ML20049H202
| ML20049H202 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden, Zion, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 10/31/1980 |
| From: | Wesley D STRUCTURAL MECHANICS ASSOCIATES |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20049H203 | List: |
| References | |
| SMA-12901.02, NUDOCS 8112020951 | |
| Download: ML20049H202 (35) | |
Text
-.
3 A
S!M 12901.02
~
CONDITIONAL PROSABILITIES OF SEISMIC INDUCED FAILURES FOR STRUCTURES A!;D COMPONENTS FOR THE ZION t;UCLEAR GE!ERATIf;G STATION J
I i
l1 i
{
l prepared for i
PICKARD, LO',lE AND GARRICK, INC.
l Irvine, California October, 1980 bupt yll30 A095l C
/-
STRUCTURf!L' c;
_.;rf. fDECHAniCS
. _ :. 2,RSSOCIRTES 4
A C4 e' CCrC I *U k 0n h 3f mdf', Neweer t Seacti, Cahf.92Eco (7142833-7 56 2 1
ATTACHMENT 2 g
7.2 SEISMIC EVENTS This section describes the analysis of the likelihoods and consequences of seismic-ir.itiated events at the pla it site. The general methodology is presented in Section 7.2.1 to provide an overview perspective of the approach. Subsequent sections apply the methodology to the Zion site.
Reports by seismicity and structural mechanics consultants are included in Section 7.9 and contribute to the information presented here.
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7.2.1 METHOD 0L0dY A seismic safety analysis consists of five main steps:
1.
Seismicity:
determination of the frequency of various sized ground motions at the site.
2.
Fragility:
determination of the ability of plant structures and components to survive various seismically initiated ground accelerations.
3.
Plant Logic:
determination of the effect of various combinations of structural and equipment failures on the behavior of the plant.
4.
Initial Assembly: combination of the seismicity, fragility, and plant logic to determine the likelihood of occurrence of various core damage states as a result of the ground motion.
5.
Final Assembly:
further combination of these curves with the containment model to obtain the likelihoods of various release cate-gories and these, in turn, with the site-specific release conse-quences model to obtain the final seismic risk curve.
7.2.2 SEISMICITY A site seismicity study has been i.ccomplished by Dames & Moore and is provided as Section 7.9.1.
The key results are shown there in Table 3, reproduced here as the seismicity curves of Figure 7.2-1.
These curves, in the now familiar probability of frequency format, give the frequency of various sized earthquakes at the Zion site. The approach used in the seismicity study is explained below along with a discussion of the physical reasons for the shapes of the curves.
The study makes extensive use of tectonic provinces described in the work of TERA Corporation (1979) in which a number of nationally recog-nized seismicity experts made judgments of the seismicity in various regions of the U.S.
In determining the historical earthquakes to be considered, where their sizes were reported in terms of intensity, Io, these values were converted to body-wave magnitudes, mb, using the relation m = 0.5 (I + 3.5).
b g
7.2-1 I
Interest is limited to earthquakes where mb 2 4.0 since earthquakes of smaller magnitude rarely cause structural damage.
The annual number, n, of earthquakes of various sizes was expressed by the logarithmic form 10g10 "I"bj = a - bmb where a and b are parameters fit to available seismicity data and mb is the earthquake size of interest. The maximum historical earthquake has an estimated mb of 5.3.
The best estimate of a predicted maximum j
value was chosen to be 5.8 with probabilitier for maximum mb = 5.6, 5.8, or 6.0 assigned as 0.28, 0.44, and 0.28, respectively.
Seismic ground motion at the site was estimated using the relationship a = 0.584 exp -0.427 exp(.444m ) + 1.098m[
where epicentral 3
b distance < 10km s
a = 3.98 i exp -0.0427 Aexp(.444m ) + 1.098m where epicentral s
b
\\
/
distance A 210km and as is the sustained level of acceleration corresponding to the third highest peak in the acceleration time history. This value is representative of the peak ground acceleration to which structures and components must be subjected, requiring several cycles of input motion at a given amplitude level in order to experience damage. The study results are tabulated in terms of peak sustained-based accelerations, ps = 1.23 a, where the factor 1.23 is a aps, on the basis that a s
variable that depends on earthquake magnitudes and considers horizontal compenent orientations. Therefore, the curves used in the assembly were developed by dividing reference Table 3 values by 1.23 in order to obtain sustained ground accelerations.
The uncertainty in maximum mb that was provided by assigning a prob-ability to each of three hypothesized maximums was applied to each of the three tectonic zones from which the earthquakes would generate.
Thus nine curves were produced.
It is believed by many seismologists that there is an upper bound to the ground acceleration that an earthquake of given intensity or magnitude can cause to occur at a distant location. However, there is uncertainty about the maximum value of this sustained ground acceleration. Much of the basis for determining the peak ground acceleration is the attenu-ation of earthquake intensity at the source to the intensity at the point of interest. Siace intensity values indicate the level of damage to structures, we must look to the structural analyst for guidance as to the upper bound of intensity as it relates to structural damage, hence, the ground acceleration the structure will "see."
Section 7.9.3 is a brief report by Structural Mechanics Associates, Inc.,.in which this j
subject is discussed. The report indicates there is a correlation between the maximum source intensity, its energy and frequency content, and the maximum damage experienced by structures at the point of interest, as borne out by historical and test data from various sized earthquake;. Empirica' relationships have not yet been developed, but 7.2-2 i
estimates of upper bounds on sustained ground accelerations are made in the report to reflect upper bound damage-effective ground acceleration for various source intensities. This is reflected in Figure 7.2-1 where for the maximum mb (or intensity) in each hypothee,is a corresponding ground acceleration upper bound is representeo by the termination of the curves. These curves were used in the assembly process of the seismic analysis.
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7.2.3 FRAGILITY, An analysis of the fragility of Zion station structures and equipment has been performed by Structural Mechanics Associates, Inc., and is included in Section 7.9.2.
The results are displated in Tables 7.2-1 and 7.2-2 where the median acceleration capacity, F, in units of g, is given for each component along with two factors, #R and U, that specify uncertainty. These factors describe a family of lognormal distributions that give probability of frequency of failure for each component and each level of damage-effective ground acceleration. The fragility curves for a limited number of key components are plotted in Figure 7.2-2, where the solid curves represent the median values, including the randomness of those values, and the dashed curves repre-sent the uncertainty in those values at the 10% and 90% confidence levels, respectively. The approach used in the fragility analysis is explained below.
The approach adopted in assigning a fragility (f ailure fraction as a function of effective peak ground acceleration) to each structure, equipment, and other component, was to first determine the median factor of safety and its statistical variability under the Design Basis Earth-quake (DBE). From these values the expected response at failure and, hence, the median effective ground acceleration for failure was estimated.
In general, the factor of safety of a structure or component is the resistance capacity divided by the response associated with the DBE of 0.179 peak ground acceleration. The development of these considers their variability. In each case, several factors are involved in deter-mining structural response and capacity, and each such factor, in turn, has a median value and variability associated with it. The overall factor of safety is the product of the factors of safety for each factor. The median of this overall value is the product of the median safety factors of all of the variables.
The variabilities of the indi-vidual factors also combine to determine the variability of the overall safety factor.
Variables influencing the factor of safety on structural capacity include the strength of the structure compared to the design stress i
level and the inelastic energy absorption capacity (ductility) of a structure or its ability to carry load beyond yield. The variables in computed structural response for a given ground acceleration are made up of-many factors. The more significant of these include:
(1) ground motion and the associated ground response spectra for a given peak free-field ground acceleration, (2) energy dissipatior. ' damping),
(3) structural modeling, (4) method of analysis, (5) combination of 7.2-3
modes, and (6) combination of earthquake components. Piping and equip-ment mounted in structures also require consideration of the response of the equipment relative to the building at the equipment location. The ratio between the medua value of each of these factors and the value used in design of the plant (by analysis or qualification test) is quan-titatively estimated for each critical plant component. A combination of generic and plant-specific information was used to determine median values and variability of the factors.
i 7.2.3.1 Definition of Failure For purposes of this study, Class I structures are considered to fail functionally when inelastic deformations of the structure under seismic load are estimated to be sufficient to potentially interfere with the operability of safety-related equipment attached to the structure.
