ML20045H052
| ML20045H052 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200001 |
| Issue date: | 07/02/1993 |
| From: | Fox J GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Poslusny C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9307160297 | |
| Download: ML20045H052 (72) | |
Text
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GENuclearEnergy Generd Electnc Company 175 Cunner Avenue. San kse, CA 95125 July 2,1993 Docket No. STN 52-001 Chet Posiusny, Senior Project Manager Standardization Project Directorate Associate Directorate for Advanced Reactors and License Renewal Office of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Subject:
Submittal Supporting Accelerated ABWR Schedule - AllWR Station Illackout Considerations
Dear Chet:
Enclosed is the final version of Appendix 1C,"ABWR Station Blackout Considerations,"
(Enclosure 1). This replaces the draft version of this appendix provided in my letter dated April 30,1993 addressing DFSER Confirmatory item 9.2.13-1.
Also included is a SSAR markup (Enclosure 2) supporting the final version of Appendix IC.
Please provide copies of this transmittal to Charlie Thomas and Butch Burton.
Sincerely,
'f
<m Jack Fox Advanced Reactor Programs ec: Alan Beard (GE)
Carl Christensen (GE)
Norman Fletcher (DOE)
John Power (GE)
Bob Strong (GE) j Jf4219 130169 9307160297 930702
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Appendix 1C ABWR STATION BLACKOUT CONSIDERATIONS-(ABWR DESIGN COMPLIANCE WITH 10CFR50.63)
ABWR uuaxc Standard Plant nrv c TABLE OF CONTENTS Page IC.1 INTRODUCTION IC.1-1 1C.2 DISCUSSION IC.2-1 1C.2.1 Station Blackout Definitions IC.21 IC.2.2 Plant SBO Design Basis IC.2-2 1C.2.2.1 General SBO Design Basis 1C.2-2 1C.2.2.2 Specific SBO Design Basis IC.2-2 1C.2.3 Plant SBO Safety Analysis 1C.24 1C.2.3.1 Plant Event Evaluations IC.2-4 1 C.2.3.1.1 Plant Normal Operation IC.2-4 1C.2.3.1.2 LOPP Events 1C.2-5 1 C.2.3.1.3 SBO Events 1 C.2-5 1 C.2.3.1.4 Other Operational Capabilities IC.2-6 1C.2.3.2 Alternate AC Power Source Evaluation IC.2-6 1C.2.4 Plant Conformance With SBO Requirements IC.2-7 1C.2.4.1 10CFR50.63 Requirements IC.2-7 1C.2.4.2 New ALWR Requirements (SECY904)l6)
IC.2-7 1C.2.4.3 Regulatory Guide 1.155 Guideline Requirements IC.2-7 1C.2.4.4 NUMARC 87-00 Guidelines 1C.2-8 1C.2.5 Other SBO Considuations 1C.2-8 1C.2.5.1 Plant Technical Specifications IC.2-8 1C.2.5.2 Design Interface Requirements IC.2-8 1C.2.5.3 Station Blackout Procedures IC.2-8 1C.2.5.4 Equipment Qualification, Testing and Reliability 1C.2-8 1C.2.5.5 Periodic Surveillance, Testing, Inspection and Maintenance IC.2-8 1C.2.5.6 Power Feed Cable Routing IC.2-9 1C.2.5.7 Plant Battery Recharging IC.2-9 1C.2.5.8 Plant HVAC Restoration Capabilities IC.2-9 1 C.2.5.9 Power Connection Breakers IC.2-9 1C.2.5.10 CTG-Physical Protection Considerations IC.2-10 1C.3 CONCLUSIONS 1C.2-11 1 C.4 REFERENCES 1C.4-1 Amendment M
Mkk 23A6100AC Standard Plant anv c LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1 C.2-1 ABWR Design Compliance with 10CFR50.63 Requirements I C.2-1-0 IC.2-2 ABWR Design Compliance with RGl.155 Guidelines IC.2-2-0 IC.2-3 AIMR Design Compliance with NUh1 ARC 874)0 Guidelines I C.2.3-0 Amendment 30
ABWR useuse Standard Plant nov c 1C.1 INTRODUCTION This appendix describes (a) how the ABWR Design addresses Station Blackout (SBO) Events; (b) how the ABWR Design complies with 10CFR50.63 SBO requirements; and (c) where supporting documentation to these conformances exist in the ABWR SSAR.
IC !
Amendment 30
ABWR 23A 00A Signdard Plant r,C 1C.2 DISCUSSION 1 C.2.
Station Blackout (SBO) Definitions For the ABWR design the definitions of Station Blackout, Alternate AC (AAC) Power Source, and Safe Shutdown given in 10CFR50.02 are provided below:
Station Blackout
" Station blackout means the complete loss of alternating current (AC) electric power to the essential and nonessential switchgear buses in a nuclear power plant (i.e., the loss of offsite electric power system concurrent with turbine trip and unavailability of the onsite emergency AC power system). Station blackout does not include the loss of available AC power to buses fed by station batteries through inverters or by alternate AC sources as defined in this section, nor does it assume a concurrent single failure or design basis accident."
Alternate AC Power Source
" Alternate AC sourcemeans an alternating current (AC) power source that is available to and located at or nearby a nuclear power plant and meets the following requirements:
(1) Is connectable to but not normally connected to the offsite or onsite emergency AC power systems; (2) Has minimum potential for common mode failure with offsite power or the onsite emergency AC power sources; (3) Is available in a timely manner after the onset of station blackout; and (4) Has suflicient capacity and reliability for operation of all systems required for coping with station blackout and for the time required to bring and maintain the plant in safe shutdown (nondesign basis accident)."
Safe Shutdown (SSD)
" Safe shutdown (nondesign basis accident (non-DBA)) for station blackout means bringing the plant to those shutdown conditions specified in plant technical specifications as Hot Standby or Hot Shutdown, as appropriate..."
1C 2 Amendment 30
23A6100AC e
Standard Plant uvc 1C.2.2 Plant SBO Design Basis
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1C.2.2.1 General SBO Design Basis The ABWR design will mitigate station blackout events as defined in Section IC.2.1.
The ABWR design will comply with 10CFR50.63 requirements relative to the loss of all alternating current power sources.
The ABWR design willinclude and utilize an Alternate AC (AAC) power source to comply with 10CFR50.63 requirements and the recommendations for AL%%s, as defined by the NRC in SECY90416.
The ABWR design will be consistant with Regulatory Guideline 1.155 and NUMARC 87-00 guidelines relative to an AAC power source.
The ABWR design AAC power source will supplement and compliment the current ofFsite AC power connections, the on-site normal AC power sources (transformers), the on-site emergency AC power sources (DGs) and the on-site DC power sources.
1C.2.2.2 Specific SBO Design Basis The ABWR AAC power source will be a combustion turbine generator (CTG).
The normal design function of the CTG will be to act as a standby, non4afety -related power source for the plant investment protection (PIP) non-safety -related loads during -
loss of preferred power (LOPP) events.-
The CTG will be capable of being manually configured to provide power to a selected safety-related emergency bus within 10 minutes during SBO events.
The CTG will automatically start, accelerate to rated speed, reache rated voltage and frequency and be ready to accept PIP loads within two minutes of the receipt ofits start signal.
The CTG will be a diverse, self contained unit (including its auxiliarries) and will be independent of the plant preferred and emergency power sources.
The target reliability of the GTG will be >0.95, as calculated by NSAC-108 methodology.
1C-3 Ameadment 30
ABWR unsuic Standard Plant arv c The CTG will have capacity to supply the required safe shutdown loads.
The CTG will be housed in a Uniform Building Code structure which is protected from adverse site weather related conditions.
The CTG design will minimize potential for single point f:dlure vulnerability with onsite emergency power sources.
Adequate pneumatic pressure and water make-up sources will be available throughout the SBO duration.
The ABWR design will confine the SBO duration to 10 minutes or less with the use of the alternate AC power source.
The CTG will be controllable locally or from the MCR.
Provisions will be made to facilitate the orderly restoration of off-site and on-site power source during the SBO event.
Special quality assurance and control practices will be applied to the CTG.
Special equipment requirements will be applied to the CTG support components.
The CTG will utilize a separate fuel oil storage tank and transfer system from that of the on-site emergency power sources.
The CTG will operate during the SBO event without external AC power sources.
The standby function of the CTG will be to mitigate LOPP or SBO events.
Dual manually operated circuit breakers will separate the CTG from the onsite emergency power buses.
The AAC power source will utilize the available station and/or internal batteries for breaker control and inidal CTG starting functions.
The CTG Fuel Oil Supply will be periodically inspected and the oil analyzed.
1C-4 Amendment 30
M 23A6100AC Standard Plant nev c The CTG operation will be subject to plant operation, maintenance and testing procedures.
All operator actions required during SBO events will be demonstrated by training exercises and will be according to appropriate plant procedures.
CTG power will be used to restore various selected plant emironmental control components (HVAC, chillers. etc.) as soon as possible.
The CTG will not normally be used to provide power connected to the plant loads.
The CTG will be capable of being inspected, tested, and maintained.
The CTG capabilities will be demonstrated prior to shipment, during initial pre-operational test, and periodically during power operation.
Required plant core cooling and containment integrity during the SBO duration (10 minutes) will not depend on any AC power sources.
1C.2.3 Plant SBO Safety Analysis 1C.2.3.1 Plant Event Evaluations -
1C.2.3.1.1 Plant Normal Operation The normal configuration of the on-site AC power distribution system and its individual power sources are described in SSAR Subsections 8.2.1 and 8.3.1.
The CTG (AAC) system attributes and its interconnections are described in Subsection 9.5.11 and in Subsection 8.3.1, respectively. Both are shown on SSAR Figure 8.31.
The normal preferred AC power sources supply safety-related and non-safety-related loads. Power -
to these loads are supplied from the unit auxiliary transformers (UATs) units and the reserve auxiliarv transformer (RAT).
The CTG is designed to supply standby power to the nonClass IE 6.9 Ky buses which carry the plant investment protection (PIP) loads. The CTG IC-5 Amendment M
Mk 23A6103AC Standard Plant anv c automatically starts on detection of under voltage on the PIP buses. When the CTG is ready to assume load, if the voltage is still deficient, power automatically transfers to the CTG. (Refer to Figure 8.3-1.)
The CTG can also supply non-Class 1 power to the power generation' buses which supply feedwater and recirculaung water pumps. These buses normally receive power from the unit auxiliary transformers and supply power to the plant investment protection (PIP) buses through a cross-tie. The cross-tie automatically opens on loss of power but may be manually reclosed ifit is desired to operate a condensate or feedwater pump from the combustion turbine generator or the reserve auxiliary transformer which are connectable to the PIP buses. This arrangement allows the powering ofload groups of non-class lE equipmentin addition to die Class lE divisions which may be used to supply water to the reactor vessel. (Refer to Figure 8.3-1.)
1C.2.3.1.2 LOPP Events The ABWR on-site emergency power sources r
during LOPP events are the diesel generator (DG) units. These units and their system responses are discussed in SSAR Subsection 8.3.1.1.8. However, the CTG is available to provide backup emergency power during LOPP to safety-related loads by manual reconfiguration of the CTG and the loads.
1C.2.3.1.3 SBO Events The CTG is the AC power source during an SBO event. The CTG can supply safe shutdown buses through the realignment of pre-selected breakers during SBO events. The CTG will reach operational speed and voltage in 2 minutes and will be available for bus connection within 10 minutes. Upon a LOPP, the CTG is automatically started and configured to non-safety-related PIP loads. Plant operators using appropriate procedures will reconfigure any of the emergency buses to accept CTO power. Refer to SSAR Sections 8.3.1.1.7 and 9.5.11.
IC-6 Amendment 30 i
ABWR uumc Standard Plant any c 1C.2.3.1.4 Other Operational Capabilities The CTG can be used for postulated prolonged SBO scenarios.
F Up to the limits ofits capacity, the CTG can be connected to any combination of Class IE and non-Class 1E buses to supply loads in excess of the minimum required for safe shutdown.
The ABWR design provides for local and main control room operation of the CTG.
Communication is available between the CTG area and the main control room.
.i 1C.2.3.2 Alternative AC Power Source Evaluation The alternate AC power source (1) is a combustion turbine generator, (2) is provided with an immediate fuel supply that is separate from the fuel supply for other onsite emergency AC power systems, (3) fuel will be sampled and analyzed consistent with applicable standards, (4) is capable of operating during
+
and after a station blackout without any AC support systems -
powered from the preferred power supply or the blacked-out units Class 1E power sourcest (5) is designed to power all of the PIP and/or Class lE shutdown loads necessary within 10 minutes of the onset of the station blackout, such that the plant is capable of maintaining core cooling and containment integrity (6) will be protected from design basis weather events (except seismic and tornado missiles) to the extend that there will be no common mode failures between offsite preferred sources and the combustion turbine generator power source, (7) will be subject to quality assurance guidelines commensurate with its importance to SBO, (8) will have sufIicient capacity and capability to supply one division of Class IE loads, (9) will have sufIicient capacity and capability to supply the required non-Class 1E loads used for a safe shutdown, (10) will undergo factory testing to demonstrate its 2
ability to reliably start, accelerate to rated speed and voltage and supply power within two minutes, (11) will not normally supply power to nuclear safety-related equipment except under specific conditions, (12) will not be a single point single failure detriment to onsite emergency AC power sources, and (13) will be subject to site acceptance testing; periodic preventative maintenance, inspection, testing; operational reliability assurance program goals.
