ML20054J341

Proposed Tech Spec Pages,Requiring Addl Surveillance for Containment Purge & Vent Valves to Provide Greater Assurance of Isolation in Event of Accident.Safety Evaluation Encl

ML20054J341
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	06/21/1982
From:	POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK
To:
Shared Package
ML20054J331	List: ML20054J330 ML20054J337 ML20054J341
References
NUDOCS 8206280515
Download: ML20054J341 (11)

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ATTACHMENT I 4

• PROPOSED TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES i

j RELATED TO 1

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l CONTAINMENT PU1GE l

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s AND VENT >

1, l-r 1 I POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK i

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- JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT l 4

4 DOCKET NO. 50-333 1 l

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3.7 (cont'd) JAFNPP 4.7 (cont'd)

e. At least once per operating cycle, manual operability of the bypass valve for filter.

cooling shall be demonstrated.

f. Standby Gas Treatment System

2. From and after the date that one circuit Instrumentation Calibration:

of the Standby Gas Treatment System is made or found to be inoperable for any differential once/ operating reason, the following would apply: pressure Cycle

a. If.in Start-up/ Hot Standby, Run or Hot Shutdown mode, reactor operation 2. When one circuit of the Standby or irradiated fuel handling is Gas Treatment System becomes permissible only during the succeeding inoperable, the operable circuit 7 days unless such circuit is sooner shall be demonstrated to be wade operable, provided that during operable immediately and daily such 7 days all active components of thereafter.

the other Standby Gas Treatment Circuit shall be operable.

b. If-in Refuel or Cold Shutdown mode, reactor operation or irradiated fuel handling is permissible only during the succeeding 31 days un-less such circuit is sooner made operable, provided that during such 31 days all active components of the other'Standy Gas Treatment Circuit shall be operable.

3. If Speci fica tion s '3. 7. B . l 'and 3.7.B.2 3*

are not. met, the reactor shall be placed in the' cold condition and

. irradiated fuel handling operations and INTENTIONALLY BLANK operations that could reduce the shutdown margin shall be. prohibited.

Amendment No. J4f JW(

3.7 (cont'd) JAFNPP 4.7 (con'd) 4- When valve No. 27-Mov-120 is

4. Whenever primary containment integrity required to be closed as specified is required as specified in Section 3.7.A.2, valve No. 27-MOV-120 shall be in section 3. 7. a .4 , its position in the closed position; flow to the shall be verified and recorded monthly.

system shall be through valve No. 27-MOV-121.

183 A

. Amendment No.

3.7 '(Cont'd) JAFNPP 4.7 (cont'd)

c. Secondary Containment capability to maintain a 1/4 in. of water vacuum under calm wind conditions with a filter train flow rate of not more than 6,000 cfm, shall be demonstrated at each refueling outage prior to refueling.

D. Primary Containment Isolation Valves D. Primary Containment Isolation Vales

1. Whenever primary containment. int-egrity is reguired per 3.7.A.2, 1. a . A t least once per operating the containment isolation valves cycle, verify that closure listed in Table 3.7-1 shall be time of each automatic isol-operable with closure times as ation valve is in accordance stated in Table 3.7-1, except as with the time limit specified specified in 3.7.D.2 and 3.7.D.3. in Table 3.7-1.

b. At least once per operating cycle, the instrument line excess flow check valves shall be tested for proper operation, c.At least once per quarter:

(1.) All normally open power-operated isolation valves (except for the main steam line power-Amendment No. operated isolation valves) shall be fully closed and reopened.

185 h

I 3.7 (cont'd) JAFNPP 4.7 (cont'd)

(2.) With the reactor at reduced power level, trip main steam isolation valves and ver if y closure time.

d. At least twice per week, the main steam line power-operated isolation valves shall be exercised by partial closure and subsequent reopening.

2. With one or more of the isolation 2. Whenever an isolation valve listed valves listed in Table 3.7-1 inope- in Table 3.7-1 is inoperable, the rable, maintain at least one position of at least one other valve isolation valve operable in each in each line having an inoperable affected penetration that is open and: valve shall be recorded daily,

a. Restore the inoperable valve (s) to operable status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />; or

b. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the closed positions or

c. Isolate each affected penetration by use of at least one closed manual valve or a blind flange.

186 Amendment No.

3 .'7 (cont'd) JAFNPP 4.7 (cont'd) I

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3. When primary containment integrity is required 3. The isolation valves listed

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per 3.7.A.2, the containment vent in Table 3.7-1 shall be .

and purge line isolation valves may d emo n s tr a t ed operable prior

, be open for safety related reasons. to returning the valve to With one containment purge supply service after maintenance, isolation valve and/or one contain . repair or replacement work ment purge exhaust isolation or vent is performed on the valve valve inoperable, operation may or its associated-actuator, i continue until the next cold shutdown control or power circuit by provided that:

performance of a cycling test and verification of closure

a. The operable valve is.close'd; and, time. I l b. Either the inoperable valve is restored to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, or the operable valve is locked closed.

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4. If Specification 3.7.D.1, 3.7.D.2,.and 3.7.D.3 cannot be met, an orderly shutdown i shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in the cold condition within 24 hr.

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, Amendment No.