These limits on inelastic energy absorption capability (ductility limits) chosen for Class I structures are estimated to correspond to the onset of significant structural damage, not necessarily corresponding to structure collapse.
Piping, electrical, mechanical, and electromechanical equipment vital to a safe shutdown of the plant are considered to fail when they can no longer perform their designated functions. Rupture of the pressure boundary on mechanical equipment is also considered a failure. Depend-ing upon the equipment type, one or the other failure will govern.
In most cases, however, function failure will govern as equipment pressure boundaries are usually very conservatively designed for equipment such as pumps and valves.
)
7.2.3.2 Fragility Curve Formulation Seismic-induced fragility data are generally unavailable for specific plant components and are unavailable for structures. Thus, fragility curves which plot the fraction of expected failures versus effective peak ground acceleration must be developed primarily from analysis combined with engineering judgment supported by limited test data. Such fragility curves will contain a great deal of uncertainty and, there-fore, great precision in.ttempting to define the shape of these curves is unwarranted.
The entire fragility curve for any component and its uncertainty can be expressed in terms of the best estimate of the median ground acceler-ation capacity, I, and random variables, ER and eV, where ER expresses the inherent randomness of the earthquake and response characteristics that affect structures or equipment, and EU expresses our uncertainty about those characteristics. Thus, the ground acceler-ation, a, corresponding to failure is given by:
)
a = $c E
- RU It is assurned that both ER and EU are lognormally distributed with logarithmic standard deviation of OR and pu, respectively. This is justified since the statistical variation of many material properties i
7.2-4
\\
4 r
.s N
and seismic response variables are reasonably represented by them so long as one is not primarily concerned with the extreme tails of the distribution. This assumption and the above equation enable the fragil-ity and its uncertainty to be represented in a curve as shown later in Figure 7.2-2.
The results of the fragility analysis for the structures are tabulated
~
l in Table 7.2-1.
The results of the fragility analysis for key equipment
( )
and other mechanical and electrical components in systems which are part I
of the initiating event or accident mitigation processes are tabulated in Table 7.2-2.
Recall from the seismicity curves of Figure 7.2-1, that the upper bound on damage-effective ground acceleration is about 0.65g. Next delete from the lists of Tables 7.2-1 and 7.2-2, the structures and equipment u
that, even considering the uncertainty, have almost no chance of failure at 0.65g. The result is Table 7.2-3, Fragility of Key Zion Structures and Equipment. The fragility curves for most of these critical components are shown in Figure 7.2-2.
Note that the strongest of these, the pressurizer enclosure roof 6, has only a slight chance of failure i
at 0.65g.
q The following section develops the plant response to failure of these 4
key components.
7.2.4 PLANT LOGIC This section uses the plant model of Section 1 along with the list of key components and their fragility information in Table 7.2-3 to develop a model for core melt due to seismically induced failures.
Review of the fragility information in Table 7.2-3 shows that @,
offsite power (transformer ceramic insulators), has a median acceleration capacity much lower than any other component.
In fact, from Figure 7.2-2, it is clear that failure of the ceramic insulators is essentially guaranteed at all accelerations large enough to endanger any other components. Therefore, as a result of any earthquake large enough to affect the plant, offsite power will be lost and the turbine will trip due to loss of load.
As noted in the footnote of Table 7.2-3, and as discussed in Section 7.9.2, the fragility of several of the electrical components is based on recoverable failure modes such ar chatter and relay trip.
These conditions are either momentary or easily corrected manually at the time of their occurrence. The median acceleration capacity values which represent nonrecoverable failure are about three times those shown in the table. As a consequence, components @, @, @, @, and @
are not considered further because their capacity for nonrecoverable failure modes is sufficiently high that there would only be a slight chance of failure at 0.65g, the upper bound.
i y
7.2-5 1
4.sh u: t j f,'y
, ' 'j A A a.
- d i.,. = i r
j' I s.1 x
~
1,
' T$e failure of the containment tin cooler system ductwork, item @ duct
, is not included bEcause enby those1 risers and portions of the circular
' ^.
Jad their supports would fail where their orientation is consistent with t'ns doainant direction of the earta,uake force. Since only about three out offive-fu coolers and duct risers need to be operable to be effective, hi is improbable that all would fail from the same earth-q6ne. Even if all the ducts did fail, the'. fan coolers would still be e
. ca;iable of mixing a large portion of tne containment gases, although less effe':tively.
s
)
s ib Failbre cf the auxiliary building concrete ' roof diaphragm, item @,
oniy arfects the upper story. Equipment on that level is failed, but
/
since pane lofi it is essential for core cooling, item @ does not appear 1n.the models for core melt.
7 A large seismic initiating event could cause more than one of the plant inityting event categories to occur. Wnile, the exact sequence of
\\
events can become very complicated, only a limited number of key func-I' tfons musy be examined. Review of the transient event trees in Section (, ET-5 to ET-13, will confirm that as long as turbine trip due to loss uf offsite power occurs, ET-11b,a.sks'all the required functional
, /~
quistions. Therefore, no matter how manf transient initiating event categorias-occur, toe same requirements exist to avoid core damage.
~'
However, should the earthquake induce a reactor coolant system rupture,
- additional requireDeppS WJst" be met.
The plant logic is developed iia,a seismic fault tree whose basic events r
correspond to, and are coded identically with, the key component fail-
)
' _' ures in l ele l.2-3.
Each such component failure is denoted by a circle symbol; Oi, u;, etc.
Tne fau)t tree is given in Figure 7.2-3, where Figure 7.2-3a is the master 1ree,> 7.2-3b, 7.2-3c, and 7.2-3d are expan'sioss of the tree for cach ofcthe 'three contributors, and 7.2-3e,
, 7.2-3f, ia?il.2-39 are br5nch expansions'where referenced. The results of these thees are summdrized belod using the Boolean algeDra symbols A = "anc*
V = "or".
Thus, from the fault tree in Figure 7b-Sa, core melt occurs for
'^
Ms NM1VM2 V M3 We wish to express tnis condition for core melt in terms of the casic s
component failures using the remaiaing-fault trees. Thus, beginning with the fault tree in Figure 7.2-3b, we have:
a
^
n n
1 = @ A(@V@h@ v h)5(@ Vh V @ V @)
()
M where, from Figure 7.2-3e, l
4,
~
i s@='(hv@}$(@vQv@y@v@)
gnd,- from Ki gure 7.2-3 f,
@ ? @~v @.
\\
y
~
,(_
7.2-6
~
%3
~
e
To simplify these exprassions, we note from Table 7.2-3 that, numerically, failura 1 will occur at much smaller ground accelerations than any other component and, therefore, can be conceded to have already occurred when any other component fails. Using this along with the rules of Boolean algebra, we may simplify the above expressions to:
i = @ V (E0) V [( @ V @ ) A (h V @ ))
6 M
(,
J with
- bVbVhVbVb-Similarly, from the tree in Figure 7.2-3c, we obtain for M :
2 M2={
V @ V @V[@ A @ A(hV@)]}
A {M V@vh V @ V@}
1 which reduces to:
V h V b h ^ @ ].
M2" From Figure 7.2-3d, we see that M, large LOCA, does not occur within 3
the range of possible accelerations; therefore, our expression for melt becomes:
Ms = MtVM2
= l@ V h V[( @ V @ ) A(hV@ )]}
V {h V @ V[@ A @ ]}
= h V @ V [( @ V @ V @ ) A @].