IC-7 Amendment 30
ABWR mumc Standard Plant nov c Based on the above, the ABWR design for the Alternate AC power supply complies with 10CFR50.63, with Regulatory Guide 1.155 and with SUMARC 87-00 and meets the SBO rule.
1C.2.4 Plant Conformance With S80 Requirements A brief review of the general ABWR design conformance with various SBO requirements and guidelines is given below. A more complete in-depth and specific review of each of the SBO regulatory requirements or guidelines is given in the enclosed tables. (Refer to Tables IC.2-1 thru 1 C.2-3.)
1C.2.4.1 10CFR50.63 Requirements The ABWR complies with the 10CFR50.63 requirements.
Special attention was given to the regulation definition of the SBO event, the event conditions, and the requirement for safe shutdown status. The ABWR utilizes the AAC power source option and provides an evaluation of the requirements / compliances in Table 1C.2-1.
1C.2.4.2 New ALWR Requirements (SECY 90-016)
A review of the new ALWR SBO requirements in SECY90-016 recommendations was conducted. The ABWR design is in compliance with the ALWR recommendations.
1C.2.4.3 Regulatory Guide 1.155 Guideline Requirements A review of the ABWR CTG design relative to Sections 3.3.5, 3.3.6,3.3.7,3.4 and Appendix A and B of RG.1.155 was conducted. STET design fully complies with the cited requirements. The use of the CTG as an AAC power source in the ABWR design eliminates the need for a SBO coping analyses by limiting the SBO duration to 10 minutes or less. No operator action is required within the initial ten minutes. Refer j
i to Table 1C.2-2.
f 1C.2.4.4 NUMARC 87-00 Guidelines 2
A review of the ABWR CTG design relative to the NUMARC l
SBO guidelines, Sections 7.1.1 and 7.1.2 and Appendices A and i
B was conducted. The ABWR design with CTG is consistant with the NUMARC guidelines. Refer to Table 1C.2-3.
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1C-4 Amendment 30 1
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ABWR ute - c Standard Plant nev c 1C.2.5 Other SBO Considerations Several other SBO considerations are identified below for special compliar.cc or consideration.
'eC.2.5.1 Plant Technical Specifications Surveillance and operational requirements are needed for the CTG in order to assure its reliability or maintainability.
However, these will be part of the COL-Applicant maintenance, testing, and inspection procedures. These procedures will not be part of technical specifications.
1C.2.5.2 Design Interface Requirements The CTG has a limited number of design interface requirements. Fuel oilis initially supplied from alocal tank,_
and then transferred from a fuel oil storage tank, both of which are independent of the DG fuel oil tanks. A seven (7) day oil supply for the CTG sufficient for shutdown loads will be available on-site. The local CTG I&C is powered by the unit itself or supplied from station batteries. Other auxiliary functions are an integral part of the CTG unit.
1C.2.5.3 Station Blackout Procedures Appropriate procedures will include the use of the CTG and are a COL applicant responsibility. The procedures will consider specific instructions for operation actions responses, timing and related matters during SBO events. The operator actions will include power source switching, load shedding, etc.
1C.2.5.4 Equipment Qualification, Testing and Reliability The CTG will be qualified (as a non-Class 1E AAC power source) for its intended duties and service. Qualification testing, equipment inspections, and reliability data will be made available.
1C.2.5.5 Periodic Surveillance, Testing, inspection and Maintenance Operational reliability assurance program (ORAP) requirements will be established for the CTG.
IC-9 Amendment 30
ABM nov c 23^6too^c Standard Plant 1C.2.5.6 Power and Control Cable Routing The CTG power and control cable routing is physically and electrically separated from other power sources to the extent practical. A suggested routing is shown in SSAR Figure 8.2-1.
1C.2.5.7 Plant Battery Recharging The CTG is capable of recharging the plant batteries during SBO scenarios while supplying safe shutdown loads.
1C.2.5.8 Plant HVAC Restoration Capabilities The CTG is capable of restoring emironmental control -
components during the SBO duration while supplying the safe shutdown loads.
The Main Control Room emironment will not exceed its design basis temperature even during a prolonged SBO event.
With One CiG available in ten minutes, MCR HVAC can be restored.
1C.2.5.9 Circuit Breaker Operation During the realignment of the CTG from non-safety-related
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buses to safety-related buses, at least two breakers will need to be manually closed. The current plant battery power will be utilized to control these breakers. ~
The current SBO requirement that at least one emergency bus be powered within ten minutes is achieved by the manual operation of the two breakers between the CTG and the selected emergency bus (see Figure 8.1-3).
In order to maintain a minimum number of direct connections between the CTG and any of the three Class IE emergency buses, only one Class 1E bus has its supply breaker racked in. It can therefore be controlled directly from the main control room. The other emergency buses have their supply breakers racked out, and therefore, require local operator action to rack in the breakers before main control room operation is available.
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l IC-10 Amendment 30 i
23A6100AC Standard Plant -
any c 1C.2.5.10 CTG - Physical Protection Considerations The CTG is housed in a building (separate from the building which contains the DGs) above the design flood levels. The building is designed t
l to protect the CTG from site related weather conditions.
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i IC-11 Amendment 30
JOIN 23A61CDAC Standard Plant ygy c 1C.3 CONCLUSIONS In summary:
The ABWR design will utilize a combustion turbine generator (CTG) as its Alternate AC (ACC) power source in complying with 10CFR50.63 SBO.
The ABWR design complies with 10CFR50.63 and RGl.155 and is consistant with NUMARC 87400 guidelines.
The ABWR design can successfully prevent or mitigate the consequences of an SBO event.
1C-12 Amendment 30 l
23A6100AC Standard Plant anv c 1C.4 REFERENCES (1) SECY-90D16, Evolutionary LWR Certification issues and Their Relationship To Cunent Regulatory Requirements,Januaxy 12,1990.
(2) LetterJ. Taylor to S. Chilk, Evolutionary LWR Certification Issues and Their Relationship To Current Regulatory Requirements, June 26,1990.
(3) 10CFR50.63, Loss ofAll Alternating Cunent Power (Station Blackout-SBO), July 21, 1988.
(4) RCrl.155, Station Blackout, July 1988.
(5) NUMARC 8740, Guidelines and Technical Bases For NUMARCInitiative Addressing Station Blackout at LWRs Plus Supplemental Q/A sJanuary 4,1990.
(6) 10CFR50.02, Definitions.
IC-13 Amendment 30
5 Table IC.2-1 ABWR DESIGN COMPLIANCE WITil 10CFR50.63 REGULATIONS hh.
.a 8
Requirements Compliance 1
610CFR50-63 Loss of all alternating current power.
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ABWR DESIGN COMPLI ANCE WITil 10CFR50.63 REGULATIONS (Continued)
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Requirements Compliance c.
0 50.63 Loss of all alternating current power.
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(a)
Requirements.
The ABWR design will utilize an alternate AC ( AAC) power (1) Each light-water-cooled nuclear power plant licensed to source to mitigate and recover from station blackout events operate must be able to withstand for a specified duration (defined in 50.2). The AAC power source will be a combustion and recover from a station blackout as defined in Q 50.2.
turbine generator (CTG). The CTG will be totally mdependent The specilied station blackout duration shall be basal on from off-site and on-site emergency sources. A ten (10) minute the following factors:
interval is used as the ABWR design basis for the SBO event duration. The AAC power source provides a diverse power source to the plant.
The ABWR design CTG will have sufficient capacity and capabilities to power the necessary reactor core coolant, control and protective systems including station battery and other auxiliary support loads needed to bring the plant to a safe and (i)
The redundancy of the onsite emergency ac orderly shutdown condition (defined in 50.2). The CrG supplied will be rated at a minimum of 9 MWe and be capable power sources of accepting shutdown loads within 10 minutes.
The current plant onsite emergency power sources include three (3) independent and redundant DG divisions which are designed to supply approximately 5 MWe within 1 minute.
The DG emergency power sources are also capable of providing power for the SBO event, when available.
Additionally, the plant has been designed to accommodate ac power source losses for a period up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. The AAC limits the SBO event to 10 minutes.
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(a) (Continued) th >
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(ii)
The reliability of the onsite emergency ac power The current onsite emergency ac power sources will have the following reliability 1%
8 sources 3
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DGs.. 0.975 The GTG will have the following reliability Cirs.. 0.95 The above values am used in the ABWR-PRA analysis.
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Table IC.2-1 ABWR DESIGN COMPLIANCE WITil 10CFR50.63 REGULATIONS (Continued) a Requirements Compliance 1
to 8
(a)(ii) (Continued)
The expected frequency of loss of offsite power assumed was
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0.1 events /yr.
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(iii)
The expected frequency of loss of offsite power, and (iv)
The probable time needed to restore offsite The offsite power h expected to be restored within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
power.
(2)
The reactor core and associated coolant, control, The AAC power source is capable of providing the necessary and protection systems, including station batteries and any core, containment and equipment services (e.g. makeup and other necessary support systems, must provide sufficient cooling water,1&C power, etc.) to bring the reactor to hot capacity and capability to ensure that the core is cooled and shutdown and then to cold shutdown conditions. The A AC will appropriate containment integrity is maintained in the event limit the SBO duration to 10 minutes.
of a station blackout for the specified duration. The The current plant design assures that durir.g the 10 minute capability for coping with a station blackout of specified
'".terval, the plant core, containment and other safety functions duration shall be determined by an appropriate coping w 11 be mamtamed without the use or need for ac power.
analysis. Utilities are expected to have the baseline assumptions, analyses, and related information used in their llowever, the AAC can operate indefinitely. A seven (7) day coping evaluanons available for NRC review.
supply of oil sufficient for shutdown loads is available on site.
Subsequent oil deliveries will be provided.
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ABWR DESIGN COMPLIANCE WITil 10CFR50.63 REQUIREMENTS (Continued) g g a
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8 Requirements Compliance 1
~C (2) (Continued)
In addition to the discussion under (a) above, the following is noted. He ABWR design SBO duration time considerations are s
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fa. itation ofscope.
consistant with RG1.155 and NUMARC-874X). Upon loss of (b) m (c)
Implementationdl)Information Submittal. For off-site power (LOPP) and upon the subsequent loss of all on site AC emergency power sources (three m, dependent and redundant each light-water-cooled nuclear power plant licensed to DGs), the CTG can be manually connected to any one of the operate after the effective date of this amendment, the three safety-related (Class 1E) busses by closing two circuit licensee shall submit the information defined below to the.
breakers. The alternative AC (AC) power source will Director by 270 days after the date of license issuance.
automatically start, and w, thin 2 minutes be up to rated speed and i
(i)
A proposed station blackout dumtion to be used voltage. It will then automatically connect to selected PIP buses in determining compliance with paragraph (a) of this (non Class IE) loads.
section, including ajustification for the selection based on During the first 10 minutes, the reactor will have automatically the four factors identified in paragraph (a) of this section; tnpped, the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) closed, and the RCIC actuated.
The RCIC system will automatically control reactor coolant level. Any necessary relief valve operation will also be automatic.
Within the 10 minute SBO interval, none of the above actions will require AC power or manual operator actions.
The reconfiguration of the CTG to pick up the Class IE buses will require manual closure of two circuit breakers from the control room. Upon restoration of power to the safety bus (es),
the remaining safe shutdown loads will be energized.
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i Table IC.2-1
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ABWR DESIGN COMPLIANCE WITil 10CFR50.63 REGULATIONS (Continued) g g
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5 Requirements Compliance 1
(c) (Continued Appropriate plant procedures will be developed by the COL 2
applicant for the ABWR design. 'Ihese procedures be 5
(ii)
A descr.iption of the procedures that will be, integrated / coordinated with the plant EOPs, using the EOP implemented for station blackout events for the duration methodology. Procedures will consider instructions for operator determined in paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this section and for actions, responses, timing, and related matters during the SBO recovery therefrom; and event.
(iii)
A list of modifications to equipment and Modifications to equipment and procedures is not applicable associated procedures,if any, necessary to meet the since the use of an AAC soutre and other SBO considemtions requirements of paragraph (a) of this section, for the are included in the ABWR design.
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specified station blackout duration determined in paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this section, and a proposed schedule for t
implementing the stated modifications.
