ML20043D368
| ML20043D368 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 05/16/1990 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Modenos L, Prevatte R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20043D364 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-395-90-12, NUDOCS 9006070428 | |
| Download: ML20043D368 (10) | |
See also: IR 05000395/1990012
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UNIT E] ST ATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report No.:
50-395/90-12
Licensee:
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company
Columbia, SC 29218
Docket No.:
50-395
License No.:
a
facility Name:
V. C. Summer
Inspection Conducted: April 1 - 30, 1990
Inspectors :
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Richard L. Prevatte
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Date Signed
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Approved by :
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Floya S. Ecntrell, ~5ecgifn Chief
Date Signed
Reactor Projects Branth 1
Division of Reactor Projects
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SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine inspection was conducted by the resident inspectors onsite in the
areas of monthly surveillance observations, monthly . maintenance observation,
operational ' safety verification, onsite follow-up of events at operating power
reactors, preparation for refueling, instrumentation and testing of modifica-
tions, and other areas.
Selected tours were conducted on backshift or weekends.
Backshift or weekend tours were conducted on 19 occassions.
Results:
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The plant has been- in a refueling outage for this reporting period.
A
violation, . involving failure to have adequate post maintenance and post
modification testing with two examples was identified.
The first example was
the result of the licensee identifing three electrical leads, which had been
lifted from the reactor building level transmitter since the last refueling
outage (paragraph 5b).
The second example involved reversing the polarity of
connections on the station battery prior to post maintenance testing (paragraph
7a).
One NCY was identified, involving a failure to perform a semi-annual QA
audit (paragraph Sa). Two events occurred which involved the mispositioning of
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four fuel assemblies during fuel movement and an inadvertent ESF actuation of
the emergency diesel generator when the 230 kV offsite power was lost.
Preparation for refueling was inspected with no deficiencies identified.
In
addition, work activities associated with the modifications to add a voltage
regulator and switches to the 115 kV offsite transformer were monitored with no
deficiencies identified,
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On April 16-17, 1990 the responsible Project Section Chief, F. S. Cantrell
visited the site to meet the resident inspectcts and review progress of the
refuling outage.
On April 26 and 27, 1990, the SALP board members visited the site in prepara-
tion for the end of the SALP period and the SALP board. The reporting period
ended on April 30, 1990.
The unit ended the reporting period with 27 days
remaining in the 65 day outage.
Two examples of one violation were identified.
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
W. Baehr, Manager, Chemistry and Health Physics
C. Bowman, Manager, Scheduling ani Modifications
0. Bradham, Vice President, Nucitar Operations
M. Browne, Manager, Systems Engineering & Performance
W. Higgins, Supervisor, Regulatory Compliance
- S. Hunt, Manager, Quality Systems
- A. Koon, Manager, Nuclear Licensing
G. Moffatt, Manager, Maintenance Services
- D. Moore, General Manager, Engineering Services
- K. Nettles, General Manager, Nuclear Safety
- C, Price, Manager, Technical Oversite
M. Quinton, General Manager, Station Supp'Jrt
J. Shepp, Associate Manager, Operations
- J. Skolds, General Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations
- G. Soult, General Manager, Operations and Maintenance
- G. Taylor, Manager, Operations
D. Warner, Manager, Core Engineering and Nuclear Computer Services.
M. Williams, General Manager, Administrative & Support Services
K. Woodward, Manager, Nuclear Operations Education and Training
Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians,
operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview
Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
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2.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed surveillance activities of safety related systems
and components to ascertain that these . activities were conducted in
accordance with license requirements. The inspectors observed portions of
four selected surveillance tests including all aspects of STP 409.001,
Diesel Generator A Refueling Inspection.
The inspectors verified that-
required administrative aaprovals were obtained prior to initiating the
test, testing was accomplished by qualified personnel, required test
instrumentation was properly calibrated, data met TS requirements, test
discrepancies were rectified, and the systems were properly returned to
service.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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3.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
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The inspectors observed maintenance activities of safety related systems
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. and components to ascertain - that these . activities were conducted in
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accordance with approved procedures, TS, industry codes and standards.
The inspectors determined thet the procedures used were _ adequate to
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control the activity, and that these activities were accomplished' by
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qualified personnel.
The inspectors independently verified that the
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equipment was properly tested before being returned to service.
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tionally, the inspectors reviewed several outstanding job orders to
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determine that the licensee was giving priority to safety related
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maintenance and not developing a backlog which might affect a given
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system's performance.