This Boolean equation expresses the logical relationship between the occurrence of melt and the failure (s) of the various individual compo-nents. The likelihood of failure of each individual component, as a function of acceleration, is described by its family of fragility curves. These individual families of fragility curves, thus, can now be combined, through the logic of the Boolean equation, to obtain a plant level family of fragility curves for the occurrence of core melt. This resulting family is shown in Figure 7.2-4.
Physically, the Boolean expressions above can be interpreted directly l
from the fault tree representations.
In general, this interpretation is fairly straightforward and requires only familiarity with the work k
described in Section 1 of this report.
However, the " indirect" fail-ures associated with the auxiliary building shear wall merit further explanation. Above the 592'-0" elevation, the seismic class I wall l
between the auxiliary building and the turbine building consists of a l
composite steel frame and reinforced concrete construction. This construction has a lower capacity than the reinforced concrete construc-l, tion employed for this wall below the 592'-0" elevation. Failure of I
l l
7.2-7
this wall above the 592'-0" elevation is expected to result in the fail-ure of the entire series of auxiliary building shear walls above the 592'-0" elevation due to the inability of these other walls to resist the redistributed loads.
This, in turn, fail' iny equipment supported by these walls. The effects of this failure are noted on the fault trees as " indirect" failures. Section 7.9.2 contains further details on this shear wall failurc.
7.2.5 SEISMIC CORE MELT FREQUENCIES The fragility families are now combined with the seismicity families to obtain a probability curve showing our state of knowledge about the frequency of core melt due to seismicity. The result is seen in Figure 7.2-E.
From the cumulative probability curve it is seen that the median annual frequency of core megt due to seismic events is about 2.0 x 10-6 The mean is 5.6 x 10- and the 90% confidence interval lies between 3.0 x 10-5 and 3.0 x 10-8, 7.2.6 INITIAL ASSEMBLY LEADING TO CONTAINMENT TREE ENTRY STATES In the previous section we developed a Boolean expression for the state
" core melt" in terms of plant components.
Now, in order to develop risk curves and fit seismic in with the rest of the study, we need to know which type of core melt occurs. That is, we need to develop Boolean expressions for each of the 21 plant states defined in Section 1.
For this purpose, we introduce two new expressions:
x = fan coolers fail y = containment spray fails.
i The fault trees of Figures 7.2-6 and 7.2-7 give the logic for x and y.
Summarizing:
hV V@VhVhV Vh x=
y= hV@ V@ V h.
These simplify to:
VhVh x=
and V h V @.
y=
Now, from the definitions of the plant states in Section 1, the following assignments can be made:
s f
)
7.2-8
Plant State Boolean Expression SEFC M2AXAy i
SEF M2AIAy SEC M2AxAy SE, M2^xAY 1
3 TEFC M1 A5AxAy 1AI^I^Y TEF M
2 1^I^X^y TEC 2
TE M1 A M2 ^ X A y Here, we have used bars over the symbols to denote negation. Thus, x means that fan coolers do not fail, and so on.
In terms of component failures, the above plant states may now be expressed.
Plant State Boolean Expression AhA@^@^@
SEFC
=
@A@A@^@A@
SEF
=
w
@A@A@A@^@
SEC
=
hV @V(@ A @ A@)
=
c
@A@A@ A@ ^ @ A(@ V@)
TEFC
=
@^ @ A @ A @ A(@ v @)A@
TEF
=
hah A@ A @ A @ A(@ V @)
TEC
=
@ A@ A @ A @ A(@ V @)A@
=
These Boolean equations express the logical relationships between compo-i nent failures and occurrence of the various plant states. Using these
(
expressions and the fragility' families for the components, we obtain fragility families for each plant state. These families, in numerical form, constitute the seismic M matrix. The uncertainties in the compo-nent fragility curves translate through this process into uncertainty in the M matrix. This uncertainty is represented, in Table 7.2-4, by show-ing five different " values" of the M matrix with 20t probability assigned to each. This table, thus, is an example of the OPD process applied at a matrix level as discussed in Section 0.8.4.2.
7.2-9 t
The numbers entered in Table 7.2-4, being elements of the seismic M matrix, give the conditional frequencies of occurrence of the various plant states given.an earthquake of the acceleration specified in the left-most column. We observe that all of these numbers are zero except for column SE. This says that, for practical purposes, tha only plant damage state that occurs due to seismic action is state SE. The others, while not theoretically excluded, are just numerically very unlikely.
The reason for this is simple. When all AC power is lost, h4 above, state SE is guaranteed; complete loss of AC power results in a small
}
LOCA (RCP seals), loss of safety injection, and failure of containment occurs if (4) or (8) occur and their cap @acities are among To h ve any other state, must not occur.
fan coolers.~
A spray Since the wea st, it is highly unlikely t!.at we can have seismic core melt without failure of all AC power.
7.2.7 SEISMIC EFFECT ON CONTAINMENT The only containment-related item in Table 7.2-3 is item @ -- impact between the reactor and auxiliary buildings.
This item is a local phenomenon in which the concrete shell is fractured and the steel liner is compromised, resulting in a containment leak path but not collapse of the concrete structure. However, the clearance between the two struc-tures must be closed first as the structures go into motion and before they impact. Structural Mechanics, Inc., estimates that impact will not occur until at a peak ground acceleration of about 0.749 (median value) occurs. The uncertainty in this " threshold value" is expressed in the fragility family for this item.
It should be noted that the effect of the impact on the containment has been assumed to be a major release path in the absence of detailed structural analysis. The significance is as follows. We have seen, in the previous section, that, if a seismic event causes core melt, it will result, essentially always, in plant state SE.
If the containment does not fail, then we see, from the C matrix, Table 8-5 in Section 8, that state SE results in release category 2R.
If the containment does fail, however, as a result of the seismic action, then, instead of category 2R, the release assumed in this s gt dy is changed to a category 2.
Therefore, the occurrence of item qp changes the C matrix so that SE leads to 2 rather than 2R.
In actuality, the isotopes in the source term will be determined by the condition (s) of the containment such as the release path size and the time-dependent pressure / temperature profile of the containment atmosphere. The assignment to category 2 is considered to be a conservative treatment.
7.
2.8 CONCLUSION
S 5
The preceding actions have provided, in effect, the matrix $, i.e.,
the frequencies of seismic initiating events; the matrix MS, the seis-mic plant matrix; and Cs, the seismic containment matr'ix (or that part
(
)
of it which is numerically significant, to our calculations). Those matrices are combined in Section 8 along with the matrix S to produce the total risk in terms of our five damage indices.
It will be seen there that seismic events are the major contributor to tre base case risk.
7.2-10
The mean galue of seismic melt frequency from Figure 7.2 5 is 5.6 x 10~ per year. Essentially all seismic melts rmit in plant damage state SE, and hence in release category 2R.
With respect to uncertainties, it is also interesting to cbserve that almost all the calculated frequency of seismic melt results from the uncertainties in the fragility curves. To see this, it is instructive to compare the median fragilities with the seismicity. Figure 7.2-8 I) presents such a comparison. The ordinate represents the number of structures and/or components undergoing a permanent loss of function given a seismic event of a specified acceleration. The abcissa repre-sents a spectrum of such accelerations.
Other than the ceramic insula-tors associated with offsite power, a clear threshold exists for median failure accelerations. This threshold occurs at the 0.63g value asso-ciated with the service water pumps. The median value for the accelera-tion cutoff is about 0.55g and the upper limit for that cutoff is 0.65g. Therefore, on a deterministic or "poitit estimate" basis using median values of fragility and seis:nicity, one would conclude that seis-mic initiated melt is impossible. The melt frequency computed on a probabilistic basis, therefore, results from the interaction of the tails of the seismicity and fragility distributions.
Lastly, recall that the design basis for Zion was 0.179 for class I items.
