ML20039D801
| ML20039D801 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 12/23/1981 |
| From: | Chiangi N CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NUDOCS 8201060173 | |
| Download: ML20039D801 (4) | |
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File: SH N-2/18 Item 38 t-f' Mr. James P. O'Reilly g
United States Nuclear Regulatory Ccemission N-w
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Region II b
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101 Marietta Street, Northwest JM 57982t>
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Atlanta, Georgia 30303 j
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' c a h' t h - m SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT f
DOCKET NOS.- 50-400 AND 50-401 X
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SAFETY INJECTION (CHARGING) PUMP OPERATION D#
FOLLOWING A SECONDARY SIDE HIGH ENERGY LINE RUPTURE
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
Attached is the second interim report on the subject item which was deemed as reportable on July 7,1980. As stated in the report, it is currently projected that corrective action will be completed.(pending any NRC clarification) and the final. report submitted by June 1,1983, for Unit 1.
Corrective action date for Unit 2 will be provided later.
Thank you for your consideration in this matter.
RDB/gea Yours very truly, Attachment ec:
Mr. G. Maxwell W/A g
Mr. V. Stello (2) W/A N. J. Ch ngi -
nager Engin M. & Construction Quality Assurance / Quality Control 8201060173 011223?
~~Offlgg,e f PDR ADOCK 05000400 S-PDR 1 FeystteviNe Street
- P. O. Box 1551
- Raleigh, N. C. 27602
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s SHNPP Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Safety Injection Pump Operation Following a Secondary Side High Energy'Line Rupture Interim Report December 15, 1981 Reportable Under 10CFR50.55(e) i=
i Prepared ~by: CP&L l.
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SUBJECT:
- 10CFR50.55(e) Reportable Item Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Potential Sr.fety Injection Pump Damage ITEMS:
Safety Injection Pumps for SHNPP Units 1 and 2 SUPPLIED BY:
Westinghouse Water Reactor Division (Pacific Pump Company, Subvendor)
NATURE OF DEFICIENCY:
Following a secondary side high energy line rupture, the.
safety injection pumps will automatically come on line and inject cooling water into the reactor coolant system.
However, if during a safety actuation incident (when the miniflow valves are closed) the reactor backpressure increases to a value below the safety valve set pressure but above the pump shutoff head, the high head safety injection pumps could reach a deadhead condition.
There is a potential for the pumps to be damaged while operating in a deadhead condition..Such consequential damage to one or more of the high head safety injection pumps before the safety injection termination criteria is satisfied may adversely impact long-term recovery operations for the initiating event.
DATE PROBLEM WAS CONFIRMED TO EXIST:
Westinghouse Letter.CQL-5888 dated May 22, 1980, received June 2, 1980.
PROBLEM REPORTED:
Westinghouse Letter NS-TMA-2245 dated May 8, 1980 (T. Anderson to V. Stello) - 10CFR21 notification.
N. J. Chiangi notified the NRC that this item was potentially reportable under 10CFR50.55(e) on June 6,1980.
N. J. Chiangi notified the NRC (J. Bryant) that this item was reportable under 10CFR50.55(e) on July 7,1980.
SCOPE OF PROBLEM:
The scope of the problem is to prevent the high head safety injection pumps from reaching a deadhead condition.
REASON PROBLEM IS REPORTABLE: Potential to damage the high head safety injection pumps before the safety injection termination criteria is satisfied.
This could lead to a degraded safety condition.
CORRECTIVE
' ACTION:
-The corrective action currently intended for SHNPP is to utilize the existing high head safety injection pump miniflow return lines in conjunction with operator action.. More specifically the._correctivefaction would consist of removing the. safety injection initiation automatic ~ closure. signal-from_the high. head safety-injection miniflow isolation valves and to modify. plant-emergency operating procedures to instruct the operator to close these miniflow isolation ~ valves when the reactor
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coolant reaches saturation conditions and to reopen these valves-should the wide range RCS pressure subsequently rise to greater than-2,000 psig.- This is the current recommended corrective action provided to CP&L by Westinghouse.
Subsequent to NRC clarification to the Westinghouse position, we will initiate these changes. ~All corrective-actions should be completed (pending any-NRC. clarifications) by June 1, 1983.
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