ML20033A969
| ML20033A969 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Black Fox |
| Issue date: | 11/20/1981 |
| From: | Gallo J, Gibbs M, Gibbs M, Steptoe P ISHAM, LINCOLN & BEALE, PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF OKLAHOMA |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20033A956 | List: |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-CP, NUDOCS 8111300233 | |
| Download: ML20033A969 (62) | |
Text
_
i 11/20/81 1
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00LKETED USNRC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 91 NW 23 P5:20 NDCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSI N ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD CF SECRETARY tim 3 A SERVICE ERAhCH f
Before Administrative Judges Sheldon J. Wolfe, Chairman Dr. Paul W.
Purdom Frederick J.
Shon In the Matter of
)
)
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF
)
OKLAHOMA, ASSOCIATED
)
Docket Nos. STN 50-556CP ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.
)
STN 50-557CP and
)
WESTERN FARMERS ELECTRIC
)
COOPERATIVE,
)
)
(Black Fox Station,
)
Units 1 and 2)
)
APPLICANTS' RESPONSE TO INTERVENORS' PROPOSED CONTENTIONS FOR CONTINUED RADIOLOGICAL AND SAFETY HEARINGS Public Sersice Company of Oklahoma ("PSO"),
Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc., and Western Farmers Electric Cooperative
(" Applicants"), by their attorneys, hereby submit their response to the " Proposed Iontentions For The Continued Radiological and Safety Hearings," dated November 5, 19811/ submitted by Citizens' Action for Safe Energy, Lawrence Burrell, and Ilene Younghein ("Intervenors").
1/
Applicants are responding by separate pleading to Intervenors' " Motion to Reopen the Radiological Health and Safety Hearings" dated November 5, 1981.
8111300233 811120 PDR ADOCK 05000556 g
I.
'4.
For the reasons stated herein, Applicants object to the admission of all of Intervenors' proposed contentions except 9,
12(e), 13(a), 13(e), 14(g), and the siting aspects of 15.
I.
INTRODUCTION The procedural background of this construction permit proceeding is that the evidentiary record had been closed, but a final initial decision had not been rendered,1!
when on March 28, 1979 the accident at Unit 2 of Three Mile Island occurred.
The case has been in abeyance.since that time.
In the interim, on August 19, 1980, the NRC promul-gated new emergency planning and preparedness requirements applicable to construction permit applicants,1! and on July 14, 1981, the NRC Staff sent applicants with pending near-term construction permit applications a list of TMI-related licensing requirements based on the proposed revision to 10 C.F.R. Part 50 (section 50.34(e)) and NUREG-0718.
The proposed rule was approved by the Commission on August 27, l
1981.
However, the final form of the rule has not yet been published in the Federal Register, and Applicants understand i
2/
A " Partial Initial Decision Authorizing Limited Work Authorization" had been issued on July 24, 1978.
l 3/
See 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, 44 Fed. Reg. 55410 (August 19, 1980).
t
, that it may be revised from its proposed form in some re-spects.
In September, October, and November of 1981, Applicants submitted Amendments 16, 17 and 18 of their Preliminary Safety Analysis Report.
Amendment 16 contains Applicant's Emergency Response Report, which was prepared in accordance with the post-TMI revisions to NRC emergency planning requirements.
Except for hydrogen control matters, Amendment 17 contains Applicants' response to the post-TMI requirements applicable to construction permit applicants.
Amendment 18 contains Applicants' response to the section of the post-TMI requirements relating to hydrogen control.
In its Order dated October 14, 1981 the Licensing Board adopted, with some modifications, a schedule for further proceedings proposed by Applicants, the State of Oklahoma, and Intervenors, which provided that:
Contentions challenging the sufficiency of the Applicants' Emergency Plan and TMI PSAR Amendments to meet NRC regu-lations and motions to reopen the hearing record on other issues will be filed by Novem-ber 5, 1981, which is 30 days after the Applicant filed the TMI Amendments to its PSAR.
Order at 2.
< 7atervenors filed their proposed contentions on November 5, 1981.1!
This is Applicants' response.
II.
