ML20058J698

Memorandum of 891204-11 Meeting of Working Groups of US-USSR Jcccnrs in Moscow Re Analysis of Safety of Nuclear Power Plants in Ussr & Us,Modernization/Backfitting & Diagnostics, Analysis Equipment & Sys for Supporting Operators

ML20058J698
Person / Time
Issue date:	12/11/1989
From:	Heltemes C, Ponomarevstepn NRC - U.S./U.S.S.R. JOINT COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR CIVILI
To:	NRC - U.S./U.S.S.R. JOINT COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR CIVILI
References
JCCCNRS-WG-2, JCCCNRS-WG-5, JCCCNRS-WG-9, NUDOCS 9012020157
Download: ML20058J698 (33)

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i M-4 MEMORANDUM OF THE MEETING OF. THE WORKING, SROUPS OF THE US-USSR JOINT COORDINATING COMMITTEE ON CIVILIAN NUCLEAR REACTOR SAFETY December 4-11, 1989 The fourth meeting of the working groups of the US-USSR 4

Joint' Coordir.ating Committee on Civilian Nuclear Reactor

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Safety (JCCCNRS) was held in Moscow at the ' Kurchatov

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Institute on December 4 through 11, 1989.

Three of the ten working groups had discussions.

The-working groups were as-follows:

WORMING GROUP 2: ANALYSIS OF THE SAFETY OF NUCLEAR FOWER PLANTS IN THE USSR AND THE US -

l WORKING GROUP 5:

NODERNIZ ATION/BACKFITTING WORMING GROUP 9:

DI AGNOSTICS, ' ANALYSIS EQUIPMENT AND EYCTEMS FOR SUFFORTING OPERATORS t

The US side of the working groups was headed by Clemens J.

(Jc:P) Hiiri temes, J r., Deputy Director,' Of fice for Analysis and Eveluation of Operational-Data.

The USSR side was headed by Nikolay N.Ponomarev-Stepney, First Deputy Director, I.V. Murchetov Atomic Energy ' Institute.

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r vi.tsrn of t hic three wcrl:4 np greurs are previ:Vd in Appendin I.

A litt of the particip*ntn in 'the werl:1ng grcup sessions or wt'll as obe vere is provided f r - Aripend! x ! !.. The 14ott i

of 4 itwn tt; c:'ch r.ged fer ucch vN. :.n 4.ro prevised in Opper. dix !!!.

This Memorandum of Meeting reports the mejor topics of discussion, conclusions, recommendations and proposed future actions.

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Concluelens of Each Workina Greue WORVING GROUP St ANALYRIB DF THE' BAFETY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN THE USER AND THE US AGREEMENTE AND CONCLUS10NB

1) Both sides agreed that common mode f ailures should be given careful consideration in the design and man-machine interf ace is important during of f normal events.

2)

The participants agreed to discuss preliminary LOCA and i

ATWS enalysis results at the next meeting.

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The Soviets will provide a deta'iled presentation at the ment meeting with a number of examples on.the role of the i

design features which inhibit operator intervention in of f-normal conditions when selected parameters' are..sthin a prospecified range. The participants also agreed to conduct preliminary discussion of the importance.of.various types of communication during off normal events.

1 4)

The Soviets will present the analysis of, as well as procedural considerations for, steam ponerator tube rupture events at the next meeting.

5)

The participants agreed to discuss the ROVNO and the Ecuth Texas response to station blackout events at the next' meeting.

Also, the. Soviets will discuss probabilistic j

enelysin of station blackout for ROVNO.

6)

The two sides identified Written questions from previous meetings for which responses will be discussed at the next meeting.

RFCDMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ACTIVITIES The following subjects are proposed to be discussed at the next meetingt (a)

Operator's guidance for coping with accidents taking-into consideration specific design features.

Donefits cnd dieedvante;es of r.llowed octicns of the cperator during an accident.

En iet infccmetion abcut the operator's guidelines related to the initiation cf primary to secondary leakage.

The philost,.c of communication at all levels - of personnel actions.

(b)

The study of the plant black-out.

Questions related to probabilistic approach to safety assurance in such conditions, as well as the questions related to reactor coolant pump seals, and elimination of leakage from the primary circuit.

(c!

Fins 11:ation of input data to analyze LOCA and ATWS.

Consideration of the preliminary results of the analyses and finalization of input data.

(d)

Responses to the questions on FSAR related to South Texas and ROVNO plants.

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The time needed to cover the proposed work scope for the next meeting is estimated at' seven working days. In j

addition, it was agreed that as part of that meeting, tours of a US nuclear power station and the NRC Emergency Response Center are desirable.

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For the fall meeting, it is recommended that the use of '

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passive decay heat removel system and guidance with regard to the use of normal statj an equipment-for beyond design basis accident control be ciscussed by USSR.

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recommended for the fall meeting is the initiation.of more deteiled discussion on containment design, capability, and -

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i WOKVING GeOUP N MODERNf 2 ATION/MCVFITTING AGREEMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS 1

1.

Both, sides agreed that.this meeting was important and useful in obtaining a mutual understanding of the general erproaches used in evaluating. edditional safety improvements fer entsting nuclear power plants.

These approrches were frequently discussed in terms of, actual examples.

2.

Both the US and USSR have ongoing programs to modernize and to maintain safety margins in light of new information.

3.

It was observed that the backfit programs of the USSR tend t ti ermeentrete on et.-h toerific reacter while the progrem of the US tends to backfit on a generic besis.

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1 t o 9 0 a.' ti t 'E T P' P W t*.t t-me".: -! c cc' r.' + : * ! cSo eu citon important factoro in nel.ing backfit determinations.

The q'.irntitetive determination of -these costs and. the relationship to the gains in safety are frequently subject to mejor uncertainties. For some proposed changes, i

quantitative analyses of risk reduction are not feasible.

Thus, often backfit determinations must be made on the basis of engineering Judgment.

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5.

FRA studies provide unique and valuable indications of safety levels and weakness in design that may pose safety concerns. Both the US and US3R are using this analysis method to provide engineering insights that assist. in identif ying areas that may warrant backfitting.

