ML20035H156
| ML20035H156 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 04/23/1993 |
| From: | Pellet J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20035H157 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9305030214 | |
| Download: ML20035H156 (16) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES f
E NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j
c.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 i
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i M BRASKA PUBLIC POWER' DISTRICT
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DOCKET NO. 50-298 COOPER NUCLEAR STATION AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE j
Amendment'No. 162-I License No. DPR-46 i
1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
l A.
The application for amendment by Nebraska Public Power District (the licensee) dated September 9, 1992, complies with the standards'and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act),
and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; 7
B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; i
C.
There is reasonable assurance:
(i) that the activities authorized
~
by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such ' activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations i
D.
The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the l
public; and
?
E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have l
been satisfied.
i i
l 1
9305030214 930423 PDR ADOCK 05000299-p PDR
's a
. 2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifi-cations as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. OPR-46 is herehy amended to read as follows:
2.
Technical Soecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No.162, are hereby incorporated in the license.
The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3.
The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1
05 h
Ar
-i John L. Pellet, Acting Director
' Project Directorate IV-1 Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV/V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:
April 23, 1993
4
.s ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.162 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-46 i
DOCKET NO. 50-298 1
F i
Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages.
The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and i
contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.
REMOVE PAGES INSERT PAGES iii iii l
29 29 48 48 63 78 78 85 85 87 87 206 206 209a 209a 209a t
215 215 215a 215a 215d 215d 215e 215e 215f 215f 9
f r
p A-
~}
4 I
.'.s i
TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont'd)
Pare No.
SURVEILIANCE LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION REOUIREMENTS
(
3.12 ADDITIONAL SAFETY RElATED FIANT CAPABILITIES 4.12 215 - 215f A.
Control Room Energency Filter System A
215a l
[
B.
Reactor Equipment Cooling System B
215b i
C.
Service Water System C
215e D.
Battery Room Vent D
215e 3.13 RIVER LEVEL 4.13 216 3.14 FIRE DETECTION SYSTEM 4.14 216b 3.15 FIRE SUPPRESSION VATER SYSTEM 4.15 216b 3.16 SPRAY AND/OR SPRINKLER SYSTEM i
(FIRE PROTECTION) 4.16 216e
'l t
3.17 CAREON DIOXIDE AND HAIDN SYSTEMS 4.17 216f I
3.18 FIRE HOSE STATIONS 4.18 216g 3.19 FIRE EARRIER PENETRATION FIRE SEALS 4.19 216h l
3.20 DELETED 2161 j
3.21 ENVIRONMENTAL / RADIO 1DGICAL EFFIIJENTS 4.21 216n A.
Instrumentation 216n B.
Liquid Effluents 216x C.
Gaseous Effluents 216a4 D.
Effluent Dose Liquid / Caseous 216all E.
Solid Radioactive Waste 216a12
.i F.
Monitoring Program 216a13 1
C.
Interlaboratory Co=parison Program 216a20-3.22 SPECIAL TESTS / EXCEPTIONS 4.22 216b1 A.
Shutdown Margin Demonstration 216b1 B.
Training Startup 216b2.
C.
Physics Tests 216b3 D.
Startup Test Program 216b3 5.0 MAJOR DESIGN FEATURES 5.1 Site Features 217 5.2 Reactor 217 5.3 Reactor vessel 217 l
5.4 Contain=ent 217 5.5 Fuel Storage 218 5.6 Seismic Design 218 5.7 Earge Traffic 218 6.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS s
6.1 Organization 219 i
6.1.1 Responsibility 219 6.1.2 offsite 219 l
6.1.3 Plant Staff --Shift Complement 219
[
6.1.4 Plant Staff - Qualifications 219a Amendment No. 39.??.03.177*152r 162
-iii-i
O COOPER NUCLEAR STATION d
TABLE 3.1.1 (Par.e 2) k REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM IN!;TRUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS E
y Minimum Number Action Required Applicability Conditions of operable When Equipment 93 Reactor Protection Mode Swit ch Position Trip Level Channels Per Operability is i
System Trio Function Shutdown Start up Refuel Run Settinn Trio _. Systems (1) Not Assured (1)
I os os Main Steam Line m
Isolation Valve Closure X(6) s 10% of valve 4
A or C l
2*
MS-LMS-86 A,B,C, 6 D closure 4
A or C
$l MS-LMS-80 A,B,C
& D to Turbine Control valve X(4) a 1000 psig turbine 2
A or B Fast Closure control fluid TCF-63/0PC-1,2,3,4 Turbine Stop Valve closure X(4) s 10% of valve 2
A or B SV05-1(1), SVOS-1(2)
Closure SV05-2(1), SV05-2(2)
,w I
Turbine First Stage Permissive MS-PS-14 X(9)
X s 30% first 2
A or B A.B.C. & D stage press.