LEGAL STANDARDS TO BE USED IN EVALUATING THE SUFFICIENCY OF INTERVENORS' CONTENTIONS t
The Commission's Rules of Practice provide that a petitioner shall file "a list of the contentions which petitioner seeks to have litigated in the matter, and the buses for each contention set forth with reasonable specifi-city."
10 C.F.R. 5 2.714(b).
The Commission has stated, 4
" definition of the matters in controversy is widely recog-ni=ed as the keystone to the e'fficient progress of a con-tested proceeding."
37 Fed. Reg. 1512 3.
In setting forth issues of interest or concern to it, the petitioner "'must be specific as to the focus of the desired hearing'
[a]nd contentions.
serve the purpose of defining the l
' concrete issues which are appropriate for adjudication in the proceeding.'
Northern _ States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-106, 6 AEC 188, 191, affirmed CLI-73-12, 6 AEC 241 (1973), pffirmed sub nom., BPI v. Atomic Energy Commission [502 F.2d 424, 425 i
-4/
The Licensing Board has granted Intervenors' request for additional time to respond to PSAR Amendment 18 by Order dated November 12, 1981.
i
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. (D.C. Cir. 1974)]."
Gulf States Utilities Company (River Bend Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-444, 6 NRC 760, 768-69 (1977).
The primary purpose for requiring that the issues be set forth with adequate specificity and particularity is to provide the applicant / licensee and the NRC Staff with a f air opportunity to know precisely what the issues are and exactly what support Intervenors intend to adduce for its allegations.
River Bend, supra at p. 771.
As another Licensing Board has recently explained, " ' Bases ' does not mean evidentiary proof, which is produced at the hearing.
But it does contemplate a clear articulation of the theory of the contention, sufficient that the Applicant can. cake an intelligent response."
Commonwealth Edison Company (Quad Cicins Station, Units 1 and 2), " Order (Reflecting Actions Taken at Preliminary Conference). "
(October 27, 1981) at p.
6.
l In this case, the degree of sc :ificity and basis required of Intervenors should be judged by reference to the l
amount of information Applicants have provided in PSAR l
l Amendments 16 and 17.
In most cases, Applicants have submitted a detailed explanation of how compliance will be achieved with emergency planning and TMI-related require-ments, and therefore it is not reasonable for Intervenors merely to assert that Applicants have failed to consider l
something adequately or that Applicants have failed to provide sufficient information.
Such conclusory statements fail to inform Applicants of why the PSAR discussion is inadequate or what specific additional information Inter-5 venors think is necessary.
Moreover, it should be remembered i
that this is a construction permit proceeding in which it is not necessary or customary for Applicants to provide operating license review-level information.
Indeed, 10 C.F.R.
S 50.34(e) in its proposed form is very explicit in describing the level of information applicants must submit (and the schedule for such submissions) to support issuance of con-struction permits.
Some of Intervenors' contentions, by arguing that further information or analyses are needed before construction permits are issued, would be clearly inconsistent with 10 C.F.R.
S 50.34(e), and they would constitute rule challenges which must meet the requirements of 10 C.F.R.
S 2.758 to be admissible in this proceeding.
Since the final form of 10 C.F.R.
S 50.34(e) has yet to be published in the Federal Register, it would be premature to interpose this objection at this time.
However, Applicants j
reserve the right to object on this ground to the various contentions proferred by Intervenors when the final rule is adopted.
1 I
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. _., _., _. _. -. _. -. -, _... _. ~.
Not only must an intervenor raise specific and focused issues in its contentions, such issues aust be appropriate for adjudication in the particular proceeding.
As the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board has stated:
The imposition of reasonable limitations on the scope of full trial-type hearings in administrative proceedings is essential.
The need for limi-tations in such hearings is a general one which is not limited to hearings which con-cern the licensing of nuclear power plants.
These limitations do not mean that interested members of the public may not express their concern before other forums wnich are appro-priate.
If facts pertaining to the licensing of a particu-lar nuclear power plant are at issue, an adjudicatory proceed-g is We right forum.
