ML20038A813

Evaluation Criteria for Detailed Control Room Design Review

ML20038A813
Person / Time
Issue date:	10/31/1981
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
NUREG-0801, NUREG-0801-FC, NUREG-801, NUREG-801-FC, NUDOCS 8111160491
Download: ML20038A813 (57)

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NUREG-0801 Evaluation Criteria for Detailed Control Room Des.ign Review i

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Manuscript Completed: October 1981 Date Published: October 1981 Division of Human Factors Safety 1

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Pa2e 1.

INTRODUCTION I

1.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE 1

1.2 OVERVIEW OF DCRDR AND NRC EVALUATION ACTIVITIES 2

1.2.1 Evaluation of the Program Plan Report..........

2 1.2.2 Site Visit During the Review Phase 4

1.2.3 Evaluation of the DCRDR Report 4

1.2.4 Verification of the Implemented Changes.........

4 1.3 GLOSSARY............................

5 1.4 ACRONYMS............................

6 2.

PROGRAM PLAN 7

2.1 ACCEPTANCE GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSEE'S DCRDR TEAM 7

I 2.1.1 Team Composition and Qualifications...........

7 2.1.2 Structure and Management of the Review Team.......

10 2.1.3 Team Responsibilities..................

12 2.1.4 Team Orientation 12 2.2 ACCEPTANCE GUIDELINES FOR THE DCRDR AND HED 3

ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY.....................

12 i

2.3 DCRDR SCHEDULE.........................

13 2.4 DCRDR INFORMATION MANAGEMENT..................

13 3.

NRC SITE VISIT DURING THE REVIEW PHASE 18 3.1 SCHEDULING THE SITE VISIT 18 3.2 PERFORMANCE OF THE SITE VISIT 18 3.3 RESULTS OF THE SITE VISIT 18 4.

DCRDR REPORT 19 4.1 NRC EVALUATION OF LICENSEE / APPLICANT IDENTIFICATION OF HEDs.....................

19 4.2 NRC EVALUATION OF LICENSEE / APPLICANT DETERMINATION OF HED SIGNIFICANCE 20 4.2.1 Determining the Significance of HEDs 20 4.2.2 Categorizing HEDs into Levels of Significance...... 24 4..- NRC REVIEW OF PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 28

.4 SCHEDULING OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS................ 30 4.5 NRC EVALUATION OF OVERALL CONTROL ROOM IMPROVEMENT.......

33 4.6 RECOMMENDED FORMAT FOR REPORTING HEDs IN THE DCRDR REPORT 33 v

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

Page 5.

IMPLEMENTATION VERIFICATION.....................

35 APPEN,lDIX A.

MANAGEMENT OF HED INFORMATION............... A-1 A.1 INTD.0 DUCTION TO RECORDING OF HEDs............... A-1 A.2 RECORDING OF HEDs....................... A-1 A.3 MANAGING THE HED RECORDS.................... A-5 J

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LIST OF EXHIBITS Exhibit Page 1-1 An overview of DCRDR and NRC evaluation activities.......

3 2-1 Major DCRDR processes and recommended discipline emphasis 11 2-2 Sample methodology flowchart 14 2-3 Sample DCRDR milestone chart..................

16 4-1 Sample items for HED assessment 21 4-2 Sample performance topics for use in assessment of HED significance 23 4-3 Summary of HED categories 26 2

4-4 HED assessment process..................... 29 4-5 Schedule for modifications as a function of HED categories for operating plants 31 4-6 Schedule for modification as a function of HED categories for plants not yet licensed to operate 32 A-1 Table of system / subsystem (control board) components and HEDs

...................... A-2 l

A-2 Sample HED report sheet.................... A-4 t

A-3 Supplementary explanation of the HED report sheet....... A-6 L

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PREFACE NUREG-0660, "NRC Action Plan Developed as a Result of the TMI-2 Accident,"

was designed to correct or improve the regulation and operation of nuclear facilities.

The objective of Task I.D, " Control Room Design," is to " Improve the ability of nuclear power plant control room operators to prevent accidents or cope with accidents if they occur by improving the information provided to them."

Item I.D.1, " Control Room Design Reviews," describes the NRC Actions and the Licensee Actions necessary to accomplish the objective. The licensee and applicant for operating license is required to perform a comprehensive review (Detailed Control Room Design Review--DCRDR) using NRC human factors design guidelines and evaluation.

To aic' the licensee in performing the review, NUREG-0700, " Guidelines for Control Room Design Reviews," was developed and published. To aid the NR'.' staff and the licensee / applicant in judging the acceptability of the review performed and the design modifications implemented, NUREG-0801, " Evaluation Criteiia for the Detailed Control Room Design Review," was developed. Other action programs affecting the operator should be considered in conjunction with the DCRDR.

They are listed below with items referenced to the NUREG-0660 mandate:

e Items I.C.1, I.C.8, and I.C.9 of NUREG-0660, Improved Emergency Operating Procedures

- NUREG-0799, " Draft Criteria for Preparation of Emergency Operating Procedures" e Items I.C.6 and I.D.3 of NUREG-0660, Verification of the Correct Performance of Operating Activities

- Regulatory Guide 1.47, " Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indication for Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems" e Item I.D.2 of NUREG-0660, Installation of a Safety Parameter Display Console

- NUREG-0696, " Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities"

- NUREG-0835, " Human Factors Accepunce Criteria for Safety Parameter Display System" e Item III. A.1 of NUREG-0660, Upgrading of Licensee Emergency Support Facilities

- Regulatory Guide 1.97, " Instrumentation of Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident"

- NUREG-0814, " Methodology for Evaluation of Emergency Response Facilities."

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l The DCRDR should be integrated with any physical and operational changes to the control room that are required by the programs described in these documents. 'The enhancements and. design changes developed to correct the significant human engineering discrepancies (HEDs) found during the DCRDR should be coordinated with the changes that result from these other programs.

Operator training and the. development of operating procedures (NUREG-0799) should also be integrated with any changes made to the control room.

(See the exhibit on the following page for the relationship of the above-mentioned tasks with the DCRDR).

A task analysis should be performed as the basis for the systems review of the control room design, determining operator training and staffi.ng needs, l

determining the information the Safety Parameter Display system will present, ar.d developing emergency operating procedures.. i;UREG-0700 and NUREG-0799 both identify a task analysis that will tell what information is needed by the operating crew. The task analysis that is performed in developing upgraded emergency operating procedures as described in Action Plan Items I.C.1 and I.C.9 is the same task analysis that is used in defining the scope of the systems review of NUREG-0700, and is the same task analysis that is used in identifying improvements in operator training. As a minimum this analysis should emphasize abnormal and emergency operating conditions.

It is antici-pated that the task analysis will be completed well in advance of the vendor l

or owners group generic emergency operating procedures guidelines.

It is recommended that each licensee and applicant for an operating license have an ongoing program to ensure that the future development of any changes to the control room include a human engineering analysis performed as part of the design and validation.

The success of the DCRDR will be to a large extent dependent on the l

composition and balance of the interdisciplinary team that performs the i

review.

It is attempted in NUREG-0801 to provide sufficient guidance to assist licensees and applicants. The NRC staff is interested in obtaining public comments as to the usefulness of this guidance.

The human engineering discrepancy (HED) assessment process and method l

for prioritization of fixes are the best available techniques that the NRC l

staff is currently aware of.

Public comment is especially desired on these schemes and identification of other ways to address potential for operating crew error and safety consequences from HEDs, and establishing priorities for fixing HEDs.

As stated in NUREG-0660, the NRC plans to evaluate the teact on licensees of the implementation of these evaluation criterie, Comments are specifically requested from knowledgeable members c# the public, licensees, human factors. specialists, and other interested parties to assist the NRC in determining the inpact of implementing these criteria.

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NUREG-0801 has been submitted to the Office of Management and Budget for review and clearance'under the Paperwork Reduction-Act of 1980.

