ML20055H757

Amend 145 to License DPR-53,replacing Existing 0-10 EFPY & 10-40 EFPY Heatup & Cooldown Curves w/0-12 EFPY Heatup & Cooldown Curves

ML20055H757
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	07/24/1990
From:	Wessman R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20055H758	List: ML20055H757 ML20055H759
References
NUDOCS 9007300021
Download: ML20055H757 (34)

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WASHING TON, D. C. 20$$b BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET.NO. 50-317 CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.145 L

License No. DPR-53 e

1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (thelicensee)datedMay 14, 1990, as modified on July 18, 1990, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility wi11 operate in conformity with the application.

j the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (1) that the activities authorized by ',his amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be co.iducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.2 of Facility Operating License No.

d."R-53 is hereby amended to read as follows:

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(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and 3; as revised through Amendment No.145, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance to be implemented upon receipt.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS$10N wA-Richard Wessman, Acting Assistant Director for Region I Reactors Division of Reactor Projects - 1/!!

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of issuance: July 24,1990 l

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t-i ATTACHMENT T0. LICENSE AMENDMENTS i

AMENDMENT NO.

.. FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR DOCKET NO. 50 317 i

1 Revise Appendix A as follows:

i Remove Pages insert Pages 3/4 1 3/4 1-7*

3/4 1-8 3/4 1-8 3/4 1-9 3/4 1-9*

3/4 1-10 3/4 1-10 3/4 3-11 3/4 3-11 3/4 3-12 3/4 3-12*

3/4 4-2a 3/4 4-2a L

3/4 4-2b 3/4 4-2b 3/4 4-23 3/4 4-23 3/4 4 3/4 4-24 3/4 4-24a 3/4 4-24a 3/4 4-25*

3/4 4-25*

3/4 4-26 3/4 4-26 3/4 4-26a 3/4 4-26a 3/4 4-26b 3/4 4-26b 3/4 4-26c l

3/4 5-3 3/4 5-3*

l 3/4 5-4 3/4 5-4 l'

3/4 5-6 3/4 5-6 i

i 3/4 5-7 3/4 5-7*

B 3/4 4-1 B 3/4 4-1 J,

B 3/4 4-5 B 3/4 4-5 I

B 3/4 4-6 B 3/4 4-6 L

8 3/4 4-7 8 3/4 4-7 I

B 3/4 4-8 B 3/4 4-8

[

B 3/4 4-9 B 3/4 4-9 l-B 3/4 4-10 B 3/4 4-10 B'3/4 4-11 B 3/4 4-11 B 3/4 5-1 B 3/4 5-1*

l B 3/4 5-2 B 3/4 5-2 B 3/4 5-2a

• Pages that did not change, but are overleaf.

o

o REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY LUilTING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.1.5 The Reactor loop temperature avg) shall be 1515goolant System lowest operatin (T

F when the reactor is critica.

APPLICABillTY: MODES 1 and 2#,

ACTION:

With a Reactor Coolant System operating loop temperature (T,NOT STANDBY 0

) < 515 F, restore T to within its limit within 15 minutes or be in withinth$*8 ext 15 minutes.

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.1.1.5 The Reactor-Coolant System temperature (Tav9) shall be 0

determined to be 1 515 F:

a.

Within 15 minutes prior to achieving reactor criticality, and b.

At least once per 30 minutes when the reactor is critical and 0

the Reactor Coolant System T,yg is less than 525 F, With Keff 2 1.0.

cal. VERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 1-7 Amendment No.145

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j REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS T

3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS j

FLOW PATHS - SHUTDOWN k

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION V

?

3.1.2.1 As a minimum, one of the following boron injection flow paths and one associated heat tracing circuit shall be OPERABLE:

I A flow path from the boric acid storage tank via either a boric a.

acid pumr or a gravity feed connection and charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System if only the boric acid storage tank in Specif' cation 3.1.2.7a is OPERABLE,. or b.

The flow path from the refueling water tank via either a

-?

charging pump or a high pressure safety injection pump

• to the l

i Reactor Coolant Syste:n if only the refueling water tank in l-Specification 3.1.2.7b is OPERABLE.

j-APPLICABILITY _: MODES 5 AND 6.

6.01103:

i With none of the above flow paths OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until at least ore injection path is restored to OPERABLE status.

7

$URVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.1.2.1 At least one of the above required flow paths shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 7 days by verifying that the temperature of the heat traced portion of the flow path is above the temperature limit line shown on Figure 3.1-1 when a flow path from the concentrated boric acid tanks is used, b.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not l-lockod, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its L

correct position, p

Below 327DF, the required OPERABLE HPSI pump shall be in pull-to-lock and will not start automatically.

Below 327 F, HPSI 0

pump use will be conducted in accordance with Technical Specification 3.4.9.3.

l -

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CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 1-8 Amendsant No.145

l REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS FLOW PATHS - OPERATING i

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i

- 3.1.2.2 At least two of the following three boron injection flow paths and one associated heat tracing circuit shall be OPERABLE:

Two flow paths from the boric acid storage tanks required to be-a.

OPERABLE pursuant to Specifications 3.1.2.8 and 3.1.2.9 via 1

either a boric acid pump or a gravity feed connection, and a 1

charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System, and 1

b.

