ML20056E991
| ML20056E991 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 08/09/1993 |
| From: | Freudenberger, Holmesray P, Landis K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20056E984 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-302-93-17, NUDOCS 9308250384 | |
| Download: ML20056E991 (3) | |
See also: IR 05000302/1993017
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UNITED STATES
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Report No.:
50-302/93-17
Licensee:
Florida Power Corporation
3201 34th Street, South
St. Petersburg, FL 33733
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Docket No.: 50-302
License No.: DPR-72
Facility Name: Crystal River 3
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Inspection Conducte : June 6 - J y 10, 1993
Inspecto :
C4/Wf h. . ,
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P.Holmespy,SenforRes ent inspector
Date' Signed
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Inspect r:
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R. Freudent(frger, RMident Inspector
Dat'e Signed
Accompanying Personnel:
R. Schin, Project Engineer, Region II
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Approved by:
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K. Landis, Section Chief
Date Sfgned
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine inspection was conducted by two resident inspectors in the areas
of plant operations, security, radiological controls, Licensee Event Reports,
and licensee action on previous inspection items. Numerous facility tours
were conducted and facility operations observed.
Backshifts inspections were
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conducted on June 7, 13, and 20.
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Results:
In the area of plant operations, one violation and two non-cited violations
were identified.
VIO 50-302/93-17-01: Failure to perform a safety evaluation prior to
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making a plant change that affects safety (paragraph 3.a),
NCV 50-302/93-17-02: Entry into High Radiation Area without proper
monitoring device (paragraph 3.b.(1)), and
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NCV 50-302/93-17-03: Failure to sign-in prior to an RCA entry (paragraph
3.b.(2)).
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The prompt reporting of a radiation protection RWP violation when observed by
a member of the licensee's staff is considered a strength. (paragraph 3.b.(1))
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In the maintenance area, another example of a previous violation (50-302/93-
13-01: Failure to miintain plant system operational alignments in accordance
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with procedures) wa: identified (paragraph 4.a).
The planning and coordination resulting in an efficient change out of an
Emergency Safeguards battery cell is considered a strength (paragraph 4.c).
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
J. Alberdi, Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations
- G. Boldt, Vice President Nuclear Production
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R. Davis, Manager, Nuclear Plant Maintenance
- E. Froats, Manager, Nuclear Compliance
- F. Fusick, Manager, Design and Modifications
- B. Hickle, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations
- G. Longhouser, Nuclear Security Superintendent
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- W. Marshall, Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations
- P. McKee, Director, Quality Programs
- R. McLaughlin, Nuclear Regulatory Specialist
- A. Miller, Senior Nuclear Scheduling Coordinator
- L. Moffatt. Manger, Nuclear Plant Technical Support
- B. Moore, Manager, Nuclear Integrated Planning
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- S. Robinson, Manager, Nuclear Quality Assessments
- L. Santilli, Nuclear Operations Planning Supervisor
- F. Sullivan, Nuclear Shift Manager
- J. Terry, Manager, Nuclear Plant Systems Engineering
- D. Wilder, Manager, Radiation Protection
R. Widell, Director, Nuclear Operations Site Support
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Other licensee employees contacted included office, operations,
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engineering, maintenance, chemistry / radiation, and corporate personnel.
NRC Resident Inspectors
- P. Holmes-Ray, Senior Resident Inspector
R. Freudenberger, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview
Acreayms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
2.
Plant Status and Activities
The plant continued in power operation (Mode 1) for the duration of this
inspection period.
During-the week of June 14, a Security inspection was conducted by a
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specialist inspector from Region II. The results of. the inspection will
be documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/93-15.
On June 23 and 24, The Director, Project Directorate II-2, NRR; the
Senior Project Manager, Project Directorate II-2, NRR; and the Project
Engineer, NRR Headquarters were on site for a site visit.
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3.