l i
i i
.. ~
- - 6 m%.
ew-w
,s LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS I
3.2 (cont'd.)
4.2 (cont'd.)
D.
Radiation Monitorine Systems -Isola-D.
Radiation Monitorine Systems -Isole-tion 6 Initiation Functions tion & Initiation Functions 1.
Steam Jet Air Ejector Off-Cas System 1.
Steam Jet Air Ejector Off-Cas System l
a.
Operability of the Stemn Jet Instrumentation surveillance Air Ej ector Off-Cas System requirements are given on monitor is defined in Table 4.2.D.
Table 3.21.A.2.
b.
The time delay setting for closure of the steam jet air ejector isolation valves shall not exceed 15 minutes.
c.
Other limiting conditions for operation are given on Table 3.2.D and Specifica-tions 3.21. A.2 and 3. 21.C. 6.
2.
Reactor Building Isolation and Standby Gas Treatment Initiation 2.
Reactor Building Isolation and Standby Cas Treatment Initiation The limiting conditions for opera-tion are given on Table 3.2.D.
Instrunentation surveillance requirements are given on Table 4.2.D.
3.
Liquid Radwaste Discharge Isolation 3.
Liquid Radwaste Discharge isolation The limiting conditions for opera-tion are given on Table 3.2.D and Instrumentation surveillance Specification 3.21.B.
requirements are given on Table 4.2.D.
l 4.
Control Room Emergency Filter System 4
Control Room Emergency Filter System ine limiting conditions for opera-tion are given on Table 3.2.D and The instrument surveillance the Section entitled Additional requirements are given on Table Safety Related Plant Capabilities.
4.2.D.
5.
Mechanical Vacuum Pump Isolation 5.
Mechanical Vacuum Pump Isolation a.
The mechanical vacuum pump shall be capable of being The instrument surveillance require-automatically isolated and ments are given on Tables 4.2. A, and secured by a signal of high 4.2.D.
radiation in the main steam line tunnel whenever the main steam isolation valves are open.
l b.
If the limits of 3.2.D.5.a are not met, the vacuum pump shall be isolated.
1 Amendment No. 35,SO,E9,125,16?,158,162 4g.
COOPER NUCLEAR STATION v
TABLE 1.2.D k
RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEMS THAT INITIATE AND/OR ISOLATE SYSTEMS a
d Number of Sensor Instrument Setting Channels Provided Action l
System I...D.
No.
Limit by Desian (1)
C Steam Jet Air Ejector Off-Gas RMP-RM-150 A & B (3) 2 A
System i
C Reactor Building Isolation RMP-RM-452 A, B, s 100 nr/hr 4
B and Standby Cas Treatment C&D cn Initiation Liquid Radwaste Discharge RMP-RM-1 (2) 1 C
Isolation Control Room Emergency Filter RMV-RM-1 4x10 CPM 1
D Mechanical Vacuum Pump RMP-RM-251 A B.
3 times normal full power 4
E C
Isolation (4)
C&D background. Alarm at 1.5 times normal full power background e
l l
.y COOPER NUCLEAR S1 ATION g
TABLE 4.2.D MINIMUM TEST AND CALIBRATION FREQUENCIES FOR RADIATION f10NITORING SYSTEMS
{
?
