ML20034F601
| ML20034F601 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200001 |
| Issue date: | 03/01/1993 |
| From: | Poslusny C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9303040039 | |
| Download: ML20034F601 (32) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES y
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March 1, 1993 Docket No.52-001 APPLICANT: GE Nuclear Energy (GE)
PROJECT:
Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR)
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF MEETING WITH GE ON OCTOBER 28 AND 29, 1992 A public meeting was held between Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and GE Nuclear Energy (GE) technical staff on October 28 and 29,1992, in the GE office in San Jose, California. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss unresolved issues from the staff's recently issued draft final safety evalua-tion report (DFSER) for the advanced boiling water reactor (ABWR).
Plant systems issues included in Chapters 3 and 9 of the DFSER were the specific items addressed in the meeting. Enclosure 1 is a list of the staff who attended this meeting.
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CHAPTER 3 AND 9 DFSER OPEN AND CONFIRMATORY ITEM RESOLUTION For each of the two chapters, DFSER open, confirmatory and COL action items were discussed to determine the status of resolution as reflected in standard safety analysis report (SSAR) amendments. The following table summarized the
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status of the iteas which were discussed during the meeting for each category of unresolved item.
It should be noted that Chapter 3 includes other review areas which were not discussed and also only a few of the inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria (ITAAC) related open items for these two chapters were specifically discussed during this meeting.
DFSER RESOLUTION PROGRESS Chapter Items Total Discussed Resolved Unresolved 3'
Open 68 7
3 (C) 65 Confirm.
35 11 7
28 COL A Item 39 13 6
33 9
Open 49 20 7 (4(C))
42 Confirm 35 33 14 21 COL A Item 19 15 7
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, March 1, 1993 GE understands that a follow-up amendment is required to completely resolve all design related issues.
It is expected that such an amendment will be provided by early December to facilitate FSER documentation of issue closure.
The follcwing is a detailed listing of unresolved items in the two chapters with text entries following those items which were discussed with GE with brief discussions of agreements made and revised staff findings.
1.
Summary of Open Items Discussed 3.4.1-1 Flooding in Turbine building The staff indicated that the SSAR needs a discussion of protection from flooding due to breaks in turbine SW and condenser circulation water. The SSAR also needs a summary of those design features that provide protection.
GE needs to describe how a break in the turbine building could effect safety related equipment in the reactor building. GE will discuss the risk evalua-tion it has done along with mitigation features.
Insert C was provided in as a proposed insert to the SSAR.
Based on this information, this item is resolved and becomes a confirmatory item (not numbered).
t 3.5.1.2-1 Missiles from rotating equipment GE proposed adding a reference to the SSAR for a methodology to determine the thickness of housings for rotating equipment which was provided to the staff.
It is the proprietary PED-18-0389, " Missile Generation Study" for Peach L
Bottom. The staff will place it on the docket and GE committed to providing a non proprietary version. This item remains open while the staff reviews the methodology.
l 3.5.1.2-2 ITAAC-protection of S/R equipment from missiles This ITAAC needs to indicate the requirement to perform an inspection, l
analysis to demonstrate the required protection. GE may choose to include a building or a Generic ITAAC.
r 3.6.1-1 ITAAC-protection safety equipment from DBA The staff wants building ITAAC to include protective features to avoid damage to SR equipment from a pipe break. GE is considering putting these features in the building ITAAC.
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. March 1, 1993 3.11.3-1 ITAAC-EQ radiation concern This item remains unresolved.
3.11.3-2 EQ radiation concern The staff wants a commitment from GE that the total integrated dose for electronic equipment will not exceed 1000 R.
This will define the mild environment.
It was not clear what GE's position was on this issue and what the definition of the harsh environment will be. GE indicated that it would add the following in the SSAR:
"all equipment subject to exposure in excess of 1000 R will be qualified in accordance with 10 CFR 50.49."
This item was resolved and will become a confirmatory item (to be numbered).
3.11.3-3 Integrated gamma dose in primary containment GE committed to recalculate the integrated gamma dose level for containment and will include it in the SSAR.
If it is lower than that experienced ir operating plants a justification will be provided.
9.1.3-1 Use of the RHR as part of the FPC The staff needs GE to verify that functions of the RHR will not be affected during Mode 5 when RHR is being used for fuel pool cooling during the first 150 hours0.00174 days <br />0.0417 hours <br />2.480159e-4 weeks <br />5.7075e-5 months <br /> after shutdown. Also GE needs to verify that the TS will not be violated in this mode.
9.1.5-1 ITAAC-RxB crane capability under SSE This issue is resolved in SSAR Amendment 21. This issue is closed. This should not have been labeled as ITAAC.
9.1.5-2 CB and secondary containment cranes under SSE This issue is resolved in SSAR Section 9.1.5.2.2.4 Amendment 17. GE will clarify the wording.
This action is Confirmatory (not numbered).
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9.1.5-3 Discrepancies between SSAR Table 3.2.1 and Section 9.1 4
The jib crane will be deleted from the design. GE needs to update the SSAR to l
delete jib crane from SSAR Table 3.2-1.
GE has committed to revise the SSAR j
to make the use of the refueling platform consistent in SSAR Table 3.2-1.
The open item is closed. These actions are confirmatory.
9.1.5-4 Non-single-failure-proof lifting devices in CB j
GE has revised the SSAR Section 9.1.6.6 Amendment 21 to specify the require-I ment for protection of safety related loads from non single failure proof loads. GE needs to revise Figs.1.2-20 and 1.2-21 to include additional equipment hatches. The open item is closed. The second part of this issue is confirmatory.
l 9.1.5-5 ID all hoists in RB, DW, steam tunnel, refuel platform f
The open item is resolved. This is now a Confirmatory item for GE to revise Section 9.1.6.6 to identify that the COL applicant will provide information on all load handling systems. See Enclosure 3 markups of SSAR.
j 9.1.5-6 Interlocks, limit switches for loads over spent fuel This open item is resolved and is now confirmatory for GE to include in SSAR Section 9.1.6 to clarify that the COL applicant will provide details on the limit and safety devices for automatic and manual operation of all heavy load handling systems. The staff needs to properly address how this item will be
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resolved by the addition of a list of systems which are out of scope in SSAR Chapter 1.
9.1.5-7 Load-lifting systems outside design certification This item will be resolved in conjunction with the resolution of Open Item 1.2.6-1.
i 9.2.4-1 Sanitary and potable water system conceptual design The information was included in Amendment 21. The staff still needs to evaluate the acceptability of the description. The system is designated as an I
interfacing system and therefore licensee design requirements will be treated l
as interface requirements.
