ML20035B330
| ML20035B330 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200001 |
| Issue date: | 03/26/1993 |
| From: | Fox J GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Poslusny C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9304010207 | |
| Download: ML20035B330 (13) | |
Text
)
GENuclear Energy saw re:va crg>y
- ?h {;T:St h enit? $w,W!?,cA 95ll5 March 26,1993 Docket No. STN 52-001 4
h u
l Chet Poslusny, Senior Project Manager Standardization Project Directorate 1
Associate Directorate for Advanced Reactors and License Renewal Office of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation l
Subject:
Submittal Supporting Accelerated ABWR Resiew Schedule - Flooding Protection
Dear Chet:
Enclosed are SSAR markups for Subsection 3.4 on Flooding. These markups were j
mentioned to NRC staff at the Bethesda ITAAC meetings. These changes address a Utility request to eliminate curbs and sills where not required.
4 Please provide a copy of this transmittal to Butch Burton.
Sincerely.
/
Fox Advanced Reactor Programs cc: Gary Ehlert (GE)
Norman Fletcher (DOE) 1
- k l
'L l
new PE yZ 9304010207 930326 PDR ADOCK 05200001
//
'A PDR
=
Standard Plant RFV B 3.4 WATER LEVEL (FLOOD) DESIGN hydrostatic head from a moderate energy pipe failure inside the tunnel, or in a connecting The types and methods used for protecting the building.
ABWR safety-related structures, systems and components from external flooding shall conform 3A.1.1.1 Flood Protection from External to the guidelines defined in RG 1.102.
Sources Criteria for the design basis for protection Seismic Category I structures that may be against external flooding shall conform to the affected by design basis floods are designed to requirements of RG 1.59. The design criteria for withstand the floods postulated in Table 2.0-1 protection against the effects of compartment using the hardened protection approach with flooding shall conform to the requirements of structural provisions with incorporated in the ANSI /ANS-56.11. The design basis flood levels plant design to protect safety-related are specified in Table 3.4-1.
structures, systems, and components from postulated flooding. Seismic Category I 3A.1 Flood Protection structures required for safe shutdown remain accessible during all flood conditions.
This section discusses the flood protection measures that are applicable to the standard ABWR Safety-related systems and components are plant Seismic Category I structures, systems, and flood-protected either because of their location components for both external flooding and above the design flood level or because they are postulated flooding from plant component enclosed in reinforced concrete Seismic Category failures. These protection measures also apply I structures which base the following to other structures that house systems and. w m r:::
components important to safety which fall within
-fe cA re3 the scope of plant specific.
(1) wall thicknesses below flood level of not less than two feet; J
3A.1.1 Flood Protection Measures for Seismic Category I Structures (2) water stops provided in all construction joints below flood level; The safety-related systems and components of the ABWg Standard Plant are located in the (3) watertight doors and equipment hatches reactorgontrol end :t=: buildings which installed below design flood level; and f
are seismic category I structures. These 1
structures together with those identified in (4) waterproof coating of external surfaces.
Table 3.4-1 are protected against external flood damage. Flood protection of safety-related (5) roofs are designed to prevent pooling of systems and components is provided for all large amounts of water in accordance with RG postulated design flood levels and conditions 1.102.
described in Table 2.0-1. Postulated flooding from component failures in the building compart-Waterproofing of foundations and walls of 1
ments does not adversely affect plant safety nor Seismic Category I structures below grade is i
does it represent any hazard to the public.
accomplished principally by the use of water stops at expansion and construction joints. In i
Structures which house the safety-related addition to water stops, waterproofing of the equipment and offer flood protection are plant structures that 1.ouse safety related identified in Table 3.4-1. Descriptions of these systems and components is provided up to 8 cm (3 structures are provided in Subsection 3.8.4 and in) above the plant ground level to protect the l
3.8.5.
Exterior or access openings and external surfaces from exposure to water.
penetrations that are below the design flood level are identified in Table 6.2-9.
The flood protection measures that are described above also guard against flooding from Pipe penetrations below design basis flood on-site storage tanks that may rupture. The
, level will be scaled against resulting largest is the condensate storage tank that has 3 4-t Amendmem M i
MlM Standard Plant nrv 8 a capacity of 2,110 cubic meters. This tank is constructed from stainless steel and is located between the turbine building and the radwaste building where there are no direct entries to these buildings. All plant entries start one foot above grade. Any flash flooding that may result from tank rupture will drain away from the site and cause no damage to site equipment.