Plant Operations (71707, 93702, & 40500)
Throughout the inspection period, facility tours were conducted to
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observe operations and maintenance activities in prograss. The tours
included entries into the protected areas and the radiologically
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controlled areas of the plant. During these inspections, discussions
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were held with operators, health physics and instrument and controls
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technicians, mechanics, security personnel, engineers, supervisors, and
plani, management. Some operations and maintenance activity observations
were conducted during backshifts. Licensee meetings were attended by
the inspector to observe planning and management activities. The
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inspections confirmed FPC's comoliance with 10 CFR, Technical
Specifications, License Conditions, and Admtaistrative Procedures.
a.
Operational Events
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On June 28,1993, at 1:30 p.m. with the plant at full power, the
licensee determined that the regulator in the hydrogen line for
makeup tank (MUT) overpressure setting was outside design basit
(>10 psig). At 1:44 p.m. a report was made to the NRC duty office
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as required by 10 CFR 50.72. The regulator was set to 10 psig and
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the licensee wrote a problem report to insure followup.
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The inspector reviewed the Shift Supervisor's log to determine
when the pressure was increased on the MUT and found that the
pressure was increased to greater than 20 psig on May 12, 1993, on
swing shift. A search of the work request system revealed no work
request was on file for the adjustment of MUV-491 in the May 1993
time frame. Therefore there is no documentation as to when the
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regulator was set to greater than 10 psig. Also, there was no 10
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CFR 50.59 safety evaluation on file for the setpoint change to the
regulator. The SS0D for the shift when the pressure was increased
in the MUT stated to the inspector that the regulator setting was
not changed during that shift and that the tank pressure was
raised by opening the solenoid stop valve, allowing the pressure
to reach the desired value and closing the stop valve from the
control room. This method of pressurizing the MUT indicates that
the regulator was adjusted to greater than 10 psig prior to May
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12, 1993.
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MUV-491-is a non-safety regulator that was installed in response
to Appendix R so that if the solenoid stop valve in the hydrogen
fill line to the MUT should fail open the MUT would not pressurize
to header pressure (50 psig) and be floating on the header at that
pressure. With the regulator set pressure too high, there would
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be a potential for hydrogen binding of the high pressure safety
injection pumps during a LOCA if the solenoid operated stop valve
failed open at that time. Appendix R required the regulator to be
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at 10 psig.
MUT hydrogen pressure was raised to increase the hydrogen
concentration in the RCS in response to an INP0 good practice.
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order to prevent a hydrogen binding of the high pressure injection
pumps due to the higher overpressure in the MUT, an operating
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curve was developed for required MUT level vs hydrogen
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overpressure. The licensee reviewed the applicable control room
recorder charts for the period from May 12, 1993 through June 19,
1993, and the inspector reviewed portions of those recorder
charts.
Both the licensee and the inspector concluded that the
level / pressure limits were adhered to except for short periods of
time while the relationship was being adjusted.
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The operation of the makeup system with the MUT pressure greater
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than 12 psig violated OP-204, Power Operations, section 4.1.5
which requires MUT pressure to be maintained 3 to 12 psig. Al so,
the hydrogen regulator to the MUT was set greater than 10 psig,
which violated the Appendix R Design Basis. No safety evaluation
was performed prior to the setpoint change in violation of 10 CFR 50.59(b)(1). The MUT hydrogen regulator was adjusted, without the
required safety evaluation performed, to greater than 20 psig
which is outside the required range of 5-15 psig stated in FSAR,
Section 9-1.
The regulator remained improperly adjusted until
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June 28, 1993, when the licensee questioned the setting and
returned the regulator to a setting of ten psig. This issue will
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be tracked as Violation 50-302/93-17-01:
Failure to perform a
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safety evaluation prior to making a piant change that affects
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safety,
b.
Radiological Protection Program
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Radiation protection control activities were observed to verify
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that these activities were in conformance with the facility
policies and procedures, and in compliance with regulatory
requirements. These observations included:
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Entry to and exit from contaminated areas, including step-
off pad conditions and disposal of contaminated clothing;
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Area postings and controls;
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Work activity within radiation, high radiation, and
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contaminated areas;
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RCA exiting practices; and
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Proper wearing of personnel monitoring equipment, protective
clothing, and respiratory equipment.