NUREG-0801 is being issued-to establish criteria that. the NRC staff intends to use in' evaluating whether a licensee / applicant meets the require-D ments of 10 CFR 50. NUREG-0801 is not a substitute for the regulations,~ and compliance ~is not a requirement. However, the use of criteria different from

'those set forth herein will be accepted only if the substitute. criteria provide a basis 1for determining that' the above-cited regulatory requirements have been' met.-

Mr. Marcus Greenberg is the NRC Task Manager for'these evaluation criteria for detailed control room design review.

Should there be specific

. questions regarding the content of tnis document, Mr. Greenberg may be l

c contacted by. calling (301) 492-8344 or by writing to tl e following address:

- Division of Human Factor.; Safety

~0ffice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attention:

M. Greenberg 3

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' ACKNOWLEDGEMENT-nt.

The draft report has been Lcompiled lwith the assistance of many. individuals from NRC,- Lawrence Livermore National' Laboratory, and Biotechnology, Inc.

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G.W. Lapinsky T. Mrozowski V.J..Pezoldt EW.N. Thompson

' Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory J. Preston

'J.-Savage Biotechnology, Inc.

R. Pain

.B.-Paramore H.P. Van Cott 1:

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INTRODUCTION Section I.D.I

" Control Room Design Reviews," of the NRC Task Action Plan (NUREG-0660) requires all licensees and applicants for operating licenses-to-conduct a detailed control room design review (DCRDR).

This review will

' identify human engineering discrepancies (HEDs) and their effects on plant operations and safety. To aid the licensees / applicants in conducting the

' DCRDR, NRC has deyeloped and published NUREG-0700, " Guidelines. for Control Room Design Reviews." The objectives,of the DCRDR program are:

1.

To identify HEDs in the man / machine interfaces in the control room 2.

To assess the significance of these HEDs 3.

To propose and.implementi design modifications that will improve the safe and effective operation of the nuclear power plant.

The NRC evaluation of the licensee / applicant DCRDR efforts will consist of four phases. The first phase will be an evaluation of the licensee's/

applicant's program plan report. The second phase will be a scheduled visit at some of the sites. The third phase will be an evaluation of the DCRDR report. The fourth phase will be the verification of the implemented modifications.

1.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE The. purpose of this document is to provide:

e Additional guidance to the licensee / applicant and acceptance -

guidelines for the NRC staff in evaluating the DCRDR.

e Evaluation criteria that can be used by both the licensee / applicant and the NRC evaluator in assessing the significance of HEDs identified during the DCRDR.

The NRC evaluation will include an assessment of the:

e Team composition and qualifications e Structure and management of review team o Review team responsibilities e Review methodology e. Review schedule o HEDs identified during the DCRDR 1

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e1 Licensee's/ applicant's assessment of HED significance e Proposed corrective actions e Schedule of corrective actions e Overall control room improvement.

The acceptance guidelines and evaluation criteria provided in this document

'will be used by the NRC! staff to determine whether the objectives of the DCRDR have been met and evaluate the DCRDR results. Any departures by the licensees / applicants from the methodologies. recommended in NUREG-0700 or this document will require justification.

1.2 OVERVIEW 0F DCRDR AND NRC EVALUATION ACTIVITIES Exhibit 1-1 is an overview of the four phases of the DCRDR as performed by the licensee / applicant, and of the four phases of the evaluation as performed by the NRC staff.

-The phases as performed by the licensee / applicant and described in NUREG-0700 are:

1.

Planning 2.

Review 3.

Assessment and implementation 4.

Reporting.

The phases of the NRC evaluation will be coordinated with those of the licensee / applicant.

The four phases of the NRC evaluation are:

1.

Evaluation of the program plan report 2.

Scheduled site visits at some of the sites during the review phase

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Evaluation of the DCRDR report 4.

Verification of the implemented changes.

1.2.1 Evaluation-of the Program Plan Report Early in the Depca. process, the licensee / applicant will submit a program

. plan report which the NRC will evaluate.

This evaluation will be useful in providing early feedback to the licensee / applicant on possible problems in the

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Exhibit 1-1. An overview of DCRDR and NRC evaluation activites.

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m e ' Team composition and qualifications e Structure and management of review team e -DCRDR team responsibility e DCRDR methodology e DCRDR schedule.

1.2.2 Site Visit During the Review Phase During the review phase the NRC may selectively visit some licensee / -

applicant sites to assess the ongoing process of the control room review.

The NRC visit will be pre-announced and will be scheduled at a suitable stage of the DCRDR review.

The purpose of the visit will be to determine whether it is necessary for the NRC to provide any additional guidance to aid in the review.

1.2.3 Evaluation of the DCRDR Report f

During' this phase the NRC will evaluate the licensee's/ applicant's report, including:

e HEDs identified during the DCRDR a Licensee's/ applicant's assessment of HED significance e Proposed corrective actions 1

o Schedule of corrective actions i

e Overall control room improvement.

A limited number of licensees / applicants will also be selected for an-on-site audit. The NRC staff may interview review team members, review licensee / applicant records, survey the control room, walk through certain procedures, and examine any mock-ups or simulator results used in the DCRDR.

1.2.4. Verification of the Implemented Changes Licensees / applicants will implement HED corrective actions according to a schedule submitted 'in.their DCRDR Report.

NRC will verify completion of -

the proposed corrective -actions by on-site audits by NRC ' personnel, or by

. evidence provided by the licensee / applicant.

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1.3; GLOSSARY Since there are differences in usage of terms (even amona practitioners in the~ same field), the following definitions are provided to reduce ambiguity.

Acceptance Guidelines: Guidelines used by utilities and the NRC in assessing the acceptability of.the DCRDR.-

Cumulative Effects: The effects of HEDs when considered interactively; the effect on human and/or machine performance which results from the incremental

-impact of one HED plus those impacts of other HEDs when considered together.

Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR): The control room design review

- as required by NUREG-0660, Item I.D.1., and as described in NUREG-0700.

DCRDR Report:

Final report of the results of the DCRDR (as required by NUREG-0660, Item I.D.I).

Enhancements: Surface modifications that do not involve major physical changes; for example, demarcation, labeling changes, and painting.

Evaluation: NRC staff review of licensee / applicant submittal or program.

Evaluation Criteria:

Criteria provided by NRC to the licensee / applicant as guidance for assessing HEDs as required by NUREG-0660, item I.D.1.

These criteria are provided in this document.

Function: An activity (or a static ~ role) performed by one or more system constituents (people, mechanisms, structures) to contribute to a larger

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activity or goal state.

Functional Analysis: The examination of system goals to determine what.

functiots they require.

Also, examination of the required functions with respect to available manpower, technology, and other. resources to determine how the functions may be allocated and executed.

In NUREG-0700, primarily the identification of established-functions and examination of how they are allocated and executed.

Functional. Allocation: The distribution of functions among the human and automated comtituents of a system.

Human Engineering Discrepancy (HED): A departure from some benchmark of system design suitability for the roles and capabilities of the human operator.

Licensee / Applicant: Holder of an operating license and/or an applicant for an operating license.

i Ongoing Programs: Other programs required by NUREG-0660, Task-Action Items.

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Program Plan Report: Early submittal report as discussed in NUREG-0700 and required by NUREG-0801 that describes the DCRDR ~ program to allow early NRC feedback on problem areas.

Review:. Licensee / applicant DCRDR effort.

Significant HEDs: Those HEDs which, alone or in combination with other HEDs, may increase the potential for operator error and/or may have serious impact on syste'm performance.

The ' Sta f f: NRC staff.

System: A whole which functions as a whole by virtue of the interdependence of its parts. An organization of interdependent constituents that work together in a patterned manner to accomplish some purpose.

System (s) Analysis: Examination of a complex organization and its constituents to define (usually, but not necessarily, in mathematical terms) their relation-ships and the means by which their actions and interactions are regulated to achieve goal states.

