ML20056D814
| ML20056D814 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 08/03/1993 |
| From: | Constable G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20056D810 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-458-93-21, NUDOCS 9308180048 | |
| Download: ML20056D814 (16) | |
See also: IR 05000458/1993021
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APPENDIX
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMISSION
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REGION IV
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Inspection Report:
50-458/93-21
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License: NPF-47
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Licensee:
Gulf States Utilities
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P.O. Box 220
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St. Francisville, Louisiana
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Facility Name: River Bend Station-(RBS)~
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Inspection At: RBS, St. Francisville, Louisiana -
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Inspection Conducted: June 21 through July. 16, 1993
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Inspectors:
Howard F. Bundy, Reactor Inspector, Plant. Support Section
Division of Reactor Safety
Lee-E. E11ershaw,. Reactor Inspector, Maintenance Section
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Division of Reactor. Safety
Michael E. Murphy, Reactor Inspector, Plant Support Section
Division of Reactor Safety
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Approved:
. 9/J/ff
able, Chief, P1 ant Support.Section
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Division of Reactor Safety-
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Inspection Summary =
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Areas Insoected: . Routine, announced inspection of licensee's self-assessment
capability, licensee feedback of operational experience information, and
followup on previous inspection items involving commercial grade procurement.
Results:
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The licensee had demonstrated a~ strong ability to self-identify plant
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operational issues (Section 1).
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The licensee's ability to implement long-term corrective actions for-
problems identified during audits and assessments was weak (Section 1).
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The Nuclear Safety Assessment Group reports were effective in-
identifying plant operational issues,' particularly in.the areas of
corrective action and repeat equipment failures (Section-1).--
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9308180048 930811
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ADDCK 05000453
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A recent GSU self-assessment identified significant weaknesses in the
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areas of personnel performance, system engineering program'
implementation, and effectiveness of long-term corrective actions
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(Section 1).
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A recent safety system functional assessment identified significant
plant design and testing deficiencies (Section_1).
Establishment of the performance assessment group was indicative of a
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proactive attitude by management to identify and correct personnel
performance deficiencies (Section 1).
The Nuclear Review Board was not actively engaged in assuring timely
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resolution of the issues identified in the audits and assessments
performed under its cognizance (Section 1).
The licensee was suitably processing and responding to operating
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experience information
(Section 2).
The licensee's lack of trending of safety-related component and
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equipment failures associated with maintenance work orders was
considered a weakness (Section 2).
The recent establishment of an operating experience group should enhance
to licensee's ability to respond to operating experience information
(Section 2).
The licensee had evaluated all commercial grade items purchased after
January 2, 1985, and determined that those items were acceptable and
that there were no operability issues (Section 3).
The licensee had established a commercial grade procurement program,
wht;'i as responsive to Generic Letter 89-05 (Section 3).
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Summary of Insoection Findinos:
Inspection Followup Item 458/89200-01 was closed (Section 3).
Attachments:
Attachment 1 - Persons Contacted and Exit Meeting
Attachment 2 - Documents Reviewed
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DETAILS
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EVALUATION OF LICENSEE SELF-ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY (40500)
The objective of this part of the inspection was to evaluate the effectiveness
of the licensee's self-assessment programs. The inspection focused on
determining whether the licensee's self-assessment programs contributed to the
prevention of problems by monitoring and evaluating plant performance,
providing assessments and findings, and communicating and following up on
corrective action recommendations.
1.1
Discussion
The inspectors observed that the licensee had demonstrated a strong ability to
self-identify plant operational issues. However, there appeared to be a
weakness in prioritizing and implementing long-term corrective actions for
problems identified during audits and assessments. The self-assessment
program consisted chiefly of audits and surveillances conducted by the quality
assurance (QA) department and assessments and analyses conducted by the
nuclear safety assessment group (NSAG).
The following reports contained
particularly useful infoltation:
Self-Assessment of RBS, March 30, 1993;
Safety System Functional Assessment, April 13, 1993;
Fourth Quarter Executive Summary Report for 1992, February 9, 1993;
First Quarter Executive Summary Report for 1993, May 3,1993;
Corrective Action Program, February 19, 1993;
Repeated Equipment Failures, September 21, 1992;
1993 First Quarter Trend Report, June 14, 1993;
Risk Assessment of Refueling Outage #4, January 22, 1992; and
Performance Monitoring Program Management Report, May 1993.
Report numbers are documented in Attachment 2.