It is clear that substantial margin in seismic capability exists with respect to the design basis.
i
(
7.2-11
TABLE 7.2-1 STRUCTURE FRAGILITY VALUE - ZION UNITS 1 AND 2 Median Variability Structure Critical Component / Mode Acceleration Capacity (g).
- R
- U 7
Reactor Building Foundation Slab Soil Failure 0.73 0.32 0.29 Reactor and Auxiliary Buildings Impact 0.78*
0.28 0.41 Pressurizer Enclosure Roof Collapse 1.8 0.39 0.34 Containment Wall Shear Failure 2.4 0.38 0.38 sa Buttress Plates Vertical Shear Failure 2.4 0.35 0.37 k>
Containment Wall Flexural Failure 5.1 0.35 0.36 d.
Internal Structure Shear Anchors 6.5 0.35 0.36 Foundation Slab Shear Failure 7.3 0.32 0.36 Auxiliary Building Concrete Shear Wall Failure 0.73 0.30 0.28 Concrete Roof Diaphragm 1.4 0.31 0.33 Masonry Walls 1.7 0.50 0.26 Crib House Pump Enclosure Roof Collapse 0.86 0.24 0.27 N-S Intake Walls Failure 2.5 0.23 0.27 N-S Guide Walls Failure 3.9 0.22 0.27 E-W Intake Walls Failure 5.4 0.27 0.27 Condensate Storage Tank Tank Wall Failure 0.83 0.28 0.29 Underground Pipes Pressure Boundary Failure 1.4 0.20 0.57
- Applicable only with a median lower bound of 0.749 and pu = 0.29.
0745A050581/1
m
%.s.
TABLE 7.2-2 FRAGILITY DESCRIPTIONS FOR ZION EQUIPMENT i
ed.an Ground 5tructural R
Equipment a
t out pmen t s
Accelera tion fquipment Setssic
Response
Struc teral Respoase Equipeen t Capacity E4utpment Capacity (6's)
Unce,rtalety Randon Systen & Component Location in 5tructure Characteristics Qual. Method Factor
Response
f actor
Response
Factor Capacity I
,A U
Main Steam System
- 1) Patn Steam Isolation Valve (4)
Safety Valve Room $80' Rtgid. Active Stat {c Analysis 8 1.30 0.32 2.71 0.10 18.60 0.30 11.14 0.18 0.41 Test
- 2) Main Steam safety valves (20)
Safety Valve Room 580' Rtgid. Active Static Analysis 3.30
- 0. 32 2.48 0.41 12.20 0.60 6.69 0.29 0.74
- 3) Matn Steam Power operated safety Valve Room 580' Rigid. Acttee Static Analysis 8 1.30 0.32 2.48 0.41 12.20 0.60 6.69 0.29 0.74 Valves (4)
Testl
- 4) Piptag & Supports (34")
Cont. Oldg. 540'-642' Flesible. Passive Response Spectrum 1.30 0.32 3.30 0.38
!!.20 0.51 -
3.84 0.27 0.66 a
Main Feedwater System
- 1) Feedwater Isolation Valves (4)
Aus. Oldg. 580' 590' Rtgid. Active Static Analysts 1.04 0.22 2.57 0.45 9.70 0.60 4.41, O
M
- 2) Piping 4 Supports (16-)
Cont. 8169 581'-617' Flesible. Passive Response Spectrum 1.30 0.32 3.30 0.38 11.20 0.51 3.84 0.27 0.66 52rofce Water System
- 1) Service hater Pumps (6)
Crlb House 564'-594' Flentble. Actf ve Response Spectrum 1.10 0.20 1.53 0.28 2.20 0.18 0.63 0.15 0.36
- 2) Serstcr Water d ves (8* MOV Aus. Bldg. 579' Rigid. Active Static Analysis &
l.04 0.22 2.48 0.41 12.20 0.60 5.35
- 31 0.69 Fo Aus. F.W. )
Test 3 Piping (Butted) 48" Avs $1dg. 542*-$7g' Flesible. Passtre DynamfC Analysts 8.40 0.61 M
M hA NA 1.40 0.20 0.57 y
4 Piping (supported) (12*-48*)
Aun. Oldg. 542*-579' Flesible. Passive Response Spectrum 1.04 0.22 3.60 0.33 11.20 0.5I
- 3. 35 c.26 0.60
- 5) Piping (supported) (3*-8*)
Aun. Blog. 560*-592*
Flentt'le. Passive Dynaufc Analysts 1.04 0.22 5.29 0.40 16.10 0.46 7.09 0.33 0.57 Condensate Storage System N
- 1) Condensate Storage Tank Outside. 591' F1entble. Passtve 4.90 0.40 MA M
MA NA 0.83 0.28 OE g
- 2) Piptag Burted) 20" Outs ide. 542' 591' Flestble. Passive Dynamic Analysts 8.40 0.63 nr.
M mA mA 1.40 OE 0.57 2
N
- 3) Pf plag i supported) (8*)
Aus. Bldg. 579*
Flesible. Passive Dynaefc Analysis 1.04 0.22 4.69 0.38 16.10 0.46 6.28 0.26 0.58 1
- 4) Piptn9 i supported) (10*-12")
Aus. 81dg. 579' Flestble. Passive Response spectrum 1.04 0.22 3.60 0.33 11.20 0.51 3.35 0.26 039 W
Otcsel Fuel 011 System
- 1) Fuel Oil Storage Tanks (3)
Aus. Bldg. 560' Flesible. Passive 1.04 0.22 1.0 0.23 21.2 0.37
- 3. 7 0.28 0.40
- 2) Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps Aus. 81d. 560*
Rigid. Active 5tatic Analysts 3.04 0.22 3.91 0.11 19.62 0.50 6.63 0.33 0.45 9
f ontatenrnt Spray System
- 1) Motor Driven Pumps (2)
Aus. Bldg. 560' Rigid StattC Analysts I.04 0.22 1.91 0.11 19.62 0.50 6.63 0.33 0.45
- 2) Olesel Ortwen Pump (1)
Auu. 81dg. 560' Rigid Static Analysts 1.04 0.22 1.93 0.!!
19.62 0.50 6.63 0.33 0.45
- 3) Actf ve MOV's (3)
Aus 81dg. 560' Rigid. Active Stat t.04 0.22 I.79 0.40 21.90 0.60 6.93 0.31 0.68 Test {cAnalysis&
- 4) Passive MOV's (3)
Aun. Bldg. 560' Rf gid. Active Static Analysts &
4.04 0.22 1.79 0.40 21.90 0.60 6.93 0.31 0.68 Testl
- 5) Spray Peaders (6)
Cont. 81dg. 760' Flestble. Passive aesponse Spectrua 1.30 0.32 5.28 0.38 11.20 0.51 6.15 0.27 0.66
- 6) Refueltaa Water Storage Tank Aus. Bldg. 560*
Flesible. Passive 3.10 0.43 NA NA NA NA 0.73 0.30 0.28 3
- 7) Piping (6".8")
Ava. 81dg. 560*-590' Fleutble. Passive Dynamic Analysts 1.04 0.22 5.29 0.40 16.10 0.46 7.09 0.31 0.57 P) Pf otag (10* 14")
Aus. 81d. 560'-590' Flesible. Passive Response Spectrum 1.04 0.22 4.13 0.35 11.20 0.5I 3.85 0.27 0.60 9
8 R].ctor Coolant System 11 Reactor Vessel Cont. 81dg. 584' Flexible. Passive Response Spectrum 1.30 0.32 2.71 0.28 12.20 0.41 7.31 0.28 0.52 il Core Geometry Cont. Bldg. 584' Fles6ble. Passtve
- esponse spectrum 1.30 0.32 3.15 0.28 1.66 0.24 1.16 0.25 0.42 3
5 team Generator (4)
Cont. B1dg. 590'-617' Flesible, Passive Response Spectrum 1.30 0.32 2.71 0.28 5.50 0.34 3.29 0.21 030 t
4 i Reactor Coolant Pumps (4)
Cont. 81dg. 591' Flesible. Passive Response Spectrum 1.30 0.32 2.11 0.28 5.50 0.34 3.29 0.21 0.50
.I
- 5) Pressur tier Cont. 81dg. 590* -617' Flestble. Passf ve Static Analysts
- 1. 30 0.32 5.72 0.39 2.08 0.31 2.63 0.26 0.53 6 i Power Actuated Rettef Valve Cont. Bido. 617' Rtgld. Active 1.30 0.32 1.46 0.27 12.20 0.60 3.94 0.30
- 0. 6 7 ' Spring Loaded Safety Valves Cont. Bldg. 617' Rigid. Active Static Analysts 1.30 0.32 2.22 0.35 12.20 0.60 5.M OE 0.75 8 ' Loop Isolation Valves (8)
Cont. Bldg. 584*
Rtgid. Active Statte Analysis &
I.30 0.32 2.19 0.35 15.20 0.60 7.36 0.27 0.78 Test!