The iiow path from the refueling water tank via a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

I ACTION:

. With only one of the above required boron injection flow paths to tha Reactor Coolant System OPERABLE, restore at least two boron injection' flow paths to the Reactor Coolant System to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STAND 8Y and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 3% Ak/k at 200 F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; restore 0

at least two flow paths to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be s'

in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

- it)RVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.1.2.2 At least two of the above required flow paths shall be

?

demonstrated OPfpM LE:

l At least once por 7 days by verifying that the temperature of a.

the heat traced portion of-the flow path from the concentrated boric' acid tanks is above the temperature limit line shown on-g Figure 3.1-1.

1 u

b.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manJal, L

power operated or automatic) ir, the flow path that is not C

locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position, c.

At least once per refueling interval by verifying on a SIAS test signal that:

(1) each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its

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correct position, and (2) each boric acid pump starts.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 1 '1 Amendment No, fE/Jpf/JJp,Me 145 m

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CEARGING PUMP - SHUTDOWN j

LIMITING CONDII10N FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.3 At least one charging pump or one high pressure safety injection pump

• in the boron injection flow path required OPERABLE pursuant to l

i Specification 3.1.2.1 shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency bus.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

i ACTION:

t With no charging pump or high pressure safety injection pump OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until at least one of the required pumps is restored to OPERELE status.

SW VEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS

}

4.1.2.3 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.

i L.

Below 327 F, the required OPERABLE HPSI pump shall be in 0

pull-to-lock and will not start automatically.

Below 327 F, HPSI l

pump use will be conducted in accordance with Technical Specification 3.4.9.3.

l CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 1-10 Amendment No.145 L

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[n TABLE 3.3-3 ENGINEERED SAFFTY FEATURE-' ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SG MINIMUM-

]

TOTAL NO.

CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICA8LE P

FUNCTIONAL UNIT.

OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTI0lt G

1.

SAFETY INJECTION (SIAS)0 a.

Manual (Trip Buttons) 2 1

2 1, 2, 3, 4 6

b.

Containment Pressure - High 4

2 3

1, 2, 3 7*

c.

Pressurizer Pressure - Low 4

2 3

1,2,3(a) 7*

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2.

CONTAlletENT SPRAY (CSAS) a.

Manual (Trip Buttons) 2 1

2 1, 2, 3, 4 6

b.

Containment Pressure - High 4

2 3

1, 2, 3 11.

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b 3.

CONTAll8ENT ISOLATI0M (CIS)#

a.

Manual CIS (Trip Buttons) 2 1

2 1, 2, 3, 4

. 6 b.

Containment Pressure - High 4

2 3

1, 2, 3 7*

E a

Containment isolation of non-assential penetrations is also initiated by SIAS (functional units 1.a and 8

1.c).

9 When the RCS temperature is:

F (a) Greater than 350 F, the required OPERABLE HPSI pumps must be able to start automatically upon 8

receipt of a SIAS signal O

(b) 8etween 350'F and 327 F (inclusive), a transition region exists where the OPERABLE HPSI pump will.

8 D

be placed in pull-to-lock on a cooldown and restored to' automatic status on a heatup,

'E (c) Below 327'F, the required OPERABLE HPSI pump shall be in pull-to-lock and will not start automatically.

w TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY-FEATURE ACTUATION-SYSTEM INSTRLMENTATION nn##

MINIMUM

.MM TOTAL NO.

CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION nn

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i CC 4.

MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION

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a.

Manual (MSIV Hand Switches and Feed Head Isolation Hand EE Switches) 1/ valve 1/ valve 1/ valve 1, 2, 3, 4 6

ZZ b.

Steam Generator Pressure :

Low 4/ steam 2/ steam 3/ steam 1,2,3(c) 7*

generator generator generator 5.

CONTAllWEEN[SUMPRECIRCULATION R.

(2AS)

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a.

Manual RAS (Trip Euttons) 2 1

2 1, 2, 3, 4 6

b.

Refuelina Water Tank - Low 4

2 3

I, 2, 3 7*

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!t REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM I'

COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.1.3 a.

At least two of the coolant loops listed below shall be OPERABLE:

1.

Reactor Coolant Loop #11 and its associated steam generator and at least one associated reactor coolant pump.

2.

Reactor Coolant Loop #12 and its associated steam generator and at least one associated reactor coolant

pump, 3.

Shutdown Cooling Loop #11*,

4.

Shutdown Cooling Loop #12*.

b.

At least one of the above coolant loops shall be in operation **.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4***# and 5***f.

MIJ,M:

a.

With less than the above required coolant loops OPERABLE, initiate corrective action to return the required coolant loops tc OPERABLE status within one hour or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

b.

With no coolant loop in o>eration, suspend all operations involving a reduction in soron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and initiate corrective action to return the required coolant loop to operation within one hour.

The normal or emergency power source may be inoperable in MODE 5.

All reactor coolant pumps and shutdown cooling pumps may be de energized for up to I hour provided (1) no operations are permitted that would cause dilution of the reactor coolant system boron concentration, and (2) core outlet temperature is maintained 0

at least 10 F below saturation temperature.

• • • A reactor coolant pump shall not be started with the RCS temperature 0

less than or equal to 327 F unless (1) the pressurizer water level is less than or equal to 165 inches, and (2) the secondary water temperature of each steam generator is less than or equal to 30 F 0

above the RCS temperature, and (3) the pressurizer pressure is less than or equal to 300 psia by plant computer indication or equivalent precision instrument. These are temporary restrictions and are only valid for the current shutdown condition.