Additional specific provisions for flood protection include administrative procedures to assure that all watertight doors and hatch covers are locked in the event of a flood warning. If local seepage occurs through the walls, it is controlled by sumps and sump pumps.
i In the event of a flood, flood levels take a relatively long time to develop. This allows ample lead time to perform necessary emergency I
actions for all accesses which need to be protected.
The safety-related components located below the design flood levelinside a Seismic Category I structure are shown in the Section 1.2 plant layout drawings. All safety related components located below the design flood level are protected using the hardened protection approach described above.
1 3#II Amendment 24
- e..
ABM 22xstoor s -
. Standard Plant Rev. n 3A.1.1.2 Compartment Flooding from Postulated After receiving a flood detection alarm, the' Component Failures operator has a ten minute grace period to act in I
cases when flooding can be identified and i
All piping, vessels, and heat exchangers with terminated by a remote action from the control flooding potential in the reactor building are room. In cases involving visual inspection to
- 7 ::,and identify the specific flooding source in the l
seismically qualified
^ ::: '
9 complete failure of a non-seismic tank or piping affected area (except ECCS areas) followed by a system is not applicable. The ac:,;cp h h remote or local operator action, a minimum of 30.
l h ni:=:c M!E ;; %E :--W:;
. =6 minutes is provided for the operator.
-l t
thede: :;eip :::
j In accordance with Reference 2, leakage cracks
'f are postulated in any point of moderate-energy i
piping larger than nominal one-inch diameter.
j The leakage flow area is assumed to be a circular i
orifice with flow area equal to one-half of the pipe outside diameter multiplied by one-half of the pipe nominal wall thickness. Resulting In all instances of compartment flooding, a l
i leakage flow rates are approximated using. single failure of an active component is Equation 3 2 from Reference I with a flow considered for systems required to mitigate coefficient of 0.59 and a normal operating consequences of a particular flooding pressure in the pipe.
condition. The emergency core cooling system (ECCS) rooms are also evaluated on the basis of a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) and a single active failure or a LOCA combined with a single l
passive failure 10 minutes or more after the l
LOCA.
i
-t The MSL tunnel There are no interface requirements made upon
-j area is instrumented with radiation and air the remainder of the plant from possible i
temperature monitors that are used to floodingin the ABWR Standard Plant buildings.
automatically isolate the MSL isolation valves Other lines, such as storm drains and normal i
upon detection of high abnormal limits.
waste lines, interface with plant yard piping.
However, provisions are made in these lines j
l However,in the event of worst case flooding that, should the yard piping become plugged,
_j involving a feedwater line break, the maximum crushed, or otherwise inoperable, they will vent flow rate from this high energy line break will onto the ground relieving any flooded condition.
l not exceed 3.6 cubic meters per minute (950 gpm) over a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> period. Refer to Table 15.6-16 for Considering the above criteria and assump-l feedwater line leakage parameters. Water tions, analyses of piping failures and their j
4 discharged from a postulated feedwater line break consequences are performed to demonstrate the will be contained in the Seismic Category I adequacy of the ABWR design. These analyses structure of the MSL tunnel area and will not are provided separately for the reactor eed j
3 control l
+uc lam,5:ME n ccal=ste,* secy,te eci l
flood any safety related equipment in the reactor
- e. 6' fdm ep.
building. The flooded area will be allowed to j drain through normally closed floor drains in the Analysis of the worst flooding due to pipe i
tunnel area which are routed to the HCW sumps in and tank failures and their consequences are the reactor building for collection and peformed in this subsection for the reactor discharge, building, control building, radwaste building j
and the service building. No credit is taken j
No credit is taken for operation of the drain for safety-related equipment within these i
sump pumps although they are expected to operate structures if the equipment becomes partially j
during some of the postulated flooding events.
flooded. However, in accordance with Section
{
342
.l Amendment 24 i
s
RM}M Standard Plant gev s 3.11, all safety-related equipment is qualified to high relative humidity.
For those structures outside the scope of the ABWR Standard Plant (e.g., the ultimate heat sink pump house), the COL applicant will demonstrate the structures outside the scope will meet the requirements of GDC 2 and the guidance of RG 1.102. See Subsection 3.4.3.4 for Col license information requirements.