n
- w TABLE 7.2-2 (continued)
FRAGILITY DESCRIPTIONS FOR ZION EQUIPMENT Median gro.,4 5tructural P
Equipment a
f out omen t s
Acceleration a ndom uncertataty Equipment Seismic Respoese Structural
Response
E9utoriat Capacity f ee tpmen t Capacity (6's)
,a System & Component Location in Structure Characteristics Qual. Metnod Factor
Response
Factor Resoc se F ac tor Cacacity 3
R 1
- 9) Peltef Tank Cont. 81dg. %0' Fleutble. Passtre Static Analysts I.30 0.32 1.04 0.02 11.00 0.58 1.19 G.20 0.63
- 10) RCL Piptag (271/2"-31*)
Cont. 81ds. 584*
Flenttle. Passive Response Spectrum 1.30 0.32 2.71 0.28 18.50 0.41 11.06 0.28 0.52
- 11) Other Piping (l"-8*)
Cont. 8169 560'-650' Flenttle. Passive Dynamic Analysts 1.30 0.32 4.5g 0.42 16.10 0.46 7.69 0.31 0.63
- 12) Other Piping (10*-14")
Cent. 81dg. 560'-650' Flestble. Passive Response Spectrum 1.30 0.32 3.30 0.38 11.20 0.51 3.84 0.27 0.f6
- stdual Heat Reaeval
- 1) Motor Operated Pumps (2)
Aun. Bldg. 542' Flestble Response Spectrum 1.04 0.22 16.35 0.27 1.46 0.11 4.22 0.28 0.30
- 2) beat tathangers (2)
Auu. 81dg. %Q*
Flen1ble Response Spectrum 1.04 0.22 15.53 0.48 2.62 0.24 7.19 0.31 0.49
- 3) Passive MOV s (4)
Aus. 81dg. 542'-560' Rtgid. Active static Analys's 5 1.04 0.22 3.79 0.40 21.90 0.60 6.93 0.31 0.f8 Testl
- 4) Active MOV's (3)
Aus. 81dg. 542'-%0' Algid. Active Static Analysis &
!.04 0.22 1.79 0.40 21.90 0.60 6.93 0.31 0.68 Testl
- 5) Ptoing (8")
Avn. B1dg. 542*-560*
Flenible. Passive Dyeamic Analysis 1.04 0.22 7.80 0.44 16.10 0.46 lo.45 0.28 0.61
- 6) Pipiag (10*-14')
Aus. 81dg. 542'-%0' Flestble. Passive Response Scectre I.04 0.22 8.15 0.40 11.20 0.51 7.59 0.29 0.62 g
Saf tty lajection System 2l Passive Motor OperatedSafety injection pumps (2)
Avu. 81dg. 560'
- 1gid. Acttve Static Analysts 1.04 0.22 1.80 0.05 2.84 0.35 0.90 0.20 0.37 l
Avu. 81dg. 560' Rigid. Passive Stat {c Analysts 4 3.04 0.22 1.79 0.40 21.90 0.60 6.93 0.31 0.t9 valves (12)
Test
- 3) Active Motor Operated Aus. 81dg. 560' R1 1d. Active Static Analysts &
l.04 0.22 3.79 0.40 21.90
- 0. U?
6.93 0.31 0.68 9
valves (5)
Testl 4 1 Diesel Ortwen RHR Pep Aum. 81dg. 542' Rigid. Active Static Analysts 3.04 0.22 1.79 0.11 23.88 0.50 7.56 0.33 0.45
[
5t RHR Heat Enchaw Aum, e;dg. %C' Flentble. Passive Response Spectrum 1.04 0.22 15.53 0.48 2.62 0.24 7.19 0.31 0.49 6' Accouleters (8 -
Cont. 81dg. 560' Fleuttle. Passive static Analysis 1.30 0.32 20.52 0.19 8.20 0.37 37.19" 0.20 0.48 g
7 > Piping (4"-8" i P89tes (4*-2")
Avs. Bldg. 560' Flentble. Passive Dynamic Analysts 1.04 0.22 7.80 0.44 16.10 0.46 10.45 0.29 0.60 s
8 7
Cont. 81dg. %0'-584*
Floatble. Passive Dynamic Analysts 3.30 0.32 2.64 0.32 16.10 0.46 4.42 n.25 0.60
.Bh 91 Piping (10")
Aun. Sieg. 560' Flentble. Passive Response Spectrum 1.04 0.22 8.15 0.40 11.20 0.51 7.59 0.29 0.62 Coolant Charging System I i Motor Crtwen Cent. Pumps (2)
Aus. 81dg. 57g' ptgid. Active Response Spectrum 1.04 0.22 10.00 0.05 2.13 0.23 3.77 0.20 0.25 2
Positive 01splacement Pep (1)
Ave. 8149. 579' Rtgid. Active Response Spectrum 1.04 0.22 3.48 0.11 11.14 0.50 6.95 0.24 0.51 3 seron lajection Tank Aus. 81dg. 601' Fleutble. Passive Static Analysis 1.04 0.22 20.25 0.36 2.42 0.37
- 8. ( 6, 0.26 0.50 4
Peping (3 -8")
Au s. Blog. 574'-601*
Rtgid. Passive Dynamic Analysts 1.04 0.22 5.67 0.48 16.10 0.46 7.60 0.32 0.62 51 Piping (1 1/2.3a}
Cont. 81dg. 584'-601' Algid. Passive Dynamic Analysts 1.30 0.32 4.59 0.42 16.10 0.46 7.69 0.31 0.63 Component Cooling System I) Component Coolleg Pumps (5)
Aun. 81dg. 560*
Rigid. Active Static Analysis 1.04 0.22 1.91 0.11 19.62 0.50 6.63 0.33 0.45 21 CCW Heat Eschangers (3)
Aun. 81dg. 560' Flentble. Passive Static Analysts 1.04 0.22 18.59 0.18 2.53 0.33 S.32, 0.22 0.38
- 3) Piping (3*.8*)
Auu. 81dg. 570'-617' Fleutble. Passive Dynamic Analysts 1.04 0.22 5.67 0.48 16.10 0.46 7.60 0.32 0.62
- 4) Piping (10"-16*)
Ave. 81dg. 570'-617' Flentble. Fassive Response Spectre 1.04 0.22 3.68 0.45 11.20 0.51 3.43 0.31 0.64 Cont.sinment Vent tlat'on System
- 1) Contatnment Fan Coolers (5)
Cont. 81dg. 590' Flentble Response Spectre 1.30 0.32 2.%
0.29 2.66 0.23 1.74 0.21 0.43
- 2) Ductwork & Dampers Containment 81dg.