Entry into MODE 2 will not occur until these restrictions have been revised.

1 See Special Test Exception 3.10.5.

I CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 4 2a Amendment No. AB,145

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REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION SHUTDOWN SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.1.3.1 The required shutdown cooling loop (s), if not in operation, shall be determined OPERABLE once per 7 days by verifying correct breder alignments and indicated power availability for pumps and shutdown cooling loop valves.

4.4.1.3.2 The required steam generator (s), if it is being used to meet 3.4.1.3.a. shall be determined OPERABLE by verifying the secondary side water level to be above -50 inches at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

4.4.1.3.3 At least one coolant loop shall be verified to be in operation and circulating reactor coolant at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

l l

i CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 4 2b Amendment No. )),145 d

i REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM l

3/4.4.9 PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION f

3.4.9.1 The Reactor Coolant System (except the pressurizer) temperature and pressure shall be limited in accordance with the limit lines shown on i

Figure 3.4-2 during heatup, cooldown, criticality, and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing with:

r a.

A maximum heatup of:

Maximum Allowable Heatuo Rate RCS Temoerature i

0 0

0 60 F in any one hour period 70 F to 305 F 0

0 0

10 F in any one hour period 305 F to 327 F i

0 0

60 F in any one hour period 1 327 F b.

0 Amaximumcooldownof100FinanyonehgurperiodwithT,y9 0

above 250 F and a maximum cooldown of 20 F in any one hour 0

i period with T,yg below 250 F.

i 0

c.

A maximum temperature chang 2 of 5 F in any one hour period, during hydrostatic testing operations above system design pressure.

APPLICABillTY:

At all times.

ACTION:

With any of the above limits exceeded, restore the temperature and/or l

pressure to within the limit within 30 minutes; perform an engineering evaluation to determine the effects of the out of-limit condition on the fracture toughness properties of the Reactor Coolant System; determine that the Reactor Coolant System remains acceptable for continued operations or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> nd reducetheRCST@nthefollowing30 hours.and pressure to less than 200 F a l

0 respectively, wi SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.4.9.1.1 The Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressure shall be determined to be within the limits at least once per 30 minutes during system heatup, cooldown, and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing operations.

4.4.9.1.2 The reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance specimens shall be removed and examined, to determine changes in material properties, at the intervals shown in Table 4.4 5.

The results of these examinations shall be used to update Figure 3.4-2.

l CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 4-23 Amendment No.145

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e F60URE 3.4 2a CALVERT CLIFFS UNIT 1 HEATUP CURVE,12 EPPY REACTOR COOLANT SYSTE3 PRESSURE TEMPERATURE LIMITS ISM HE ATUP _ f l

l gi INSERVCE HYDROSTATC TEST

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=:

2000 i

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I BELOWEST 3

' CORE g SERVCE f

f CRITICAL I

H TEMPERATURE 1

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f 55 ISO 'F -

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5 1000

=

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.f 70TTO3089 560T/1 HR f

f RCS TEMP.

H/U RATE

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3069 TO 3279 s109/1 HR f

2:3279 5609/1 HR

_-_ _ __ a 500 f

T" MIN. SOLTUP TEM'd. 70 'F MAXIMUM PRESSURE FOR SDC OPERATION

= _

0 100 100 300 400 500 600 INDICATED REACTOR COOLANT TF.MPERATURE T ' Y C

The minimum boltup temperature is the temperature of the reactor vessel flange, not the coolant temperature.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 4-24 Amendment No.145 i

FIGURE 3.4>2b CALVERT CLIPPS UNIT 1 COOLDOWN CURVE,12 EFPY REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE TEMPERATURE LIMITS 2500 1-

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FOR SDC OPERATION.

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0 100 200 300 400 800 400 1

1 INDICATED REACTOR COOLANT TEMPERATURE T,*F C

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The minimum boltup temperature is the temperature of the' reactor l

vessel flange, not the coolant temperature.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 4-24a Amendment No.145

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TABLE 4.4-5 REACTOR VESSEL MATERIAL IRRADIATION SURVEILLANCE SCHEDULE SPECIMEN REMOVAL INTERVAL 1.

Capsule No. 1 5 years 2.

Capsule No. 2 14 years

.3.

Capsule No. 3 23 years.

4.

Capsule No. 4 30 years 5.

Capsule No. 5 35 years l

6.

Capsule No. 6 40 years I

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CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 4-25 Amendment No.14b

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REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM i

PRESSURIZER

' LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.9.2 The pressurizer temperature shall be limited to:

P 0

a.

A maximum heatup of 100 F in any one hour period, 0

b.

A maximum cooldown of 200 F in any one hour period, and c.

A maximum spray water temperature differential of 400 F.

t 0

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

i P

With the pressurizer temperature limits in excess of any of the above limits, restore the temperature to within the limits within 30 minutes; i

perform an-engineering evaluation to determine the effects of the out-of-limit condition on the fracture toughness properties of the pressurizer; determine that the pressurizer remains acceptable for continued operation or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> l

and reduce the pressurizer pressure to less than 300 psia within the l

following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS l

4.4.9.2 The pressurizer temperatures shall be determined to be within the limits at least once per 30 minutes during system heatup or cooldown.