Task: A specific action, performed by a single system constituent--person or equipment--that contributes to the accomplishment of a function.

In NUREG-0700, only tasks allocated to people, in particular to control room operators, are addressed in detail.

Validation: The process of determining whether the physical and organizational design for operations is adequate to support effective integrated performance of the. functions of the control room operating crew.

Verification: The process of determining whether instrumentation, controls, and other equipment meet the specific-requirements of the tasks performed by-operators.

1.4 ACRONYMS CR:

Control Room.

DCRDR: Detailed Control Room Design Review.

DHFS:

Division of Human Factors Safety.

ECCS:

Emergency Core Cooling System.

-HED:

Human engineering. discrepancy.

- VTR,:

Video tape recorder.

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2.

PROGRAM PLAN To ensure that the objectives of the DCRDR will be met, the NRC will verify that-the licensees / applicants have developed a well-defined program plan for conducting the review. This plan should be available for NRC evaluation within two months of the beginning of the DCRDR effort to allow for timely-feedback from NRC on any problem areas.

The NRC will acknowledge receipt of the program plan and will respond to the licensee / applicant on any negative aspects of its evaluation within approximately one month.

The licensee's/ applicant's program plan will be evaluated according to the Acceptance Guidelines outlined below and described in the following subsections.

The subsections are:

2.1 Acceptance Guidelines for the Licensee's DCRDR Team 2.1.1 Team Composition and Qualifications 2.1.1.1 Human Factors Specialist 2.1.1.2 Reactor Operator 2.1.1. 3 Instrumentation and Control Engineer 2.1.1.4 Other Disciplines 2.1.2 Structure and Management of the Review Team 2.1.3 Team Responsibilities 2.1.4 Team Orientatial -

2.2 Acceptance Guidelines for the DCRDR and HED Assessment Methodology 2.3 DCRDR Schedule 2.4 - DCRDR Information Management 2.1 ACCEPTANCE GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSEE'S DCRDR TEAM The quality of the review effort and the results of the DCRDR will depend on the composition and balance of the team performing the review.

The selection of the best team for the task can follow no set formula; however,'some general guidelines can be given for the acceptance of the licensee's/ applicant's team and the qualification of team members.

2.1.1 Team Composition and Qualifications The DCRDR team should have a core group of specialists in the fields of human factors engineering, plant operations (e.g., licensed operators),

and instrumentation and controls engineering. This core group should be supplemented by other disciplines such as nuclear engineering, mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, industrial engineering, reliability analysis, systems' engineering, operations research, and visual performance assessment, as required. At various times during the course of the review, additional specialists (e.g., lighting and acoustics) will be needed for i

specific tasks.

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44 Whenever. possible,. the review team should save access to the _ original control room' designers' as resource persons, especially during the delineation of system functions, operator task analyses,.and control room inventory -

efforts.- However, individuals who were extensively involved in the. design of the: existing control room should not be directly responsible for directing-those portions of the DCRDR process that require-objectivity about the quality of that design.

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- The reconnended qualifications of personnal providing expertise-in the

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fields: required are'given below:

2.1.1.1 Human Factors Specialist.*

Formal Education: A degree, preferably at the-graduate level, in human factors engineering or engineering psychology is reconnended. However, qualified human factors specialists may have received their formal training in other disciplines; ranging from the behavioral sciences-to engineering; therefore', the pertinent formal training requirements for human factors specialists should include course work inEat least some.

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of.the following areas:

e Human factors engineering l

e-. Ergonomics i

e Human performance theory e Sensory / perceptual processes e Experimental design e Quantitative methods / statistics i

e Anthropometry e Survey design e-Industrial engineering / design.

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. Professional Experience:

Si,nce there is no single academic ' route, certification, or licensing requirement.for qualifying as a human factors

. specialist, the past professional experience of a prospective team member,should be taken into account. 'As a guideline five or more years

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• The practice of using " human factors specialist" is followed in these guidelines ' to_ avoid = any possible connotation that only professional engineers l

are contributors to the. human factors design process. To the contrary, many professional fields, subfields, and-disciplines play a significant role in c the - re6 view and-evaluation of human factors.

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-of experience is recommended for a lead role in the DCRDR. Less experi-enced human factors personnel may effectively conduct review activities with direction / advisory guidance from a serior human factors specialist.

Pravious experience in process control system design and operations is preferred. Demonstration of extensive hands-on experience in the application of human factors engineering and human factors psychology to other large, complex man-machine systems (e.g., command and control-systems, submarine control-display layouts) would be an acceptable alternative.

Preferred specific experience should include the application of human factors to design and/or evaluation in the following areas:

e Workspace layout e Panel design (control and display layout) e _ Environmental conditions (e.g., lighting and acoustics) e Procedures and training.

Experience in systems analysis and task analysis should also be demon-strated within the complement of human factors professionals on the team.

2.1.1.2 Reactor Operator.

Professional Experience:

For operating plants, a reactor operator with a minimum of two years of experience, preferably in the specific control room being reviewed, should be included on the DCRDR team.

For near-term operating license applicants, a licensed operator of that plant or a licensed operator with two years of operating experience in a control room similar to the one being reviewed should be selected.

2.1.1.3 -Instrumentation and Control Engineer.

Formal Education: A bachelor's degree in engineering or equivalent is recomrrended as a minimum.

Professional Experience: A minimum of five years of applied experience is recommended. Most, if not all, of this experience should have been gained in.the nuclear field, preferably at a nuclear power plant similar

' to the one under review.

The instrumentation and contr.1 engineer should be familiar with the regulations, standards, and design constraints that h.ve an impact on nuclear power plant control room design.

2.1.1.4 Other Disciplines.

General guidelines for selection of team members representing the other disciplines required for the DCRDR team are as follows:

9

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1 Formal Education:: A _ba-helor's degree or equivalent in a course of Itudy. releyant to the specific discipline is recommended as a minimum.

' Professional Experience:-- A minimum of.three' years of. applied design or L

operating technical experience is reconenended.

Professional licenses

-or, certification' and appropriate society memberships provide. additional-u L

indication of competency in some fields.

Previous experience in' power -

.plantstor other process contrul applications is preferred. - Alternatively,-

~

experience with other complex. commercial, industrial, or military L facilities and systems will be considered acceptable.

- 2.1.2. Structure and Management of the Review Team The structure and managemen.t'of the review team will vary for the different DCRDR ~ efforts because of the needs,~ capabilities,:and resources f-a,ailable to the various licensees / applicants.

As long as the necessary-interdisciplinary expertise is-p ovided, utilization of in-house and outside L

personnel is left to -the discretion of-the individual licensee / applicant.

~

l

- The management structure of the review team should include:

u Becaus! the ultimate responsibility of the_ review An Administrator:

lies _ with the licensee /arplicant, the individual with-the overall

-admiaistrative lead and responsibility-should be a licensee / applicant

. employee.

Technical' Review Leaders: The technical lead responsibility and the participation of the various team members will vary throughout the-

. different: phases of the DCRDR. However, a human factors. specialist 'with well-documented capabilities' and experience should be involved in the

,~

project planning phase.. This-human factors specialist should also share overall technical leadership of the entire project.

. In evaluating the structure of the licensee / applicant review team, NRC L

staff.will consider the different demands of the technical review tasks and L

' the resources which will be needed by.the team. ~ In order to function'well as a team, all team members should participate in most team' activities, thereby -

bringing their ?pecial skills;and points. of view to each task.

I

_ The different phases of the DCRDR will. require varying degrees of emphasis of:the primary' disciplines to bring the desired perspective to the review. -Exhibit:2-1 provides a list of the major identifiable' portions.of -

I o

the review and the reconinendct disciplines which 'should be emphasized to provide appropriateLtechnical direction'to those efforts. ~ Specification

.of a discipline which should be' emphasized for the various review processes (as outlined in-ExhibitL2-1)' does not imply that these. functions should be.

l

. performed solely by the team memoers with that expertise.