However, neither cour.c' ry currently requires a full PRA for each plant.

6.

A key aspect of backfit programs is knowledge of the level of safety establish 2d by the current licensing basis l

of each plant, and the actual level of safety that exists day to day in each plant.

Proper and consistent backfitting i

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As a result, activities to monitor the existing saf ety level relative to that required are essential.

Particularly important in this regard are operational experience reviews, inspection activities, and research.

programs which include PRA studies.

..REEOMMENDATfDNE FDR FUTURE AETIVITfEB WS-5 believes the next meeting agreed to in the Second Protocol would be of mutual benefit, in order to review and '

discuss o'

e recent generic backfit including the associated analyi+;

.nd Justification, and the process used in terms of the itentification of the safety problem, and the-assentment, approval, and implementation of the backfitt b) a recent plant-specific backfit, including the essecieted analyses and justification, and the process used in terms of the identification of the safety problem, and tha essasoment, approval and implementetion of the backfit; cnd c) other aspects of a backfit program which are of high mutual interest.

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The first meeting of the working group proved fruitful c.nd contributed to better undertianding of the approaches in each country in the areas c. diagnostics, use of simulators, personnel training, and use of emergency operating procedures.

2.

The working group believes that further discussion of the above matters would be very useful and would contribute to a better understanding of the practices in each country.

3.

Full scope simulators are used for personnel training in both countries, but the use is much more widespread in the US.

In the USSR..for personnel training purposes, a wide range of technical means are used including conceptual simulators and functional-analytical. simulators.

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The use of engineering simulators or plant analy:ers is increasing in both countries in order to

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T analyze potential emergencies end those which have occurred.

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The concept of plant diagnostics in the USSR is to I

use systems and means for early detection of equipment failures and transient prevention, while in the US more emphasis As placed on transient control and mitigation l

efforts.

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At Soviet plants there is no safety' parameter display system (SPDS),

although a number of diagnostic.

systems provide functions similar to those, performed by the safety parameter display systens.

7.

EmerCency operating procedures in the US are symptom-based, while in the USSR they are event-based.

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of cperators are semcwhat similar, although additionalIt appears information is necessary for.a better comparison.

i THE MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE'JuRKING GROUP ARE:

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Share experience in the areas of diagnostics and persennel training through contacts between US and USSR nuclear industry specialists and by the potential exchange of computer codes, algorithms, and methodologies, subject to the necesscry approveln.

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Consider the possibility of a separate visit dtiring g.,.... 4 c.~ t t,e p, m y t,

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. - *. v r (in Chr.titncoge. lennustee) for observation of parameter display. systems and symptom-based emergency safety cperating procedures.

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discussion of each country's ef forts in the evolving area ofC severe accident training and simulation.

4.

Develop the program for future activities of Working Group 9 for 1991 and beyond at the next meeting.

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SROPOSED FUTURE ACTIVITIES OF THE WORKING GROUP ARE:

The proposed agenda for the next meeting agreed to in the second protocol is as follows:

1.

Discuss operator support systems, including in-cor end essential component' diagnostics.

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provide additional detail of operator support systems discussed at. the initial me eting.

2.

Discuss expert sys tems from the point of view of providing support for plant operators.

3.

Discuss staf fing arid training of nut:1 ear plant personnel, ir71uding trainirig programs and emergency operating pr. ':edure traininji scenarios.

4.

Discuss modular miniulation of nuclear plant systems.

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E0* THE uesR STATE COMMITTEE FOR THE U*gt.'UCLEAR E.OP THE UTIll.iLATION DF REGULATORY COMMIEE10N ATOMIC E W '

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MrwSRM! DOM De MEFTING FOR WDRVING BRDUP 2 ANALYSIE-DF THE BAFETY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTE IN THE USER AND THE US

3. WORKING BROUP BCDPE AND CONTENT OF-D1SCUSSIONS' l

The main topics discussed by the USSR and the US par.ticipants were i

i) - The Soviet philosophy for, less of coolant accident' 1

analysis and the input data needs for1 the: Rovno and South

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Texas plants for.such analyses.

2)

The US philosophy of;ATWS requirements including the history of the develpment of tFe ATWS. rule andothe input l'

dete newds for the Rovne end; South Texas plants-for the ATNS nndivtis.

3)

Each country's philosophy;for operator actions

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during off normal conditions.

4)

Each country's approach to consideration ei station-blackout.

5)

Each country's shutd'own margin-requirements during

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i cold shutdown cnd het shutdown conditions.

j USSR presented'its LOCA analysis philosophy and proposed.an exchange o'i' data in-the-format specified in i

computer manual documents.- The USSR would provide data and input assumptiens for Revne for RELAP5; MOD 2 analyses.

I The US would provide the same for the South Texas plant for Soviet analyses using'the TETCH-M code.

Actual.deta-ter: bence wAs p eporad to be accompli 9 hod t y correa.pondence.

I' eller.inorv enclysis rotd1 tu would beFdiscussed.et, the next 1

nett'5e end thn i n pu t s c o rr ec t r':' ui "crec*' thrn.

This

.; c cc :4 91 wat., t v st't unce cenna.*ar taca by - UC r.a t.r t; thn-difficulty of gett.ing all the required data for South Texas at well as a proposal to issue-a joint report.

Both parties agreed on the need to understand models used in the others computer codes in order to provide the proper input data.

.Both parties agreed that the proposed'LOCA;to bei I

ant.lyzed for Rovno should be a: cold leg break. located. 650 mm from the RPV.

The available ECCS should-be'3 accumulators.,

2 high pressure injection pumps-andolow pressure injection pumps.

two accumulators should discharge into the lower 1

plenum and i into'the. upper plenum.

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The US presented model areas considered mestiimportant i

for LOCA analysis of Rovno.

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.l Both parties agreed-that<independentfanalyses of South Texas by the Soviets and of Rovno.bys the US of the same

.l event at both Rovno and South Texas 1 would be~beneficia111er

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understanding the safety of'each other's.plents.

