ML20054L490
| ML20054L490 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 06/30/1982 |
| From: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Fiedler P JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20054L491 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-02-03.A, TASK-02-03.B, TASK-02-03.B1, TASK-02-03.C, TASK-2-3.A, TASK-2-3.B, TASK-2-3.B1, TASK-2-3.C, TASK-RR LSO5-82-06-145, LSO5-82-6-145, NUDOCS 8207080171 | |
| Download: ML20054L490 (22) | |
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q June 30, 1982 Docket No. 50-219 LS05-82-06-145 Mr. P. B. Fiedler Vice President and Director - Oyster Creek Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Post Office Box 388 Forked River, New Jersey 08731
Dear Mr. Fiedler:
SUBJECT:
OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, SAFETY EVALUATION OF SEP HYDROLOGY TOPICS, II-3.A, II-3.B.
II-3.B.1 AND II-3.C is our staff's evaluation of SEP hydrology topics II-3.A, Hydrology Description; II-3.B. Flooding Potential and Protective Require-ments; II-3.B.1, Capability of Operating Plants to Cope with Design Basis Flood Conditions; and II-3.C. Safety Related Water Supply (Ultimate Heat Sink). These evaluations are based on review of our contractors Technical Evaluation Report concerning these topics and is provided for your infor-mation as Enclosure 2.
Our conclusions regarding these topics are summarized below:
o Topic II-3. A. HydroSogy Description, complete. No further action required.
o Topic II-3.B. Flood Potential and Protection Requirements, points out that the Oyster Creek plant does not provide adequate protecting against local flooding resulting from the probable maximum.
precipitation.
In particular, roof loads and ground water design levels do not meet licensing criteria.
5604 o Topic II-3.B.1, Capability of Operating Plants to Cope with a Design Basis Flood, points out that the existing Oyster Creek procedure for shutting down the plant during hurricane induced flooding does not meet current licensing criteria.
b54 M5 o Topic II-3.C. Safety Related Water Supply, points outt that shutdown core cooling could be lost during a hurricance induced flood (assuming a loss of power to the condensate transfer system) and that the present emergency procedures are not adequate to ensure 8207080171 820630 PDR ADOCK 05000219 P
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Mr. Fiedler core cooling for 30 dafs. Consequently, the ultimate heat sink does not meet licensing criteria.
These topic evaluations will be a basic input to the integrated assessment.
Sincerely, Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #5 Division of Licensing
Enclosures:
As stated cc w/ enclosures:
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Mr. P. B. Fiedler cc G. F. Trowbridge, Esquire Resident Inspector Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge c/o U. S. NRC 1800 M Street, N. W.
Post Office Box 445 Washington, D. C.
20036 Forked River, New Jersey 08731 J. B. Lieberman, Esquire Commissioner Berlack, Israels & Lieberman New Jersey Department of Energy 26 Broadway 101 Commerce Street New York, New York 10004 Newark, New Jersey 07102
. Ronald C. Haynes, Regional Administrator Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 J.. Knubel BWR Licensing Manager GPU Nuclear 100 Interplace Parkway Parsippany, New Jersey 07054 Deputy Attorney General State of New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety 36 West State Street - CN 112 Trenton, New Jersey 08625 Mayor Lacey Township 818 Lacey Road Fo.rked River, New Jersey 08731 U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Region II Office ATTN:
Regional Radiation Representative 26 Federal Plaza New York, New York 10007 Licensing Supervisor l
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
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Post Office Box 388 Forked River, New Jersey 08731 l
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ENCLOSURE 1 1
HYDROLOGIC ENGINEERING SAFETY EVALUATION FOR SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM Topic II-3.A, Hydrologic Description Topic II-3.B. Flooding Potential and Protection Requirements Topic II-3.B.1, Capability of Operating Plants to Cope with Design Basis Flood Conditions Topic II.-3.C. Safety-Related Water Supply (Ultimate Heat Sink)
Plant Name: Oyster Creek Nuclear Power Station Docket Numbers: 50-219 I.
INTRODUCTIOjl The Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) was established by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to evaluate the safety of 10 older nuclear power p.lants.