The following specific maintenance activities were
observed:
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MWR 215950006
Remove existing battery rack assembly and install new
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and
battery rack on battery B in accordance with MRF 21595 -
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215950002
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PMTS P0125054
Five year RCP B motor inspection / overhaul'
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PMTS P0130733
Loop calibration for SW building SWGR room A ambient
temperature
MWR 90M0111
D/G A Replace cylinder liner and water jacket 0-rings
MWR 215950010
Rework battery cable conduit in accordance with MRF-
21595
MWR 215950008
Remove battery cable conduit support for MRF 21595
MWR 9000821
Repair, as necessary, RMA-004
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors nonducttd daily inspections in the following areas:
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control room stariing, access, and operator behavior; operator adherence -
to approved procedures, TS, and limiting conditions for operations;
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examination of panels containing instrumentation and other reactor
protection system elements to determine that required channels are
operable; and review of control room operator logs, operating orders,
plant deviation reports, tagout logs, jumper logs, and tags on components
to verify compliance with approved procedures.
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The inspectors conducted weekly inspections in the following areas:
verification of operability of selected ESF systems by valve alignment,
breaker positions, condition of equipment or components, and operability
of instrumentation and support items essential to system. actuation- or
performance,
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Plant tours included observation of general plant / equipment conditions,
fire protection and preventative measures, control of activities in-
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3rogress, radiation protection controls, physical' security controls, plant
lousekeeping conditions / cleanliness, and missile hazards.
The inspectors conducted biweekly inspections in the following areas:
verification review and walkdown of safety related tagout(s) in effect;
review of sampling program (e.g. - primary and secondary coolant samples,
boric acid tank samples, plant liquid and gaseous samples); observation of
control room shift turnover; review of implementation of the plant problem
identification sy(s)em; verification of selected portions of containment
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isolation lineup
- and verification that notices -to workers are posted'
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as required by 10 CFR 19.
Selected tours were conducted on backshifts or weekends.
Inspections
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included areas in the cable vaults, vital battery rooms, safeguards areas,
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emergency switchgear -rooms, diesel generator rooms, control room, auxiliary
building, containment, cable penetration areas, service water intake
structure, and other general plant areas.
rates were reviewed to ensure that detected or suspected leakage from
the system was recorded, investigated, and evaluated; and that appropriate
actions were taken, if required.
On a regular basis, RWP's were reviewed
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and specific work activities were monitored to assure they were being
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conducted per the RWP's.
Selected radiation protection instruments were
periodically checked, and equipment operability and calibration frequency
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were verified.
In the course of monthly activities, the inspectors included a review of
the licensee's physical security program.
The performance of various
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shifts of the security force was observed in _ the conduct of daily
activities to include:
protected and. vital creas access controls;
searching of personnel, packages and vehicles; badge issuance and
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retrieval; escorting of visitors; and patrols and compensatory posts.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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5.
Onsite Follow-up of Events at Operating Power Reactors (93702)
a.
On March 22,1990, the licensee discovered that a scheduled six month
QA audit was not performed in the second half of 1989.
This
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discrepancy was identified during the performance of the first half
1990 program audit.
This audit was omitted from the audit schedule,
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that is published quarterly, and subsequently not performed.
TS 6.5.2.8.c requires that an audit be performed at least once per six
months to verify the results of actions taken to correct deficiencies
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occurring in unit equipment, structures or method of operation that
affect nuclear safety.
As a corrective action the licensee performed an audit that
considered a sample size which included nonconforming documents,
which were initiated since the previous program audit, one year ago.
No impacting deficiencies were noted.
The quarterly audit schedule
will now require verification prior to issue.
The NSRC members who
review the audit program will be placed on distribution for- audit -
schedules.
This licensee-identified violation will- not be cited
because of the criteria specified' in Section V.G of the NRC
Enforcement Policy was satisfied.
This item will be tracked as NCV
90-12-01, Failure to perform QA audit,
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b.
On April 9,1990, while implementing MRF 21479 for refuel 5, the
licensee discovered that three electrical leads from the reactor
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building level -transmitter LT 1976 were lifted, rendering the
transmitter inoperable.
Investigation revealed that during refuel
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in November 1988, an equipment qualification inspection required
lifting of the leads to rework a Ray Chem splice. A lifted lead and
jumper sheet was initiated in accordance with SAP-300.