186 A l

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3.7 BASES (cont'd)

JAFNPP complete containment system, secondary particulate release to the environment containment is required at all times and to prevent clogging of the iodine that primary containment is required as filter. The high-efficiency filters well as during refueling. have an efficiency greater than 99 per-cent for particulate matter larger than The Standby Gas Treatment System is 0.3 micron. The minimum iodine removal designed to filter and exhaust the efficiency is 99 percent. Filter banks reactor building atmosphere to the main will be replaced whenever significant stack during secondary containment changes in filter efficiency occur.

isolation conditions with a minimum Tests (11) of impregnated charcoal iden-release of radioactive materials from tical to that used in the filters in-the reactor building to the environs. dicated that shelf life up to 5 yr leads Both standby gas treatment fans are to only minor decreases in methyl iodine designed to automatically start upon removal efficiency.

containment isolation; however, only one fan is required to maintain the reactor The 99 percent efficiency of the charcoal building pressure at approximately a and particulate filters is sufficient to negative 1/4 in. water gage pressure; prevent exceeding 10CFR100 guidelines for all leakage should be in leakage. Each accidents analyzed. The analysis of the of the two fans has 100 percent capacity. loss-of-coolant accident assumed a char- 1 If one Standby Gas Treatment System coal filter efficiency of 90 percent, a I

circuit is inoperable, the other circuit particulate filter efficiency of 90 percent, must be tested daily. This substantiates and TID 14844 fission product source term.

l the availability of the operable circuit Hence, requiring 99 percent efficiency for j and results in no added risk; thus, both the charcoal and particulate filters reactor operation or refueling operation Provides adequate margin. A heater maintains can continue. If neither circuit is relative humidity below 70 percent in order operable, the Plant is brought to a to assure the efficient removal of methyl l condition where the system is not iodine on the impregnated charcoal filters.

required.

Flow from containment to the S t a ndby Gas While only a small amount of parti- Treatment System is via 6-inch valve culates is released from the Pres- No. 27-MOV-121. Since the maximum flow sure Suppression Chamber System as through this line is within the design a result of the loss-of coolant capabilities of the system, this require-accident, high-efficiency particulate ment assures the operability of the filters are specified to minimize Standby Gas Treatment System.

potential Amendment No. 191

3.7 BASES (cont'd) JAFNPP D. Primary Containment Isolation Valves Double isolation valves are provided on lines penetrating the primary containment and open to the free space

, of the containment. Closure of one of

! the valves in each line would be suf-ficient to maintain the integrity of the Pressure Suppression System.

Automatic initiation is required to minimize the potential leakage paths from the containment in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident.

The containment isolation valves on the containment vent and purge lines may be open for safety related reasons.

Safety related reasons specifically includes inerting or de-inerting primary containment, and maintaining the differential pressure between the drywell and suppression pool.

Amendment No. 192 4

ATTACHMENT II SAFETY EVALUATION RELATED TO CO!TIAINMENT PUIGE AND VENT l

l POWER AUTHORITY OF T!!E STATE OF NEW YORK JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POhTR PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-333

Section I - Description of Modification This proposed amendment to Appendix A of the James A. FitzPatrick nuclear power plant Facility Operating License was prepared in response to NHC letters dated November 29, 1978 and December 15, 1981 (Reference (c) and (d) respectively). These changes are proposed as a result of our review of the sample Technical Specifications provided as Enclosure 5 and Reference (d).

The changes affect the following Sections of Appendix A: 3.7.B.3,

3. 7. D .1, 3. 7. D. 2, 3. 7. D. 3, 4. 7.B . 4, 4 . 7.D. l . a , 4. 7.D. l .b and 4. 7.D. 3 (pagos 183, 183A, 185, 186, 186A and 192.)

These changes were committed to in Reference (e).

sSection II - Purpose of the Modification These changes will provide greater assurance of containment isolation in the event an accident by requiring additional surveillance tests for all containment isolation valves, and by describing actions to be taken in the event of an isolation valve becomes inoperable . Specific actions are detailed for containment vent and purge valves.

In addition, to prevent over pressurization of the Standby Gas Treatment System in the event of an accident, Section 3.7.B.3 has been added. This section requires that flow from containment be routed through a 6 inch valve (2 7-MOV-121) rather than a 12 inch valve (27-MOV-120 ) whenever the system is required to be operable. (See Reference (a) Figure 5.3.2, and drawings attached to Reference (f) . )

Section 4.7.B.4 adds an associated surveillance requirement.

1 Section III - Impact of the change The increased surveillance testing and record keeping required by these proposed Technical Specification Changes should improve safety at the FitzPatrick plant by providing greater assurance of containment isolation in the event of an accident.

Also, the operability of the Standby Gas Treatment System is assured by these changes.

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.Section IV - Implementation of ths Modification The modification as proposed will not impact the Fire Protection or ALARA Programs at the James A. FitzPatrick nuclear power plant.

Section V - Conclusion The incorporation of these modification: a) will not change the probability nor the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report; b) will not increase the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report; and c) will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifications and d) does not I constitute an unreviewed safety question.

Section VI - References l (a) JAF FSAR 1

(b) JAP SER (c) November 29, 1978 letter, T. A. Ippolito (NDC) to G. T. Berry (PASNY) regarding Containment Purging During Normal Plant Operation.

l (d) December 15, 1981 letter, T. A. Ippolito (NRC) to G. T. Berry (PASNY) regarding Generic Coacerns of Containment Purge and Vent.

(e) March 8, 1982 letter, J. P. Bayne (PASNY) to D. Vassallo (NRC) regarding Containment Venting and Purging (JPN-82-28).

(f) August 15, 1979 letter, P. J. Early (PASNY) to T. A. Ippolito (NRC) regarding, Justification for Continued Containment Purging During Normal Plant Operation (JPN-79-50).

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