Taken together, the above
reports identified most of the problems associated with recent plant
operational deficiencies. To obtain corrective actions, QA issued quality
condition reports (QCRs) and quality assurance finding reports (QAFRs) and
NSAG issued recommendations.
In addition, some findings triggered issuance of
condition reports (CRs) and licensee event reports by the plant staff. When
properly implemented, the available management systems appeared suitable for
identifying needed corrective actions. However, the existence of a
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significant number of long-term corrective action issues and a large backlog
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of open corrective action documents indicated that the corrective action
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program was not being effectively implemented.
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The backlog of open corrective action documents had remained high for a
considerable period. Starting with NSAG Report SA 92-005, " Corrective Action
Program," dated February 19, 1993, the inspectors obtained the following
breakdown:
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10/30/92
05/30/93
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Maintenance Work Orders (MW0s)
2789
2746
Condition Reports (CRs)
294
339
Modification Requests (MRs)
234
168
Betterment NRs
394
322*
Regulatory Comitments
258
280
QAFRs/QCRs
89
108
NSAG Recomendations
97
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- Status as of June 24, 1993
From the above data, it was apparent that little progress had been made in
reducing overall corrective action document backlog between October 1992 and
May 1993. The licensee had identified this timeliness issue in a number of
audits and assessments, but progress was not apparent.
Repeat equipment and component failures was addressed in several NSAG reports
and appropriate recomendations were made.
Corrective actions taken had not
been fully effective.
Examples of components having repeat failures included
the instrument air compressors, main steam isolation valves, personnel
airlocks, recirculation pumps, and residual heat removal non-return valves.
The corrective actions taken for problems with these specific components
were apparently not sufficient to prevent repeat failures of other components.
It appeared that plant conditions, trends, and improvement opportunities were
being comunicated to upper management through the following reports:
NSAG quarterly executive sumary and trending reports, and
The monthly performance monitoring program management report.
The NSAG executive sumary reports had sections for emerging issues,
persistent issues, and long standing issues. These sumaries adequately
reflected the issues the inspectors had observed in other documents. An
unusually high number of deficiencies were identified in the areas of
maintenance, radiation protection, plant chemistry control, security, and
general housekeeping. The NSAG quarterly trending reports provided
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interpretations of CR' data. This data appeared useful for developing
corrective action programs. The monthly performance monitoring program
management report contained extensive plant operating data and performance
indicators.
It also included regulatory information.
The RBS self-assessment report clearly identified significant plant operating
deficiencies. They involved the areas of personnel performance, system
engineering program weaknesses, and effectiveness of long term corrective
actions. Also, the safety system functional assessment identified significant
plant design and testing deficiencies. The assessment covered the reactor
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core isolation cooling and low pressure core spray systems. The inspector
reviewed several management presentation outlines, which indicated that
management was intimately familiar with the issues presented in the reports
discussed above.
In some instances, plant management was proactive in
resolving long-term corrective action issues.
For instance, the root cause of
many operational events was related to personnel performance errors. To
identify and correct personnel performance deficiencies a performance
assessment group with the supervisor reporting to the manager of safety
assessment and quality verification was authorized. The supervisor had plans
to hire two employees in the near term and two more later.
In the near term
the supervisor intended to analyze the responses to the self-assessment
recomendations and evaluate the maintenance process to establish any links to
the latest performance problems.
Although plant operational issues were clearly stated in the reports discussed
above, a clear plan for establishing priorities and resolving corrective
action issues was not evident. This weakness was recognized by upper
management, and some initiatives had been taken to correct it.
Proposed
Procedure RBNP-063, " Strategic Planning," was initiated to establish a
mechanism to integrate long range planning and scheduling and the budget
process to facilitate plant improvement, enhance performance, and provide
positive control over major projects and programs. The Nuclear Review
Board (NRB) and Facility Review Comittee (FRC), the offsite and onsite safety
review comittees required by the RBS Technical Specifications (TS), had been
challenged to "..be proactive, challenge the line organizations, and be
thorough." However, there did not appear to be an integrated plan for
resolving the long-term corrective action issue.
The inspectors reviewed resumes and interviewed selected board members for the
NRB and FRC. There appeared to be sufficient breadth and depth of experience
available to perform the duties required by the TS and individual comittee
charters. The inspectors also reviewed the resumes and interviewed selected-
members of the NSAG. This group satisfied the requirements of the independent
safety engineering group required by the TS. The inspectors determined that
the-depth -and breadth of experience of the NSAG group was exceptionally high
in that the group consisted chiefly of principal and senior engineers.