I ns trurnent Instrument System 1.D. No.
Functional _ Test Freo.
Calibration Freo.
Check
. Instrument Channels
- . Stoam Jet Air Ejector Off-Cas System RMP-RM-150 A & B (12)
(12)
(12)
- . R2
- ctor Building Isolation and RMP-RM 452 A,B,C&D (12)
(12)
(12)
. g Stcndby Cas Treatment Initiation y
$ Liquid Radwaste Discharge Isolation RMP-RM-1 (11)
(11)
(11) l C:ntrol Room Emergency Filter RMV-RM-1 Once/ Month (1)
Once/3 Months once/ Day M:chanical Vacuum Pump Isolation RMP-RM-251 A, B, C & D See Table 4.2.A hLoricSystems SJAE Off-Cas Isolation Once/18 Months a
i Stcndby Cas Treatment Initiation Once/18 Months Racetor Building Isolation once/18 Months Liquid Radwaste Disch. Isolation once/6 Months l
C:ntrol Room Emergency Filter Once/6 Months l
t M;chanical Vacuum Pump Isolation once/ Operating Cycle 6
l
)
3.2 B\\SES (cont'd)
B.
Core and Containment Cooline Systems Initiation and Control The instrumentation which initiates Core Standby Cooling System (CSCS) action is arranged in a dual bus system. As for other vital instrumentation arranged in this fashion, the Specification preserves the effectiveness of the system even during periods when maintenance or testing is being performed. An exception to this is when logic functional testing is being performed.
t CORE SPRAY Initiation and control instrumentation settings ensure that the Core Spray system operates to ensure fuel cladding temperatures do not exceed 2200T during a design l
basis IDCA. The basis for the settings is discussed in USAR Section VIl-4.
t RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (LPCI MODE) f Initiation and control instrumentation settings ensure that the LPCI mode of the Residual Heat Removal system operates to ensure fuel cladding temperatures do not exceed 22007 during a design basis IDCA.
High drywell pressure and reactor water level instrumentation also allow injection water to be diverted for containment spray.
The basis for the settings is discussed in USAR Section VII-4.
l t
HICI 7
~he HPCI high flow and tenerature instrurentation are provided to detect a break in the HPCI steam piping including the RHR Condensing Mode Steam.
Tripping of this instrumentation results in actuation of HPCI isolation valves. Tripping logic for the high flow is a 1 out of 2 logic.
F Temperature is monitored at twelve (12) locations with four (4) temperature sensors at each location. Two (2) sensors at each location are powered by "A" direct current ccr. trol bus and two (2) by "B" direct current control bus. Each pair of sensors, e.g.,
"A" or
- E", at each location are physically separated and the tripping of either "A" or "B" bus sensor will actuate HPCI isolation valves.
The trip settings of s 300% of design flow for high flow and s 200*F for high temperature are such that core uncovery is prevented and fission product release is within limits.
RCIC The RCIC high flow and temperature instrumentation are arranged the same as that for the HPCI. The trip setting of s 300% for high flow and s 200*F for temperature are based on the same criteria as the HPCI.
ADS The effective emergency core cooling for small pipe breaks, the HPCI system, must function since reactor pressure does not decrease rapid enough to allow either core spray or LPCI to operate in time. The automatic pressure relief function is provided as a backup to the HPCI in the event the HPCI does not operate. The arrangement of the tripping contacts is such as to provide this function when necessary and minimize spurious operation.
The trip settings given in the specification are adequate to assure the above criteria are met. The specification preserves the effectiveness of the system during periods of maintenance, testing, or calibration, and also minimizes the risk of inadvertent operation; i.e., only one instrument channel out of service.
Amendment No. 'J S3,l';1,162 -
3.2 BASES (Cont'd)
Both instruments are required for trip but the instruments are so designed that any instrument failure gives a downscale trip. The trip setting of 1.0 ci/sec (prior to 30 min. delay) provides an improved capability to detect fuel pin cladding failures to allow prevention of serious deEradation of fuel pin cladding integrity which might result from plant operation with a misoriented or misloaded fuel assembly.