The two=si.fes reviewed the d'etails.-of the information'

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request kit.for LOCA and ATWS events. prepared"by US and-clarification was provided as'needed.; It was1 agreed that g

the data needs were understood,by both sidescandzthat"the j

data would be transmitted, if.available,:not-later~than" J

March 1, 1990.

Further agreement was rJached on the!

t variables for which results'will be'provided.

Both sides agreed on the importance of man-machine interf aces in dealing ' with of f. normal: events and that. common -

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mcde failures should.bo'given adequate consideration in' pler.t design.

Further the'two sides; agreed that enhanced

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capability to, deal.with severe accidents including ATWS is-decirable for future plants.

r The US presentation on.ATWS summarized the operational emperience which supported 'he issuance of the' ATWS' rule: for US plants.

The backgrou'.d discussion included.the~Kahl' muitiple relay failures, the Salem ATWS-event end the Browns

-4 Fe ey partial scram system failure.

The' presentation-also

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covered the-importance of key parameters.(e.g., MTC) as well an design changes resulting from'the:ATWS rule..The Soviets

.i presentud preliminary ATWS calculation results.using the-DYMMIMA code.

The Sevie^s compared these results with 50.l# 5 '<0M. cciculctions which yielded. ec.newhat : elf f cront.

ren.ults perticularly-in.the. area of primar.y prosture.

A utilquo f ruature of the Soviet 'decign which'may impact ATWS response is the tripping of the Reactor Coolant Pumps on lov steam generator level.

There was'some discussion of the sensitivity of the results to this-feature,.

Both parties agreed to exchange necessary data to-perf orm independent calculations of' ATWS-event.

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The Soviets presented their philosophy regarding the q

operator's role in - dealing with postulated - accidents.

Instructions to the operatorsjare based on OPB-92'which contains rules icr safe operation of plants,as wellnas.the-limits. 1The. chief engineer;(a licensed operator) at the plant has-the authority to override the operators' decisions l

l with regerd to the conduct of. post accidenti operations.- A particularly unique feature of.the Soviet' design.is the i

incorporation of electrical-inhibits which preclude the operators from over-riding automatic safety > functions whilei certain parameters-ere within a prospecified range.

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The US presented a summary of'the philosophy for operator response during accident conditions.1 :Un11ke the-Soviet approach'the US designs do not incorporate features

.to inhibit operator intervention at any time during of f normal conditions.- The US approach for operator actions is-based on symptoms which represent the status of six specified critical safety _ functions as; opposed to. event 3

i based procedures.

The'US briefly!discribed the steps'the.

l operators would be instructed to. follow to deal with any off i

.' normal events.-

It.was noted.that the immediate operator actions were basically identic'alefer both the US andithe

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USSR approaches.

Both parties agreed that consideration should be given sur dialogue in the areas offsymptom based: and event based:

guidelines for operator action,; the degree of: reliance on oparator actionLfor design basis events'and the opportunities for operatoru.to override automaticisafety functions.- Both sides alsoEc. greed that-independent ATWS-enclyses for Rovno would be benefici,al.

1 The-US presentation on Station-Blackout (SBO) traced the boetground beginning with'the discussion of>the sita/ design. specific considerc.tions reg +rding~the likelihood od extoncied los's of of folte power, the reliability 1of the onnite AC power system, and the capability of the plant'to withstand an SBO.

The analyses of SBO.do not require pontulating any other simultaneous failures.- Further, it wen noted that every; plant's battery capacity would-be.

eufficient.to support' essential DC' loads for-a minimum:of_

twn hours.

Until the genoric issue.on the prr<uer.ance ef reec tor cool v.t puap nesin ein roccived; --tho' EE0. enalpes lerkApe of 05'GFM eer puw. US FG.5.1tB'and.

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% the UE;) de c./ t c. + i m:re uced to dot c ri.'a the key elcwets :tcLbe rwloateo ~. L.

1 determine the required SED' coping period av well as LDs required ane. lysis.

The Sovie ts.Indic a t ' d that ta _, total SBO e

is neither required nor sr..ly:ed. Instead itiis assumed'that lors ef offsite-pcaer: coincident with failure:ofLtwo diesels accur.but cne diesel generator is still available to

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<1y' shut the reactor down.

However,<recentlyLthe USSR-has begun to analyze-the plants' capability to withstand SBD i

events.

The Soviets also indicated.that1 theyLdo not expect the reactor coolant pump seals to. leak excessively 11er several hours af ter loss-of a11' seal: cooling. - Further the.

USSR.is' planning experiments to assess the pump seal performance beyond:8~to'10 hnurs,after' loss of all seal g

L cooling.- The Soviets'alsolindicated that'after; reviewing RG 3.155 and NUMARC-8700 documents they.would consider the desirability of conducting SBO coping; analyses.

The Soviets, in response to a-US question, stated'that althouDh USSR regulations require a 2'% shutdown margin I

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p-I (G. iring refueling)'to critica11t, without takingiany. credit L

for control-ted positionsg inn fect' plant admiristrative procedures for which a' physicist As responsible (durir.g refueling) require a 5 X' margin:ta criticality without '

taking credit for: control rod position._ _ Further,'the most1 limiting core configurations are'enalyzed before fuel-movement begins.

For hot l shutdown ' conditions USSR regulations. requi. e that at t least l' X margin to criticality; be maintained.'

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- i AGREEMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS-

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1) Both sides agreed that common mode f ailures sheuld-be.

given careful consideration in the design and man-machine; interf ac e-is important. during of f normal events,-

The participants agreed to discuss preliminary LOCA'and=

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ATWS analysis results at.the next meeting.

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The Soviets will provide,a detailed-presentation-at1the' j

nent meeting with a number ofLexamples on the role of the denign features which ',hibit operator: intervention in i

ciff-normal conditione i

when selected paratriaters are withini a prespecified range. Ti.e participants also agreed to conduct.

-l preliminary discussion of the importance'of various' types of-communication during off normal 1 events, j

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'The Soviets will present the analysis ofb asjwell as procedural considerations for, steam, generator tube rupture e v;+n t s. at the next meeting.