The program evaluates the, plants against current licensing criteria with respect to 137 selected topics.
,e The hydrologic topics provide:
e a brief description of the hydrologic features of the site and t
surrounding area, plant facilities and the[ design bases used for construction.
Additionally both surface and groundwater and their interfaces with plant safety-related buildings and systems are described.
o Design bases floods for the plant are developed, using current criteria, and compared to the design bases events used when the plant was built.
Deviations and their safety signifi.ance are discussed.
Acceptability of current features are noted where applicable.
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=2-e Where physical protection is used to prevent plant flooding, the design and design bases are reviewed and compared to current criteria.
The variations, if any, and their safety significance with respect to structural and equipment distress are discussed.
e The design basis groundwater level for hydrostatic loading is determined in accordance with current criteria and compared to the value used for design.
e Existing emergency plans or procedures and technical specifications related to flooding or safety-related water supply are reviewed and compared to current criteria. Deficiencies are noted and, where possible, acceptable fixes are recommended.
Where emergency plans or t'echn,ical specifications do not exist but are a potential solution to a problem, they are disdussed and recommendations made, if appropriate.
e As reviewed here, the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) consists of water sources for the cooling water system, necessary ret'aining structures (e.g.,
a pond with its dam or a cooling tower supply basin), and the canals or conduits connecting the sources with (but not including) the cooling water system intake structures. The existing UHS is compared to current criteria with respect to available supply and maximum temperature, and if deficiencies exist, they are discussed and acceptable solutions recommended, if possible.
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3-The information used to perform the reviews was gathered from the licensee's files, NRC files, other agencies, and the site visit.
In some cases, detailed information was not available. In such cases, the staff and its consultants conservatively estimated these parameters required for analysis. For this evaluation the staff consultant was the Franklin Research Center.
II.
REVIEW CRITERIA Current licensing criteria for nuclear power plants, related to the SEP topics addressed in this report, were developed from the Code of Federal Regulations: 10 CFR Part 50, " Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," and General Design Criterion 2, 4, 5, and 44 of Appendix A.
" General Design Criteria"; 10 CFR Part 100, " Reactor Site Criteria" and Appendix -A, " Seismic and Geologic Siting Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants".
The criteria which are applicable are (1) Standard Review Plans 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 2.4.3, 2.4.4, 2.4.5, 2.4.6, 2.4.7, 2.4.8, 2.4.9, 2.4.10, 2.4.11,
2.4.12, 2.4.14, 3.4.1, and 9.2.5 (Ref.1 ); (2) Regulatory Guides 1.102, 1.127,1.27,1.59 and 1.70 (Ref. 2); and (3) American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Standard N170-1976 (Ref. 3).
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RELATED SAFETY TOPICS AND INTERFACES The effects of high surface water and ground water (pertaining to structural strength of building walls, loss of important equipment and its effect on the plants' ability to safely shutdown, etc) are outside the scope of the hydrologic evaluation.
However, the levels of flood j
and ground water are determined in this evaluation and given to the structural and system reviewers for their use.
SEP interface topics are:
11-4.D - Stability of Slopes I1-4.E - Dam Integrity II-4.F - Settlement of Foundations and Buried Equipment III-l - Classification of Stru,ctures, Components and Systems III-3.A - Effects of High Water Level on Structures III-3.8 - Structural and.Other Consequences of Failure of Underdrain Systems III-3.C - Inservice Inspection of Water Control Structures l
III Seismic Design Considerations VII Systems Required for Safe Shutdown VIII On-Site Emergency Power Systems - Diesel Generator
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IX Station Service and Cooling Mater Systems XVI - Technical Specifications n
IV. REVIEW GUIDELINES The hydrologic issues identified in the Introduction are developed from design information for the nuclear power plant and from many sources containing hydrologic infomation for the site. Design bases (elevation of floods, depths of precipitation flooding, elevation of ground water and amounts of available cooling water) are determined and their conformance with or degree of departure from the current criteria is,
assessed. The Standard Review Plans and Regulatory Guides identified in Section II direct a complete evaluation of all issues and suggest or reference appropriate technical evaluation methods.