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(1)
On June 15, 1993, a contract engineer for the licensee
entered the Auxiliary Building Triangle Room without a dose
rate meter or alarming dosimeter. The Triangle Room was
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posted as a High Radiation Area. The engineer had correctly
logged on to RWP 93-0018 prior to entering the RCA, but did
not comply with the RWP. The RWP required: " Contact HP
office prior to RCA entries for current survey data.";
" Follow all posted radiological instructions."; " Dose rate
instrument, alarming dosimeter, or HP escort required to
enter a posted High Radiation Area." The Triangle Room was
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posted "High Radiation Area"; " Survey Instrument Required
for Entry"; " Contaminated Area".
The engineer that entered the Triangle Room was
appropriately dressed in anti-contamination clothing but was
not properly monitored.
An FPC employee working in the room next to the Triangle
Room noticed the engineer was not properly monitored and
informed the engineer and HP.
FPC corrective actions were timely and appropriate. The
engineer was escorted from the RCA, interviewed to determine
his path in the Triangle Room, a post-entry survey was done
to determine what radiation levels were encountered, his
dosimetry was read, and the DNP0 restricted his entry to the
RCA. Dosimetry and the survey showed that no overdose
occurred and that no actual high radiation levels were
encountered. This licensee-identified violation is not
being cited because criteria specified in Section V.G.1 of
the NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfied. This issue will
be tracked as Non-cited Violation 50-302/93-17-02:
Entry
into High Radiation Area without proper monitoring device.
(2)
On June 29, 1993, an I&C supervisor entered the reactor
building without signing in on an RWP. The licensee
determined and documented in PR 93-017 that when the I&C
supervisor attempted to log on to the appropriate RWP, the
computer system (RDMS) would not accept him on the RWP. He
had completed all requirements to be on the RWP but was not
so entered in the computer. He correctly followed
instructions to contact the HP desk and indicated to HP that
he could not log into RDMS. The HP at the desk asked what
job he was going to work on and checked the HP pre-job
briefing form to assure that the supervisor had attended the
pre-job briefing. The HP then informed the supervisor that
he needed to get a mini-rad, check with HP at the reactor
building personnel hatch, and it was okay for him to
proceed. The supervisor stated that he thought, when told
by the HP it was okay to proceed, they had taken care of the
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log-in for him. The HP thought the supervisor was checking
in with him as required by the RWP for entry. The HP did
not realize that there was a log-on problem with RDMS.
Authorizing an individual to be placed on a RWP is the
responsibility of the shop supervisor and the I&C supervisor
was authorized to work on the RWP. The electronic
authorization did not occur. This event was attributed to
poor communication between the supervisor and HP.
Failure to log-in on the RWP violated RSP-101, Basic
Radiological Safety Infcrmation and Instructions for
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Radiation Workers, section 4.1.1.4 which required the rad-
worker to " Perform RWP sign-in process".
TS 6.11 states " Procedures for personnel radiation
protection shall be prepared consistent with the
requirements of 10 CFR Part 20 and shall be approved,
maintained, and adhered to for all operations involving
personnel radiation exposure."
The licensee's corrective action was (1) Informed Chem-Rad
supervision, wrote RTR 93-007.
(2) Placed a hold on RDMS to
prevent the I&C supervisor from making further RCA entries
until approved by the Director of Nuclear Plant Operations.
(3) The I&C supervisor's entry was manually added to RDMS
for the purpose of assigning MPC hours as a result of being
in the Reactor Building.
(4) Verbally contacted the
Training Department and requested that instructors continue
to emphasize the individual's responsibility for RWP sign-in
prior to an RCA entry. This licensee-identified violation
is not being cited because criteria specified in Section
V.G.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfied. This
issue will be tracked as Non-cited Violation 50-302/93-17-
03:
Failure to sign-in on RWP prior to an RCA entry.
c.