The spray water temperature differential shall be determined to be within i

the limit at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> during auxiliary spray operation.

f 1

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 4-26 Amendment No.145

F I

f REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS

,7 i

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

\\

3.4.9.3.The following. overpressure protection requirements shall be met:

.One of the following three overpressure protection systems a.

shall be in place:

1.

Two power-operated relief valves (PORVs) with a lift setting 1 424.5 psia or l

2.

A single PORY with a lift setting of 1 424.5 psia and a Reactor Coolant System vent of 21.3 square inches, or 3.

A Reactor Coolant System (RCS) vent 2 2.6 square inches.

b.

Two high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pumps # shall be disabled by either removing (racking out) their motor circuit breakers from the electrical power supply circuit, or by locking shut their discharge valves, The HPSI loop motor operated valves (HOVs)# shall be prevented c.

from automatically aligning HPSI pump flow to the RCS by placing their hand switches in pull to override.

d.

No more than one OPERABLE high pressure safety injection pump

-with suction aligned to the Refueling Water Tank may be used to inject flow into the RCS and when used, it must be under manual control and one of the following restrictions shall apply:

s 1.

The total high pressure safety injection flow shall be limited to s 210 gpm OR 2.

A reactor coolant system vent of 2 2.6 square inches shall exist.

APPLICABILITY: When the RCS temperature is 1 327 F and the RCS is vented 0

to < 8 square inches.

ACTION:

a.

With one PORV' inoperable, e:ther restore the inoperable PORV to OPERABLE P atus within 5 days or depressurize and vent the RCS l

through a 2 1.3 square inch vent (s) within the next 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />; maintain the RCS in a vented condition until both PORVs have been restored to OPERABLE status.

b.

With both PORVs inoperable, depressurize and vent the RCS through a 2 2.6 square inch vent (s) within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />; maintain the RCS in a vented condition until either one OPERABLE PORV and a vent of 21.3 square inches has been established or both PORVs have been restored to OPERABLE status.

EXCEPT when required for testing.

CALVERT CLIFFS UNIT 1 3/4 4-26a Amendment No. A4,145

i i

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM I

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued) c.

In the event either the PORVs or the RCS vent (s) are used to i

(

mitigate a RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to S>ecification 6.9.2 within 30 days.

The report shall describe tie circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the PORVs or vent (s) on the transient and any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence, L

d.

With less than two HPSI pumps # disabled, place at least two HPSI pump handswitches in pull-to-lock within fifteen minutes And disable two HPSI pumps within the next four hours, l

8 e.

With one or more HPSI loop MOVs not prevented from automatically aligning a HPSI pump to the RCS, immediately t

place the MOV handswitch in pull-to-override, or shut and disable the affected MOV or isolate the affected HPSI header flowpath within four hours, lad implement the action j

requirements of Specifications 3.1.2.1, 3.1.2.3, and 3.S.3, as applicable, f.

With HPSI flow exceeding 210 gpm while suction is aligned to the RWT and an RCS vent of < 2.6 square inches exists, i

1.

Immediately take action to reduce flow to less than or equal to 210 gpm.

4 2.

Verify the excessive flow condition did not raise pressure

~

above the maximum allowable pressure for the given RCS temperature on Figure 3.4-2a or Figure 3.4-2b.

3.

If a pressure limit was exceeded, take action in accordance with Specification 3.4.9.1.

g.

The provisions of specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

l l

f EXCEPT when required for testing.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 4-26b Amendment No. #,145

JtEACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE RE0VIR E NTS 4.4.9.3.1 Each PORY shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a.

Performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on the PORY actuation channel, but excluding valve operation, within 31 days prior to entering a condition in which the PORV is required OPERABLE and at least once per 31 days thereafter when the PORV is required i

OPERABLE.

b..

Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on the PORY actuation channel at least once per 18 months.

Verifying the PORV isolation valve is open at least once pe, 72 c.

hours when the PORV is being used for overpressure protection..

j d.

Testing in accordance with the inservice test requirements for i

ASME Category C valves pursuant to Specification 4.0.5 4.4.9.3.2 The RCS vent (s) shall be verified to be open at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />

• when the vent (s) is being used for overpressure protection.

4.4.9.3.3 All high pressure safety injection pumps, except the above OPERABLE pump, shall be demonstrated inoperable at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by verifying that the motor circuit breakers have been removed from their electrical power supply circuits or by verifying their discharge valves are locked shut.

The automatic opening feature of the high pressure safety _ injection loop MOVs shall be verified disabled at least once per.12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

i l

r 1

L

}

l-Except when the vent pathway is locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the open position, then verify these vent pathways open at least once per 31 days.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 4-26c Amendment No. Jf,145 t

's EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 0

ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T 2 300 F agg LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.2 Two independent ECCS subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of:

a.

One OPERABLE high-pressure safety injection pump, b.

One OPERABLE low-pressure safety injection pump, and c.

An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water tank on a Safety injection Actuation Signal and automatically transferring suction to the containment sump on a Recirculktion Actuation Signal.

APPLICABIllTY: MODES 1, 2 and 3*.

ACTION:

a.

With one ECCS subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, b.

In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date.