3.4.1.1.2.1 Esaluation of Reactor Building Flood Events Analysis of potential flooding within the reactor building is considered on a floor-by--
floor basis The potential consequences of ".he high energy breaks in the reactor building are evaluated in Subsection 6.2.3.3.1.
3.4.1.1.2.1.1 Evaluntion of Floor 100 (B3F)
Worst case flooding on this floor level would result from leakage of the RHR 18" suction line between the containment wall and the system iso-lation valve (this applies also to the HPCF, RCIC, and SPCU suction lines, although in smaller line sizes). Leakage from this source may cause flooding of the affected RHR heat exchanger (HX) roomlat a rate of 1.04 cubic 'l[Mh }**M CW3
- 4 Oc.
ECCS r= =
meter / minute (275 gpm) and may continue until the line is repeated or equalization of water level O
- 5*-
N-m occurs between :M: :::rgwith the suppression l pool level. Flooding in the room may cause loss of functions for that particular divisional J
system loop. This will not impair the safe shutdown capability of the reactor system.
O*..
"5 Flooding of other Wis prevented by wate,r tight doors. Suction lines to other services always remain submerged. Other flooding inci-dents mat result from failures of other piping systems penetrating the RHR HX rooms for each division; these events, however, upon detection by sump pump alarms, are controllable by terminating flow with closure of valves and shutdown of pressure sources.
MI Amendment 24
ABM nuioars Standard Plant nrv. n HPCF and RCIC systems, while having the to system isolation this would result in a susceptibility to flood their respective flooding rate of 2.8 cubic meters / minute (745 compartments from the suppression pool, do so at gpm). T"er'y eight cubic mete:Ma-DF;;ica: E e lower rates than the RHR system. Failure. : d C ::: :pread-ovese-minime= cf 350+quare msert however, is guarded against by watertight doors m+++r+,-and-therefore-can4 -rostrained-by "o'
so that flooding in one +empar4 ment does not r-aised-sills-41. divisional-entries; the-arca--in 1 - :te d 2nd "zatestight s e a!e d propagate to other-awa$.
Di =cr ^. :
- 66. n s geg~ u n! prement rurther r!gg a;mg A failure in a nondivisional area, the failure of the 8" suppression pool cleanup system suction In the fourth quadrant, SWCU and CUW F/D line before the isolation valve will permit valve rooms, holding pumps and HNH pump and HX flooding of the fourth quadrant uncontrollably by rooms, may experience flooding from various system elements. The flooding rate, driven by system line failures. The maximum flooding will suppression pool head, would not exceed.27 cubic be from an 8' line at pump pressure resulting in meter / minute (or 70 gpm) and, depending upon the discharge of.92 cubic meter / minute (240 pm).
W" d 27 O C " +t*5 SP'"'
rate of manual repair, may permit 25-30 cubic meters of waier to escape into the fourth The leakage may propagate c :- 5: feu ^
quadrant. Certain functions of the SPCU, CUW, quadrant but en area cf 300 square meters is and backwash systems may be lost, but because of available, so that depth ' Aagn ='a te 6' rude mstet watertight doors on divisional areas no essential !ste di % _r2! r e :, cr: ::!u d ;"E Alarming and prompt operator
' c.*
functions would be lost and plant integrity would not be in question.
isolation of these systems is then performed.
]
Firefighting in the divisional rooms on this Firefighting on this floor will be accom-floor will be done by sprinklers in the plished manually with a flow of.57 cubic meter /
watertight rooms. Manual firefighting in the minute (150 gpm). Areas of activity are rather l fourth quadrant and in the HCU room will bring in large so that this quant ty of water (hss than i
.57 cubic meters / minute (150 gpm). Such for other events above) presents no problem.
activities would not create a water depth which would cause concern.
Ficcfighting-inaheRIP-& FMCRD maintenance ree -s -i" a!s e-have littic impac-t;-2hm-(4 j
3.4.1.1.2.1.2 Evaluation of Floor 200 (B2F) echbhigh sills and curbs prevent mov:=:r' cf water-from area of application and thus malatun.
a Flooding events on this floor may result from dh=en:! Hegrity, piping failures in the RHR pipeways, or from piping systems of the HPCF and RCIC. Maximum 3.4.1.1.2.1.3 Evaluation of Floor 300 (BIF) flooding would occur from a 10" RHR pressure line at a flow rate of 1.34 cubic meter / minute (354 Primary flooding events on this floor are te associated with pipeways and pipechases utilized
(
gpm). -D!' 9 B 2nd C 2reat Ere arr!e re:
msert spr e ad 'M
,,n a me,respe m e pe.!cd) het D F;;ic: A is that postulated for a 10' RHR pressure line c
has M :te d f!c e d spread-an: and will-have 4eiler
!= ccm:. th:: :.:: es;;;;;;d :o :cums =6--
e :='igh 3:=: te p::r::t : d:p:F cf 0.' O.i belew, raia4-sills-in-4hese-rooms preven +
- ' ',d l eeding Dimier C sotasion of
- ter from.a failed divitier rte
,4 1
n meten.@fteer inches) from
.au n D!
