ML20059B781

Annual Facility Rept of Procedure Changes,Tests & Experiments Conducted During 1989

ML20059B781
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	08/27/1990
From:	Nandy F SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9008300090
Download: ML20059B781 (15)

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h Southem Califomia Edison Company 23 PARKER STREET IRVINE, CALIFORNIA 92718.

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' i MONQOER. NUCLE AR LICENS*NG (714) 007 6400-43 P

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention:

Document Control Desk

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Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject:

Docket Nos. 50 206, 50 361, and'50 362

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Annual Facility Change Report

,t San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1,2, and 3 1

This letter transmits the Annual Facility Change Report (AFCR) for 1989 required by 4

10 CPR 50.59(b)(2). The report contains a brief description of facility changes, procedure _ changes, tests, and experiments-conducted for San Onofre Units 1, 2, and 3,.

.during the calendar year January 1 through December 31,1989.

I provides a summary of the facility changes implemented in 1989,

. including a safety evaluation for each change. Enclosure 2 provides a summary statement regarding procedure changes, tests, and experiments for the reporting.

period.

If you require any additional information, please let me know.

Very truly yo rs,

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Enclosures cc:

J. B. Martin (Regional Administrator, USNRC Region V)

C. W. Caldwell (USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, Units 1, 2 and 3)

J. E. Tatum (NRR SONGS 1 Project Manager)

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)

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Y ENCLOSURE 1

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SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION-

' UNITS 1, 2 AND 3

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FACILITY CHANGES IMPLEMENTED IN 1989 a

V INDEX Unit 1 y

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Facility Change No.-

Iills Eage s

1-89 001, Rev.1 Modification of SI-FWS-CV 36 and CV 37 1.

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Y, 16734.00SC, Rev. O Meteorological-Tower Replacement 2

4 13548.04SN, Rev. 0

' Cross Connect Existing Backup Nitrogen to 3

Instrument Air for FCV 111D, E, and F to 4

Meet Single Failure Criterial

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d The following facility changes, which were implemented in 1989, involved Technical j

. Specification Changes previously reviewed.and approved by the NRC.' These changes are i

L listed only in the Index for completeness.

A Facility Change No.

Iitig.

1-88 3364, Rev. 8

. Auxiliary Feedwater System Modifications to Meet Single Failure Criteria L

1-88 3496, Rev. 3 '

Feedwater/ Steam Flow Mismatch Reactor Trip Modification i

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189 3539, Rev. 0

- Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Undercurrent /Overcurrent Trip.

3 on RCP Failure i

1-89 3563, Rev. O Steam Generator Level Instrumentation Modification i

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INDEX Unit 2 l

I Facility Chance NumberTitic Eage 2 87-6553, Rev. 2 Addition _of an Anticipated Transient Without 4 Scram (ATWS) Diverse Scram System-p, 2 88-6604.1, Rev. 0 -

Re calibration of RCS Hot Leg and Cold 5

Temperature Instrumentation 89 6713, Rev.0 Addition of Condensate Collection / Removal 6 Capability for the Fuel Handling Area

. Vent Monitor Sampling Line j

LCP 2 6759, Rev. O Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray Line 7.

l Modification -

LCP 2 6777, Rev. O Installation of Cables, Conduits, and 8

L Circuit Breakers to Provide' Alternate' 1!

i-Power to 125V DC Bus 2D2 During Replacement 1

of Battery Cells 3

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..c INDEX N

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UNITS 2/3-

.i Facility Change NumberIitig Engs.