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l 9.2.11-1 RCW system heat exchanger design capacity l
GE provide a draft write-up to clarify the heat exchanger capacities to be l
included in a future SSAR amendment. This item needs further discussion.
i 9.2.13-1 ITAAC-HVAC emergency cooling water system
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This item in the DFSER text concerns the need for analyses regarding the HECW system ability to recover post SBO.
It was incorrectly titled in Chapter 1.
The staff believes that GE needs to provide additional information in the SSAR beyond what is included. GE needs to show that the EQ analysis bounds the conditions following a SB0 after 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. GE agreed to do such an l
analysis.
9.2.15-1 RSW interface criteria in SSAR GE committed to including a requirement that the RSW piping be no more than 2 km in length.
l This is still under review.
9.2.16-1 Discrepancy in SSAR concerning number of TSW pumps Amendment 21 corrected this information and this is resolved.
9.3.1-1 Nitrogen supply requirements (ANSI MCll.1-1976)
The staff indicated that GE should add a statement in the SSAR of a particu-late requirement of 5 microns for instrument air and high pressure nitrogen and a statement that components using these systems must meet this require-ment. GE indicated that these changes would be made in Sections 9.3.1 and 6.7.2.
This item becomes a confirmatory item (not numbered).
t 9.3.1-2 Instrument air compliance with GDC 1 The staff indicated that GE should add a statement in the SSAR of a particu-late requirement of 5 microns for instrument air and high pressure nitrogen-and a statement that components using these systems must meet this require-ment. GE indicated that these changes would be made in Sections 9.3.1 and 6.7.2.
This item becomes a confirmatory item (not numbered).
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9.4.1-1 Include ESF-grade filter train electric heaters GE indicated that the ESF grade heaters will be added to the design and reflected in the P&ID Figure 9.4-1.
This item is resolved and becomes confirmatory item (not numbered).
9.4.6-1 P& ids, flow diag, comp descrip for RW control rm HVAC GE has committed to provide P&ID and description for the RW control rm HVAC.
The open item is closed and this becomes a confirmatory item.
9.5.4.1-1 Tornado missile effects on fill vent and sample connect The staff indicated that additional discussion of the protection from missiles is needed in the SSAR.
9.5.5-1 ITAAC-put interfaces into ITAAC GE has indicated that these items are identified as COL Action Items in a Amendment 21. This resolves this issue.
9.5.8-1 Protection of silencers from tornado missiles This protection information still needs to be added to the SSAR.
GE described the current protection measures and the proposed results of an impact of a
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missile and they were found to be acceptable. This item is still open.
II. Summary of Confirmatory Items Discussed 3.4.1-1 Remove references to LBB GE committed to removing the references from the SSAR.
This also requires a revision to SSAR 3.6.1 which GE indicated it will do.
3.4.1-2 CB design against MST flooding GE has modified SSAR to address this concern in Amendment 20. This item is resolved.
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March 1, 1993 3.4.1-3 CB design against RSW/RCW flooding GE needs to add information to the SSAR to show how the protection takes place.
l 3.5.1.4-1 DBT and missile spectra Information included in Amendment 21. This item is resolved.
3.5.1.4-2 DBT design classification Information included in Amendment 21. This item is resolved.
3.6.1-1 Revise Table 31.3-15 for blowout panel fail GE needs to modify the table to be consistent with Chapter 6 information.
GE understands the issue and will modify the SSAR as required.
(This item was numbered 3.6.1-2 in the Chapter Text.)
3.11.2.1-1 Compliance w/NUREG-0588, Cat I and RG 1.89 GE included in Amendment 21 appropriate information from the RG and this item is resolved.
3.11.3-1 Update SSAR to include Rx water quality The staff stated that GE needs to add a reference to another SSAR chapter where the water quality controls are described for normal operation.
GE included the reference in Amendment 21 and this item is resolved.
3.11.3-2 Include definition of mild environment The information was included in Amendment 21 and this item is resolved.
3.11.3-3 Revise SSAR Figures 31.3-1 thru 31.3-22 Amendment 21 included the required references to P&lDs and this item is resolved.
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3.11.3-4 Time-based profiles for environ zones GE has provided data for thermodynamic environmental conditions over time in the SSAR which is not in a plotted format. The staff indicated that it would look again at the information prior to considering this item resolved.
9.1.3-1 Ventilation / filtration in standby gas The staff requires a statement in the SSAR regarding the protection of the common line for the fuel pool cooling system, RHR, and suppression pool cooling.
t 9.1.3-2 Firewater to provide spent fuel pool makeup Information still needs to be included in the SSAR.
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9.1.3-3 Incorporate 2 filter trains into SGTS The information has been included in the SSAR in Chapter 6 and the staff determined that no change to Chapter 9 was needed. This ftem is resolved.
9.1.5-1 ID equipment to be handled by cranes This item is still confirmatory and will be addressed with Open Item 9.1.5-5.
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9.1.5-2 Incorporate response to RAI 410.43 GE responded in Amendment 21 which was found to be acceptable.
This item is-resolved.
9.2.12-1 HVAC normal cooling water 150 valves The staff determined that the SSAR includes the valves in the design. This item is closed.
I 9.2.13-1 Correct number of HECW pumps in SSAR 9.2.13.2 i
i Amendment 21 corrected the information. This is reso'lved.
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. March 1, 1993 9.2.13-2 Clarify non-safety portion of HECW Amendment 20 included the necessary P&ID changes. The design description in the text was revised in Amendment 21 and this item was resolved.
9.2.14-1 Discrepancies in TCW design in SSAR i
Amendment 21 clarified the identification of the number of heat exchangers, pump capacities, and the number of trains. The staff had indicated in the DFSER that it had understood that the system had three trains.
GE in Amend-ment 21 provided the necessary system descriptions. The staff had incorrectly i
stated that there were three trains. The design is acceptable as described and all concerns have been clarified. This item is resolved.
9.2.15-1 Protect RSW from piping failures In Amendment 21, GE addressed the required aspects of GDC 4 and this is resolved. GE identified that it would add high-point vents for protection from water hammer.
9.2.16-1 More TSW design information in SSAR t
The staff requires additional conceptual design information concerning heat loads. GE understands what is need and will provide the information.
9.2.16-2 Interface for flood protection from TSW This information is included in Amendment 21 and this item is resolved.
9.3.1-1 Primary containment penetration ref The necessary SSAR change is yet to be made.
9.3.1-2 ID safety-related portion of HPIN GE revised Figure 6.7-1 in Amendment 20 to include the requested valve information and this item is resolved.
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i March 1, 1993 9.3.1-3 ID failure modes of CA system valves The staff indicated that Figures 6.7-1, 9.3-6, 6.2-39, and 9.3-7 need to be modified to indicate failure mode. GE agreed to do so.
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9.3.1-4 ID failure mode of A0 valves F018A & B i
The staff indicated that Figure 6.7-1, 9.3-6, 6.2-39, and 9.3-7 need to be modified to indicate failure mode. GE agreed to do so.