Security Control
In the course of the monthly activities, the inspector included a
review of the licensee's physical security program. The
performance of various shifts of the security force was observed
in the conduct of daily activities to include: protected and
vital areas access controls; searching of personnel, packages, and
vehicles; badge issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors;
patrols; and :ompensatory posts.
In addition, the inspector
observed the operational status of protected area lighting,
protected and vital areas barrier integrity, and the security
organization interface with operations and maintenance.
No performance discrepancies were identified by the inspectors.
d.
Fire Protection
Fire protection activities, staffing, and equipment were observed
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to verify that fire brigade staffing was appropriate and that fire
alarms, extinguishing equipment, actuating controls, fire fighting
equipment, emergency equipment, and fire barriers were operable.
Violations or deviations were not identified.
4.
Maintenance and Surveillance Activities (62703 & 61726)
Surveillance tests were observed to verify that approved procedures were
being used; qualified personnel were conducting the tests; tests were
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adequate to verify equipment operability; calibrated equipment was
utilized; and TS requirements appropriately implemented.
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The following tests were observed and/or data reviewed:
- SP-113, Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Calibration; and
- SP-317, RC System Water Inventory Balance.
The following item was considered noteworthy.
The inspector observed an experienced technician work with a less
experienced technician during the performance of SP-113, Power Range
Nuclear Instrumentation Calibration. The work control, procedure usage
and the communication between the two technicians and from technician to
contrul room operators was professional in all aspects.
In addition, the inspector observed maintenance activities to verify
that correct equipment clearances were in effect; work requests and fire
prevention work permits, as required, were issued and being followed;
qua' .:v control personnel performed inspection activities as required;
and .; requirements were being followed.
Maintenance was observed and work packages were reviewed for the
following maintenance activities:
- PM-141, Battery Charger Preventive Maintenance Setpoint Adjustments
DPBC-1A thru IF;
- MP-401, Battery Maintenance;
- WR NUO310605, Troubleshoot DC ground condition on "A" battery bank;
- WR NUO311353, Replace cell in "A" battery;
- WR NUO311518, Install fabrication piece for CDV-196;
- WR NUO311521, Pre-fabrication of pipe section for CDV-196; and
- WR NUO311665, Cnntrol room ventilation repair.
a.
WR NUO311665 performance resulted in operators discovering on July
7,1993, that the B train of control complex ventilation was
inoperable. At 8:00 a.m. on July 7, operators were swapping
control complex ventilation from A train to B train and found that
the B train of ventilation could not achieve proper flow rates.
Operators restored the A train to service, declared the B train
inoperable, and entered the TS 3.7.7.1 action statement. The TS
action statement requires that, with one control room emergency
ventilation system inoperable, restore the inoperable system to
operable status within 7 days or be in at least hot standby within
the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within the following 30
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hours.
Investigation of the B train ventilation low flow found
the cause to be a manual damper that was closed. The damper had
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no ID number and was located downstream of ventilation heat
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exchanger AHHE-78. The damper had been closed during the
performance of WR NUO311665. The work was to solve the problem of
moisture accumulation in the control complex ventilation ductwork.
As immediate corrective action the operators repositioned the
damper; completed Surveillance procedure SP-353, Control Room
Emergency Ventilation System, B-Train Testing satisfactorily;
exited the TS 3.7.7.1 action statement; and wrote problem report
PR 93-177, Manual Damper in Control Complex Not Returned to Normal
Position.
The inspector reviewed the working copy of WR NUO311665 and
related maintenance procedures, inspected the work site,
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interviewed HVAC maintenance personnel and operators, and reviewed
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the licensee's immediate corrective actions. The WR did not
indicate that a ventilation manway was to be opened or that a
ventilation damper was to be repositioned, but did state that no
equipment control tags were needed. The WR included an " Equipment
Alteration Log" for recording equipment alterations and
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restorations. Directions for this log gave examples of
alterations as_ an electrical link opened or an electrical jumper
installed. The directions did not require getting shift
supervisor permission prior to making an alteration. There were
no entries in the Equipment Alteration Log. The WR included work
instructions to " seal air flow gap at the bottom of heat exchanger
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fins where polyorithene foam has failed and increased air velocity
is carrying moisture through the duct vs ejecting through
condensate drains." The work was clearly to be performed inside
the control . complex ventilation ducting.