The inspectors reviewed recent FRC meeting minutes and attended a portion of
an FRC meeting.
It appeared that appropriate plant safety issues were being
discussed and resolved. Meetings had been called every few days for the past
6 months.
It appeared from the volume of day-to-day operating problems that
the FRC had little time to be proactive and consider initiatives for plant
operational improvements. The inspectors noted that many of the meetings
barely met the quorum requirements and expressed a concern that the chairman
should ensure that the necessary expertise was available to disposition the
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agenda items for each meeting. The inspectors learned that the NRB had
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recognized this problem and initiated corrective action. Their investigation
had determined that the necessary expertise had been available at previous
meetings. The FRC did not currently use subcomittees to reduce the workload
of the full FRC. The FRC chairman stated that the FRC had previously used
subcomittees and found that the practice did not work well. The inspectors
determined that there were 14 open FRC action items, of which 10 were overdue
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for responses. However, these action items were being appropriately managed.
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The inspectors found no immediate safety issues involving the open action
items. The goal was to obtain acceptable responses to all FRC action items at
least quarterly.
The inspectors reviewed all NRB meeting minutes for the past year. There were
35 open NRB action items, of which the inspectors followed up on 7 and
determined that none represented immediate safety issues. However, there was
no evidence of active management of the NRB action items. No response
required dates were found for any of the items. The NRB chairman agreed that
this was an apparent weakness. The NRB satisfied all TS requirements, and the
meeting minutes reflected in-depth analyses of selected issues. However, it
appeared that the NRB had not become actively involved in resolving many of
the issues identified in the audits and assessments performed under the
cognizance of the NRB.
There were 91 open findings and 4 open concerns as of July 15, 1993, which had
been issued by the QA department. Approximately 36 were older than 6 months.
Eleven findings were older than 1 year and 2 were older than 2 years.
Apparently, response date extensions had been easy to obtain until recently.
The inspectors were informed that an effort was being made to ensure that
there were reasonable justifications for extensions. The inspectors reviewed
9 of the oldest open findings and did not identify any imediate safety
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concerns.
The NSAG recommendations were being actively managed. The inspectors reviewed
the open recommendations as of July 14, 1993, and did not identify any
immediate safety concerns. Most of those open involved long term corrective
actions.
The inspectors determined that CRs -issued by plant personnel were being
actively managed and tracked by operations quality assurance. Of 310 CRs open
on July 12, 1993, 8 had overdue dispositions. There were 62 that had been
open longer than 1 year.
The inspectors observed that there had been extensive organizational changes
since November 1992, and the current procedures often referred to revised or-
abolished positions and several of the new positions were not reflected in the
procedures.
It was also observed that this reorganization was ongoing at the
departmental level. There did not appear to be an integrated plan for
reflecting these revised and new responsibilities in the procedures. Although
no examples were identified, the inspectors had a concern that safety
responsibilities might be dropped. The licensee stated that a procedure
conversion program, to be completed by June 1994, was in process and steps
would be taken to ensure the new responsibilities are reflected in the
converted procedures.
The inspectors conducted a tour of portions of the facility to observe ongoing
corrective actions and to look at painting and cleanup activities in the
diesel generator area. This painting and clean up activity was part of a long
delayed effort to provide plant workers with a better work environment and to
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give the plant a finished look.
To support this effort the licensee has
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increased the cleanup staff in the power block from 6 to 25. Twenty-five
painters were also working in the power block as part of a systematic effort
to improve plant appearance. At the time of the inspection, little progress
was evident.
Several oil leaks were being soaked up by absorbent material at
various locations on the Division 3 Emergency Diesel Generator. The oil leaks
did not appear significant from a fire protection or operability perspective.
During the tour the inspectors observed two tags on temperature indicators on
the lube oil cooler for Emergency Diesel Generator B.
Ono temperature
indicator was held in place with what looked like duct tape because its
support bracket was broken and the dial of the other temperature indicator was
completely broken off at the base. The tags were dated September 29, 1992 and
June 3, 1992 and referred to MW0s R170119 and R144693, respectively. A review
of the MW0s revealed that the temperature indicators were Seismic Class 1, but
not safety related.