9.3.1-5 Is IA available as a backup to HPIN7 i
In amendment 22, GE did not clearly describe the backup function.
GE needs to clarify the discussion in 9.5.6.2 in the SSAR.
In addition GE needs to add a cross reference to Figure 9.3-6 which depicts the backup function of the system.
1 9.3.5-1 Include SLCS storage tank injection valves in RAP This item was not discussed.
9.3.8-1 Clarify class of rad drain transfer valve The staff needs the valve classification included in the SSAR. Amendment 21 included a modification of Table 3.2-1 to include the necessary information and this item is resolved.
9.3.8-2 Inaccuracies in Tables 9.3.8.1 and 9.3.8.2 The in accuracies exist in Sections 9.3.8.1 and 9.3.8.2 not in the Table.
The aspects related to safety-related classification was included in Amend-ment 21. GE needs to clarify what is within scope. The staff determined that the COL action item is not needed for this section because the requirement for avoiding interconnections between rad and non-rad drain systems will be included in Section 9.3.3.
9.4.1.1-1 Provide smoke detector at the' air intake GE indicated that they would revise either the SSAR P&ID Figure 9.4.1-1 or the SSAR Section 9.4.1.1 text to include a smoke detector in the intake to the control building HVAC.
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9.5.1.2.2-1 Revise SGTS for fire protection concerns This item was not discussed.
9.5.4.2-1 Revise fuel oil storage and transfer P& ids GE indicated that the P&ID change is being processed for a future amendment to reflect the temperature sensor on the tank discharge.
9.5.4.2-2 Include level switches and stick gauge The P&ID change is being processed for a future amendment.
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9.5.4.2-3 Revise SSAR Figure 9.5.6 1
1 The P&ID change is being processed for a future amendment, and SSAR textual changes have been made in Amendment 21. The staff will review the SRP related l ~
to the confirmatory item.
l 9.5.5-1 Inconsistencies wrt jacket water pumps l
This item was included in Amendment 21 and is resolved.
9.5.5-2 Amot temp sensor or equivalent in SSAR This information was included in Amendment 21 and is resolved.
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9.5.6-1 Pre-and after-filters in DG SA system GE has made a change to a figure and will be in a future amendment.
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9.5.6-2 DG SA system requirements This change was included in Amendment 21 Section 9.5.13.5 and resolves this item.
9.5.6-3 Incorporate coolers in DG SA description l
l This information was included in Amendment 21 Section 9.5.6.2 and is resolved.
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4 March 1,.1993 9.5.7-1 SSAR Fig 9.5-9 to show level indication This information is expected in a future amendment.
9.5.7-2 Provision to prevent crankcase explosion This information was included in Amendment 21 in Section 9.8 and is resolved.
9.5.7-3 ANSI & ASME requirements for DG lube oil This will be included in a future amendment.
9.5.8-1 Integrity of DG exhaust silencers This information will be included in an amendment.
9.5.8-2 Modify response to RAI 430.294 This item was included in Amendment 21 in Section 9.5.8.2 and is resolved.
III. Summary of Combined License (COL) Action Items 13.4.1-1 Flood analysis for structures not in GE design scope This item was identified as on interface requirement in the SSAR and is to be listed as a COL action item in future amendment.
3.5.1.1-1 Missile protection for all SSCs The staff indicated that this item is redundant and should be deleted in the FSER and need not be addressed in the SSAR.
3.5.1.2-1 Prevent internally-generated missiles in containment GE indicated that this item will be added to the COL action item list.
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1 3.5.1.4-1 ID missiles generated by other natural phenomena SSAR wording needs to be changed to reflect the COL action will address SSCs outside of GE's scope of design.
3.5.1.4-2 Protect SSCs from missiles gen'd by other nat'l phen SSAR wording needs to be changed to reflect the COL action will address SSCs outside of GE's scope of design.
3.5.2-1 Protection from missiles to SSCs outside of GE scope This item still needs to be included in the SSAR as a COL action item.
3.6.1-1 Dynamic analysis of high energy piping systems
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Included in Amendment 21.
3.6.1-2 Protect S/R SSCs from moderate energy piping systems Included in Amendment 21.
3.6.1-3 ID method for protecting systems Included in Amendment 21.
3.6.1-4 Protect MSIV operability from piping failures Included in Amendment 21.
3.6.1-5 Examples using enclosures to protect fm failed pipe Included in Amendment 21.
3.11.1-1 Environmental qualification of electrical equipment GE committed to adding the required information notice, IE Notice 79-22 to the SSAR in Table 1.8-22 and in Section 3.11.
This was acceptable to the staff.
March 1, 1993
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3.11.2.2-1 S/R mechanical equipment in a harsh environment i
GE will modify the SSAR to include a reference to the methodology used to i
qualify equipment.
t 3.11.3-1 IN 89 flooding above flood level GE indicated that the SSAR will be modified to indicate this item is a COL i
Action Item in 3.11 and in the Table 1.8-22 in Chapter 1.
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3.11.3-2 Rad levels in environmental zones GE reviewed this item and agreed that it would be reflected in the SSAR as a COL action item.
3.11.3-3 Ensure operability of equip in mild environ zones GE indicated that it would look for a reference the maintenance program to add to Section 3.11 to address the surveillance and maintenance programs require-ment. The requirement to provide vendor certificate of compliance will be added as a COL Action item by GE.
i 9.1.5-1 Change interfaces to COL action items This has not been included in the SSAR as of yet and refers to the COL applicant providing the necessary procedures and training for heavy load handling equipment.
9.1.5-2 Implement NUREG-0612 guidelines This has not been included in the SSAR as of yet.
9.2.10-1 MUWP design features NRC needs to review this detailed list of criteria and determine a suitable course of action to delete these criteria.
9.2.15-1 RSW information The above COL Action Item needs to be addressed in the interface requirements section for the reactor service water system rather than listed as a COL
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< March 1, 1993 Action Item. This is a matter of packaging rather than technical concern.
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agreed to add the necessary information in Section 9.2.15 including cross references to other SSAR sections as appropriate.
i 9.2.15-2 RSW biofouling prevention l
This was addressed in Amendment 21 under the interface requirements section.
The staff determined that this was acceptable and need not be called a COL Action Item.
i 9.2.15-3 RSW procedures to prevent water hammer GE indicated that it would include a specification that high point vents and a requirement to have procedures to prevent water hammer will be included as part of the interface requirement.