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Authorization to begin work had been approved by the shift
supervisor on June 24, 1993. The WR record indicated that work
had been performed at the bottom of AHHE-5B (inside the ducting)
on June 25, 28, 29, and July 6.
There was no record of
repositioning the damper. On those dates, operators had not
declared the B train of control complex ventilation inoperable.
The applicable Problem Report stated that the damper was closed on
July 6,1993. Opening the ventilation ducting manway or closing
the damper would have rendered the B train of control complex
ventilation inoperable on those dates and for the duration that
the damper was left closed. When work was performed on July 8,
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operators declared the affected train of control complex
ventilation inoperable while work was in progress and had blue
equipment control tags placed on the ventilation manway and
damper. The tags required permission from the shift supervisor
before removing / repositioning the manway/ damper and remained in
place after work for the day was completed and the system restored
to operable. The resident Inspector reviewed the corrective
actions and assessed that the July 8 entry into the HVAC duct was
performed appropriately. The lack of control of safety-related
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equipment described above is another example of Violation 50-
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Failure to maintain plant system operational
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alignments in accordance with procedures.
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b.
The inspector reviewed a report on the rotating equipment
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monitoring program. The scope of the program included fans,
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pumps, and emergency diesel generators, some of which are not
safety-related but are important to plant operation. Parameters
monitored include vibration, oil reservoir levels, and bearing
temperatures. This program provides information that allows pre-
failure repair of the components monitored. The inspector
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concluded that the corrective actions from this program provided
for increased reliability of the plant and therefore plant safety.
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c.
On June 16, 1993, the licensee found that cell 17 of the "A"
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safety related battery had a small crack in the jar. This crack
was leaking a small amount of electrolyte and causing an
electrical ground fault.
Several pre-job meatings were held to determine.the best course of
action. One complication was the short (2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />) TS LC0 time to
restore the battery to service or commence reactor shutdown. The
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last cell change out was accomplished during a outage, was an
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easier to replace cell and took very close to two hours to
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complete.
Pre-job planning and preparation for the number 17 cell
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was extensive and thorough.
Cell change out was accomplished in
one hour and fifteen minutes. The inspectors attended pre-job
meetings and reviewed the completed work documentation. The
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change out of cell 17 was an example of good job preparation and
execution.
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Overall, with the exceptions noted above, surveillance and maintenance
activities observed and discussed above were performed in a satisfactory-
manner in accordance with procedural requirements and met the
requirements of the TS.
5.
Review of Licensee Event Reports (92700)
LERs were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect trends, and
to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate.
Events
that were reported immediately were reviewed as they occurred to
determine if the TS were satisfied.
LERs were also reviewed in
accordance with the current NRC Enforcement Policy.
a.
(Closed) LER 91-18: Reduction in Reactor Coolant System Pressure
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due to Failure of Pressurizer Spray Valve and Associated Position
Indication Results in Actuation of Reactor Protection System and
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Engineered Safeguards. (paragraph 6.)
b.
(Closed) LER 92-01: Relay Design Combined With Maintenance
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Troubleshooting Leads to De-energized ES Busses, Reactor Trip, and
Emergency Diesel Generator Start
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In this event, maintenance troubleshooting on the "C" vital bus
inverter (lifting one lead to the constant voltage transformer and
repowering the inverter) created a 350 volt peak-to-peak voltage
spike on the DC system. This spike caused the Offsite Power
Transformer (OPT) feeder breaker remote opening relays to chatter,
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which picked up the relay contacts and opened both breakers
feeding the OPT.
