable codes and standards.

As an alternative to testing in the bypass mode, testing in the trip mode is also possible and permitted.

Tre Engineered Safety Features Actuation System senses selected plant parameters and determnes whether or not predetermined limits are being exceeded. If they are, the signals are cocined into logic matrices sensitive to combinations indicative of various acc1 cents, events, and transients.

Once the required logic combination is completed.

the syster sends actuation signals to those engineered safety features components whose ag;*egate function best serves the reagirements of the condition. As an example, the folloain; actions may be initiated by the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System to mitigate the consequences of a steam line break or loss of coolant accident:

(1) safety injection pumps start and automatic valves position, (2) Reactor trip. (3) feedwater isolation. (4) startup of the emergency diesel generators. (5) containment spray pumps start and automatic valves position. (6) containment isolation. (7) steam line isola-tion. (8) Turbine trip. (9) auxiliary feedwater pumps start and automatic valve posi-tion, (10) containment fan cooler units start, and (11) component cooling water pumps l

start and automatic valves position.

The Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation Trip Setpoints speci-fied in Table 3.3 4 are the nominal values at which the trips are set for each func-tional unit.

If the functional unit is based on analog hardware, the setpoint is con-sidered to be adjusted consistent with the nominal value when the *as left* setpoint is within the band allowed for calibration accuracy.

hardware the setpoints are set at the nominal values.For all setpoints in digital DIABLO CANYON UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 3 1 Amendment Nos. Si and M-EA & E3 OCT 7-1993

INSTRUMENTATION BASES REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM and ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTfM e

BIS _LRUMENTATION (Continued)

To accommodate the instrument drift that may occur between operational tests and the accuracy to which setpoints can be measured and calibrated, Allowable Values for the setpoints have been specified in Table 3.3-4.

Operation with setpoints less conservative than the Trip Setpoint, but within the Allowable Value, is acceptable.

The methodology to derive the Trip Setpoints is based upon combining all of the uncertainties in the channel.

Inherent to the determination of the Trip Setpoints are the magnitudes of these channel uncertainties.

Sensor and rack instrumentation utilized in these channels are expected to be capable of operating within the allowances of these uncertainty magnitudes.

ESF response times specified in Table 3.3-5, which include sequential operation of the RWST and VCT valves (Table Notations 4 and 5), are based on i

values assumed in the on-LOCA safety analyses.

These analyses take credit for injection of borated water from the RWST.

Injection of borated water is assumed not to occur until the VCT charging pump suction isolation valves are closed following opening of the RWST charging pump suction isolation valves.

When the sequential operation of the RWST and VCT valves is not included in iba response times (Table Notation 7), the values specified are based on the LifA analyses.

The LOCA analyses takes credit for injection flow regardless of the source.

Verification of the response times specified in Table 3.3-5 wil' assure that the assumptions used for the LOCA and non-LOCA analyses with res}ect to the operation of the VCT and RWST valves are valid.

Undervoltage protection will generate a loss of power diesel generator j

start in the event a loss of voltage or degraded voltage condition occurs.

The jiesel generators provide a source of emergency power when offsite power is either available or is insufficiently stable to allow safe unit operation.

The first level undervoltage relays (FLURs) detect the loss of bus voltage (less than 69% bus voltage). The second level undervoltage relays (SLURS).

provide a second level of undervoltage protection which protects all Class IE loads from short or long term degradation in the offsite power system.

The SLUR allowable value is the minimum steady state voltage needed on the 4160 volt vital bus to ensure adequate voltage is available for safety related

~

equipment at the 4160 volt, 480 volt, and 120 volt levels.

P l

l l

l DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 3-la Amendment Nos. 86 & 85

J 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL __ POWER SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.8.1, 3/4.8.2, and 3/4.8.3 A.C. SOURCES, D.C. SOURCES, and DNSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION The OPERABILITY of the A.C. and D.C power sources and associated distribution systems during operat4*-

available to supply the safety rt' ensures that sufficient power will be equipment required for:

(1) the safe shutdown of the facility, and (2;

- mitigation and control of accident conditions within the facility.

ine minimum specified independent and redundant A.C. and D.C. power sources and distribution systems satisfy the requirements of General Design Criterion 17 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

The ACTION requirements specified for the levels of degradation of the with the level of degradation. power sources provide restriction upon continued fac The OPERABILITY of the power sources is consist-ent with the initial condition assumptions of the safety analyses and is based upon maintaining sufficient redundancy of the onsite A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems OPERABLE during accident conditions coinci-dent with an assumed loss of-offsite power and single failure of one onsite A.C. source.