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l 9.3.3-1 Non-rad drainage systems design concerns The SSAR needs to be clarified to indicate what is in scope and out of scope relative to the radioactive drain transfer system, GE needs to modify the SSAR to indicate the drain transfer system sumps, and piping from the drain transfer system sump pumps and radwaste system is within GE's scope. Thirdly, the SSAR needs to include a COL Action Item which will guarantee that there will be no interconnections between the floor drainage system and the radioac-tive drain transfer system or the radwaste system, i.e., no connections i
between a radioactive and a non-radioactive drain system will exist in the design.
i 9.3.8-1 Rad and non-rad drain system connection concerns This is the same item as 9.3.3-1 and should be deleted from this section and identified with a cross reference.
9.3.8-2 Monitor effluents from non-rad systems i
This item was not discussed.
9.4.1.1-1 Protect CR operators from toxic substances SSAR Section 6.4.7.1 (Amendment 21) contains a COL Action Item addressing this issue.
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9.4.8-i Service building ventilation design concerns GE has committed to provide a P&ID and description for the service building j
ventilation design concerns. This remains a COL item.
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9.5.1.5-1 Administrative controls 3
i This item was not discussed.
I 9.5.4.1-1 NUREG/CR-0660 DG reliability recommendations GE will be including this item in the SSAR as a COL action item.
9.5.4.2-1 DG fuel oil transfer pump design concerns j
This item will be incorporated in the design in a future amendment and is a confirmatory item (not numbered).
9.5.4.2-2 Sediment obstruction concerns in DG fuel lines Amendment 21 included this as a COL Action Item.
9.5.5-1 Power source for jacket water cooling pumps This item was included in Amendment 21.
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9.5.7-1 ITAAC-DG lobe oil system design criteria Amendment 21, Section 9.5.13.5 includes this item.
1 9.5.8-1 ITAAC-DG combustion air system flow capacity This item is in Amendment 21 Section 9.5.13.5.
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ITAAC RELATED OPEN ITEMS It was decided that the ITAAC related open items would not be explicitly discussed during the meeting. This is because GE is still preparing its i
proposed revised ITAAC incorporating staff input and comments included in the i
DFSER and in the August 12, 1992 letter to GE, as well as comments from NUMARC generated by an industry review of GE's Phase Tier 1 document.
Instead, the l
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March 1, 1993 i
staff committed to providing GE a list of recommended ITAAC and Tier 1 information requirements based on the discussions of unresolved design related items identified during the two-day meeting. The following list was provided as a first cut at the total list which will be provided to GE by November 6, j
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1.
Test for water level switches in control building.
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For condenser pit verify flood protection isolation function.
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Verify that there are no penetrations from steam tunnel to control t
building.
4.
Pressurized gas bottles will not generate missiles as themselves or by parts thereof by verifying protection features.
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Protection of SR equipment from failures of NSR SSCs not housed in tornado-resistant buildings (0 pen Item 3.5.2-1).
6.
Modify EQ ITAAC to include harsh environment requirements of 50.49(f)
(0 pen Item 3.11.3-1).
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New fuel storage concerns (0 pen Item 9.1.1-1).
8.
Fuel pool cooling (0 pen Item 9.1.3-2).
Protection features for piping used for cooling by RHR.
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Overhead heavy load handling system. Need for a load test.
i GE indicated that it would consider the list in its preparation of a Tier 1 document reflecting Chapters 3 and 9 which would be completed in November and provided to the staff to support a follow-up meeting with the staff. This I
meeting will be held in December to resolve the Tier 1 and ITAAC issues for the two chapters.
l FUEL POOL COOLING DESIGN CHANGE A discussion was held on the fuel pool cooling function. GE indicated that in j
the post LOCA scenario, with the assumption of no cooling will result in j
boiling which may not be addressed by the SGTS capability design. GE has i
analyzed two offload scenarios (maximum normal and abnormal heat loads) but there is still a concern over the saturation of the SGTS by the steam from boiling.
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! March 1, 1993 RESOLUTION PROCESS FOR DESIGN AND TIER I ISSUES In a separate meeting, GE and the staff discussed a strategy to promote complete closure of design and Tier 1 issues. The following steps were proposed for achieving review finality for each SSAR chapter.
Note that steps 1-8 are completed for each chapter until all chapters have been addressed by the process.
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Design Issue Phase l
1.
GE evaluates DFSER unresolved items and identifies existing SSAR amendment 3
or generates proposed SSAR documentation to propose closure, f
x 2.
The staff completes its review of the most recent SSAR amendments or submittals, revises DFSER findings as appropriate and begins the prepara-tion of applicable FSER sections.
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GE and the staff meet and confer by telephone to resolve the DFSER open i
and confirmatory items and agree upon design related SSAR changes for future amendments.
ITAAC Issue Phase 4.
The staff indicates additional Tier 1/ITAAC requirements based on design issue resolution.
5.
GE disposes of all industry and staff comments on Tier 1/ITAAC.
GE and the staff meet to close Tier 1/ITAAC issues.
6.
7.
GE submits the SSAR Amendment with design and Tier I information.
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The staff completes the preliminary version of FSER.
9.
GE submits the certified SSAR and Tier 1 document for all chapters.
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- 10. The staff conducts its final review for consistency and completeness.
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- 13. The staff issues its FSER.
l It was agreed that this process would be discussed in the next senior manage-ment meeting with GE.
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(Original signed by) j Chester Poslusny, Project Manager Standardization Project Directorate Associate Directorate for Advanced Reactors i
and License Renewal Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosures:
i As stated i
I cc w/ enclosures:
j See next page i
DISTRIBUTION: w/ encl.
i Docket File PDST R/F TMurley/FMiraglia,12G18 DCrutchfield PDR WTravers JNWilson CPoslusny PShea EJordan, 3701 GGrant, EDO i
TBoyce RPerch, BH7 WBeckner, 10E4 WBurton, 801 w/o encl.
JMoore, 15B18 ACRS (11)
J. Lyons, 8D1 J0'Brien. RES BHardin, RES LShao, RES OFC: LA:PDST:ADAR PM:Pb:ADAR S.
SI:ADAR NAME: PSheaap)
CPoslusny:sg J
son A 9p 03/t/93 g///93 i
DATE: 02/
/
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0FFICIAL RECORD COPY: BUTCHSUM i
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GE Nuclear Energy Docket No.52-001 cc: Mr. Patrick W. Marriott, Manager Mr. Joseph Quirk Licensing & Consulting Services GE Nuclear Energy GE Nuclear Energy General Electric Company 175 Curtner Avenue 175 Curtner Avenue, Mail Code 782 San Jose, California 95125 San Jose, California 95125 Mr. Robert Mitchell General Electric Company 175 Curtner Avenue San Jose, California 95125 Mr. L. Gifford, Program Manager Regulatory Programs GE Nuclear Energy 12300 Twinbrook Parkway Suite 315 Rockville, Maryland 20852 l
Director, Criteria & Standards Division Office of Radiation Programs U. S. Environmental Protection Agency 401 M Street, S.W.
i Washington, D.C.