Licensee corrective actions included disabling
the remote opening relays for the OPT (they provided no protective
relaying functions), monitoring the DC bus for noise during the
next refueling outage (no significant AC noise was detected), and
performing a human performance resiew. As a result of the human
performance review, the troubleshooting procedure was revised to
add a troubleshooting control form and to improve communication
between system engineers and shop personnel (use written or face-
to-face whenever possible), and corrections to the vendor manual
were initiated. This LER is closed.
Violations or deviations were not identified.
6.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Inspection Findings (92702 &
92701)
The inspector reviewed the FPC Final Report dated January 10, 1992,
titled " Florida Power Corporation Generic Implementations of Reactor
Trip Events in December, 1991". The report includes a list of recom-
mended corrective actions with assigned responsibilities and due dates
by functional area. The completion of the licensee's short-term
corrective actions was documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/92-03.
The completion of long term corrective actions was previously reviewed
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in NRC Inspection Reports 50-302/92-07 and 50-302/92-12. On June 3,
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1993, the licensee issued a revised status of the long term corrective
action recommendations which recommended final closure of the report,
including revised completion dates for all items not yet complete. The
inspector reviewed the June 3rd status report. The results of that
review are documented below.
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Operations -
Review " shift manager" concept.
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Status
Complete - The Shift Manager concept has been devel-
oped and was partially implemented in December 1992.
The Shift Manager will be an additional position on
shift. The Shift Managers will hold, or will have
held, Senior Reactor Operator licenses, will represent
the plant manager, and will perform the duties of the
Emergency Coordinator when conditions warrant. Since
December 1992, the Shift Manager position was partial-
ly manned during power operation, and fully manned
during plant shutdowns.
Maintenance -
Evaluate methods for review of PMT when WR scope
expands.
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Status
Complete - Revision 8 to CP-113A, Work Request Initia-
tion and Work Package Control, included changes to
address reevaluation of the adequacy of post mainte-
nance testing if a change in the work scope occurs.
Training on this subject was also provided to appro-
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priate maintenance personnel.
Maintenance -
Improve documentation of work performed.
Status
Complete - The licensee's status report dated June 3,
1993 identified this issue as remaining open. This
status was based on findings of a Maintenance Self
Assessment which indicated additional improvement in
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this area would be beneficial to reduce the
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administrative burden in the shops. Recent NRC in-
spections have noted an improvement in the quality of
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documentation of work performed during maintenance;
therefore, this item is considered complete.
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Maintenance -
Monitor quality of work package 0,ompletion.
Status
Complete - The licensee's status report dated June 3,
1993 identified this issue as retaining open. This
status was based on the fact tha* ongoing periodic
reviews of work package completia.n are continuing.
Standards for work package documentation and shop logs
have been developed.
Quality Auditing personnel and
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Work Controls (Planning) personnvl conduct routine
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sampling reviews of work package:. As noted above,
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recent NRC inspections have noted an improvement in
the quality of documentation of isork performed during
maintenance; therefore, this itua is considered com-
plete.
Training
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Improve training on S0TA diagnostic skills.
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Status
Complete - S0TA's have attended Licensed Operator
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classroom training and have played a more active role
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in simulator requalification training. Also, a simu-
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lator training session, developed for the 50TA's,
which concentrated on the improvement of diagnostic
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skills was completed. The purchase of a "see-through"
reactor model currently planned for 1993, will provide
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a training tool to reinforce thermodynamic theory with
visual and physical evidence.
Training
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Enhance operational experience and teamwork opportuni-
ties for SOTA's.
Status
Complete - The 50TA's attended an industry sponsored
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Team Training Course. The SOTA role was more clearly
defined, operations personnel were made more aware of
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how the SOTA fits into the operating crew team, and
the SOTA's were placed "on-shift" verses their former
"on call" status, effective October 1992.
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Training
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Ensure verification procedures do not dilute OTA
ability to "get the big picture."
Status
Complete - The licensee's status report dated June 3,
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1993 identified this issue as remaining open. A
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revision to VP-580, Plant Safety Verification Proce-
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dure, which incorporated flow charts to aid in follow-
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ing the course of events involved in a transient, was
issued in November of 1992. NRC review of this issue
in_ response to the December 1991 events is complete.