Fleatble. Passive No Qualification 1.30 0.32 1.04 0.02 9.00 0.57 0.97 0.20 0.(2 Auntif ary Feedwater System
- 1) Motor Ortwen Puaes (2)
Aus. 81dg. 579' Rigid Static Analysis 1.04 0.22 3.48 0.11
!!.14 0.50 6.85 0.33 0.45
- 2) Turbine Ortwen Pump (1)
Aun. 81dg. 579' Rigid Static Analysts 3.04 0.22 3.48 0.11 11.14 0.50 6.e5 0.33 0.45
- 3) Pf eing (3'-6*)
Avs. 81dg. 579*
Fleatble. Passtve Dynaste Analysis 1.04 0.22 4.69 0.38 16.10 0.46 6.28 0.28 0.57 4
- 4) Piping (3*)
Coet. Side. 584' Flexible. Passive Dynamic Analysis 3.30
- 0. 32 2.64 0.32 16.30 0.46 4.42 0.25 0.60 Ructor Protection System 1 ' Logic Panets (2)
Aus. 81dg. 642' Fleatble. Active Test (Assumed).
1.04 0.22 1.42 0.24 10.70 0.35 2.t9 0.29 0.38 2 i Reactor fris Breakers (2)
Aus. 81dg. 642' Flexible. Active Test (Assumedl 1.04 0.22 1.42 0.24 10.70 0.35 20 03, 0 38 3' Lif Logic Pacels Auu. 81dg. 642' Flestble. Active Test (Assumed) 1.04 0.22 1.42 0.24 10.70
- 0. 35
. (9 0.29 0.38 4 i instrnatation various Fleatble. Actf ve Static Analysts 3.04 0 22 1.42 0.24 10.70 0.35 2.+#
0.29 0.38 5 i CCR Mechanisms Cont. 81dg. 600*
Flemible. Active Response 5pectrum 1.30 0.37 2.74 0.26 5.50 0.24 3.33 0.24 0.41
m TABLE 7.2-2 (continued)
FRAGILITY DESCRIPTIONS FOR ZION EQUIPMENT
/
%dten Ground Structural e
Equissaent a
t outpaent i
Accelera t ton feutpment Seismic 9esponse Structural
Response
Equipment Capacity tout paent Capacity (G's) a,R
,U s adom tincertalaty System 8 Component Location in Structure Characterf s tics Qual. Nthod Factor
Response
Factor
Response
Factor Capacity I
Electrical Power (4160 v)
- 1) Switch Geer Aus. Oldg. 617' Flestble. Active Test (Assened) 1.04 0.22 1.52 0.22 2.67 0.50
- 0. 72 0.35 0.47 5
- 2) Diesel Generators Ava. 81dg. 592' Fleatble. Active Static Analysts 8 I.04 0.22 1.35 0.39 3.60 0 ?S,
0.86 0.35 0.37 5
Test
- 3) Transformer Aus. 81dg. 617' Flesible. Active Test (Assumed) 1.04 0.22 I.52 0.22 11.00 0.58 1.39 0.25 0.60 El?ctric Power (480 %)
- 1) Switch Gear Aus. 81dg. 617' Flestble. Active Test (Assweed) 1.04 0.22 a.52 0.22 2.67 0.50 0.72 0.36 0.47 5
- 2) Motor Control Centers Aus. 9189. 617' Flestble. Active Test 1.04 0.22 1.52 0.22 2.67 0.50 0,72 0.36 0.47 g
- 3) Cable trays Ava. Oldg. 617' Flexible. Passive Test 3.10 0.43 1.08 0.!!
8.33 0.55 4.74 0.40 0.59 Elrctric Power (125 VAC)
- 1) Inverters Aus. 81dg. 642*
Flestble. Active Test (Assumed) 1.04 0.22 1.42 0.24 10.70 0.35 2.69 0.2g 0.38
- 2) Otstelbutton Fanel Ava. Bldg. 642' Floatble. Active Static Analysts 3.04 0.22 1.52 0.29 2.22 0.50 0.60 0.37 0.50 5
11 etric Po=er (125 VOC)
- 1) Battertes 6 Racts Aun. BTdg. 642' Fleaible. Active Test & Analysis 1.04 0.22 1.35 0.33 9.00 0.57 1.01 0.28 0.63 21 DC Bus Work Aus. Bldg. 642' Fleatble. Active Test (Assumed) 1.04 0.22 1.52 0.29 2.22 0.50 0.60 0.37 0.50 5
Offstte Power Il Ceramte lasulators Outside. Grade Level Fleatble. Passf ve he Qualf fication M
M M
M M
M 0.20 0.20 0.25 N
e N !
The values were qualif ted by static analysts, and the motor operators were Quellf fed by test, ea I
(,rt values taken from Section 4 of this report.
'Sased on Availlary Butiding Failure. Table 411.
Falws Itsted are for case of no soil fail under containment building base mat. For fragility descrfption including 5011 failure, see Figure 5-4 a wetton 5.2.3.3.6.
Postulated piping fatture due to soll failure is a break at the containment penetration.
Fativres are interetttant relay chatter or breaker trip which are considered recoverable ela manual reset.
Permanent damage tstimated to occur at double tnese values.
TABLE 7.2-3 FRAGILITY OF KEY ZION STRUCTURES AND EQUIPMENT Symbol Structure / Equipment aa Sg
- g Offsite Power 0.20 0.20 0.25
(,
)
Cetamic Insulators 1251AC Of stribution Panel
- 0.60 0.37 0.50 125 VDC Buswork*
0.60 0.37 0.50 Service Water Pumps 0.63 0.15 0.36 4,160V Switchgear (chattering)*
0.72 0.35 0.47 480V Switchgear (chatter *ng)*
0.72 0.36 0.47 480V Motor Control Centers (chattering)*
0.72 0.36 0.47 Auxiliary Building-Failure of 0.73 0.30 0.28 Concrete Shear Wall Refueling Water Storage Tank 0.73 0.30 0.28 Interconnecting Piping / Soil 0.73 0.33 Failure Beneath Reactor Building h
Impact Between Reactor and 0.78**
0.28 0.41 Auxiliary Buildings Condensate Storage Tank 0.83 0.28 0.29 h
4,160V Olesel Generators
- 0.86 0.35 0.37 h
Crib House Collapse of Pump 0.B6 C.24 0.27 Enclosure Roof h
Safety Injection Pusps 0.90 0.20 0.37 Containment Ventilation Ductwork 0.97 0.20 0.62 and Oampers 125 VOC Batteries and Racks 1.01 0.28 0.63 Core Geometry 1.16 0.25 0.42 h
Reactor Coolant Systee Relief Tank 1.19 0.20 0.63 4,160V Transforiner 1.39 0.25 0.60 Service Water System Buried Pipe 48" 1.40 0.20 0.57 CST Piping 20" 1.40 0.20 0.57 6
Auxiliary Building-Failure of Concrete 1.40 0.31 0.33 Roof Diaphrage
(
O Failure of Masonry Walls 1.70 0.50 0.26 O
Containment Ventilation System 1.74 0.49 0.23 Fan Coolers O
Collapse of Pressurizer Enclosure 1.80 0.39 0.34 Roof
- Fragility values indicated are for chatter, relay trip, or other intermittent or easily recoverable condition.. Nonrecoverable failure is expected to occur at about three times the indicated fragility value.
" Applicable only with a median lower t..nd of 0.74g and pu = 0.29.
7.2-16 I
TABLE 7.2-4 s
SEISMIC PLANT MATRIX M CONDITIONAL FREQUENCY (20% Probability Each Table)
TABLE 7.2-4A
,T,
,o.....u u,c u,
uc u
are n,
uc n
( I
.. m 0
0 0
0 0
0 i.0 0
0 i0 0.m 0
0.11,,.
0 0.,..,,
0 0
0 0
0 0
9.=
0 0
0 0
0.
0 0
0.
- 0. n, 0
0 0
- 0.,.n 0
..n 0
0 0.0.,
0 0
0
.i 0...
0 0
- 0. >0, 0
0 0
0.nu 0
0 0
0.,r.