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Table IC.2-1 f
ABWR DESIGN COMPLI ANCE WITil 10CFR50.63 REGULATIONS (Continued) i H)C 8
Requirements Compliance g
(2)
Altemate ac source: The alternate ac power The ABWR CFG will be automatically initiated upon the
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source (s), as defined in i 50.2, will constitute acceptable loss of power to the PIP buses. The CFG will achieve rated s
capability to withstand station blackout provided an speed and voltage within 2 minutes. The CrG will be analysis is performed which demonstrates that the plant has manually connected to safe shutdown loads with 10 this capability from onset of the station blackout until the minutes. These equipment capabilities will be attemate ac source (s) and required shutdown equipment are demonstrated 1) by the manufacturer's component tests and started and lined up to operate. The time required for
- 2) by the CrG initial start-up tests and 3) periodically by startup and alignment of the alternate ac power source (s) the COL-applicant as part of his operational reliability and this equipment shall be demonstrated by test. Alternate assurance program.
ac source (s) serving a multiple unit site where onsite The ABWR design is a smgle unit plant arrangement emergency ac source are not shared between units must have, as a minimum, the capacity and capability for coping design.
with a station blackout in any of the units. At sites where The CTG AAC source is availaMe to power shutdown loads onsite emergency ac sources are shared between units, the w thin 10 minutes as describea above. Therefore, no attemate ac source (s) must have the capacity and capabihty coping analysis is required. In addition, the AllWR is as required to ensure that all units can be brought to and designed with an 8-hour battery to accomodate station maintained m safe shutdown (non-DBA) as defined in {
blackout without the need for AC power. Also, the three 50.2. If the alternate ac source (s) meets the above independent emergency diesel generator systems will requirements and can be demonstrated by test to be accomodate one DG out of service, plus a single failure, available to power the shutdown buses with,m 10 minutes of with the remaining DG capable of bringing the plant to safe the onset of station blackout, then no copmg analysts is shutdown.
required.
(3)
Regulatory Assessment:
(4)
Implementation Schedule: (53 FR 23215, June 21,1988) e 6
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Table IC.2-2 50>
R ABWR DESIGN COMPLIANCE WITil RGl.155 GUIDELINES (Continued)
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Requirements Compliance 3
RG1.155 - Station Blackout m
E REGULATORY POSITION 3.3.5 If an AAC power source is selected specifically for satisfying the requirements for station blackout, the design should meet the following criteria:
The ABWR AAC power source is not nonnally connected to the prefened or the on-site emergency AC power system. Two 1.
The AAC power source should not nonnally be open circuit breakers - one Class IE and the other non-Class IE directly connected to the preferred or the blacked-out unit's
- separate the CTG from the safety-related emergency buses.
onsite emergency ac power system.
The AAC power source is also not normally connected to any of the preferred AC power sources or their associated non-safety related buses. A non-Class 1E circuit breaker separates the CTG from the PIP buses.
The ABWR design minimizes the potential for a) common 2.
Here should be a minimum potential for cause failures between the preferred sources and the on-site common cause failure with the preferred or the blacked-out emergency power sources; b) common cause failures between unit's onsite emergency ac power sources. No single-point on-site emergency power sources themselves; c) common cause vulnerability should exist whereby a weather-related event failures between on-site power sources and the AAC power or single active failure could disable any portion of the source; and d) common cause failures between preferred sources blacked-out unit's onsite emergency ac power sources or and the AAC power source.
the preferred power sources and simultaneously fail the AAC power source.
The design also precludes interactions between preferred, onsite emergency, and AAC power systems resulting from weather related events or single failures such that a single point vulnerability will not simultaneously fail both the AAC power source and the on-site emergency or offsite preferred power x$
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Table IC.2-2 f
ABWR DESIGN COMPLI ANCE WITII RGl.155 GUIDELINES (Continued)
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Requirements Compliance 1
2.
Coritinued sourte(s). This is accomplished by having on-site emergency
[
and the A AC power sources inside weather protected buildings a
and by maintaining adequate separation between the four power sources. None of the four standby power sources share emergency buses or loads, auxiliary services or instrumentation and controls prior to the recovery actions from the SBO event.
These power sources are physically, electrically, mechanically and environmentally separated.
3.
He AAC power source should be available in a The ABWR.AAC design power source will be automatically timely manner after the onset of station blackout and have staned and reach rated speed and voltage and be available to provisions to be manually connected to one or all of the supply PIP loads within 2 minutes, and safety-related loads redundant safety buses as required. The time required for within 10 minutes for any loss of preferred off-site power making this equipment available should not be more than 1 sources (LOPP).
hour as demonstrated by test. If the AAC power source can The design has provisions to assure the timely manual be demonstrated by test to be available to power the interconnection between the A AC (CTG) and any one or more shutdown buses within 10 minutes of the onset of station of the safety-related shutdown buses.
blackout, no coping analysis is required.
The ABWR AAC design will be demonstmted by test to show that it can be connected :n safety-related buses within 10 minutes. Therefore, no coping analysis is required.
4.
He AAC power source should have sufficient The ABWR AAC power source is rated at 9 MWe, which is capacity to operate the systems necessary for coping with a more than sufficient capacity to operate the necessary safe station bl=kaut for the time required to bring and maintain shutdown loads which are less than 5 MWe..
[ the plant in safe shutdown.
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ABWR DES!GN COMPLIANCE WITli RG1.155 GUIDELINES (Continued)
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1 5.
'Ihe AAC power system should be inspected The ABWR design includes previsions to demonstrate the 3
maintained, and tested periodically to demonstrate operability and reliability of the AAC power source. The CIII
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operability and reliability. The reliability of the AAC will be subject to surveillance inspection, testing and 1
power system should meet or exceed 95 percent as maintenance in accordance with the manufacturer's determined in accordance with NSAC-108 (Ref. I 1) or requirements, the COL-Applicant it's maintenance program and equivalent methodology.
with opemtional reliability assurance program requirements.
The CTG will meet or exceed a reliability goal of 0.95 in accortlance with NSAC-108 or equivalent methodology.
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Table IC.2-2 N
I ABWR DESIGN COMPLIANCE WITil RGl.155 GUIDELINES (Continued)
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3.3.6 If a system or component is added specifically to The ABWR design includes the CFG as the AAC power source 3
meet the recommendations on station blackout duration in for SBO mitigation. A test program will be conducted by the Regulatory Position 3.1, system walk downs and initial manufacturer / equipment vendor to verify the major equipment tests of new or modified systems or critical components perfonnance objectives (e.g., start time, rated speed and voltage should be performed to verify that the modifications were times, stable voltage outputs, etc.). These tests will be performed properly. Failures of added components that conducted prior to CFG installation at the plant site. Prior to may be vulnerable to internal or external hazards within the plant operation, the AAC power source will be subject to pre-design basis (e.g., seismic events) should not affect the operational testing to demonstrate that the CFG will perform its operation of systems required for the design basis accident.
intended function. Periodically, the AAC power source will be tested to assure that the reliability / availability goals are being met and maintained.
The ABWR design safety evaluations take into account potential plant disturbances that could affect AAC power source reliability. These disturbences could occur as a result of internal and external hazards (e.g., fkxxis, fires and harsh environs, respectively). The adverse effects on AAC power source components due to operational hazards will not affect the operations of safety-related systems required for the design basis events. The effects caused by or upon the AAC power source due to operational events (internal and external hazards) are limited since the AAC power source components are physically, mechanically and essentially electrically isolated from the design basis engineered safety features and other power generation systems and components. Design bases accident events may result in the potential degradation of the AAC power source. Ilowever, the resulting effects of the AAC will not diminish the current safety system responses and the current event outcomes.
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Table IC.2-2 to i
ABWR DESIGN COMPLIANCE WITil RGl.155 GUIDELINES (Continued) g g
b-u Compliance 2,
8 Requirements 3.3.7 The system, or component added specifically to meet The ABWR design AAC power source will be capable of being the recommendations on stauon blackout duration in tested, inspected and maintained on a periodic basis.
5 Regulatory Position 3.1 should be inspected, maintained, and tested periodically to demonstrate equipment The CTG location in the Turbine Building provides easy access opembility and aliability.
to the unit. The access and environmental conditions in the CrG area allow physical surveillance, easy maintenance, and testing.
The CTG will be periodically started, brought up to speed and voltage, and connected to the PIP buses.
The CTG will be subject to periodic test in order to verify the operability and reliability goals in the plant operational reliability assurance program (ORAP) 3.4 Procedures andTrainingTo Cope with Station Appropriate plant procedures will be developed by the COL Blackout applicant for the ABWR design. These procedures will be integrated / coordinated with the plant EOPs, using the LiOP Procedums and tmining should include all operator actions methodology. Procedures will consider instmetions for l
necessary to cope with a station blackout for at least the P*'"' ' "C'2""8' '**P "S*S' *'"8' ""d '"I"I'd """#'S d"'I"E duration determined according to Regulatory Position 3.1 the SBO event.
and to restore normal long-term core cooling / decay heat removal once ac power is restored.
IPmcedures should be integrated with plant. specific technical guidelines and emergency procedures developed using the emergency operating procedure upgrade prtgram established in response to Supplement I of NUREG-0737 (Ref.12). The task analysis portion of the emergency operating procedure upgrade prognun should include an q
analysis of instnunentauon adequacy during a station blackout, y
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Table 1C.2-2 ABWR DESIGN COMPLIANCE WITII RGl.155 GUIDELINES (Continued) 3s i
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8 Requirements Compliance p
3!
3.4 Continued so 3
3.5 Quality Assurance and Specification Guidance for The ABWR AAC power source design addresses the quality Station Blackout Equipment That is. Not Safety-Related assurance and equipment specification guidance indicated in Appendices A and B of this guide.
Appendices A and B provide guidance on quality assurance (QA) activities and specifications respectively for non-The specific responses to Appendices A and B are presented safety-related equipment used to meet the requirements of 5 in the following sections in this table.
50.63 and not aheady covered by existing QA requirements in Appendix B or R of Part 50. Appropriate activities should be implemented from among those listed in these appendices depending on whether the non-safety equipment is being added (new) or is existing. His QA guidance is applicable to non-safety systems and equipment for meeting the requirements of 4 50.63 of 10 CFR Part 50.
He guidance on QA and specifications incorporates a lesser degree of stringency by eliminating requirements for involvement of parties outside the normal line organization.
NRC inspections will focus on the implementation and effectiveness of the quality controls described in Appendices A and B. Additionally, the equipment installed to meet the station blackout rule must be implemented such that it does not degrade the existing safety-related systems.
This is to be accomplished by making the non-safety-related equipment as independent as practicable from existing safety-related systems. He non-safety systems identified in Appendix B are acceptable to the NRC staff for responding to a station blackout.
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b Table IC.2-2 ABWR DESIGN COMPLIANCE WITil RGl.155 GUIDELINES (Continued) a
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Requirements Compliance 1
8 APPENDIX A-QUALITY ASSURANCE The ABWR AAC power source design is in compliance with
[
the following QA guidelines in 10CFR50.63 as indicated
- s The QA guidance provided here is applicable to non-safety below:
systems and equipment used to meet the requirements of 6 50.63 and not already explicitly covered by existing QA requirements in 10 CFR Part 50 in Appendix B or R.
Additionally, non-safety equipment installed to meet the station blackout rule must be implemented so that it does not degrade the existing safety-related systems. His is accomplished by making the non-safety equipment as independent as practicable from existing safety-related systems. The guidance provided in this section outlined an acceptable QA program for non-safety equipment used for meeting the station blackout rule and not already covered by existing QA sequirements. Activities should be implemented from this section as appropriate depending on whether the equipment is being added (new) or is existing.
1.
Design Control and Procurement Document Control Measures should be established to ensure that all design-The GE and the COL-Applicant QA programs will comply related guidances used in complying with 6 50.63 are with this requirement.
included in design and procurement documents, and that deviations therefrom are contmlled.
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ABWR DESIGN COMPLIANCE WITil RGl.155 GUIDELINES (Continued) gg 3
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Requirements Compliance 2,
2.
Instmctions, Procedures, and Drawings
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s inspections, tests, administrative controls, and training The GE and the COL-Applicant QA programs will comply
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necessary for compliance with 6 50.63 should be prescribed with this requirement.
by documented instructions, procedures, and drawings and should be accomplished in accordance with these documents.
3.
Control of Purchased Material, Equipment, and Services Measures should be established to ensure that purchased The GE and the COL-Applicant QA programs will comply material, equipment, and services conform to the with this requirement.
4.
Inspection A program for independent inspection of activities required The GE and the COL-Applicant QA programs will comply to comply with i 50.63 should be established and executed with this requirement.
by (or for) the organization performing the activity to verify conformance with documented installation drawings and test procedures for accomplishing the activities.
5.
Testing and Test Control The GE and the COL applicant QA programs will comply A test program should be established and. implemented to with this requirement.
ensure that testing is performed and verified by mspection and audit to demonstrate conformance with design and system readiness requirements. The tests should be performed in accordance with written test procedures; test results should be properly evaluated and acted on.
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g ABWR DESIG. i COMPLIANCE WITil RGl.155 GUIDELINES (Continued) gg 5
Requirements Compliance T
l 6.
