ML20033G379
| ML20033G379 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 03/26/1990 |
| From: | Randy Erickson Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Ronald Bellamy NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20033G380 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9004090234 | |
| Download: ML20033G379 (1) | |
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UNITED STATES.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 4g yg W ASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
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March 26, 1990 MEMORANDUM FOR: Ronald R. Be11 airy, Chief Facilities Radiological Safety and Safeguards Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Saieguards Region 1 FROM:
Robert A. Erickson, Chief Energency Preparedness Branch Division of Radiation Protection and Emergency Preparedness Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation SUBJEC1:
FEMA EXERCISE REPORT FOR THE OYSTER CREEK GENERAT1HG STA110N Enclosed is a letter from Dennis Kwiatkowski of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) dated March 16, 1990, transmitting the FEMA Region 11 report for the June 7,1989 exercise at the Oyster Creek Generating Station. The State of New Jersey, Ocean County and seventeen municipalities participated. A copy of the medical drill conducted on June 8,1989, is also included in the package.
There were no deficiencies identified during the exercise or the medical drill.
We recommend that you transiait the enclosed FEMA letter and exercise report to the licensee.
Ro!ertA.Erickson, Chief Energency Preparedness Branch Division of Radiatton Protection and Emergency Preparedness.
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosure:
FEMA ltr. dtd. 3/16/90 w/ enclosure
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- J Mr. Frank J. Congel Director, Division of Radiation Protection and Emergency Preparedness Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
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Dear Mr. Congel:
Enclosed is a copy of the Post Exercise Assessment (PEA) of the June 7, 1989, Joint exercise of the offsite radiological emergency response plans for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station. The State of New Jersey, Ocean County and seventeen municipalities participated in the exercise.
A medical drill was conducted out of sequence on June _8,1989. ' The results of the drill are included in the PEA.
The report, dated December 11, 1989, was revised on February 9,1990.
It was prepared by the staff of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region II.- It was transmitted to FEMA Headquarters on February 27, 1990.
There were no offsite deficiencies identified during the Oyster ' Creek Nuclear Generating Station exercise or the medical drill.
Thus FEMA considers offsite emergency preparedness adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken offsite to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the site in the event of a radiological emergency.
If you have any questions, please contact'me at 646-2871.
Sincerely, t
"Denbis H. Kwiatkowski Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Programs Enclosure
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t POSTEXERCISE ASSESSMENT June 7-8,1989, Exercise of the Radiological Emergency Response Plans of the State of New Jersey, Ocean County and Seventeen Municipalities for the OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION December 11,1989 (Revised February 9,1990)
Federal Emergency Management Agency Region 11 26 Federal Plaza, New York. N.Y.10278 Yb
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.j POST EXERCISE i
ASSESSMENT I
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June 7-8,1989.
Exercise of the Radiologleal Emergency Response Plans of the State of New Jersey, Ocean County, and Seventeen Munfelpalltles for i
GPU Nuclear Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
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i December 11,1989 (Revised February 9, 1990)
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i Federal Emergency Management Agency Region II 1
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26 Federal Plaza j
New York, N.Y.10278 i
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c CONTENTS P ARTICIP ATIO N OF GOVE RN M ENTS........................................
Y ABB R EVIATI O NS.........................................................
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SUMMARY
lx 1 I NT R O D U C TI O N........................................................
1 1.1 Exercise Bac kground.................................................
1 1.2 Federal Evaluat ors..................................................
2 1.3 Evaluation C riteria..................................................
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- 1. 4 Ex e rc ise Obj ec tives.................................................
4 1.4.1 New Jersey State Emergency Operations Center...................
5 1.4.2 New Jersey State Field Activities...............................
6 1.4.3 State BNE FC P and Field Monitoring Teams......................
6 1.4.4 Emergency Operations Facility..................................
7 1.4.5 E m erge nc y Ne ws C e nt e r.......................................
8 1.4.6 Ocean County Emergency Operations Center......................
8 1.4.7 Ocean County Field Activities..................................
9 1.4.8 Ocean County Municipalities....................................
9 1.4.9 Ocean County Medical Drill....................................
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- 1. 5 Exercise Scenario...................................................
10 1.5.1 Sce nario Overvie w............................................
10 1.5.2 Description of State and County Demonstrations..................
11 2 E X E R C ISE EVALU ATIO N................................................
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2.1 N e w Je rse y S t a t e...................................................
15 2.1.1 New Jersey State Emergency Operations Center...................
15' 2.1.2 State Field Activities.......................................... 19 2.2 BNE Forward Command Post and Field Monitoring Teams................. 21 2.3 Emergency Operations Facility........................................ 27
- 2. 4 Em ergency Ne w s C ent er............................................. 29
- 2. 5 Oc e a n C oun t y...................................................... 31 2.5.1 Ocean County Emergency Operations Center...................... 31 2.5.2 Field Monitoring Te a ms........................................ 37 2.5.3 Field A c tivities............................................... 40 2.5.4 Emergency Worker Radiological Exposure Control................. 45~
2.5.5 Ocean County Municipal Response Activities...................... 46
- 2. 8 M e dic al Drill....................................................... 52 2.6.1 A m bulanc e Portion............................................ 53 2.6.2 Hospi t al Portion.............................................. 53 3
SUMMARY
OF AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION.................. 55 4 REMOVAL OF COMPLETED ARCAs FROM PREVIOUS PEA.................. 72 111 i
TABLES 1.5.3 Emergency Classification and Event Time Line Jane 7,1989 OG NO S Ex e rc ise.................................................... 13 1.5.4 Protective Action Timeline, June 7,1989 OCNGS Exercise................
14 3.1 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generation Station - Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action, June 7-8,1989 - State of 56 N e w J e rse y.........................................................
3.2 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generation Station - Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action, June 7-8,1989 - Bureau of Nucle ar Engineering.................................................
57 3.3 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generation Station - Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action, June 7-8, 1989 - Emergency Operations Fac ility.................................................. 60 3.4 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generation Station - Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action, June 7-8, 1989 - Emergency N e w s C e n t er....................................................... 61 3.5 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generation Station - Summary of Areas-Requiring Corrective Action, June 7-8, 1989 - Ocean County.............. 62 3.6 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generation Station - Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action, June 7-8,1989 - Ocean C o un ty M un ic i pals................................................... 68 l
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PARTICIPATION OF GOVERNMENTS Participating Governments The State of New Jersey Ocean County.
Barnegat Township Barnegat Light Borough Beachwood Borough Berkeley Township Dover Township Harvey Cedars Borough Island Heights Borough Lacey Borough Long Beach Township Ocean Township Ocean Gate Borough Pine Beach Borough Seaside Park Borough Ship Bottom Borough South Toms River Borough Stafford Township Surf City Borough Nonparticipating Governments None 1
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i ABBREVIATIONS 4
ANL Argonne National Laboratory j
BERC N.J. Department of Environmental Protection, Bureau of Emergency
.j Coordination j
i BNE N.J. Department of Environmental Protection, Bureau of Nuclear Engineering BNE FCP Bureau of Nuclear Engineering Forward Command Post BNL Brookhaven National Laboratory
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DOA N.J. Department of Agriculture DEP N.J. Department of Environmental Protection k
l DOE U.S. Department of Energy DOC U.S. Department of Commerce l
DOR N.J. Department of Health
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DOI U.S. Department of Interior
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DOT U.S. Department of Transportation DRD Direct Reading Dosimeters EBS Emergency Broadcast System j
i ECL Emergency Classification Levels I
EIS Emergency Information System EMC Emergency Management Coordinator EMRAD N.J. Emergency Management Radio I
EMS Emergency Medical System l
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ENC Emergency News Center EOC Emergency Operations Center j
EOF Emergency Operations Facility Vk f
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EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency -
'EPAs-Emergency Planning Areas
.j EPZ Emergency Planning Zone j
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FCP Forward Command Post-1 FDA' U.S. Food and Drug Administration FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency I
GPU General Pubile Utilities -
l HHS U.S.' Department of Heal' h and Human Services t
INEL Idaho National Engineering Laboratory K!
Potassium lodide
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MD Ocean County Medical Delli i
NAWAS National Warning System NJSP-New Jersey Division of State Police NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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NUE Notification of Unusual Event
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OCEOC Ocean County Emergency Operation Center OCFA Ocean County Field Activities
'l OCM Ocean County Municipalities OCNGS Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station OCSCD Ocean County Sheriff's Communication Division NJSP Office of Emergency Management OEM PAG Protective Action Guide PIO Public Information Officer RAC Regional Assistance Committee i
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o RACES Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service RBCCW Reactor Building Closed Coc!!ng Water RCS Reactor Coolant System RERP Radiological Emergency Response Plan SEOC New Jersey State Emergency Operating Center SFA New Jersey State Field Activities SOP Standard Operating Procedure TLD Thermoluminescent Dosimeter USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture w
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SUMMARY
On June 7-8, 1989, a team of twenty-five (25) Federal evaluators evaluated an exercise of the radiological emergency response plans and the level of State, County and ~
municipal preparedness for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS). The i
l-exercise held on June 7 was an announced plume exposure pathway exercise taking place-from approximately 1430 to 2400 hours0.0278 days <br />0.667 hours <br />0.00397 weeks <br />9.132e-4 months <br />. Following the exercise, an evaluation was made by the Federal evaluator team, and a preliminary briefing for exercise participants was i
held at the Morring Motel Conference Room on Friday June 9,1989 at 0900.. A media-briefing was held on June 14, 1989 at the Ocean County EOC located at the Miller Air _
Park. Subsequent to those preliminary belefings, detailed evaluations were prepared and are included In'this report.
During a full-participation exercise, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) requires that most components of the State and local emergency response-organizations participate. Federal evaluators evaluated the following operations:
State Emergency Operations Center Off-Site Emergency Operations Facility Emergency News Center Bureau of Nuclear Engineering - Forward Comr. sand Post Ocean County EOC l
Evacuation of the Gencial Population l-t Radiological Field Monit<. ring
- Traffic & Access Control Points General Population Monitoring and Decontamination Emergency Worker Decontamination Reception Center and Congregate Care Center Medical Dell!
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1 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 EXERCISE BACEGROUND On. December 7,
1979, the President directed the Federal Emergency -
management Agency (FEMA) to assume lead responsibility for all off-site nuclear planning and response. FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for
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fixed nuclear facilities include the following:
i Taking the lead in off-site emergency planning and in the review o
and evaluation of radiological emergency response plans (RERPs) developed by state and local governments.
Determining whether such plans can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans conducted by State and local governments, and Coordinating the activities of Federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning processi-
- U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC)
- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory commission (NRC)
- U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
- U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
- U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
- U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)
- U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)-
- U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
- U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI)
Representatives of these agencies serve as members of the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.
Annex B to the State of New Jersey Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) for Nuclear Power Plants is the RERP for the OCNGS. It includes detailed state, county and municipal plans pertaining to that site. This plan was evaluated, reviewed
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and revised.
The following exercises have been conducted by FEMA Region 11 to assess the capabilities of State and local emergency preparedness organizations in implementing i
their RERPs and procedures-to protect the public in a radiological emergency involving 1
the nuclear power plant.
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- t Issuance of-l Final Exercise-Exercise Post-Exercise l
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,Date Assessment l-t
.06/01/82-1.
-03/16/s2.
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05/24/83-09/16/83 3.
06/05/85 08/22/85 4.
05/12/87 12/10/87-l 2-12/10/87
,l Remedial Drill '.06/10/87 3
l Remedial Drill
- 07/22/87,
12/10/87 4
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06/07/89 12/11/89
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ITwo Remedial Drills were. conducted to s
retest emergency response capabilities and
- i correct issues evaluated at the May 12, 1987 exercise.
2Pinelands Congregate Care' Center 3 South Toms' River EOC 4 Medical drill held on 6/8/89 h
The fifth exercise, the subject of this report, was an announced exercise for the'-
plume exposure emergency planning zone (EPZ) activities.
An evaluation - team comprised of personnel from FEMA Region II, RAC, and FEMA's contractors, evaluated -
the June 7,1989 exercise. Twenty-five (23) evaluato'es were assigned to evaluate the-emergency response activities of State and local jurisdictions. Team leaders coordinated j
team operations.
The findings presented in this report are based on the evaluations of the Federal evaluators, with final determinations by the FEMA Reglen !!- RAC Chairman. FEMA -
roquests that State and local jurisdictions submit a schedule of = remedial actions for correcting the areas requiring corrective action (ARCAs) discussed in this report. The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director of State, and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C., that all. areas requiring corrective action. Identified during the exercise 1 will be corrected and that;such.
corrections are being incorporated into State and local plans, as appropriate.
1.2 FEDERAL EVALUATORS Twenty-five (25) Federal evaluators evaluated off-site emergency response functions. These Individuals, their affiliations, and their exercise assignments are given belows i
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g Evaluators Entity Exercise Location [ Function (s)].
P. Weberg FEMA RAC Chairman R. Acerno FEMA Exercise Oversight T. Baldwin ANL New Jersey State EOC (Team Leader)
J. O'Sullivan FEMA New Jersey State EOC (Communications).
S. Nelson ANL New Jersey State EOC (Operations) t C. Gordon NRC Emergency Operations Facility J. Sutch ANL Emergency News Center L. Testa
. FEMA EBS Gateway Station D. Schweller ANL BNE Forward Command Post C. Herzenberg ANL State Field Monitoring Team P. Kier ANL Ocean County EOC (Team Leader)
S. James FEMA Ocean County EOC (Communications)
R. Walsh FEMA Ocean County EOC (Operations)
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M. Marley FEMA Siren Activation;-Medical Drill B. Salmonson
'INEL Ocean County Field. Monitoring Team W. Serrano INEL Ocean County Field Monitoring Team M. Simonin ANL Ocean County; General Population Bus Evacuation l
B. Galloway ARC Pinelands Congregate Care Center M. Pensak EPA Pinelands Monitoring and Decontamination; Emergency Worker Decontamination M. Farrell FEMA Traffic / Access Control H. Fish DOE Dover Twp. EOC; Island Heights EOC; Seaside Park EOC.
N. Furth ANL Ocean Gate Boro. EOC; Pine Beach Boro. EOC; Beachwood Boro. EOC Ll
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A. Davis FEMA Stafford Twp. EOC Barnegat Twp. EOC j
i J. Moore ANL Ocean Twp. EOC; Lacey Twp. EOC A. Teotia ANL Long Beach EOC; Ship Bottom EOC J. Staroba ANL Surf City Boro. EOC; Harvey Cedars EOC; Barnet it Light Boro. EOC 1.3 EVALUATION CRITERIA The exercise evaluations presented in Section 2 are based on applicable planning.
standards and evaluation criteria set forth in NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1 (Nov.
1980) FEMA classifles exercise inadequacies as deficiencies or areas requiring corrective action. Defieleneles are demonstrated and observed inadequacies that would cause a finding that off-site emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken to protect the' health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power facility in event of a radiological emergency. Because of the potential impact of deficiencies on emergency preparedness,- they are required to be promptly corrected through appropriate remedial actions including remedial exercises, dellis, or other actions. Areas Requiring Corrective Actions are demonstrated and observed inadequacies of State and local government performance, and although their correction is required during the next scheduled biennial exercise, they are not considered, by themselves, to adversely impact public health and i
safety.
In addition to these inadequacles, FEMA identifies Areas Recommended for Improvement, which are issues observed during an exercise that are not considered _ to adversely impact public health and safety. While not required, correction of these would j
enhance an organization's level of emergency preparedness..
j 1.4 EXERCISE OBJECTIVES The licensee (General Public Utilities [GPU]), and the State of New Jersey planned a coordinated exercise of their respective emergency plans for both the on-site -
and off-site support agencies. The exercise involved activation and participation of the staff and response facilities of OCNGS as well as emergency organizations and emergency facilities of the State of New Jersey, Ocean County, and. seventeen municipalities.
The exercise was intended to demonstrate many, but not necessarily all, of the OCNGS capabilities to respond to a wide range of emergency conditions. This scenario' was designed to activate the offsite radiological emergency response plans (RERPs) for OCNGS and the GPU corporate plan through their various levels. Although the scenarlo-accurately simulates operating events, it was not intended to assess all of the operator's diagnostic capabilities, but rather to respond to events that resulted in exercising both l
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on-site and off-site emergency procedures.
The exercise demonstrated a number of primary emergency preparedness functions. At no time was the exercise permitted to p
Interfere with the safe operations of OCNGS, and the plant management at its discretion could have suspended the exercise for any period of time necessary to ensure this goal.-
Free play was encouraged and the referees interfered only if operator or player action would have prematurely terminated the exercise or deviated excessively from the drill schedule.
Federal agencies with radiological emergency preparedness responsibility did not actively participate in the play of this exercise. Federal representatives, however, did i
act as exercise evaluators.
