ML20041F931

LER 82-029/01T-0:on 820222,steam Line Flow Instruments for a Main Steam Line,Channels 3 & 4, & B Main Steam Line,Channel 3,reported Inoperable During Startup.Caused by Lack of Power Supply Fuses to Transmitters.Fuses Replaced

ML20041F931
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	03/08/1982
From:	Joshua Wilson VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20041F919	List: ML20041F918 ML20041F931
References
LER-82-029-01T, LER-82-29-1T, NUDOCS 8203170561
Download: ML20041F931 (5)

Text

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REPORT GATI 4 SO Si CCCKET Nuustm SS 69 EV ENT QATI EVENT DESC11PTICN AND PRC8A8LE CCNSECUENCES h t o i2 e l During urat startup, while at 8% power, instrument technicians reported that steam- I io,3, j line flow instruments for "A" MS line, channel 3 and channel 4 and "B" MS line, l ,

gol4l l channel 3 were inoperable. This event is contrary to T.S.3.7.B. Table 3.7-2 l lo !5j i and is reportable per T.S.6.6.2.a.(6) . The redundant channel for "B" MS line and l l o is 1 I both channels for "C" MS line remained operable as did other systems which would l

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ATTACIIMENT 1 SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO.1

• DOCKET NO: 50-280 REPORT NO: 82-029/OlT-0 EVENT DATE: 02-22-82 TITLE OF THE EVENT: F-474, F-475, and F-484 INOPERABLE

1. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

On 2-22-82, during unit startup following a maintenance outage, the instrument "

technicians reported that the power supply fuses to certain main steamline flow instruments were removed. The unfused condition rendered these steam-line flow transmitters inoperable. Reactor power was approximately 8% and reactor coolant average temperature was approximately 547' at the time of discovery.

The instruments affected were F474 and F475 serving "A" main steamline and F484 serving "B" main steamline.

Inoperability of the main steamline flow instruments with reactor coolant

average temperature above 543' is contrary to Technical Specification 3.7.B.

Table 3.7-2. This event is reportable per Technical Specification 6.6.2.a.(6) .

2.. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF OCCURRENCE:

Protection against a steamline break accident is brought about, in part, by actuation of the Safety Injection System which provides emergency cooling and a reduction of reactivity. Diverse instrumentation has been provided to sense accident conditions and to initiate the operation of the Engineered Safety Features.

Signals which provide automatic SIS actuation following steamline break accidents include:

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1. High steamline flow from 1 of 2 channels from 2 of 3 steamline in coinci-dence with low reactor coolant average temperature.

Page 2 Report No. 82-029/0lT-0

2. Probable Consequences of Occurrence (continued)

2. High steamline flow from 1 of 2 channels from 2 of 3 steamlines in coincidence with low steanline pressure.

3. A 120 psig difference between 2 of 3 main steam header pressure channels .

and 2 of 3 pressure channels of 1 of 3 main steamlines.

4. Containment pressure of 3 psig (due to the loss of high energy steam inside the containment).

5. Low pressurizer pressure (due to the increased extraction of reactor coolant system heat) .

The high steamline flow signals mentioned above also initiate closure of the main steam trip valves on all 3 main steamlines. Closure of these valves is designed to prevent blowdown of all 3 steam generators in the event of a break of 1 steamline. Should a trip valve fail to close, a degree of redundancy is provided by the angle type non-return valve.

During the 02-22-82 event, both channels of steamflow instrumentation on "C" main steamline remained operable as did the channel 4 instrument, F485, on "B" main steamline. Thus, the ESF actuation from high steamline flow logics was still possible, though in a degraded mode.

The other systems' instrumentation which act to automatically initiate the ESF functions remained operable and therefore provided a backup to the degraded steamline flow logic.

A steamline break is also characterized by system parameter indications in the main control room such as:

1. Decreasing level in the affected steam generator.

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Page 3 Report No. 82-029/OlT-0

2. Decreasing steam pressure in the affected steam generator.

3. Increased AT within the affected loop due to increased extraction of reactor coolant heat.

It is concluded that at the time of the event, there existed adequate instrumentation to provide protection and alert the control room operator of steamline breaks. For these reasons, the public health and safety were not affected.

3. CAUSE OF EVENT:

This event was the result of both personnel error and inadequate procedures.

The steamline flow transmitters were replaced during the maintenance outage which -

preceeded the unit startup. No specific instructions were contained in the Design Change Package, the Instrument Department procedures, or Periodic Test procedures to ensure the condensate (sensing) lines of the transmitters were filled following the transmitter replacement and. before unit startup. Con-sequently, some of tP;se lines contained inadequate fluid and provided

{ erroneous flow indication. The transmitters so affected were left in the unfused l

l condition to avoid the KWST cross connect signal initiated by a high steamline

. .ow in coincidence with reactor coolant averge temperature less than 543*F.

Intradepartmental correspondence prior to startup cautioned that the unfused instruments were to be fused when the sensing lines were filled and before reactor coolant average temperature reached 543*F. As a result of ad_

ministrative oversight, tha instrument fuses were neglected and the mistake was not realized until the reactor power was approximately 8% and the reactor l coolant average temperature was 547*F.

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Page 4 Report No. '!-029 /01T-0

4. IMMEDi.\TE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS :

The immediate actions were to install power supply fuses in the affected instruments.

5. SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

The "B" main steamline channel 3 instrument, F484, continued to produce an erroneous signal. This channel was placed in the trip mode and the transmitter was subsequently replaced.

6. ACTIONS TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

More definitive guidance and checks will be implemented to ensure the operability of engineered Safeguards and reactor protection instrumentation. Appropriate personnel have been re-instructed in the use of existing . Jministrative controls for maintenance and other related activities.

7. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:

The possibility of unit startup without the full-protection from process instrumentation is increased when on scale indications from the instruments are not achieved before the protection function is required.

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