Inspection, Test, and Operating Status iir a
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Measures should be established to identify items that have The GE and the COL applicant QA programs will comply satisfactorily passed required tests and inspections.
with this request.
7.
Nonconforming Items Measures should be established to control items that do not The GE and the COL applicant QA programs will comply conform to specified requirements to prevent inadvertent with this request.
base or installation.
8.
CorTective Action Measures should be established to ensure that failures, The GE and the COL applicant QA programs will comply malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective with this request.
components, and nonconformances are promptly identified, reported, and corrected.
9.
Ese GE and the COL applicant QA programs will comply Records with this request.
Records should be prepared and maintained to furnish evidence that the criteria enumerated above are being met for activities required to comply with 6 50.63.
TIie GE and the COL applicant QA programs will comply 10.
Audits with this request.
Audits should be conducted and documented to verify compliance with design and procurement documents, instructions, procedures, drawings, and inspection and test activities developed to comply with 5 50.63.
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Table IC.2-2 50>
2 ABWR DESIGN COMPLI ANCE WITil RGl.155 GUIDELINES (Continued)
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Requirements Compliance g
8
~f APPENDIX B -GUIDANCE REGARDING g
SYSTEMS / COMPONENTS Alternate AC Sources ABWR AAC Power Source Safety-Related Not required, but the existing Class IE Existing on-site emergency power soun:es, buses and loads Equipment electrical systems must continue to meet will continue to meet all applicable safety-triated criteria (Compliance with all applicable safety-related criteria.
L IEEE-279)
Redundancy Not required.
i Diversity fmm See Regulatory Position 3.3.4 of this The ABWR design will utilize a AAC diverse power source from that of the EDGs. A qualified combustion turbine Existing EDGs guide.
generator will be used as the AAC.
q Independence Required if connected to Class 1E Two breakers separate the on-site emergency power buses 1
from Existing buses. Separation to be pmvided by 2 fmm the CTG. One breaker is Class IE and the breaker r
Safety-Related circuit breakers in series (1 Class IE at closest to the CrG is non-Class 1E (see Figure 8.3-1).
Systems the Class IE bus and 1 non-Class IE).
Seismic Not required.
Qualification Environmental If normal cooling is lost, needed for The use of the ACC power source will assure that the plant Consideration station black-out event only and not equipment / environment cooling loss will be limited to 10 to 60 for design basis accident (DBA) minutes (SBO duration). Normal plant cooling loads will be conditions. Procedures should be in restored after shutdown loads are reestablished. Temperature place to affect the actions necessary to rise conditions will be limited to minutes rather than hours.
maintain acceptable environmental conditions for the required equipment.
See Regulatory Position 3.2.4.
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Compliance 8
Requirements
-c Alternate AC Sources ABWR AAC Power Source iir
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Capacity Specified in 5 50.63 and Regulatory The AAC power source is capable of powering more than the Position 3.3.4.
minimum required shutdown loads.
Quality indicated in Regulatory Position 3.5.
The ABWR design will be subjected to the quality assumnce standards cited in Appendix A.
Assurance Technical Should be consistent with the Interim The AAC power source operational and test requirements will Specification for Commission Policy Statement on be defined by the Plant Maintenance Program and the ORAP.
Maintenance.
Technical Specifications (Federal They will also be consistent with the Interim Commission Limiting Register Notice 52 FR 3789) as Policy Statement on Tech Specs.
Condition, applicable.
FS AR, etc.
Instrumentation Must meet system functional The AAC power source instrumentation, controls and and Monitoring requirements.
monitoring will be of such number, type and quality to assure that the CTG reliability goals are met.
Single Failure Not required.
Common Cause Design should, to the extent practicable, The A AC power source will be physically, mechanically and Failure (CCF) minimize CCF between safety-related electrically independent of the off-site and on-site power and non-safety related equipment.
systems.
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Table IC.2-2 N
ABWR DESIGN COMPLIANCE WITil RGl.155 GUIDELINES (Continued)
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E Compliance 8
Requirements c.
Water Source (Existing Condensate y
Storage Tank or Alternate SBO Recovery with AAC Power Source
- g Safety-Related Not required, but the existing Class The ABWR design Condensate Storage Tank will provide E
Equipment IE systems must continue to meet all primary make-up water via the RCICor liPCF. The (Compliance applicable safety-related criteria.
suppression pool will serve as the secondary water source. The with IEEE-279)
AAC powered RCWS and RSWS pumps will provide heat removal service to the plant systems including chillers and ilVAC cooling subsystems.
Redundancy Not requimd.
Diversity Not required.
Independence Ensum that the existing safety The loss of all AC power (SBO) will automatically cause from Existing functions are not compromised, reactor scram, MSIV closure, and initiation of the RCIC. The Safety-Related including the capability to isolate AAC power source will re-energize the lost shutdown loads Systems components, subsystems, or piping, if (emergency make-up water, heat removal and IIVAC services) due to the SBO condition within ten (10) to 60 minutes. The necessary.
condensate storage tank will used during the first ten minutes and throughout the hot shutdown transition period A significant amount of water is available from the CST (e.g.
600,000 gal). Afler restoration of power via AAC other plant make-up and cooling water sources will be made available.
Seismic Not required.
Qualification Environmental Need for station blackout event only The AAC power source does not need plant service or cooling Consideration and not for DBA conditions. See water for operation. It's a self (air) cooled, self-lubricated and Regulatory Position 3.2.4. Procedures self-controlled machine.
should be in place to effect the actions necessary to maintain acceptable environmental conditions for required equipment.
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Table IC.2-2
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ABWR DESIGN COMPLIANCE WITil RGl.155 GUIDELINES (Continued) s CL S
5 Requirements Compliance yN cL Water Source (Existing Condensate y
Storage Tank or Alternate SBO Recovery with AAC Power Source Capacity Capability to provide sufficient water The Condensate Storage Tank (CST) is capable of providing at E
for core cooling in the event of a least 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> of make-up water without replenishment. With station blackout for the specified the use of the AAC power sourtes other water sources are duration to meet 0 50.63 and this readily available for make-up, heat removal, and plant regulatory guide.
equipment cooling.
Quality As indicated in Regulatory Position The ABWR design's immediate response to an SBO event does Assurance 3.5.
utilize a non-safety make-up water source (the CST). The AAC power source will allow the use of non-safety water sources.
Technical Should be consistent with the Interim No additional non-safety-related water sources are required Specifications Commission Policy Statement on during the duration of the 10 to 60 minute SBO event. Use of for Technical Specifications (Federal other sources during cold shutdown activities is optional.
Maintenance, Register Notice 52 FR 3789) as Surveillance, applicable.
Limiting Conditions, FSAR, etc.
Instrumenta-Must meet system functional The make-up water source instrumentation and controls, used tion and requirements.
during the SBO duration, are safety-related and divisionally Monitoring separated.
Single Failure Not required.
Common Cause Design should, to the extent The primary make-up water source (Condensate Storage Tank)
Failum (CCF) practicable, minimize CCF between and the secondary make-up water source (Suppression Pool),
safety-related and non-safety-related utilized during the 10 minute SBO duration, are physically, mechanically and environmentally separated from one another.
systems.
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Table IC.2-2 k
ABWR DESIGN COMPLIANCE WITil RG l.155 GUIDELINES (Continued) m C:!
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5 Requirements Compliance
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2 Instrument Air (Compressed Air System)
SBO Recovery with A AC Power Source
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Safety-Related Not required, but the existing Class Use of Plant Instrument Air / Compn:ssed Air Systems during Equipment IE systems must continue to meet all the 10 minute SBO duration is not mquired. Plant air systems (Compliance applicable safety-related criteria.
availability is restored after 10 minutes by the AAC power with IEEE-279) source. Safety-mlated SRV nitrogen gas sources are available during the SBO event and are independent of non-safety air systems.
Redundancy Not required.
Diversity Not required.
Independence Ensure that the existing safety Air systems are not required to operate during the SBO from Existing functions are not compromised, duration. The CIU unit does not depend on an air starter Safety-Related including the capability to isolate system nor air supplied services. The CTG does have a self-Systems components, subsystems, or piping, if contained intake and exhaust system. This is provided by the machine power sources itself.
necessary.
Seismic Not required.
Qualification Environmental Needed for station blackout event The CTG does not require special air or environmental control Consideration only and not for DBA conditions. See services befon:, during or after the SBO event.
Regulatory Position 3.2.4. Procedures should be in place to effect the actions necessary to maintain acceptable environmental conditions for required equipment.
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Table IC.2-2 rop ABWR DESIGN COMPLIANCE WITil RGl.155 GUIDELINES (Continued) y"3 e
[9 E
2N Requirements Compliance tg Water Source (Existing Condensate StorageTank or Alternate Silo Recovery with AAC Power Source 3
Capacity Sufficient compressed air to com-Air service may be utilized later in the SHO recovery stage to ponents, as necessary, to ensure that reconfigure plant system to nonnal operation alignments.
the core is cooled and appropriate containment integrity is maintained for the specified duration of station blackout to meet i 50.63 and As indicated ia$ Regulatory Position Non-safety related air systems are not utilized during the 10 Quality Assurance 3.3.
minute SiiO duration.
Technical Should be consistent with the Interim The CTG does not require air start services. The unit is started Specifications Commission Policy Statement on by a self-contained diesel engine starting system.
for Mainte-Technical Specifications (Federal nance, Surveil-Register Notice 52 FR 3789) as lance, Limiting applicable.
Conditions, FS AR, etc.
Instrumenta-Must meet system functional Plant air system instrumentation, control and monitoring is not tion and requirements.
required during the 10 minute SBO duration.
Monitoring Single Failure Not required.
Common Cause Design should, to the extent Failure (CCF) practicable, minimize CCF between safety-related and non-safety-n: lated systems.
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Table IC.2-2 ABWR DESIGN COMPLIANCE WITil RGl.155 GUIDELINES (Continued)
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Requirements Compliance Qw Water Delivery System ( Alternative gy to Auxiliary Feedwater System, g
RCIC System, or Isolation Condenser Makeup)
SBO Recovery with AAC Power Source Safety-Related Not mquired, but the existing Class The ABWR AAC power source design response during the 10 Equipment IE systems must continue to meet all minute SBO duration does not require additional water make-(Compliance applicable safety-mlated criteria.
up sources beyond the CST and/or the Suppression Pool.
with IEEE-279)
Later in the SBO recovery sequence, the ABWR will utilize the normal plant water systems by powering selective divisions with the AAC power source (e.g. reactor service water and reactor cooling water systems).
Redundancy Not required.
Diversity Not required.
Independence Ensure that the existing safety functions The powering of the nonnal plant water sources by the A AC from Existing are not compromised, including the power source during SBO will not be inconsistent or contrary Safety-Related capability to isolate components, with their current DBA design basis.
Systems subsystems, or piping,if necessary.
Seismic Not required.
Qualification Environmental Need for station blackout event only The use of the nonnat plant cooling water systems will not Consideration and not for DBA conditions. See require prior equipment environment controls or cooling.
Regulatory Position 3.2.4. Procedures Their operation will be provided concurmntly with the should be in place to effect the actions powering of water make-up sources.
necessary to maintain acceptable envimnmental conditions for requimd equipment.
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Table IC.2-2 y
ABWR DESIGN COMPLIANCE WITil RGl.155 5 - ~'DELINiiS (Continued) cnp_
h Compliance E
Requirements 3.
Water Delivery Systern ( Alternative t
to Auxiliary Feedwater System, iT RCIC System, or isolation Condenser Makeup)
SBO Recovery with A AC Power Source Capacity Capability to provide sufficient water The emergency water make-up sources include the condensate for core cooling in the event of a station storage tank and the suppression pool inventory. The normal blackout for the specified duration to plant water make-up sources (component and service water, meet i 50.63 and this regulatory guide.
etc.) are in addition to other altemative core and containment make-up sources (e.g., feedwater, fire pumps, make-up water systems, etc.) all of these systems can supply make-up or cooling water.
Quality As indicated in Regulatory Position 3.5.
The plant nonnat make-up water systems are subject to quality assurance evaluations (e.g. CST and the SP).
Assurance Technical Speci-Should be consistent with the Interim Emergency water make-up systems are subject to Tech Spec fications for Commission Policy Statement o i requirements.
Maintenance, Technical Specifications (Federal Surveillance, Register Notice 52 FR 3789) as Limiting applicable.
Conditions.
FS AR, etc.
Instrumenta-Must meet system functional Instrumentation and controls for normal plant make-up water tion and requirements.
systems are qualified for their functional services.
Monitoring Single Failure Not required.
Common Cause Design should, to the extent practicable, The use of additional plant water make-up systems (post SBO)
Failure (CCF) minimize CCF between safety-related will not degrade the operation or reliability of the necessary and non-safety-related systems.
make-up systems (RCIC, ilPCF, etc.). The CTG has sufficient capacity to power accessary shutdown loads and selective other safety and non-safety loads needed for water make-up.