!ce C has er see: e d e qu::: te e* ether-dw+sien-whi4 clean access-con 4rel neers but "4" hre access-walls. prevent propagation into emergency r! :m'n w !er depth er
.uerrigh' het^cs bet"-er Division-C-arca+-en electric rooms. Water-may-spread-afts: : fe" F'eer 200 and Di'dce ^. ren c: F!cc-100.
rirete: c n r the d " and e ' " ce" da" ep,o n
m !e. q !37ge,e M ge 2!res ne preeided 6 these aren f=
bus the are: 2 se e
de'ec'u ~ 2nd eperater -s pers e.
k=' : " 5 := (1-2 In:her) dent; th-respe~-
pu ed ::dir; _ syster s e!stier E q ui p '" a "'
In associated divisional compartments failures hn;h: is :h: r~:e!!:d crer: r e e are s"'ad of 16' RCW pressure lines may also occur. Prior watertight-to-prevent propagation of a-failue.
i 34-3 1
Amendment 24
ABWR N t%AE Standard Plant REV B
/
inte e dificica; dNi;; bc!cr. ":::: r :::
Fleeding-may.f ::!r::: the feurth qu:drant 2: :
fleedingJewn-stairwells-may :!:0 cccur malmum depth, and !eabge may alsa accer thrwebhatches te rerd;"e!er2! iscahw.
i Flooding in the emergency electric rooms A, B and C and the remote shutdown rooms may occur Emergency diesel generator A, B and C rooms from leakage or failures in the heating and contain cooling water piping to components of ventilating chilled water supply or Emergency this system. Flooding may occur from failures j
HVAC cooling water system. These failures are of 8' RCW piping serving these cooling needs at i
limited in potential water release by line a maximum rate of.9 cubic meter / minute (240 inventory and surge tank capacity and will not gpm), which will fill the floor area and escape exceed 8 cubic meters (2000 gallons), causing a into the corridor, with potential cascading down total water depth of 4-5 cm (12 inches).
the stairwell. The water will spread over the side areas on the lower floor while action to j
Equipment mounted on pedestals of 20 cm (8*) isolate the failed system takes place. Intru-
- d d;; :!'!: :: :::: :r"::::: will pure r' sion of water into othu divisional.anas is prep:g::'- ::d provide cer!:!m:r' for this prevented by r9ed 5 " er the entry pan:gew -
water quantity until response to the failures is
".5fd t
made.
Leakage of lubricating oil is also possible j
in the diesel generator rooms, but level indica-i Firefighting activity in all areas of this tion provides a continuing control on this q
level are carried out by manual means at a source. Even major leakage will be contained in maximum rate of.57 cubic meter / minute (150 gpm) the subject rooms due to the small inventory of and no greater effects than those already fluid available.
considered will occur. R:!; d dec: :.!!!: p::r::'
4aunice4f-firefighting w:!:: inte unaffected Firefighting in the diesel generator area division--rat:d ::c=:.
will be provided by a foam sprinkler system.
Other firefighting will be by hoses but will be Failures in the CUW and SPCU systems filter / of smaller volumes than those considered, and demineralizers and associated piping may occur as will be of limited duration.
on Floor 200 but will spread over a comparable area or drain down to Floor 200 or 100 so that 3.4.1.1.2.1.5 Evaluation of Floor 500 (2F) adequate time is available for detection and subsequent system isolation.