Regulatory Guides 1.27, 1.59 and 1.102 have been specifically identified as needing consideration for backfit on operating reactors. These guides are used in detemining whether the facility design complies with current criteria or has some equivalent alternatives acceptable to the staff.
The acceptability or nonacceptability of any deviations identified in this evaluation and the need for further action wi]1 be judged during the integrated assessment for this facility.
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l V.
EVALUATION The staff's consultant, Franklin Research Center (FRC), has reviewed the submittals from the Licensee (Ref. 4 and 5) and available background information and made independent analyses necessary to prepare a Technical Evaluation Report (TER) (Appendix A) titled, " Hydrological Considerations (SEP, II-3.A, B, B.1, C) Jersey Central Power and Light Company, Oyster Creek Nuclear Power Plant" dated May 19, 1982 (as revised June 9, 1982). This work was performed under NRC Contract No. 03-79-118 and provides the assessment for Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) Topics:
II-3. A Hydrologic Description; II-3.B, Flooding Potential and Protection Requirements; II-3.B.1, Capability of Operating Plants to Cope with Design Basis Flood Conditions and, II-3.C Safety Related, Water Supply (Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)).
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l The staff has reviewed the TER and generally coEcurs with the evaluations, conclusions and recommendations. The following sumary evaluation describes significant features addressed, any staff differences of opinion with the TER and any independent staff judgements.
Hydrologic Description (Topic II-3.A)
Site and Facilities - The Oyster Creek Nuclear Power Plant went into commercial operatioil in December 1969 producing 650 MWe of electricity with a boiling water reactor. The plant is located about 40 miles north of Atlantic City, New Jersey and is in Ocean County, New Jersey.
It is situated on about 800 acres of land on the east shore of Barnegat Bay, about 2 miles inland. The plant draws once through cooling water from Barnegat Bay through a large intake canal and discharges into a large canal that returns water to the bay.
Hydrosphere - Potential sources of flooding the plant site are Oyster Creek and Barnegat Bay. Oyster Creek drains a 12.4 square mile watershed and flows along the south side of the plant snptying into the discharge canal.
Barnegat Bay is a relatively shallow body of water about 3 to 4 miles wide, between the plant site and a barrier island, separating the bay from the Atlantic Ocean.
Further details about these potential flooding sources are given in the accompanying TER.
i Design Bases - The design basis and protection requirements as originally used to design the Oyster Creek Nuclear Power Plant and those t. hat would be required under current NRC criteria are summarized in Table 1.
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Tabl e 1 Summary of Design Bases Elevation (Protection Requirements) of the Oyster i
1 Creek Nuclear Power Plant Original Bases Current Bases 1969 1982 Event Criteria Value Criteria Value I.
Flooding O
31.88 in/24 hr Roof unknown unknown PMP 27.00 in/6 hr U
23 ft. 5 in. ms1 Local plant unknown unknown PMP+RO U
11.8 ft ms1 Oyster Creek unknown unknown PMF
/ Dam break unknown unknown PMF/ Dam 4712.2 ft ms1 Barnegat Bay Highest 4.5 ft msl PMH_/
22 ft ms1 5
Hurricane surge historical el ev.
1 II. Groundwater Short duration level Plant site unknown 15 ft msl PMH 23 ft ms1 structures
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Intake structure unknow'n 3 ft msl PMH 22 ft ms1 Normal high leve1U Plant site structures unknown unknown 1G ft ms1 Intake structure-tunnel unknown unknown ground level at pt.
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III. Low Water 8l
. unknown Barnegat Bay unknown unknown PMME (Intake Canal)
-(-4.4 ft msl)97 U or use in combination with E robable maximum precipitation.
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seismic loads UPMP routed to surface ~ runoff.
3f robable maximum flood.
Probable maximum meteorological event.
P Extreme low tide plus hydraulic OPMF with dam failure loss as given by Licensee.
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- Probable maximum hurricane N or purposes of hydrostatic pressures and F
uplift forces the total submergence of the structure by the PMH is used.
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_ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ Flooding Potential and Protection Requirements (Topic II-3.8).