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Table IC.2-3
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ABWR DESIGN COMPLIANCE WITil NUMARC 87-00 GUIDELINES (Continued)
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Requirements Compliance c.N 7.0 COPING EVALUATIONS
-c EI 7.1.1 Coping Methods 3
For purposes of this assessment, coping methods are The ABWR design utilizes the " Alternate AC(ACC)"
separated into two different approaches. The first is approach as defined in Appendix A. The AAC power referred to as the "AC-Independent" approach. In this source will be available to be connected to the core inventory make-up and decay heat removal loads within ten approach, plants rely on available prrcess steam, DC (10) minutes. The AAC power source is capable of being power, and compressed air to operate equipment necessary electrically isolated fmm the preferred off-site and to achieve safe shutdown conditions (i.e.,Ilot Standby or llot Shutdown, as appropriate) until off-site or emergency emergency on-site AC power sources and complies with the AC power is restored. A second approach is called the Appendix B criteria including electrical isolation
" Alternate AC" approach. This method is named for its use requirements.
of equipment that is capable of being electrically isolated from the preferred off-site and emergency on-site AC power sources. Station blackout coping using the Alternate AC power approach would entail a short period of time in an AC-Independent state (up to one hour) while the operators initiate power fmm the backup source. Once power is available. the plant would transition to the Alternate AC state and provide decay heat removal until off-site or emergency AC-power becomes available. The AC power sources used in the Alternate AC power approach would be subject to the Appendix B criteria including electrical isolation requirements in order to assure their availibility in the event of a station blackout.
Appendix A provides a definition of Alternate AC power sources. Appendix B provides detailed acceptance criteria for an Alternate AC power source.
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Table IC.2-3 i
ABWR DESIGN COMPLIANCE WITil NUMARC 87-00 GUIDELINES (Continued) cn E
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E Requirements Compliance 8
ca.,
7.1.2 Coping Duration AC Independent plants must meet the requirements of this The ABWR design will demonstrate by test that the AAC
{
methodology for at least four hours (or at least two hours CTG is capable of being available within ten (10) minutes for plants in hgih emergency AC group A and off-site of the onset of a SBO event and therefore no formal coping power group PI). Plants using an Alternate AC power evaluation is necessary or required. All actions during the source must assess their ability to cope for one hour.
10 minute period are safety-related and automatic. De flowever, if an Altemate AC power source can be shown ABWR design provides the operator in the main control by test to be available within 10 minutes of the onset of room with the means to reconfigure the electrical station blackout, then no coping assessment is required.
distribution system including circuit breakers, and to Available within 10 minutes means that circuit breakers connect the AAC power sourte to the necessary shutdown necessary to bring power to safe shutdown buses are buses and loads within the ten (10) minute interval.
capable of being actuated in the control room within that period.
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Table IC.2-3 ABWR DESIGN COMPLIANCE WITil NUMARC 874X) GUIDELINES (Continued) g g
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Requirements Compliance a
8 APPENDIX A-DEFINITIONS m
This appendix defines the terminology used throughout the The ABWR AAC power source design will meet the iT E
guide.
following requirements:
ALTERNATE AC POWER SOURCE. An alternating (i)
The design is connectable to (but not nonnally current (AC) power source that is available to and located connected to) the preferred or on-site emergency AC power at or nearby a nuclear power plant and meets the following sources. Two normally open breakers separate the AAC CTG requirements:
from the safety-related on-site emergency power buses. A single nonnally open breaker separates the AAC CTG from (i) is connectable to but not normally connected to the non-safety related PIP buses (preferred power)(see Figure the preferred or on-site emergency AC power systems:
8.3-1).
(ii) has minimal potential for common cause failure (ii)
The ABWR design has a minimal potential for with off-site power or the on-site AC power sources:
common cause failure between preferred power or on-site AC (iii) is available in a timely manner after the onset of power sources. The ABWR AAC power source is a diverse power supply to the normal on-site emergency DGs. The station blackout'.
A AC power supply is totally independent of the preferred and (iv) has sufficient capacity and reliability for on-site power sources. The AAC power source automatically operation of all systems necessary for coping with a station starts and is available for loading in two minutes. The A AC blackout and for the time required to bring and maintain the power supply is connectable to a Class IE bus through the plant in safe shutdown (110t Shutdowr. x Ilot Standby, as actuation of two (2) manual operated circuit breakers. The appropriate); and, AAC power source is normally electrically, physically, mechanically, and environmentally isolated from the preferred (v) is inspected, maintained, and tested periodically and on-site power sources. The AAC power source is to demonstrate operabih v and reliability as set forth in nonnally used during LOPP and SBO events. Ilowever, the Appendix B.
CTG can be used for a number of operational services (i.g.
peak loading, maintenance backup, etc.).
0 x$
2
- 8 AN
Table IC.2-3 ABWR DESIGN COMPLIANCE WITil NUMARC 87-00 GUIDELINES (Continued) p r
m a
9s R
a<
"g Requirements Comphance ALTERNATE AC POWER SOURCE (Continued)
(iii)
The ABWR AAC power source is available in a y
timely manner after the onset of a SBO event. The AAC g
power source automatically starts on LOPP, attains rated
~
speed and voltage within two (2) minutes, and is capable of being connected to shutdown loads within ten (10) minutes.
(iv)
The ABWR AAC power source is rated a minimum of 9 MWe. The shutdown loads an:less than 5 MWe. The CTG reliability is 0.95. The ABWR is expected to be in hot shutdown condition in twenty four (24) hours, and in cold shutdown condition in ninety-six (96) hours. He CrG, is designed to run indefinitely under SBO conditions at rated load. A seven-day fuel supply is available on the site for the CIU (v)
The ABWR AAC power source will be capable of being inspected, maintained and tested periodically to demonstrate its operability and reliability to guidelines set forth in Appendix B.
REQUIRED COPING DURATION - the time between the The ABWR AAC power source design does not require a onset of station blackout and the mstoration of off-site AC fomial SBO coping analysis. He AAC power source will be available to supply shutdown loads within ten (10) minutes.
power to safe shutdown buses.
The cunent design mquirements associated with DBA events assure that the plant will be able to cope with a ten (10) minute SBO event.
5 M
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Tabic IC.2-3
[
ABWR DESIGN COMPLIANCE WITil NUMARC 87-00 GUIDELINES (Continued) e lllllll E
- s 9
y" Requirements Compliance 41 SAFE SilUTDOWN - For the purpose of this procedure The ABWR design will assure safe shutdown plant conditions y
safe shutdown is the plant conditions defined in plant as defined by the Plant Technical Specifications and the g;;-
technical specifications as tiot Standby or llot Shutdown, definition in 10CFR50.63.
g as appropnate.
STATION BLACKOUT-means the complete loss of The ABWR design accomodates the SBO definition and the alternating current (AC) electric power to the essential and other definitions defined in 10CFR50.63. The ABWR design nonessential switchgear buses in a nuclear power plant (i.e.,
utilizes the current available station batteries throughout the loss of off-site c!ectric power system concurient with event. The station batteries will be recharged as necessary by turbine trip and unavailability of on-site emergency AC the AAC power source.
power system). Station Blackout does not include the loss of available AC power to buses fed by station batteries through inverters or by Altemate AC power sources as defined in this appendix, nor does it assume a concurrent single failure or a design basis accident. At a multi-unit site, station blackout is assumed to occur in only one unit unless the emergency AC power sources are totally shared between the units.
O x?
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Table IC.2-3
{
ABWR DESIGN COMPLIANCE WITil NUMARC 87-00 GUIDELINES (Continued) p 88 tlC a
9#
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iT,
E Requirements Compliance 5.N f
f APPENDIX B. ALTERNATE AC POWER CRITERIA y
His appendix describes the criteria that must be met by a y
~
power supply in order to be classified as an Alternate AC power source. He criteria focus on ensuring that station blackout equipment is not unduly susceptible to dependent failure by establishing independence of the AAC system from the emergency and non-Class IE AC power systems.
A AC Power Source Criteria B.I The AAC system and its components need not be The ABWR AAC power source is a non-safety-related designed to meet Class 1E or safety system requirements.
C'IG.
If a Class IE EDG is used as an Alternate AC power source, this existing Class IE EDG must continue to meet all applicable safety-related criteria.
B.2 Unless otherwise provided in this criteria, the The ABWR AAC power source is housed in a Unifonn AAC system need not be protected against the effects of:
Building Code Building (Turbine Building). The AAC power source is physically, mechanically, electrically and (a) environmentally separated from the preferred and on-site power sources. The A AC power source is pmtected from failure or misoperation of mecham. cal equipment, including normal plant and site environmental perturbations (e.g.,
(i) fire, (ii) pipe whip, (iii) jet impingement, (iv) water w nd, temperature, etc.).
spray, (v) flooding from a pipe break, (vi) radiation, pressurization, elevated temperature or humidity caused by high or medium energy pipe break, and (vii) missiles resulting fmm the failure of rotating equipment or high -
energy systems; or (b) seismic events.
8
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Table IC.2-3
{
ABWR DESIGN COMPLIANCE WITil NUMARC 87-00 GUIDELINES (Continued)
Q 3w E
W R
Compliance E.,i 5!
Requirements c.
8 B.3 Components and subsystems shall be protected The ABWR AAC power source is protected against the against the effects oflikely weather-related events that may effects of weather-retted events that may initiate the loss 3
initiate the loss of off-site power event. Protection may be of off-site power events. De AAC power source is located g
provided by enclosing AAC components within structures above the maximum flood level in the Turbine Building.
A that conform with the Uniform Building Code, and burying The power and contml cables from the CTG to the exposed electrical cable mn between buildings (i.e.,
shutdown buses are routed separately from the offsite connections between the AAC power source and the preferred power and control cables to the shutdown buses in shutdown busses),
the Reactor Building. The Turbine Building design basis capabilities will pmvide adequate protection for the enclosed equipment in compliance with their equipment design basis requirements.
B.4 Physical separation of AAC components from The ABWR AAC power source design maintains physical safety related components or equipment shall conform with separation between safety-related components or equipment the separation criteria applicable for the unit's licensing and the CTG by adhering to applicable separation criteria basis.
used in the plant licensing basis.
Connectability to AC Power Systems B.5 Failure of A AC components shall not adversely The ABWR AAC power source design and its associated affect Class IE AC power systems.
components failures will not adversely affect Class IE AC power systems. Class 1E AC power system failures will not affect AAC power source operability.
5 M
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Table IC.2-3 i
ABWR DES!GN COMPLIANCE WITil NUM ARC 874X) GUIDELINES (Continued) cn G
S Requirements Compliance 5 50 The ABWR AAC power source is electrically isolated from the H.6 Electrical isolation of AAC power shall be provided through an appropriate isolation device. If the Class 1E power sources by two (2) circuit breakers in series 3
m AAC source is connected to Class IE buses, isolation shall (one Class IE at the Class iE buses and one non-Class 1E be provided by two circuit breakers in series (one Class IE breaker at the CTG bus). Power to the breakers will be from I
breaker at the Class 1E bus and one non-Class iE breaker appropriate DC sources.
to protect the source).
B.7 The AAC power source shall not normally be The ABWR AAC power source will not normally be connected directly connected to the preferred or on-site emergency to the preferred or on-site emergency AC power system.
AC power system for the unit affected by the blackout. In flowever, the COL applicant may use the CTG for other addition, the AAC system shall not be capable of automatic services (e.g. peak loading, maintenance backup, etc.). De loading of shutdown equipment from the blacked-out unit AAC power system will not automatically connect to or load unless licensed with such capability.
any shutdown equipment on safety-related emergency buses.
The A AC power source will automatically start upon occurrence of a LOPP event. It is connected automatically to the non-safety-related Plant Investment Protection (PIP) buses.
It is capable of being manually connected to safety-related buses. It is also be capable of being manually connected to non-safety power generation loads (feedwater pumps, condensate pumps, etc.).
Minimum Potentialfor Common Cause Failure B.8 Dere shall be minimal potential for common The ABWR AAC power source design contains a number of cause failure of the AAC power source (s). The following design and operational features which provide assuranct of j
system features provide assurance that the minimal minimal poten:ial for common cause failure.
potential for common cause failure has been adequately addressed.
(a)
The AAC power system shall be equipped with a DC The AAC power system is equipped with sufficient plant or power source that is electrically independent from the self-contained non-Class IE DC power supplies (separate from blacked-out unit's prefened and Class IE power system.
the Class IE DC power supplies) to facilitate successful operation.
5 5
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Table IC.2-3
[
AllWR DESIGN COMPLIANCE WITil NUMARC 87-00 GUIDELINES (Continued) 3
- =
3 a
a.
il Compliance g
Requirements g
cL During normal opemtion, the plant electrical distribution y
(a) systems will provide charging power to the plant battery 55-Continued systems.