This limit is more restrictive than 0.39 ci/see noble gas release rate at the air ejectors (after 30 min. delay) which was used as the source term for an accident analysis of the augmented of f-gas system. Using the.39 ci/see source term, the maximum off-site total body dose would be less than the.5 rem limit.
2.
Reactor Building Isolation and Standby Cas Treatment Initiation r
Reactor Building Isolation and Standby Cas Treatment initiation is provided in a 1-out-of-2 taken twice logic design via four radiation sensors located on the Reactor Building ventilation exhaust plenum.
Each trip system (division) consists of two channels with a 1-out-of-2 logic for upscale trips, and a 2-out-of-2 logic for downscale trips. This trip function is provided to limit the release of radioactivi-ty resulting from a refueling (fuel handling) accident.
Trip settings of (100 mr/hr for the monitors in the ventilation exhaust ducts are based upon initiating normal ventilation isolation and standby gas treatment system operation so that none of the activity released during the refueling accident leaves the Eeactor building via the normal ventilation path but rather all the activity is processed by the standby gas treatment system.
3.
Liquid Radwaste Discharge Isolation The liquid radwaste monitor assures that all liquid discharged to the discharge canal does not exceed the limits of Specification 3.21.B.
Upon sensing a high discharge level, an isolation signal is generated which closes the radwaste discharge valve.
The set point is adj ustable to compensate for variable isotopic discharges and dilution flow rates.
4 Control Room Emergency Filter System l
The main control room ventilation isolation is provided by a detector monitoring the intake of the control room ventilation system.
Automatic isolation of the normal supply and exhaust and the activation of the emergency filter system is provided by the radiation detector trip function at the predetermined trip level.
P 5.
Mechanical Vacuum Pump The mechanical vacuum pump isolation prevents the exhausting of radioactive gas thru the 1 minute holdup line upon receipt of a main steam line high radiation signal.
i E.
Drvwell Leak Detection Flow transmitters are used to record the flow of liquid from the drywell sumps. An air sampling system is also provided to detect leakage inside the primary contain-ment.
Amendment No. 62.S2 S3, e9,l':?,162 i
1 1
j
' LIMITING C5NDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILIANCE REOUIREMENTS
-3.10 (Cont'd) 4.10 (Cont'd)
(-
}
C.
Control Room Emercenev Filter System H.
Svent Fuel Cask Handline From and after the date that the 1.
Prior to_ fuel cask handling opera-l Control Room Emergency Filter system tions, the redundant crane including.
is made or found to be inoperable the rope, hooks, slings, _ shackles for any reason, refueling operations and other operating mechanisms will are permissible only during the be inspected.
succeeding seven days unless the j
system is sooner made operable. If The rope will be replaced if any of i
these conditions cannot be met, the following conditions exist:
refueling operations shall be termi-nated in an orderly manner.
i a.
Twelve (12) randomly distrib-(
uted broken wires - in one lay _
11.
Spent Fuel Cask Handline or four (4) broken wires in one strand of one rope lay.
1.
Fuel cask handling above the 931' level of the Reactor Building vill b.
Wear of one-third the original j
be done in the RESTRICTED MODE only diameter of outside individual i
except as specified in 3.10.H.2.
vire.
2.
Fuel cask handling in other than the c.
Kinking, crushing, or any oth-'
RESTRICTED MODE will be peruitted in er damage resulting in distor.
l emergency or equipn.ent failure situ-tion of the rope.
ations only to the extent necessary to get the cask to the closest ac-d.
Evidence of any type of heat-ceptable stable location.
damage.
e.
Reductions from nominal diame-I ter of more than 1/16 inch for a rope diameter from 7/8" to 1 i
1/4" inclusive.
3.
Operation with a failed controlled 2.
Prior to operations in the RESTRICT-6 area limit switch is permissible for ED MODE j
48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> providing an operator is on the refueling floor to assure the a.
the controlled area limit.
crane ' is operated within the re-switches will be tested; stricted zone painted on the floor.
b.
the "two-block" limit switches 4.