Licensee representatives stated that the indicators were
not needed for the conduct of any normal operating procedure and that their
only function would be to assist during trouble shooting. Multiple failures
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of diesel generator temperature indicators had been identified by the licensee
as a concern in Condition Report CR 93-0003. Although no specific safety
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issue was identified by the NRC, concern was expressed over the length of time
needed to repair the temperature indicators.
1.2
Conclusions
The licensee had demonstrated a strong ability to self-identify plant
operational issues. However, there appeared to be a weakness in prioritizing
and implementing long-term corrective actions for problems identified during
audits and assessments. The corrective action issues were being prioritized
with departments, but the existence of a significant number of long term
corrective action issues and a large backlog of open corrective action
documents indicated that the overall corrective action program was not being
effectively implemented. The NSAG reports were effective in identifying plant
operational issues, particularly in the areas of corrective action and
repeated equipment failures. Numerous other documents were available which
presented good assessments of plant performance including the performance
monitoring program management report and various management presentation
outlines. The self-assessment conducted in February and March,1993, clearly
identified significant plant operating deficiencies in the areas of personnel
performance, system engineering program weaknesses, and effectiveness of long-
term corrective actions. The SSFA conducted in January and February, 1993,
identified significant plant design and testing deficiencies. Establishment
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of the performance assessment group was indicative of a proactive attitude by
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management to identify and correct personnel performance deficiencies.
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appeared that the NRB had not become actively involved in resolving many of
the issues identified in the audits and assessments performed under the
cognizance of the NRB, and there was no evidence of active management of the
NRB action items.
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FEEDBACK OF OPEPATIONAL EXPERIENCE INFORMATION (90700)
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The purpose of this part of the inspection was to determine the effectiveness
of the licensee's program to assess and feed back to the plant staff
operational experience information pertinent to plant safety originating both-
within and outside the licensee's organization.
2.1
Discussion
The inspectors reviewed ten operating experience documents and found that they
had been properly processed. Appropriate actions had been initiated to
resolve concerns. No single organizational element was responsible for
assuring consistency in the program.
Licensing had the lead in processing
operating experience documents, and reactor vendor operating experience-
information was being processed by the equipment qualifications and
specifications group in accordance with a desk top procedure.
The inspectors observed that corrective action documents being trended were
CRs, QCRs, and QAFRs. The licensee was not trending safety-related equipment
and component failures associated with MW0s, which could be a good use of
operating experience information. The NSAG group had documented a similar
finding.
The licensee had recently established an operating experience review group to
integrate the operating experience feedback program.. At the time of the
inspection there was a supervisor and one employee assigned to the group. The
supervisor stated that eventually he expected to have five employees in this
group. They would coordinate processing of both industry and internal
operating experience information. They would focus on identifying the
precursors for operating events. The inspectors reviewed a preliminary copy
of Procedure RBNP-062, "RBS Operating Experience Program.
It presented an
integrated approach to processing operating experience information, which was
responsive to the inspectors' concerns and should enhance the licensee's
response capability.
2.2
Conclusions
The licensee was suitably processing and responding to operating experience
information. The fact that the licensee was not trending safety-related
component and equipment failures associated with MW0s was considered a
weakness. The licensee had established and was in the process of staffing an
operational experience group. The preliminary procedure for the revised
operating experience program was responsive to the inspectors' concerns and
should enhance the licensee's response capability.
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FOLLOWilP (92701)
3.1
(Closed)
Inspection Followuo Item 458/89200-01:
Inadeouate
Dedication Was Performed on (1) Commercial Grade Items Installed in
Safety-Related Systems and (2) Nonsafety-Related Items That Were
Unaraded and Installed in Safety-Related Systems
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3.1.1 Comercial Grade Items Installed In Safety-Related Systems
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The licensee initiated Condition Report 89-1142 on October 27, 1989, which
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initially addressed comercial grade items associated with 12 purchase orders
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identified by the NRC during the first week of a two week inspection, as not
being suitable for the intended applications. During the second week, an
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additional 13 purchase orders were identified by the NRC as being in the same
category, Subsequent to the NRC irdpection, the scope of the condition report
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was expanded to perform a review of all in-stock comercial grade items
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purchased between January 2, 1985, and December 31, 1989. This encompassed
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approximately 1575 purchase orders and 5537 items of various quantities. The
results of this effort concluded that no further actions were required for
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1030 items. However, the licensee ~ identified that additional actions, as
sumarized in the corrective action section of the condition report, were
required for the remaining 4507 itets. The actions, with the associated
quantity of line items, were basically grouped into the following five
categories:
Itemt that required additional dedication actions - 1394;
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Iten not issued that were downgraded for use in nonsafety-related
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applications - 1619;
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Items reclassified as serving nonsafety-related functions - 742;
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Items that had not been issued and were scrapped, surplussed, or
returned to vendt r - 733; and
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Items that were determined to have sufficient documentation that
supported reclassification from comercial grade to
safety-related - 19.