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2/3-85 6287, Rev.' 1 Control Room Consoles 2CR 55 and 3CR 55: 9

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Telephone Cable Installation

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2/3-88-6736, Rev. 0 70 Ft. Level Cafeteria Serving Station 10

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heijirv channe: 1-89-001. Revision 1 i

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Iillt Modification of SI FWS CV 36 and CV 37

- Description D

The feedwater recirculation valves SI FWS CV 36 and SI FWS-CV-37 are required to close t l

at time t=SISLOP+21 seconds after initiation of a LOCA according to the assumptions in the Westinghouse Safety Analysis. To meet this requirement, the valves' closing stroke time must be 9 seconds or less. This change, which allows the recirculation valves to-

' achieve'a stroke time of 9 seconds or less, included: (1) replacing solenoM valves SI-3

- FWS SV 17 and SV-18 with new ASCO model 206-381-3U supplying air to the top of the actuator; (2) replacing solenoid valves SI-FWS SV-17A and SV-18A with new ASCO J

model NP8316A7SE venting off air from the bottom of the actuator; (3) increasing from 3/8"_to 1/2"i the stainless steel air tubin, from the bottom of the actuator to solenoid valves SV 17A and SV-18A; and,_ (4) providing close signals to CV 36 and CV 37 in 1-

'I second or less after the refueling water storage tank miniflow control valves CV-875A'and c

CV 875B receive open signals following a SISLOP as required by the safety injection analysis.

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u Safety Evaluation g

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This change ensures that the feedwater recirculation valves CV-36 and CV 37 stroke from-L open to close in 9 seconds or less in order to meet the Westinghouse large break LOCA single train SI safety analysis.. The modified closing circuitry for these valves does not 3

increase the probability of circuit failure since there is.no increase in circuit load or circuit -

exposure. = There are no other circuit changes made which affected the SI or feedwater (FW) system functions. Accordingly, all accident. scenarios, malfunctions, and

consequences remain bounded by the existing analyses. Therefore, (1) the probability 'of occurrence and the consequences of an accident or. malfunction of equipment important to L

safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report (SAR) will not be increased as a result of this change; and, (2) the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different L

type than any previously evaluated in the SAR will not be created as a result of this change. This change does not affect any existing Safety Injection and Containment Spray

- Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) or Surveillance Requirements (SRs). Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS

-will not be reduced as a result of this change.

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Encility Chance: Ilmited Change Pad:ve (LCP) 1-6734. Revision 0

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! Meteorological Tower Replacement Descrio.Ilgn :

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This change involved replacing the damaged 40 meter Meteorological Tower at San i

Onofre and the removal of redundant, non safety related, nowTS instruments from the 20 -

1 ft/120 ft tower elevations. The replacement tower is equipped with an instrument elevator allowing convenient access-to the instruments at the 10 meter and 40 meter -

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' levels during maintenance and/or repair. The TS tower instruments were transferred to-J the new tower at the 10 meter and 40 meter locations.

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Safety Evaluation

- This change does not modify the function of any existin'g safety related equipment and no.

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- safety related equipment viere added or modified by this change. The additional electrical' loading of the instrument elevator does not adversely impact safety related bus loading.

I L-L Accordingly, all accident scenarios remain bounded by the existing analysis. Thereforn l

(1) the probability of occurrence and the consequence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR will not be increased as a result of this change; and, (2) the possibility of'an accident or malfunction of a differcnt type than' any previously evaluated in the SAR will not'be created as a result of

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this change. Since this change has no effect on existing LCO or SRs governed by the existing TS, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS will not be reduced as 1

a result of this change, l

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- Feility thnee: Minor MadiGcation Packare (MMP) 1-3548.04SN. Revicion 0

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' Cross Connect Existing Backup Nitrogen to Instrument Air for FCV-1115D, E, and F to Meet Single Failure Criteria

- Description i

This change reconfigured the pneumatic control systems for the cold leg recirculation b

control FCV 1115D, E, and F to ensure.both the instrument air (IA) and the backup' q

. nitrogen are available to both Train A and train B pneumatic control paths. This

' eliminates the postulated common cause failure susceptibility and improves the reliability i

of both trains. This change included: (1) adding nitrogen tie in to IA line to provide IA y

and/or nitrogen to Train A and/or Train B; (2) provided test connections to the check--

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valves.in the IA line; (3) making appropriate Train B solenoid valves fail close or fail l-open on loss o_f control power to allow isolating Train A pneumatic supply when switching to Train B control, making sure appropriate three way valves retain their fail to-L Train' A alignment on loss of power, and appropriate solenoids remain Train B powered;-

(4) re-arranging hand switch operation of appropriate solenoid valves to actuate as

-i required; (5) adding 6 nitrogs reserve bottles (2 per FCV for a total of 15 reserve bottles.

l per FCV) to provide capacity to support 5 days of operation following a DBE; and, (6):

increasing the minimum nitrogen bottle pressure to provide additional on lir,e nitrogen capacity.