All of the

disciplinesand types of experience represented on the~ DCRDR. team will be

-necessary for most efforts.in the review.

" ~

l10

Review Process Discipline Emphasis 1.

Operating Experience Review e Examination of Available Nuclear Systems Engineering / Reactor Documents Operations e Control Room Operations Human Factors /Reac' tor Operations Personnel Survey 2.

Review of System Functions and Analysis of Operator Tasks e Identification of Event Nuclear Systems Engineering Sequences e Function Identification Nuclear Systems Engineering e -Function Analysis Human Factors / Systems Analysis e Operator Task Identification Nuclear Systems Engineering / Reactor Operations e Task Analysis Human Factors / Systems Analysis 3.

Control Room Inventory Instrumentation and Control / Reactor Operations 4.

Control Room Survey Human Factors / Subject Specialists 5.

Verification of Task Performance Capabilities e Verification of Instrumentation and Control / Reactor Availability Operations e Verification of Human Human Factors Engineering Suitability 6.

Validation of Control Room Instrumentation and Control / Reactor Functions Operations / Human Factors / Systems Analysis Exhibit 2-1.

Major DCRDR processes and recommended discipline emphasis.

11

In preparing the program plan, the licensee / applicant should name.the team members for each process or phase of the DCRDR, state their responsi-bilities, state their estimated phrticipation, and provide a brief statement of their qualifications. NRC staff will evaluate the appropriateness of the qualifications of the team members for their assigned tasks.

2.1.3 Team Responsibilities

' To clarify the role of the DCRDR team and its relationship to other

-licensee / applicant organizational elements, the program plan should specify the authority given to the team to carry out -its mission.

This statement l

should include types of support to be given the team, e.g.:

e Access to information (records, documents, plans, procedures, drawings,etc.)

e Freedom to document dissenting opinion Access to ' required facilities (control room, computer, word processing, e

cameras /VTR,etc.)

I-Access to people with useful or necessary information (reactor e

operators, equipment designers or pla ners, or utility management).

l l

2.1.4 Team' 0rientation_

I Once the team members have been selected, it is reconnended that they receive orientation in the following areas:

i 1.

Human factors engineering objectives and methodology i

2.

The methods and content of NUREG-0700 NUREG-0801, and NUREG-0799 3.

General plant design and operation.

l This is to help ensure a common framework for all team members.

l-2.2 ACCEPTANCE GUIDELINES FOR THE DCRDR AND HED ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY l

The NRC staff will evaluate the plan for the entire DCRDR to ensure l

that the intent of NUREG-0660 and NUREG-0700 can be met by the licensee's/

~

l applicant's proposed approach. ~As a minimum, the staff will evaluate the list of tasks proposed and will compare the proposed app."oach with the DCRDR

~

l processes that are recommended in NUREG-0700, Section 3.

'If the proposed methodology deviates from that suggested in NUREG-0700, this should be noted i

i and justified so that the NRC evaluator can determine whether the proposed

- methodology will fulfill the objectives of the DCRDR suggested in NUREG-0700.

12

Section 3 of NUREG-0700 explains the objectives of the DCRDR effort.

-It also describes source data, methods and procedures for developing the reference or benchmark information.eaded and for applying that information.

The guidance given in Section 3 sf NUREG-0700 will be the basis for the evaluation of the methods and procedures proposed by the licensees / applicants.

The NRC staff evaluation should establish that the objectives are understood and can be expected to be met by the proposed program.

The key points to be-verified in evaluating program plans are listed below:

1.

The program plan commits to developing the necessary reference information for HED identification or demonstrates that it exists from previous activities in a form suitable for use in the DCRDR.

2.

The data sources used to develop reference / benchmark information for HED identification are appropriate and comprehensive.

3.

The methods proposed for developing the information are detailed enough to allow identification of specific HEDs and solutions to them.

4.

If existing reference /henchmark information is to be used (e.g., a previously performed task analysis), it is detailed enough for identification of specific HEDs and solutions.

5.

Procedures are defined for systematic comparison of each set of reference / benchmark-information to component characteristics, individual task requirements, and functional interaction requirements.

An overview of the methodology may be submitted in the form of a flow-chart. A sample is shown in Exhibit 2-2.

This chart is included only for illustrative purposes.

Supporting materials should also be submitted or referenced by the licensee if further clarification of the program plan is necessary.

2.3 DCRDR SCHEDULE The licensee / applicant should develop a milestone chart as part of the program plan showing the schedule of phases and tasks and a tentative identification of the team skills required for each task.

An example of a milestone chart is given,in Exhibit 2-3.

2.4 DCRDR INFORMATION MANAGEMENT A considerable amount of information and data will be used or generated during the DCRDR. Methods of collecting, recording, and storing this information will be necessary to assure ready access by the DCRDR team during or after the review, supply supporting documentation for the NRC evaluator, or to retrieve information for other requests.

13 i

O DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW PROCESS (NUREGS- 0700/0801)

NUREG 0700 REFERENCE 0700 SECTION DCRDR l

f

• AVAILABLE g

3.3 l

DOCUMENTS

1. OPER ATING

• PERSONNEL L HISTORIC I

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SURVEYS SOURCE l e TECH. SPEC.

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& TASK ANALYSIS 3.5

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INTEGRATE l

OF TASK PER-OTHER FORMANCE l

CAPABILITIES l

ACTION PLANS I

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3.9

6. VALIDATION OF l

CONFIGURATION OF INTEGRATED l

PROCEDURES lf IDENTIFIED DISCREPANCIES If Exhibit 2-2. Sample methodology flowchart.

14

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4 Exhibit 2 2. Sample methodology flowchart.

(CONTINUEO) 15

Corresponding Time (Months)

Phase Task NUREG Reference 1

2 3

4 5

6 7

8 9

to 11 12 Analyze Objectives and Integrate 2.1 (0700)

M Review Team Selection 2.3 (0700) M Pt nig Organize Methodology 2.4-2.6 (0700)

M Prepare and Submit Program Plan 2.0 (0801)

Operating Experience Review 3.3 (0700)

Human Factors hrs., Sys. Eng. _ hrs., OperatW:s hrs.'

System Function and Task Analysis 3.4 (0700)

Control Room Inventory 3.5 (0700) etc.

Review Control Room Survey 3.6 (0700)

Verify Task Performance Capabilities 3.7 (0700)

Validate Control Room Functions 3r (0700)

Compile Discrepancy Findings 3.9 (0700) a Determine significance 4.2 (0801) and Categorize HEDs 4.2 (0700) gg ent Select / Design Corrective 4.2.2 (0700) ns 4.3 (0801)

Implementa Acti tion Prioritize and Schedule 4.4 (0801)

Begin implementation 4.3 (0700)

Develop Ongoing CR Program gy 4.6 (0801)

Report Final Report implement Interaction with NRC Finalize and Verify implementation 5.0 (0801) f

• This chart is a place to summarize manpower commitments by task as suggested by this example.

Exhibit 2-3. L.mple DCRDR milestone Chart.

O e

e

Of. particular concern is the collection, tabulation, analysis, and sumarization of HEDs. ' Standardization of information management by the industry will permit comunication and information exchange between the various licensees /applica'nts performing the DCRDRs. Appendix A presents.

a possible format and procedure for collection, recording, and storing

. the information.

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-3.

NRC SITE VISIT DURING THE REVIEW PHASE During the review phase, either before or after the staff evaluation

~

of the program plan report, the staff may selectively visit some licensee /

applicant sites.

This visit will allow the NRC to audit the process of the control room review. The purpose of this selective audit is to. determine

whether additional NRC guidance on the review process is needed.

3.1 SCHEDULING THE SITE VISIT The NRC site visit will be pre-announced and will be scheduled at various stages of the DCRDR. The NRC will determiiie the appropriate time for the visit from the program plan milestone chart described in Section 2.3 and Exhibit 2-3 of this document.