1 Si The perticipents -egreed to discese' the ROVNO :a"J ther t nitt. in nu rie s p ot.e to station blethout erven u at the next meeting.

Also, the Soviets will discuss probabilistic analysis of static'n blackout for ROVNO.

6)

The two sides identified written questions: Trom previous meetings for which responses will be discussed'at the next-

meeting, i

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ACTIVITIES' 1

The following subjects are proposed to be discussed at <

the next meetings (a)

Operator's guidance Tor coping:with accidents o

taking into consideration-specific design'1eatures.

Benefits and disadvantages of allowed actions of the'

. operator during an accident.

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. Soviet information about the~ operator's guidelines j

related to the., initiation of. primary.to secondary leakage.

The philosophy of communicationiat all 2evels of

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i (b) -The study of the plant black-out.

Questions related to probabil'istic approach to safety assurance-in such conditions', as well as the questions-

. related-to reactor coolant pump seals; Land-elimination of.

leakage from the primary. circuit.

(c). Finalization of input data. to-analyze LOCA and' l

ATWS.

Consideration of preliminary res'ults of the atalyses

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and finali:ation of input data.-

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I (d)

Responses to the questions-on FSAR related to i

Ecuth Texas'and ROVNO plants..

s The tir.o needed to cover the proposed:May: work scope is estimated at seven working ~ days. In1 addition,Jit was agreed:

thet as part of the next meeting,' tours'of a US nuclear power station and the NRC Emergency' Response Center areL desirable.

I For the fall meeting, it is recommended!that'the use of=

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passive decay heat removal system and guidance with, regard to the use of normal station equipment for beyond design l

l Leais eccider.t control-be discuuod by) UW.. ' A;se.

l recommended for the fall meeting.is'the. initiation of more dotelled discussion on contoinment desigr, cepability,.end 9

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MEMORANDUM CF MEETINGt' WORKING OROUP~SD-MODERNIZATION /BACKFITTING f

A. REOPE AND CONTENT OF DfECUEEIONE l

The main topics covered by the US and USSR participants-

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were The USSR provided - detailed: infernation on several activities' that are now-underway or completed to swsess/ operating plants with regard.to:the need for'beckfitting.; : Ten -

presentations were offered of.which sixfwere selected _for.

delivery at the meeting.- Theisix papers given addressed thel l

followings.

1) a. peper addressing improvements' to the RBMK-reactors to' ensure thelrffurther operation:at1high.

reliability and safety levels:

2)ln-discussion:of.the VVER) 2 000 reac tor using f aul t-tree. analysis: methods to : improve j

dynamic stability:

3) a=reportton.the results of PRA; a

I cnelysis for VVER'1000 reactors and!the identification of~

i potential beckfit modifications, including a passive:

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secondary heat sink for decay heat;

4) a paper. discussing items approved and planned by Gosatemenergonad:or-(GAEN) which are directed towards improving reactor safetyg.-5) a-7 report on methods and some-results-of,probabilistic_ fracture.

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4 ca.lculetion of pipeline' components and 6) a paper l

dir:: vet.Jng backfitting proncuols f or VVER reactors,. using the bacL12 tting proposcls f or the, Armenian power plant - as an

- t c:t om pl e.

Thu USSR also provided some.information on the< remaining

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four papers which were not presented at-the meeting.

The US provided detailed information on the US: program for the backfitting of operating plants. These presentations covered: 1) The history and principles of%the program

2) The licensing process which establishes' adequate-protection margins: 3)'The' key documents leading to a-completed design and a plant licensing basiss-4)'The policy on safety goals;

5) activities used to monitor safety margins: and.6) the. process used'to contro1' generic and plant specJfic backfits.

Extensive-background-documents-were provided.

B. AGREEMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS 1.

Both~ sides agreed that this meeting was important and useful in obtaining a. mutual understanding of the general approaches used in evaluating additional' safety improvements 4

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L for. existing. nuclear power. plants.; -These: approaches:were f requent1y' discussed in terms of factual 1 examples.

2.

Both the US and USSR have ongoing programs to modernize I

and to maintain safety marginst in light >of.new information.-

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It was observed that the backfit programs of the' USSR' tend to concentrate on each specific : reactor, while ' the l

program of the US tends to backfit on a generic basis.,

4.

The US'and USSR noted that economic considerations are I

of ten importa nt factors 11n making backfit' determinations.-

The quantitative determination of these. costs'and the!

relationship to the gains in safety are" frequently subject' to me.jor,uncertaintiesc For;some proposed-changes, quantitetive-analyses of rish reduction are not feasible..

Thus, often beckfit determinations must be made on the basis of engineering Judgment.

5.- PRA. studies provide unique and valuable indications of-

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sefety levels and weakness 'in designe that may. pose safety '

L cencerns. Both the'US and USSR.are.using this analysis method. to provide engineering insights that assist in identjfying arean that-mey. warrant backfitting.

However,.

neither country currently requires a fu11 PRA for each '

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6.

A key aspect of backfit programs is k'nowledge of1the level of safety established by the current licensing sbasis of kach plant, and the actuel level.of safetyithat enists

'l day to day in each plant.

Proper'ond consistent.backfitting

't decisions depend on a continuing sssessment of this.

cituotion.

As a result, activities to monitor.the existing

-tifoty levc1 rel etive ir t!,et requirul tre etcent301.-

Portacularly it.pertant in this regard are operational experience reviews, inspection activities, and research programs which include'PRA studies.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ACTIVITIEE-t

'WG-5 believes the ne'xt meeting agreed to in the Second Protocol would~be of' mutual benefit,'in order review and-

. discussa a) a recent generic backfit including tbc associated analyses and justification, and the process used in terms of h

the ider.ilf1 cation of, the safety problem, ' and the assessment, approval, and implementation of the backfit; L

b) a recent plant-specific back' fit, including the associated analyses and justification,.and the process'used l

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1 in. terms'of the identification of the safety problem, and-the assessment, approval and implementatien of-the backfits c

and c) other aspects'of a backfit program which are of

hign mutual interest.

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MEMORANDUM OF MEETING WORKING GROUP 9:

DIAGNOSTICS, ANALYSIS EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS FOR SUPPORTING DPERATORS 2.