This topic identifies all potential external flooding sources that could endanger the plant structures. Flood levels (elevations) are detemined using current NRC criteria.
Roof Flooding - The depth of roof flooding from the Probable Maximum Precipitation (PMP)varieswitheachstructure.
In general, the roofs have not been designed to support the water from a 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> PMP event that will be ponded behind parapets, assuming that the drains are completely blocked.
FRC made the following assessment: "With drains fully blocked, the reactor and turbine building design loads would be exceeded in less than 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> of PMP. Lack of information about other roofs and about roof drains makes it impossible to confirm the Licensee's statement that the design basis loading will not be exceeded by the loading from FMP averaged over the roof if drains are completely functioning. The fact that average loading is below the allowable level does not prove the acceptability of a loading configuration in which some areas of the roof are loaded beyond the design basis. The roofs'do not fulfill current NRC s
criteria."
In the conclusions on roof loading, our consultant has suggested that inservice inspection under Regulatory Guide 1.127 may be an acceptable method to insure fall capacity of roof drains. The NRC staff does not agree with this suggestion. The inspection frequency necessary to insure drain capacity will preclude this as a feasible solution.
Local Flooding - Local site flooding from the PMP was determined by the licensee to have a maximum depth of 5 inches. This depth added to the 23 ft. msl plant grade gives a flooding level of 23 ft. 5 in. msl. The licensee states that the " sill level of all the doorways is at least 6 inches above grade, that is, at El. 23 ft 6 in." (5, p. 37). The licensee did not provide their analysis for review. However, our consultant concluded, based on a site visit and inspection of topographic maps, that, with exception of an area near the off gas building, the site will drain naturally. Our review of drawings S714 and 5715 accompanying the Licensee report (5) indicates that an outside entrance of the turbine building,
several outsi.de entrances of the machine shop-maintenance building,and'two doors between the machine shop and turbine building may have sills below 23 ft 6 in ms,1. Also, no entrances for the die'sel building are shown on drawing S714.
It is known that there are at least 3 entrances to the diesel building that appear to be near plant grade.
The evaluation by FRC also has a concern that ponding in the vicinity of the off gas building may flood that building.
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Until these issues are resolved, we cannot conclude that the plant meetis NRC criteria with respect to local flooding.
Oyster Creek Floodinq - The probable maximum flood (PMF) level for Oyster Creek was determined to be 11.8 ft msl and 12.2 ft ms1 with the failure of Wells Mills dam. These flood levels are no threat to the main plant:
buildings, but the latter one is slightly above the fire pump house elevation of 12 ft msl. Further the dike between the intake and discharge canals would be overtopped by 0.3 ft to 0.7 ft. However, because of the relatively short duration (less than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />) of overtopping and the shallow overflow depths of 0.3 to 0.7 foot, the staff judges that this situation would not be a flooding threat to the pump structure.
Hurricane Flooding - The probable maximum hurricane (PMH) stillwater level at the site is estimated to be 22 ft msl with less than 1 foot of wave runup. This level would not reach any structures on the main plant site, but would inundate both the intake structure and the fire water pump building.
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1 Groundwater - FRC assumed that the maximum shor,t duration groundwater elevation would occur from precipitation associated with a PMH and it coincides with plant grade (23 ft ms1). The design basis groundwater level for use in combination with seismic events is 18 ft ms1 (or ground elevation for locations where ground level is less than 18 ft msl).
Capability of Operating Plants to Cope with Design Basis Flood Conditions (Topic II-3.B.1)
Protection against" floods can be accomplished by implementing emergency procedures and technical specifications. This topic focuses on the adequacy
. of the emergency procedures to provide for safe shutdown and cooldown of the reactor during and after hurricane flooding from Barnegat Bay.
The attached TER has evaluations of the Licensee's Emergency Procedures
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520 and 532, that prepare the plant for shutdown when the water level (in the intake canal) reaches elevation 4.5 and 6.0 ft ms1 respectively.
'Our consultant found the procedures to be deficient in that there is no redundancy with respect to pump motor power supply. This issue will need to be evaluated by the SEP as it is outside the scope of the Hydrologic issues.