The licensee plans to further improve VP-580 and a
major revision to the procedure was initiated. The
completion of this revision requires revisions to
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complementary procedures and simulator validation.
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Training
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Develop diagnostic aides for OTA's
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Status
Complete - The licensee's status report dated June 3,
'993 identified this issue as remaining open. A
revision to VP-580, Plant Safety Verification Proce-
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dure, which incorporated flow charts.to aid in follow-
ing the course of events involved in a' transient, was
issued in November of 1992. NRC review of this issue
in response to the December 1991 events is complete.
Engineering -
Evaluate RCV-14 History.
t
Status
Complete - Failure Analysis 91-RCV-14-01 was performed
i
for the RCV-14 failure. An analysis of the RCV-14
maintenance history was included in the Failure Analy-
sis.
Repetitive entries regarding improper operation
of the valve and its position indication were identi-
fied.
Engineering -
Time study system engineering activities.
Status
Complete - A time study of System Engineers' daily
activities from January to September 1992 was per-
formed. A final report addressing the analysis of the
data and recommendations to senior management was
developed. See the next item for the implementation
of corrective action based on the study.
Engineering -
Take corrective action on the recommendations of the
time study.
Status
Complete - Corrective actions based on the System
Engineer time study were incorporated into a revision
.
_ _ _
__
.
.
_
_
_
_
_ _ _
.
.
12
of the System Engineering Manual. An action to trans-
fer procedure writing activities to a dedicated writ-
ers group was rejected based on the inherent
inefficiency of transferring detailed technical infor-
mation from the S;, tem Engineers to the procedure
writers.
Engineering -
Establish performance indicators for vital functions.
Status
Complete - The intent of this action was to ensure the
important functions vital to plant operation were
being performed by system engineers.
Rather than
formal tracking of statistics, the licensee chose to
implement a quarterly report of systems' status. This
report utilizes performance statistics as well as
other information to develop an overall assessment of
systems condition.
Engineering -
Establish Root Cause Criteria.
Status
Complete - N00-40, Root Cause/ Failure Analysis, and
CP-144, Root Cause Analysis, established a "rcot cause
threshold" criteria to enable personnel to determine
when the preparation of a failure analysis and root
cause determination is appropriate.
Engineering -
Estaolish " brainstorming" practices
,
Status
Complete
" Brainstorming" practices were incorporated
into revision 4 to the Systems Engineering Manual.
Additionally, the FPC PACE (People Achieving Corporate
Excellence) program provides guidance and recommenda-
tions in " brainstorming" practices.
Engineering -
Establish single point of accountability responsibili-
ties / practices.
Status
Complete - A new plant procedure, AI-255, System
Outage Scheduling and Implementation, establishes a
system manager-as the single point of accountability
for troubleshooting and corrective maintenance prac-
tices during system outages.
l
Engineering -
Establish method to issue troubleshooting / corrective
l
action plans.
l
Status
Complete - Maintenance Procedure MP-531, Troubleshoot-
iag Plant Equipment, controls plant troubleshooting
evolutions. This procedure was revised in December
l
1992 to implement changes to shift responsibility for
!
development of troubleshooting plans to the craft
'
supervision, development of corrective actions to
l
.
1
.
!
.
13
maintenance planners, and involves Operations in an
assessment of the impact of the troubleshooting on
plant operations,
i
Completion of the review of these corrective actions constitutes the
completion of NRC inspection of the licensee's corrective actions
regarding the enforcement actions and open items identified as follows:
-
VIO 50-302/91-25-02; Failure to Maintain Engineered Safety Feature
Actuation System Operability,
-
VIO 50-302/91-25-03; Failure to Implement Procedures for
Correcting Abnormal Plant Operating Conditions,
-
VIO 50-302/91-25-04; Failure to Report a High Pressure Injection
Actuation in a Timely Manner and to Declare and Report the Related
Unusual Event in a Timely Manner,
-
VIO 50-302/91-25-05; Failure to Implement Effective Corrective
Actions for a Defective Pressurizer Spray Valve,
-
LER 50-302/91-18; Reduction in Reactnr Coolant System Pressure due
to Failure of Pressurizer Spray Valve and Associated Position
Indication Results in Actuation of Reactor Protection System and
Engineered Safeguards, and
These items are closed.