Spent fuel casks weighing in excess will be tested; of 140,000 lbs. shall not be han-died.
c.
the " inching hoist" controls l
will be tested.
l 3.
The empty spent fuel cask' will. be i
lifted. free of all support. by a
,i
~
maximum of I foot and left hanging for 5 minutes prior to any series of fuel cask handling operations.
l I
Amendment No. 25,51,97,162
-206-r
]
1
.s 4*
I 3.10 BASES (Cont'd)
D.
Ijne Linitation i
The radiological consequences of a fuel handling accident are based upon the accident occurring at least 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after reactor shutdown.
E.
Standby Cas Treatment System Only one of the two Standby Cas Treatment subsystems is needed to clean up the reactor building atmosphere upon containment isolation.
If one subsystem is found to be inoperable, there is no immediate threat to the containment system performance and refueling operation may continue while repairs are being made.
If both subsystems are inoperable. the plant is brought to a condition where the Standby Cas Treatment System is not required.
F.
Core Standby Cooline Systens During refueling the system cannot be pressurized, so only the potential need f
for core flooding exists and the specified cocbination of the Core Spray or LFCI subsystems can provide this. A more detailed discussion is contained in the bases for 3.5.F.
l C.
Control Room Emerrenev Filter System If the system is found to be inoperable, there is no immediate threat to the control room and refueling ' operation may continue for a limited period of time I
while repairs are being made.
If the system cannot be repaired within seven days, refueling operations will be terminated.
H.
Svent Fuel Cask Handline The operation of the redundant crane in the Restricted Mode during fuel cask j
handling operations assures that the cask remains within the controlled area once it has been removed from its transport vehicle (i.e., once it is above the 931' elevation).
Handling of the cask on the Refueling Floor in the
+
Unrestricted Mode is allowed only in the case of equipment failures or emergency conditions when the cask is already suspended. The Unrestricted Mode of operation is allowed only to the extent necessary to get the cask to a suitable stationary position so the required repairs can be made. Operation with a failed controlled area microswitch will be allowed for a 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> period providing an Operator is on the floor in addition to the crane operator to assure that the cask handling is limited to the controlled area as marked on the floor.
This will allow adequate time to make repairs but still will not I
restrict cask handling operations unduly.
4.10 EASES
\\
A.
Refueline Interlocks i
Complete functional testing of all refueling interlocks before any refueling outage will provide positive indication that the interlocks operate in the situations for which they were designed. By loading each hoist with a weight equal to the fuel assembly, positioning the refueling platform and withdrawing control rods, the interlocks can be subjected to valid operational tests.
Chere redundancy is provided in the logic circuitry, tests can be performed to assure that each redundant logic element can independently perform its functions.
l Amendment No. 45,61,97,152,162
-209a-i
j LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION Sl'RVEILIANCE REOUIREMENTS 3.12 Additional Safety Related Plant 4.12 Additional Safety Related Plant Carabilities Canabilities Arolicability:
Aeolicability:
Applies to the operating status of Applies to the surveillance require-the: Control Room Emergency Filter ments for the Control Room Emergency system, the Reactor Equipment Cool-Cooling system, the Reactor Equip-ing system and the Service Water ment Cooling system and the Service system.
Water system which are required by the corresponding Limiting Condi-Obieetive:
tions for Operation.
To assure the availability of the Obieetive:
Control Room Emergency Filter sys-tem, the Reactor Equipment Cooling To verify that operability or avail.
system and the Service Water system ability under conditions for which upon the conditions for which the these capabilities are an essential capability is an essential response response to station abnormalities.
to station abnormalities, s
Amendment No. 82,EE,102,126,162
-215-
~
J 1.1MITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILIANCE REOUIREMENTS
]
A.
Control Room Emercenev Filter System A.
Control Room Emercency Filter System l
1.
Except as specified in Specification 1.