But if someone wants to advance generali-zations regardIng his particular views of what applicable policies I,
ought t2i Ee, a role othsr than as a party to a trial-type hearing sEculd M cliosen.
Duke Power Company (Nilliam B.
McGuire Nuclear Station, l
Units 1 and 2), ALAB-128, 6 AEC 399, 401 (1973) (emphasis supplied).
4
a s
III. SPECIFIC CONTENTIONS PROPOSED CONTENTION 1:
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION The Applicant has not demon-strated that it will be in com-pliance with NUPEG-0588* and Generic Technical Activity A-24 for exie ting safety related equipment and equipment added as a result of post-IMI require-ments.
Applicants oppose this contention.
First, it lacks nexus, basis, and specificity required by 10 C.F.R.
S 2.714.
As the Appeal Board observed in Gulf States Utilities Company (River Bend Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-444, 6 NRC 760, (1977).
The mere identification of a generic technical matter which is under further study by the staff (such as a TSAR item **
or Task Action Plan) does not fulfill this obligation [to supply a legal nexus for the contention], even if the matter has some patent relationship to the category of reactor under review.
For as we have seen, the generic study may have little (Footnote from original contention)
NUREG-0588 Interim Staff Position on Environmental Qualifi-cations of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment, U.S.N.R.C., December 1979.
(Applicants' Footnote)
The TSAR was a compendium of NRC Staff research topics which has now been replaced by the Task Action Plans.
_g_
bearing on safety -- e.g., where it concerns the methodology of the staff's review.
To establish the requisite nexus between the permit or license application and a TSAR item (or Task Action Plan), it must generally appear both (1) that the undertaken or contemplated project has safety significance insofar as the reactor under review is con-cerned; and (2) that the fashion in which the application deals with the matter in question is unsatisfactory, that because of the failure to consider a particular item there has been an insufficient assessment of a specified type of risk for the reactor, or that the short-term solution offered in application to a problem under staff study is inadequate.
To bring newly issued regulatory guides into play, it would have to be shown, e.g.,
that the means adopted by the applicant (as reflected in the application) for satisfying a regulatory require-ments are either not efficacious or significantly less satisfactory than those recommended in the guide.
6 NRC at 773.
(Material in brackets added by Applicants, Appeal Board's footnote omitted.)
In this case, Intervenors have done nothing more than reference a NUREG document and a Task Action Plan, without making any attempt to show how Applicants' approach to environmental qualification of electrical equipneat is unsatis factory.
In the PSAR, Applicants have agreed to
3
. follow IEEE-323 (1974) and Reg. Guide 1.89, Rev. O, November 1974, yet contrary to River Bend, supra, proposed Contention l
1 fails to indicate why application of this standard may be inadequate.
NUREG-0588, which is entitled, " Interim Staff Position on Environmental Qualifications of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment," was made applicable to operating reactors and near-term operating license applicants until a forthcoming rulemaking on environmental qualification is completed.
See Petition for Emergency and Remedial Action, CLI-80-21, 11 NRC 707, 712 (1980).
To Applicants' knowledge, however, the interim positions in NUREG-0588 have not been imposed on construction permit applicants.
Second, Contention 1 should be rejected because the environmental qualification of equipment is the subject of proposed rulemaking.
NUREG-0588 states:
On May 23, 1980, a Commission Memorandum and Order (CLI-80-21) encorsed the position in the "For Comment" NUREG-0 58 8 as the imterim positions that shall be satisfied (in order to verify conformance to General Design Criterion No. 4 in Appendix A of 10 C.F.R.
- 50) until the ' final' positions are established in rule-making.
The staff is currently developing these positions for l
rulemaking, and anticipates that the proposed rule (that is, the l
' final positions') will be is-l sued for public comment in Decem-ber 1981.
I l.
. (Nureg-0588, Rev.
1, Introduction at ix.)
In fact, on November 10, 1981, the Commission met to review alternative proposed rules for environmental qualification of electrical equipment.
See SECY-81-603 (dated October 20, 1981).
Following additional revisions, a proposed rule will soon be published for comment.. Construction permit holders and applicants will, of course, be bound by the results of this rulemaking and the interim positions in NUREG-0588 will be supplanted.