On November 17, 1988, the electrical job supervisor requested that
I&C reconnect the leads and clear the lifted lead and jumper sheet.
The electrical. supervisor realized that other work activities were
being performed on' LT '1976 and transferred the paper work and
responsibility to I&C.
The section of the lifted: leads- form for
retermination was marked NA and a reference was made on the-form that
the circuits would be reterminated on MWR 8810501 by I&C. The lifted
leads form was never transferred to the I&C MWR,
As it turned out
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MWR 8810501 had been closed and signed as. complete on . November 8,
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1988. Hence, the lifted leads were never reterminated.
The maintenance task sheet was signed on November 17, 1988.
In
addition to LT 1976, the other train of the reactor building level
indication, LT 1975, was also worked on. during this outage.
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135.001, Post Accident Monitoring Instruments Channel Check,
Revision 7 was specified as the post maintenance test.
The post
maintenance channel check, required by STP 135.001, uses a visual
comparison of LT 1975 and 1976.
With no water in the reactor
building sump, the level transmitter will read zero.
When the
instrument is deenergized it also reads zero. Therefore, the channel
check would not detect an inoperable system.
This is contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,
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Criteria V, which requires that procedures be developed and implemented
to ensure that important activities have been satisfactorily
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accomplisFed.
The above work activities did not contain sufficient ~
procedures or instructions to ensure that necessary post maintenance -
testing was accomplished.
This is the first example of Violation
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90-12-02, " Failure to have adequate- post maintenance and post
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modification testing".
c.
On April 23, 1990, the licensee experienced an ESF actuation of the
emergency diesel generator, when they lost the 230 kV offsite power.
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An inadvertent loss of the 230 kV line was the result of relay.
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department personnel
performing preventive maintenance on
differential relays in the switch yard.
The relay personnel failed
to defeat the differential relay trip signals for the switch yard bus
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3 input and output 0CB's,-except for 0CB 8892, plant feeder.
When
the test began bus 3 power was lost causing the undervoltage relays
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on B train ESF bus to start the DG, and loss of power to the balance
of plant busses.
The relay personnel immediately realized what
happened and restored power to bus 3.
However, the IDB bus could not
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be restored until the diesel was secured _ and the sequencer reset.
The diesel ran for cbout one hour before it was secured.
The
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licensee is investigating root cause,
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d.
On April 23, 1990, while-performing video inspection of the SFP fuel
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assembly locations, prior to core reload, it was discovered that four
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fuel assemblies (G28, G35, F30, E14) were out of position.
Fuel
assemblies G28 and G35 were located in SFP Region 3-and Region ?.
respectively, instead of the called for and required Region 1, per TS
3.9.12.
These two assemblies were new Vantage 5 fuel assemblies that
are scheduled to be reloaded into the core. The-other two assemblies
were burned fuel that was to be stored in . the- fuel pool.
The-
licensee took immediate corrective actions to verify SFP boron
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concentration to be greater than 2000 ppm, suspended all crane-
operations within the pool, provided a SR0 to supervise movement of
fuel assemblies to correct locations, and video taped the entire fuel
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pool to verify correct positioning of all assemblies.
Investigations
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revealed the cause of the misposition to be an.off indexing error
while picking up G35 and a numerical transposition error from the
material transfer form while moving G28.
Prior to reload the
licensee took the following corrective measures:
a fuel movement.
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status board-has been added in the fuel handling building to further
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improve communications between the handling crane operator and the
special nuclear material executor; and a double set of initial
approvals prior to execution of any material transfer forms.
One example of a-violation was identified.
6.
PreparationForRefueling(60705)
The inspector completed the review of the licensee's progress on their
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preparation for refueling.
The inspector observed equipment checkout in
preparation for the fifth refueling outage.
This included fuel assembly
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inspection, using underwater video system; fuel handling, transfer and
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core verification.
In particular, checkout and dry run was observed for
the spent fuel bridge, upender, fuel transfer tube and safety interlocks.
Activities were monitored to ascertain they were performed in accordance
with TS or with the approved procedures.
The following procedures were
reviewed for technical adequacy:
FHP-601
Refueling Organization
FHP-602
Limitations and Precautions for Handling New and
Partially Spent Fuel Assemblies
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FHP-604
Functional Testing.of the Fuel Handling Systems
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FHP-608
Transfer of New Fuel Assemblies from the New Fuel Storage
Racks
The inspector verified that the licensee had the proper staffing and
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supervision, was . in procedural compliance - and maintained good
housekeeping in the refueling area.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Installation and Testing of Modifications (37828)
a.