With pressurizer pressure 2 1750 psia.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 5-3 Amendment No.145

L EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS S RVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.5.2.Each ECCS subsystem shall be ' demonstrated OPERABLE *:

I

a.

At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by verifying that the following valves are in the indicated positions with p0wer to the valve

' operators removed:

Yg]ye Number Valve Function Valve Position 1.

MOV-659 Mini-flow Isolation Open 2.-

MOV-660 Mini-flow Isolation Open 3.

CV-306 Low Pressure SI Open Flow Control b._

At least once per 31 days by:

1. -

Verifying that upon a Recirculation Actuation Test Signal, the containment sump isolation valves.open.

2.

Verifying that each valve-(manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

c.

By a visual-inspection which verifies that no loose-debris

')

(rags,. trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the containment which could be transported to the containment sump and cause

' restriction-of the pump suctions during LOCA conditions. This Anal inspection shall be performed:

1.

For all accessible areas of the containment prior to establishing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, and 2.

Of the areas affected within. containment at the completion of containment entry when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established, d.

'Within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> prior to increasing the RCS pressure above 1750 psia by verifying,' via local indication at the valve, that CV-306 is open.

Whenever flow testing into the RCS is required at RCS temperatures 0

below 327 F, the high pressure safety injection pump shall recirculate RCS water (suction from RWT isolated) or the controls of Technical Specification 3.4.9.3 shall apply.

.CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 5-4 Amendment No.145

t s

a,. :

EMERGENCY' CORE COOLING' SYSTEMS-0 w

. ECCS: SUBSYSTEMS - T,yg _ < 300 F

= LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.3 As a minimum, one ECCS subsystem comprised of the following aall be OPERABLE:

a.-

One# OPERABLE high pressure safety injection pump, and-b.

An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water tank on a Safety Injection Actuation Signal and automatically transferring suction to the containment sump on a Recirculation Actuation Signal.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 3* and 4.

ACTION:

a.

With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status within I hour or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />, b.

In the event the ECCS is actuated.and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation.

and the: total accumulated actuation cycles to date.

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS-4.5.3.1 The ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the applicable Surveillance Requirements of 4.5.2.

With pressurizer pressure'< 1750 psia, 0

Between 350 F and 327 F (inclusive), a transition region exists where the OPERABLE HPSI pump will be placed in pull-to-lock on a cooldown and restored to automatic status on a heatup.

Below 327 F, 0

the required OPERABLE HPSI pump shall be in pull-to-lock and will 0

not start automatically. Below 327 F, HPSI pump use will be conducted.in accordance with Technical Specification 3.4.9.3.

CALVERT_ CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 5-6 Amendment No. J H M E,145

j4 F

.. 3 4*

EMERGENCY CORE C00LENG SYSTEM REFUELING WATER TANK LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.4 The refueling water tank shall be OPERABLE with:

a.

A minimum contained borated water volume of 400,000 gallons,

,j b.

A boron concentration of between 2300 and 2700 ppm.

0 c.

A minimum water temperature of 40 F, and 0

d.

A maximum ' solution temperature of 100 F in MODE 1. -

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

. ACTION:

With the refueling water tank inoperabic, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS I

4.5.4 The RWT shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

i 11 a.

At least once per 7 days by:

1.

' Verifying the contained borated water volume in the tank, and-t 2.

Verifying-the boron concentration of the water.

1 1

b.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying the RWT temperature 0

when the.outside air temperature is < 40 F, 4

i 1

I

\\

i CALVERI CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 5-7 AmendmentNo.f2,44145 y

I I

,4 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES 3/4.4.1-COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION The plant is designed to operate with both reactor coolant loops and associated reactor coolant pumps in operation, and maintain DNBR above 1.195 during all normal operations and anticipated transients.

'A single reacto coolant. loop with its steam generator filled above the low;1evel trip setpoint provides sufficient heat removal capability for core cooling while in MODES 2 and 3; however,. single failure considerations require plant shutdown if component repairs and/or corrective actions cannot be made within the allowable out-of-service time.

In MODES 4 and 5, a single reactor coolant loop or shutdown cooling loop provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; but single failure' considerations require that at least two loops be OPERABLE. Thus, if the reactor coolant loops are not 0PERABLE, this specification requires two shutdown cooling loops to be OPERABLE.

The operation of one Reactor' Coolant = Pump or one shutdown cooling pump provides adequate flow to. ensure mixing, prevent stratification and produce gradual reactivity changes during boron concentration reductions in the Reactor Coolant System. The reactivity change rate associated with boron reductions will, therefore, be within the capability of operator recognition and control.

The restrictions on starting a Reactor Coolant Pump during MODES 4 and 5 with the RCS temperature 1 327 F-are provided to prevent RCS l

0 pressure, transients, caused by energy additions from the secondary system, which could exceed the limits of Appendix G to 10'CFR Part 50 (see Bases 3/4.4.9).

For operation of the reactor coolant pumps during the summer / fall 1990 outage and the associated low decay heat load

(:hutdown for.at least 60 days) the following criteria apply:

-(1) restricting the water volume in the pressurizer and thereby providing a volume for the primary coolant to expand into and (2) by restricting-starting of the-RCPs to when the indicated secondary water temperature of-each steam generator is less than or equal to 30 F above the Reactor 0

Coolant System temperature, (3) limit the initial indicated pressure of-the pressurizer to less than or equal to 300.psic by plant computer indication or equivalent precision instrument.