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The licensee's evaluation, subsequent to the performance of the additional
dedication actions, determined that those items were found to be acceptable
and a operability is:,ues were identified.
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The licensee performed a root cause analysis which was docur d.ed in Condition
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Report 89-1142. A synopsis of the root cause analysis indicated that the
licensee's procurement program did not reflect the guidelines established in
the Electric Power Research Institute's guideline (EPRI NP-5652) that was
issued in June 1988, and as endorsed by the NRC in Generic Letter 89-05..
Therefore, the evaluations and dedications of comercial grade items procured
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prior to 1989 were not perfornied and documented in accordance with the
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requirements of Generic Letter 89-05. Training, methodology, and procedures
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associated with commercial grade dedication were considered weak or
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inadequate.
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The licensee's stated corrective actions, in addition to the evaluation of the
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line items 'nentioned in the above review, dealt with the establishment of a
program and implementing procedures that would follow the guidelines endorsed
by Generic Letter 89-05, and to provide comercial grade dedication training
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to procurement engineers.
Further, it was identified that the performance of
comercial grade surveys at certain vendor facilities would be necessary.
The inspectors verified that a program had been established.
Site Procedure
RBNP-046, " Evaluation and Control of Comercial Grade items for Use in Q
Class-1 Applications," was written and approved. Site Procedure RBNP-054,
" Technical and Quality Requirements and Controls for the Procurement of Items
and Services for RBS," Revision 0, was written and approved.
Site Procedure
RBNP-003, " Procurement of Materials and Services," was revised to reflect the
program changes instituted by the other site procedures.
In addition, the
following engineering department procedures were either initiated or revised
to incorporate the methodology identified in the site procedures:
EDP-EQ-03,
" Evaluation and Justification of Commercial Grade Items For Use in Q Class-1
Applications," Revision 4; EDP-EQ-09, " Parts Interchangeability Evaluation,"
Revision 3; EDP-EQ-12, " Quality and Safety Classification of Parts," Revision
1; and EDP-EQ-22, " Items With Special Considerations for Procurement, Transfer
or Upgrade," Revision 0.
While the inspectors did not evaluate implementation
of these procedures, a review did indicate that the guidelines addressed in
EPRI NP-5652 and Generic Letter 89-05 had been incorporated.
The inspectors verified through documentation review and discussions with the
lead procurement mechanical and electrical engineers, that the personnel
directly involved with procurement engineering activities had received
training in program requirements and the implementing procedures.
The inspectors also verified that commercial grade surveys had been performed
at vendor facilities for three of the six items identified in NRC Inspection
Report 50-458/89-200. The remaining three items were adequately dedicated.
The licensee had also established an on-site test facility to perform
dedication testing and verifications. The inspectors visited the test
facility and observed test equipment capable of providing physical and
mechanical characteristics (i.e., alloy analyzer, infra-red spectrometer,
material separator, 0-ring tester, tensile tester, and hardness testers).
The testing apparatus used for electrical, and instrumentation and controls -
equipment were in a different location and were not observed by the
inspectors.
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The licensee had established a 250 page index that sorted all purchase orders
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reviewed and included brief information such as item description, actions
taken, and results of dedication activities.
In addition, a memorandum number
was noted for each line item. The memorandum number identified the document
that contained the information which supported the specific action taken for
each line item. The inspectors selected for review 17 purchase orders
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(identified in Attachment 2) that had a total of 372 line items and
encompassed five of the above listod categories. Certain purchase orders
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(those with multiple line items) generally included more than one category.
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This resulted in each category being invoked as follows:
additional
dedication required - 10 times; no action required - 8 times; scrap, surplus,
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or return to vendor - 6 times; downgraded - 6 times; and reclassification -
4 times. The licensee had established a complete package associated with each
purchase order, including all documentation that supported the actions taken.
The inspectors' review concluded that the licensee had thoroughly evaluated
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purchase order items and properly determined the appropriate actions to take.