MRF 21595 was implemented to upgrade the class IE DC system from a
two hour to a four hour rated battery to meet licensee's commitment
to NRC " Station Blackout-Rule", 10CRF 50.63. This modification will
provide sufficient capacity in the Class IE battery for four hour-
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operations without load shedding.
Since the new batteries are of a
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larger physical size, this modification required replacement of the
battery racks, conduit, and conduit supports.
The higher rated
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battery also required replacement of.the molded case circuit breakers
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in panels DPN 1HA1, DPN-1HA2, and DPN 1HBl.
The inspector reviewed
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the modification package and supporting data, selected portions of
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the work activities associated with the removal of battery B, the
installation of new battery racks, and the completed service test on
battery B.
The service acceptance test for the battery was performed
in accordance with surveillance test procedure, DC Battery Service
Test, STP 501.003.
The testing for the new molded case circuit
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breaker was performed under molded case circuit breaker testing,
EM 280.004, Rev. 8.
After completion of the above installation on battery B, on April 12,
1990, the red clearance tag was cleared by an auxiliary operator.
The next steps specified in the MRF was to charge the battery and
perform a service test. When the DC breaker was closed, at 6:30 a.m.
on April 12, 1990, to connect the battery to the DC bus, all lights
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in the area went out and the auxiliary operator reported smoke.
The
control room ordered him to open the battery breaker.
When the
battery breaker was open, all AC power and DC control power for B
train was lost.
At the time, reactor defueling operations were in progress. Since a
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multitude of control room annunciators and the audio count rate was
lost, a decision was made to suspend fuel movement until all power
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and annunciators were restored.
Subsequent investigations by the licensee revealed that both the
normal and swing battery chargers, which were connected to the DC
train B bus,' received damage to various components.
Further
investigation revealed that the source of the problem was that the-
battery had been reconnected with reverse polarity.
The battery
connections were reworked and verified to be correct.
The battery
charger was also repaired and normal service was restored to B train
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during the afternoon of April 12,.1990.
Reactor refueling operations
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were then completed,
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The inspectors investigated this event and attended the-licensee's
management review board on April 19, 1990 where the event was-
discussed in detail.
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It was determined that the cause of the error was inadequate procedural
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requirements to verify correct polarity- of the battery when it was
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terminated to the battery feeder cable.
A review of the MRF stated
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that the polarity should be verified prior to energization.
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However, when the old battery was disconnected, the battery field
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cable leads were not labeled and a lifted lead and jumper form, as.
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required by SAP 300, Conduct of Maintenance, Rev. 4, was-not filled
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out.
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The new battery installation consisted of a two tier battery rack
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instead of the previous one tier rack.
After the new battery was
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installed, the engineers responsible for the MRF noted that the
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feeder cable could not be easily connected to the bottom. row of the
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battery.
He then issued MRF, Minor change notice No.-5, to change
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the connectihis to the top row of the battery,
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Field discussion, between the field and maintenance personnel
performing the work and the engineer, resulted in the engineer
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showing the field personnel how to make the connection.
At that time
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the field personnel assumed that the engineer's description of.how
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and where to made the connections included correct polarity.
Based
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on these discussions the field supervisor provided a sketch, on how
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the connection should be made, to the field personnel.
The
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in the area went out and the auxiliary operator reported smoke.
The
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control room ordered him to open the battery breaker.
When the
battery breaker was open, all AC power and DC control power for B-
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train was lost.
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At the time, reactor defueling operations were in progress.
Since a
multitude of control room annunciators and the audio count rate was
lost, a decision-was made to suspend fuel movement until all power
and annunciators were restored.
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Subsequent investigations. by the licensee revealed that both the
normal and swing. battery chargers, which were connected to the DC
train B _ bus,- received damage to various components.
Further
investigation revealed that the source of the problem was that the
battery had been reconnected with reverse polarity.
The battery
connections were- reworked and verified to be correct.
The battery
charger was.also' repaired and normal service was restored to B train
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during the afternoon of April 12, 1990.
Reactor refueling operations
were then completed.
The inspectors ' investigated this event and attended the licensee's
management review board on April 19,1990 where the event was
discussed in detail.
It was determined that the cause.of the error was inadequate procedural
requirements to verify correct polarity'of the battery when it was
terminated to the battery feeder cable. ' A review of the MRF stated
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that the polarity should be verified prior'to energization.