Additionally, the instrumentation for measuring the water level in the intake ' channel is inadequate and there is no measuring device in the discharge channels. We suggest that there be a,utomatic water level gages in both canals with infomation electronically conveyed to the control room (and alarmed) and easily read back-up visual gages so that Procedures 520 and 532 can be implemented at the predetermined water levels, There are presently no technical specifications that incorporate the flood emergency procedures at Oyster Creek Nuclear Power Plant.
It is recommended that a technical specification be prepared by the Licensee which limits operation of the plant when water levels in the intake and discharge canals exceed 4.5 ft msl. This specification will ensure that normal cooldown will be effected for as long as possible prior to emergency cooldown.
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The emergency procedures in their present form do not meet current criteria specified in Regulatory Guides 1.59 and 1.102. Modifications necessary to make the procedures acceptable to the staff will have to be addressed during the integrated assessment. A Technical Specification is suggested to set the' limiting conditions of operation and to establish time and elevation control points to be used in implementing the procedures.
Safety-Related Water Supply (UHS) (Topic II-3.C)
This topic reviews the acceptability (supply and temperature) of water source (s) with re'spect to providing safety-related water during emergency shutdown and maintenance of safe shutdown.
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The Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) f'or Oyster Creek Nuclear Power Plant is Barnegat Bay, from which Water is drawn by an inlet canal and returned by a discharge canal. The inlet canal is 140 feet wide,10 feet deep, and lined with riprap covered with a layer of 4 inches of crushed stone bonded I
with asphalt. The discharge canal is 100 feet wide and lined similarly to the inlet canal.
i In the attached TER, our consultant has evaluated the vulnerability of the f
' UHS complex to seismic phenomena, probable maximum hurricane, flooding, missiles, combination of events, single failure of a structure and low water. Some of the topic evaluation in the TER is outside the scope,of
.. the hydrologic review and needs to be complemented by SEP evaluation.
As noted in the TER, the licensee has not addressed some necessary technical specification issues.
Refer to the attached TER for the complete evaluation. Two issues of particular concern are discussed below.
The Licensee has not demonstrated that, in the event of a PMH, use of the Oyster Creek Emergency Procedures 520 and 532 are sufficient to ensure that the safe shutdown of the reactor can be maintained for 30 days. The procedures rely on the use of the isolation condenser which has two sources of supply water.
Each isolation condenser shell contains a minimum of 22,730 gallons, which represents 11,060 gallons of water above the tubes.
Makeup to the isolation condensers is provided by either the condensate transfer system (normal source) or the fire protection system. -Because the. makeup sources for the isolation condensers are susceptible to a single failure and flooding, the plant does nob have a completely reliable means for maintaining a safe shutdown. As a consequence, the Oyster Creek plant does not meet 3riteria 1 and 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.27 with respect to a PMH.
1 The Licensee estimated an elevation of -4.4 ft ms1 as the extreme low tide plus hydraulic loss, but has not verified that the design low water level resulted from a probable maximum meteorological event. The design low water elevation would have to be revised should the level from a probable maximum event be lower. A technical specification may have to be developed
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for safe shutdown of the reactor if the estimated minimum water level is below the service water pump suction, elevation (which has also not been provided by the Licensee). At present, however, the plant has a backup supply of water in the fire protection pond which acts as an UHS for this event and for other events resulting in a loss of water in the intake canal.
With respect to the unresolved issues, the supply of safety-related water does not meet current criteria.
VI. CONCLUSIONS,
The following conclusions identify those site features, protection structures, or procedures which meet or do not meet present licensing criteria. Those issues which are unresolved or will be resolved in interface topics are identified.
In the TER, the bracketed conclusions should be interpreted as ' meeting' and 'do not meet
- in place of acceptable and unacceptable.
Hydrologic Description (Topic II-3.A)
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For the purpose of this review, the hydrologic environment has been adequately described. There are no outstanding issues witiiin this topic.
Flooding Potential and protection' Requirements (Topic II-3.B)
Roofs - Roofs of buildings were not designed to withstand the PMP event.
Modifications are recommended so as to comply with present NRC licensing standards.