THE EUBJEETE DF BfREbenfDN By'USSRs

-1.

Monitorine and Dimenestics

'Evstem of Nuclear i

Power Units The. system of operating mode diagnostics -for identification of fast emergency processes was. described.

A rpecific example demonstrating the diagnostics e l,go ri t hm,

the

' structure of technica1' systems and sytem nottwt.re was described.(Dmitriev, V.)

2. F"rert Sveteme for Menitorino.-Modelino and Eefe_

Orerotien of Nuclear Power:

4 The paper described _enport systems being currently

}

developed in VNIIAES. The expert system for classical conteinment type in capable to-deal with probabilistic c upert assesstnents. The enpert system of ong-ess-diagnostics has been implemented in the on-line mode as an intergral part of the operating mode monitoring system. Enpert systems of other types for various purposes-usre described.

(Gorlin, A.)

3. DeveleDment of Generic Systems of'Fest Dinanestics of.

thl,t,W r Pewer Pl ants r This paper described the creui r mnts-l end linitationc of gencric systems of Tatt diagncs tie n and the role of generic. systens of feet'diagnottics

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• R v./_1.:s r 7ce.r r i. ! a l t e x. t er i r.g c :.

c c.i t c l syntem.(Lebedav, N.)

i

4. Devoleement and Imolementation Eneerlence of the Generic System of Fast Diaanestics for-the First Power Unit ~

of Ionalina NFP 'This paper discussed an agreement with-the developed' requirements,' implementation and operation enperience and development-prospects associated with the j

subj ec t.

(Lebedev, N.)

5. Faut Dimenestic Evstem of the Reactor Cere and Main Ecuiemer.e of VVER Durine Doeration:

The paper described an: advanced. multifunctioni i

diagnostic system comprising individual' types of diagnostic and monitoring as subsystems:

< vibroacoustic! monitoring,

(

small leak diagnostics,-detection of loose equipment items, monitoring

_of the equipment' lifetime, etc. The system is integrated!'with :the information -subsystem of the general power -unit control : system.-(Mitin, V. )

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jb." Dimenestic'Evstem-of-the Nuclear Power Plant koul'ement Lifetime with Cvelle Leads:

h Thrs paper discussed. the 1 methodology of..

calculaiions-of primaryfequipment a.ptal' thermally stressed.

k conditions based on the-data of the recording system of the.

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power unit parameters; during transients, ; diagnostic system hardware.and

software, trial _, operation of thel j

system at an existing-~ nuclear. power plant.1 (Mashchenko,-B.)

3

7. Reliabilitv Pre 3metions of Unieum Nuelmar Power Plant -

Eauiement Under Cvelic Leads durine the Deerations l

The paper described = the methodology to-calculate the equipment-; metal

damage' potential; under -

cyclic loads.

The methodology is compared with the method-of linear summing up of damagssicthe incorrectness of-the later for the given ennditions-was deh: ens tra ted.'_ (Vere:emskyi, V. ) '

l The mcin tcpics covered by the US participants'weres' i

j A.

'Informetien Suecort'for'Doerators:

The US described the evolution _of the_ Safety Parameter Display: System (FPDS), SFDS evaluation criterie,-major: problem-areas.found

/

in certain SFDSs, post-trip review recording equipment, post-trip review good practices,_and annunciator-warning systems.

(Regan, W.)

j B.

Simulator Histerv The US described the evolution 101 full-scope training simuletors in the<US, the7 j

chnreceristics and limitations of each :mejorJ class of simuletors, tho fectures and nojor equatiens;cf advanced t 'mr m a ?. hyd c.ulic cedes for simulators, and recent trends in cim.tlatim,

( f*;a g l in, N.)

C.

Simulator Certification Process

.The US described the process for certification of simulation facilities including the standards, policy, regulationsiLand plans established by ANSI /ANS 3 5, 1985 Regulatory Guide l'.149, 10 CFR 55.45(b), and.NUREG-12SB.. The US'also described the

. simulation facility' inspection and the: simulator operability tests.

(Raglin, K.)

D.

Simulator Tvons and Use in the USA:.The US' described-the types of simulators in'the US (including full scope-simulators, basic principles trainers,-. concept simulators, part-task trainers, medular simu?ators, engineering simulators, and plant enalyzers), utility use of. full scope simulators, USNRC use of full scope simulators, structure of modular simulators, and characteristics and uses of engineering simulators and plant analyzers.

-(Raglin, K.)

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Evstems Acereach to Trainino The_US discussed the key:

elementt of_the systems approach-to training, determining-Job performance needs'through systematic analysis, training.

program improvements through program = evaluation,esnd the-i 1

purpose, process, and scope of thet!NPO. accreditation l

program.

(Regan, W.)

i l

F.

Deerater Trainine'and Licensine: 1 The USLdiscussed the d

-training of non-licensed operators, training of reactor 1

operators, training of SOnior reactor operators, licensing'

.of reactor operators anc. senior reactor o'perators, and

_i requalification program.for licensed' operators.

-(haglin, M..)

G.-

Precedural summert for Deerators: ;The US discussed" thel event-bened emergency operating procedure structure prior to the.Three Mile Island event, the structure of the newer-t.ymptom-based emergency. operating; procedures,,the: technical-adequecy of emergency operatang procedures,: imprpvements to 4

make emergency ~ operating: procedures:more understandable,'

I and improvements to make emergency operating procedures ecere usable.

(Regan, W.)-

l l

H-era T Develenment of Dreert Fvstems:

The US described t ' development of expert - systems by Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), including the potential -benefits from such expert systems, oxpert. system buildingstools, and

]

i various expert systems ~ developed or being developed in i

ofiertc sponsored by EPRI.

(Raglin,-M.)

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II. A"4TF"FNTc AND CCNTLUSTONE:

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'"+ M *rt rent!np of t ' tr we rkiv g*c.p ;;r eve d fruitful and contributed-to better understanding of the c.pproaches in-each country-in.the areas of: diagnostics, use of simulatore, personnel training, and.use of emergency-operating procedures.