1 To provide a conservative exercise in terms of off-site doses and areas affected, exercise meteorology was used.
Actual meteorology might have led to projected i
radiological' doses below established protective action guides (PAGs) within the areas of Interest.
The following objectives were developed for this exercise and have been referenced in the narrative of the exercise evaluation (Section 2) of this report:
1.4.1 New Jersey State Emergency Operating Center (SEOC) i SEOC1 Demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand and use emergency classification levels (ECL) through the appropriate implementation of emergency functions arid activities corresponding to ECL's as required by the scenario.-
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SEOC 2 Demonstrate the ability to fully-alert, mobilize and activate personnel for both facility and field-based emergency functions.
SEOC 3 Demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate and control emergency activities.
I SEOC 4 Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations organizations, and field personnel.
SEOC5 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays and other i
materials to support emergency operations.
SEOC 6 Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.
SEOC 11 Demonstrate the ability to make appropriate protective action decisions, based on projected or actual dosage, EPA PAG's, availability 'of adequate shelter, evacuation time estimates and other relevant factots. -
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i SEOC 12 Demonstrate the ability to initially alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an instructional message within :15 minutes of a deelslon by appropriate State and/or local official (s). -
l SEOC 13
' Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the formulation and dissemination of accurate information and instructions to the public in a timely fashion after the initial alert and notification has occurred.
'1 SEOC 15 Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor. control in' a-coordinated and timely fashione SEOC 16 Demonstrate the ability to make the deelslon to recommend the use of '
KI to emergency. workers and institutionalized persons, based on-C predetermined criteria, as well as to distribute'and administer it =once the decision is made, if necessitated by radiolodine releases.
SEOC 18 Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to Limplement appropriate protective actions for the impact'ed permanent and transient plume EPZ population (including transit-dependent).
1.4.2 New Jersey State Field Activities (SFA)-
SFA 6 Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.
SFA 7 Demonstrate the appropriate equipment and procedures for determining field radiation measurements.
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SFA 18 Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to. Implement appropriate protective actions for the impacted permanent and transient plume EPZ population (including transit-dependent).
I SFA 20 Demonstrate the organizational. ability' and resources necessary to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to evacuated and.
sheltered areas.
1.4.3 State BNE FCP and Field Monitoring Teams BNE1 Demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand and use emergency classification levels (ECL) through the appropriate implementation of-emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECL's as required by the scenarlo.
BNE2 Demonstrate the ability to fully alert,-mobilize and activate personnel for both facility and field-based emergency functions.
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BNE4 Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all locations, organiza-
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tions, and field personnel.
l BNE 5 Demonstrate the ability of facilities,- equipment, displays and other
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materials to support emergency operations.
I BNE 6 Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency
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BNE7 Demonstrate the appropriate equipment and procedures for determining field radiation measurements.
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'l Demonstrate the appropriate equipment and procedures for.th i
BNE 8 measurement of ' airborne radiolodine concentrations as low as 10'y -
microcuries per cc in the presence of noble gases.
BNE 9 Demonstrate the ability to obtain samples of particulate activity in the 3
altborne plume and promptly perform laboratory analyses.
BNE 16 Demonstrate the ability to make the deelslon to recommend the use of.
KI to emergency workers. and Institutionalized persons, based on; predetermined criteria, as well as to distribute and administer it once -
the decision is made, if necessitated by radioactive releases.'
1.4.4 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)-
EOF 1_
Demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand and use emergency classification levels (ECL) through the appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECL's as required by the scenario.
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EOF 4 Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations,.
organizations, and field personnel.
EOF 5 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays and other I
materials to support emergency operations.-
EOF 10 Demonstrate the ability, within the plume exposure pathway, to project dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant and field data.
j EOF 16 Demonstrate the ability to make the decision to recommend the use of j
KI to emergency workers and 4nstitutionalized persons, based on_
predetermined criteria, as well as to distribute and administer it once the decision is made, if necessitated by radiolodine releases.
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1.4.5 Emergency News Center (ENC)
ENC 2 Demonstrate the ability to fully' alert, mobilize and activate personnel for both facility and field-based emergency functions..
l-4 ENC 14 Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in an accurate, coordinated and timely manner.
ENC 34 Demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing on a continuous 24-hour' j
I basis by an actual shift change (Ocean County P!O only).
1.4.8 Ocean County Emergency Operations Center (OCEOC)'.
f OCEOC1 Demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand and use emergency classification levels (ECL) through the appropriate Implementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECI/s as required by the scenario.
OCEOC 2-Demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobillze and activate personnel for both facility and field-based emergency functions.
OCEOC 3 Demonstrate the ability 'to= direct, coordinate and control emergency q
activities.
OCEOC 4 Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations,.
' organizations, and field personnel.
l OCEOC5 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays and other j
- materials to support emergency operations.
.j OCEOC 6 Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.
OCEOC 12 Demonstrate the ability to initially alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an instructional message within 15 minutes of a deelslon by appropriate State and/or local official (s)..
OCEOC 16 Demonstrate the ability to make the decision to recommend the use of KI to emergency workers and institutionalized ' persons, based. on-predetermined criteria, as well as to distribute and administer it once the decision is made, if necessitated by radiolodine releases.
OCEOC 34 Demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing on a continuous 24-hour basis by an actual shift change.
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9 1.4.7 Ocean County Fland Activities (OCFA)
OCFA 6 Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.
OCFA 7 De'monstrate the appropriate equipment and procedures for determining field radiation measurements.
Demonstrate the-appropriate equipment and procedures for th OCFA 8 measurements of airborne radiolodine concentrations as low as 10'{
microcuries per cc in the presence of noble gases.
OCFA 9 Demonstrate the ability to obtain samples of particulate activity in the-airborne plume and promptly perform laboratory analyses.
OCFA 21 Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures, facilities, equipment and personnel for the registration, radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees.
OCFA 22 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment and personnel for -
congregate care of evacuees.
l OCFA 25 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, supplies, procedures and personnel for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment and vehicles and for waste disposal..-
1.4.8 Ocean County Municipalities (OCM)
OCM1 Demonstrate the' ability to monitor, understand and use emergency-y classification levels (ECL) through.the appropriate implementation of '
emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECL's as required by the scenario.
OCM 2 Demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize and activate personnel for both facility and field-based emergency functions.
OCM 3 Demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate and control emergency activities.
OCM 4 Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel.
OCM5 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays and other materials to support emergency operations.
OCM6 Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.
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o OCM 20 Demonstrate the organizational. ability ' and resources necessary to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas.
1.4.9 Ocean County Medical Drill (MD)l MD 23 Demonstrate the adequacy of vehicles, equipment, procedures' and personnel for transporting contaminated, injured or exposed individuals.-
MD 24 Demonstrate the adequacy of medical facilities equipment, procedures and personnel for handling contaminated, injured or exposed individuals..
1.5 EXERCISE SCENARIO 1.5.1 Seenario Overview The initial conditions include the #1 Diesel Generator (DG) out of service for repair to the DG wiring harness.
Maintenance crew is: presently: working on-DG1 (maintenance workers will be prestaged). The DG failed load testing surveillance and '
was declared inoperable. The DG has been out since 1500 hours0.0174 days <br />0.417 hours <br />0.00248 weeks <br />5.7075e-4 months <br /> yesterday when the T.S.
1 clock was started per T.S. 3.7.C.2.
DG #2. was load tested satisfactorily at 1515 hours0.0175 days <br />0.421 hours <br />0.0025 weeks <br />5.764575e-4 months <br />
.i yesterday.
The first major event of the exercise will be initiated by the operator performing the DG operability surveillance for day 2. During the conduct of the surveillance, DG #2 will also be identified as inoperable due to its potential transformer failure. This will result in the declaration of an Unusual Event due to Category M-2, loss.of both DGs during power operations. Normal power reduction to cold shutdown will commence per j
T.S. 3.7.C.3.
The power reduction will be halted prior to reaching approximately 30%
power.
The loss of both Diesel Generators during power operations:
requires the declaration of an " Unusual Event" based on Category M-2.
During the power reduction, a tube leak will develop on the "A" Iso Condenser (IC). This will be indicated by steam issuing from the IC vent, Increasing radiation monitor readings and increasing shell temperature. The isolation attempts will only be partially successful.- Due to the leak from the IC, it is expected that an Alert be j
declared based on " Iso Condenser isolation required and Iso Condenser isolation valves malfunction causing leakage" (Alert H-1-b).
3 Following the Iso Condenser problem, the Control Room staff will be alerted tc a loss of offsite power capability via start up transformers. The start-up transformeza (Banks 5 and 6) are postulated to be knocked out of service due-to. damage from an airliner discharging its waste-tank overhead. The ice block from the airliner strikes the regulators for Bank 5 causing extensive damage, and debris from the block strikes an insulator on Bank 6's side causing a ground fault. A JCP&L crew will be in the area to effect repairs (simulated by Controller), however, the repairs will take 2-6 hours due.to the nature of the damage.
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The loss of offsite power, concurrent with the loss of both DGs, will necessitate the-declaration of a Site Area Emergency: based on " loss of offsite power exceeds 15 minutes and loss of both diesel generator capabilities" (SAE M-1).
Approximately' four hours into. the exercise, one= (SIB) transformer will be returned to service. This will be followed shortly by a~ feedwater line rupture in the Condenser Bay. The rupture is located downstream of the High Pressure Feedwater heaters where the lines become a common header outside the Trunnion Room..The rupture is postulated to be a double-ended shear which is exacerbated by a failure of both-check valves in one header. This will cause the reactor to lose inventory through the feedwater line and effectively prevent level restoration utilizing the feed and condensate _-
systems. This leak can be isolated by shutting the feedwater header Isolation valve (s) in the Drywell. The level drop will initiate a reactor scram followed by a turbine trip.
Core spray main pump NZO1B will not start due to a motor fault. _ Core Spray System I will start, however, when Rx pressure is reduced, main pump NZ01C will trip due;to water from the control rod drive seal leakage shorting out motor. Initially, CRD will provide the only makeup to the Rx vessel. It is anticipated that fire water will be cross--
connected to Core Spray System II, however, level restoration to the feed water sparger j
level can be accomplished without its injection.
The loss of coolant inventory will be of such magnitude that the core will be uncovered prior to complete depressurization.
This should cause the declaration of a General Emergency based on " loss of coolant accident with failure of ECS to perform leading to core melt degradation in i
minutes to hours. Loss of containment may be. imminent" (GE-H-1), or " loss of two out of three fission product barriers with potentialloss of the third"(GE-S-1).
The release of activity will take place through the Turbine Building ventilation to the Turbine Building and main stacks.
l 1.5.2 Description of State and County Demonstrations Traffle Control Points (TCPs)/ Access Control Points (ACPs)
One (1) TCP in Ocean County One (1) ACP in Ocean County The team leader at the New Jersey State EOC was to insert the message to the ~
State Controller to request the activation of the ACP in Ocean County. The Federal evaluator at the Pine Beach Boro EOC was to insert the message to the EMC to request the activation of the TCP in Ocean County.
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Bus Evaustion Routes One (1) general population bus run (Route la A)-
FEMA selected the bus route to be run for the exercise. The team leader at the'-
New Jersey State EOC was to insert the message to the State Controller to request the activation of the general population bus evacuation Route 14A in Ocean County.
Meen Activation The Federal evaluator was to report to the Ocean County Sheriff's Communications Division to observe the transmission of the stren setivation message.
from the Ocean County EOC.
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g3 TABLE 1.5.3 Emergency Classification Tid Event Time Line June 7,1989 OGNGS Exercise
Emergency State EOC Ocean.
Media.-
Classification Utility West Trenton County Center Municipal-Notification Declared Received Received Received ities**
Unusual 1525 1529*
1541 1545 Event Alert 1550 1557*
1603 1605 1620 Facility 1624 1710 1730 Declared Operational Site Area 1743 1749 1755 1750 1810-Emergency General 1951 1957 1C01 2000 2009 Emergency Release 1550 1557 1603 1605 1620 started
- Initial notification received by New Jersey State Police Communication duty officer at the State Warning Point.
- Times averaged for all municipalities.
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. TABLE 1.5A Protective Action Titellne, Jun] 7,1989 OCNGS Ex:rnisa New Jersey State EDC ocean County E0C-Decision-Decis!'on.
Firen EIS Made Received Activation-Activation Event Time EPAs Time EPAs' Time (State EOC)
Siren ActivationI 1800 N/A at site Aree
~ 1801 N/A 1808 "N/A 1815 Emergency ERS Test Messagel-1815-N/A 1822 N/A 1815 1119-1 Announcement Protective Action 2021 1,2,5,6,9,10, 2021 1,2,5,6,9 2029 2024
- 11 Evacuation 14,15 10,14,15 Protective Action-2040 K! to 2044
.:I t o N/A N/A
$21 K1 emergency emergency workers workers Protective Action 2121 '
1,2,5,6,9,10, 2121 1,2,5,6,9,10, N/A2 2129-
- 51 Evacuation
- 14,15,16,18, 14,13,16,18, 19,20 19,20 Protective Action 2215 1,2,5,6,9.
2217 Affected N/A3 2223
- 41 Shelter Fars 10,14,15 EPAs Animals
- Additional EPAs included due to wind shift.
N/A = Not Applicable 1The first tiren activation was not -in a: cord with pre-esercise plans which established that the strens would be activated out of sequer.ca at a predeter ined time. However, when the State :4de the decision that sirens were to be slaulated at the SAE Ect., this information was not relayed ta the Ocean County Sheriff's office (which is responsible for activating the sirens), and the strens were actually sounded..This event was rectified, as soon as the actual sounding be:a:e t
known to the State decision makers (at approximately 1815), who authorized issuance of the necessary E33 test message at 1819.
2$ tate decision makers decided that the sirens would not be sounded for the implementation of this PA1. This was because that decision involved espansion of the evacuation recommendation to EPA 16 which was previously alerted by the sounding of the strens, and EPAs 18,19 and 20 which are water areas in Barnegat Bay that had already been cleared by the New Jersey State Marine Police and the U.S. Coast Guard.
3state dension makers decided that the strens would not be ' sounded for the implementation of this PAR because livestock owners are notified directly by representatives from the State Depart =ent of Agriculture for PARS that affect their animals.
'EPAs - Emergency Planning Areas.
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n 2 EXERCISE EVALUATION l
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2.1 NEW JERSEY trrATE q
2.1.1 New Jersey State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC)
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The SEOC is located on a lower level in the State Police Headquarters building in 4
West Trenton, New Jersey. The SEOC had 12 objectives to demonstrate during this exercise, all of which were met.
SEOC.1. The objective to demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand, and use.
emergency classification levels (ECLs) through the appropriate implementation ' of.
emergency functions and activities was met at the SEOC. The Notification.of Unusual Event (NUE) was received at the State Warning Point in the State Police Communication center at 1529 and promptly relayed to.the Deputy Director, Office of Emergency Management (OEM), who was in the State Police Headquarters building, at 1533. The Deputy Director promptly notified key SEOC responders at both the NUE and the Alert i
ECL. Upon activation of the EOC, at the Alert, all changes of ECL were announced and 1
prominently displayed in the executive, operations, and support rooms throughout the exercise. 'In addition, the current ECL was displayed on monitors used for the on-line '
1 electronic Emergency Information System (EIS). The EIS is used to maintain an ongoing log of events and. action taken to respond to these events. The management and staff
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demonstrated that they were aware of current ECLs.. They were also aware that the RERP for Oyster Creek is organized to provide a graduated response as appropriate to an escalating emergency.
-lj SEOC 2. The objective to demonstrate activation and mobillzation of personnel to the SEOC was met.
SEOC staff were promptly. mobilized for their assignments in accordance with the provisions for notification and activation of personnel during normal i
working hours as specified in the plan. ' Following receipt of an initial notification, the Deputy Director, OEM fulfilled his responsibility to notify the State Police Field Operations, Central Region Coordinator, State Director, Governor's Office, Governor's Press Secretary, and FEMA Region IL The Office of Emergency Management Civillan Duty Officer is responsible for making the initial notification of U.S. Coast Guard, and all other State agencies.
Each agency in turn follows their internal procedures to mobilize representatives to the EOC.
These representativa have the authority to j
commit the resources of their organization and to speak on behall of the agency head in the event of an emergency. - EOC staff notification began upon receipt of the Alert ECL at approximately 1601. The EOC was declared operational at 1624. All primary staff were mobilized in a timely manner. Full staffing was complete about 1710.
SEOC 3.
The objective to demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate, and control ongoing activities was met at the SEOC. The Deputy Director, New Jersey OEM was l
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.i effectively in charge of the emergency response.
Staff were actively _ involved in deelslon making and the implementation of these deelstons throughout the course of the exercise. The events and actions taken to respond to these event were closely munitored by the Deputy Director and the Chief of Operations using the EIS, which provides an on-line message handling and tracking system. The Deputy. Director, Chief of Operations, and Information Specialists who monitored and maintained the inputs' to the EIS were extremely well trained in.Its use.