3/4.4.2-SAFETY VALVES The pressurizer code safety valves operate to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2750 psia.

Each safety valve is designed to relieve approximately 3 x 105 lbs per hour of saturated steam at the valve setpoint. The relief capacity of a single safety valve is adequate to relieve any overpressure condition which could occur during' shutdown.

In the event that no safety valves are OPERABLE, an operating shutdown cooling loop, connected to the RCS, provides overpressure relief capability and will prevent RCS overpressurization.

During operation, all pressurizer code safety valves must be OPERABLE to prevent ~the RCS from being pressurized above its safety limit of 2750 psia. The combined relief capacity c' these valves is sufficient to

)

CALVERT. CLIFFS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-1 Amendment No. Ef/EJ/JE/EE,145

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM-sms -

steam generator tube _ rupture accident in conjunction with an assumed steady state primary-to secondary steam generator leakage rate of 1.0 gpm and a concurrent loss of offsite electrical power. The values for' the; limits on specific activity represent interiin limits based upon a-parametric-evaluation by tho NRC of typical site locations.

These values are' conservative in that specific site parameters of the Calvert Cliffs site, such as site boundary location and meteorological conditions, were not considered in this evaluation.

The NRC is finalizing site specific criteria which will be used as the basis for the' reevaluation of the specific activity-limits of this site. This reevaluation may result in higher limits.

The ACTION statement permitting POWER OPERATION to continue for limited time periods with the primary coolant's specific activity >1.0 uCi/ gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131, but within the allowable limit shown on Figure 3.4-1,~ accommodates possib?e Mdine spiking phenomenon which may occur following changes in THERMA POWER. Operation with specific activity levels exceeding 1.0 uti/ gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 but within

-the limits shown on Figure 3.4n must be restricted to no more than 10 percent of _the unit's yearly operating time since the activity levels allowed by Figure 3.4-1 increase-the 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> thyroid dose at the site boundary by a factor of up to 20 following a postulated steam generator tube rupture.

0 Reducing T to < 560 F prevents the r61 ease of activity should a steamgenerator,Oberupturesincethesaturationpressureoftheprimary coolant is below the lift pressure of the atmospheric steam relief valves.

The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that excessive specific. activity levels.in the primary coolt.nt will be detected in-sufficient time to take corrective action.

Information obtained on iodine sp Aing will be used to assess the parameters associated with spiking phenomena. A reduction in frequency of isotopic-analyses following power changes may be permissible if justified by the data obtained.

3/4.4.9 PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS Operatior, within the appropriate heatup and cooldown curves assures the= integrity of the reactor vessel against fracture induced by combinative thermal and pressure stresses. As the vessel is subjected to increasing fluence, the toughness of the limiting material continues to decline, and ever more restrictive Pressure / Temperature limits must be observed. The current limits, Figures 3.4-2a and 3.4-2b, are for up to and including'12 Effective Full Power Years (EFPY) of operation.

The shift in the material fracture toughness, as represented by RTunT, t the 1/4 T position, the adjusted reference temperature (ART) is calculated using Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2.

For 12 EFPY, a CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-5 Amendment No. 145

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM C

BASES' 0

0 value-is-222 FJ.

At the 3/4 T position the ART value is 162.5 F, These values'are used with procedures developed in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III,' A>pendix G to calculate heatup and cooldown limits in accordance with t1e requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G.

' To develop composite pressure-temperature limits for the heatup transient, the isothermal,1/4 T heatup, and 3/4 T heatup pressure-temperature limits are compared for a given thermal rate.

Then the most-restrictive pressure-temperature limits are combined over the complete temperature interval resulting in a composite limit curve for the reactor vessel beltline for the heatup event.

To develop a composite pressure-temperature limit for the cooldown event, the isothermal pressure-temperature limit must be calculated. The

-isothermal pressure-temperature limit is then compared to the pressure-temperature limit associated with a cooling rate and the more restrictive allowable pressure-temperature limit is chosen resulting in a composite

. limit curve for the reactor vessel beltline.

Both 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix G and ASME, Code Appendix G require the development of-pressure-temperature limits which are applicable to inservice hydrostatic ~ tests.

The minimum temperature for the inservice hydrostatic test pressure can be determined by entering the. curve at the test pressure (1.1 times normal operating pressure) and locating the corresponding' temperature. This curve is shown for 12 EFPY on-Figures 3.4-2a and 3.4-2b.

Similarly,10 CFR Part 50 specifies that core critical limits be established based on material considerations. This limit is shown on the heatup curve, Figure 3.4-2a.

Note that'this limit does not consider the core reactivity' safety analyses that actually control the temperature at which the core can be brought critical.

The Lowest Service Temperature is the minimum allowable temperature at pressures above 20% of the pre-operational system hydrostatic test pressure'(625 psia). This temperature is defined as equal to the most limiting,RT for the balance of the Reactor Coolant System components plus 100 F,NDTper Article NB 2332 of Section III of the ASME Boiler and

-Pressure Vessel Code.

The horizontal line between the minimum boltup temperature-and the Lowest Service Temperature is defined by the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code as 20% of the pre-operational hydrostatic test pressure.