Further, the revisions to site programs and procedures that incorporate the
positions of Generic Letter 89-05 should ensure adequate dedication of
commercial grade items.
3.1.2 Nonsafety-Related Items That Were Upgraded and Installed in
Safety-Related Systems
The licensee had been upgrading selected Q Class-2 (procured
nonsafety-related) items for use in safety-related applications. These
upgrades applied to both components and piece parts. The program was found to
be flawed because many of the purchases were improperly classified. For
example, Condition Report CR-87-1719 documented the fact that two capacitors
and one operational amplifier board, purchased from General Electric Nuclear
Energy as non-safety related (Q Class-2) components, were installed in a
safety-related system without proper dedication. This application was
approved after the fact by the licensee's engineering, and it was determined
that it had been normal practice to substitute Q Class-2 parts for Q Class-1
if a CR was processed after the fact. The licensee subsequently determined
that the amplifier board was properly procured, but incorrectly identified as
a Q Class-2 component when issued from the warehouse. The dedication of the
capacitors, however, was incomplete since it did not establish safety
functions and critical characteristics.
The inspectors determined that the licensee had stopped the practice of
issuing CRs after the fact for substituting Q Class-2 parts for Q Class-1.
The licensee had also issued a specific " Product Data Page" for capacitors.
This document had attached to it a "Comn<ercial Grade Justification Form," also
specifically for capacitors. The inspectors reviewed these two documents and
determined-that they provided qualified supplier information,-safety
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functions, and critical characteristics.
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ATTACHMENT 1
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1 PERSONS CONTACTED
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1.1 Licensee Personnel
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-R. Backen, Supervisor, Quality Assurance Systems
D. Banks, Procurement Engineer
K. Bankston, Quality Control Inspector
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-R. Biggs, Supervisor, Operations Quality Control-
- J. Booker, Manager, Safety Assessment and Quality Verification
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+R. Cole, Supervisor, Process Systems
T. Crouse, Director, Engineering Support
- D. Darbonne, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations
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P. Freehill, Assistant Plant Manager, Outage Management
- K. Garner, Licensing Engineer
- K. Gladrosick, Director, Quality Assurance
- P. Graham, Vice President, River Bend Station
D. Grand, Lead Electrical Procurement Engineer
- J. Hamilton, Manager, Engineering
D. Hance, Senior Engineer, Licensing
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+G. Hockman, Senior Quality Assurance Engineer
+R. Kelly, Supervisor,-Instrumentation and ; Controls
+J. Leavines, Supervisor, Nuclear Safety Assessment Group
-D. Lorfing, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing
-R. Ludwig, Lead Mechanical Procurement Engineer
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Malik, Supervisor,-Operations Quality Assurance
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-C. Maxson, Supervisor, Performance Assessment
J. Millacci, Quality Assurance Engineer
-S. Radebaugh, Assistant Plant Manager, Maintenance
-L. Rougeux, Senior Engineer, Nuclear Safety Assessment Group
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- J. Schippert, Plant Manager
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+V. Shertukde, Senior Engineer, Equipment Qualifications and Specifications -
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-A. Soni, Supervisor, Equipment Qualification and Specifications Group
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- J. Spivey, Senior Quality Assurance Engineer
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M. Stein, Director, Plant Engineering
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+K. Suhrke, Manager, Site Support
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-J. Venable, Operations Supervisor
+0. Wells, Supervisor, Operational Experience Group
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1.2 NRC Personnel
- W. Smith, Senior Resident Inspector
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D. Loveless, Resident Inspector
+G. Constable, Chief, Plant Support Section, Division of Reactor Safety
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In addition to the personnel listed above, tLa inspectors contacted other
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personnel during this inspection period.
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-Denotes personnel that attended the exit meeting on July 2,1993.
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+ Denotes personnel that attended the exit meeting on July 16, 1993.
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- Denotes personnel that attended both exit meetings.
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2 EXIT MEETING
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Exit meetings were conducted on July '2 and July 16, 1993. 'During these'
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meetings, the inspectors reviewed the scope and findings for those. parts of
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the inspection completed. The licensee did not identify as proprietary, any.
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information provided to, or reviewed by the inspectors.