This floor contains the following equipment areas:
3.4.1.1.2.1.4 Evaluation of Floor 400 (1F)
(a) The emergency diesel generator A, B, and Flooding from the RHR, HPCF, and RCIC systems C equipment areas including fans, may occur in valve rooms A, B and C. Maximum control panels, air,torage tanks and flooding is a failure of the 10* RHR pressure associated piping.
line with leakage flow of 1.34 cubic meter /
minutes (354 gpm). With : :oom-erea of ebeu:44 (b) The fuel pool cooling and cleanup system square re'er: n m ever 29 ce_(g-).5;ggsacy,-in consisting of two circulating pumps, two f e
33 @rter bn! s much larger-area-is-availeMe heat exch ange r s, two fiit e r in cerrider: ::d-woms4utside-4 hose di"ision demineralizers, instrumentation and ranmt sa 'h =' by 'he end eLthe-ton =?::::
associated valves and piping.
resperse period, a water Icvel of 2-3 cm-(eee mur u seer geren!!y cr"!d: 'he (c) The SGT3 monitor room.
u
! reb) r a
e n.... a, m m.,, u, :.. a. : n, m.,
..,,y ge,,e ety, gN:7 7 7,etre, nmma;ng prnp.gne ;-,a (d) The stacP monitor room.
. h:r di ::!:::; : par-aiion--walk betwere
- r- : i':d neu and ete:- scress 3r " pr ~ati (c) The MSL tunnel area.
l Hood p ;;:ge4! - !c d!:abgcacrater e".
.g ms-e t i
)
b i
34-4 Arnendment 18 i
i j
AMM 2suione Standard Plant RFV B Flooding on this level may also occur from room cooling systems or from firefighting efforts. Cooling system failures in air supply, exhaust or filter rooms may allow flooding at j
the rate of.3 cubic meter / minute (80 gpm) which will flow out into adjacent corridor areas if undetected for 10 minutes, the approximate 3 cubic meter (800 gallons) released may create a 3.4.1.1.2.1.6 Evaluation of floor 600 (3F) depth of a few millimeters over the available l
floor area; a very limited amount of water will Flooding events at this floor level may cascade down the stairwells. Divisional areas involve fuel oil as well as water. ~ihose encompassing the three emergency electric supply divisional rooms associated with the emergency fans ;;d L M"., uhomi-Ji inelede une d +--"wt diesel generator fuel tank and cooling system, 4Mb :s p ::bd: wa;;; * : wee-ehhe gh = es have the potential of leakage from the fuel -degh w!" b; digh: Equip =::: p:dn::b =H4
'E storage tanks. These rooms must accommodate d e % imin S : ding imp r: ea-a" : p.p = r:
leakage of 11.4 cubic meter (3000 gallons) for each division. Twenty em (8 inches) sills on Firefighting activities in this area would entry to these areas successfully contain all the cause water inflow of.57 cubic meter / minute volume in the tanks. Leakage from these tanks (150 gpm) under controlled conditions and will also be monitored through safety grade level expected water intrusion is no more than that indication and alarm equipment so that protracted above.
leakage as well as gross leakage can be identified. The rooms are protected by CO, 3.4.1.1.2.1.8 Evaluation of floor 800 (4F) a 4
f' :Eghd:g system. Water flooding may occur pna, from the cooling system at about.15 cubic Flooding on this floor can be caused by meter / minutes (41 gpm). If undetected for rupture of the RCW surge tanks A, B & C piping.
several hours water may begin cascading down the However, each tank and its associated piping is nearest stairwell but is prevented from : Wag located in a separate compartment which can be
' ", f Nether dimica :,en by seMJit.
scaled off in the event of accidental flooding.
m a: a raned :nu y ;a m..,.
al In the SGTS areas, the room cooling equipment :::::? 'h: : npag: :: 'h: "seded =n_ Also, may cause flooding at a rate.15 cubic meter / the use of pedestals for equipment installation minute (41 gpm). Raised sills prevent intrusion of the RIP supply and exhaused fans and for the of water into rooms af another division. DG.C exhaust fans will guard against flooding Flooding may also occur from manual firefighting this equipment.
in equipment maintenance areas or from leakage from the standby liquid control tanks. Maximum Flooding in the main reactor hall may occur tank leak rate will be.1 cubic meter / minute (25 from reactor service operations, but will be gpm) so that a response to tank level alarms drained into service pools. Firefighting water within 10 minutes will limit loss to one cubic expended into this area would occur at a maximum meter (or 250 gallons). Large floor areas permit rate of.57 cubic meter / minute (150 gpm) but {
s spread of water at limited depth.
will spread over the large service area available. Minor amounts of water may find the 3.4.1.1.2.1.7 Evaluation ef Roor 700 (M4F) way to stairwells, but would not impede operations.