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15-Local Flooding - The evaluation indicates that the reactor, turbine, diesel generator, old radwaste, and new radwaste buildings will not be flooded by local runoff if it is confirmed that all entrance levels are no lower 4
than the general lowest sill level of 23.5 ft ms1 stated by the Licensee.
Due to configuration of contours near the southwest door of the offgas building, that entrance may flood even though the sill is at 23.5 ft ms1.
Probable Maximum Flood - The PMP-generated PMF of Oyster Creek and the South Branch Forked River does not pose hazards to the buildings on the site.
Probable Maximum Hurricane - The PMH surge elevation does not affect structures at plant grade (elevation 23.0 feet msl). However, surge levels are higher than the elevations of circulating water pumps, emergency service water pumps, and diesel-drive'n fire pumps.
Groundwater - Groundwater elevation at plant grade (elevation 23 feet msl) should be considered a possible short duration event and should be used for the structural analyses except for the intake structure and the fire water pump building. A groundwater elevation of 18 ft msl is to be used in combination with seismic events, except for those structures where ground elevation is less than 18 ft ms1.
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9 Capability of Operating Plants to Cope with Design Basis Flood Conditions (Topic II-3.B.1)
Technical Specifications - There are presently no Oyster Creek plant technical specifications which relate to flooding. Technical specifications are recommended which would limit plant operatiun during high water conditions in the intake canal.
Emergency Procedures - The Oyster Creek Plant Hurricane Emergency Procedures 520 and 532 do not assure that adequate actions would be taken to protect the plant from the consequences of a PMH surge at the site.
Procedures and necessary equipment to assure a reliable cooling water supply during and after a PMH event are needed.
Additionally, tetter water level measuring instrumentation is recommended.
Safety'Related Water Supply (Ultimate Heat Sink) (Topic II-3.C)
The' 0yster Creek ultimate heat sink complex woyld not be functional during a postulated PMH event. Although the cooling water supply in the intake canal would be available, it could not be used during the PMH because all pump motors would be submerged. Emergency procedures 520 and 532,:
which are intended to prepare the plant for flood loss of those pumps, are not adequate to assure that safe shutdown will be reached and maintained.
Additionally the determination of the adequacy of the cooling water, supply during low water events remains unresolved.
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. VII.
REFERENCES 1.
Standard Review Plans, HUREG 0800 (formerly HUREG 75/087), U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, a.
2.4.1 - Hydrologic Description b.
2.4.2 - Floods c.
2.4.3 Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) on Streams and Rivers d.
2.4.4 Potential Dam Failures e.
2.4.7 - Ice Effects f.
2.4.8 - Cooling Water Canals and Reservoirs g.
2.4.10 - Flooding Protection Requirements h.
2.4.11 - Low Water Considerations 1.
2.4.12 - Groundwater J.
2.4.14 - Technical Specifications and Emergency Operation Requirements e
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3.4.1 - Flood Protection
'1.
9.2.5 - Ultimate He'at Sink o
2.
Regulatory Guides, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comniission, Office of Standards Development.
!i 1.102 - Flood Protection for Nuclear Power Plants a.
b.
1.127 - Inspection of Water Control Structures Associated with Nuclear Power Plants 1.27 - Ultima,te Heat Sink for Nuclear Power Plants c.
d.
1.59 - Design Basis Floods for Nuclear Fower Plants 1.70 - Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports e.
for Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG-75/094, I
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. 3.
American flational Standard fil70-1976, " Standards for Deten;:ining Design Basis Flooding at Power Reactor Sites," Published by the American Nuclear Society (ANS-2.8).
1 4.
I. R. Finfrock, GPU Nuclear, Letter to W. Paulson, NRC,
Subject:
Transmittal of Draft SEP Topic Assessments, including II-3.A.
II-3.8, II-3.B.1, II-3.C. III-3.A, II-1.A, II-1.B. II-1.C, III-2, III-3.A. III-4.D. II-4.A II-4.8, and II-4.C. May 7, 1981.
5.
Burns & Roe Report, Response to NRC Questions, SEP Hydrologic Tonic February 1982.
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