In view of the fact that publication of a proposed rule appears imminent, the Licensing Board should follow the Appeal Board's recent directive that, licensing boards should not accept in individual license proceedings contentions which are (or are about to-become) the7ubject of general rulemaking by the Commission. (Emphasis added.)
Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), ALAB-655, 14 NRC (October 7, 1981), quoting Potomac Electric Power Co. (Douglas Point Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB218, 8 AEC 79, 85 (1974).
Applicants recognize, of course, that even though Intervenors have failed to submit contentions meeting the requirements of the Commission's Rules of Practice, this Licensing -Board has a duty to inquire whether the NRC
. Staff's review of unresolved generic safety problems has been adequate. River Bend, supra, 6 NRC at 774-5.
Applicants have no objection to this sort of review of the environmental qualification issue in Black Fox in the context suggested by the NRC Staff in their November 5,
1981, motion to reopen the hearing record.
But there is an important distinction to be drawn between the review of uncontested generic issues mandated by River Bend and the litigation of a properly framed contention.
In Virginia Electric and Power Company (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2) ALAB-491, 8 NRC 245 (1978), a case in which the River Bend rationale was extended to operating license proceedings, the Appeal Board indicated the standard of substantive review applicable to River Bend issues:
In view of the limitations im-posed by regulations and the fact that our review was necessarily unaided by any of the parties, we have not probed deeply into the substance of the reasons put forth by the staff for allowing operation to go forward.
Rather, we have only looked to see whether the generic safety issues have been taken into account in a manner that is at least plausible and that, if proven to be of sub-stance, would be adequate to justify operation.
Scrutiny of the substance of particular explanations will have to await a contested proceeding.
North Anna, supra, 8 NRC at 248 f.n. 7.
, An understanding of the last sentence in the above quotation is of crucial importance.
In view of the fact that both River Bend and North Anna were contested pro-ceedings at the licensing board level, this sentence cannot possibly be read as requiring that a licensing board should address generic safety issues as matters in controversy irrespective of whether there are adequate contentions which raise such issues, Rather, a licensing board is required to scrutinize "the substance of particular explanations" re-garding proposed solutions to applicable generic safety issues only where there is a viable,. properly pleaded con-tention challenging the approriateness of the solution.
See, River Bend, supra, 6 NRC at 774, f.n. 26.
Intervenors have failed to submit such a valid contention in Black Fox.
Therefore, this Licensing Board's examination of environ-mental qualification should be limited as indicated in North Anna.
r
,.--.m.
. PROPOSED CONTENTION 2:
POST ACCIDENT MONITORING The Applicant has not demon-strated that it will meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.34(e)
(2)(xii)* and (xix) and Reg.
Guide 1.97 Rev. 2 in the fol-lowing areas:
a.
The Applicant has not provided sufficient pre-liminary design infor-mation to show that it can provide an on-line monitor capable of con-tinuous sampling of halogens and provide a timely indication of actual releases of radio-active halogens and par-ticulate from all poten-tial accident release points.
b.
The Applicant has failed to provide sufficient pre-liminary design information with respect to instrumen-tation for monitoring acci-dent conditions.
They have not provided conceptual design information or justi-fication for alternatives to i
items in Ref. Guide 1.97, Rev. 2 as required by 10 CFR 50.34(e)(2)(xvii) and (x ).
- These references in preposed Contention 2 appear to be typographical errors.
Applicants assume Intervenors mean to refer to subsections 50.34(e)(2)(xvii) and (xix).
. c.
The Applicant has not pro-vided sufficient preliminary design information to show how it will meet the environ-mental qualifications require-ments described in Reg. Guide 1.97, Rev.
2, for post-acci-d e.
c.,nitoring instruments.
Applicants on November 5, 1981, moved to reopen the record with respect to Board Question 13-1, so that the record may reflect Applicants ' commitment to follow Reg.
Guide 1.97, Rev.
2.
In PSAR Amendment 17, Applicants have provided detailed information on post-accident monitoring, including how the commitment to comply with Reg. Guide 1.97, Rev.