20460 Mr. Sterling Franks
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U. S. Department of Energy NE-42 Washington, D.C.
20585 Mr. Steve Goldberg Budget Examiner 725 17th Street, N.W.
Room 8002 Washington, D.C.
20503 Mr. Frank A. Ross U.S. Department of Energy, NE-42 Office of LWR Safety and Technology 19901 Germantown Road Germantown, Maryland 20874 Mr. Raymond Ng 1776 Eye Street, N.W.
Suite 300 Washington, D.C.
20006 Marcus A. Rowden, Esq.
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Suite 800 Washington, D.C.
20004 i
Jay M. Gutierrez, Esq.
Newman & Holtzinger, P.C.
1615 L Street, N.W.
r Suite 1000
)
Washington, D.C.
20036 1
MEETING ATTENDEES i
ABWR OPEN ISSUES MEETING l
i l
OCTOBER 28 AND 29, 1992 NAME AFFILIATION I
Chet Poslusny NRR/ADAR/PDST William Burton NRR/DSSA/SPLB G. W. Ehlert GE Bernie Genetti GE i
Maryann Herzog GE j
Jack Fox GE Jack Duncan GE H. A. Careway GE J. E. Lyons NRC/DSSA/SPLB A. Sallman GE l
W. E. Taft GE l
Gail Miller GE Morris Munson GE i
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23A6100AE Standard Plant arv s
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SECTION 3.4 I
CONTENTS Section Tills Eagg
'i 3.4.1 Flood Protection 3.4 1 3.4.1.1 Flood Protection Measures for Seismie
)
Category I Structures 3.4-1 1
3.4.1.1.1 Flood Protection from External Sources 3.4-1 3.4.1.1.2 Compartment Flooding from Postulated Component Failures 3.4-2 3.4.1.1.2.1 Evaluation of Reactor Building Flood Events 3.4-2.1 3.4.1.1.2.1.1 Evaluation of Floor 100(B3F) 3.4-2.1 3.4.1.1.2.1.2 Evaluation of Floor 200 (B2F) 3.4-3 3.4.1.1.2.13 Evaluation of Floor 300(B1F) 3.4-3 3.4.1.1.2.1.4 Evaluation of Floor 400(1F) 3.4-4 3.4.1.1.2.1.5 Evaluation of Floor 500(2F) 3.4-4 3.4.1.1.2.1.6 Evaluation of Floor 600 (3F) 3.45 3.4.1.1.2.1.7 Evaluation of Floor 700(M4F) 3.4-5 1
3.4.1.1.2.1.8 Evaluation of Floor 800 (4F) 3.4-$
j 3.4.1.1.2.1.9 Flooding Summary Evaluation 3.4-5 3.4.1.1.2.2 Evaluation of Control Building Flooding Events 3.4-6 3.4.1.1.23 Evaluation of Radwaste Building Flooding Events 3.4-6.1 l
3.4.1.1.2.4 Evaluation of Service Building Flooding Events 3.4-6.1 5
3.4.1.2 Permanent Dewatering System 3.4-6.1 3.4.2 Anah1Ical and Test Procedum 3.4-6.1 hriA)(Dt L Ltsge,Gbreathth 3.43 4
3.4-7 3.43.1 Flood Elevation 3.4-7 3. 4 Arnendment 18 a
4 ABWR zwious Standard Plant REV B 3.4 WATER LEVEL (FLOOD) DESIGN 3.4.1.1.1 Flood Protection from External Sources The types and methods used for protecting the j
b ABWR safety-related structures, systems and Seismic Category I structures that may be 5
components from external flooding shall conform affected by design basis floods are designed to &
to the guidelines defined in RG 1.102.
withstand the floods postulated in Table 2.0-1 9
using the hardened protection approach with Criteria for the design basis for protection structural provisions with incorporated in the against external flooding shall conform to the plant design to protect safety-related requirements of RG 1.59. The design criteria for structures, systems, and components from protection against the effects of compartment postulated flooding. Seismic Category I flooding shall conform to the requirements of structures required for safe shutdowu remain ANSI /ANS-56.11. The design basis flood levels accessible during all flood conditions, are specified in Table 3.4-1.
Safety-related systems and components are 3.4.1 Flood Protectiori flood-protected either because of their location j
above the design flood level or because they are This section discusses the flood protection enclosed in reinforced concrete Seismic Category measures that are applicable to the standard ABWR I structures which have the following g
plant Seismic Category I structures, systems, and requirements:
y components for both external flooding and postulated flooding from plant component (1) wall thicknesses below flood level o' not failures. These protection measures also apply less than two feet; I
to other structures that house systems and components important to safety which fall within (2) water stops provided in all construction the scope of plant specific.
joints below flood level; 3.4.1.1 Flood Protection Measures for Seismic (3) watertight doors and equipment batches Category I Structures installed below design flood level; and The safety-related systems and components of (4) waterproof coating of external surfaces.
l5 g
the ABWR Standard Plant are located in the y
reactor, control, and radwaste buildings which (5) roofs are designed to prevent pooling of are seismic category I structures. These large amounts of water in accordance with RG
{
structures together with those identified in 1.102.
Table 3.4-1 ate protected against external flood damage. Flood protection of safety-related Waterproofing of foundations and walls of systems and components is provided for all Seismic Category I structures below grade is accomplished principally by the use of water 7 l postulated design flood levels and conditions d described in Table 2.0-1. Postulated flooding stops at expansion and construction joints. In C from component failures in the building compart-addition to water stops, waterproofing of the ments does not adversely affect plant safety nor plant structures that house safety related A
does it represent any hazard to the public.
systems and components is provided up to 8 cm (3 in) above the plant ground level to protect the Structures which house the safety-related external surfaces from exposure to water.
g equipment and offer flood protection are 3l identified in Table 3.4-1. Descriptions of these The flood protection measures that are structures are provided in Subsection 3.8.4 and described above also guard against flooding from 3.8.5.
Exterior or access openings and on-site storage tanks that may rupture. The penetrations that are below the design flood largest is the condensate storage tank that has N
level are identified in Table 6.2-9.
a capacity of 2,110 cubic meters. This tank is d
k constructed from stainless steel and is located between the turbine building and the radwaste Amendment 18 34-1
~
ABWR m ooone Standard Plant prv n 3A.1.1.2 Compartment Flooding from Postulated After receiving a flood detection alarm, the Component Failures operator has a ten-minute grace period to act in cases when flooding can be identified and All piping, vessels, and heat exchangers with terminated by a remote action from the control flooding potential in the reactor building are room. In cases involving visual inspection to seismically qualified with one exception, and identify the specific flooding source in the complete failure of a non seismic tank or piping affected area (except ECCS areas) followed by a system is not applicable. The one exception is remote or local operator action, a minimum of 30 the radwaste building which contains no safe minutes is provided for the operator.
shutdown equipment.