Flooding in the FMCRD panel rooms may occur from firefighting activities at an input rate of 3.4.1.1.2.1.9 Flooding Summary Evaluation
.57 cubic meters / minute (150 gpm). Since these activities are rnanually controlled, any excessive Floor-by-floor analysis of potential pipe depth of water will be noted and action taken to failure generated flooding events in the reactor mitigate water intrusion to other areas, building shows the following:
34-5 Amendment 25 1
I r
23A6100AE Standard Plant REV B d ue. b cu mppre ssso n peo\\ w dnors \\w.E a% ct (1) Where extensive floodingg y c:::: in a blowdown will cause most of the steam to vent d;_; ut:d compartment, propagation to out of the tunnel into the turbine building.
other divisions is prevented by watertight Water or steam cannot enter the control doors : =:!:d be::he: Flooding in one building. See Section 3.6.1.3.2.3 for a division is limited to that division and description of the subcompartment pressurization j
flood water cannot prooagate to other analysis performed for the steam tunnel.
I divisions.
Moderate energy water services in the control (2) Leakage of water from large circulating building comprise 28-inch service water lines, water lines, such as reactor building 18-inch cooling water lines,6-inch cooling j
cooling water lines may flood rooms and water lines to the chiller condenser,6-inch corridors, but through sump alarms and fire protection lines, and 6-inch chilled water leakage detection systems the control room heater lines. Smaller lines supply drinking is alerted and can control flooding by water, sanitary water and makeup for the chilled l
system isolation. -Dwi4 hen! re n re water system. ? ::::
v:te: pip: Icuted All "***' l
- 5* d
-p;c:n::d by ::::ctsgh" d en, r ~hre Hy_ i;;;gh :n opp!Ef 7 N - & ia: ::d :::51 * " 5"PPk T,
4:_:;d -::: 3:p:5 :n an :, hy ::ixd to route leakage to the basement floor so that O ha e!
'h pedu::1 r;;n::d q;ipx; control or computer equipment is not subjected drams acpcc;n;;d c ::
t o wat e r. ' " - - -
- rme: 5: ':!:::::d,:h: :: = x
_I" r e (3) Limited flooding that may occur from manual
- . u : d.
firefighting or from lines and tanks having i
fr Maximum flooding m.sy occur from leakage in a
- ==g i=;; =:= y:: I limited inventory n :
g a n. x,... : ::d 28-inch service water line at a maximum rate of E
- !:":!" dFfn ::n.
k 12.0 cubic meters / minute (3150 gpm). Early detection by alarm to control room personnel Therefore, within the reactor building, will limit the extent of flooding which will internal flooding events as postulated will not also be mitigated by drainage to exterior of the prevent the safe shutdown of the reactor.
building. The expected release of a service water leak is limited to line volume plus 3A.1.1.2.2 Evaluation of Control Building operator response time times leakage rate. The Flooding Events assumed operator response time is 30 minutes to i
close isolation valves and turn off the pump in The control building is a seven story the affected service water division. Water will building. It houses in separate areas, the be contained inside a division of closed cooling control room proper, control and instrument water equipment rooms in the bottom level of the cabinets with power supplies, closed cooling control building. A maximum of 5.0 meters of l water pumps and heat exchangers, mechanical water in a divisional room is expected. Water equipment (HVAC and chillers) necessary for tight doors will confine the water to a building occupation and environmental control for division.
computer and control equipment, and the steam The failure of a cooling water line in the tunnel.
mechanical rooms of thein:pe building may The only high energy lines in the control result in a leak of 0.6 cubic meter / minute (160 building are the mainsteam lines and feedwater gpm). Early detection by control room personnel lines which pass through the steam tunnel will limit the extent of flooding. Total j
connecting the reactor building to the turbine release from the chilled water system will be building. There are no openings into the control limited to line inventory and surge tank volume, building from the steam tunnel. The tunnel is spillage of more than 6 cubic meters (1500 1
sealed at the reactor building end and open at gallons) is unlikely. Elevation differences and j
t he turbin e _ buildin g e n_d.
It consists of separation of the mechanical functions from the J
I I*
reinforced concrete with A meter thick walls, remainder of the control building prevent Any break in a mainsteam or a feedwater line will propagation of the water to the control area, flood the steam tunnel with steam. The rate of i
AfDendmCat 26 i
i 1
i ABWR msm Standard Plant uv y i
t
. =rE _. J 2.C
.... cf ::::: % : d!m.:;d mm, which is 3 meters above the radwaste
- r I. ::p::::d. "/.i. i.J., d:::: a:" ;s;I;; building basement slab. This tunnel connects to
- ic
- ::::te di t ;
the turbine and reactor buildings at the same
?
elevation.