2, will be implemented.
Proposed Contention 2 amounts to the naked assertion that Applicants have not provided
" sufficient preliminary design information" on post-accident monitoring without referring to the specific deficiencies, if any, which they may perceive in Reg. Guide 1.97, Rev.
2, and without alleging any specific inadequacies in the infor-mation supplied by Applicant in PSAR Amendment 17.
There-fore, this contention should be dismissed for lack of basis and specificity.
For example, subsection (a) of Proposed Contention 2 fails to specify why the detailed system of sample col-lection, transport, and analysis described at pages 142-143 of PSAR Amendment 17 is inadequate.
It is not at all clear
'* whether Intervenors' challenge is to the technical feasi-bility of the sampling equipment Applicants will use, or to the proposed sampling mode of operation, or to the location of the proposed equipment such that it will provide a timely indication of actual releases from "all potential accident release points."
Applicants should not be forced to guess what problem Intervenors seek to raise. This same criticism applies to subsection (b ).
Subsection (b ) also calls on Applicants to provide
" conceptual design information or justification for al-ternatives to items in Reg. Guide 1. 97, Rev. 2, " but as PSAR Amendment 17 makes clear, no such alternatives have been p roposed.
Therefore, this assertion has no basis.
Subsecticn (c) argues that Applicants have not provided sufficient preliminary design information to show how they will meet the environmental qualification require-ments of Reg. Guide 1.97, Rev.
2.
But the point is that Applicants have committed to meet Reg. Guide 1.97, Rev.
2, and that Regulatory Guide contains within itself and by reference to NUREG-0588* a fairly detailed program for By committing to follow Reg. Guide 1.97, Rev.
2, Applicants have also committed to using NUREG-0558 with respect to post-accident monitoring equipment described
. accomplishing environmental qualification of post-accident monitoring equipment.
Intervenors fail to specify what further information is needed, or any basis supporting the need for this additional' information at the construction permit stage.
PROPOSED CONTENTION 3:
ECCS MODELS The Applicant has not ade-quately demonstrated compliance with 10 CFR 50.34(e)(1)(iii),
(v), (viii), and (xi) because it has not fully resolved defi-ciencies in its computer models for ECCS and Fuel performance as identified in NUREG-0630.
This proposed contention lacks sufficient basis for two reasons.
First, no effort is made to explain what the perceived relationship is between NUREG-0630 and the proposed TMI-related requirements referenced in the con-tention.
NUREG-0630, which is a draft report entitled
" Cladding Swelling and Rupture Modelt for LOCA Analysis,"
suggests that there may be a need to reevaluate all cladding models used for LOCA analyses to assure that licensing analyses are performed in accordance with 10 C.F.R.
Part 50, in Reg. Guide 1.97, Rev.
2.
With respect to other equipment, Applicants will follwo the rule which re-sults from the permanent environmental qualification rulemaking proceeding.
t
o
. Appendix K.
The four subsections of proposed 10 C.F.R.
S 50.34(e)(1) cited by Intervenors require studies of the impact of reactor coolant pump seal damage following a small-break LOCA with loss of offsite power (iii), sepa-ration of HPCI and RCIC system imitation levels (v), restart of core spray and LPCI systems on low level (viii) and depressurization method; other than by full actuation of the automatic depressurization system (xi).
While all these subsections refer in some fashion to ECCS or LOCA's, it is not at all clear, and Intervenore provide no explanation why the possible ECCS model deficiencies described in NUREG-0630 would have any effect on analyses of these TMI-related topics.
Moreover, there has been no showing that the deficiencies referred to in NUREG-0630 are significant in and of themselves.
Certainly the NRC has not taken action with respect to licensees' and applicants' ECCS models following the publication of NUREG-0630.
In short, it is not sufficient for Intervenors merely to refer to an interim report of a NRC Staff research effort in juxtaposition with certain proposed TMI-related construction permit require-ments, without explaining what they have to do with each other or what specific issues Intervenors wish to litigate.