Their famillarity with EIS expedited message handling. The flow of information to and from the various response organizations was exceptionally good. Periodic briefings were held for agency staff in the support room.
OEM management staff frequently reviewed and discussed pending and ongoing actions that were being taken in response to a-variety of events. Protective action deelslon making was expedited with " SIT REPS" obtained from the EIS. These provided a rapid -
summary of population size, special populations, schools, evacuation routes, _ and -
evacuation time estimates for any combination of affected zones. Key decision making data have been pre-programmed into the EIS thereby reducing the time required to analyze various protective action options. Nevertheless, a hard copy of the plan was available for reference and the Emergency Analyst working in the command room computed and verified information presented in the- " SIT REP" summaries. Overall -
deelslon making was efficient.
It was apparent that staff would have been able to respond to events evolving faster than those presented by the exercise scenario. The-Deputy Director and OEM staff are to be commended for their knowledge and use of state-of-the-art emergency management and deelslon-making tools.
i SEOC 4. The objective to demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel was met at the SEOC. - The first and second -
l ECLs, NUE and Alert, were received at the State Warning Point. The duty officer correctly followed procedures, verifying the call, n.otifying BNE and notifying OEM. ' The.
Operations room (OPS room) of the SEOC was declared operational at 1624.. At that j
time it assumed responsibility for State communications. The SEOC communications 1
network consists of commercial telephone, RACES, EMRAD, and NJ State Police Radio i
systems, the EIS computer network (which has a link to the Ocean County EOC but was -
not to be evaluated), direct telephone lines to the utility, OCEOC, State Police Forward Command Post, the EOF, and the Technical Support Center (TSC) from the OPS room, and direct lines to the EOF and TSC from the executive room. The PIO room had direct lines to the radio station-(WADB) and the Emergency News Center. There were no communication delays observed during the exercise.
i SEOC 5.
The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays and other materials to support emergency operations was met. During an emergency the SEOC is divided into the executive room, operations room, support room, PIO room, a room for BNE staff, communications room, and rumor control room. The EIS has reduced the noise level to a very low level. The OPS room had 6 computer stations and two large screens, also visible in the executive room, displaying pertinent information such as wind shifts, EPAs, PAGs, ECLs, and all messages to and from OCEOC. There are two large screens in the support room and a computer station linked to EIS in the executive room.
l All appropelate maps (e.g., evacuation routes, congregate care locations, etc.) are loaded ~
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-l onto the EIS. This allows retrieval and examination in great detall. There are paper maps and status boards available should the EIS (which has two independent servers) fall. The PIO room is equipped with 2 computers having all' the EBS messages loaded l
onto a word processer, one printer (the other computer is tied into the main printer in the OPS room), a FAX machine, and telephones with direct lines to the radio station and the ENC.
The SEOC has sufficient space and equipment ' to support emergency -
operations. Access to the facility was controlled by the New Jersey State Police.
SEOC 6. The objective to demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure was met.
The SEOC was well outside the plume EPZ.
Consequerstly, workers there did not require and were not issued dosimetry. The SEOC does play a role in command and control dec sfons.
The decision to implement KI Ingestion for emergency workers was made in scoordance with the state plan based upon recommendations from the Bureau of Nuclerr Engineering. This recommendation was communicated to OCEOC and emergency workers from the SEOC in a timely fashion.
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SEOC 11. The objective to demonstrate protective action decision making based on -
projected dose, EPA PAGs, evacuation time estimates and other factors was met.
Technical analysis and the State's coordination of dose assessment.with the utility was performed, as specified in the plan by the Bureau of Nuclear Engineering (BNE) staff at the EOF. Technical recommendations were in turn relayed to the BNE liaison at the SEOC who advised the Deputy Director OEM and other management personnel of the utility's protective action recommendations and' BNE's analysis.
Protective action e
decisions made at the EOC were based upon careful and rapid analysis of population in the affected zones, evacuation time estimates, and other factors. Data from the plan have been entered into the EIS system and " SIT REP" analyses of projected protective L
action decisions were performed throughout the exercise 'as ECLs and meteorological -
l conditions changed. The OEM staff was very profielent in using and Interpreting.the results of the " SIT REP" analyses, which helped to expedite protective action decision making.
SEOC 12. The objective to initially alert the public within the 10 mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an instructional message within 15 minutes of - a decision by the appropriate official was met. At 1800, a decision was made to simulate the sounding 'of the strens at 1808 and to simulate EBS message Number 1, notifying the-public of Site Area Emergency (no action required), at 1813. The SEOC followed correct procedures in l
!ssuing this decision, however, Ocean County did not advise the Ocean County Sheriff to simulate siren sounding and the sirens were actually sounded at 1808. EBS message-Number 1 had already bien faxed 'to the EBS station with instructions to simulate, "do not transmit." The State immediately adjusted to the actual situation by preparing a new EBS message. This message, EBS Number 2, was faxed to the station which was directed to transmit it immediately. It advised the public that although the sirens were sounded, i
no emergency was in progress. The State PIO also had an EBS message aired via the cable TV system at 1832 advising that, although the sirens sounded at 1808, there was no emergency. There were 4 EBS messages approved at the SEOC for issuance during the exercise. All were transmitted to the EBS station within the 15-minute time-frame.
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18 SEOC 13. The objective to demonstrate the ability to coordinate the formulation and dissemination of accurate Information and Instructions to the public in a timely fashion after the initial' alert and notifloation has occurred was ' met.- Based upon the utility's recommendation, the first protective action was considered at 2000 and involved the evacuation of 5 EPAs. The deelslon to implement this recommendation was made by the State at 2021.
Sirens were to be simulated and an EBS message was to be alred.
(simulated). While the State PIO was faxing the EBS message to the radio station, the initial PAR deelslon was amended at 2021 to evacuate three additional EPAs. The State
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was able to successfully add these EPAs, their descriptions, and evacuation routes and far this Information to the EBS station in time for a simulated alting at 2034 (within the 15 minute time frame). Later EBS messages, adding 4 EPAs due to.a' wind shift and opening an additional Congregate Care Shelter were also sent to the EBS station within 15 minutes of the decision time.
At the - SEOC, the State PIO ~ was in constant communication via a two-way radio headset with the executive room. - He was Immediately advised to prepare the appropriate EBS message. The PIO room had a word processor loaded with all prescripted EBS messages. The appropriate EBS' message was' i
retrieved, applicable EPAs trserted, as necessary, as well as any other changes that i
might be required. The message was then printed and brought to the decision makers for approval. Once approved, the message was faxed to the EBS station, the Ocean County EOC, and the Emergency News Center. The State PIO also called the radio station, read the message being faxed, and advised _ them as to the time to air the message. This 4
system worked very well. All messages were transmitted in time for alting within 15 minutes of the decision. Two previous ARCAs (NJS 1 and 2) from OCNGS PEA dated 12/10/87 were corrected.
SEOC 15. The objective to demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control was met. The rumor control center was activated promptly upon notification that the plant had reached the alert emergency classification level (ECL).' They handled 17 actual calla during the exercise. Most of the callers wanted to know why the strens -
had sounded.
All the calls were answered promptly and courteously, and the staff provided accurate and responsive infermation. The rumor control number is displayed prominently in the Oyster Creek emergency information booklet.
This booklet is distributed to all residents and to commercial and public facilities. The rumor control number was also mentioned in all EBS messages. There are 6 telephone lines available to take calls. Only five were set up for the exercise as the call volume did not necessitate using all 6.
These telephones can only take incoming calls. There are an additional 4 lines available to respond to queries that require a return call. There were three people on duty for the exercise (there would be 6 for a real emergency and personnel are avaUable as demonstrated by a roster). The rumor control staff was provided with half hourly status reports. If necessary, they could step outside the. door.to their room and observe the EIS monitors in the support room. Also, when the telephones were not ringing, support staff briefings can be heard in the rumor control center.
SEOC 16. The objective to demonstrate the ability to make the decision to recommend the use of KI to emergency workers and institutionalized persons based on predetermined criteria, as well as to distribute and administer it once the decision is made if i
19
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necessitated by radiolodine releases - was met.
It was projected, by BNE, that _ the -
H radiolodine would expose workers to levels in excess of the guidelines for Ingesting KI..
l This information was communicated to the SEOC at 2030. At 2040 the Commissioner of Health, as required by the plan, determined that all emergency workers in the plume area should take KI. This information was transmitted from the SEOC to OCEOC and the field at 2044.
SEOC ' 18. ' The objective to demonstrate: the ; ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for the impacted permanent and transient.
plume EPZ population was met. The State la responsible for providing buses for transit dependent individuals. It has no direct responsibility for special needs, handicapped, and institutionalized persons. To meet its responsibility NJ Transit was notified shortly after j
the SAE. Arrangements were made to dispatch 63_ buses to the bus mustering point. At 2023 NJ Transit was notifle.d to dispatch 30 buses to run a Ilst of assigned routes. These buses were to rerun these routes until either ordered to stop or no further evacuees were picked up.
Shortly before exercise termination reports came in to the SEOC that virtually no evacuees were being picked up. The buses were not, however, directed to i
stop running their routes until after termination of the exercise.
1 DEFICIENCIES There were no deficiencies observed at the SEOC during this' exercise.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION There were no areas requiring corrective action observed at the SEOC during this exercise.
4 AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT There were no areas recommended for improvement observed at the SEOC during this exercise.
2.1.2. State Fleid Activities The field activities involved were a traffic control point at Route 166 and Water Street and a bus route..There wera.three objectives, two of which were met and the i
other partially met.
SFA 18. The objective to demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement -
appropriate protective actions for the impacted permanent and transient plume EPZ population (including transit dependent persons, special needs populations, handicapped-persons, and institutionalized persons) was partially met. The State is responsible only
.4
-.- 1 20 for transit dependent persons. New Jersey _ Transit dispatched a bus to the Lakehurst.
Naval Air Engineering Center from one of their garages. The bus and supervisor arrived 1
at the bus mustering point about 1855. The Commanding Officer for the base stated that '
to the best of his knowledge the state had not established a letter of agreement with the I
base to maintain a bus mustering point at the base. As a result of the exercise, it was found that the Letter of Agreement for the State of New Jersey to use the Lakehurst Naval Engineering Center as a bus mustering point is outdated. This has been identifled -~
as a planning issue. A new Letter of Agreement refleeting current arrangements should -
be developed. Furthermom, due to the rapid turnover of base commanders, the base commander should be reminded annually of this agreement.'
The bus was dispatched from the bus mustering point at 2019 to. follow evacuation route 14A. The bus traveled route 14A,-escorted by the NJ State Police trooper, in an effielent manner, and arrived at the congregate care center in Lakewood by 2108. In a real emergency the actual running time would be 30 to'45 minutes longer, according to the bus driver and the State trooper, since the bus would be stopping to pick up persons along the route. Throughout'the entire traveling of the route, information was never received by the State trooper as to the status of emergency events, such as ECLs.
SFA 20. The objective to demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas was met. At 1951 the evaluator arrived at the designated control point.- A State Police trooper was already in position, having been dispatched at 1800. At 2020 the message to activate the access control point was received via. EMRAD. The trooper simulated setting up of traffic control barricades, sign lights, and traffic cones, as well as' direction of traffic flow. This demonstration was ended at 2036. One previous ARCA (NJS 3) from OCNGS PEA dated 12/10/87 was corrected.
SFA 6.
The objective to demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure was partially met. The NJ State Police trooper arrived at the Lakehurst Naval Air base at 1948 and issued direct read dosimeters, a-TLD, an exposure record card, and radiological exposure control procedures, KI, and personal protective equipment including a half face respirator to the bus driver. The driver was Instructed to read his dosimetry every 30 minutes even though he had never received _any radiological control training. The driver was also to wear the half-face mask respirator when instructed to do so by the trooper even though he had never received any training or been fit tested for the respirator. There were two stops made to read dosimeters, record exposures, and communicate results to the State Police command point. The State Trooper assigned to the access control point demonstration was equipped with an anti-contamination kit, two dosimeters, a TLD, an exposure record card, and KI. He read -
the two dosimeters every 15 to 30 minutes, logged the readings on his card, and radioed them in to the FCP. He was aware that he should only take K! if ordered to do so by a superior officer at the FCP by the authority of the Deputy State Director or his designee.
21 DEFICIENCIES There were no deficiencies observed in State field activities during this exercise. -
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AREA 8 REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION 1.
Descriptiom The bus driver read his dosimetry every 30 minutes l
although he had no training (NUREG-0654, II, K.3.a).
i Recommendattom The State' Police trocper is' supposed to read the bus driver's dosimeters. They should be reminded of; this at the -
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mustering point. Otherwise bus drivers should be trained in use of dosimetry..
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2.
Descriptiom The bus driver was provided with a respirator which he had no training in using and had not been fit tested (NUREG-0654, II, K.3.a).
Recommendatiom Bus drivers be fit tested and trained to use respirators if they are being provided with them.
l AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT There were no areas recommended for improvement' observed in State field activities during the exercise.
y 2.2 BNE FORWARD COMMAND POST (BNE FCP) AND FIELD MONITORING TEAMS The field monitoring teams were dispatched to the field and directed to their monitoring locations from the BNE FCP. The BNE FCP and field monitoring teams had nine objectives. Three of these were met and six were partially met.
BNE 1.
The objective to demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand and use emergency classification levels (ECLs). through the appropriate-implementation of L
emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECL'slas required by the scenario was met. The Forward Command Post (FCP), received and posted the current ECLs.
l The ECLs were prominently displayed in a timely fashion and staff were aware of the
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current ECL. Staff briefings werd adequate to keep BNE staff apprised of the current situation.
BNE 2.
The objective to demonstrate the ability to fully alert,' mobilize and activate personnel for both facility and field based monitoring activities was met. Personnel from the State began arriving at 1700 and communication was established with the EOF and:
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22' SEOC by 1725. Almost all State personnel were at the FCP by 1730, including 4 vans for
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transportation ' of the field monitoring teams.
The Forward Command Post was considered fully activated at 1736. Three State field monitoring teams were dispatched to their initial monitoring points by 1828 following briefings and equipment checks. Two f
county monitoring teams arrived at 1855 and were similarly briefed and dispatched to their initial monitoring points. Appropriate available information was provided to all participants during this mobilization phase.
i BNE 4.
The objective to demonstrate the ability to communicate with all locations, organizations and field personnel' was partially met. State personnel began arriving at j
the BNE FCP at approximately 1700 and communication was established with the EOF' I
and SEOC by 1725. Af ter they had been deployed to the field, the BNE FCP established 4
radio communications with the State' and county field monitoring teams which reported their monitoring data and personnel exposure readings.
Considerable difficulty was -
experienced with radio communications between the BNE FCP and the State and Ocean County field monitoring teams due to failure of the primary radio frequency and -
subsequent problems with the backup radio frequency. However, the FCP staff showed considerable initiative and ability to communicate with the State field teams by using
- l vehicles and message runners to relay information to and from those State field teams..
j Messages were only minimally delayed during the frequent transfers required to relay ~
information from one system to another. The radios in the vehicles used by the Ocean County field monitoring teams did not have a frequency compatible with the BNE FCP l<
base station. Therefore, the county teams were supplied with State hand-held Motorola model MT-500 portable radios for direct communications with BNE FCP. The range of these hand-held radlos is not sufficient to insure communications over the distances' traveled by the county teams. As a result, there were poor communications between the county field teams and the field team coordinator at the BNE FCP throughout the exercise.
i BNE 5. The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays and other materials to support emergency operations was partially met.
For_ the short duration of the exercise the BNE FCP facilities' were marginally adequate..The facility is a small trailer with no bathroom or kitchen facilities. It has, in general, a minimum of space and in an actual emergency it would be inadequate for sustained operations. Wall space is limited.
Consequently, flip charts are the primary source. of information display. This often results in burying important information, such as PAGs, and in fragmenting data that would benefit from consolidation. The method of handling plume monitoring data is very poor, being both labor and time consuming. It requires using a small protractor, a ruler, repositioning the plume overlay (using a chair for a step ladder) and at least two people to change the plume plot each time the wind shifts it takes at least five minutes to complete this procedure, and wind direction changes were often provided every fifteen minutes. The lack of a copier meant that each message must be sequentially routed through 3 to 5 different people for Information transfer and logging.
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BNE 6. The objective to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure j
was met. All workers were issued TLD's and 2 ranges of self-reading dosimeten. They were provided with appropriate instructions on usage, recording, and authorized levels of
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exposure. Appropriate exposure log records were provided for all personnel and they were told to record initial readings and to take readings every 15 to 30 minutes. F! eld teams regularly reported their exposure readings via the radio communications. The one state team observed did not have some supplies, such as rubber or plastic gloves but simulated their use. The team members indicated that they had been fitted for new respirators, but since these had not yet been delivered, the use of respirators was -
simulated. Two previous ARCAs (BNE I and 2) from OCNGS PEA dated 12/10/87 were corrected.,
BNE 7.