0
..t 10 0
0 0
.0 30 0.rs O
c 0
- 0. =
0 0
0 0
0.=
TABLE 7.2-4B u....u unc u,
we u
nec ru nc n
0 0
0 0
O i0 0.i r,i 0
0 0
.9 0
- 0. i 5 0
0 0
0
- 0.,.0,,
i 0
0 0
0.m 0
0 0
0m 0
0 0
- 0. 03 0
0 0..n, 0,
0 0
0 0
0.On 0
0 0
0.m 0
0 0
0
.. r.
0.
0 0.
0 6.113 0.55 0
0.727 0
0 0.03, 0
0 0
3 0
0 0.
0 0
0 0.=
0.0$
0 O
i.e 0
0 0
O TABLEf.2-4C (Median M Matrix)
,T,
u...,.u urc u,
ue u
ruc ur nc n
- 0. i,,
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 i.0 9.lis 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 4.0 0.itt 0
0 0
0.001 0
0 0
0
- u. 9+1 0.219 0
0
.009 0
0 0
0 0.911 0.064 0
0 0
0 0.934 0
0
- 0. 3%
0 0.422 0
0 0
0 0.3F0 0.43 0
0.55 0
0 0
0.902 0
0 0
0 0.090 0.46 0
0
. 996 0
0 0
0 0.004 0.75 0
0 0
1.0 0
0 0
0 0.0%
0 0
0 8.0 0
0 0
0 0
TABLE 7.2-40 Ate ler.s t e.
ufc Sif uc u
fpC it, rh n
,fg 0
0 0
0 i.e 0
- 0. ii, 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
1.0 0.475 0
0 0
0 u.1 + F 0
0.273 0
0 0
0.003 0
0 0
0.977 0.275 0
0 0
0.02 3 0
0 0.193 0
0 0
9 d.coi 0
- 0. Jb 9
0.642 0
0 0
0 0.30s 0.43 0
0.69 0.965 0
0 0
e 0.c34 0 et 0
0 i.0 0
0 0
0
- 0. 7%
0 0
l.0 0
0 0
0 0
0.0%
0 0
0 1.0 0
0 0
0 0
TABLE 7.2-4E
,]l, Ace teret ten uf6 uf uc u
arc ret it s it
- 0. t tt 0
0 0
0 0
0 9
4.0 0.l f t 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 1.0 0.27%
0 0
0 0.007 0
0 0
0
- 0. *v 3 0.d re 0
0 0
0.01 0
0 0
0
- 0. ut s 0
0.304 0
0 o
0 0.4 t t 0
0.36 0
0 0.sut 0
9 d
G 0.1t*4 9.4h 0
- 0.,v 7 0
0 0
e d.eJ) 0 0.St 0
0 8.0 0
0 0
0 0
0.6s 0
0 0
0 0
0 0.75 0
0 0
l.0 0
0 J
0 0.05 0
0 e
5.0 7.2-17
10-3 0.064 0.056\\
l i
0.088 0.132 0.056 10'4 0.14 0.084 Uz 0.22 8
10-5 O
8 h
5 8
E u.
k 3
$ 104 s
10'I O
I I
I I
I I
O 0.1 02 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
- 0. 7 DAMAGE. EFFECTIVE GROUND ACCELERATION (g's)
Figure 7.2-1.
Seismicity Family 7.2-18
~
^
tese*
1.0 f.
0.75
/
/
j F
/
OFFSITE POWER Y
/
CE RAMIC INSULATORS 0.50
/
0.25
/
j
/
l'/
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I 0
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 8.0 8,0 10 i
1.0
/
/
0.75
/
7 p
/
SERVICE WATER PUMPS 7
0.50
/
f y
/
/
7 0.25 f
/
G
/
0 I
I I
I I
I I
I I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 8.0 8.0 10 1.0
/
/
0.75 p
p
/
AUXILIARY BLDG FAILURE OF SHEAR WALL 0.50
/
/
/
j
/
0.25 0
I U
l I
I I
I I
I I
I
=
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 8.0 LO 10 DAMAGE-EFFECTIVE GROUND ACCELERATIOM (g's)
Figure 7.2-2.
Fragility Families for Key Components
~
4 1.0 g
/
l 0.75
/
/
/
/
0 F 0.50
/
/
REFUELING WATER STOR AGE TANK l
/
0.25
/
j I
E I
I U
I I
I I
I I
I 0
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.0 2.0 3.0 40 5.0 6.0 8.0 10 1.0
/
/
0.75
/
g' 10 l
l SOIL FAILURE BENEATH REACTOR BLDG p
0.50 l
l
/
/
7 0.25
/
/
8
/
s'
/
/
I I#
I l
F l
l I
I I
l I
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 8.0 10 1.0
/,,
/
0.75
/
/
DIESEL GENER ATORS 0.50
/
/
/
,/
0.25
/
/
I"p /
0 l
I I
I l
I I
l l
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 8.0 10 DAMAGE-EFFECTIVE GROUND ACCELERATION (g's)
Figure 7.2-2.
Fragility Families for Key Components (continued) l l
^
1.0
/
/
l 0.75 l
/
/
0
/
POMP ENCLOSURE ROOF F 0.50
/
/
l
/
/
0.25 j
?
/
i I
- 1 I
I I
I I
I o
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.D 5.0 6.0 8.0 10 1.0
/
/
/
/
0'7~6
/
/
/
/
F 0.50
/
/
SAFETY INJECT!ON PUMPS
/
/
/
/
N 0.25
/
j
~
/
/
I L/
I I
I l m/
I I
I I
t 1
o 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 8.0 10 1.0 p-l,,
/
/
/
/
/
0.75
/
/
Q
/
/
F 0.50
/
/
CORE GEOMETRY
/
/
/
/
0.25
/
/
/
/
I l'
I I
I
/
I I
I I
I I
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 G.0 8.0 to DAMAGE. EFFECTIVE GROUND ACCELERATION (g's)
Figure 7.2-2.
Fragility Families for Key Components (continued)
o
'0
/
0.75 p
/
F
/
/
0.50 SERVICE WATER BURIED PIPE 48"
/
j
/
/
0.25
/
/
/
/
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i.
i i
1 o
0.1
-.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 8.0 10 1.0
/
/
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/
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/
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f 0.50 CST PIPING 20" j
j
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/
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0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 8.0 10 1.0
,r
,e w
/
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0.75 p
s
/
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/
/
PRESSUft ZED ENCLOSURE ROOF j
f 0.25 s
/
s' s'
O "d
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0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 8.0 10 DAMAGE-EFFECTIVE GROUND ACCELER ATION (g's)
Figure 7.2-2.
Fragility Families for Key Components (continued)
w M CORE ME LT g
DUE TO SEISMIC EVENTS f%
1' L LOM M,' TR ANSIE NT 2
M, LARGE LOCA WITH LOSS OF 3
WfTH IDSS Of.
SAFETY INJECTION WITH LDSS OF COO LING OR COOLING SAF ETY INJECTION N
rob M
M M
g 2
a w
NOTES:
1.
SYMBOLS IN TRIANGLES A
)
REFER TO LATER F AU LT TREE DEV F LOPMENT.
l Figure 7.2-3a.
Zion Seismic Core Melt Master Fault Tree
TR ANS3f NT wff N LDSS OF CDOUNG "1
T l
l TUR8tNE TR er DUE Loss oF TO LOSS OF OFF5ITt COGUNG Powtm O
t T
1 I
LDSS OF 8stinaARY togg of (BLEED ANO FEEDl
$fCDNDARV (DOLWeG cpo(gNo N
Y I
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AU1'LIAA Y Aw F f f D CDNDfNSAft CONTROL ACrowim CDNTROL F A1LURt F a tDusAftm EOutresENT STORAGE TAM PURSS
^
^
^
92 esA T
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l h" 'm TEO M I '
PIPING F AILURE OF F AILL511e OF F AILtset OF F
n seen A
' A'M N
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NA n
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t SvueOLS ese TReANGLES A l
R(7tm TO LATER f A >LT TREE DEVELOPuf 4T g
g 2
NUMBERS IN TIRCL ES OOR l
1 RESPOND TO S AS'C E VENTS OF TABLE 7 7 3 F AILUptf OF F AILIAlt OF 3
te A INOT A *PUC A8 tf l SAF ETV INJE CT fDN CNARGI88G N
ME AN5 TH AT TMIS F AILURE is NOT INDUCFD ev TME RANGE OF PO55i8t f SE IS W'C Evf NTS 16 esA Figure 7.2-3b.