The change in the line at 150 F on the cooldown curve is due to a cessation of RCP flow induced pressure deviation, since no RCPs are permitted to 0

operate during a cooldown below 150 F.

I CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-6 Amendment No.145

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM:

o -

BASES The mihimum boltup temperature is the minimum allowable temperature at pressures below 20% of the pre-operational system hydrostatic test pressure. The minimum is defined as the initial RT nT for the material N

of the~ higher stressed region of the reactor ve sel plus any effects for irradiation per Article G 2222 of Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.

The initial reference temperature of the reactor vessel and closure head flanges was determined using the certified

,o material test reports and Branch Technical Position.MTEB 5-2.

The maximum initial RT nT associated with the stressed region of'the closure head flange is -10k.

The minimum boltup temperature including 0

0 0

temperature instrument uncertainty is -10 F + 10 F-= 0 F.

However, for 0

conservatism, a minimum boltup temperature of 70 F is utilized.

The design basis events in the low temperature region assuming a water-solid system are:

A RCP start with hot steam generators; and, An inadvertent HPSI actuation with concurrent charging.

Any measures which will-prevent or mitigate the design basis events are sufficient for any less severe incidents.

Therefore, this section will discuss the results of the RCP start and mass addition transient analyses. Also discussed is the effectiveness of a pressurizer steam bubble and a single PORV relative to mitigating the: design basis events.

The RCP start transient is a severe LTOP challenge for a water solid RCS.

Therefore, during water solid operations all 4 RCPs'are tagged out of service. Analysis indicates the transient is adequately controlled by restricting' initial pressurizer pressure and level, and by the secondary-to-primary system temperature difference. -To avoid opening the PORV, indicated initial pressurizer pressure shall be no_ more than-300 psia =(320 psia, actual) for RCP starts.

Indicated pressurizer level shall be go more than 165--inches, based on an actual level of 190 inches, or 737 ft steam volume. The indicated secondary-to-primary system 0

0 temperature difference shall be no more than 30 F, (50 F actual)..

The inadvertent actuation of one HPSI pump in conjunction with one charging pump is the most severe mass addition overpressurization event.

Analyses were performed for a single HPSI pump and one charging pump 2

assuming one PORV available with the existing orifice area of 1.29 in,

TorL the limiting case, only a single PORV is considered available due to, aingle failure criteria. A figure was developed which shows the cliculated RCS pressures versus time that will occur assuming HPSI and caarging pump mass inputs, and the expansion of the RCS following loss of decay heat removal.

Sufficient overpressure protection results when the equilibrium pressure does not exceed the limiting Appendix G curve p', essure.

Because the equilibrium pressure i

l CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-7 Amendment No.145

l._

t l l -e,

j REACTOR C00LANT SYSTEM BASES exceeds the Appendix G limit for full HPSI flow, HPSI flow is throttled to no more than 210 gpm indicated when the HPSI pump is used for mass addition.

The HPSI flow limit includes allowances for instrumentation uncertainty, charging pump flow addition and RCS-expansion following loss of decay heat removal. -The HPSI flow is injected through only one HPSI_

loop MOV to limit instrumentation uncertainty, No more than one charging pump (4A gpm) is allowed to operate during the HPSI mass addition.

Comparison of the PORV discharge curve with the critical pressurizer pressure of 424.5 psia indicates that adequate protection is-provided by 0

a single PORV for RCS temperatures above 70 F when all mass input is-limited to 380 gpm.

HPSI discharge is limited to 210 gpm to allow for one charging pump.and system expansion due to loss of decay heat removal.

To provide single-failure protection against a HPSI pump mass addition transient, the HPSI loop M0V handswitches must be placed in pull-to override so the valves do not automatically actuate upon receipt of a SIAS signal. Alternative actions, described in the ACTION STATEMENT, are to disable-the affected MOV (by racking out its-motor circuit breaker or equivalent), or to isolate the affected HPSI header.

Examples of HPfl header isolation actions include; (1) de-energizirg and tagging shut the HPSI header isolation valves; (2) locking shut ard tagging all three HPSI pump discharge MOVs; and (3) disabling all three HPSI pumps.

Three 100% capacity HPSI pumps are installed at Calvert Cliffs.

Procedures will require that two of the three HPSI pumps be disabled 0

(breakers racked out) at RCS temperatures less than or equal to 327 F and that the remaining HPSI pump handswitch be placed in pull-to-lock.

Additionally, the HPSI pump normally in pull-to-lock shall be throttled to less than or equal to 210 gpm when used to add mass to the RCS.

Exceptions are provided for ECCS testing and for response to LOCAs.

A pressurizer steam volume and a single PORV will provide satisfactory control-of all mass addition transients with the exception of-a spurious actuation of full flow from-a HPSI pump. Overpressurization due to this 0

. transient will be precluded for temperatures below 327 F by disabling two HPSI pumps, placing the third in pull-to-lock, and by throttling the third pump to less than or equal to 210 gpm flow when it is used to add mass to the RCS.

Note that only the design bases events are discussed in detail since the less severe transients are bounded by the RCP start and inadvertent HPSI actuation analysis.

RCS temperature, as used in the applicability statement, is determined as follows: (1) with the RCPs running, the RCS cold leg temperature is the appropriate indication, (2) with the shutdown cooling system in operation, the shutdown cooling temperature indication is appropriate, (3) if neither the RCPs or shutdown cooling is in operation, the core exit thermocouples are the appropriate indicators of RCS temperature.