2.

The working group-believes.that-further discussinn of the above matters.would be very useful:end would contribute to a better undarstanding1of the' practices in i

each country.

3.

Full scope simulators are.used for personnel

. training in both countries,Lbut the use is much more widespread in the US.

In the USSR,-for.personne1' training-purposes, a wide range of technical means are used j

including conceptual simulators-and functional-analytical simulators.

4.

The use of engineering simulators or plant ana l yr.e rt is increasing in'both countries in order to I

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t' analy:e potential'p,ergencies and.those which:have e: curred.

5, The concept of plant diagnosticaT n: the USSR is( to-i use systems and means-for early' detection of equipment.

failures and. transient. prevention,,while in;the US more em;.nasis is< placed on transient. control and mitigation efforts.

~.

i 6.

At Soviet plants there is no safety parameter display system (SPDS), although a -number of diagnostic and information display systems provide functions similar to' i

those performed by the safety parameter display systems.

7.

Emergency operating procedures in the:US are tymptem-based, while in the USSR they are event-based.-

9.

-It appears that general: approaches to the-training, of operators'are.somewhat-similar, although' additional informatien is necessary for a'better1 comparison.-

III.

1 THE MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE WORKING GROUP ARE:l 3

1.

Pharo experience in the areas ef,diu jostics and pc-sonnel training,through contacts between-bt and USSR nuclear industry specialists and by'the' potential exchenge of computer codes,-algorithms, andc methodolo;'ler, nubject i

to the necessary-approvals.

2.

Concider the possibility of a seperate visit =

during the nent meeting in.the US to the NRC Techni el i~sining Ccmter (in Chettancoga, TennesLee) fcr observation 1

j of r.afety pareceter display systems ond symptom-b;. red-r cr<;a a:/ opors, ting p'cc crurec.-

s 0.

Consider-including'in thegWorking Group 9 program a dis ussion of each country's efforts in the evolvir.g area of severe accident training and simulation.

4.

Develop the progra'm for-future activities of Working Group 9 for'1991 andabeyond at the next meeting.

IV.

PROPOSED FUTURE ACTIVITIES OF TH2 WORKING GROUP ARE",

The ' proposed agenda for the.next meeting agreed to in the second protocol is as followst' i.

Discuss operator support systems -including in-core end essential component diagnostics.

Each. country would ' provide ~ additional detail of operator support systems discussed at the initial meeting.

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2. - Discuss expert systems-from the. point of view of i

i.

providing, support-for plant operators.

'5.

Discuss staffing e.nd training'of nuclear-plantt L

personnel,.' including; training; programs. and emergency.

operating procedure training scenarios.

4.

Discuss modular simulation cf nuclear plant, systems.

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I Aeoendin Ift List of Particioants and Dbservers US Participants in Working' Group 2: Analysis.cf the Safety:-

of Nuclear Power Plants in the USSR and the'US:

Co-Leader:

Thadani, Ashok C.,

. Director, Division _ of S' ystems Technology, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Other

Participants:

Tondi, Dominic, Section Chief Electrical Systems Bran'ch, Division of Systems Technology, US Nuclear Regulatory Commis9 on 1

Collins. Timothy E.. Section= Chief, Reactor Systems Pranch, Division of Systems Technology, US Nuclear j

Regulatory Commission Momoriya, Hideko, President,finternational Technical Services,Incteperated,-consulte.nt-to the US Nuclear-Regulatory Commission 1

Ubservers Gordon Fowler. Office of: International Programs l

USSF. Participants in-Wo-king Group 2 Analysis of tho Scfcty of Nuclear Power Plantsnin-the USER'and the US :

~

Co-Leeder LUNIN, Gleb L., Deputy Director, Nuclear Reactors Department, I.V.Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute i

I.V.KURCHATOV ATOMIC ENERGY INSTITUTE.

ASTAMHOV Sergey A.

,' Senior Researcher-

-KOSOUROV Konstantin B.

Leading ~ Researcher t

Soecial Desien Bureau "Hvdroeress" FIL Nikolay S.

Department Head LEGUNENK0'Inna N.

Engineer ALL-UNION STATE fNSTITUTE ON RESEARCH; DESIGN AND ENGINEERING e

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EURVEY *ATOMtNERBOPROEl7"

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.l TAKH Sergey M.. Chief Engineer.

I NOVII:0V Gennadyi' A., Chief' Engineer-EPSHTEIN Isaak M.-Department Head 4e 1

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g US Participants in Working Group St.

Modernization /Backfitting

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Co-Leaders-Hel tomes, - Clemens J., Jr, Deputy. Director, Of fice for

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Analysis and Evaluation of. Operational Data, US Nuclear

-Regulatory Commission Other

Participants:

Cox,, Thomas H., Section Chief', Policy Developmentfand IR Technica1' Support Section and Branch,. Office of Nucleart Reactor Regulation,1US= Nuclear Regulatory Commission-l Observers Gordon Fowler.. Office of International-Programs

'l USSR Participants in Working Group =St.

Modernization /

Backfittino (Members identified by-*)

Co-Leader KORNIENKO, Arnold G.,. Deputy Chief' Engineer,-

4 All-Union State Institute:en'Research, Design an*

i" Engineering Survey "Atomenergoproect" (AEP)

All-Union Stete Inntitute en Reneerch. Desion and.

. j Encinearsno Eurvev "Atomeaerceerqect" ( AEr;1 GDRELOV Yuri V.

- Deputy Chief. Engineer of-AEP,: Department in Cat *hy-City' EHVYRYAEV Yuri V.

- Head of' Department-RYBACHEV Vladimir V.

Head offDepartment I

KNYA2HESKAYA Margaret V. - Senior Engineer l

All-Union Research Institute for Nuclear Power-Plant i

Doeration

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'KA2AKOV Vladi im r A.

' Head of Department-GETMAN Alexander F. - Head of Department' 2HUDENKOV Vladimir V. - Senior Researcher 1

• VIDENZEV Evgeny N. - Senior' Researcher MAIDANIK Vitaly N. - Leading Reseracher i

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The UESR Etate Committee for the-Bunervisionof Nuclear Power safetv

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• GORELOV Alexander N. - Chief Specialist:

• GOUSTCHIN Nikolai'.N. - State Inspector d

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• ROSOV Michael F..- Head of Department.