3.2 PERFORMANCE OF THE SITE VISIT During the site visit, the NRC staff may:

e Survey the control room o Interview review team members e Discuss aspects of the program plan Examine the licensee's/ applicant's information management system e

o Generally audit the status of the review process.

3.3 RESULTS OF THE SITE VISIT If the NRC staff determines as a result of the selective site visits that additional guidance on the DCRDR process is needed, such guidance will be developed and disseminated to the licensees / applicants.

9 18

4.

DCRDR REFORT Upon completion of the DCRDR, the licensee / applicant should submit to NRC a detailed sumary of the results.

These results will be evaluated by the NRC staff to verify that the activities described in the program plan were accomplished.

The DCRDR report should describe:

1.

riEDs identified during the DCRDR 2.

Licensee / applicant determination of HED significance 3.

Proposed corrective actions 4.

Scuc.Jule of corrective ac'. ions 5.

Overall control room improvement.

In addition, the licensee / applicant should explain and justify any deviations from the licensee's/ applicant's program plan and/or deviations from the methodologies recommended in NUREG-0700 and NUREG-0801.

4.1 NRC EVALUATION OF LICENSEE / APPLICANT IDENTIFICATION OF HEDs The licensee / applicant should report and describe all HEDs identified during the DCRUR. A recomended format is provided in Section 4.6.

In evaluating the DCRDR report, NRC will focus on the completeness and accuracy of discrepancy identification.

NUREG-0700 describes four review processes for identification of HEDs:

1.

Operating Experience Review (NUREG-0700, c,ection 3.3) 2.

Control Room Survey (NUREG-0700, Section 3.6) 3.

Verification of Task Performance Capabilities (NUREG-0700, Section 3.7) 4.

Validation of Control Room Functions (NUREG-0700, Section 3.8).

NRC staff will verify that the licensee / applicant has identified HEDs using these, or similar processes. NRC staff will verify the licensee / applicant identification process by selecting a small number of panels, subsystec:s, and/or procedures and requesting the licensee / applicant in-house documen-tation of the HED identification process, or by on-site audit.

19

Ii 4.2 NRC EVALUATION OF LICENSEE / APPLICANT DETERMINATION OF HED SIGNIFICANCE The NRC evaluation will be aimed at verifying that after identifying discrepancies the licensee / applicant performed an analysis to determine the impact of the identified discrepancies on operating crew performance and

-overall plant safety and reliability.

It is assumed that every HED represents a potential source of operating crew ermr which could result in adverse consequences on plant operation.

Therefore, all HEDs should be considered.

for correction.

It is the licensee's/ applicant's prerogative to correct HEDs without assessment of their significance so that they will comply with the guidelines presented. in Section 6 of NUREG-0700.

Those HEDs that, for any reason, cannot or will not be corrected to comply with NUREG-0700 should be assessed to determins the impact of the discrepancies on crew performance and overcll plant safety.ami reliability. This assessment procedure will aid in discriminating between significant HEDs that must be corrected, and those which may justifiably remain unmodified.

The assessment procedure can also serve to provide a means to pricritize the urgency of implementing corrective actions.

A recommended procedure for assessing HEDs is presented here, both to provide guidance to the licensees / applicants and to assist the NRC staff in evaluating licensee / applicant performance of the DCRDR.

4.2.1 Determining the Significance of HEDs The significance of an HED should be assessed on the basis of any resulting increase in the potential for operating crew error and its potential impact on safety.

All HEDs which are known to have previously contributed to an operating crew error, as documented in an LER or other historical record or as estab-lished by interview (or questionnaire) responses of operating personnel.will be considered significant. All other HEDs must be systematically assessed to determine their impact on safety and operating crew performance.

It is recommended tl.at these HEDs be subjected to a series of statements or questions, such as those shown in Exhibit 4-1.

The responses to this series of questions should aid the reviewers in identifying those HEDs which degrade safety and operating cru.v performance.

Responses to most items should not be a binary yes-no or pass-fail.

Items should be formulated to allow responses that reflect the degree of performance degradation. Therefore, a four-point or five-point scale could be used in conjunction with the question which allows for degrees of agreement to be expressed. A numerical rating assigned to this scale could be of some additional help.

Operator surveys and interviews may be of additional help during this step of the assessment 1

process.

Exhibit 4-2 provides a limited list of sample topics that could be used to develop questions to aid in the assessment of HED significance.

20

To what extent do you agree with the following?

1.

This discrepancy will cause undue operator fatigue.

2. This discrepancy.will cause operator confusion.

3.

This discrepancy will cause operator. discomfort.

4.- This discrepancy presents a risk of injury to control room personnel.

i-

'5.

This discrepancy will increase the operator's mental workload

.(for example, by requiring interpolation of values, remembering inconsistent or unconventional control positions, etc.).

6.

This' discrepancy will distract' control room personnel from

.their duties.

7.

This discrepancy will affect the operator's ability. to see or read accurately.

8. 'This discrepancy will affect the operator's ability to hear correctly.

l 9.

This discrepancy will degrade the operator's ability to communicate with others (either inside or outside the control

-room).

10. This-discrepancy will degrade the operator's ability to manipulate controls correctly.

11. This discrepancy will cause a delay of necessary feedback to the. operator.

12. Because of this discrepancy the operat7r will not be provided with positive feedback about centrol tasks.

13. This discrepancy viol.ates control room conventions or. pi actices.

14., This discrepancy, violates nuclear industry conventions.

15 '. This discrepancy violates population stereotypes.

Exhibit 4-1.

Sample. items for HED assessment.

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.16..

Operators have attempted to correct' this-discrepancy themselves-(. by-self-training, temporary labels. " cheaters," " helper" i

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controls, compensatory body movements, etc.).

I i

17. Tasks-in which this discrepancy is involved will be highly y-

. stressful (i.e., highly; time constrained, of serious

' consequence,etc.).

L

'18.

This discrepancy ~ will lead to inadvertent activation or

~

~ deactivation of controls.

1 I' u this discrepancy: caused a specific error, it is probable 19.

f p

that anotherl error of equal or more; serious consequence will

.tue committed.;

20. This discrepancy is involved in a task which is usually l

1 performed concurrently with another task.(e.g., watching water level meter while manipulating a throttle valve control).

21. This discrepancy involves controls or displays that are used

[

by operators while executing emergency procedures.

22. Assuming that this HED caused an operating crew error, it.is likely that this error would result in:

a. ' A violation of a technical specification, safety l limit, j

or a limiting condition for operation.

- b.

The unavailability of a safety-related system needed to mitigate transients or system needed to safely shut down -

the plant.

23. This discrepancy involves controls or displays that are part I

of'an engineered safety -function or are associated with a-L reactor trip 'functicc.

l l

r Exhibit 4-1 (Continued).

1 A =

22

L Impacts on Physical Performance-Fatigue Discomfort.

Injury

. Control suitablity-Impacts on Sensory / Perceptual Performance Distraction Visibility Readability Audibility

-Noise Display adequacy Inconsistency with stereotypes and conventions Impacts on Cognitive Performance Mental overload Confusion Stress-Sequential or compound errors Task Variables Communication needs Task ~ duration Task frequency Delay or absence of necessary feedback Concurrent task requirements Mission response characteristics (a)accuracyrequirements

-(b) speed requirements Exhibit 4-2.

Sample performance topics for use in assessment of HED significance.

23 (t

n -

f This technique relies on the observer's judgment as' to whether the discrepancy represents conditions that could degrade operating crew perfor-manca.- If an HED is judged by the DCRDR team to have a degrading effect on performance, the review team must then decide, using the same set of questions or another set of questions, whether that effect is serious.enough to cause or contribute to increasing the potential for operating crew error.

If so, the HED is significant and safety x d resulting consequences should be considered.

All HEDs which have been judged to have little potential for causing or contributing to' operator error are not significant.

If there is any doubt in the review team's judgment concerning degradation of performance or the increase in potential for error, the HED should be considered significant.