- All-leak before-bttek analysis will-use In accordance with Reference 2, leakage cracks plant-specifie-data-such as piping geometry, are postulated in any point of moderate-energy materials, fabrication-procedures, and pipe piping larger than nominal one inch diameter. support locations. See Subsection 3.4.3 for The leakage flow area is assumed to be a circular inter ac Yequirements, -
orifice with flow area equal to one-half of the
- w ~p@
pipe outside diameter multiplied by one-half of in all instances of compartment flooding, a the pipe nominal wall thickness. Resulting single f ailure of an active component is leakage flow rates are approximated using considered for systems required to mitigate Equation 3-2 from Reference I with a flow consequences of a particular flooding coefficient of 0.59 and a normal operating condition. The emergency core cooling system pressure in the pipe.
(ECCS) rooms are also evaluated on the basis of a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) and a single f
The dynamie<ffects-of postulated 4igh-ene+gy active failure or a LOCA combined with a single line breaks in the MStauncel-eree4nehrding passive failure 10 minutes or more after the r
flood analysis are4xcluded in the evaluatien, LOCA.
assuming credit for detection of leaks-before-a-line b2eakowith a goodacewacy-an44eliability There are no interface requirements made upon to permit shutdown-and4epak. The MSL tunnel the remainder of the plant from possible area is instrumented with radiation and air flooding in the ABWR Standard Plant buildings.
3 temperature monitors that are used to Other lines, such as storm drains and normal automatically isolate the MSL isolation valves waste lines, interface with plant yard piping.
j}5 upon detection of high abnormal limits.
However, provisions are made in these lines that, should the yard piping become plugged.
However, in the event of worst case flooding crushed, or otherwise inoperable, they will vent involving a feedwater line break, the maximum onto the ground relieving any flooded condition.
flow rate from this high energy line break will not exceed 3.6 cubic meters per minute (950 gpm)
Considering the above criteria and assump-over a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> period. Refer to Table 15.6-16 for tions, analyses of piping failures and their feedwater line leakage parameters. Water consequences are performed to demonstrate the discharged from a postulated feedwater line break adequacy of the ABWR design. These analyses will be contained in the Seismic Category I are provided separately for the reactor and structure of the MSL tunnel area and will not control buildings.
.,,,,g flood any safety related equipment in the reactor
%a' building. The flooded area will be allowed to Analysis of the worst flooding due to pipe drain throughT he floor drains in the tunnel area and tank failures and their consequences are i
wEch are routed to the HCW sumps in the reactor peformed in this subsection for the reactor
%,-w' building for collection and discharge.
building, control building, radwaste building i
and the service building. No credit is taken
' No credit is taken for operation of the drain for safety-related equipment within these sump pumps although they are expected to operate structures if the equipment becomes partially during some of the postulated flooding events.
flooded. However, in accordance with Section Amendmem 18 34-2
4 ABWR 2mtme -
Standard Plant prv s 3.11, all safety-related equipment is qualified to high relative humidity.
i For those structures outside the scope of the ABWR Standard Plant (e.g., the ultimate heat sink
.l pump house); the applicant referencing the ABWR
{
design will demonstrate the structures outside the scope will meet the requirements of GDC 2 and the f
guidance of RG 1.102. See Subsection 3.4.3 for m
3.4.1.1.2.1 Evaluation of Reactor Building Rood Events 6
Analysis of potential flooding within the reactor building is considered on a floor by-t floor basis. The potential consequences of the high energy breaks in the reactor building are l
't evaluated in Subsection 6.2.3.3.1.
l 3.4.1.1.2.1.1 Evaluation of Moor 100 (B3F)
'f 1
Worst case flooding on this floor level would
}
result from leakage of the RHR 18" suction line between the containment wall and the system iso-lation. valve (this applies also to the HPCF, RCIC, and SPCU suction lines, although in
[
smaller line sizes). Leakage from this source may cause flooding of the affected RHR heat
[
. \\ j, exchanger (HX) toom at a rate of 1.04 cubic l
. ig "
meter / minute (275 gpm) and may continue until the line is repaired or equalization of water level occurs between this room with the suppression p'
pool level. Flooding in the room may cause loss l
_o.fJnctions for that particular divisional i
system,Q This will not impair the safe j
shutdown capability of the reactor system.
Flooding of other areas is prevented by water j
tight doors. Suction lines to other services always remain submerged. Other flooding inci-dents may result from failures of other piping
[
systems penetrating the RHR HX rooms for each division; these events, however, upon detection by sump pump alarms, are controllable by l
terminating flow with closure of valves and shutdown of pressure sources.
l l
I l
Amendment 18 342.1 I
ABWR msat Standard Plant nrv s (1) Where extensive flooding may occur in a blowdown will cause most of the steam to vent division rated compartment, propagation to out of the tunnel into the turbine building.
other divisions is prevented by watertight Water or steam cannot enter the control doors or scaled hatches. Flooding in one building.g See Section 3.6.1.3.2.3 for a division is limited to that division and description of the subcompartment pressurization
[ )
flood water cannot propagate to other analysis performed for the steam tunnel.
- A divisions.
Moderate energy water services in the control % i L.m (2) Leakage of water from large circulating building comprise 28-inch service water lines, L.i d,,,
water lines, such as reactor building 18-inch cooling water lines,6-inch cooling cooling water lines may flood rooms and water lines to the chiller condenser,6. inch (o,,,
3
- ***=
corridors, but through sump alarms and fire protection lines, and 6-inch chilled water leakage detection systems the control room heater lines. Smaller lines supply drinking W e o.
is alerted and can control flooding by water, sanitary water and makeup for the chilled 7-....i.
system isolation. Divisional areas are water system. Areas with water pipe routed protected by watertight doors, or where only through are supplied with floor drains and curbs limited water depth can occur, by raised to route leakage to the basement floor so that sills with pedestal mounted equipment within control or computer equipment is not subjected the protected rooms.
to water. In those areas where water infusion cannot be tolerated, the access sills are (3) Limited flooding that may occur from manual raised.
firefighting or from lines and tanks having limited inventory is restrained from Maximum flooding may occur from leakage in a entering division areas by raised sills and 28-inch service water line at a maximum rate of elevation differences.