Fescerch Develemment Institute of Power Enmineerine i

• BALDIN Victor D Head of. Laboratory Documents Exchanged I

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US Participants in Working Group 19 L Diagnostics', Analysis I

Equipment and Systems.for Supporting Operators Co-Leader Raglin, Kenneth A., Director,JTechnicalLTraining.

4 Center, Division ofLOperational Assessment, Office for j

Analysis,and Evaluation of Operational Data US: Nuclear Regulatory Commission-3 Other

Participants:

Wi l liera H. Regan~, Jr.,: Chief,'Humanc Factor a Assecsment-Branch,' Office of r

Nuclear Reactor' Regulation 1 1

Observer

.i Gordon Fow)er, Office of International: Programs UESR Pe.rticipatits in Working Group 9:

Diagnostics, Analysis Equipment and Systems for Supporting Operators i

Co-Leader: DMITRIEV, Vikt7r M. Department 1 Head, All-Union:

1 Research Institute for Nuclear Power Plant} Operations (VNIIAES) i Other Pertleipants:-

All-Union Research Institute for Nuclear Power Plant L

-ii Operation-i VELTCHINSKY Vladimir.I.

- Laboratory Head.

VERE 2EMSKY Vladimir G.-

. Leading Researcher GORLIN Alexander I.

- Leading' Researcher =

^a GOSTOMELSKAYA Nataliya N.

- Junior Researcher ZHUMAVIN Alexander P.

Laboratory' Head' KASHCHENKO Stanislav F.

- Laboratory Head M

MATCHINA 2ciya G.

- Engineer; l;

I.V.KURCHATOV ATOMIC ENERGY INSTITUTE

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a KALINUSHKIN Andrew E.

- Senior Engineer l

'KU2HIL Alexander S.

Laboratory' Head:

NITIN Valentin I.

- Laboratory Head l

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RAKITIN Igor D.

Labora tory._ Head -

1 KHAZANOVITCH Igor M.

i Senior,Restrarcher i

1.V.KURCHATOV ATOMIC ENERGY. INSTITUTE-BRANCH

.i KRYTIEV Ivan S.

Laboratory Head KUZNETSOV Uryi P.

t Engineer DANILIN Vitalyi V..

' Laboratory Head-RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE OF POWER' ENGINEERING LEPEDEV Nikolai N.

Senior Researcher-STRELMOV Boris P.

Laboratory Head.

SPECIAL DESIG'N BUREAU ~"HYDROPRESS"'-

NOVOSELOV Vladislav A.'

Leading' Designer PHYSICAL'AND ENERGY INSTITUTE.

PETRENKO Alexender A.

Senior Researcher 9

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Dbcuments Exchanged by Working Group 2 I

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Information Request-Kit for LOCA & ATWS Analyses l

Chapter 17 af NUREG-0460:

l-Writeup on Determination of' Initial"MTC

" Anticipated Transients Without Scram",

i W.E. Burchill i

' I NRC Regulatory Guide l1.155, August 1988 NUMARC-9700,." Guidelines:andLTechnical~Resis i

for NUMARC Initiatives Addressing Station-l Blackout at Light-Water Reactors, November 1987,'

NUREG-1032, ' Evaluation of Station. Blackout Power Plants, May 19851 i

NUREG-12CO, " Training Review; Criteria and-Procedures"

.L Paper by Jamezz E. he.ight,' NRC, " Station

. s Blackout",. presented'at NRC'Information.

Meeting, April-18-20, 1989 Irap l emen t ation" By ' T*bt Deveri rtf en of Eeviet' Thernr L Hyd.-Ulf e-Anelysis Codes Six Documents Describing Input Data Needs for Each Analysis Code Module Computer Listing.of Input

• Data for.the i

DINAMIKA Computer Code for LOFW-ATWS &.

Description of Inputs-

- 1 Four Plots of Calculational Results for LDFW-ATWS Power vs. Time Pressurizer Pressure vs. " Time; Total Reactivity vs. Timeg.

Mass in' Steam Generator vs.' Time; and Nodalization Diagram'for Analysis-of South Texas The list of source data' on. the South Texas NPP that ' are necessary for the calculations of

'large leaks and ATWS using the following computer codes DINAMI::A, TETCH, f: ANAL-4, MAZ-1,-

SA02, TVEL-2, NASOS.

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The description of ' computer codes for the analysis of q

operating and emergency conditions-of. WER-type-reaetors.

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By US:

NRC regulation s Revision of Backfitting Process for.

Power Reactors", M oral Remis ter,: Vol..e 53, No. -108,_

June 6, 1988.

" Revised Cherter--Committee to Review Generic r

Requirements", memorandum from~ Victor Stello,.

April 23,'1987.'

NRC Chapter NRC-0514, "NRC Program for Management of, Plent-Specific Backfitting-of. Nuclear Power Plants"..

August 26, 1988.

NUPEG/CR-3568, December 1887., - "A ' Handbook 1or Value- '

Impact Assessment" i

i NUREG/CR-4627 Rev. 1

" Generic Cost ~ Estimates" NUREG/CR-3971, October 1984, ""A' Handbook for Cost-Estimating" NUREG/CR-5236,. October 1989, " Radiation-Related:

Impacts for Nuclear Plant Physical Modifications" Reports to the Honorable' Tom Bevill, U.S. Congress,-

at frcm the C5cirmen, NRC, deteds' i

Merch 10, 1989 Idarch 9 1888 February 13, 1997 i

March 4, 1986 L

Seb.iect Changes to = Nuclear Power Plants l

Generic. Letter No. 89-10, June. 28, 1989 Saf ety-Related Notor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance

10. CFR 50.54(1)

Summary of CRGR Agenda Items 1

(

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NRC Bulletin No. 89-01, May 15, 1989, " Failure of.