(b)
The AAC power system is equipped with a self-contained, independent diesel engine hydraulic starting system. This De AAC power system shall be equipped with an air start starter is designed for SBO conditions. The entire starter system, as applicable, that is independent of the prefened assembly is mounted on the same skid with the CKi.
and the blacked-out unit's preferred and Class IE power supply.
(c)
The AAC power supply is equipped with a fuel system separate from that of the DGs. An external fuel supply transfer system The AAC power system shall be provided with a fuel oil will also be provided. A seven (7) day supply of oil for use by supply, as applicable, that is separate fmm the fuel oil the CrG to achieve safe shutdown is available on site. The supply for the onsite emergency AC power system. A CTG oil storage and transfer system is physically and separate day tank supplied fmm a common storage tank is mechanically independent of the LX3 oil storage and transfer acceptable provided the fuel oil is sampled and analyzed system.
consistent with applicable standards prior to transfer to the day tank.
U a8
Table IC.2-3 ABWR DESIGN COMPLIANCE WITil NUMARC 87-(X) GUIDELINES (Continued) 9 g
E@
5 3
E Requirements Compliance B
1 8
The ABWR AAC power source is an independent and (d) diverse power supply from the on-site emergency DG 3
If the AAC power source is an identical machine to the power sources. The AAC power source is a combustion
~
emergency onsite AC power source, active failures of the turbine generator.
emergency AC power source shall be evaluated for applicability and corrective action taken to reduce subsequent failures.
The ABWR of the AAC power source design precludes (e) single point vulnerabilities, weather-related events effects, No single point vulnerability shall exist whereby a likely or single active failures that could disable any portion of the weather-related event or single active failure could disable on-site emergency AC power sources or the preferred any portion of the onsite emergency AC power sources or power sources and simultaneously fail the AAC power the prefe:Ted power sources, and simultaneously fail the source.
AAC power source (s).
The AAC power source is physically, mecham.cally, electrically and environmentally separated from the other plant power systems (e.g. circuit breaker separation, separate oil supplies, separate auto start circuits, etc.).
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Table IC.2-3 ABWR DESIGN COMPLIANCE WITII NUMARC 87-00 GUIDELINES (Continued)
C C2 E
5 R
C g
Hequirements Compliance cL The ABWR AAC power source design does not require y
(f) prefened or on-site ac power sources to support the operation The AAC power system shall be capable of operating of the CfG unit. The CTG and its auxiliary support systems a
~
during and after a station blackout without any support are maintained in their standby status by normal plant power systems powered from the preferred power supply, or the
- sources, blacked-out unit's Class 1E power source affected by the Up n reaching design speed and voltage, the CTG operation is event ~
supported by a self-powered intemal control package. This package assures continued operation without external power or auxiliary service needs.
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Table IC.2-3
?
ABWR DESIGN COMPLIANCE WITil NUMARC 87-00 GUIDELINES (Continued) tn E
l k
5, E
Requirements Compliance
- o
-i
(
8 The AllWR AAC power source is capable of being tested (g) r.d will be periodically tested:
g s
The portions of the AAC power system subjected to (i)
~
maintenance activities shall be tested prior to returning the l
AAC power system to service.
to demonstrate its reliabih.ty and its availability; (ii) to demonstrate that it can be connected to shutdown buses within ten (10) minutes from the MCR; (iii)
I to demonstrate the operability after maintenance has been j
performed on the CTG.
l Availability After Onset ofStation Blackout The ABWR AAC power source is designed to provide reliable B.9 power to shutdown loads during and after the SBO duration.
He AAC power system shall be sized to carry the required The CTG will maintain supply voltage and frequency within shutdown loads for the required coping duration determined the limits currently required during normal operation, and in Section 3.2.5, and be capable of maintaining voltage and during loading tmnsients, etc.
frequency within limits consistent with established industry standards that will not degrade the performance of any shutdown system or component. At a multi-unit site, except for 1/2 Shared or 2/3 emergency AC power configurations, an adjacent unit's Class 1E power source may be used as an AAC power source for the blacked-out unit if it is capable of powering the required loads at both units.
O ox
Table IC.2-3
{
ABWR DESIGN COMPLIANCE WITil NUMARC 87-00 GUIDELINES (Continued)
T ca 5.#
=
E Requirements Compliance g
c.
Capacity andReliability The ABWR AAC power source will be started and brought B.10 to operating conditions consistent with manufacturer's
~
Unless otherwise governed by technical specifications, the recommendations, the plant ORAP, or in accordance with AAC power source shall be started and brought to specific plant developed pmceduits. His is a COL-operating conditions that are consistent with its function as Applicant interface item.
an AAC source at intervals not longer than three months, The AAC power source is capable of being started and following manufacturer's recommendations or in accor.
connected to the preferred power source for load capacity dance with plant-developed procedines. Once every testmg..
refueling outage, a timed start (within the time period specified under blackout conditions) and rated load The COL applicant will provide testing procedures based capacity test shall be performed.
on plant specific OR AP objectives.
Plant specific surveillance and maintenance procedures B.11 based on the appmpriate manufacturer's/ vendor's Unless otherwise governed by technical specifications, recommendations, operational reliability assurance surveillance and maintenance procedures for the AAC programs, plant maintenance effectiveness programs and system shall be implemented considering manufacturer's plant operational requirementswill be provided by the COL recommendations or in accordance with plant-developed applicant.
procedures.
The ABWR AAC power source design will be tested to B.12 demonstmte that the CTG is capable of powering shutdown Unless otherwise governeo by technical specifications, the equipment within 10 minutes of the SBO event.
AAC system shall be demonstrated by initial test to be capable of powerii;g required shutdown equipment within one hour of a station blackoui event.
xD 6
75 E
4 Table IC.2-3 ABWR DESIGN COMPLIANCE WITil NUMARC 87-00 GUIDELINES (Continued) 4-- :
g Egt 1
- '3 E
Requirements Compliance 9
8 Capacity and Reliability 1
The ABWR AAC powet source satisfies the following iT B.13 3
reliability and availability goal-
'lhe Non-Class IE AAC system should attempt to meet the System reliability well be ma.mtamed at or above 0.95 per target reliability and availability goals specified below, demand as determmed m accordarre w,th NS AC-108 i
depending on normal system state. In this content, methodology or its equivalent.
reliability and availability goals apply to the overall AAC system rather than individual machines, where a system Periodic testing and maintenance, to assure this reliability, may compnse more than one AAC power source.
will be perfomsed.
(a) Systems Not Normally Operated (Standby Systems)
System reliability should be maintained at or below 0.95 per demand, as determined in accordance with NS AC-108 methodology (or equivalent).
(b) Systems Normally operated (Online Systems)
Availability: AAC systems normally online should attempt l
to be available to its associated unit at least 95% of the time the reactor is operating.
Reliability: No teliability targets or standards are established for online systems.
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G N C LO Su g6 L INSERT SBO-A (Insert at end of last caracraoh of 9.5.11.4 as marked) the plant maintenance program, and the operational reliability program (see 9.5.13.17).
INSERT SBO-B (Insert in 1.2.2.17.2 as marked)
(Paragraph break) The fuel supply for the combustion turbine generator (CTG) is separate from the DG fuel tanks.
In event of a station blackout, sufficient fuel is available on the site to supply the CTG for seven days operation of safe shutdown loads (see Appendix 1C).
INSERT SBO-C (Insert at end of 8.3.1.1.7 as marked)
(9) Station blackout (SBO) considerations: A station blackout event is defined as the total loss of all off-site (preferred) and on-site ac normal and e:nergency power systems.
In such an event, the combustion turbine generator (CTG) will automatically start and achieve rated speed and voltage within two minutes.
The CTG will then automatically assume pre-selected loads on the PIP buses. With the diesel generators unavailable, the reactor operator will manually shed PIP loads and connect the non-Class 1E CTG with the required shutdown loads within ten minutes of the event initiation.
Specifically, the operator will energize one of the Class 1E emergency power buses by closing each of the two circuit breakers (via controls in the main control room) between the CTG unit and the Class 1E bus.
The circuit breaker closest to the CTG is non-Class lE and the circuit breaker closest to the Class 1E bus is Class 1E.
Later, the operator will energize other safety and non-safety loads, as appropriate, to complete the shutdown process.
See Appendix 1C and 9.5.11 for further information on Station Blackout and the CTG, respectively.
INSEPT SBO-D (Insert as new 9.5.13.17 as marked) 9.5.13.17 Periodic Testing of Combustion Turbine Generator (CTG)
Appropriate plant operating procedures shall include periodic testing and/or analysis to verify the adequacy of the CTG to meet alternate ac (AAC) requirements for station blackout. As a minimum, such procedures shall verify the following:
- 1) The CTG can be started and connected to a preselected Class 1E bus (Division II is preferred) within ten minutes following the CTG start signal.
- 2) The operator can accomplish this from the main control room.
3)
One Class 1E circuit breaker and one non-Class 1E circuit breaker exist and are functional between each of the Class 1E diesel generator buses and the CTG.
(Note that only the circuit breakers for the preselected division are racked in.
The remaining two divisions have their Class 1E breakers normally racked out, as shown in Figure 8.3-1.)
- 4) The capacity of the CTG is sufficient to carry the loads necessary to achieve safe shutdown (i.e.
perform a load capacity test).
- 5) The reliability of the CTG is at least 0.95.
c:\\ow62\\ch8/sboinsrt.wp July 1, 1993 l
t 9.5.13.18 Operating Procedures for Station Blackout Appropriate operating procedures and personnel training shall be developed to:
- 1) Address the operation of the AAC CTG during an SB0 event;
- 2) Restore other plant off site (preferred) and on-site emergency power sources as soon as possible;
- 3) Recover plant HVAC systems as soon as possible to limit heat rises;
- 4) Provide additional core, containment, and vital equipment makeup and cooling services, as necessary; and to
- 5) Establish orderly plant safe shutdown conditions.
9.5.13.19 Quality Assurance Requirements for CTG Quality assurance standards and practices shall be developed to assure continued operational reliability of the CTG as an alternate ac (AAC) power source for SB0 events, in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1,155 and 10CFR 50.63.
INSERT SBO-E (Insert replaces first two caracraohs of 9.5.11.11 The primary functions of the combustion turbine generator (CTG) are: 1) the alternative ac (AAC) power source during the station blackout (SBO) event as defined in Regulatory Guide 1.155 (see Appendix 1C); 2) a standby non-safety related power source located on site to energize non-safety-related plant investment protection (PIP) loads during loss-of-preferred-power (LOPP) events; and 3) a standby power source during shutdown operations.
INSERT SBO-F (Insert in 9.5.11.1 as marked)
(2) The CTG shall be capable of being manually connected to SB0 shutdown loads (via any one of the Class lE diesel generator buses) from the main control room within ten minutes from the beginning of the event.
The CTG shall also be capable of being manually connected to the remaining Class 1E buses.
However, the CTG shall not be normally. connected to the plant safety buses nor require any external ac power to operate.
There shall be two circuit breakers (one Class 1E and one non Class lE) in series between the CTC and each Class 1E bus.
INSERT SBO-G (Insert in 9.5.11.1 as marked)
As a minimum, the CTG shall have sufficient capacity to energize required shutdown loads.
c:\\ow62\\ch8/sbotnsrt wp
.ruly 1, 1993 2-
INSERT SBO-H (Insert at the end of 9.5.11.1 as marked)
(8) The non-Class lE CTG shall be physically and electrically independent from the Class 1E emergency diesel generators such that weather-related failures, common cause failure, or single-point vulnerabilities are minimized or n
precluded.
(9) The CTC shall be capable of being periodically inspected, tested and maintained (see 9.5.13.17 for COL license information).
INSERT SBO-I (Insert in 9.5.11.2 as marked)
The reconfiguration necessary to shed PIP loads and connect the CTG to a preselected bus for emergency shutdown loads can be accomplished from the main control room within 10 minutes of the onset of a postulated station blackout event.
Thus, the CTG meets the requirements for an alternate ac (AAC) source (per Regulatory Guide 1.155) such that a station blackout coping analysis is.
not required.
The additional connection capability for the remaining. Class lE' buses enable the operator to start and operate redundant shutdown loads and other equipment loads if necessary.
INSERT SBO-J (Insert in 9.5.11.5 as marked)
Controls are also provided in the main control room for manual startup of the CTC, and to facilitate connections to the Class 1E buses, should a station blackout occur.
INSERT SBO-K (Insert at end of 9.5.11.3 as marked)
Relative to its function as an AAC source, the CTG complies with 9.5.14, references 7, 8, and 9.
For detailed assessment of the ABWR during station blackout, see Appendix 1C.
INSERT SBO L (Insert at end of 9.5.14 as marked) 7.10CFR 50.63 - Loss of All Alternating Current Power.
- 8. Regulatory Guide 1.155 - Station Blackout
- 9. NUMARC-87 Guidelines and Technical Bases for NUMARC Initiatives Addressing Station Blackout at Light Water Reactors, c:\\ow62\\ch8/sboinsrt.wp July 1, 1993 3-
1.