In addition, HEDs which initially have been determined to be not significant must be examined carefully for possible interactions with other, related HEDs.

This is necessary because in some instances a single non-significant HED may pose significant error potential in conjunction with other HEDs.

The process, suggested above, for assessing HED significance is based primarily on the assumption that if an HED is subjectively judged to have little or no effect on operator performance, there will be little or no increase in the potential for error and, therefore, little likelihood of an

" event" of adverse consequence.

Because of the subjectivity of the assess-ment process, the assumption of "no consequences" may, in some cases, be questionable. Therefore, it is recommended that HEDs initially determined to be not significant, based on their low potential for error, but which could result in adverse consequences if an error did occur, be further analyzed with a view toward improving operator performance and plant safety.

For example, if an HED associated with manual control of an engineered safety function was judged to have only a trivial effect on operator performance, the review team should still consider this HED as a candidate for correction or improvement because of the possible safety consequences.

It is recommended that in correcting such HEDs extreme care be taken to avoid introducing new sources of operating crew error.

4.2.2 Categorizing HEDs into Levels of Significance Presented below is a method of categorizing HEDs.

This categorization will not only aid the reviewer in further assessing the significance of HEDs but will also provide a means of prioritizing HEDs for correction. All HEDs, significant and non-significant, should be subjected to this categorization process.

This method allows for distinguishing between those discrepancies that are known to have contributed to operator error (for which documentation exists) and those discrepancies that have been evaluated and determined to have increased potential for contributing to operator error.

In the following method of categorizing discrepancies, each category is subdivided into levels of significance.

These categories and levels also provide a way of priori-tizing the urgency of implementing corrective actions based on system importance and potential consequences.

24

The categories were formulated on the basis of:

1.

The HED's effect on operator performance (documented or potential) 2.

System importance to safety

(

3.. Consequences (documented or potential).

l l

- The categories are summarized in Exhibit 4-3, and discussed in detail below.

4.2.2.1 - Category I--HEDs' Associated with Documented Errors.

Category I includes all HEDs which are known to have previously caused or contributed to an operating crew error,'as documented in an LER or other historical record, or-as established by interview (or questionnaire) responses of operating personnel.

Category I, Level A: Level A includes those HEDs for which the related documented error:

1.

was associated with a high safety importance function, or_ any function necessary to mitigate the consequences of an accident, and 2.

resulted in unsafe operation or the violation of a technical speci fication.

Category I, Level B:

Level B includes those HEDs for which the related documented error:

1.

was associated with a low safety importance function, and 2.

resulted in unsafe operation or the violation of a technical l

specification.

l l

Category I, Level C:

Level C includes those HEDs for which the related documented error:

1.

was associated with either a high safety or low safety importance j

function, and 2.

could' result in unsafe operation or the violation of a technical specification.

Category I, Level D: Level D includes those HEDs for which_ the related documented error:

1.

was associated with.either a high safety or low safety _importance function, but 2.

did not and could not result in unsafe operation or the violation of a technical specification.

25

Documented Unsafe Potentially Unsafe High Low.

Documented Potential Condition / Violation Condition / Violation"

-Safety Safety Category Level Error-for Error of Tech.: Spec.

of. Tech. Spec.

Importance Importance Yes No Yes I

A Yes B

Yes No Yes Yes Either No

.Yes C

Yes Either No No

~

D Yes II A'

No Yes Yes No No Yes B

No Yes No Yes No Yes cn C

No

-Yes

.Either No

.No III No Low Either No Yes IV No No, assuming No No, but interactions interactions should be checkedL have been checked and no error potential is likely Exhibit 4-3.

Summary of HED categories.

By definition, Category I applies only to plants with an operating history.

It is recomended, how(fer, that information about Category. I HEDs be disseminated to NT0Ls with similar control rooms through owners groups, industry organizations, or, in the case of utilities with both operational and'preoperational plants, through utility management, so that NT0Ls will benefit from the past experience of operating plants.

Categories II and III (discussed below) are equally applicable to both operating plants and applicants.

4.2.2.2 Category II--HEDs Associated with Potential Errors.

Category II includes all HEDs which have been assessed and determined to increase the potential for causing or contributing to an operating crew error, but for which there has been no previous documentation.

Category II, ' Level A: Level A includes those HEDs for which the related potential error:

1.

is associated with a high safety importance function, or any function necessary to mitigate the consequences of an accident, and 2.

could; result in unsafe operation or the violation of a technical specification.

Category II, Level B: Level B includes those HEDs for w di the related potential error:

J.

is associated with a low safety importance function, and 2.

could result in unsafe operation or the violation of a technical specification.

Category'II, Level C: Level C includes those HEDs for which the related potential error:

1.

is associated with either a high safety or low sr.fety importance function, and 2.

could not resuli. in unsafe operation or the violation of a technical specification.

~

4.2.2.3' Category III--HEDs Associated with Low Probability Errors of Serious Consequences.

Category III includes all HEDs that are associated with low probability errors of serious consequence.

HEDs in this category are those associated with errors which are. intolerable because of their -

possible adverse consequences.

4.2.2.4 Category IV--HEDs Not Associated with Errors.

Category IV includes any discrepancy that has.been evaluated and determined neither to increase the potential for causing or contributing to operating crew error nor to have adverse safety consequences. All discrepancies in this category

> :f 27 t

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should be examined for their cumulative or interactive effects, This is necessary because in some instances a single HED may not increase the poten-tial for operating crew error but may pose significant error potential in conjunction with other HEDs.

Category IV HEDs should be organized on the. basis of system, subsystem, panel, component, function / task, and human performance modality. This will facilitate determination of any cumulative or interactive effects.

Development of correlation matrices or computer-aided sorts will simplify this process.

~

Category IV HEDs which are shown to have cumulative or interactive effects which do increase the potential for error should be re-categorized in the appropriate level of Category II.

Exhibit 4-4 summarizes the HED assessment process.

4.3 NRC REVIEW 0F PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Based upon the DCRDR process, the licensee / applicant should identify and propose methods for the correction of HEDs, and should assess the impact of these corrections on operating crew effectiveness and system safety. The NRC staff will verify that the licensee / applicant has chosen acceptable design modifications to correct significant HEDs, that the modifications have been evaluated for consistency with existing control room characteristics and with other planned modifications, and that the effect of the modification on operating crew performance, training, and procedures has also been considered.

In evaluating proposed design modifications, the licensee / applicant should consider the following:

1.

Does the modification conform to the applicable precepts of human engineering practice?

2.

Does the modification introduce new HEDs?

3.

For each task affected, (a) will the specific information and control requirements of the task be met after the modification; and (b) will other requirements for effective task performance (e.g., proximity and consistency of controls and displays used in the task) be met after the modification?

4.

For each function affected, will. the modification enhance or at least not detract from integrated performance of the task sequences involved in the function?

5.

Does the modification enhance the overall safe operation of the plant?

6.

Are all safety criteria such as those involving fire protection, physical separation, and equipment qualifications complied with?

28

IDENTIFIED HED 1f DOES NOf IT DEGRADE m

PERFORM-ANCE7 YES y

DOES ITINCHEASE I< NO THE POTENTIAL I

FOR ERROR?

YES goys YES II CAT lli CONSEQUENCES S

NO IT A YES 1F DOCUMENTED y

CATI ERRO CAT IV y

NO 1f CAT ll NO 1f IS HERE AN CUMULATIVE YES OR INTER-ACTIVE FFECT?

Exhibit 44. HED asses;. ment process.

?

29

To evaluate proposed modifications in each of these ways, the licensee /

applicant should review and in essence reiterate the four processes of discrepancy identification summarized in Section 3.2 of NUREG-0700 and discussed in detail in Sections 3.6-c.8.

'In addition, as indicated above, the modification should be checked for consistency and compatibility with established control room conventions, features that will not be modified, and other proposed modifications.