Violations or deviations were not identified.
7.
Exit Interview
!
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 13, 1993, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspectors described the
l
areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed
l
below.
Proprietary inf mnation is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
,
!
Item Number
Status
Description and Reference
VIO 50-302/91-25-02
Closed-
Failure to Maintain Engineered
Safety Feature Actuation System
Operability. (paragraph 6.)
VIO 50-302/91-25-03
Closed
Failure to Implement Procedures for
Correcting Abnormal Plant Operating
Conditions. (paragraph 6.)
VIO 50-302/91-25-04
Closed
Failure to Report a High Pressure
j
Injection Actuation in a Timely
i
Manner and to Declare and Report the
-_~.
.
._.
.
.
i
..
l:
l
~
-
14
j
1
l
Related Unusual Event in a Timely
Manner. (paragraph 6.)
l
'
t
VIO 50-302/91-25-05
Closed
Failure to Implement Effective
i
Corrective Actions for a Defective
Pressurizer Spray Valve. (paragraph
6.)
VIO 50-302/93-13-01
Open
failure to Maintain Plant System
Operational Alignments in Accordance
!
With Procedures. (paragraph 4.a)
I
VIO 50-302/93-17-01
Open
Failure to perform a safety
evaluation prior to making a plant
i
change that affects safety.
,
(paragraph 3.a)
,
HCV 50-302/93-17-02
Closed
Entry into RCA without proper
monitoring davice.'(paragraph
3.b.(1))
!
!
NCV 50-302/93-17-03
Closed
Failure to sign-in prior to an RCA
entry. (paragraph 3.b.(2))
LER 50-302/91-18
Closed
Reduction in Reactor Coolant System
}
Pressure due to Failure of
i
Pressurizer Spray Valve and
i
Associated Position Indication
!
Results in Actuation of Reactor
Protection System and Engineered
Safeguards. (paragraph 6.)
'
8.
Acronyms and Abbreviations
- Alternating Current
j
AE00 - Office of Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data
AI
- Administrative Instruction
a.m.
- ante meridiem
CFR
- Code of Federal Regulations
- Compliance Procedure
- Direct Current
'
DNP0 - Director Nuclear Plant Operations
- Engineered Safeguards
j
- Florida Power Corporation
'
- Health Physics.
HVAC - Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning
- Instrumentation and Control
INPO - Institute for Nuclear Power Operation
LCO
- Limiting Condition for Operation
LER
- Licensee Event Report
i
- Maintenance Procedure
'
- Maximum Permissible Concentration
-
.
.
- .
..
.
-.
..
.
. .
- .
-
.
_
,.
-
.
15
MUT
- Makeup Tank
MUV
- Makeup Valve
- Non-cited Violation
N0D
- Nuclear Operations Department
NRC
- Nuclear Regulatory Commission
'
- Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
OP
- Operating Procedure
OPT
- Offsite Power Transformer
OTA
- Operations Technical Advisor
p.m.
- post meridiem
- Preventive Maintenance
- Post Maintenance Testing
PR
- Problem Report
,
psi
- pounds per square inch
psig - pounds per square inch gauge
RC
- Radiation Control Area
- Reactor Coolant Valve
RDMS - Radiological Data Management System
- Chemistry and Radiation Protection Procedure
.
RTR
- Radiological Trouble Report
'
- Radiation Work Permit
SALP - Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance
S0TA - Shift Operations Technical Advisor
- Surveillance Procedure
'
SSOD - Shift Supervisor on Duty
- Technical Interface Agreement
l
TS
- Technical Specification
'
- Violation
l
- Verification Procedure
- Work Request
!
i
,
1
l
!-
.,
.. -
-.
. . - - - .
- - - . . . . . . - .-,-
- -