Safety Evaluation

.This change ensures both IA and backup nitrogen systems are made available to both-

. trains of pneumatic control for each of the three cold leg recirculation FCVs. This-f eliminates the potential common-cr.use loss of Train A pneumatic control for each FCV o

due to seismic or pipe break interactions, and ensures at least one train remains available for cold leg recirculation following a LOCA with concurrent single active failure. These i

valves are normally supplied by compressed air IA. As such, the backup nitrogen system has no effect on the probability of the valves' failure as an initiating event. Therefore, (1) the probability of occurrence and the consequence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR will not be increased as a result of this change; and, (2) the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the SAR will not be created as a result of this change. Since this change has no effect on existing LCO or SRs governed by the ~

existing TS, the matgin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS will not be reduced as a result of this change.

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~t Facility Chanoe: 2-87-6553. Revision 2 Titis

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Addition of an Anticipated Transient Without Scram Diverse Scram' System' DescriDtion Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) is an expected operational transient

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accompanied by a failure of the reactor protection system (RPS) and the Emergency -

L Feedwater Actuation System (EFAS). The Diverse Scram System (DSS), the Diverse -

l Turbine Trip (DTT), and the Diverse Emergency Feedwater Actuation System-(DFAS)~are required by the ATWS rule (10 CFR 50.62).

This change adds a DSS to comply with the DSS and the DTT portions of the ATWS rule.

The DSS, is a backup reactor trip system that is completely independent and diversified from the RPS. The DSS detects the presence of an ATWS and initiates a reactor trip and H

turbine trip to mitigate the consequences of ATWS. The DSS is a 4-channel, 2 out of 4 -

r logic, reactor trip actuation system consisting of four Rosemount transmitters, a two bay -

Foxboro cabinet, alarm and status system displays via the CFMS CRT through a multiplexer / modem data link, and associated cabling.

l Safety Evaluation

- This change added a DSS, which is neither required for safe shutdown of the reactor nor mitigate the consequences of accidents other than the ATWS. The DSS is a stand alone system and does not interface with any equipment important to safety.except for the DSS l.

pressurizer pressure (PP) transmitter sensing lines. These lines share a power bus tie breaker control circuit,' which provides power for status indication on the DSS cabinet,.

L with the control element drive mechanism (CEDM). The reliability and integrity of the PP -

sensing lines will not be affected because any fault developed in the DSS will be properly.

isolated. Therefore, (1) the probability of occurrence and the consequence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR will not be increased as a result of this change; and, (2) the possibility of an accident or l

malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the SAR will not be created as a result of this change. Since this change is not govern by any TS, it has no-effect on existing LCO or SRs governed by the existing TS, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS will not be reduced as a result of this change.

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l Padll y ChmNee: 2-88-6604.1 Revision 0 t

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Re calibration of RCS Hot Leg and Cold Leg Temperature Instrumentation j

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. Descriotion L

L This change' resulted from ' Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) report (SCE '

Document No. M 37328) Human Engineering Deficiency. (HED) rege ICCR 05, and Retrofit Problem Report (RPP) 538.. This change eliminated the p%ntial HED. identified.

l-in ICCR 05 due to different ranges of RCS hot leg and cold leg temperature indicators'on

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ESP.2L-42 by re calibrating the temperature instruments to a uniform range.' This change implements required software modifications on the Plant Monitoring System (PMS),

Critical Function Monitoring System (CFMS), and the Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) backup computer system to accommodate the range change on 2T-0115

- and 2T 0125.