The A.C. and D.C. source allowable out of service times are based on Regulatory Guide 1.93, " Availability of Electrical Power Sources,"

December 1974 except for the allowed outage time associated with Action Statement b. of Specification 3.8.1.1.

be consistent with the recommendation of Diablo Canyon Power Plant DieselTh Generator Allowed Outage Time Study, May 1989.

inoperable, there is an additional ACTION requirement to verifWhen one diesel generator required systems, subsystems, trains, components and devices, y that all that depend on the remaining OPERABLE diesel generators as a source of emergency power, are also OPERABLE, and that at least two auxiliary feedwater pumps are OPERABLE.

This requirement is intended to provide assurance that a loss-of-offsite power event will not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical systems during the period one of the diesel generators is inoperable.

The footnote to Action Statement b. allows the third (common) diesel generator to be inoperable for up to 7 days for preplanned preventive maintenance and testfog provided one unit is in Mode 5 or 6.

that the remaining diesel generators are OPERABLE. Compensatory measures are The term, verify, as used in both of these contexts means to administratively check by examining logs or other information to determine if certain components are out-of-service for main-tenance or other reasons.

It does not mean to perform the surveillance require-ments needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the component.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum specified A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems during shutdown and refueling ensures that:

(1) the facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended time periods, and (2) sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the facility status.

The design of the 125-volt D.C. distribution system is such that a battery can have associated with it a full capacity charger powered from it associated 480 volt vital bus or an alternate full capacity charger powered from another 480 volt vital bus.

in the latter configuration to 14 days. Technical Specification 3.8.2.1 ACTION c. limits Technical Specification 3.8.3.1 re-quires either charger be OPERABLE.

The Surveillance Requirements for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the diesel generators are in accordance with the recommendations of Regulatory DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 8-1 Amendment Nos. 44 and 43

F ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS BASES A.C. SOURCES. D.C. S0')RCES. and DNSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION (Continued)

Guides 1.9, " Selection of Diesel Generator Set Capacity for Standby Power Sup-plies," March 10,1971,1.108, " Periodic Testing of Diesel Generator Units Used as Onsite Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1, August 1977, where applicable, and 1.137 " Fuel Oil Systems for Standby Diesel Generators," Revision 1, October 1979, where applicable.

For the five diesel genera-tor configuration, the third (common) diesel generator is designed to respond to a Safety Injection Signal from either i; nit 1 or Unit 2.

If the capability to respond to a Safety Injection Signal from one unit is maintained during surveillance testing on the other unit, then the third (common) diesel generator shall be considered to be OPERABLE for that unit.

The steady state voltage and frequency Surveillance Requirements for demon-strating the OPERABILITY of the diesel generators are consistent with the second level undervoltage relay allowable values. This is the minimum steady state voltage needed on the 4160 volt vital buses to ensure adequate 4160 volt, 480 volt and 120 volt levels. The maximum steady state output voltage of 4400 V is the maximum operating voltage for 4000 V motors specified in ANSI C84.1.

The maximum steady state output voltage of 4400 V ensures that for a lightly loaded distribution system, the voltage at the terminals of 4000 V motors is no more than the maximum frequencies of the DG are 58.8 Hz and 61.2 Hz, respectively.

These values are equal to 2% of the 60 Hz nominal frequency and are derived from the recommendations given in Regulatory Guide 1.9.

l The Surveillance Requirements for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the batteries are based on the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.129, "Mainte-nance Testing and Replacement of Large lead Storage Batteries for Nuclear Power Plants," February 1978, and IEEE Std 450-1980, "IEEE Recommended Prac-tice for Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations."

Verifying average electrolyte temperature above the minimum for which the battery was sized, total battery terminal voltage onfloat charge, connection resistance values and the performance of battery service and discharge tests ensures the effectiveness of the charging system, the ability to handle high discharge rates and compares the battery capacity at that time with the rated capacity.

Table 4.8-3 specifies the normal limits for each designated pilot cell and each connected cell for electrolyte level, float voltage and specific gravity.

The limits for the designated pilot cells float voltage and specific gravity, greater than 2.13 volts and 0.015 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity or a battery charger current that had stabilized at a low value, is characteristic of a charged cell with adequate capacity. The normal limits for each connected cell for float voltage and specific gravity, greater than 2.13 volts and not more than 0.020 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity with an average specific gravity of all the connected cells not more than 0.010 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity, ensures the OPERABILITY and capability of the battery.