At least once per operating cycle, 3.12.A.3 below, the Control Room the pressure drop across the com-Emergency Filter system, the diesel bined HEPA filters and charcoal generators required for operation of absorber banks shall be demonstrated this system and the main control to be less than 6 inches of water at room air radiation monitor shall be system design flow rate, operable at all times when contain-ment integrity is required.
2.a. The results of the in-place cold DOP 2.a. The tests and sample analysis of leak tests on the HEPA filters shall Specification 3.12.A.2 shall be show a 99% DOP removal. The results performed at least once every of the halogenated hydrocarbon leak 18 months for standby service or tests on the charcoal adsorbers after every 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of system shall show 299 halogenated hydro-operation and following significant carbon removal. The DOP and haloge-painting, fire or chemical release nated hydrocarbon tests shall be in any ventilation zone communicat-performed at a flowrate of s 341 ing with the system.
Cm.
- b. The results of laboratory carbon
- b. Cold DOP testing shall be performed sample analysis shall show a99%
after each complete or partial re-radioactive methyl iodide removal placement of the HEPA filter bank or with inlet conditions of: velocity after any structural maintenance on 222 FPM, 21.75 mg/m' inlet iodide the system housing.
concentration, a 951 R.H. and s30'C.
l
- c. The emergency bypass fan shall be
- c. Halogenated hydrocarbon testing shown to provide 341 C m $10%.
shall be performed after each com.
plete or partial replacement of the charcoal absorber bank or after any structural maintenance on the system housing.
- d. The system shall be operated at
[
1 east 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> every month.
3.
From and af ter the date that the 3.
At least once per operating cycle l
Control Room Emergency Filter system automatic initiation of the system is made or found to be inoperable shall be demonstrated.
for any reason, reactor operations are permissible only during the
}
succeeding seven days unless the system is sooner made operable.
Refueling requirements are as speci-fled in Specification 3.10.G.
4.
If these conditions cannot be met, reactor shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in cold shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
/mendment No. W 162
-215a-
-6
,4 3.12 BASES A.
Control Room Enerrenev Filter System The Control Room Emergency Filter system is designed tc. filter the control room atmosphere for intake air and/or for recirculation during control room isolation conditions.
The system is designed to automatically start upon control room isolation and to maintain the control room pressure to the design positive pressure so that all leakage should be out leakage.
High efficiency particulate absolute (HEPA) filters are installed before the charcoal adsorbers to prevent clogging of the iodine adsorbers. The charcoal adsorbers are installed to reduce the potential intake of radiciodine to the control room. The in-place test results should indicate a system leak tightness of less than 1 percent bypass leakage for the charcoal adsorbers and HEPA filters. The laboratory carbon sample test results should indicate a radioactive methyl iodide removal efficiency of at least 99 percent for expected accident conditions. If the performance of the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers are as specified, the resulting doses will be less than the allowable levels stated in Criterion 19 of the General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.
If the system is found to be inoperable, there is no immediate threat to the control room and reactor operation may continue for a limited period of time while repairs are being made. If the system cannot be repaired within seven days, the reactor is shutdown and brought to cold shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, 3.
Feeeter Ecuir ent Coolint (REC) System The Reactor Equipment Cooling System consists of two, distinct subsystems, each containing two pumps and one heat exchanger. Each subsystem is capable of supplying the cooling requirements of the essential services following design accident conditions with only one pump in either subsystem.
The REC System has additional flexibility provided by the capability of interconnec-tion of the two subsystems and the backup water supply to the critical cooling loop by the Service Vater System. This flexibility and the need for only one pump in one critical cooling loop to meet the design accident requirements justifies the 30 day repair time during normal operation and the reduced requirements during head-off operations requiring the availability of the LPCI or Core Spray systems.
C.
Service Vater System The Service Vater System consists of two, distinct subsystems, each containing two vertical Service Vater pumps located in the intake structure, and associated strainers, piping, valving and instrumentation.