The objective - to demonstrate appropriate equipment - and procedures for determining field radiation measurements was partially met. Based on the ECLs, the release, and meteorological information, field monitoring teams were directed by the BNE FCP to speelfic locations where the plume was expected.
Little actual data resulted from the positioning of the five teams. Only one air sample and sporadic plume t
data were reported. Teams were dispatched based on the FCP understanding of where the plume should have been. But only the team closest to the plant reported positive readings. Belleving the plume to be directly on the centerline of.the two farthest out locations, the FCP left these teams in place for about one hour with negative results.
Whatever caused these negative results, a search for the plume by lateral movement of.
the field teams should have been initiated earlier. And whenever teams were moved they should have collected data en route if possible. While the teams were ultimately moved and traversed the plume the limited time for this activity did not yield the results one would normally expect. The state field team, which was evaluated for this exercise had several different survey instruments and a micro R meter, but did not have a high range (greater than.05 R/hr) survey instrument.
They were supplied with: some spare equipment. The team installed batteries, performed battery checks _ and source checks, and used their SOPS to set up and check out equipment. ' All instruments examined were within their calibration period. The team kept one survey instrument enclosed in plastic t
l bagging and simulated this for others. They had a probe monitor outside the vehicle window and monitored its counting rates continuously. Beta-gamma and gamma only readings at both 1 meter and just above ground level were demonstrated. Readings were successfully logged onto the forms provided.
The. state team. transmitted ambient readings by radio promptly to' the FCP with only occasional delays associated with radio communication problems. A plume traversal was simulated late in the exercise. The team was able to find and arrive at monitoring locations even though there was some discrepant information and other problems in written directions and maps and much'of the exercise was in late evening or at night. Team members wore dark jumpsult uniforms i
which gave an official and professional appearance, but were difficult to see at night.-
The team members were capable and efficient, they displayed appropriate knowledge and training, and performed very well together.
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24 BNE 8. The objective to demonstrate the appropriate equipment gnd procedures for the measurement of airborne radiolodine concentrations as low as 10' microcuries per cc in presence of noble gases was partially met. The air pump operated off a power convertor in the vehicle. A charcoal' cartridge was'used to demonstrate air sampling. Team members noted that silver. zoollte cartridges - would be: available for an actual emergency. ' An air sample was taken with appropriate flow rate and sampling duration.
However, an air. pump control knob broke during sampling. The field team moved out of '
the plume to a location having ambient radiation at background levels, purged the sample, and prepared to count it. A fixed and reproducible geometry was set up for counting cartridges; however, the Stabilized Assay meter was not operating correctly.
This system, although recently calibrated, was found not to be operating properly during i
equipment checkout at the FCP. However, no spare equipment was available at the FCP for this function. The count was simulated and the counting rate for the charcoal cartridge was radioed back to the FCP. A calculation was' performed in the field of both the radiolodine concentration in the air and' the associated dose rate to the thyroid.
Except for equipment difficulties the team performed very well.
BNE - 9.
The objective to demonstrate - the ability to obtain samples of particulate activity in the aleborne plume and promptly perform laboratory analysis was partially met. A particulate sample on filter paper was obtained during ale sampling and was properly bagged and labeled.
The control knob on the air pump broke-. during air sampling. This particulate sample was ncA transmitted to the laboratory for analysis during the exercise. It was anticipated that a mobile laboratory would be brought to the-a FCP. But difficulties developed that prevented bringing in the mob!!e lab._ No courier was sent to rendezvous with the: team and collect samples from them.- The team.
returned to the FCP following the exercise termination.
~
BNE 18. The objective to demonstrate the ability to make the decision to recommend the use of KI to emergency workers and institutionalized persons based on predetermined -
criteria, as well as to distribute and administer it once. the decision Is made, If necessitated by radiolodine releases, was partially met. The field team had a vial of'KI in their vehicle. No simulated usage of this K1 was observed to occur, even though such usage had been called for by the Commissioner of Health.
DEFICIENCIES There were no deficiencies observed among the field monitoring teams at this j
exercise.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION 1.
==
Description:==
Considerable difficulty was experienced with radio communications between the BNE FCP and the State and Ocean County field monitoring teams due to failure of the primary radio 1
25 l
frequency and ' subsequent. problems - with.the backup radio frequency (NUREG-0654, II, F).
Recomsendation: All State and county'fleld monitoring teams-should be provided with a reliable mobile radio system' to provide effective communications over the entire plume EPL Desedption: The BNE FCP is inabequate for sustained operations,
- i 2.
l being too small and lacking toilets or kitchen fac!!!tles. Wall space is !!mited, and consequently, flip charts are the primary source of Information ' display.
This often results in " burying" Important.
Information such as PAGs, and'in fragmenting data-that would benefit from consolldation. The method of handling plume moni-
'I l
toring data is very poor, being both labor and time consuming.
Also, the lack of a copler meant _ that each message must be.-
i f
sequentially routed through 3 to 5 different people for information transfer and logging (NUREG-0654, !!, H).
Recommendations: This activity should be housed in a-suitable.
permanent building: where adequate' space' and facilities 1can' be made available.
The facility should have adequate. toilet and kitchen facilities, and ample wall space. - Also, a copter should be 4
available in the permanent, suitable space.
l 3.
==
Description:==
Very little data were obtained' from - the field' i
monitoring teams to adequately define the plume (NUREG-0654,1, l
11 l
!.8).
1
~
Recommendation: Procedures for controlling, movement of. field-monitoring teams need to be revised to insure that they traverse-the projected plume. path to pick up radiation levels.
4.
==
Description:==
The monitoring. team did not have a high range survey meter as speelfled in the plan (NUREG-0654, II, I.8).
Recommendation: Each state team should be provided!with a high l
range survey meter.
l 5.
Descriptions. The Stabilized Assay Meter system for identification p
l and measurement of radiolodine was not operating properly and no backup instrument was available to the team (NUREG-0654, II, I.8).
I Recommendation: The system should be repaired as needed and a full and correct calibration made, and spares of all important equipment should be 'available at the FCP for. the state 'fleid teams.
26 6.
Deseription: The only particulate sample taken was not forwarded
(
to a laboratory during the exercise. A mobile lab was not brought
)
in, and no courier was sent to rendevous with the team and collect I
samples from them (NUREG-0454, II, H).
Recommendation: Provisions should be made for courier pickup in 2
the event the teams are unable to report to a mobile laboratory as called for in the plan.
j t
7.
==
Description:==
The field team did not simulate ingesting'KI even i
though this had been called for by the Commissioner' of Health (NUREG-0654, !!, K.5).
4 Recommendation Additional training should be provided to the 7
field teams either in the use of El or in communicating key 1
information between field teams and the BNE FCP.
4 AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT r
i Deseriptions The display at the BNE FCP used to plot the projected l
e plume path is cumbersome, time consuming, and requires several l
people to change it, j
l Recommendation:
A simpler, quicker, less labor-intense system I
should be installed to plot the projected plume path at the BNE l
FCP.
Descriptions The one State team observed did not have some supplies, such as rubber or plastic gloves.
f Recommendation:
Rubber or plastic gloves should be made I
available to team members.
i
==
Description:==
The field team has been fitted with new respirators, but these had not yet been supplied to them.
j Recommendation: Fitted respirators should be made available to team members.
==
Description:==
The state field team was able to find and arrive at monitoring locations even though they were given some discrepant Information regarding written directions and maps.
I Recommendation: Field tearns should be provided with accurate written directions and up-to-data maps for the monitoring locations.
l 1
i
l 38 BOF le The objective to demonstrate the ability, within the plume exposure pathway, to project dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant and field data was partially met. This activity was conducted using primarily plant data. Information on turbine building or main stack high range RAGEMS, vent flow rate, and release status was readily available for input into the dose model. Calculations made using the Zenith 183 computer appeared adequate and were updated every half hour. Dose assessment results were discussed among BNE members at the EOF, then provided to the State officials at the FCP and SEOC. In addition to dose assessment capability, the computer provided displays of plume locetion and expected time of plume arrival at speelfled distances downwind (i.e., 0.25, 2, 5, and 10 miles).
At the General Emergency ECL, PARS were formulated by the utility based upon degrading plant conditions. The PAR was accurate and was agreed upon by BNE staff.
When dose assessment results were evaluated in terms of affecting the PAR, a difference by a factor of 10 was noted between BNE and utility assessments. There was little discussion observed between the staffs to attempt to resolve the difference.
It is recommended that differences in projections and assessments be resolved through discussion between EOF staffs, which highlight comparisons of input data, and differences in dose models.
ROF 18 The objective to demonstrate the ability to make the deelslon to recommend the use of K1 to emergency workers and institutionalized persons, based on predetermined criteria, as well as to distribute and administer it once the deelslon is made, If re asitated by radiolodine releases was met.
The procedure to authorize K! la not the responsibility of the BNE staff at the EOF. However, based on dose assessment results of 33 Rem thyroid dose, the ability to make the decision to recommend K! was considered, and in fact made. The'eiere the objective was met at the EOF.
DEFICIENCIES There were no deficiencies observed at the EOF during the exercise.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION 1.
Description Although the BNE team at the EOF was aware of each emergency classification level, they were unclear on how degradations in fuel and containment status each affected the General Emergency ECL (NUREG-0654, !!, D.3).
4 Recommendattom The BNE staff should receive additional I
training during the annual emergency action level review with the licensee so that the State understands how plant conditions affect the declaration of all ECLs.
I i
27
}
Deserlption:
Field team members wore dark jumpsult uniforms which have an official and professional appearance but were difficult to see at night and could also be a safety hazard during l
poor lighting conditions.
l Rooommendation The field teams should be provided with orange
)
reflector vests for added safety.
i 1.3 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACUJTY (EOF)
The EOF is located at Route 9 and Hurley Avenue in Lakewood, New Jersey.
1 There were five objectives to demonstrate during the exercise, three were met and two l
were partially met.
EOF 1 The objective to demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand and use.
l emergency classification levels (ECL) through the appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECL's as required by the scenario was partially met.
[
I l
The ability to use and monitor ECLs was adequately demonstrated. The BNE staff at the EOF was aware of each ECL as they were declared. However, BNE staff did not appear to understand how degrading plant conditions were associated with the General Emergency ECL, speelfically, when considering fuel and containment status.
EOF 4 The objective to demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel was met. EOF communications were rapidly established upon activation and included an adequate number of commercial and ring-
[
down telephones. Performance of the communications capability was efficient with no I
excessive delays of critical information. Transmission of dose assessment and reactor-data to the SEOC was performed via facsimile copy and verbal communications.
EOF 5 The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays and other materials to support emergency operations was met. The space, equipment, and supplies available in the EOF for use by the BNE staff are sufficient to-support o
emergency operations. Data displays and status boards provided information on nuclear engineering assessment, reactor status, field monitoring data, dose. projections,15
(
minute meteorological data, telemetry data at five fixed sites, and the location of the field monitoring teams. These displays were continuously-maintained and updated as changes occurred. Dose assessment computer capability provided quick and accurate results as needed.
During the initial activation of the EOF, the Attachment 207-8 checklist to SOP-207 entitled " EOF Activation Procers" was not speelfically used by the staff.
u
- i l
\\
L 30 which included the announcement of "No Protective Actions" when in fact Ocean County had recommended evacuation eighteen minutes prior to the news briefing.
The information on the evacuation was not given to the media until the next news briefing conducted thirty minutes later, approximately fifty minutes after the initial evacuation recommendation. The information on protective actions should have been released to the media much quicker.
The principal staffs at the ENC (Utility, State and County) were in contact with their primary organizations throughout the exercise, exchanging information and data.
Seven press briefings were held to provide detal'.: on the status of the emergency and the steps taken by the emergency responders. Press releases, ESS messages and media kits were available to keep the media representatives Informed and up to date on the situation. In addition, charts graphs and plant schematics were used to describe the emergency and to assist in the answering of questions. However, in several Instances during the exercise,a health physicist or other quallfled professional was needed to answer questions concerning the health effects of radlation.
A representative of the utility was available to assist the media with questions and to arrange interviews between press belefings. The development and preparation of messages was handled in an efficient and pecfessional manner, assuring that accurate and complete Information was disseminated to the public.
A previous ARCA (NJS 1) from the OCNGS PEA dated December 10,1987 was corrected. The State has developed a system to assure that outgoing messages from the ENC are complete and accurate. This system utilizes a checklist to review all EBS messages prior to release. Each message was reviewed by the P!O and another staff member to verify content, correct EPA boundary descriptions and any other pertinent information. Following this review, the PIO initialed the message and it was forwarded on for transmission. As the message was being read over the racio it was tape recorded to insure accuracy and facilitate review.
ENC 34. The objective to demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing on a continuous 24-hour basis by an actual shif t change (Ocean P!O only) was met.
The Ocean County P!O staff demonstrated an actual shift at the ENC. The second shift was briefed on the status of the emergency by the first shift. Incoming staff reviewed past press releases and message logs to famillarize themselves with what had happened prior to their arrival.
A previous ARCA (OC 2) from the OCNGS PEA dated December 10,1987 was corrected.
A Federal evaluator was positioned at the EBS radio station WABD to evaluate the station's response to the emergency. For the purposes of the test demonstration, the
{
activation of the EBS system was initiated at 1822. Activation of the EBS system was
.l again demonstrated at 2034 with subsequent repeat messages at 2036 and 2038.
1
A i
29 2.
Deseription At the General Emergency ECL, PARS were formula-ted by the utility based upon degrading plant conditions. The PAR was accurate and was agreed upon by BNE staff.
When dose assessment results were evaluated in terms of affecting the PAR, a difference by a factor of 10 was noted between BNE and utility' I
assessments. There was little discussion observed between the staffs to attempt to resolve the difference (NUREG-0654,11,1.10).
l Rooommendation:
It. Is recommended that ' differences in projections and assessments be resolved through-discussion i
between EOF staffs, highlighting comparisons of input data, and
)
differences in dose models.
i AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT
==
Description:==
During the inltlal. activation of the EOF, the i
- 07-8 checklist to SOP-207 entitled " EOF Activation
' j Process" was not used by the staff. Activations of the EOF function j
was achieved but the SOP was not properly referenced.
j f
Reeommendation:
Applicable checklist-from the plans and procedures should be utilized by emergency personnel to ensure that nothing is overlooked during the activation phase.
2.4 EMERGENCY NEWS CENTER (ENC)
The ENC is located at the Toms River Elks Club in Toms River, New Jersey.
There were three objectives to demonstrate; two were met and one was partially met.
J l
ENC 2. The objective to demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize and activate personnel for both facility and field-based emergency functions was met.
The staffing of.the ENC was recomplished over a two hour period; personnel were notified using telephones, radlos and pagers. All required ENC personnel were present at the facility and the ENC was declared operational at 1750. The facility was
~
fully staffed by 1800 and the first press briefing was held at 1815.
ENC 14. The objective to demonstrate the ability to brief the media in arr securate, coordinated and timely manner 'vas partially met.
The ENC provided an adequate central point for the dissemination of information to the media and the public.
Generally, the information provided to ' media representatives, through press briefings and news releases, was accurate and well coordinated. However, in at least one instance, a media briefing contained Information l
l l-n-.-
--..-_-------...-___-___-------.------->----,_,-,,,,aa-w-,e a
e--
~.~
e-w-o~~e
- - ~ - --
- wce
33 emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECL's as required by the scenario was met. The Notification of Unusual Event was received at the Ocean County Sheriff's Communleation Division (OCSCD) at 1541. The other three ECLs were received from the SEOC via the hotline (Alert at 1603, Site Area Emergency at 1755, and General Emergency at 2001). The staff was promptly briefed after each change in ECL and status boards were changed accordingly. There was a checklist display in the command and control room that lists actions to be planned for or taken at each ECL. The use of this checklist by the County Emergency Management Coordinator (EMC) and the New
]
Jersey State Pollee (NJSP) cadre, who tasisted in managing the facility, facilitated appropriate impler entation of emergency responses.
OCEOC 2. The objective to demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize and activate personnel for both facility and field-based emergency functions was met. Staffing of the OCEOC began at 1622 with the activation of the pagers for key personnel at the OCSCD.
E Because the activation began during normal working hours for the County OEM, its staff was on site. Other staff began to arrive within 15 minutes. The OCEOC was fully staffed by 1710, except for the transportation representative who did not arrive until nearly an hour later. This staff member had to be contacted at home by telephone, some distance from the OCEOC, because her working hours ended at 1430. Pagers should be provided for all staff members.
g The agencies and organizations participating during the exercise at the OCEOC included:
County OEM, Sheriff's Department Health Department Social Services.