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 8-2 Amendment Nos. 86 & 85

I ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS BASES A.C. Sources. D.C. Sources. and ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION (Continued)

Operation with a battery cell's parameter outside the normal limit but within the allowable value specified in Table 4.8-3 is permitted for up to 7 days. During this 7-day period:

(1) the allowable values for electrolyte level ensures no physical damage to the plates with an adequate electron transfer capability; (2) the allowable value for the average specific gravity of all the cells, not more than 0.020 below the manufacturer's recommended full charge specific gravity ensures that the decrease in rating will be less than the safety margin provided in sizing; (3) the allowable value for an individual cell's specific gravity ensures that an individual cell's specific gravity will not be more than 0.040 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity and that the overall capability of the battery will be maintained within an acceptable limit; and (4) the allowable value for an individual cell's float voltage, greater than 2.07 volts, ensures the battery's capability to perform its design function.

The OPERABILITY of the A.C. electrical power sources requires maintaining a supply of fuel oil to support the operation of the emergency diesel genera-tors. The stored fuel oil supports the function of the A.C. power sources to provide power for the operation of emergency systems and engineered safety features (ESF) during and following the shutdown of the reactor in the event that offsite power sources are not available. The specified fuel oil quantity is based on the calculated fuel oil consumption necessary to support the opera-tion of the emergency power source to power the minimum required ESF systems.

Operation of minimum ESF systems is required to mitigate a design basis acci-dent (LOCA) in one unit and those minimum required systems for a concurrent non-LOCA sa shutdown in the remaining unit (both units initially in Mode 1 operation).

The fuel oil consumption is calculated for a period of 7 days operation of minimum ESF systems. This requirement provides a sufficient operating period within which offsite power can be restored and/or additional fuel can be delivered to the site.

The Surveillance Requirements applicable to diesel generator fuel oil storage requires cleaning the fuel oil storage tanks on a 10-year frequency.

Conducting this surveillance requires the tank to be taken out of service.

for this infrequent event, the inventory in the remaining tank is sufficient to support operation of the emergency diesel generator to power the minimum required loads to maintain safe conditions for a time period of 4 days, considering one unit in Mode 1 through 6 operation and one unit in Mode 6 operation with at least 23 feet of water above the reactor vessel flange or with the reactor defueled.

3/4.8.4 ELECTRICAL E0VIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES The OPERABILITY of the motor operated valves thermal overload protection and bypass devices ensures that these devices will not prevent safety related valves from performing their function. The Surveillance Requirements for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of these devices are in accordance with DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 8 3/4 8-3 Amendment Nos. 19&l8, 74&73,

,n

,o-

6"& 85'

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8 i

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS BASES ELECTRICAL E0VIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES (Continued)

Regulatory Guide 1.106, " Thermal Overload Protection for Electric Motors on Motor Operated Valves," Revision 1, March 1977.

A list of the TS-controlled MOV thermal overload protection and bypass devices is maintained in the Diablo Canyon plant procedures. The adninistra-tion of the list shell be conducted in accordance with Section 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50 and tae provisions in the Administrative Controls Section of the TS.

Records of the changes to the valve list are maintained, and an annual report is made that includes a brief description of changes and a summary of the safety evaluation of each in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59.

Containment electrical penetrations and penetration conductors are pro-tected by either deenergizing circuits not required during reactor operation or by demonstrating the OPERABILITY of primary and backup overcurrent protec-tion circuit breakers during periodic surveillance.

The Surveillance Requirements applicable to' lower voltage circuit breakers provide assurance of breaker reliability by testing at least'one representative sample of each manufacturer's brand of circuit breaker.

Each manufacturer's molded case and metal case circuit breakers are grouped into representative samples which are then tested on a rotating basis to ensure that all breakers are tested.

If a wide variety exists within any manufac-turer's brand of circuit breakers, it is necessary to divide that manufac-l turer's breakers into groups and treat each group as a separate type of breaker for surveillance purposes.

A list of containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices, with information on location and size and. equipment powered by the 1'

l protected circuit, is maintained and controlled at the plant site.

The list is limited to those overcurrent devices installed for the purpose' of keeping circuit fault current below the penetration rating.

It does not apply to other overcurrent devices associated with containment penetrations. The addition or deletion of any containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective device is governed by Section 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50, t

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l DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 8-3a Amendment Nos. 49-&-18, 71 1 73, l

86 & 85 l

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