Westinghouse Steam Generator Tubt -Mehantcal Plugs" NRC Inf ormation Notice No. 89-7*, November 1,1989, '

" Potential Overpressurization of Low Systems" CRGR Background Package for Neeting' No.162 Ret,

Service Water-System Problems (9'maparate. Documents) i L-Packages Containing 123 Pages of Presentation on the US Papers g.

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"Probabili'stic. Safety Assessment in Support of Safety.

Improvemente: Measures for NPP;with'VVER-1000",'"'

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V. Shvyrysev "Some Aspects of' Backfitting, of, State-of-the-art Power.

e Units with,RBMK", V.-Baldwin,

l "First-Stage Measures on Reconstruction andEUpdating-of NPPs with VVER-1000-According to'Results of.

Chernobyl NPP Accident: Investigation and Mitigation"',

A. Gorelov

" Methods and.Some Results ofLProbabilistic Fracture-Calculation of Pipe,line-Components on VVER and

' 1 RPMK-type NPPs", A. Getman

^ !

" System Approach to Dynamic Stability =Analysisief VVER-1000 Units",

V. Zhudenkov "Beckfitting of'the First Generation'of NFPsowith' VVER-440 on the Example of the Armenian'NPP",

Y. Gorelov UE Request for Documentatient t

1.

Documents similar to those provided by'the US,.

includingt Organi:ation charts for.these.organi:ations

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represented'by meeting participants, the location o the participant with;T the org7nicatic7. and-tPv relotionship and responsibilitiesrof the or;anization for. backfit decisions; b.

A group of documentation indicating how a new requirement applicable to a number of plants is

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created, approved,. and implemented at various

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1 organizational levels, from the ministry level

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down to an'd including the individual: plant-supervisor (including' supporting analyses and number and type of actions taken.)

2.

One reproducible copy of.the; full-text of USSR I

paper numbers J.,

6, 7, and S when -available.-

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. Brief

(

abstracts of these papers were provided at the meeting.)

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Documents Enchanced by Workine Greue 9:

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t Ey US:

j NUREG 0899, " Guidelines for the Preparation 'of P

Emergency Operatir.g Procedures" NUREG 1258, " Evaluation Procedures for Simulation Facilities Certified Under do CFR - 55"'

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NUREG 1342, "A Status Report Hwfarding Industry 3

Implementation of.SPDS" NUREG 1358,'" Lessons Learned from the Special Inspection Program 1o,r EOPs" NUREG/CR-3217, "Near-Term Improvements. for. Nuclear-Power Plant Control Room Annunciator Systems" i

NUREG/CR-3987,."Computeri:ed Annunciator Systems" NUREG/CR-4797, " Progress Reviews cf Six Safety-i t

Parameter Disple.y Systems" Regulatory Guide 1.8, " Qualification and-Training of' Personnel for Nuclear Power Plants" Regulatory Guide 1.134, " Medical Evaluation of Licensed Personnel for Nuclear Power Plants" Fe;victery Guiein 1.149, "Nu ;1 err Peter P!nt

' r 1 <t t h f etcilities for Ude in'Opetetor Laconse E uamins ' '.ons" 1h'O S0-001, "Mainta'ining-the Accreditation o?'

Training in the Nuclear Power Industry"~

INPO B5-002, "The Accreditation of' Training in the i

Nuclear Power Industry" ANSI /ANS 3.1 1981, " Selection, Qualification, and Training of Personnel for Nuclear Power Plants" ANSI /ANS 3.4 1983, " Medical Certification and Monitoring of Personnel Requiring Operating Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants"'

ANSI /ANS 3.5 1985, " Nuclear Power Plant Simulators Tor Use in Operator Training" i

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Monitoring and. ' Diagnostics;.

.i Systemi of

~ Nuclear Power

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Units

.The system of operating mode. diagnostics for identification-of fast emergency processes was described.

Al specific example demonstrating the diagnostics algorythm,-

the structure of;

.. j technical systems and sytem sof tware.was described. (Dmitriev, V.)-

2. Expert Systems for Monitching, Modeling and Safe Operation ofL

~

Nuclear Power 4

i The paper described expert systems being currently developed-1 in VN!!AES. The expert system for' classical containment type-is capable to deal with probabilistic ' expert assessments. The. expert system of express-diagnostics has been implemented in the on-line l

mode as an intergral part of the operating mode monitoring system.

Enpert systems of ether types for various purposes.were described.

(Scrlin, A.)

3. Development of Generic Systems of Fast Diagnostics of Nuclear Power Plants:

t This. paper described the requirements and limitations-of generic tyctems of fast diagnostics and the role of gereric systems-of l

fast diagnostics whithin the nuclear power. plant monitoring an centrol system.(Lebedev, N.)

1

4. Devalopment and Implementation Experience of the Generic System of Fast Diagnostics for the First Power Unit of Ignalina NPP This paper discussed an agreement with the developed requirements, implemente. tion and. operation experience and development prospects assccieted with the subject. (Lebedev, N.)

l U. Frut Dingnostic Syntem of thn Resctor Core and Mcin Equipment

' i l

of WER Dur-!ng Operation:

The paper described an advanced multifunction ' diag'nostic system comprising individual types et diagnostic'and monitoring as.

i aubsystemst vibroacoustic monitoring, small leak diagnostics, detection of loose equipment items, monitoring of the equipment lifetime, etc. The system is integrated with. the information subsystem of the general power unit. control system. (Mitin, Y. )

6. Diagnostic System of the Nuclear Power Plant Equipment. Lifetime with Cyclic Loads:

This paper discussed the methoodology of calculations of primary equipment metal thermally stressed conditions based on the data of the recording system of the power unit. parameters during transients, diagnostic system hardware and software,-

trial.

operation of the system at an existing nuclear power plant.

(Rashchenko, S.)

7. Reliability Projections of Unique Nuclear Power Plant Equipment Under Cyclic Loads during the Operation:

The paper described the methodology to calculate the equipment metal damage potential

u. der cyclic loads.

The methodology is compared with the method of linear summing up of damagest the incorrectness of the later for the given conditions was demonstrated. (Verememskyi, V.)'

DocumerLis..Exchanced

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