. PROPOSED CONTENTION 4:
CONTROL ROOM / HUMAN FACTORS The Applicant has not performed an independent human factors re-view of the control room design concepts utilized in the proposed Black Fox control room, nor has it applied the evaluation criteria in NUREG-0700.*
Applica..t/ nbject to Contention 4 for a lack of basis as requir(.i by eaction 2.714.
Three examples serve to support this chiecacion.
First, the contention criticizes Applicants for not having performed an " independent" human factors review of the control room design.
The section of the pending rule covering this subject, S 50.34(e)it)(iii),
however, does not purport to require an applicant to do an independent review.
What is mandated by that section is that an applicant provide for NRC review "a control room design that reflects state-of-the-art human factor princi-ples prior to committing to fabrication or revision of fabricated control room panels and layouts."
Applicants' response to Section (e)(2)(iii) clearly commits to do just that.
Intervenors have not made any showing as to why Applicants should be required to go beyond the provisions of the pending rule and perform an independent review.
NUREG-0700, " Guidelines for Control Room Design Re-views, " September, 1981.
. Second, this contention ignores the fact that Section (e)(2)(iii) is a Category 4 requirement, which means that an applicant must provide sufficient information to demonstrate that the required actions will be satisfactorily completed by the ope. rating license stage, and that Applicants have made the necessary commitments to take these action in the future.
The thrust of Contention 4, however, is that Applicants have not yet taken certain actions which the proposed rule postpones to the operating license stage.
Intervenors failed to provide any insight as to why the operating -license deadline is inadequate.
Finally, Applicants have already done or have committed in Amendment 17 of the PSAR to do everything that is requi::ed by Section (e)(2)(iii), including the use of a control room evaluation plan which will meet the guidance of NUREG-0 70 0.
In the face of these commitments, Intervenors have made only the bare assertion that Applicants' program is not adequate.
Clearly, more is required in order to state a valid contention.
i For these reasons, Contention 4 should be rejected as lacking in basis.
PROPOSED CONTENTION 5:
PLANT SHIELDING The Applicant has failed to perform adequate radiation and shielding design reviews to assess the need
~
for shielding as required by 10 CFR 3
50.34(e)(2)(vii).
Nor have they demonstrated that the possible design changes are technically feasible and i
that there exists reasonable assurance that the requirements will be properly implemented.
This proposed contention falls far short of meeting the requirements of the Commission's Rules of Practice.
In the first place, proposed 10 CFR S"50.34 (e)(2)(vii) does not, contrary to the assertion in this contention, require applicants to complete radiation and i
shielding design reviews prior to issuance of a construction permit.
All that is required is sufficient information to demonstrate that the required studies will be completed by i
the operating license stage.
Applicants have committed to i
do such radiation and shielding studies, and provided de-tailed information on how they will be done, in PSAR Amend-ment 17.
Rather than pointing to any specific aspect of Applicants' discussion and providing a basis for believing it is deficient, as the Rules of Practice require, Inter-venors simply ignore the discussion altogether.
The second sentence of this proposed contention argues that Applicants have not demonstrated that "the a
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. possible design changes are technically feasible."
Appli-cants have no idea what "possible design changes" are being referred to.
Specific design changes, if any, can not be t
identified until the radiation and shielding studies are completed, and there is no. requirement that this take place prior to issuance of the construction permits.
Applicants have stated in PSAR Amendment 17 that the following options are available for dealing with any potential problems:
a.
Move the offending radiation source to a less sensitive location.
b.
Move the target equipment or operator control / work station to a location with an acceptable radiation field.
c.
Place additional shielding around the offending radiation source.
d.
Place local shielding around the target equipment or operator control / work station.
e.
Purchase equipment designed to withstand the newly specified radiation environment.
Intervenors have not attempted to provide any basis sug-gesting why these options may not be technically feasible or may not be properly implemented.
This proposed contention illustrates why the Commission's requirements of basis and specificity are more
r
. than mere procedural obstacles -- they are essential to the adjudicatory process.
If Intervenors have specific prob-lems with Applicants' plans to perform radiation and shielding studies, these problems are certainly not disclosed by proposed Contention 5.