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ATTACHMENT 2
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DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
1
RBS Technical Specifications, Section 6.0, " Administrative Controls"
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RSS Technical Specifications, Section 6.5, " Review and Audit"
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Procedure RBNP-030, " Initiation & Processing of Condition Reports," Revistor, 1
Procedure RBNP-052, "RBS Trending Program," Revision 2, CN-052-2-2
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NSAG Report ES 92-004, "4th Quarter Executive Summary Report for 1992,". issued
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February 9, 1993
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NSAG Report ES 93-001, "Ist Quarter Executive Summary Report for 1993," issued
May 3, 1993
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NSAG Report OER 92-003, " Operating Experience Report for Scram 92-003," issued
March 19, 1993
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NSAG Report RPA 93-001, " Assessment of the Control . Room Activities," issued
February 5, .1993
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NSAG Report SA 92-005, " Corrective Action Program," issued February 19, 1993
NSAG Report SA 92-004, " Repeated Equipment Failures," issued September 21, '
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1992
NSAG. Report TR 93-001, "1993 First Quarter Trend Report," issued June 14,.1993
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HSAG Report SA 91-012, " Risk Assessment of Refueling Outage #4," issued
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January 22, 1992
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Procedure RBNP-047, " Corrective Action Program," Revision 3'.-
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Report, "Self-Assessment.of. RBS;" issued March 30, 1993-(limited distribution)<
"RBS - Unit 1 Performance Monitoring Program Management Report, May 1993"
Report, "NRB Action Items," dated May 6,11993'
Report, "FRC Open Action Items," dated June.'17, 1993
Report, "QA Audit 93-01-I-SSFA," approved April 13 1993
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Procedure NLP-10-006, " Processing & Tracking of Regulatory & Industry
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Correspondence," Revision 3, IPC 3-1-
Procedure RBNP-062, "RBS Operating' Experience Program," Revision 0,
preliminary
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2
"NRB Meeting Minutes," for the period May 29, 1992 to May 3, 1993
Procedure ADM-0002, " Charter of the FRC," Revision 110, CN-93-0479
"FRC Meeting Minutes," for the period February 14 to June 25, 1993
"RBS Nuclear Review Board Manual"
Report, " Audit 92-09-I-CANC, Corrective Action & Nonconformance Control
Program," issued October 30, 1992
Report, " Audit 93-02-I-MAINT, Maintenance Programs Audit," conducted March I
to May 20, 1993
Report, " Audit 92-08-I-HPRP, RBS Radiation Protection Program," conducted
August 17 to 31, 1992
NSAG Report SA-93-001, " Component Repeat Problems Assessment," issued
May 27, 1993
Procedure RBNP-063, " Strategic Planning," proposed -
Response File to Information Notice (IN) 92-52, " Barriers & Seals Between Hild
& Harsh Environments," dated July 15, 1992
Response File to IN 92-71, " Partial Plugging of Suppression Pool Strainers at
a Foreign BWR," dated December 7, 1992
Response File to Significant Event Report (SER) 10-92, " Unplanned Personnel
Radiation Exposure," dated November 17, 1992
Response File to SER 19-92, " Power Oscillations at BWRs," interim response
dated May 27, 1993
Response File to Significant-Operating Experience Report 92-1, " Reducing the-
Occurrence of Plant Events Through Improved Human Performance," dated
October 2, 1992
Response File to Service Information Letter (SIL) 530 " Refueling Bridge Hoist
Brake Failure," dated February 19, 1991
Response File to SIL- 537, " Lubricants in High Temperature Applications," dated
October 21, 1991
Response File to SIL 506, Supplement 1, "BWR/6 Head Stud Bolt Wear," dated
August 29, 1990
Response File to Generic Letter (GL) 91-17,
.eneric Safety Issue 29 - Bolting
Degradation of Failure'in Nuclear Power Pla;-
" dated October 17, 1991
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Response File to GL 91-15, " Operating Experience Report Feedback," dated
September 23, 1991
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3
Closed Quality Assurance Finding Report (QAFR) P-90-03-008
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Open QAFRs P-91-10-13, P-91-10-14, P-91-10-16, P-91-10-18, P-91-11-11, P-92-
03-4, P-92-03-9, P-92-05-7, and P-92-06-5
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Purchase Orders 87'-1Q-74434, 87-10-75308, 87-1Q-73840, 89-4-75309, 87-1Q-
72794, 89-E-71975, 86-lQ-72678, 87-lQ-74965, 88-1Q-70564, 88-10-70562, 89-4-
76269, 87-lQ-72624, 89-D-70826, 82-1-B0062, 88-1Q-72073, 56-50022-000, S6-
S0055-000
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