The pumps discharge to a common header from which independent piping supplies two Seismic Class I cooling water loops and c,ne turbine building loop. Automatic valving is provided to shutoff all supply to the turbine building loop on drop in header pressure thus assuring supply to the Seismic Class I loops each of which feeds one diesel Eenerator, two RHR Service Water booster pumps, one control room basement fan coil unit and one REC heat exchanger.
Valves are included in the common discharge header to permit the Seismic Class 1 Service Vater System to be operated as two independent subsystems.
The heat exchangers are valved such that they can be individually backwashed without interrupting system operation.
Amendment No. 42,SS,102,152, N
-215d-
~
t i
i I
3.12 EASES (cont'd) i 1
During normal operation two or three pumps will be required.
Three pumps are used l
for a normal shutdown.
i 1
The loss of all a-c power will trip all operating Service Vater pumps. The automatic j
i emergency diesel generator start system and emergency equipment starting sequence i
vill then start one selected Service Water pump in 30-40 seconds.
In the meantime, I
the drop in Service Water header pressure will close the turbine building cooling water isolation valve guaranteeing supply to the reactor building, the control room l
j basement, and the diesel generators from the one Service Water pump.
t Due to the redundance of pumps and the requirement of only one to meet the accident requirements, the 30 day repair time is justified.
D.
Battery Room Ventilation The temperature rise and hydrogen buildup in the battery rooms without adequate ventilation is such that continuous safe operation of equipment in these rooms cannot be assured.
I t
4.12 BASES 4'
i A.
Control Room Emerrency Filter System i
)
4 l
l Pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers of less than l
l 6 inches of water at the system design flow rate will indicate that the filters and adsorbers are not clogged by excessive amounts of foreign matter.
Pressure drop j
should be determined at least once per operating cycle to show system performance i
j capability, i
j Tests of the charcoal adsorbers with halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant should be performed in accordance with ANSI N510-1980.
The frequency of tests and sample analysis are necessary to show that the HEPA f
filters and charcoal adsorbers can perform as evaluated. The test canisters that are installed with the adsorber trays should be used for the charcoal adsorber efficiency test.
Each sa.uple should be at least two inches in diameter and a length equal to the thickness of the bed.
If test results are unacceptable, all adsorbent in the 1
system shall be replaced with an adsorbent qualified accordin5 to Table 5.1 of ANSI j
N509-1980.
The replacement tray for the absorber tray removed for the test should meet the same adsorbent quality.
Tests of the HEPA filters with DOP aerosol shall be performed in accordance to ANSI N510-1980. Any HEPA filters found defective shall l
be replaced with filters qualified pursuant to Regulatory Position C.3.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52.
Operation of the system for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> every month will demonstrate operability of the l
filters and adsorber system and remove excessive moisture built up on the adsorber.-
ber.
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Amendment No. S2,13C,152.162
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4.12 BASES (cont'd)
If significant painting, fire or chemical release occurs such that the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber could become contaminated from the fumes, chemicals or foreign material, the same tests and sample analysis shall be performed as required for operational use. The determination of significance shall be made by the operator on duty at the time of the incident. Knowledgeable staff members should be consulted prior to making this determination.
Demonstration of the automatic initiation capability is necessary to assure system performance capability.
B.
Resetor Ecuimrent Cooling System l
Normal plant operation requires one heat exchanger and three pumps.
Therefore, normal equipment rotation will demonstrate pump operability.
Pump rates will be demonstrated every three months as an indication of the pump condition.
C.
Service Water System The Service Water pumps shall be proven operable by their use during normal station l
operations. Since three pumps are continuously operating during normal operation and only one pump is required during accidents, the normal equipment rotation shall prove 3
the pump operability.
Pump discharge head tests will be run every three months to verify the pumping ability.
4l Any silting problems caused by the Service Water system will be analyzed during and l
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following the Precperational Test Program.
Any required changes in operating procedures, technical specifications or surveillance requirements will be made prior to CSS ce=ercial operation.
4 D.
Battery Room Ventilation i
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f The ventilation fans will be rotated on a weekly basis '.o demonstrate oper bility.
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Amendment No. M 162
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