Evaluation of proposed modifications will be facilitated through the use of mock-ups, mosaics, and/or implemen-tation on simulators.

It is recommended that licensees / applicants employ these techniques in acsessing candidate modifications to correct significant HEDs.

4.4 SCHEDULING 0F CORRECTIVE ACTIONS The categorization of discrepancies resulting from the application of criteria and methods described in the previous sections may be used as the basis for determining the urgency of corrective actions.

All discrepancies which are classified in Categories I, II, and III should be scheduled for corrective action. The priority of implementation of corrective actions for each category and level is indicated in Exhibits 4-5 and 4-6.

In all cases, for both operating and non-operating plants, implementation of corrective actions on a shorter schedule than that indicated is encouraged.

For purposes of scheduling corrective actions for operating plants, the following designations are recommended:

Prompt Action: Correct promptly on schedule approved by NRC. Make t

changes at the first refueling after submittal of the report or the first outage after receipt of equipment (expedited).

Note: Enhanecment correctione do not require NRC approvat and chould be made prior to submittat of the report to NRC.

Near Term:

Cctrect on schedule approved by NRC. Make changes at the second refueling outage after submittal of the report.

Long Term (Optional): Corrections of non-significant discrepancies may be implemented at any time.

Earlier correction will be required of plants undergoing operating licensing review.

Exhibit 4-6 indicates the priority of implementation for plants not yet licensed to operate.

The following designations apply in Exhibit 4-6.

Prompt Action:

Implement corrective action prior to issuance of an operating license.

30

l I

Category Schedule for Modification Priority t

l IA Prompt (1)

I-0 Prompt (2)

I.C' Prompt (3)

IO Near-tern (7) l II A Prompt (4)

II B Near-te rm.

(6)

II C Near-term (8)

III Prompt (5) l l

l IV Long-term (9).

l (optional)

{

i 1.

Exhibit 4-5~.

Schedule for modifications -as a function of HED categories for operating plants.

l

i..

31 L.

~

Category Schedule for Modtfication Priority -

I Not Applicable II A Prompt (1)

II B Prompt (3)

II C Near-term (4) 4 III Prompt (2)

IV Long-term (4)

(optional ) '

Exhibit 4-6.

Schedule for modification as a function of HED categories for plants not yet licensed to operate.

a 4

32 7

w o

s..

Near Term: For plants requiring an operating license two or more years after issuance of NUREG-0700, implement corrective ac' dons prior to licensing.

For plants requiring an operating license less than two years after issuance of NUREG-0700 implement corrective actions at the first scheduled outage.

Long Term (Optional): Corrections of non-significant discrepancies may be-implemented at any time.

Any practical constraints on the scheduling of modifications should be considered separately from the determination of the significance of the HEDs.

Classification of HEDs into the various categories should be made solely on the basis of the potential for error and the consequences of such errors on

-the safe operation of the plant.

The licensee / applicant should provide the NRC with a proposed implemen-tation schedule.

The licensee / applicant should also notify the NRC of any slippage in the proposed implementation schedule, with an explanation, and should provide a revised schedule.

Insignificant changes in schedule need not be reported.

4.5 NRC EVALUATION OF OVERALL CONTROL ROOM IMPROVEMENT In the final section of the DCRDR report the licensee / applicant should sunnarize the DCRDR effort such that the NRC reviewer will be assured that the modified control room is the safest that can be designed within the licensee / applicant's present constraints, and that it will enhance the operator's detection and response capabilities and will lessen the probability of operator error under stressful conditions thereby permitting safe operation of the plant.

4.6 RECOMMENDED FORMAT FOR REPORTING HEDs IN THE DCRDR REPORT To assure that HEDs reported in the DCRDR report are sufficiently described, it is reconnended that licensees / applicants use a format which provides the following information:

1.

The review process by which the HED was identified, e.g., operating experience review, control room survey, etc.

2.

The location of the HED and the system, subsystem, and/or task affected by the HED 3.

The NUREG-0700 guideline or other principle of good human engineering practice violated by the HED 4.

A concise description of the HED 5.

The category and level to which the HED has been assigned 33

'6.

. Photo ID number, if applicable 7.

The proposed correction selected from alternative designs considered

8. - Justification -for non-correction or modification that is not in compliance with NUREG-0700.

9 e

e 34

W

\\

5.

IMPLEMENTATIO1 VERIFICATION Licensee's/ applicant's corrective actions will be implemented according to a schedule submitted with the DCRDR report (if acceptable to the NRC).

Using that schedule f4RC will establish a timetable to. verify corrective action completion.

NRC staff may elect to audit corrective action completions through either the routine NRC inspection mechanisms or announced special

- on-site visits by NRC staff.

If licensees / applicants provide the NRC with ample evidence that a corrective action was implemented as proposed in the DCRDR, on-site audits may not be necessary..This evidence could take the form of before and after photos or video tapes.

O 1

'35

APPENDIX A.

MANAGEMENT OF HED INFORMATION A.1 INTRODUCTION TO RECORDING 0F HEDs To ensure completeness in surveying the control room for HEDs, the DCRDR team should use a systematic approach that will identify all equipment for which an HED can exist, all classes of HEDs which might apply to the equipment, and interactions between equipment or HEDs.

One such approach is a matrix in which line titles are used to list all possible equipment (such as switches, meters, mimics, recorders, pushbuttons, o

and demarcation lines), and column headings are used to list all possible HEDs.

which could apply to the equipment (such as all of the criteria contained in the guidelines of Section 6 of NUREG-0700).

A matrix of this type (drawn in sections on multiple pieces of paper) can be used as a conceptual guide in the development of tabular formats and HED report sheets which are illustrated later.

The formats which follow provide space for all of the HED data which could be useful to a reviewer in analyzing the results of the control room review.

It is anticipated that the coordinated use of the information contained in the HED report sheets and tables will give a complete picture of IlEDs and their interrelationships with (1) the events which are the basis of the control room review, (2) the functions and tasks which must be executed in order.to mitigate event consequences, and (3) other HEDs.

A.2 RECORDING 0F HEDs HEDs can be identified during any of four review processes (operating experience review, control room survey, verification of task performance capabilities, and validation of control room functions; see NUREG-0700, Sections 3.6 to 3.8).

HEDs may be summarized in a tabular format such as the one shown in Exhibit A-1.

The tabular format consists of two parts. The first is identifier informa tion.

HEDs may be associated with a:

o Component e Panel e Section e Subsystem o System e Task, function, procedure, or event e Human performance modality.-

A-1

Plant Plant CB Human I-System Il-Subsystem Control Bd.

Control Bd.

Task / Function lil-Component Performance HED Name Name Section I.D.

Panel I.D.

Name and I.D.

Modality Serial No.

A A1 101 1

J-Switch A2 203 2

H Meter Skill Vision 2

A3 3

Mimic Info. Proc.

A4 4

Etc.

if y

y y

B B1 B2 B3 U

}-

u u

y N

C C1 C2 C3 C4 y

u u

y All Call Read Labels CR Lighting Low Ambient Light Level y

u Exhibit A-1 Table of system / subsystem (control board) components and HEDs (This data can be subdivided into books" or packets of pages by any identifier as desired.)

Each HED should be identified only to the appropriate level of detail. Thus, air quality or background noise might relate to the entire control room and need not be identified at the component level.

The plant system and subsystem nomenclature will be plant specific and will be supplied by the licensee.

Examples are:

System Subsystems ECCS Low Pressure Core Injection, High Pressure Core Spray, etc.

Chemical Contro:

Make-up Water, Boron Injection, etc.

The control board section and panel names are also plant specific and will be supplied by the licensee using their plant terminology or numerical descriptions.

Component names and ids should follow plant terminology so that their locations and identities will be clearly known.

Identifying the task, function, or event will aid in locating HED interactions.

The human performance modality identifier refers to a general categorizing of the HED in terms of:

e Vision e Hearing e Other sense receptors e Information processing (computing / interpreting) e Decision making e Motor skills (manipulation).