Tb f..L., of a ecl:sg a:n "-: ':S
- h:249 :::=: of :h ;M::: be!! ding -ury-The structural design of this building is r:: h 'n r. l::L ef 0.5 ::H: =:::r/=! Me (1% such that no internal flooding is expected or
-gp=), E;.ly dc;cetica by cen;;e; ic:= y 4 will neur under the worst case conditions from.
f w;!! "-it 'h: :::::: of f!cedtag. Tete! n!:=: those tanks that are isolated by the Seismic
-fica.:h: ch"!:d _ e;;; mim.
'" h !' ':: d :c-Category I compartments.
!;n; h;;.:e.j ood ;;;; taak re!:=:, q!":;;: ;f l
-met th:: 5 caic mc6cu WOO ge:Lu.;l Flooding from other sources within the i
e n M ely. E!:=:!en differ;;;e
.od ;;rde _ building such as internal radwaste and j
non radwaste piping, plant drains, small tanks, i
-of-the-mec' " ' -- - ' - '
- 5 ce=1Eld:r.; y.nini picp:g :::: c' % and pumps is not expected to cause the water j
)
-weter40-th: :entm! am -
level to rise more than 1 meter above the flood I
- M 5d --*-
depth of 3 meters to reach the tunnel and spread
.l<
Tiesdb; :... m. :.. ;..., ; ; _ :!" ' : - :h-radioactive liquid waste to other buildings that fM!::: cf "; ; f;gh" ; g e : :
h:
house safety-related systems.
l
- -H 5 !!!rg d: :.s; SiY p!:
aft There are no sprinkler systems in the control Therefore,it can be concluded from the above building. Hose and standpipes are located in the analysis that there is no uncontrolled leakage corridors. Service equipment rooms may build up path of radioactive liquid from the radwaste limited water levels from either service water, building under the conditions of worst-case cooling water, or chilled water leaks, but internal flooding.
i elevation differences ::d :::.:d d!!: prevent ntrusion of water into control areas. Control 3A.1.1.2A Evaluation of Service Building room responses to those various Icvels of Flooding Events j
j flooding may extend from system isolation and correction to reduction of plant load or The service building is a non-seismic shutdown, but control room capability is not concrete structure consisting of four_ floors, t
I compromised by any of the postulated flooding two above and two below grade. It serves as the main security entrance to the plant and provides i
events.
the controlled access tunnels to the control 3A.1.1.2.3 Evaluation of Radwaste Building building, the turbine building, and the reactor j
Flooding Event building. This building does not house' any safety related equipment.
j The radwaste building is a reinforced concrete structure designed as Seismic Category The connecting access tunnels to other 1, consisting of a substructure 13.8 meters below buildings are below plant grade as indicated in l
grade and a super-structure 16 meters above Table 3.4-1. These passage ways are water light i
grade. This building does not contain to prevent scepage into the tunnels. Also, the j
safety-related equipment and is not contiguous controlled access chambers employ curbs and
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with other plant structures except through a pipe closed doors at both ends of the tunnel that tunnel. In case of a flood, the building guard against water leakage into structures that j
substructure serves as a large sump which can house safety-related equipment.
i collect and hold any leakage within the building. Also, the medium and large radwaste The only plant piping that run through this tanks are housed in sealed compartments which are building are those needed for fire protection, designed to contain any spillage or leakage from water services, HVAC heaters and chillers, and tanks that may rupture. The piping that trans,
for draining the sumps. This building has floor fers the liquid waste from the other buildings drains and two sump pumps (HCW & HSD) for traverses through a scaled water-tight tunnel to collecting and transferring the liquid waste.
the radwaste building at an elevation of -3,500 Under worst-case conditions, flooding from line 3441 Amendment 24 a
1
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l ABM 23xsioaxs REV B Stapdard Plant l
ruptures is unlikely and can be contained from and load combinations indicated in Subsection l
spreading to the structures that house safety-3.8.4.3 and 3.8.5.3 using well established related equipment.
methods based on the general principles of engineering mechanics. All Seismic Category I 3.4.1.1.2.5 Evaluation of Ttarbine Building structures are in stable condition due to either Flooding Events moment or uplift forces which result from the proper load combinations including the design Circulating water system and turbine building basis flood.
service water system are the only systems large enough to fill the condenser pit; therefore, only 3.4.3 COL License Information i
these two systems can flood into adjacent buildings.