Schools, American Red Cross, Roads Department Traffic Safety / Engineering, RACES, Fire Coordinator, New Jersey State Police, Salvation Army, Transportation, and the Board of Freeholders.
OCEOC 3.
The objective to demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate and control emergency activities was partially met.
The direction, coordination and control of emergency response activities was accomplished by the County EMC with the able assistance of several NJSP personnel. One of these assistants, the State Liaison, handled communications with the SEOC via the hotline; others assisted in the management of the faellity and gave briefings. The Freeholder present was actively concerned with the command and control function and the activities of the county agencies. A copy of the plan was available and each agency or function was given a packet that contained relevant procedures. Message logs were kept and a corps of runners facilitated rapid reproduction and distribution of messages between the command and control room and the operations room. Messages to and from municipal EOCs were handled efficiently by the Message Entry Clerk stationed at a window in the wall between the command and control room and the communications room.
There were frequent (every 10-15 minutes), concise briefings that kept the staff abreast of the current situation. Each briefing contained the current meteorological conditions, especially the wind direction. To assist the staff to plan and implement an evacuation, "SITREP" sheets were available which contain information on wind-direction-dependent evacuation requirements and resources, information on evacuation
1 31-DEFICIENCIES l
There were no defielencies observed at the ENC during the exercise.
i AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION 1.
Desoription:
A media briefing contained Information which Included the announcement of "No Protective Actions" when in fact the County had recommended evacuation alghteen minutes prior to the news briefing, The information on the evacuation wu not given to th media until the next news briefing conducted fifty minutes after the initial evacuation order.
(NUREG-0654, II, l
G.3.a)
Recommendation: A system should be developed to insure that all necessary information impacting the public is included in press' briefings. Personnel at the ENC should be trained to brief the media in an accurate, coordinated, and timely manner.
2.
==
Description:==
A health physicist or other quallfled professional was needed at the ENC to answer questions concerning the health effects of radiation. (NUREG-0654, !!,0.3.a)
I I
l Recommendation:
A health physicist or other quallfled l
professional should be available at the ENC.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT There were no areas recommended for improvement observed at the ENC during this exercise.
2.5 OCEAN COUNTY l
2.5.1 Ocean County Emergency Operations Center The Ocean County Emergency Operations Center (OCEOC) is located in a County building at the Miller Airpark in Berkeley Township that houses the offices of the County Office of Emergency Management (County OEM).
}
There were seven objectives for the OCEOC.
Four were met; three were partially met.
OCEOC 1.
The objective to demonstrate the ' ability to monitor, understand and use emergency classification - levels ' (ECL) through the appropelate implementation - of:
l
34 communleations systems available. These include the dedicated telephone hotline to the SEOC, a dedicated telephone line to the JNC, EMRAD radio net for the primary link to the muntelpal EOCs, Emergency Management not radio, State 75m SSB, State 2m FM, RACES, and County 2m FM.
There are also a sufficient number of commercial telephones in the operations room for agency staff communleations with the field and in the communications room to receive message verification or requests that messages be repeated. The communications systems generally operated well. There was a breakdown in the State 2m radlo; however, the State 75m radio was readily used as backup.
Sometimes, information was not communicated to municipal EOCs via radio as rapidly as possible. There was generally a 10-15 minute Interval between initiation of a message for municipal EOCs oy the County EMC and radio transmission.
OCEOC 5. The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays, and other materials to support emergency operations was met. The facility consisted primarily of four rooms: the operations room, the command and control room, the communications room, and a room with the dedicated line to the ENC used by the county public Information officer. The EOC was generally well configured. In the operations room, work places were clustered to enhance communications among agencies with related responsibilities (e.g., agencies with responsibilities for operations at shelters were at one table). The command and control room was well positioned between the operations room and the communications room with windows in walls to facilitate passing of messages. The public information officer was isolated, however, and during the first shift had an assistant stand in the back of the operations room and periodically return to the public Information room to keep her informed of developments.
Facility components and equipment were quite adequate. The status boards were well located for viewing. There were separate status boards for weather, public shelters, decontamination centers, and EPAs. Also there were maps throughout the OCEOC with information on bus routes, access control points, EPAs, and public shelter locations. Two Sheriff's officers provided security. One was located at the front door and logged in the staff after being shown proper identification. The other was stationed adjacent to a side door that was locked after the exercise began.
OCEOC 18. The objective to demonstrate the ability to initially alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an Instructional message within 15 minutes of a decision by appropriate State and/or local official (s) was partially met. The OCEOC is not involved with the instructional message broadcast over EBS, but rather with activation of strens. As was discussed earlier.(see OCEOC 3), a message was received i
from the SEOC via the hotline to simulate activation of the strens at 1808. The message that was received by the Sheriff's representative at the OCEOC indicated that the strens should actually be sounded. The Sheriff's representative promptly notified the OCSCD in Toms River where the strens were to be activated. The strens were activated at the OCSCD at 1808 by a key on a console. At 1812, a computer display indicated that only 6 of 47 strens sounded. At 1815, the strens were reactivated and the computer display i
indicated that 44 of the 47 sounded. The identification numbers of strens that did not activate were displayed after the second sounding but not after the first sounding.
- l I
33
.l requirements and resources includes:
EPAs affected, populations (general population with vehicles, special cr.re, school, etc.), evacuation routes and time estimates for the various populations, bus routes ' for the transit-dependent, access control points, decontamination facilities, and shelter and bus requirements.
l '
The control system used by Ocean County, requires that the County EMC devote I
considerable attention to reading, initiating, and approving messages. About the time that the Site Area Emergency ECL was received (1755), message flow was very heavy.
l At 1801, the State Llatson received direction from the SEOC via the hotline to simulate r
sounding the strens at 1808 and left an appropriate message on the County EMC's desk.
i At that time the County EMC was fully occupied with messages and was not surficiently involved with coordination with the State. He initiated a message (OC #10) to the
[
municipal EOCs and to the Sheriff's representative at the OCEOC that Included Information on the sounding of the strens. This message was on a standard message form that did not instruct hat the stren activation was only to be simulated. The Sheriff's representative contacted the OCSCD and the strens were actually sounded at 1808.
Because many strens failed, they were actually resounded at 1815. Shortly before this second sounding occurred, it was realized that the sounding of strens had not been simulated but had actually occurred and a futile attempt to rescind the second sounding was made.
No PARS were Itavolved and the problem was mitigated by an actual broadcast of the test EBS message. The County EMC should give priority to coordination
.wlth the SEOC and should be aware of the precise content of action directives from the State.
I Nearly an hour after the offsite radioactive release began, when notice of a wind l
shift was received from the SEOC at 2059, the County EMC af ter discussion with NJSP l
advisers decided that because of the wind shif t, it was appropriate to evacuate additional
+
EPAs (16,19, and 20). As protective action decision making resides with the State, this suggestion was made to the State. At 2121, the SEOC decided that EPAs 16,18,19,and 20 should be evacuated. However, the County EMC prematurely began development of a message to the municipal EOCs at 2113 that EPAs 16,19, and 20 should be evacuated.
This message was communicated to the municipal EOCs at 2125. Shortly thereafter, at 2130, the correct message that was consistent with the State decision was communicated to the municipal EOCs Procedures should be developed to help ensure that PARS are not communicated to municipal EOCs prior to the decision by the State.
During the early hours of the exercise, the County was confronted with three actual emergencies an overturned tanker spilling a flammable liquid on the Garden State Parkway; a marine spillage of oll; and a demonstration by citizens protesting a l
decision by the Freeholders concerning a waste incinerator. The Garden State incident required the attention of the County EMC and radio. operators; the citizens demonstration required-deployment 'of the second shift Sheriff's officers. The County gave primacy to these actual emergencies; this did not detract from its performance for the exercise.
1 OCEOC 4. The objective to demonstrate the ability.to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel was partially met.
There are several 4
36 left an appropriate message on the desk of the County EMC. - The EMC Initiated a message (OC #10) to the municipal EOCs and to the Sheriff's representative at the OCEOC that included sounding the strens. This message was on a standard form that did not instruct that the stren activation was only to be simulated. The Sheriff's representative contacted the OCSCD and the strens were actually sounded (not simulated) at 1808. (NUREG-0684, II, A.2.a.
E.8)
Recommendations:
1.
The County EMC should give priority to coordination with the SEOC and should be aware of the precise content of action directives from the State. 2. The State Liaison should be trained as to the importance of coordinating and making sure the messages are seen and understood by the County EMC, rather than just leaving messages on his/her desk.
2.
==
Description:==
Nearly an hour after the offsite radioactive release began, when notice of a wind shift was received from the SEOC at 2059, the County EMC after discussion with NJSP advisors decided that because of the wind shift, it was appropelate to evacuate additional EPAs (16,19, and 20). As protective action deelston making resides with the State, this was suggested to the State. At 2121, the SEOC decided that EPAs 16,18,19, and 20 should be evacuated. However, the County EMC prematurely initiated a message to the munlelpal EOCs at 2113 that EPAs 16,19, and 20 should be evacuated. This message was sent to the municipal EOCs at 2125. Shortly thereafter, at 2130, the correct message that was consistent with the State deelslon was sent. (NUREG-0654,11, A.1.b)
Recommendation: Procedures should be developed to help ensure that PARS are not communicated to municipal EOCs prior to the decision by the State.
3.
==
Description:==
The strens were activated at the Ocean County I
Sheriff's Communication Division (OCSCD) at 1808 by a key on a console. At 1812, a computer display Indicated that only 6 of 47 strens sounded.
At 1815, the strens were reactivated and the computer display indicated that only 3 did not sound.
The Identification numbers of the strens that did not activate were displayed after the second. sounding but not after the first sounding.
Additionally, there was a discrepancy of 72 minutes between the time on the clock on the console and the time on the clock on the computer. (NUREG-0654, II, E.6, J.10.c) l Recommendation: The stren system should be checked to find the cause of the problems and the reliability of the stren system should be improved.
i i iiiii si
=iiii ii i
i.
i
i 33 J
Additionally, there was a discrepancy of 72 minutes between the time on the clock on the console and the time on the clock on the computer. The strin system should be checked
)
to find the cause of the problems and its reliability should be improved.
l The Sheriff's offleers at the OCSCD did not have a list of stren locations readily l
available in the radio room so that there was no assurance that all of the municipalltles affected by the stren failure could be promptly notified of the need for route alerting.
i Two of the three municipalities affected by the stren failures for the second sounding were notifled promptly; however, the third (Lacey Township) was not notified until 1850 l
after a list of stren locations was located. A list speelfying which municipalities should be notifled for each stren failure should be added to the stren activation procedure.
Although the alerting of hearing impaired Individua's was not a field activity objective, it was demonstrated that the OCEOC has a plan and the informutton needed to do such alerting. The plan speelfles that route alerting is the primary means for alerting j
the hearing impaired. The County EMC is to advise the municipalities to initiate alerting of the hearing impaired (at 1819 such a message was sent to the municipal EOCs). A route alerting team would get the addresses of the hearing impaired at the municipal EOC, drive to each address, and would advise the residents to turn on televisions to cable 8.
The names and addresses of hearing impaired residents by municipality is stored on computer at the OCEOC. A printout was produced upon request.
OCEOC 34. The objective to demor. strate the ability to maintain staff on a continuous 24-hour basis by an actual shift change was met. A change in shift was initiated at 1845 l
with the County EMC position. The shift change for the other positions began at 1906.
The second shift workers were thoroughly briefed in a detalled fashion by the first shift.
Some of these briefings lasted 10-15 minutes, and upon their completion the second shif t performed their duties in a competent manner. When the shift change was completed the County EMC briefed the entire second shift. All agencies demonstrated a shift change except for Emergency Medical Services (EMS), for which a second shift worker was not found (the primary replacement had a personal emergency). The EMS representative Indicated that fire department personnel could assume the position. There should be l
several EMS backups to ensure 24-hour staffing capability.
A previous ARCA (OC 1) from the OCNGS PEA dated December 10,1987 was corrected.
1 DEFICIENCIES l
There were no Deficiencies observed in the activities at the Ocean County Emergency Operations Center.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION 1.
==
Description:==
At 1801 the State Liaison received direction from the SEOC via the hotline to simulate sounding the strens at 1808 and
,n...
v
,v.,
.,,~.,n
1 l
38 1
OCFA 7.
The objective to demonstrate the appropriate equipment and procedures for
)
l determining field radiation measurements was partially met. The County field teams i
have permanently assigned vehicles with field monitoring instrument kits on board. The i
equipment kits contained the beta-gamma survey instruments and high-range gamma survey instruments speelfled in the plan. All of the instruments were within the required calibration period. The equipment kits were inErorlod and the survey instruments were l
battery-checked and source-checked prior to deployment from the OCEOC.
The l
Inventory revealed that the kit for team #2 did not have partleulate filters; these filters I
were then obtained from team #1. Also team #2 did not have smear wipes or a template, which were on their Inventory, but which are not on the inventory list in Att. 302-5, Rev. O dated September 1987. Field teams' kits should contain all the items listed in the
[
Inventory attachment in the plan and the team should be given the correct inventory list.
l Team 1 made gamma and beta measurements at waist height and ground level at each assigned monitoring location. These measurements were promptly recorded on log forms showing the time, date, and location of the measurement, and then transmitted to the BNE-FCP as soon as possible given the radio communications problems (see BNE-FCP 4). Both teams were somewhat weak on the general knowledge necessary to do fleid i
monitoring. The CDV-700 ratemeters were not set to the most sensitive scale when searching for the plume and their probes were not covered with plastic bags. Team #1 members thought that the CDV-700 was useful only for beta measurements and did not attempt to use the audio head set for night monitoring when it was difficult to see the instrument scale. The field monitoring teams should receive additional training for better contamination control of the Instruments and monitoring techniques.
I A previous ARCA (OC 3) from the OCNGS PEA dated December 10,1987 was j
corrected.
OCFA 8.
The objective to demonstrate the appropriate equipment and procedures for the measurement of airborne radiolodine concentrations as low as 10'I microcurles per ce in the presence of noble gases was partially met. The Ocean County field teams had the appropriate equipment as listed in the plan for the measurement of radiolodine.
Neither team was requested by BNE-FCP to take air samples. Team #2 was directed to locatlops outside of the plumet however, team #1 provided BNE-FCP with data Indicating a plume traverse. Since collection of an air sample was not demonstrated, the members of team #1 were interviewed by the evaluator about air sampling procedures and they responded with an adequate discussion. For example, they knew the proper sampling time and flow rate setting, that samples needed to be counted in a low-background (<300 cpm) area, and that the cartridge had to be purged with clean alt prior 'a counting. The Ludlum 2218 instrument did not have an efficiency posted on the Instrument; however, the team members were given a value of 0.025 for use in calculating the lodine-concentration.
The evaluator requested a demonstration of air sampling procedures of team #2 including setting up and taking an air sample on the particulate filter and the lodine adsorber; analysts of the lodine sample using the Ludlum 2218 and calculation of the child's thyroid dose rate using the calculational model of Att-302-4. They demonstrated
j 37 l
4.
==
Description:==
The Sheriff's officers at the OCSCD did not have a i
list of stren locations readily available in the radio room so that 4
there was no assurance that all of the municipalities affected by the stren failures could be promptly notified of the need for route alerting. Two of the three municipalities affected by the stren failures for the second sounding were notifled promptly; the third (Lacey Township) was not notified until 1850 after a list of stren locations was located. (NUREG-0654, !!, E.6, J.10.c).
Recommendation: A list speelfying which municipalltles should be
]
J notified for each stren failure should be added to the stren activation procedure, j
l l
ARRAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT l
Deseription: The OCEOC was fully staffed by 1710, except for the s
I transportation representative who did not arrive until nearly an hour later. This staff member had to be contacted at home by telephone, some distance from the OCEOC, because her working hours ended l
at 1430.
Rooommendation:
Pagers should be provided all OCEOC staff members.
i
==
Description:==
Information was not always communicated to i
e municipal EOCs via radio as rapidly as possible.
There was generally a 10-15 minute interval between initiation of a message for municipal EOC by the County EMC and the radio transmission, j
Rooommendation:
Procedures should be developed which would facilitate the rapid transmission of messages to the municipal EOCs.
==
Description:==
All agencies at the OCEOC demonstrated a shift change except for Emergency Medical Services (EMS) for which a second shift worker was not found (the primary replacement had a i
personal emergency). The EMS representative Indicated that fire department personnel could assume the position.
Recommendation: There should be several EMS backups to ensure l
24-hour staffing capability.
1 2.5.2 Field Monitoring Teams Ocean County deployed two field monitoring teams during the exercise (designated as team #1 and team #2). They had three objectives. One objective was met; two were partially met.
1
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l 40 2.
==
Description:==
The members of Ocean County field team #2 did not adequately demonstrate use of the Ludlum 2218 for analyzing the lodine sample and did not demonstrate adequate knowledge in the calculation of the child's thyroid dose rate using the model in l
' 02-4. (NUREG-0654, II, I.9) l Recommendation: Additional training in the use of the Ludlum 2218 and in the calculation of the child's thyroid dose rate is l
needed.
I AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT e
Deseription: The inventory of the contents of the kit given Ocean l
County field monitoring team #2 revealed that particulate filters l
were missing; these filters were then obtained from tes'm #1. Also team #2 did not have smear wipes or a template, which were on their inventory list, but which were not on the inventory list in Att.
l I
302-5, Rev. O dated September 1987.
j Rooommendation: Field teams' kits should contain all the items listed on the inventory list given in the plan. Team members should be given the correct inventory list.
5 2.5.3 Field Activities Ocean County had three field activities. Two were met; one was partially mat.
l 3
i OCFA 21.
The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of procedures, facilities, equipment and personnel for the registration, radiological monitoring and
- i decontamination of evacuees was partially met.
A public reception center with l
radiological monitoring and decontamination capabilities was net up at the Pinelands Regional High School in Tuckerton, N.J. Emergency workers from fire departments and the Ocean County Health Department began to arrive at 1830 and the facility was I
activated at 1900. It was under the supervision of personnel from the Little Lake Harbor j
offlee of the County Office of Emergency Management. Monitoring and decontamination of vehicles and evacuees were set up as speelffed in the plan.
Each agency was
- +
responsible for distributing dosimetry to its workers and for checking the operability of its survey instruments through battery and source checks.
t Personnel from three fire departments (Mystic-Island, West Tuckertown, and Parkertown) were responsible for vehicle monitoring and decontamination. ' They knew what contamination levels required decontamination and used proper instruments and survey techniques. It took approximately 10 minutes to monitor each enr. Although, the locations of observed areas of contamination were radioed to the vehic.le wash area, the entire vehlele was washed.
Following the decontamination trash, remonitoring. the -
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1 adequate technique in taking the 30 cuble feet alt sample with the particulate filter and I
l silver zoollte cartridge correctly Installed in the air pump. The members of team #2 did not adequately demonstrate use of the Ludlum 2218 for analyzing the lodine sample and i
did not demonstrate adequate knowledge in the calculation of the child's thyroid dose l'
rate using the modelin Att. 302-4. Additional training in the use of the Ludlum 2218 and in the calculation of the child's thyroid dose rate is needed.
i Step A.S.a of Attachment 303-1, Airborne Radiomative Sampling, page 2 of 4 i
should be modified to assure that the alt filter holder assembly is always assembled in a
{
i M'"a c" area. ' mis will help reduce ememeney worker exposure by eliminating setup time la the plume and will help keep the unused equipment from being oostaminated by opening equipment kits in the plume. This planning lasue must be j
addressed in the next revision of the Ocean County Radiologleal Emegency Preparedness e
Plan to be reviewed by the RAC.
OCFA 9.
The objective to demonstrate the ability to obtain samples of particulate activity in the alrborne plume and promptly perform laboratory analysis was met. The Ocean County field monitoring teams were not directed by the BNE-FCP to take an air sample, nor were they directed to deliver either a particulate filter or an lodine adsorber i
to a laboratory for analysis. The members of both teams knew ths.t air samples should be transported to a mobile laboratory, usually located near the BNE-FCP, for analysis. In the demonstration given by team #2_of air sampling techniques (see OCFA 8), the air sampling equipment was correctly assembled with the partleulate filter and a proper 30 t
cuble it sample was taken. The particulate filter was bagged and the team members explained the information to be included on the tag.
I DEFICIENCIES There were no defielencies observed in the Ocean County field monitoring activities.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION 1.
==
Description:==
Both Ocean County field monitoring teams were somewhat weak on the general knowledge necessary to do field monitoring. The CDV-700 ratemeters were not set to the most sensitive scale when searching for the plume and their probes were not covered with plastic bags. Team #1 members thought that the CDV-700 was useful only for beta' measurements and did not attempt to use the audio head set for night monitoring when it was diffleult to see the instrument scale. (NUREG-0654,11,1.8).
l Recommendation:
The field monitoring teams should receive additional training for better contamination control of the Instruments and monitoring techniques.
--.~
43 4
l OCFA 22. The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment and j
personnel for conpegate care of evacuees was met. Congregate care activities were demonstrated at the public shelter at the Pinelands Regional High School. This is a quite
]
adequate facility to shelter its capacity of 2,000 evacuees with sufficient toilets, showers, drinking water, and parking. The conpegate care activities are managed by the American Red Cross (ARC), which has speements in place to supplement the school l
cafeteria's three day supply of food, if necessary. At the 1987 exercise, the shelter j
manager did not know what the maximum capacity of the conpegate care center was, as l
specified in the plan. At this exercise, the shelter manager knew the maximum capacity of the conpegate care center. The ARC had sheltered elmost 2,000 individuals at this facility several years ago and most of the present staff had been involved.
They demonstrated excellent professional skills and the knowledge of how to operate a i
conpegate care facility.
[
I l
l Public shelter personnel were not aware of how many evacuees were expected to arrive. The plan does not appear to have any controls on whleh of the opened public shelters evacuees may reloeste to. There is no provision for distributing evacuees to public shelters. This may result in overcrowding at some public shelters while others are i
underutilized. This planning lasue must be addressed in the next revision of the Ocean County Radiologleal Emeriency Preparedness Plan to be reviewed by the RAC.
A previous ARCA (OC 5) from the OCNGS PEA dated December 10,1987 was corrected.
f OCFA 25. The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, supplies, l
procedures and personnel for decontaminattor. of emergency workers, equipment and vehicles and for waste disposal was met. The emergency worker decontamination center l
was set up and activated at the Ocean County Munleipal Utility Authority prior to the arrival of the evaluator and therefore were not observed.
The facility was well organized and set up lu accordance with the plan.
Vehicles were monitored using appropriate equipment designated in the plan. All vehicles and personnel were monitored within acceptable amounts of time (90 seconds per person; 3 minutes per vehicle). The survey meters used for radiological monitoring following decontamination were the type speelfled for in the plan. The CDV-700 instruments were calibrated by the State Police only in mR/hr whereas the plan Indicates that these instruments are callbrated in epm.
The plan should state that the CDV-700s are calibrated in mR/hr. This planning lasue must be addressed la the next revision of the Ocean County Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan to be reviewed by the RAC.
The personnel decontamination area was run very efficiently by knowledgeable, well-tralned Individuals.
Rubber garbage bins lined with plastic were available for contaminated clothing. Only mild soap was available in the shower area although the plan states that a more abrasive detergent should be available for more severe cleaning.
Detergent should be available in the shower area as designated in the plan.
Some decontamination personnel had some misconceptions about disposal of contaminated materials. One was that wastewater should be contained prior to disposal, whereas the plan permits wastewater to flow into storm sewers and the bay. The other
-.=
4 n
vehicles took approximately 10 minutes. This process was quite comprehensives however, it could result in a long queue if the expected number of vehicles arrive at the facility.
i The initial monitoring should be expedited by the monitoring team surveying only key locations (e.g., wheel wells, air cleaners, radiators) rather that the entire vehicle. The l
remonitoring could be expedited by having the team that did the initial monitoring complete a survey form whleh indleated the location of the contamination on each I
vehicM. The remonitoring team could then concentrate on the areas identitled. These l
recommendations were made previously in the OCNGS PEA dated December 10, 1987.
j Additional signs and/or traffic control barriers are needed to properly direct clean cars j
to the clean parking area. A 16-year old volunteer fire fighter was participating in the exercise. All emergency workers must be at least 18 years old.
The Ocean County Health Department was responsible for monitoring of evacuees. Evacuees were monitored using appropriate instruments and techniques. The monitoring forms. used were not fully completed in that the areas of contamination detected by the monitoring were not Indicated on the form. Decontamination workers did not know that the plan provides that the nuclear facility operator rather than the
{
N.J. Department of Environmental Protection is responsible for contaminated clothing pick up. The monitors should receive additional training on completing paperwork and on l
provisions of the plan relevant to their responsibilities.
Clean evacuees were sent j
directly to the congregate care area of the public shelter where they were registered by i
the American Red Cross.
j Contaminated evacuees were sent to the shower area. A plastic runner was used j
to protect the floor from contamination and plastic bag lined receptacles were provided for contaminated clothing. Evacuees could be sent into the shower area up to three times for decontamination purposes, if the individual was still contaminated then the first aid squad would be contacted and the evacuee would be transported to the Southern Ocean County Hospital. Decontaminated evacuees were provided with clean clothing and
[
directed to the registration desk of the congregate area. The shower area was not configured to accommodate both sexes in that there was no separation between the two showers.
Although the plan speelfles that detergent as well as mild soap should be available for personal decontamination, only mild soap was available in the shower area.
The shower area should.be modified so that there is a barrier between the two showers so i
that both sexes can be served. Also, detergent should be available.
Responsibility for the personal decontamination area was not clear.
It was staffed by fire fighters; however, the facility supervisor thought-that it was a County Health Department responsibility. The plan should state which agency is responsible for i
each speelfle area of the monitoring and decontamination function. This planning lasue
[
must be addressed in the next revision of the Ocean County Radiologleal Emergency Preparedness Plan to be reviewed by the RAC.
[
i All staff associated with vehicle and personal monitoring and decontamination,
~
and with registration should be commended for the knowledge that they displayed and the efficiency in which the facility was set up.
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- Deseription:
Additional signs and/or traffle control barriers are necessary to properly direct clean cars to the clean parking area.
Boeommendation: Additional signs and/or traffic control barriers should be so provided.
Desertptions A 16-year old volunteer fire fighter was participating in the exercise at the public shelter at the Pinelands Regional High School.
Recommendation:
All emergency workers should be at least 18 years old.
==
Description:==
Evacuees at the public shelter at the Pinelands Regional High School were monitored using appropriate Instruments and techniques. Decontamination workers did not know that the plan provided that the nuclear facility operator rather than the N.J.
Department of Environmental Protection is responsible for pick up of contaminated clothing.
Recommendation: The monitors should receive additional training on provisions of the plan relevant to their responsib(11tles.
==
Description:==
Only mild soap was available in the shower area at the emergency worker decontamination facility although the plan states that a more abrasive detergent should be available for more severe i
cleaning.
Recommendation: Detergent should be available in the shower area as designated in the plan.
==
Description:==
Some decontamination workers at the emergency worker decontamination facility had some misconceptions ~about disposal of contaminated materials.
One was that wastewater should be contained prior to disposal, whereas the plan permits wastewater to flow into storm sewers and the bay. The other was that contahiinated clothing is the responsibility of the N.J.
Department of Environmental Protection, whereas the plan states that this is the responsibility of the nuclear faellity operator.
Recommendation: Decontamination workers should receive further training regarding disposal of wastewater and contaminated clothing.
l p
43
,\\.
l was that contaminated clothing is the responsibility of the N.J. Department of i
i Environmental Protection, whereas the plan states that this is the responsibility of the nuclear facility operator.
Decontamination personnel should receive further training l
regarding disposal of wastewater and contaminated clothing.
i I
A previous ARCA (OC 6) from the OCNGS PEA dated December 10,1987 was corrected.
i DEFICIENCIES l
There were no deficiencies observed in the Ocean County field activities.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION t
i 1.
Descriptions The decontamination shower area at the public shelter at the Pinelands Regional High School was not configured to accommodate both sexes in that there was no separation between the two ehowers. Also, the plan specifles that detergent as well as mild soap should be available for personal decontaminationi only mild soap was available in the shower area.-
(NUREG-0654, !!, J.12)
Recommendations The shower area should be modified so that there is a barrier between the two showers so that both sexes can be served. Also, dstergent should be available.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT
==
Description:==
It took approximately 10 minutes to monitor each car.
at the public shelter at the Pinelands Regional High School.
l.
Although, the locations of observed areas of contamination were l
radioed to the vehicle wash area, the entire vehicle was washed.
Following the decontamination wash, remonitoring the vehicles took approximately 15 minutes. This process was quite comprehensive 1
however, it could result in a long queue if the expected number of vehicles arrive at the faellity.
Recommendation: The initial monitoring should be expedited by the monitoring team surveying only key locations (e.g., wheel wells, air cleaners, radiators) rather than the - entire vehicle.
The remonitoring could be expedited by having. the team that did the initial monitoring complete a survey form which Indicated the location of the contamination on each vehicle. The remonitoring l
team could then concentrate on the areas identified.
1 1
l l
l
l 46 The monitoring and decontamination personnel at both the public shelter at the Pineland Regional High School and at the emergency worker decontamination facility were knowledgeable on the proper dosimetry to be used, how often to read their dosimeters, and the level at which to contact their supervisor. At the emergency worker decontamination center, one person was assigned the task of recording all Individual dostmeter and TLD numbers and recording dosimeter readings; at the public shelter, one person was assigned this responsibility at each area (initial vehicle monitoring, final vehicle monitoring, vehicle decontamination, personnel monitoring, and personnel decontamination). This system worked very well.
A previ;m ARCA (OC 8) from the OCNGS PEA dated December 10,1987 was corrected.
DEFICIENCIES There were no defielencies observed in emergency worker radiological exposure control in Ocean County.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION There were no areas requiring corrective action observed in emergency worker radiological exposure control in Ocean County.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FO't IMPROVEMENT
==
Description:==
The second shift Radiological Officer at the OCEOC e
did not know where radiological exposure control kits were stored.
Recommendation:
Radiological Officers should be taught where redlological exposure control materials are stored.
==
Description:==
The members of Ocean County field monitoring team
- 1 did not seem to be aware of the exposure rate " turn back" limits of 1 R/hr and 10 R/hr.
Recommendation:
Members of field monitoring teams should receive additional training to increase their awareness of exposure rate turn back limits.
2.5.5 Ocean County Municipal Response Activities Activities at the following seventeen (17) municipal EOCs were evaluated during the exercise: Barnegat, Barnegat Light, Beachwood, Berkeley, Dover, Harvey Cedars, Island Heights, Lacey, Long Beach, Ocean, Ocean Gate, Pine Beach, Ship Bottom, Seaside
45 t..
i 2.5.4 Emertency Worker Radiological Exposure Control There were four emergency worker radiological exposure control objectives for Ocean County and its municipalities. Three objectives were met; one was partially met.
i OCEOC 6. The objective to demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control f
emergency worker exposure was met. The OCEOC is located in EPA 13 in the 10-mile EPZ A suffielent supply of radiological exposure control kits (100) was observed at the j
OCEOC. The contents of these kits included two direct reading dosimeters (DRDs) with ranges of 0-200 mR and 0-20 R, a thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD), an exposure card,
(
and a bottle of KI). These kits were not distributed to the staff at the OCEOC, rather I
the following procedure was used. Each staff member was given a blue card with i
information and instructions about radiological exposure control. In the hallway that adjoins the OCEOC, 4 DRDs were posted (two near the front guard post and two near the l
rear guard post). Every 15-30 minutes, an assistant to the Rad!ological Officer read i
these dosimeters.
If their readings would have shifted a few mR from zero, the radiologleal exposure control kits would have been opened, the DRDs zeroed, and the kits l
i distributed to the staff. The second shift Radiological Officer did not know where these kits were stored. Radlological Officers should be taught where radiological exposure control material are stored.
i OCEOC 16. The objective to demonstrate the ability to make the decision to recommend l
the use of KI to emergency workers and Institutional! zed persons based on predetermined l
criteria, as well as to distribute and administer it once the decision is made, if necessitated by radiolodine releases was met. At 2040, the decision that emergency workers m affected EPAs should Ingest K! was made at the SEOC and communicated to t
the OCEOC via the hotline.
'2056, the munle!palltles were notified via EMRAD. The l
radiological exposure control.
<tored at the OCEOC contain KI tablets for the OCEOC staff. Munle! pal EOCs hc e e supplies of El for their emergency workers. The County EMC and the Radiological Officer had adequate knowledge of KI usage and decision making; OCEOC staff were given blue cards that contained the basic information about K1 usage.
OCFA 6. The objective to demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency exposure wu met. Each member of the two County field monitoring teams was given a radiological exposure control kit containing the requisite items.. (In addition the equipment kits permanently stored in the vehicles contained protective clothing including respirators with proper filter cartridges.) The DRDs were zeroed prior to the teams' deployment, were read at frequent intervals (30 minutes) In the field and the readings were recorded. The team members were aware that they would have to contact the BNE-FCP If their higher range DRD exceeded 1.25 R. The members of Team #1 did not seem to be aware of the exposure rate " turn back" limits of 1 R/hr and 10 R/hr.
Members of field monitoring teams should receive additional training to increase-their awareness of exposure rate turn back limits.
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48
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calls / contacts were made within 30 minutes. Written call lists were used in notifying personnel by telephone and pagers.
Finally, staffing of most of the - muri!cipal EOCs was _ completed within 30 minutes.