INSERT SBO-M (Replace second pararraoh of 8.1.2.2 as marked)
A combustion turbine generator (CTC) supplies automatic standby power to permanent non-Class 1E loads.
These loads are grouped on the three plant investment protection (PIP) buses as shown in Figure 8.3-1.
The CTG also has capability to be manually connected to any of the three Class 1E buses, for mitigation of the station blackout (SBO) event (see Subsection (9) of 8.3.1.1.7).
f c \\oid2\\ch8/sboinsrt.wp July 1, 1993 ABWR nA6imac Standard Plant Rev. C OCrf 1.2.2.16.10 Reactor Building generator operation. Each4 uel oil pump is controlled automatically by day tank level and The reactor building includes the containment, feeds its day tank from the storage tank, drywell, and major portions of the nuclear steam Additional fuel oil pumps supply fuel to each diesel supply system, steam tunnel, refueling area, diesel fuel manifold f an the day tank.
encrators, essential power, non-essential power, f/w.A7' S 60- d) emergency core cooling systems, HVAC and 1
173 Site security supporting systems; Site Security is summarized in Subsection 1.2.2.16.11 Turbine Building 13.6 3.1.
The turbine building houses all equipment associated with the main turbine generator. Other auxiliary equipment is also located in this building.
1.2.2.16.1.2 Control Building The control building includes the control room, the computer facility, the cable tunnels, some of the plant essential switchgear, some of the essential power, reactor building water system and the essential HVAC system.
1.2.2.16.13 Radwaste Building The radwaste building houses all equipment associated with the collection and processing of solid and liquid radioactive waste generated by the plant.
1.2.2.16.14 Service Building The service building houses the personnel facilities, and portions of the non-essential HVAC.
1.2.2.17 Yard Structures and Equipment 1.2.2.17.1 Stack The plant stack is located on the reactor building and rises to an elevation of 76 meters above grade level. The stack is a steel shell construction supported by an external steel tubular frame work.
The stack vents the reactor building, turbine building, radwaste building, control and service buildings.
1.2.2.17.2 Oil Storage and Transfer System The major components of this system are the fuel. oil storage taph, pumps, and day tanks. Each diesel generatorWas its own individual supply components. Each[ing the post-L CA period and P orage tank is designed to supply the gsel needs dur eaclfgay tank has capacity for4 hours of diesel ei kT 5
L216.7 Amendment 29
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FACILITY g
=
1 REACTOR CONTAINMENT 3
2 REACTOR BUILDING 3
CONTROL BUILDING B
4 MAIN STEALWEEDWATER TUNNEL 5
TURBINE BUILDING 6
SERVICE BUILDING 5
tp 7
RADWASTE BUILDING l
8 IlOUSE BOILER 9
C NDENSATE STORAGE TANK 10 4Alf TIANSFORMER(3) 11 NORM 5i. SWIIGHGEAR
~ d I I~
12 DIESEL Ott STORAGE TANK (3)
A VXd IN 11 13 STACK 9
14 EOUFMENT ENTRY LOCK 15 FIRE PROTECTION WATER 7
STORAGE TANK (2) 3 4
3 6
16
_ F,lRE PROTECTK)N PUMPl100SE_
[7 ByWSR FUE((40[
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COM 6asiteN Tu@rf GEktOTVR{,
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l power feed is from the unit auxiliary transformers so that there normally are no bus transfers required when-the unit is tripped off the line.
One, three-winding 37.5 MVA unit reserve auxiliary transformer (RAT) provides power via one secondary winding for the Class 1E buses as an alternate to the " Normal Preferred" power. The other secondary winding supplies reserve power to the non Class 1E buses. This is truly a reserve transformer because unit startup is accomplished from the normal preferred power, which is backfed from the offsite power transmission system over the main power circuit to the unit auxiliary transformers.
The two low voltage windings of the reserve transformer are rated 18.75 MVA each.
8.1.2.2' Description of Onsite AC Power Distribution System Three non Class 1E buses and one Class 1E division receive power from the single unit auxiliary transformer assigned to each load group.
Load groups A, B and C line up with Divisions I, II and III, respectively. - One winding of the reserve auxiliary transformer may be utilized to supply reserve power to the-non-Class 1E buses either directly or indirectly through. bus tie breakers. The three Class 1E buses may be supplied power from the other winding of the r erve auxiliary transformer.
A combustion tur ne generator pplies standby over to perm nt non Clas 1E loads These loads re grouped on e of the 6.9 buses per a
500 rower is also provided rom the.coii u on turbine nerator to e
b stoup.
i thre Class 1E e.dium voltag buses via bre ers that ar ormally ra y
fo ivision I and III, a remote manua y closed un r adminis ve trol for ivision II.
Metal ClacI In general, motors largerthan300KWaresuppliedfromthe6.9Kvd(M/C) bus.
Motors 300KW or smaller but larger than 100KV are supp ied power from 480V power center (P/C) switchgear. Motors 100KV or smaller e supplied-power r
from 480V motor control centers (MCC). The 6.9KV and 480V sin W ne diagrams are shown in Figure 8.3 1.
During normal plant operation all of the non Class 1E buses and two of the Class 1E buses are supplied with power from the main turbine generator through the unit auxiliary transformers. The remaining Class 1E bus is supplied from the reserve auxiliary transformer. This division is immediately available, without a bus transfer, if the normal preferred power is lost to the other two divisions.
Three diesel generator standby ac power supplies provide a separate onsite source of power for each Class 1E division when normal or alternate preferred power supplies are not available. The transfer from the normal preferred or The alternate preferred power supplies to the diesel generator is automatic.
transfer back to the normal preferred or the alternate preferred power source is a manual transfer.
i The Division I, II, and'III, standby ac power supplies consist of an
-independent 6.9Kv Class 1E diesel generator, one for each division. Each DC may be connected to its respective 6.9Kv Class 1E switchgear bus through a-circuit breaker located in the switchgear.
c:\\ou62\\ch8/ch8ereft.se March 30, 1993 3-
I Subsequent bus transfer will be as described above. These bus voltage monitoring schemes are designed in accordance with Section 5.1.2 of IEEE 741.
Equipment is qualified for continuous operation with voltage 10% of d>t nominal and for degraded voltages below 90% for the time period established O' C in the load analysis
- for the degraded voltage protective time delay' relay.
(See 8.3 4.20 for COL license information.)
FOOTNOTE
- A complete load analysis sh61 be performed in accordance with Chapter 3 of IEEE 141, and IEEE's 242 and 399, for the power distribution system to demonstrate proper sizing of power source and distribution equipment. Such analysis shall provide the basis for the degraded voltage protective relay timer settings and otner protective relay settings.
t' 8.3.1.1.8 Standby AC Power System The diesel generators comprising the Divisions I, II and III standby ac power supplies are designed to quickly restore power to their respective Class lE distribution system divisions as required.to achieve safe shutdown of the plant and/or to mitigate the consequences of a LOCA in the event of a LOPP.
Figure 8.3 1 shows the interconnections between the preferred power supplies and the Divisions I, II and III diesel-generator standby power supplies.
See Subsection 9.5.13.8 for COL license information.
8.3.1.1.8.1 Redundant Standby AC Power Supplies Each standby power system division, including the diesel generator, its auxiliary systems and the distribution of power to various Class lE loads through the 6.9kV and 480V systems, is segregated and separated from the other divisions. No automatic interconnection is provided between the Class lE-divisions.
Each diesel generator set is operated independently of the other i
sets and is connected to the utility power system by manual control only during testing or for bus transfer.
8.3.1.1.8.2 Ratings and Capability
{
The size of each of the diesel. generators serving Divisions I, II and III satisfies the requirements of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.9 and IEEE Std-387 and-conforms to the following criteria:
-(l) Each diesel generator is capable of starting, accelerating and supplying its loads in the sequence shown in Table 8.3 4 (2) Each diesel generator is capable of starting, accelerating and' supplying its loads in their proper sequence without exceeding a 25% voltage drop or a.5% frequency drop measured at the bus.
(3) Each di s.1 3,enerator is capable of starting, accelerating and running its e
c \\od2\\ch8/ch6 draft. g March 30, 1993
-33
~_
e switch. The standby charger is fed from a load Group A control building motor control center.
Selection of the no.rmal or the standby charger is controlled by key interlocked breakers. A 250 Vde central distribution board is provided for connection of the loads, all of which are non class 1E.
8.3.2.1.3.4 Ventilation I
Battery rooms are ventilated to remove the minor amounts of gas produced during the charging of batteries.
8.3.2.1.3.5 Station Blackout 8.3.l.l A (9) a d W C* N l Station blackout performance is discusse in)fut_...i_; 195.2.1.2.2.
f.
f
- r--a* -
- f Regul
- te ry-Guide 1.155 is pcuild
- f ir. App:ndi 10 See Subsections 4
.,..; for COL license information.
W.SatS.I'/,3 9 5.l3,fg g Q q,g,g3,(q, 8.3.2.2 Analysis 8.3.2.2.1 General DC Power Systems The 480 Vac power supplies for the divisional battery chargers are from the individual Class 1E MCC to which the particular 125 Vdc system belongs (Figure 8.3-4).
In this way, separation between the independent systems is maintained and the AC power provided to the chargers can be from either preferred or standby AC power sources. The DC system is so arranged that the probability of l
an internal system failure resulting in loss of that de power system is extremely low.
Important system components are either self-alarming on failure faults.
or capable of clearing faults or being tested during service to detect All abnormal 4
Each battery set is located in its own ventilated battery room.
conditions of important system parameters such as charger failure or low bus voltage are annunciated in the main control room and/or locally.
AC and DC switchgear power circuit breakers in each division receive control power from the batteries in the respective load groups ensuring the following:
(1) The unlikely loss of one 125 Vdc system does not jeopardize the Class lE feed supply to the Class 1E buses.
(2) The differential relays in one division and all the interlocks associated with these relays are from one 125 Vdc system only, thereby eliminating any cross connections between the redundant DC systems.
8.3.2.2.2 Regulatory Requirements The following analyses demonstrate compliance of the Class 1E Divisions I, II, III and IV DC power systems to NRC General Design Criteria, NRC Regulatory The-Guides and other criteria consistent with the standard review plan.
analyses establish the ability of the system to sustain credible single failures and retain their capacity to function.
The following list of criteria is addressed in accordance with Table 8,1 1 In general, the which is based on Table 8-1 of the Standard Review Plan (SRP).
ci\\ow62\\ch8/chedraft.wp merch 30, M93 64-
- e..
4
f room whenever the breakers are racked in for service.
(See Subsection 8.3.1.1.6.2).
8.3.4.15 Administrative Controls for Manual Interconnections As indicated in 8.3.1.2(4)(b), the ABWR has capability for manually connecting loads to receive power from any of the six sources. Appropriate any plant plant operating procedures shall prevent paralleling of the redundant onsite Class lE power supplies.
AM n
- .r;.t'n; ";x ; L;;; fm hivu TM~ t d 8.3.4.16 9eletedT..;
provide instructions i their plant L. M Operating OL 4pplicancs w' A
rocedures for op ator actions during a p mulated station blacko e've nt Specifically, Division I instrumenta on is functioning pro lyhtNe*
- #d #
redundant D sions II, III, and IV s uld be shut down in er to 1) redu heat diss ation in the control ro while HVAC is lost, d 2) conserve battery nergy for additional S capacity, or other sp.cific functio as ede throughout the event.
(SeeSubsection8.3.f2.3.5).
8.3.4.17 Common Industrial Standards Referenced in Purchase Specifications In addition to the regulatory codes and standards required for licensing, purchase specifications shall contain a list of common industrial standards, as appropriate, for the assurance of quality manufacturing of both Class lE and non-Class lE equipment.
Such standards would include ANSI, ASTM, IEEE, NEMA, UL, etc.
(See Subsection 8.3.5).
8.3.4.18 Administrative Ccntrols for Switching 125 Vdc Standby Charger Administrative controls shall be provided to assure all input and output circuit breakers are normally open when standby battery chargers are not in use (See Figure 8.3 4, Note 1).
Administrative controls shall also be provided to assure at least two circuit breakers (in series) are open between redundant divisions when placing the standby charger into service.
This includes controls for the keys associated with the switching interlocks.
The only exception is an emergency condition requiring one division's loads be assumed by a redundant division by manual connection via the standby charger interface.
8.3.4.19 Control of Access to Class lE Power Equipment Administrative control of access to Class lE power equipment areas and/or distribution panels shall be provided (see Section 13.6.3).
8.3.4.20 Periodic Testing of Voltage Protection Equipment Appropriate plant procedures shall include periodic testing of instruments, timers, and other electrical equipment designed to protect the distribution
- 1) loss of offsite voltage, and 2) degradation of offsite voltage.
system from:
These protection features are described in Subsection 8.3.1.1.7.