1 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-6 Amendment No. 145

c.:

it';

t DELETED CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-9 Amendment No. 145

-. ii.

3; r

l. :,L 1

DELETED l_

i

. cal. VERT CLIFFS - 1.! nit 1 B 3/4 4-10 Amendment No 145

v

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, U. d. L.

lO 1;.

-REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM' BASES

.g'_

' 5Yr DELETED j

i i CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-11 Amendment No. Ef,145 i

- 3/4'. 5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS-(ECCS)

BASES 3/4.5.1 SAFETY INJECTION TANKJ

.The OPERABILITY of each of the RCS safety injection tanks ensure that a sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the rector core through each of the cold legs in the event the RCS pressure falls below-the pressure of the safety injection tanks. This initial surge of water into the core provides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.

The limits on safety injection tank volume, boron concentration and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for safety injection tank injection in the accident analysis are met.

The safety injection tank power operated isolation valves are considered-to be " operating bypasses" in the context of IEEE Std. 279-1971, which requires that bypasses of a protective function be removed automatically whenever permissive conditions are not met.

In-addition, as these ~ safety injection tank isolation valves-fail to meet single failure criteria, removal of power to the valves is required.

The limits for operation with a safety injection tank inoperable for any reason except an isolation valve closed minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occurring concurrent with failure of an additional safety injection tank which may result in unacceptable peak

-cladding temperatures.

If a closed isolation valve cannot be immediately opened, the full capability of one safety injection tank is not arailable and prompt action is required to place the. reactor in a mode whera this capability.is not required.

3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3-ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITY ~of two separate ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration.

Either_ subsystem operating in connection with the safety injection tanks is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to-limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward.

In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides-long term core ccoling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.

Portions.of the low pressure safety injection (LPSI) system flowpath are common to both subsystems. This includes the low pressure safety injection flow control valve, CV-306, the flow orifice downstream of CV-306, and the four low pressure safety injection loop isolation valves.

Although the portions of the flowpath are common, the system design is adequate to ensure reliable ECCS operation due to the short period of LPSI system operation following a design Loss of Coolant Incident prior to recirculation. The LPSI system design is consistent with the assumptions in the safety analysis.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-1 Amendment No. IM 145

V f; fM RGENCY CORE {00 LING SYSTEMS BASES =

.The trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) stored in dissolving baskets located in tce containment basement is provided to minimize the 5

possibility of corrosion cracking of certain metal components during operation _of the ECCS-following a LOCA. The TSP provides this protection by dissolving in the sump water and causing its final pH to be raised to 2 7.0.

The requirement < to dissolve a representative sample of TSP in a sample of RWT water providis assurance that-the stored TSP will dissolve in borated water at the po;tulated post LOCA temperatures.

The Surveillance Requ irenients provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensure that as a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are _ met and the stbsystem OPERABILITY is maintained.

The surveillance requirement for flow balance. testing provides assurance-that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA.

Maintenance g

of proper flow resistance and pressure drop'in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to:

(1) prevent total pump flow from

['

exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA-analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses. Minimum 0

HPSI flow requirements for temperatures above 327 F are based upon small break LOCA calculations which credit charging pump flow following an SIAS. Surveillance testing includes allowances for instrumentation and system leakage uncertainties.

The 470 gpm requirement for minimum HPSI flow from the three lowest flow legs includes instrument uncertainties but not system check valve leakage.

The OPERABILITY of the charging-pumps and the associated flow paths is assured by the Boration: System Specification 3/4.1.2.

Specification of safety injection pump total developed head ensures pump performance is consistent.with safety analysis _ assumptions.

0

- At temperatures below 327 F, HPSI injection flow is limited to less than or equal to 210 gpm except in response to excessive reactor coolant leakage.

With excessive RCS leakage (LOCA), make-up requirements could exceed 210 gpm. Overpressurization is prevented by controlling other parameters, such as RCS pressure and subcooling.

This provides overpressure protection in the low temperature region. An analysis has been performed which shows this flow rate is more than adequate to meet core ' cooling safety analysis assumptions.

HPSIs are not required to auto-start when the RCS is in the MPT enable condition. The Safety Injection Tanks provide.immediate injection of borated water into the core in the event of an accident, allowing adequate time for an operator to take action to start a HPSI.

Surveillance testing of HPSI pumps is required to ensure pump operability. Some surveillance testing requires that the HPSI pumps deliver flow to the RCS, To allow this testing to be done without E

increasing the potential for overpressurization of the RCS, either the RWT must be isolated or the HPSI pump flow must be limited to less than or equal to 210 gpm or an RCS vent greater than 2.6 square inches must be provided.

CALVERT CLIFFS UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. Ef/Jpf/JJ7,145 w,

j

i.3 EME GENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES ~

'l 3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER TANK (RWT)

~

.The OPERABILITY of the RWT as part of the ECCS ensures that a i

sufficient supply of boratec water is available for injection by-the ECCS in the event of a LOCA. The limits on RWT minimum volume and boron

' concentration ensure-that 1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, and 2)- the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following mixing of the RWT and the RCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly.

These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.

The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not 7

usable because of. tank-discharge line location or other physical characteristics.

1 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-2a Amendment No.145

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