However, at the Berkeley Township EOC, the EMC and the Deputy EMC arrived at the EOC in a timely fashion after notification to activate was received, and were then required to leave to respond to an actual hazardous materials incident on the Parkway. The EOC was fully staffed when they returned about three hours after the notifleation to activate.
The EMC monitored the radio traffic of the exercise, and maintained communication with the EOC while in the field. Adequate staff, in the range of 4-20, were present at each of the municipal EOCs.
OCM 3.
The objective to demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate and control' j
J emergency activities was met.
Each EMC was effectively in charge of the emergency operations at the EOC.
Periodic briefings were held to update staff at all municipal EOCs, except at Long Beach 1
Township and Ship Bottom Borough. The EOC staff were appropriately involved in major deelslon-making concerning emergency activities.
{
A copy of the Radiological Emergency Response Plan was available for reference at all municipal EOCs, except at the Ship Bottom Borough EOC (a copy of the plan was available outside the Ship Bottom EOC facility).
Messages were logged-in and written down on Emergency Operating Center Message Forms issued by Ocean County. Messages were distributed appropriately at
]
most of the EOCs. However, the accuracy of information in message forms could be j
enhanced. For example, at Barnegat Light Borough EOC, proper times of actual receipt of messages at the EOC were not recorded in the message forms. Instead, the times shown on the forms were the times reported of the event in the messages received from the Ocean County EOC.
]
J OCM 4. The objective to, demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel was met. Oenerally, the municipal EOCs i
were well prepared for any communications that would be required.
EMRAD radio was the primary communication system at most of the municipal EOCs with commercial telephone, County Emergency Management Radio Network (CEMRN), RACES, and other radio chann*N were available for backup.
Successful communication links were established between the Ocean County EOC and various municipal EOCs. However, because of some equipment problems, EMRAD radio could not be used at Stafford Township EOC. Instead, the backup RACES was utilized to y
handle voice communication. These communication systems at the municipal EOCs were able to handle communications flow without undue delays.
During the emergency operations, some confusion was experienced because of the simultaneous use of EMRAD and CEMRN radlos at three EOCs: Dover Township, l
l
47 Park, South Toms. River, Stafford, and Surf City.
There were six objectives to be demonstrated: five were met and one was partially met.
OCM 1.
The objective to demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand, and use emergency classification levels through the appropriate implementation of emergency l
funettons and activities corresponding to ECLs as required by the scenario was met. The 17 munlelpal EOCs were notifled by Ocean County EOC of the Unusual Event at 1545 hours0.0179 days <br />0.429 hours <br />0.00255 weeks <br />5.878725e-4 months <br />, Alert at 1620 hours0.0188 days <br />0.45 hours <br />0.00268 weeks <br />6.1641e-4 months <br />, Site Area Emergency at 1810 hours0.0209 days <br />0.503 hours <br />0.00299 weeks <br />6.88705e-4 months <br />, and General Emergency at 2009 hours0.0233 days <br />0.558 hours <br />0.00332 weeks <br />7.644245e-4 months <br /> (note: times averaged for all municipalltles). At each municipal EOC, the staff was aware of the current ECL. The ECLs were also prominently displayed at all municipal EOCs, except at the Ship Bottom Borough EOC where there were no ECLs displayed either on a status board or otherwise during a significant part of the exercise (no displays at least up to 1750 hours0.0203 days <br />0.486 hours <br />0.00289 weeks <br />6.65875e-4 months <br /> when the evaluator'left the facility for another 3
assignment).
OCM 2.
The objective to demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize and activate -
~
personnel for both faellity and field-based emergency functions was partially met because of events at two municipal EOCs Barnegat Light Borough and Long Beach l
l Township.
The initial notification of the Alert ECL was not received by the Barnegat Light Borough EMC from the Long Beach Township Police' Department as specified in the plan. The Ocean County EOC and the Long Beach Township Police Department were under the assumption that the Barnegat Light EMC would be notified by pagers which had been supplied earlier. However, Barnegat Light EOC staff was.not aware of this change In the procedure as it had not been documented in the plan. It was only the sounding of the strens after the Site Area Emergency that Barnegat Light EOC was activated and started their procedures for notifying the EOC staff. This EOC staff notification took.
place at 1813 hours0.021 days <br />0.504 hours <br />0.003 weeks <br />6.898465e-4 months <br /> which was more than two hours after the notification of Alert received at Long Beach Police Department.
Notificatlan of some of the, required staff was not demonstrated at the Long-Beach Township EOC. After receiving Alert notification at 1611 hours0.0186 days <br />0.448 hours <br />0.00266 weeks <br />6.129855e-4 months <br />, Long Beach Police Department notifled the Township EMC of the status. Immediately thereafter, the EMC contacted three key EOC staff members (Deputy EMC, Communications Officer, and Dispatcher) and requested them to report at the EOC. But, some EOC staff members including the Mayor were not notified of the A!ert status. The Township EMC Indleated that the Mayor and other staff would have been notifled if it was not a dell 1.
This procedure is not consistent with the plan (Section IV.A.1, Appendix 1.9) which speelfically states that the-Mayor or designated alternate would be notified of any.
emergency by telephone from the Long Beach Police Department. Figure 1.9-1 of. the.
plan also shows that among others, the Mayor is to receive Initial notification from Long Beach Pollee Department.
At other municipal EOCs, each EMC received initial notification and subsequently contacted EOC staff and field personnel.
At most of the EOCs, the i
,~ _
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OCM St.
The objective to demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to evacuated areas was met.
Upon receipt of a message in the Pine Beach Borough EOC at 1900 hours0.022 days <br />0.528 hours <br />0.00314 weeks <br />7.2295e-4 months <br /> from i
Ocean County EOC, a police car (Pine Beach Police Department) was dispatched to the i'
Junction of Route 9 and Motor Road to set.:p a traffic control point to aid in the evacuation of the EPA.
The police officer immediately simulated blocking off all southbound traffic into the affected area and assisted with maintaining an orderly flow of northbound traffic. This was accomplished by placement of road barricades, flashing signals and traffic cones.
The police officer was knowledgeable with all his duties. He was equipped with a
[
TLD Badge, a high and low range dosimeter which he continuously monitored every 15-30 minutes and reported on a log sheet, and to the Pine Beach EOC via car radio. The officer was also aware of the allowable maximum limit of the exposure, and knew that any order to ingest K! must come from supervisory authority at the Pince Beach EOC.
l Previous ARCAs (OCM 7 and 9) from OCNGS PEA dated 12/10/87 were corrected.
Previous ARCA (OCM 11) from OCNGS PEA dated 12/10/87 was corrected for Harvey Cedars Borough, but not for Pine Beach Borough.
l l
l DEFICIENCIES:
l There were no deficiencies observed in the Ocean County Municipal activities during this exercise.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION 1.
==
Description:==
The ECLs were not displayed, either on a status board or otherwise, during a significant part of the exercise at Ship Bottom Borough EOC (NUREG-0654, II, D.3).
Recommendation: The ECLs should be prominently displayed at all EOCs throughout the exercise.
2.
==
Description:==
The initial notification of Alert status was not received by Barnegat Light Borough EMC from the Long Beach Township Police Department as specified in the plan (NUREG-3 0654, II, E.1).
1 Recommendation: An agreement between the Ocean County /Long Beach Township Police Department and Barnegat Light Borough should be reached as to the method of notifying the Barnegat Light EMC when an Alert has been declared. This planning issue must be 1
i 49 o
4 Island heights Borough, and Seaside Park Borough. Repetitive messages were alred on these channels; however, they were not in conflict.
e i
OCM 5. The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays,-
and other materials to support emergency operations was met.
Except at Seaside Park Borough, all municipal EOCs had adequate space, furnishings and lighting to support emergency operations. The Seaside Park EOC was I
confined to a 6 mall room in a police facility. The EOC room was also a co-location for j
police lockers and storage. This restricted the use of the facility by more than five l
emergency workers.
l Most of the EOCs had effective control of access to the facility.
Most of the EOCs had sufficient equipment including typewriter, copter and kitchen supplies to support emergency operations.
Plume EPZ, evacuation routes maps, and other displays were generally displayed and used adequately at most EOCs. A notable exception was that evacuation routes map was not available at Long Beach Township EOC.
Status boards were used and updated in a timely manner at most of the EOCs except at Ship Bottom Borough where a status boa.'d was not used effectively during the emergency operations.
Sparse information was posted on the board and it was not updated in a timely manner. Also, the board was not mounted on the wall for improved visibility.
i OCM8. The objective to demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure was partially met. At all of the municipal EOCs except one a sufficient supply of radiological exposure control kits were observed. These kits were stocked with the items described in tha plan (0-200 mR and 0-20 R DRDs, a TLD, a record card, a bottle of K!). The radiological officers reviewed emergency worker exposure control information including their exposure limit of 1.25 R and knew who should be contacted for authorization to exceed the limit. Direct reading' dosimeters that were distributed were properly zeroed and read at appropriate intervals. Emergency workers who might be sent into the field knew to report to the emergency worker decontamination facility upon completing their assignments.
At Barnegat Township the radiological exposure control kits were kept in a closet. These kits were neither distributed nor observed. Radiological exposure control-kits should be observed and ready for distribution at exercises.
Three previous ARCAs (OCM 4 and OCM 10, and OCM 15) from the OCNGS PEA i
dated December 10,1987 were corrected.
']
I 1
l 52 h
Recommendations The equipment problems in the EMRAD radio should be corrected.
e Deseription:
Some confusion was noticed because of the simultaneous use of EMRAD and CEMRN radios at three EOCs:
Dover Township, Island Heights Borough, and Seaside Park Borough.
1 Recommendation:
A single means of communications should be i
employed, i.e., EMRAD radio.
t
==
Description:==
Seaside Park EOC was confined to a small room, which restricted the use of the facility by more than five emergency workers.
Recommendation: Expand the EOC space to an adequate level to
(
support emergency operations.
==
Description:==
An evacuation route map was not available at Long i
Beach Township EOC.
Recommendation: Evacuation routes map should be available at the -
EOC.
Description A status board was not used effectively at Ship
~
Bottom Borough. Sparse information was posted on the board and it was not updated in a timely manner.
Also, the board was not mounted on the wall for improved visibility.
Recommendation:
A status board should be used effectively by providing information on key emergency events and activities.
1 Also, the board should be mounted on the wall for improved visibility.
t 2.6 MEDICAL DRILL r
The medical drill was conducted out of sequence on June 8,1989. There were two objectives; both were met. -
b 2.6.1 Ambulance Portion L
MD 23. The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of vehicles, equipment, procedures and personnel for transporting contaminated, injured or exposed Individuals was met. At 1000, an injury occurred to a worker at the OCNGS. _ A coworker promptly called for help, at 1008 first aid workers arrived followed by a plant nurse at 1010. Clothing was cut away,' the wound was wrapped, and a shoulder. splint ' applied.
At 1012, offsite -
l
L --.
,,-,.,,--n
+
o
$1 1
addressed in the next revision of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan to be reviewed by the RAC.
l I
3.
Deseription Some EOC staff members at the Long Beach EOC laeluding the Mayor were not notified of the Alert status (NUREG-0654, II, E.2).
Recommendation: All EOC staff members speelfled in the plan, l
should be notified of the emergency in accordance with the plan i
and procedures, 4.
==
Description:==
Periodle briefings by the EMCs were not held to i
update EOC staff at Long Beach Township and Ship Bottom Borough (NUREG-0654, !!, H.3).
4 i
Recommendation: Periodic briefings should be held at all EOCs to update staff on emergency situations.
i 5.
==
Description:==
A copy of the Radiological Emergency Response Plan j
and Procedures were not available for reference at the. Ship Bottom Borough EOC (NUREG-0654, !!, P. 5).
t Recommendation: Copies of the Plan and Procedures should be ava!!able in all EOCs.
i 6.
==
Description:==
At the Barnegat Township EOC, the radiological' t
exposure control kits were kept in a closet.
These kits were neither distributed nor observed. (NUREG-0654, II, K.3.a)
Recommendation:
Radiological exposure control kits should' be observed and ready for distribution at exercises. Staff should be trained on the importance of the kits.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT
==
Description:==
Proper times of actual receipt of messages at the e
Barnegat Light Borough EOC were not recorded on the message forms.
Recommendation:
Actual message receipt time at the Barnegat Light EOC should be correctly recorded on the message forms.
Descriptions Because of some equipment problems, the EMRAD l:
radio could not be used at Stafford Township EOC. Instead,' the backup RACES was utilized to handle voice communication.
i
. -.... =, - -, - -. - - + -. -. - -.
-w w
.~-.
w
. -.. + - -
a e
y
' prepared and ready. The reason for the delay was to allow the plant j
radiation control technicians to put on gowns.
Rooommendation:
Injured contaminated patients should be transferred to the decontamination room as soon as possible.
i i
r l
i i
j o
i l
4 l
i l
l 4
l i
i 1
4
>: ', s 1
53 assistance at Community Memorial Hospital was requested.
Plant rediat!cn centrol i
technicians surveyed the patient, the immediate area. around the accident and the.
stretcher for contamination.
Lacey: Township EMS-responded to the Incident because Waretown EMS was Involved with an actual emergency. The patient and stretcher were placed on the 1
ambulance's gurney.
The ambulance crew was accompanied by two plant radiation control technicians who knew where to take the patient. The ambulance crew was i
briefed on the condition of the patient.
1 2.8.2 Hospital Portion 1
MD 24. The' objective to demonstrate the adequacy of the medical facility's equipment,.
procedures and personnel for handling contaminated, injured or exposed individuals was met. The ambulance arrived at Community Memorial Hospital at 1107. The designated j
l reception point was roped off, placarded and manned by hospital security. The patient.
was held and not transferred to the decontamination room for five minutes even though the latter was prepared and ready. The reason for the delay was to allow the-plant radiation control technicians to put on gowns. Injured contaminated patients should be transferred to the decontamination room as soon as possible.
When the patient arrived in the decontamination room, he was transferred to the decontamination table. The ambulance crew and the gurney were radiologically surveyed and released. The splint was removed and decontamination was accomplished using proper procedures.
Correct procedures -were used as the plant radiation control technicians helped hospital personnel fold and discard contaminated drapes. Hands were-repeatedly surveyed and outer gloves were changed as needed. Disrobing step out and room surveys were done properly.
DEFICIENCIES
(
i There were no deficiencies observed in the medical drill activities.-
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION There were no areas requiring corrective action observed in the medical drill' activities.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT
]
==
Description:==
The patient was held in the reception area at L
Community Memorial Hospital and not transferred to the decontamination room for five minutes even through the latter was l
2
TABLE 3.1. Syster Creek Nuclear Generatin~g System -- Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action-June 7-8, 1989 State of New Jersey
.Page.1 of 1 NUREG-0654
. FENA.
Previous Present No.
Area Requiring Corrective. Action Reference"-
Objective
- 6/7-8/89; Exercises
- Status'
'l.
.The bus driver' read his dosimetry every K.3.a.
6 X.
I 30 minutes although he had no training.
The' State Police trooper is supposed to read the bus driver's~ dosimeters. They-should be reminded of this at the mustering point. Otherwise' bus drivers
.should be trained in use of dosimetry.
2.
The bus driver was provided with a.
K.3.a 6
X I
. respirator which he had no training in ut,Ing and had not been fit tested.
Bus drivers should be fit tested and trained to use respirators if they are being'provided with them.
3.
Both' troopers had potassium lodide (KI),
J.10.f, X
C
(
but neither was aware of.the proper.
K.4 t
procedures for authorization to administer KI.
It is recommended that troopers be better trained in the procedures for authorizing the ingestion of KI..
l
t 55
.-W.,* j l
1 3
SUMMARY
OF AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION L
Section 3 of this report provides a schedule for the correction of area j
requiring corrective action noted during the June 7-8,1989 exercise..
_1 Tables 3.1 through 3.6 summarizes recommendations to correct these
{
l-areas requiring corrective action identified during the exercise. These tables
.I also include areas requiring corrective action identifled in previous exercises which remain unresolved or have been rectifled during the exercise.
t a
l r
i i
i I
i s
l l
I
TABLE 3.2 (Cont'd)'
Page 2 of 3 NUREG-0654-FEMA Previous Present No.
Area Requiring Corrective Action Reference
- Objective
- 6/7-8/89 Exercises *~ Status #
building where adequate space and facilities can be made available. The facility should have adequate toilet ~
and kitchen facilities, and ample wall-space. Also, a copier should be available in the permanent, suitable
. space.
3.
Very little data were obtained from 'the I.8 7
X I
ao field monitoring teams to adequately
' define the plume.
Procedures for con-trolling movement of field monitoring teams need to be revised to insure that they traverse ~the projected plume path to pick ~up radiation levels.
4.
The monitoring team did not have a high I8 7
X I
range survey meter as specified in the plan.
Each state team should be provided with a high range survey meter.
5.