However, when the old battery was disconnected, the battery field
cable leads were not labeled and a lifted lead and jumper form, as
required by SAP 300, Conduct of Maintenance, Rev. 4, was not filled
out.
The new battery installation consisted of a two tier battery rack
instead of the previous one tier rack.
After the new battery was
installed, the engineers responsible for the MRF~ noted that the
feeder cable could not be easily connected to the bottom row of the
battery.
Pe then issued MRF, Minor change notice No. 6, to change
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the connections to the top row of the battery.
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Field discussion, between the field and maintenance personnel
performing the work and the engineer, resulted in the engineer
showing the field personnel how to make the connection. At that time
the field personnel assumed- that the engineer's description of how
and where to made the connections included correct polarity.
Based
on these discussions the field supervisor provided a sketch, on how
the connection should be made, to the field personnel.
The
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. connection was made based on that sketch instead of the drawings
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included in the MRF package.
At no time was the circuit " rung out"
or meters used to verify correct polarity.
This work.was also
covered by - QC,
Even the _ QC procedures required independent
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verification of correct termination of the battery.
QC inspectors
used the same sketch, and- discussions with the installation
personnel, as' verification that- the cables were connected correctly.
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This is contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix _ B,
Criteria V,
which requires that procedures be developed: and
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implemented to ensure that the important ' activities have_ been
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satisfactorily accomplished.-
The above indicated: that the MRF did
not contain sufficient procedures or instructions to ensure that the
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necessary post modification check-out testing'was accomplished.
The
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QC inspector also failed to follow the procedural requirements
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contained in Inspection Checklist for Terminations OSP, Attachment 1.
This is the second example of Violation 90-12-02, " Failure to have
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adequate post maintenance and post modification testing".
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b.
The inspectors continued _to follow the work activities associated
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with the modifications to add a voltage regulator and switches to the
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115 kV offsite power transformer XTF-4. The work activities observed-
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on this modification included the receipt and installation of the
voltage regulator and switches which was completed during the week of
April 9 _13,1990.
The inspectors also reviewed the: start-up and
operational tests planned on this unit.
No deficiencies were
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identified with these activities,
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One example of a violation was identified.
8.
ActiononPreviousInspectionItems(92701,92702)
(Closed)
Inspector Follow-up Item 89-05-02: Lack of followup on ALARA
action items by the ALARA review committee.
A review of ALARA committee
meeting minutes showed that action items to reduce dose that were approved
by the committee were not always discussed at meetings nor were their
status updated.
The inspector reviewed 1990 ALARA committee meeting minutes and noted that
all action items were discussed at the- meeting and the status toward
completion for each item was updated. This item is closed.
9.
Other Areas
On April 26 and 27,1990, the SALP board members visited the site for an
update on the status of the plant and a presentation by the licensee on
their NUCLEX program for the upcoming SALP.
The SALP reporting period
ended on April 30, 1990.
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.1 01
ExitInterview(30703)
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The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 30, 1990, with
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those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspectors described the
areas inspected ~and discussed the inspection findings. The NCV associated
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with the failure to perform a semi-annual QA audit was discussed. The two
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part violation assciated with the lifted leads. found. on the reactor
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building level transmitter from the fourth refueling -outage, and the
reverse polarity on the DC batteries were discussed in detail. as
inadequate post maintenace and post modification testing problems. -The-
licensee took prompt corrective actions on the battery issues prior to
working the other train during the outage.
Two other events discussed
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were the mispositioning of four fuel . assemblies in the spent fuel pool
during fuel movement and the ESF actuation of the A diesel generator when-
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230 kv offsite was lost.
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No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The licensee did
not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed
by the inspectors during the inspection.
11. Acronyms and Initialisms
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Diesel Generator
Electrical Maintenance
,
Engineered Safety Feature
Fuel Handling Procedure
LER
Licensee Event Reports
MRF
Maintenance Request Form
MWR
Maintenance Wcrk Request
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Non-cited violation
NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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NUCLEX
Nuclear Excellance Program
OCB
011 Cooled breaker
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PMTS
Preventive Maintenance Task Sheet
Quality control
Reactor Coolant Pump
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RCSLK9
Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate
Radiation Work Permits
Station Administration Procedures
Spent Fuel Pool
SPR
Special Reports
-Senior Reactor Operator
Surveillance Test Procedures
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TS
Technical Specifications
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