12.0 cubic meters / minute (3150 gpm). Early detection by alarm to control room personnel Therefore, within the reactor building, will limit the extent of flooding which will h'h internal flooding events as postulated will not also be mitigated by drainage to exterior of the A buildingQ hTeTpYc'ted' releasiol a service' k 3
prevent the safe shutdown of the reactor.
water leak is limited to line volume plus P" s
3A.1.1.2.2 Evaluation of Control Building operator response time times leakage rate. The 4-t-assumed operator response time is 30 minutes to h~' m-Flooding Esents close isolation valves and turn off the pump in %
The control building is a seven story the affected service water division. Water will building. It houses in separate areas, the be contained inside a division of closed cooling control room proper, control and instrument water equipment rooms in the bottom level of the m
cabinets with power supplies, closed cooling control building.{A maxinhim of 2.15 meters of Q
water pumps and heat exchangers, mechanical water in a divisional room is expected. Water equipment (HVAC and chillers) necessary for tight doors will confine the water to a building occupation and environmental control for division.
computer and control equipment, and the steam tunnel.
The failure of a cooling water line in the mechanical rooms of the turbine building may l
The only high energy lines in the control result in a leak of 0.6 cubic meter / minute (160 building are the mainsteam lines and feedwater Epm). Early detection by control room personnel lines which pass through the steam tunnel will limit the extent of flooding. Total i
connecting the reactor building to the turbine release from the chilled water system will be building. There are no openings into the control limited to line inventory and surge tank volume, building from the steam tunnel. The tunnel is spillage of more than 6 cubic meters (1500 scaled at the reactor building end and open at gallons) is unlikely. Elevation differences and the turbine building end. It consists of separation of the mechanical functions from the reinforced concrete with Ameter thick walls. remainder of the control building prevent Any break in a mainsteam or a feedwater line will, propagation of the water to the control area.
flood the steam tunnel with steam. The rate of
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Amcodment 20 "d L iu.
344
ABWR 23xsimse Standard Plant arv s Flooding events that may result from the meters to reach the tunnel and spread failure of the fire fighting systems within the radioactive liquid waste to other buildings that control building do not inhibit plant safety. house safety -related systems.
There are no sprinkler systems in the control building. Hose and standpipes are located in the Therefore,it can be concluded from the above corridors. Service equipment rooms may build up analysis that there is no uncontrolled leakage limited water levels from either service water, path of radioactive liquid from the Radwaste cooling water, or chilled water leaks, but Building under the conditions of worst case elevation differences and raised sills prevent internal flooding.
intrusion of water into control areas. Control room responses to those various levels of 3.4.1.1.2.4 Evaluation orService Bullding flooding may extend from system isolation and Flooding Esents correction to reduction of plant load or shutdown, but control room capability is not The Service Building is a non seismic compromised by any of the postulated flooding concrete structure consisting of four floors, events.
two above and two below grade. It serves as the main security entrance to the plant and provides 3.4.1.1.23 Evaluation or Radwaste Building the controlled access tunnels to the Control Flooding Esent Building, the Turbine Building, and the Reactor Building. This building does not house any The Radwaste Building is a reinforced safety-related equipment, concrete structure designed as Seismic Category 1, consisting of a substructure 13.8 meters below The connecting access tunnels to other grade and a super structure 16 meters above buildings are below plant grade as indicated in grade. This building does not contain Table 3.4-1. These passage ways are water tight sa.1y-related equipment and is not contiguous to prevent seepage into the tunnels. Also, the with other plant structures except through a pipe controlled access chambers employ curbs and tunnel. In case of a flood, the building closed doors at both ends of the tunnel that substructure serves as a large sump which can guard against water leakaSe into structures that collect and hold any leakage within the house safety-related equipment.
building. Also, the medium and large radwaste tanks are housed in scaled compartments which are The only plant piping that run through this designed to contain any spillage or leakage from building are those needed for fire protection, tanks that may rupture. The piping that trans, water services, HVAC heaters and chillers, and fers the liquid waste from the other buildings for draining the sumps. This building has floor traverses through a scaled water-tight tunnel to drains and two sump pumps (HCW & HSD) for the Radwaste Building at an elevation of -3,500 collecting and transferring the liquid waste.
mm, which is 3 meters above the Radwaste Building Under worst-case conditions, flooding from line basement slab. This tunnel connects to the ruptures is unlikely and can be contained from Turbine and Reactor Buildings at the same spreading to the structures that house safety-elevation.
related equipment.
,cy.
q The structural design of this building is such 3.4.1.2 Permanent Dewatering System that no internal flooding is expected or will occur under the worst case conditions from those There is no permanent dewatering system tanks that are isolated by the Seismic Category 1 provided for in the flood design.
compartments.
3A.2 Analytical and Test Procedures Flooding from other sources within the building such as internal radwaste and non-radwaste Since the design flood elevation is one foot piping, plant drains, small tanks, and pumps is below the finished plant grade, there is no not expected to cause the water level to risc mor-than 1 meter above the flood depth of 3 Amendment 18 3441
ABWR netwas Standard Plant REV B dynamic force due to flood. The lateral 3.4.4 References hydrostatic pressure on the structures due to the design flood water level, as well as ground water 1.
Crane Co., flow of Flulas Through Valves, and soil pressures, are calculated.
Tittings, and Pipe, Technical Paper No.
410, 1973.
Structures, systems, and components in the ABWR Standard Nuclear Island designed and 2.
ANSI /ANS 56.11, Standard, Design Criteria analyzed for the maximum hydrostatic and for Protection Against the Effects of hydrodynamic forces in accordance with the loads Companment Flooding in Light Water Reactor and load combinations indicated in Subsection Plcnts.
l 3.8.4.3 and 3.8.5.3 using well established l
methods based on the general principles of 3.
Regulatory Guide 1.59, Rev. 2 Design Basis engineering mechanics. All Seismic Category I Floods for Nuclear Power Plants.
I structures are in stable condition due to either i
i moment or uplift forces which result from the proper load combinations including the design basis flood.
3..t.3 6M[JL l. Ice 515 e fa d'Mthe 1 3.43.1 Flood Elevation Tbc design basis flood elevation for the ABWR Standard Plant structures is one foot below grade.
3.43.2 Ground Water Elevation The design basis ground water elevation for the ABWR Standard Plant structures is two feet below grade.
3.433 Leak.Before. Break Analysis
\\
\\
i Leak.before-break analysis will be submitted i
to the NRC using plant-specific data such as l
piping geometry, materials, fabrication procedures, and support locations. Any piping N
qualifying for the leak.before. break approach j
h will meet the requirements of Subsection 3.6.3.
1 (See Subsection 3.4.1.1.2.)