The Stabilized Assay Meter system for I.8 8
X i
identification and measurement of radio-iodine was not operating properly and no backup instrument ~was available to the team. The systems should be repaired as needed and a' full and correct calibration made, and spares of all important equip-ment should be available at the FCP for the state field teams.
j i
u_--__
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating System -- Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action
- TABLE 3.2
" June 7-8, 1989-Bureau of Nuclear. Engineering-Page I of 3 NUREG-0654:
FEMA Previous Present d
No.
Area Requiring Corrective Action Reference
- Objective" 6/7-8/89 Exercises
- Status 1.
Considerable difficulty was experienced
- F 4
'X I
~
~
with radio communications b'etween the BNE FCP and.the State and Ocean County field monitoring teams due to failure-of the primary radio frequency and sub-sequent problems with'the backup' radio frequency.- 'All. State and county field monitoring teams should be provided with a reliable mobile radio system to pro-vide effective communications over the entire plume EPZ.
2.
The BNE FCP is inadequate for sustained H
5 X
I operations, being too small and lacking toilets or kitchen facilities. Wall space is limited,:and consequently, flip charts are the primary source of information display. This often results in burying.important information, such as PAGs, and in fragmenting data that would benefit from consolidation..The method of handling plume monitoring data is very poor, being both It.bor and time consuming. Also,f the lack of-a copier meant:that each message must be sequentially routed through 3 to 5 different people for information transfer and logging.
This activity should be housed in a' suitable' permanent 9
^
TABLE 3.3 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating System -- Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action
. June 7-8, 1989 Emergency Operations Facility-Page I of I NUREG-0654 FEMA Previous Present
'No..
Area Requiring Corrective Action Reference * ' Objective
- 6/7-8/89 Exercises
- Status
- 1.
. Although the BNE; team'atL the l'0F was:
D.3 1,3' X
I aware of each emergency class'.f tcation level, they were unclear on how'degrada-tions in fuel and containment. status
'each affected the. General. Emergency ECL.
The BNE staff should receive additional g
training during the annual emergency action level review with the licensee so e
Lthat the State. understands'how. plant conditions affect the declaration of all ECLs..
2.
.At the General Emergency EC'L, PARS were 1.10 11 X
I formulated by the utility based upon degrading plant conditions.
The PAR was accurate and was agreed upon by BNE staff...When dose assessment results were evaluated in terms of;affecting the PAR, a difference by a factor of 10 was noted between BNE and. utility assessments.
There was little discussion observed between the staffs to attempt'to resolve the difference.
It is recommended that
' differences in projections and assessments be resolved through discussion between EOF staffs, highlighting comparisons of input data, and differences in dose models.
e J
e; 4
-m TABLE 3.2 (Cont'd)
Page '3 of 3 NUREG-0654-FEMA-Previous Present No.
Area Requiring Corrective Action Reference
- Objective
- 6/7-8/89 Exercises
- Status' 6.
The only particulate sample taken.was not H
9' X
l forwarced to a laboratory during the exercise. A mobile lab was not brought in, and no courier was sent to rendezvous with the team and collect samples from them.
Provisions should be made for courier pickup in the event the teams are unable to report to a mobile laboratory as called for in the plan.
ao 7.
The field team did not simulate ingesting K.5 16 X
I i
KI even though this had been called for by the Commissioner of Health. Additional l
training should be provided to the field teams either in the use of KI or in com-municating key information between field teams and the BNE FCP.
8.
Some emergency workers did not have TLD K.3.a X
C badges. Regular briefings should be given to emergency field workers to assure that proper use of dosimeters and record keeping of doses are applied.
9.
Some emergency workers were unfamiliar K.1 X
C with the maximum exposure allowed with-i out proper authorization.
Emergency workers should be trained to know the maximum exposure levels at which they
~
will be required to notify their supervisor and be authorized to receive additional exposure if necessary.
r TABLE 3.5 '0yster Creek Nuclear Generating System _-- Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action June 7-8, 1989-Ocean County Page 1 of 6 NUREG-0654 FEMA Previous Present d
No.
Area Requiring Corrective Action Reference
- Objective
- 6/7-8/89 Exercises
- Status 1.
At 1801 the State Liaison received E.6 3,12 X
1 direction from the SEOC via the hotline to simulate the sirens at 1808 and left an appropriate message on the desk of the County EMC. The EMC initiated a message (DC #10) to the municipal EOCs and_to the
. Sheriff's representative at the OCEOC ed*
that included sounding the strens. This message was on a standard form that did not instruct that the siren activation was only to be simulated. The. Sheriff's' representative contacted the OCSCO and the sirens were actually sounded (not simulated) at'1808. The County EMC should give priority to coordination with the SE00 and should be aware of'the precise content of action directives from the State. The State Liaison should be trained as to the importance of coordinating and making sure the messages are seen and understood by the County EMC, rather than just leaving messages on his/her desk.
2.
Nearly an hour after the offsite radio-A.I.b 3
X I
active release began, when notice of a wind shift was received from the SEOC at 2059, the County [HC after discussion with NJSP adv'isors decided that because s
e O - h M
.. i..
ii. i ii.,
i..i.
....i n -i. i im-mis
~ -
J 7
TABLE 3.4 Oyster Creek Nuclear ~ Generating System--. Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action June 7-8,~1989..
Emergency News-Center
[
Page 1 of 1 l
Previous Present No.
Area Requiring Corrective' Action Reference" Objective
- 6/7-8/89 Exercises
- Status" z
1.
~A media briefing-contained information G.3.a 14 X
I which. included the announcement 'of "No Protective Actions? when in fact 1the County had recommended evacuation eighteen minutes prior to the news briefing.: The information on the
-evacuation was not given to the media-
'until the next news briefing' conducted 7
fifty minutes after the initial evacua-tion order. A system should be developed to insure that all necessary information impacting the.
public is included in press. briefings.
Personnel at-the ENC should be. trained-to brief-the.nedia in an accurate, coordinated,.and timely manner.
2.
A health physicist or.other~ qualified G.3.a 14 X
I
~
professional was needed at the ENC to answer questions ~concerning the i.
health effects of radiation.
A~ health physicist or other qualified professional should be available at the ENC.
1 x
TABLE 3.5 (Cont'd).
Page 3 of.6 NUREG-0654 FEMA Previous Present
'No.
Area Requiring Corrective Action' Reference"
- 0bjective' 6/7-8/89 Exercises
- Status' on the clock on the console and the time on the clock on the computer..The siren system should be checked to find the cause of the problems and the reliability of the siren system should be improved.
4.
The Sheriff's officers at the 0CS00 did J.10.c 12 X
1 not have a list of siren locations readily available in the radio room so that there was no assurance that all of the munici-palities affected by the' siren failures could be promptly notified of the need for route alerting. Two of the three munici-palities affected by the siren failures for the second sounding were notified promptly; the third (Lacey Township) was not notified until 1850 after a list of-siren locations kas located. A list specifying which municipalities should be notified for each siren failure should' be added to the siren activation pro-cedure.
5.
Both Ocean County field monitoring teams I.8 7
X 1
were somewhat weak on the general knowledge necessary to do field monitoring.
The CDV-700 ratemeters were not set to the most sensitive scale when searching for the plume and their probes were not covered with plastic bags.
leam #1 member thought that the COV-700 was useful only
+
.9 O
/
i __
.m.
.p
' TABLE 3.5 (Cont'd)
Page 2 of 6 '
NUREG-0654 FlHA
. Previous Present d
No.
Area Requiring Corrective Action Reference
- Objective
- 6/7-8/89 Exercises
- Status of the wind shift, it was appropriate to.
evacuate additional EPAs (16, 19 and 20).-
i As protective action decision making resides with the State, this was suggested to the State. At 2121, the SE0C
(
. decided-that EPAs-16, 18, 19, and 20 should be' evacuated. However, the-l County EMC prematurely initiated a message to the' municipal EOCs at 2113
. e, that EPAs 16, 19 and 20 should be
' ")
evacuated. This message was sent to the municipal E0Cs at 2125. Shortly.there--
.after, at 2130, the correct message that i
was consistent with the State decision was sent.. Procedures should be developed to ensure.that PARS are not communicated
'to municipal EOCs prior to the decision by the State.
3.
The' sirens were activated at the Ocean J.10.c 12 X
I County Sheriff's Communication Division (OCSCD) at 1808 by a key on a console.
At 1812, a computer display indicated that only 6 of 47 sirens sounded. At 1815, the sirens were reactivated and the computer display indicated that only 3 did not sound. The identification numbers of the sirens that did not activate were displayed after the second sounding but not after the.first sound-
~
ing. Additionally. there was a dis-crepancy of 72 minutes hetween ll'e time a
l, e
. _. ~.. -,_ _
TABLE 3.5 (Cont'd)
Page 5 of 6 '
Previous Present No.
Area Requiring Correctiv'e Action Reference
- Objective"- '6/7-8/89 Exercises' Status *
- 8.
Not all the incoming second shift per-A.4 X
C l
sonnel were sufficiently briefed by their first shift counterparts nor by the EOC director. The Emergency Management..
Coordinator should provide a detailed
. briefing of the current status'and the activities'up to the time of the shift change, for all incoming personnel.
In addition,.the.first shift, should brief.
their second shift replacements.
.m l
9.
The County PIO at the Emergency News A.2.a, X
C Center indicated that there was no A.4 County PIO back-up available. The County should identify and train a back-up for PIO in the ENC.
10.
One of the teams did not check through I.8 X
C their equipment and supplies prior to deployment into the field.
Field team personnel'should check through their equipment and verify that all required supplies are available.
11.
The shelter manager was not aware of what' A.I.d X
C the maximum capacity of the CCC was, as specified in the plan.
The' capacity of the CCC shelter should be known by.the manager.
,a~.
TA8tE 3.5 (Cont'd)
Page 4 of 6 NUREG-0654 FEMA Previous Present No.
' Area Requiring Corrective'. Action Reference
- Objective
6/7-8/89 Exercises' Status" for beta measurements and did not attempt to use the audio head set for_ night; monitoring when it was difficult to see the instrument scale. The field monitoring teams should receive additional training for better contamination control of the instruments and monitoring techniques.
e 6.
The members of Ocean County field team #2' I.9 8
X I
did not adequately demonstrate use of the Ludlum 2218 for analyzing the iodine sample and did not demonstrate adequate knowledge in the calculation of the child's thyroid dose rate using the model in Attachment 302-4. Additional training in _the use of the Ludlum 2218 and in the calculation of the child's thyroid dose rate is needed.
7.
The decontamination shower area at the J.12 21 X
I public shelter-at the Pinelands Regional High School was not configured to accom-modate both sexes'in that there was no separation between the'twoEshowers.
Also, the plan specifies that detergent as well as mild soap should be available for personal decontamination; only mild soap was available in the shower area.
The shower area should be m6dified so that there is a barrier between the two showers so that both sexes can be served.
Also, detergent should be_available.
g.
f
- f..
TABLE 3.6 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating System -- Susunary of Areas Requiring Corrective _ Action June 7-8, 1989 Ocean County Nunicipalities Page 1 of 4 NUREG-0654 FENA Previous Present No.
Area Requiring Corrective Action Reference
- Objective
- 6/7-8/89 Exercises
- Status' 1.
The ECLs were not displayed, either on a D.3 1
X I
status board or otherwise, during a signi-ficant part of the exercise at Ship Bottom Borough EOC. The ECLs should be promi-nently displayed at all EOCs throughout.the exercise.
l ew 2.
The initial notification of Alert status E.1 2
X I
was not received by Barnegat Light Borough EMC from the Long Beach Township Police
~
Department as specified in the; plan. An agreement between the Ocean County /Long Beach Township Police Department. and Barnegat Light Borough should be reached as to the method 'of notifying the Barnegat Light EMC when an Alert has been declared.
This' planning. issue must be addressed in 4
the next revision of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan to be reviewed by the RAC.
3.
.Some-EOC staff members at the long Beach E.2 2
X I
EOC including the Mayor were not notified of the Alert status. All EOC staff members specified in the plan, should be notified of the emergency in accon'ance -
with the plan and procedures.
s.
. 6 4
e e
,m_----
m-i 6
- 4
,p -
TA8LE 3.5 (Cont'd)
Page 6 of 6' NUREG-0654' FEMA.
Previous Present d
No.
Area Requiring Corrective' Action Reference"-
Objective
6/7-8/89-Exercises
- Status
' 12.
The survey meters used for radiological
-- K. S. d X
C monitoring:following decontamination was.
not the-type'specified in the plan..The equipment: identified in the plan'and the
~
equipment used by.the teams in theifield
-should be the same.
13.-
At the Manahawkin Decontamination Center-K.3.a X
C
~
the personnel did'not have.TLDs and some r-of-the workers.'did not'have DRDs.
Emergency workers;at the Decontamination Center should be.provided with the're-
- quired' dosimetry equipment and TLDs, as specified in the plan.
I 14.
It should be verified that:all schools E.5, X
under the ' jurisdiction of-the super-E.6 intendent at the Stafford Elementary School have received tone alert radios.
O
's
~
o --
TABLE 3.6.(Cont'd)
-Page 3 of 4 NUREG-0654 FENA..
' Previous Present'.
d No.
Area Requiring Corrective Action-Reference
- Objective" 6/7-8/89. Exercises * ' Status X
C
-8.
' Municipal EOCs withinLprotective action K.S.a areas should implement procedures'to ensure that contaminated individuals.are not allowed access into the E0Cs (Ocean Township).
9.
~ Lists of noninstitutionalized mobility-J.10.d X
C impaired persons should'be available at-each municipal E0C (Barnegat Township).
e e~
- 10. : Training of emergency workers in the.
K.3.b-X C
proper use, distribution, checking and recording of information from dosimeters is needed (South Toms River).
11.
Twenty-four hour staffing by roster.
A.2.a, X
should be available at~each municipality:
A.4 I
Pine Beach 46,.
e.
W '
,e+
8
4-TAGLE 3.6- (Cont'd)
Page - 2 of 4 NUREG-0654 FEMA Previous Present No.
Area Requiring Corrective Action Reference
- Objective' 6/7-8/89 Exercises
- Status' 4.
Periodic briefings.by'the EMCs were not-H.3 1
X I
held to update EOC staff at Long; Beach Township:and Ship-Bottom Borough.
Periodic briefings should be held at all.
E00s to update staff on emergency-situations.
5.
A copy of the Radiological Emergency P.5 5
X I
g.
Response Plan.and ProceduresLwere not
.available for reference at the' Ship Bottom Borough E0C.. Copies of -the Plan and Procedures should be available in all EOCs.
6.
At the Barnegat Township EOC, the radio-K.3.a 6
X 1
. logical exposure control kits were kept in a closet. These kits were neither distributed nor observed.- Radiological exposure control kits should be observed and ready for~ distribution at exercises.
Staff should~be. trained on the importance of the kits.
'7.
-Neither the Emergency Management Co-K.4 X
C ordinator nor the Radiological 0fficer knew that the authorized dose limit was 1.25 Rem. All emergency workers, par-ticularly decision makers,- should be
~
aware of the maximum dose allowed without authorization (Barnegat Light).
'4
( f . #
4 REMOYAL OF COMPLETED ARCAs FROM PREVIOUS PEA The following list summarizes those ARCAs identified in the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station PEA dated December 10, 1987 which have been corrected and verified in previous exercises and are being removed from' the tables provided in Section 3:
State of New Jersey numbers 4,5, and 6.
l Emergency Operations Facility numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.-
Bureau of Nuclear Engineering number 3.
j Ocean County numbers 4, 7,10,11,12,13, and 14.
-l Ocean County Municipals numbers 1,2,3,4 (except Barnegat Light),5, 6, 7 (except Ocean Township), 8, 9 (except Barnegat Township), ~10 (except South Toms River),11 (except Pine Beach), 12, 13, 14, 15 1
(except Surf City).
l The only ARCAs which appear in Section 3-are those previous ARCAs which
{
remain incomplete, have been completed as a result of the June 7-8, 1989 exercise, or
[
are the new ARCAs identified during the June 7-8,1989 exercise.
i 2
$ s.!),-
.. '. - r q
.,s
-TABLE 3.6 (Cont'd) i Page.4 Jof 4
.NUREG-0654 FEMA' Previous Present
)
No. -
Area'Requir'ing Corrective Action
' Reference * ~. 0bjective'.
6/7-8/89 Exercises
- Status' i
l i
12.. ' The municipal. E0Cs should be familiar
.J.10.f X
C with the procedures for. administering KI-(Surf City).
I
'NUREG-0654, FEMA REP-1, Rev.1, Criteria for Preparation and' Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Part 11.
~
- 0bjective number is from GM EX-3 (dated February 26, 1988).as it relates to ARCAs.
' Previous exercises were held on 3/16/82, 5/24/83, 6/5/85, and 5/12/87.
'Ci Remedial Action Complete.
I: Remedial Action Incomplete.
t Y
i a
l 4.-
0.
.