This provides a different perspective for revealing HED' interactions.

The second. type of information in Exhibit A-1 specifies the HED by serial number. To facilitate sumarizing and reviewing HEDs, the form shown in Exhibit A-2 (HED Report Sheet) can be used. Several types of information are contained on the form:

e HED identification in terms of system, subsyste9, physical location in the control room, and specific control board component.

e Description of the HED and relationship of the HED to operating events, functions / tasks, safety consequences, and other interactions with other HEDs.

A-3 i

HED Report Sheet Date:

Page of

• Licensee:

Plant:

Reviewer:

• Pient System:

(Reactor Coolant, Reactivity Control, Environment, etc.)

• Plant Subsystem:

(Pumps. Valves HVAC Controls, etc.)

• Equipment item or Topic - Control Board Section (name/ number)

- Control Board Panel (panelidentifierl

- Component or Topic ltem (e.g., C/D layout, lighting, maintenance procedures, etc.)

• Human Performance Modality (vision, hearing, decision making, etc.)

• NU REG-0700 ID:

(Applicable Section & Subsection of NUREG-0700, Section 6)

HED DEScalPTION:

HED SERIAL NUMBER:

(ifused)

1. Descr. tion of HED:

ip PHOTO ID NUMBER:

2. This HED Relates to:

a. Event: (From NUREG4700 Section 3.4.2.2,3.8.2, etc.)

b. Function / Task: (Needed to mitigate the event, from NUREG-0700 Section 3.4.2.3, 3.4.2.4, Exhibits 3-3,3-5, etc.)

3. Safety Consequences:

4. Interaction of HED with other HEDs,:ystems, events, functions / tasks, etc.

ACTION PROPOSED TO CORRECT HED:

CORRECTION SCHEDULE (NUREG 0700 Section 4)

COMMENTS:

This section contains other pertinent explanatory or supplementary information including:

• Identification of HED with applicable steps or substeps of system review (NUREG-0700 Section 3.2-3.8)

NOTE: This Report Sheet is not intended to be an additional task step to be done, it is meant to provide:

1. A single place to summarlie the results of the review steps described in NUREG-0700.

2. A source of information for NRC staff reviewers of licensee NUREG4700 DCRCRs to use as they apply the evalua-tion criteria described later in NUREG4301.

Exhibit A 2. Sample HED Report Sheet.

A-4 b

l e Corrective action to be taken or a justification for no action.

e Supplementary comments.

l Exhibit A-3 provides an additional explanation of several items of the HED Report Sheet.

To make the above forms more usable, a control room plan showing the location / identification of all control boards, control board sections, and control panels and components should be available.

If any information l,

requested on the HED Report Sheet cannot be furnished on the one-page form, continuation sheets.nay be attached.

A.3 MANAGING THE HED RECORDS One benefit from listing HEDs with many identifiers, as done in Exhibit A-1, is that HEDs can be recombined or categorized in several ways.

This could be done manually, but would be more readily accomplished with j

automated data processing methods, i.e., punched card sorter, computer.

l The capability to regroup HEDs can aid in identifying interactive or compound HEDs.

Examples are:

e HEDs grouped by component can indicate if there is a general problem with a particular type of equipment.

?

o hEDs grouped by panel or section may reveal that a particular panel has a number of.HEDs.

Depending on the type of HEDs, this could suggest that there can be additional human performance problems or-HEDs when any part of the panel is used, e Grouping HEDs by human performance modality could reveal that certain types of tasks or components should be further examined.

If HEDs are recorded after each of the review processes (survey, verify, validate), the regrouping or sorting capability can be used to suggest addi-l tional areas to examine in the succeeding parts of the process.

Once the control room survey is complete, individual component HEDs will be identified.

By regrouping these according to task, subsystem, or human performance l-modality, patterns of HEDs may emerge which indicate areas where task requirement and instrument function may be discrepant. Similarly, regrouping of HEDs before the third process (validation) may indicate HEDs which could interact in carrying out operating event procedures.

In addition to, or in place of, any of the Exhibit A-1 dats, all the information from the HED Report Sheet can also be automated. Such data can be manipulated as described above; however, this means the HED Report Sheet would be used throughout the review process, not just as a summary of the HED prepared at the end of the DCRDR report.

I A-5

l Exhibit A-3.

Supplementary Explanation of the HED Report Sheet i

I e System (Subsystem): The information for these items from the system analysis in NUREG-l 0700, Section 3. If numerical coding of system / subsystem has been used by the licensee, l

this should be included with the narrative description.

i The purpose of this item is to identify the specific e -Equipment items or Topic items:

l l

control board components or topic. Thus, board section or panel number, and instrument /

control'name/ number should be indicated. In some cases, the HED may involve a whole panel or section, e.g., panel layout HED or more than one panel, e.g., control-display integrat!.>n HED. For such situations all involved components / panels / sections should be identified. Also, if procedures, maintenance, etc. are involved in the HED, they should l

be specified on this line.

e The HED Serial number is a number wh(h uniquely Lantifies each HED.

l e The photo ID number will allow reference to photos which may have been taken to clarify the HED.

e HED

Description:

The purpose of these three parts is to describe the HED but also to show how the HED relates to operating events, functions, and tasks, and then, safety consequences. Examples of events, functions, and tasks with references to applicable

- NUREG-0700 sections are:

Events 0700 Ref.

Transients 3.4.2.2 Start Up 3.4.2.2 Shut Down 3.4.2.2 Change in power level 3.4.2.2 Functions / Tasks 0700 Ref.

Increase to 5% power Exhibit 3-3 Place automatic r.cntrol Exhibit 3-3 Withdraw control rods Exhibit 3-5 Determine IR detectors are on scale Exhibit 3-5

.e Action proposed to correct HED: The correction already made or proposed should be described here. If a partial or noa:orrection is proposed, the justification should be

. presented.

t-

-A-6 l

ll U.S. NUCLE AR REGUL ATORY COMMISSION BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET NUREG-0801 4 TITL E AND SU8 TITLE (Add Votume No, ef eprmnarel

2. (Leave 6 tat A t Evaluation Criteria for Detailed Control Room Design Revie4 RECIPIENT'S ACCESSION NO

7. AUTHOHtS)

5. DATE REPORT COMPLE TED M ON Tw lVEAR Detober 1481

9. PE RF ORMING ORGANIZATION N AME AND M AILING ADORESS (include lip CweJ DATE REPORT ISSUED Division of Human Factors Safety lvEaR uosta Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation October 1981 U.' S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission s- (teene manas Washington, D. C.

20555

8. (Leave blankl

~*

12, SPONSORING ORGANIZATION NAME AND MAILING ADORE SS (include I>p Codel 10 PROJECTiT ASKiWORK UNIT NO Division of Human Factors Safety Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

11. CONTRACT NO U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

20555

13. T7PE OF REPORT PE RtOD COVE RE D (Inclus.ve defell Draft Report for Comment 15 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14-(Leave ofaaAl

16. ASSTR ACT (200 wrords or teuf This docment, NUREG-0001, is being issued for public cort.T.:nt on the draf t evaluation critoria for 'J ' C: tailed Control Room Design Ta.s - (DCRDR),

including evaluation criteria for assessing human engineering dis ewncies.

Acceptance guidelines presented in this document will be used by both l

the NRC staff evaluator and the licensec/ applicant in determining the acceptability of the licensee's/cpplicant's DCRDR and resultant control room improvements as evidenced by the results of four evaluation phases. These phases are: the evaltation of the licensce's/ applicant's program plan report, a scheduled visit by NRC personr.cl of the on-going DCRDR cffort at some'of the sites, the evaluation of the DCRDR report of results, and the verification'by HRC personnel of the implementation of propored control room improvements.

Detailed guidance to the licensee / applicant and to the NRC staff concerning these four evaluation phases is provided in Sections 2 through 5 of this document.

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