Zion Seismic Core Melt Fault Tree - Transient With Loss of Cooling
?^
+
assALL LOCA sostu ldh 506 anAt t3 Y smJkC1 ION om
~
,g o
T I
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Baalt puntastat LOCA SMJECTIOss om CDOuesG Q
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'S seOT '4DUCfD tv YME
'E 8'A RAmeG8 of 8055ieLE SE en WC t vt esTS Figure 7.2-3c.
Zion Seismic Core Melt Fault Tree - Small LOCA With Loss of Safety Injection or Cooling
,w
==e LARGE LOCA WITH LOSS OF SAFETV INJECTION "3
O T
I I
F AILURE OF LARGE LOCA LOW PRESSUmE INJECTION f%
PN 1
I I
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LOSSOF LOW PRESSURIZER PIPE OTHER LOSSOF LDSS OF PRFSSURE q
F AILUR E F AILUR E F AILURES (DwfROL AC PO'vER INJECTION WATER SUPPLY ro I
^
b O\\.
NA NA NA NOTES g
1 SYMBOLS IN TRI ANGLES 6 l
REFER TO LATER FAULT TREE DEVELOPMENT F AILLM E OF FAILURE OF PIPtNG 2
NUM8ERS IN CIRCLES COR.
RWST RHR PM F AILURE RESPOND TO 8ASIC EVENTS OF TA8LE 7 2 3 3
[N INOT APPLICABLE) hitANS TH AT THt$ F ALLURE 9
NA 15 NOT INDUCED SY THE TO RANGE OF POSSIBLE SEIS-MIC EVE NTS
~
Figure 7.2-3d.
Zion Seismic Core Melt Fault Tree - Large LOCA With Loss of Safety Injection 1
w..
.C.D b\\
n T
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- gra, I
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a
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.o Figure 7.2-3e.
Zion Seismic Core Melt Fault ree - Branch Expansion, Loss of AC Power 1
l l
J.$
LDSS OF (DNTROL A
/
- 5 LDSS OF LDSS OF LDSS OF CDNTROL CONTROL CONTROL BUILDING CDNNECTIONS POWER NA y
a N
ru FAILURE OF INOMEcr PAILURE L TR AY".
OTHER BA TTERIES OF AUXILMYSUiLDING AND R ACKS CONCR TE SHfAR WALL WHICH SUPPYTS EX)hTROL POWER CASLES
)l NA NA 17 a
~
NOT:5:
1.
SYMBOLS IN TRIANGLES A REFER TO LATER FAULT TREE DEVELOPMENT.
2.
NUMBERS IN CIRCLES ODR.
l RESPONO TO EASIC EVENTS OF TABLE 7.24.
3.
(NOT APPLICASLEl ANS THAT THl3 FAILURE
!S NOT INDUCED BY THE RANGE OF POS$10LE SEIS.
MIC EVENTS.
Figure 7.2-3f.
Zion Seismic Core Melt Fault Tree - Brancn Expansion, Loss of Control i
V 4
PlPING FAILURE FAILURE OF BETWEEN AUXILIARY PRESSURIZED 8UILDING ANO 4
TAM CONTAINMENT G\\
A O\\
A f%
r%
l l
DlRECT FAILURE OF INTERCONNECTING mLUPSE OF PIPING PIPING DUE TO SOIL FAILURE DIRECT PRESSURIZCH FAILUR E SENEATH REACTOR BUILDING FAILURE ENCLOSURE ROOF N
{[10 Nb NA NA 26 e
I NOTES:
l 1.
SYM80LS IN TRIANGLES A REFER TO LATER FAULT THEE DEVELOPMENT.
3 2.
NUMSERS IN CIRCLES COR-RESPOND TO B ASIC EVENTS OF 1 ABLE 7.;-3.
3.
(NOT APPLICA8 LEI ANS THAT 1HIS F AILURE IS NOT INDUCED BY THE RANGE OF POSSISLE SEIS-MtCEVENTS.
Figure 7.2-39 Zion Seismic Core Melt Fault Tree - Specific Events: Piping Failure Betwee.i Auxiliary Building and Ccntainment, Failure Of Pressurized Taps
1.0 0.8 0.20
--- 0.20 j
z 0.20
- 0.20
~
9 0.6 N
0.20 m g
E
- ma
=
g i
o
-e I
g 0.4 l
0.2 I
l I
I I
i o
0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 DAMAGE EFFECTIVE GROUND ACCELERATION (g's)
Figure 7.2-4.
Zion Plant Level Fragility Family
n.
1.0 l
A h)
A
(
V
)]
M, =
V [(
V V
~
~
CUMULATIVE PROBABILITY r
MEAN FREQUENCY =
b
.6 5.6 X 104Y R-1 0
d N
I
?
8 w
e
' O.4 PROBABILITY
=
DENSITY 0.2 I
I I
0 4
4 10-8 10'7 10 10-5 10 ANNUAL CORE MELT FREQUENCY Figure 7.2-5.
Zion Annual Core Melt Frequency 4
i FAILURE OF FAN COOLERS
{
l h W
I DIRECT LOS$OF RV WATER FAILURG ACPOWER C
OL TO F AN COOLERS i
[ )l
^
^
i n
\\
r%.
LOSS OF SERVICE LCSS OF ALL WATER TO SERVICE WATER CONTAINMENT:
PIPE RUPTURE f%
010 LOSS OF SERVICE WATER LOSS OF SERVICE WATER PIPE F ALLURE AC POWER PUMPS 0.4 lVl A
21
~%
INDIRECT: COLLAFSE DIRECT OF CRIB HOUSE PUMP ENCLOSURE ROOF l
3 f 3l
\\
4 54 I
IV Figure 7.2-6.
Fault Tree for Seismic Failure of Fan Coolers 7.2-32
~
v FAILURE OF CONTAINMENT SPR AY y r%
I i
LOSS OF LOSS OF I
LOSS OF
'N N WATER CONTAINMENT FAILURE AC POWER C TROL SUPPLY SPRAY PUMPS
^
^
NA NA O
O
.~
.O SPRAY pgpggg F ALLURE OF FAILURE RWST 8
Figure 7.2-7.
Fault Tree for Seismic Failure of Containment Spray w
1w, h
T m-4
+
l' l
l 18 MEDI AN UPPER
~,
BOUND OF SEISMIC f16 TRANSMISSIBILITY (P a.5)\\
l l[ UPPER BOUND O TR ANSMISSIBILQY (P a 1.0t 7-l9 SEISMIC -
g.
2 g
=-
s g,l -
8 8
z DESIGN BASIS
~
Ig s
y ACCELERATION l
y 5 10 l
~
s E
/^\\
l
\\
t
/
y B
/
N l
v e
I.I s
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f e
i N
i
(
l
<6
/
i a
/
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l 5
m SEnviCE
\\
f l
$4 WATER
[Q
[
l Z
PU iPS
/
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/
l 2
FIRST FAILURE
% _./
g (T LINE CERAMIC f
g%
INSULATORS)
N__
f f
I_.
1/ Al I
I l l
I f
I I
I I i 1.0 10.0 MEDIAN ACCELERATION ("g")
Figure 7.2-8.
Approximate Median Fragility Distribution - Zion Station