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Safety Evaluation This change re calibrated the existing RCS hot leg and cold leg' transmitters to a new l

. uniform range of 0-700 degrees F, replaced existing' scales for the associated indicators l.

and recorders, and modified the PMS software to match the new temperature range. This:

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. change does not adversely affect any safety function or alter any design bases. Any potential accident scenarios or malfunction of equipment remain bounded by existing analyses. Therefore, (1) the probability of occurrence and the consequence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety eviously evaluated in the SAR will

. not be increased as a result 'of this change; and, (2) the possibility of an accident or

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malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the SAP " ". tot bc.

q created as a result of this change. Since this chan3e is not govern by r. fS, it has no L

effect on existing LCO or SRs governed by the existing TS, the margiti of safety as defined I

H in the basis for any TS will not be reduced as a result of this change.

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- Pacility Channe:- 2-89-6713. Revision 0 litle Addition of Condensate Collection / Removal Capability for the Fuel Handling Ana Vent Monitor Sampling line

= Descriotic,n This change added a condensate collection / removal system for the fuel handling monitors:

to minimize spurious actuations of Fuel Handling Building Isolation System (FHIS).

Spurious FHIS actuations have been attributed to malfunctioning of the fuel handling area vent radiation monitors due to moisture accumulation in the detector.

Safety Evaluation This change enhances FHIS operation and reliability, and does not adversely affect the iodine / particulate channel of the monitor. Removal of condensation from the_ system prevents flooding of the monitors and significantly decreases spurious actuation of the FHIS. The fuel handling monitors are nrocess radiation monitors. nd not effluent -

monitors. As such, the safety analysis (i.e., offsite dose assessment) is not affected by -

changes to the airborne monitor. The failure modes and related effects are no different -

than those previou,1y analyzed. Therefore, (1) the probability of. occurrence and the consequence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR will not be increased as a result of this change; and,'(2)

.the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a-di.fferent type than any previously.-

evaluated in the.SAR will notibe created as a result of this change. Since this change has no effect on existing LCO or SRs of the existing TS, the margin of safety as defined in the' basis for any TS will not be reduced as a result of this change.

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Pacility Chanee: tImited Nnee Packnee (LCP) 24759.0SM. Revielan 0

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Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray Line Modification i

Description l

This change modified the pressurizer auxiliary spray line, in response to NRC Bulletin 88-08, to prevent the potential for leakage-induced thennal stresses. This change prevents l

high thennal cyclic stresses at check valve 1208MUO19 due to cold water leakage through the single isolation valve 1208MU130.

Safety Evaluation This change reduces the potential for high thermal cyclic stresses associated with check valve leakage resulting in the reduction of potential HELB. The increase in auxiliary spray line length does not measurably increase the potential for a HELB because re-analysis determined the reconfigured piping meets the ASME Section III Code allowable for Class I piping. There are no new equipment added and no system functional changes were made. All accident scenarios and equipment malfunction remain bounded by the i

existing analyses. There are no changes made to any system design basis, function, or equipment. The relocation of the existing check valve does not create accidents of a different type since the relative location of any vents, drains, or connecting piping and components, does not change the function of the system. The new potential break locations resulting from this change remain bounded by the existing analyses.

Therefore, (1) the probaNlity of occur; ace and the consequence of an accident or malfsmetion of any eqtn r at important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR will not be increased as a res of this cl anta; and, (2) the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than aay previously evaluated in the SAR will not be created as a result of this change. Since this change has no effect on existing LCO or SRs, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS will not be reduced as a result of this change.

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Feuity tha*: limited thrtec Packare (LCP) 2 6777.0SIL Revision 0 N

Installation of Conduits, Cables, and Circuit Breakers in 125 Vdc Switchboard Rooms Description This change cross connected 125 Vdc buses 2D2 and 2D4 to ensure operability of bus 2D2 during battery 2B908 replacement, testing, and charging. This allowed bus 2D2 to g

remain capable of automatically providing power to the Unit 3 cmergency bus 3A06 from the Unit 2 cmcrgency bus 2A06 via the 4160 Volt tic. breakers. The Unit 2 emergency g

bus 2A06, which is one of the alternate source of power for Unit 3 emergency bus 3A06, is required to be operable by the Unit TS Sections 3.8.1.1 and 3.8.1.2.