The proposed contention does not provide Applicant with a fair opportunity to know precisely what the issues are and what support Intervenors intend to adduce for their allegations.
Gulf States Utilities company (River Bend Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-444, 6 NRC 760, 771 (1977).
Therefore, Contention 5 should be rejected for lacking sufficient basis as required by section 2.714.
PROPOSED CONTENTION 6:
DEGRADED CORE-RELIABILITY ANALYSIS The Applicant has failed to submit a program plan that demonstrates how it will con-duct an adequate site / plant-specific probabilistic risk assessment as required by 10 CFR 50 (e)(1)(i), because they have failed to include accidents more severe than those listed in PSAR Chapter 15; because they have not included an extended Liquid Pathway Study including the effects of the underclay layer on the Liquid Pathway; and because they have not established acceptance cri-teria for judging the accept-ability of the results.
. Applicants object to Contention 6 in its entirety because, as explained below, it lacks basis as required by section 2.714.
Contention 6 asserts that the Applicants' program plan for a plant / site-specific probabilistic risk assessment ("PRA") is inadequate because the plan (1) does not include a consideration of accidents more severe than those listed in Chapter 15 of the Black Fox Preliminary Safety Analysis Report ("PSAR"), (2) does not include "an extended Liquid Pathway Study (including the effects of the underclay layer on the Liquid Pathway), and (3) does not provide acceptance criteria for judging the acceptability of the PRA.
These three criticisms will be addressed seriatim.
The requirement for a PRA is found in section 50.34 (e)(1)(i) of the proposed rule, and it is' addressed by Applicants in Amendment 17 of the PSAR, Addendum II, pp.
1-5.
Page 2 of Addendum II states that:
l
'2he methodology to be used will be similar to that employed in WASH-1400.
[t]he initiating events will include LOCA (small, inter-i mediate and large),, loss of offsite power, together with L
the accidents and transients identified in PSAR Chapter 15 l
and those applicable accidents l
[ meaning BWR accidents] in WASH-1400.
l l
l i
. Table (1)(1)-1 on page 5 indicates that the PRA report will include a Chapter V on " Core Melt Probabilities," including
" Dominant Sequences" and " Dominant Cut-Sets."
Chapter 15 sets forth so-called design basis accidents, and core-melt accidents are not included therein.
However, this Licensing' Board can take official notice of the fact that WASH-1400 core-melt accident scenarios, as indicated in Addendum II above, are " accidents more severe than those listed in Chapter 15. "
Thus, it is simply not accurate for Intervenors to state otherwise.
Intervenors cannot ignore the above-cited information for purposes of framing a contention under section 2.714.
If they believe the selection of the various accident scenarios is inade-quate in some respect, they must say so and provide a basis therefor.
Having failed to provide such information and because the assertion is inaccurate on its face, this part of Contention 6 must be rejected.
The purpose of the PRA is to seek " improvements in the reliability of core and containment heat removal sys-tems" within the reactor.
NUREG-0718, Rev. 1 - Licensing Requirements for Pending Applicants for Construction Permits and Manufacturing License, section II.B.8(1), pp. B-4 and B-5.
Intervenors assert that "an extended Liquid Pathway Study" is needed.
Such a study might be necessary if the
. purpose of the PRA was to assess accident consequences.
However, as shown by the quotation from NUREG-0718, the purpose is instead to improve the reliability of certain reactor-systems.
Hence, a liquid pathway study would appear to be irrelevant.
Intervenors fail to provide any clue as to why they believe that such a study is needed.
-Thus, this part of Contention 6 lacks basis, and it should be rejected.
Page 3 of Addendum II states that " Acceptance criteria for the reliability analyses will be established during the initial phase of the [PRA] program. "
Intervenors apparently believe such acceptance criteria should be estab-lished before the program begins.
It seems perfectly reason-able to establish a program whereby during Phase I accep-tance criteria are established as a part of the overall scoping and " fleshing out" of the PRA plan.
Again, Inter-venors provide no insight as to why they believe otherwise.