[
^ *$
3.43Af'lood Protection Requirements for Other Structures cot The applicant referencing the ABWR design will de,monstrate, for the structures outside the scope of the ABWR Standard Plant, that they meet the requirements of GDC 2 and the guidance of RG 1.102. (See Subsection 3.4.1.1.2)
A:r.endment 18 3 /+-7
r
.I ABWR 2mme l
Standard Plant REV B
~
Table 3.4-1 l
STRUCTURES, PENETRATIONS, AND ACCESS OPENINGS DESIGNED FOR FLOOD PROTECTION Reactor Service Control Radwaste Turbine Structure Buildine Buildina Buildine Buildine Buildine l
Desig;n Flood level (mm) 11,700 11,700 11,700 11,700 11,700 Reference Plant Grade (mm) 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 Base Slab (mm)
-8,200
-2150 &
-8,200
-1,500 5,300 l
3500 l
Actual Plant Grade (mm) 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 l
Building Height (mm) 49,700 16,700 19,700 23,000 49,350 I
Penetrations Below Design Refer to None Refer to None None Flood Level Table 6.2-9 Table 6.2-9 g
for RCW lines g
Access Openings Below Tunnel from S/B _ Main Entrance Tunnel from S/B Pipe Tunnel Tunnel from S/B i
Design Floodlevel
@ 3.500mm DISL @ grade level
@ 7.900 mm.HX from R/B&T/B @ 7.900mm
[
Area' Access
@ t.450mm i
from S/B @
Note 3 12,0Somm i
Notes:
1 1.
Water tight doors (bulkhead type) are provided at all reactor and control building access ways that are below grade.
+
2.
Water tight penetrations will be provided for all reactor and control building penetrations that l
are below grade.
j I
3.
The lines that run through the radwaste building tunnel are not exposed to outside ground flooding.
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.itd ru4 G sis bs\\ow d vs.
(gg gg g g 14,, g g,y dros4cdi c hm\\ to A,,,
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Amendment 20 3M i
I
L T
insert a Pipe penetrations below design basis flood level will be sealed against the resulting hydrostatic head from a moderate energy pipe failure inside the tunnel, or in a connecting building.
l insert b Four Channels (3 out of 4 logic) sensors are provided at two different levels in each division of control building basement to warn operators from service water pipe failures inside the control building. The first level alarm is 150mm above the basemat to provide to warn operators of flooding in a division. The second level alarm at 800mm is used as a backup for operator action.
Its height was selected to allow the operators 30 minutes to take action.
Failure of the operators to take action, the second level alarm would signal the failed service water division to stop the pumps and close isolation valves. Only the service water system has enough inventory to reach the second level alarm.
insert c 3.4.1.1.2.5 Evaluation of Turbine Building Flooding Events I
Circulating Water system and Turbine building service water system are the i
only systems large enough to fill the condenser pit; therefore, only these two systems can flood into adjacent buildings, i
A failure in either of these systems will result in the total flooding of the turbine building upto grade. Water is prevented from crossing to other building by two means. The first is a normally closed alarmed door in the connecting passages between the turbine building and service building.
The second is that the radwaste tunnel will be sealed at both ends to prevent water from either entering the tunnel or leaving the tunnel. A large hydrostatic head is prevented by a large nonwatertight truck door at grade to provide a release point for any water.
Because of the large size of the circulating water system. A leak will fill the condenser pit quickly. Monitors were added in the condenser pit of the turbine building to provide leak detection and an automatic means to shutdown i
the circ water system in the event flooding event in the turbine building (See Chapter 10.4.5.5).
)
l l
ABWR 2aama Standard Plant an,. s n
9.1.6 COL License Information 9.1.7 References 9.1.6.1 New Fuel Stor3ge Racks Criticality Analysis L
General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuct, (NEDE.24011-P-A, latest l
The COL applicant referencing the ABWR approved revkion),
design shall provide the NRC confirmatory criticality analysis as required by Subsection 9.LI.LL 9.1.6.2 Dynamic and Impact Analyses of New Fuel Storage Racks The COL applicant referencing the ABWR design shall provide the NRC conGrmatory dynamic and impact analyses of the new fuel storage racks.
See Subsection 9.LLL6.
9.1.63 Spent Fuel Stnrage Racks Criticality Analysis l
The COL applicant referencing the ABWR design shall provide the NRC confumatory critically analysis as required by Subsection 9.L23.L 9.1.6.4 Spent Fuel Racks Ioad Drop Analysis The COL applicant referencing the ABWR design shall provide the NRC confirmatory load drop analysis as required by Subsection 9.L43.
9.1.6.6 Overhead Load HandIIng System Information The COL applicant shall provide the NRC for confirmatory review: (1) heavy load handling system and equipment maintenance procedures,(2) heavy load handling system and equipment maintenance procedures and/or manuals, (3) heasy load handling system and equipment inspection and test plans; NDE, Visual, etc., (4) heavy load handling safe load paths and routing plans, (5) OA program to monitor and assure implementation and compliance of heavy load handling operations and controls, (6) operator b, ".
- M0
^ti' qualifications, training and control program.g w,, 3 u..
. g-9.1.6.5 New Fuel Inspection Stand Seismic k d hcMhn(,
c c.t. & 1 )
6.,
c c,,,,, g 4 i/
Capability
- cA in 3
M vsti 4 tw. s. t, =a The COL applicant referencing the ABWR design will install the new fuel inspection stand fumly to the wall so that it does not fall into or dump personnel into the spent fuel pool during an SSE.
(See Subsection 9.L4.23.2.)
9 1-13 Amendment 21
+
1 o
23A6100AE Standard Plant REV B 4
TABLE 3.21 CLASSIFICATION
SUMMARY
(Continued)
Quality Group Quality Safety Loca-Class'.
Assurance Seismic Prineinal Com ponenta Classb IlanC Destiond Reautremente Catecorvf E21t1 U1 Foundation Work 3
C,SC,RZ -
B I
U2 Turbine Pedestal N
T E
U3 Cranes and Holsts L Reactor Building crane.a.
.,N SC E
(x)
- 2. Refueling Bridge _ crane N
SC E
Ex)
---3.--Fuel handling jib crane-
- N - - SC -
-E-
(r}-
T
=
E I
l'4. Upper Drywe!!Senicing N
C e i Lower DrywellSenicing N
C E
I 5 6. Main Steam Tunnel Senicing N
M E
c 7. Spedal Senice Rooms N
SC.RZ, E
T,W,X U4 Elevator 3/N SC,RZ
.B/E I/E i
US IIcating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning
- L Safety.related equipment" a.
Fan-coil cooling units 3
SC,X B
I b.
Heating units - electrical 3
SC,RZ,X -
B I
or water c.
Blowers-Air supply or 3
SC,RZ,X -
B I
d.
Ductwork 3
SC,RZ,X -
B I
c.
Filters - Equipment areas 3
SC,RZ,X -
B I
l f.
HEPA Filters, Charcoal 3
SC,X B
I Absorbers - Control Rooms l
and Secondary Containment Imludes Reactor Building ConvolBuilding and Senice Building thennat and radiological environmental controlfunctions within the ABHR Standard PlanL Controls environment in Main and Local convo! rooms, diesel-generator rooms, banery rooms, ECCS,
RCIC, pump rooms withi:s the ABWR Standard PlanL Amendment 23 3 2-2B