1 Safety Evaluation This change supported Unit 3 TS 3.8.1.1 for operations in Modes 1 through 4 and TS 3.8.1.2 for operation in Modes 5 and 6, when Bus 2D2 is requiNd to remain operable.

This allows Unit 2 Emergency Bus 2A06 to automatically supply the Unit 3 Emergency Bus 3A06 via the 4160 Volt tie breakers. With specific restrictions on loads imposed by this LCP, battery 2B010, whten supp!!es bus 2D4, provides sufficient capacity for the Modes 5 and 6 combined load requirements of Buses 2D2 and 2D4 for 90 minutes following a LOVS/SIAS event with concurrent CCAS, Since this change is only effective during Modes 5 and 6, and Train A and/or C battery systems remain available, there are no changes in the failure modes or effects from those previously analyzed. All accident scenarios and equipment malfunction remain bounded by the existing analysis. Therefore, (1) the probability of occurrence and the consequence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR will not be increased as a result of this change; and, (2) the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a 3

different type than any previously evaluated in the SAR will not be created as a result of p

this change.

This change has no effect on existing LCO or SRs. The battery loads during Modes 5 and 6 are significantly less than normal power operations and no new loads are being added, the emergency diesel generator loadings are within the limits of TS. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS will not be reduced as a result of this change.

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Facility Chanee: 2/3 85ElA7. Revielan 1 i

Iuk Control Room Consoles 2CR 55 and 3CR 55 Telephone Cable Installation l

DtKT12dQD This change installed telephone cables in existing cable trays from the control room consoles 2CR 55 and 3CR.55 to the Elev. 9' cable spreadmg room.

Safety Evaluation j

This change involved circuits to enhance control room communication and does not affect the functions of any safety related system or equipment. The change was limited to the addition of telephone cables in existing trays except for a 10' long 3" rigid steel conduit for the transition to the new terminal box in Elev. 9. No other existing system or equipment were affected by this change. Any consequences of potential accidents or equipment malfunctions remain bounded by the existing analysis. All affected equipment, devices, and wiring are Quality Class IV. Addition of the cables does not impact cafe shutdown equipment or ode safety related equipment. Therefore, (1) the proiability of occurrence and the consequence of an accident or malfunction 'of any equipment important to safety }

usly evaluated in the SAR will not be increased as a resalt of-this change; and, (2) 0 - possibility of an accident or malknction of a different type than any previou*'v evaluated in the SAR will not be created as a result of this change. Since this chang sill not alter any system or equipment governed by any TS, no TS LCO or SR are affected. Therefore, the margin of safety as defm' ed in the basis for any TS will not be reduced as a result of this change.

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Facility _Chapee: 2/3484736. Revision 0 DIlt l

Modification to Provide a Cafeteria Serving Station Descriotion i

Th(s change, which involved the modification of Room 404 en E!:v. 70' of the Control Building, ine:uded: (1) adding a new 120/208 Volt distribtion subpanel 2LP9B to feed.

l the new serving station loads; and, (2) providing plumhmg hookups for domestic cold-water system and for sanitary drain system.

Safety Evaluation This change does not involved or affect the functions of safety related systems or systems l

important to safety. Therefore, (1) the probability of occurrence and the consequence of an accident or malfttnction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR will not be increased as a result of this change; and, (2) the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the SAR will not be created as a result of this change. Since this change will not alter any system or equipment governed b,' any TS, no TS LCO or SR are affected. Therefore, the margin of.

safety as defined in the basis for any TS will not be reduced as a result of this change.

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ENCLOSURE 2 SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION (SONGS)

UNITS 1,2, AND 3 1989 PROCEDURE CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS All procedure changes, tests, and experiments in 1989, applicable to San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1,2 and 3, received a safety evaluation pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59.' The safety evaluation concluded that none of the procedure changes, tests, or experiments involved an unreviewed safety question. The safety evaluations were reviewed and approved by appropriate personnel as required by the Technical Specifications. For each change, the respective review concluded that: (1) the probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report (SAR) was not increased; (2) the consequences of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR was not increased; (3) the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the SAR was not created; and, (4) the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification was not reduced.

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