3A3.1 Flood Elevation A failure in either of these systems will The design basis flood elevation for the ABWR result in the total flooding of the turbine Standard Plant structures is one foot below building up to grade. Water is prevented from grade.
crossing to other buildings by two means. The first is a normally closed alarmed door in the 3A3.2 Ground Water Elevation connecting passage between the turbine building and service building. The second is that the The design basis ground water elevation for radwaste tunnel will be sealed at all ends to the ABWR Standard Plant structures is two feet prevent water from either entering the tunnel or below grade.
Icaving the tunnel. A large hydrostatic head is prevented by a large non-water tight truck door 3A33 Flood Protection Requirements for Other at grade to provide a release point for any Structures water.
The COL applicant will demonstrate, for the l Because of the large size of the circulating structures outside the scope of the ABWR water system, a leak will fill the condenser pit Standard Plant, that they meet the requirements
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quickly. Monitors were added in the condenser of GDC 2 and the guidance of RG 1.102. (See pit of the turbine building to provide leak Subsection 3.4.1.1.2) detection and an automatic tneans to shutdown the circulating water system in the event of flooding 3.4.4 References in the turbine building (see Subsection 10.4.5.2.3 a n d 10.4.5.6).
1.
Crane Co., Flow of Fluids Through Valves, Fittings, and Pipe, Technical Paper No.
3A.1.2 Permanent Dewatering System 410, 1973.
There is no permanent dewatering system 2.
ANSI /ANS 56.11, Standard, Design Criteria provided for in the flood design.
for Protection Against the Effects of Compartinent Flooding in Light Water Reactor 3.4.2 Analytical and Test Procedures Plants.
Since the design flood elevation is one foot 3.
Regulatory Guide 1.59, Rev. 2 Design Basis below the finished plant grade, there is no Floods for Nuclear Power Plants.
i dynamic force due to flood. The lateral hydrostatic pressure on the structures due to the design flood water level, as well as ground water I
and soil pressures, are calculated.
i Structures, systems, and components in the l
ABWR Standard Nuclear Island designed and analyzed for the maximum hydrostatic and hydrodynamic forces in accordance with the loads 34-7 Amendment 26 i
l
2 insert a These lines are inside pipe chases. Hence, leakage from these ' breaks
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accumalates on floor 100 (B3F).
r insert b i
i A total of 84 cubic-meters of water are spilled.
l insert c The leakage may propagate between divisions but an area of over 300 i
f square meters is available, so that a depth of less than 8 inches is maintained. No water will damage safety-related equipment.
insert d Maximum leakage is that postulated for a 10 inch RHR pressure line f
failure in rooms that are connected to rooms below on floor 100 (B3F).
' Hence, leakage from these breaks accumalates on floor-100 (B3F).
insert e These rooms are connected to floor 100 (83F) by pipe chases. No accumalation expected on this floor.
j insert f i
raising the equipment 8 inches off the floor.
l 1
insert g Flooding may occur from the failure of 8 inch fuel pool cooling lines atamaximumrateof.9cubicmeters/ minute (240gpm]s,whichwillfill
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the floor area. The water will escape down stairwel or flow down the drain system to floor 100 (B3F). Due to limited im tory, water is limited to a few millimeters in depth.
Safety-related equipment sensitive to water (i.e., electrical, control, and instrumentation) will be protected i
by raising-them at least 8 inches above the floor.
r e
Flooding may also occur inside the steam tunnel. This water volume will be kept inside the tunnel until the operators are ready to pump it to radwaste for treatment. No safety-related equipment will be effected by this break.
All valve operators are well off the floor. They are expected to act prior to their emersion by any flood.
i insert h damaging safety-related equipment by raising water sensitive equipment at least 8 inches above the floor.
insert i will be raised at least 8 inches off the floor to minimize flooding impact on all safety-related equipment.
insert j Only limited water depth can occur; therefore, safety-related equipment are raised at least 8 inches off the floor for their protection.
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l insert k Flooding events that may result from the failure of the fire fighting systems within the control building are directed to the basement-by the l-floor drain system.
On all floors, water ser.sitive equipment will be raised at least 8 l
inches off the floor to protect them in case of water intrusion due to manual firefighting or other flooding event on their floor.
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