8.3.4.21 Diesel Generator Parallel Test Mode c:\\ow62\\ch8/ch8 draft.wp March 30, 1993 64-
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ABN 2s w oo m Standard Plant ggy 3 through three isolation transformers. These components will be measured for moment of
(
isolation transformers provide two functions in inertia and inspected for mechanicalintegrity.
the RIP power supply systems. They step down the The electrical properties and load MG set voltage output to the level compatible characteristics of the individual motor and with the rectifier circuit in the ASD. Also, by get.crator components will also be tested.
phase-shifting the output of the three transformers by plus or minus 20 degrees among The complete, assembled MG set will be one another, a majority of the harmonic currents tested in the factory for control panel l produced by the 6 pulse ASD converter is function, as well as for normal and transient canceled, thus preventing most of the performance response. The normal performance negative-phase sequence current from flowing back test will be repeated at the site during plant l into the generator.
startup.
The MG set will be started with no load.
The MG set equipment is always in service I
This is accomplished by first leaving all during plant operation, hence its operability is connected ASD loads in their tripped position. continuously demonstrated. Its extended The MG set motor is started by a control switch coastdown performance is a result of its l in the main control room, and accelerates inherent design that does not require special directly to the rated speed. The connected ASD demonstration by periodic testing.
loads are then sequentially placed on line by the
' control room operator through issuance of proper 9.5.10.5 Instrumentation Requirements mode switch commands. The MG set output varies from no load to fullload in accordance with the The operation of the MG set equipment is variable operating speed of the exact reverse of monitored by instrumentation for early detection the start-up.
of abnormalbehavior. The motor-input voltage, generator output voltage, current and speed
(
9.5.10.3 Safety Evaluation signals are available for display in the control
\\,
room. In addition, protective relays are The MG set equipment performs no safety-supplied with the equipment for automatic I
related function. Failure of the MG set detection and alarm annunciation of control equipment does not compromise any safety-related panel malfunction, unbalanced loads, breaker system or component and does not prevent safe trip, and open or short circuit conditions.
I reactor shutdown.
9.5.11 CornbustionTurbine/ Generator However, the equipment does include some inherent passive design features which help to 9.5.11.1 Design Basis g [ h0 b alleviate the consequence of a complete loss of AC power bu3 or moraentary voltage drop event.
he primary lunuiuu uf de combusti This feature involves automatic c.xtension of urbine generator (CTG) is to act as a dby electrical coastdown power to the connected RIPS on-site non-safety power so e to feed during a bus failure event.
permanent non-safety loads g LOOP events.
In normal operation, the consequence of The unit also pr es an alternate AC power having one MG set failure is no worse than that
[ource in e of a station blackout event, as d,ffined Appenda B of Regulatory Guide L155.
l of any three RIP trip event.
e 9.5.10A Tests and Inspection The design bases of the equipment shall meet the following performance criteria:
Each major component of the MG set, including the motor, generator, flywheel and (1) The CTG unit shall automatically start, control panel will be tested in the vendor's accelerate to rated speed, reach nominal f acility for verification of design and voltage, and begin accepting load within two
(
functional conformance. The motor and generator minutes of receipt of its start signal.
(
Q S60- F 5 10.1 A ~ h t29
MM z w to w l Stanttard Plant 0, f,5~
n v. s The reliability of t CTG unit, still deficient, power is automatically and successful transferred from the unit auxiliary transformers I
(.-
g based on successfg> star, as calculated by to the CTG.
load runs, shall be; SAC 108, The Reliability methods defined in N of Emergency Diesel Generators at US Nuclear Manually controlled breakers also provide the capaMty of connecgng the combustion tusine Power Plants.
o
,/g c generator to anyes-of the emergency buses if
% The gas turbine shall(have an ISO rating all_other power ces are lost.fD (continuous rating at)(59'F)and at sea $g $fo-If l
level) of at least 9 mW, with nominal output ine Clu ts provided with a fu su ply:that voltage of 6.9 kV at 60 Hz.
is separate from the fuel supply og onsite d emergency ac power system,(^ '
er n-%
f The generator output shall have a f y - ' ad ' '- - ~-: : :x;;: *-4) M steady-state voltage regulation within 0.5% The fuel shall be sampled and analyzed to of rated voltage when the load is varied maintain quality consistent with standards from no load to rated kVA and all tr.nsients recommended by the CTG manufacturer, have decayed to zero.
$80-(f c:
6, e CTG is completely independent, and (6) The transient response of the generator located in a separate building, from the shall be capable of assuming sudden emergency ac power sources. Thus, no single
' application of up to 20% of the generator point vulnerability exists between them. N NEMA rating when the generator, reiter, and A w 3.i sif - 2r a
., o ;,
regulator are operating at no. load, and c The CTG consists of a completely-packaged, rated voltage and frequency results in less fully-assembled and tested, skid-mounted unit than 25% excursion from rated voltage, with the following components:
+
Recovery shall be within 5% of rated voltage, with no more than one undershoot or (1) A gas turbine with diesel hydraulic start
(
system (i.e., capable of black start). The
(
one overshoot withm one second.
' # unit shall be operated with liquid fuel.
h
')
.<v.
<i
& N w ilie 4 (g) With the generator initially operating at rated voltage, and with a constant load (2) A generator with brushless excitation system between 0 and 100% at rated power factor,
. and terminal box. b: m the change in the regulated output shall not exceed 1% of rated voltage for any 30-(3) A reduction drive gear system between the turbine and generator.
inute period at a constant ambient
' o 1. c. '
h%'.5.11.2 Sys emperature.
530 (4) Lubricatim system.
.m 9
Descriptica jf yis//63tgyffsg.
(5) An,y ~^" ; -- -*':n 2..JMs. J -AC -4
/
The interconnections fbr the CTU are shown on 7-
^rW'
" al m the power distribution system single line diagram
.c-(SLD), Figure 831.
(6) Amwy gearbor.
setectd lods os
+
The CTG is designed to supply standby power to4 (7) Airinth anderhamt eqe,,-t
' the three turbine building (non-Class 1E) u=7-m
".9kV buses which carry the plant investment(8) Microprocessor-based controrsystem with 6
protection loads elvri $ 1.0ff ev4uis, control and protective circuita.
k (9) Panels, junction boxes and other accessories The CTG automatically u required.
t r a m i starts on detection of a voltage drop of less See 1,2,1;I@i-fsrf* 0, l Jforeg e am/1raas /cc,
9.5.11.3 Safety Eval =metons
(-
than 70% gnps dcrxnstream bus. When the CTG is f
ready toKj W--h, if the voltage level is The CTG is non Class 1E and its failure will 9.5 10.2 p_~_.A~at 29
~
ABM zwtoaan av.
y..a..a vi..,
not affect safe shutdown of the plant. The unit q is not required for safety, but is provided Was e.,,Iterute ac (//c). source to nitya/e-t
- L' "
2':'--':= the consequences of a station blackoulMowever, the plant can I
dope with a starinn himekant without the CTG Te CTG does not supply power to nuclear safety related equipment except on condition of complete failure of the emergency diesel i go eve 1)
'g generators and a!! off-site powe( Under this condition, the CTG can provide emergency back-up power through manually-actuated Class-1E breakers in the same interface manner as the off-site power sources. This provides a diverse
(.
1 I.
'l l
951011 A h '29
ABM 2246iooxa arv e Standard Plant So%ce
(
powerpin accordance with RG 1.155. Adequate The equipment shall meet the following protection of the CTG against sabotage is performance criteria:
provided by locating the unit inside the security (1) The LDF shall provide a flow path from the protected at a
e ktT Soo suppression pool to the lower drywell when 93.11.4 Tests and inspections the drywell air space temperature reaches i
2600C.
The initial test qualification requirements described in IEEE 387, IEEE Standard Criteria for (2) The LDF shall pass sufficient flow from the Diesel Units Applied as Standby Power Supplies suppression pool to the lower drywell to for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, shall also quench all of the postulated corium, cover be applied to the CTG in order to ensure adequate the corium, and remove the corium decay system reliability. However, the factory-test heat, as confirmed by severe accident portion of this requirement may be waived if the analysis (Appendix 19E).
l identically designed unit has been shown capable of maintaining a reliability of 0.99 over a (3) The LDF shall operate automatically in a passive manner.
five-year period.
Site acceptance testing, periodic surveillance (4) The LDF outlet shall be at least one meter testing and preventive maintenance, inspections, above the lower drywell floor.
etc., shall be performed in accordance with the _(5) The LDF inlet shall be located as far manufacture's recommendations, including time the bottom of the first horizontal intervals for parts replacement cdj drywell-to-wetwell vent as possible while still meeting the requirements for the 9J.11.5 Instrumentation Requirements g 6 @g location of the LDF outlet.
The CTG is provided with local instrumenta-
.n tion and control systems suitable for manual (6) The LDF shall not become a flow path from start.up and shutdown, and for monitoring and the suppression pool to the lower drywell control during operation. Automatic start up and during design basis accidents (DBAs) such as load sequencing is controlled via the control loss-of coolant accidents (LOCAs) or during
=nle located in the main control room.j normal plant operation.
Q c f 3 00.Z F
. s :-
Mechanical and electrical instrumentation (7) The LDF shall distribute flow evenly around linked to control room displays are provided to the circemference of the lower drywell.
monitor starting, lubricating and fuel supply systems, the combustion air in-take and exhaust 9.5.12.2 System Description system, and the excitation, voltage regulation r*
-t The LDF is shown schematically in Figure and synchronization systems.
2-9.5 3.
Generator output voltage, current, kVA, pcwcr factor, Hz, etc., are also displayed in the The LDF provides a flow path for suppression control room. Annunciat6rs and computer logs pool water into the lower drywell area during a provide early detection of abnormal behavior, severe accident scenario that leads to core meltdown, vessel failure, and deposition of 9.5.12 lower DrywellFlooder molten corium on the lower drywell floor.
Molten corium is a molten mixture of fuel, 9.5.12.1 Design Basis reactor laternals, the vessel bottom head and control rod drive components. The flow path is The function of the lower drywell flooder opened when the lower drywell airspace (LDF) is to flood the lower drywell with water temperature reaches 260*C.
(-
from the suppression poolin the unlikely event 4
of a severe accident where the core melts and The flow of suppression pool water to the causes a subsequent vessel failure to occur.
lower drywell through the LDF quenches the 9.5-10 3 Amendment 20
mm DABWR SimpJard Plant..
nrv s
' 9,*,1216 NUREG/CR4660 IMesel Generator Reliability Recoanmendations Programs shall be' developed to address NUREG/CR-0660 recommendations regarding training, preventive maintenance, and root cause analysis J
nent and spm failure o
9Ybferences 1.
Stello, Victor, Jr., Design Requirements Related To The Evolutionary Advanced Light Water Reactors (ALWRS), Policy Issue, SECY 89 013, The Commissioners, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, January 19, 1989.
2.
Cote, Authur E., NFPA Fire Protection Handbook, National Fire Protection Association, Sixteenth Edition.
3.
Design of Smoke Control Systems for Buildings, American Society of Heating, Refrigerating, and Air Conditioning Engineers, Inc., September 1983.
4.
Recommended Practice for Smoke Control Systems, NFPA 92A, National Fire Protection Association,1988.
5.
Life Safety Code, NFPA 101, National Fire Protection Association.
N 2I%a r7 hm2rst S60- L i
93-10.7.1 Amendment 24 l
m,-.
- ..s.
a h
r-MARK-UP TEXT INSERTS A capacity nd voltage drop analysis will be performed in ac rdance with IEEE 141 to assur that power sources'and distribution equipme will be capable of -
transmitting s icient energy _to start and operate al equired loads for all plant conditions.
ll INSERT S (87 CONF)
(7) The bus tie arrangment, d-the cap ty and capability of the-CTG, is-
7 designed such that the tim to pl e the CTG on line to feed any one train -
of shutdown loads (i.e., inc s manual connection to.any one Class lE bus) shall be within 10 minu s.
INSERT T (87 CONF - RG 1.1", Sect. 3.
5 assessment)
The reliability of th TG should meet or ex ed 95 percent as determined in' accordance with NS 108 or equivalent methodo y,
s INSERT U (87 ONF - RG 1.155, Sect. 3.3.5 assessment 6.
Electric Power Research Institute, " Reliability of Emergency Diesel Generators at U.S. Nuclear Power Plants," NSAC-108. September 1986.
IffsEfC V (66 CONF)
Light fixtur in safety a'reas are seismically supported, and are desi ed with.
appropriate gri or diffusers, such that broken material will be co ained and will not become a
'ard to personnel or safety equipment during following a-seismic event.
t INSERT U (Needed to backup 1 C)**
- 4 Displays provided in the Main Contr Room (MCR) nsist of (but are not'-
necessarily limited to) the following: Main C erator output voltage, amperes.
watts, VARS (or power factor), frequency, synchronization; also, distribution system medium voltage (M/C) hgear voltages, feeder and load amperes, and circuit breaker position.
Manual controls are provided in e MCR for the Main enerator output circuit breaker, the medium voltage / /C) switchgear feeder cir it breakers, and' load circuit breakers to power neers or motor control center j
i
-.