Again, this fundamental lack of basis is fatal to the standard of admissibility under section 2.714, and this part of Contention 6 must be rejected.
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l lu
. PROPOSED CONTENTION 7:
SAFETY / RELIEF VALVE TESTING Applicant has failed to comply with 10 CFR 50. 34 (e) (2 ) (x) be-cause it has not committed to demonstrate the applicability of the generic valve tests described in the PSAR to the plant-specific valve and piping design of Black Fox or to modify their design on the basis of plant-specific test-ing.
Also, the tests have not been conducted over ATWS corMi-tions and thus are not adequate to assure safety.
Applicants object to Contention 7 in its entirety because Intervenors have failed to set forth with specifi-j city any bases whatsoever for their assertions.
First, as shown in PSAR Amendment 17, Applicants are meeting the requirements of section (e)(2)(x) of the proposed rule through their participation in the BWR Owners' Group, which is conducting the required tasts in order to qualify safety /
relief valves and piping.
The PSAR discussion points out that the safety / relief valves purchased for Black Fox were included in those tests, as -well as another type of valve which could be used in Black Fox.
Thus, there is no basis for Intervenors' claim that Applicants have not demonstrated the applicability of the generic, Owners' Group, tests to Black Fox.
Applicants' final objection to Contention 7 re-lates to Intervenors' charge that the safety / relief valve
m.
. tests are not adequate to assure safety because they were not conducted over ATWS conditions.
There is no basis for this contention insofar as it purports to require more than section (e)(2)(x) of the pending rule requires.
That section states:
" Actual testing under ATWS conditions need not be carried out until subsequent phases of the test program are developed."
As Intervenors have not attempted to demonstrate why tests under ATWS ' conditions are necessary at this time to assure safety, this part of Contention. 7 lacks the specificity and basis demanded by S 2.714(b) and, thus, cannot be admitted.
PROPOSED CONTENTION 8:
DETECTION OF INADEQUATE CORE COOLING Applicant has failed to pro-vide preliminary design informa-tion required by 10 CPR 50.34 (e)
(2)(xviii), at a level consistent with that normally required at the construction permit stage of review with respect to the design of their system for monitoring conditions leading to inadequate core cooling, including in-core thermocouples.
Nor have they demonstrated that their design concept is technically feasible and within the state of the art or that there exists reasonable assurance that the requirements will be implemented properly.
Applicants object to contention 8 in its entirety because it does not attempt to meet the standard articulated
. in 10 C.F.R.
S 2.714(b), which requires that an intervenor provide "the bases for each contention set forth with reasonable specificity."
Contention 8 pertains to section (2)(xviii),
" Identification of and Recovery from Conditions Leading to Inadequate Core Cooling," of the proposed rule concerning i
post-TMI requirements for construction permit applicants, which will be codified as 10 C.F.2. S 50.34(e).
The re-quirements of section (2 ) (xviii) are further detailed in NOREG-0718, Fev. 1.
Rathar than point to specific faults or J.nade-quacies in Applicant s' response to those requirements, h owever, Intervenors' Contention 8 merely parrots the language of the NUREG-0718 elaboration of seccion (2)(xviii).
That document states:
Applicants shall, to the extent possible, provide preliminary design information at a level consistent with that normally required at the construction permit stage of review.
Applicants shall also demon-strate that the design concept is technically feasible and within tha state of the art, and that there exists reason-able assurance that the re-quirements will be implemented properly prior to the issuance of operating licenses.
NUREG-0718, Rev.
1, at B-ll.
. A comparison of this text with the words of Con-tentton 8 reveals that Intervenors have done nothing but reiterate the post-TMI requirement relating to Jetection of inadequate core cooling.
Such a reiteration does not con-1 stitute a valid centention, which requires that the bases be set forth "with reasorable specificity. "
Obviously, Inter-venors have set forth no be.ses for this contention, much less described them with specificity.
Applicants believe that this failing is fatal.
After all, it must be remembered that the requirements of 5 2.714 (b) are not mere legal formalisms.
Rather, they are vital to the integrity of the NRC hearing process, for an applicant cannot be expected to litigate and, indeed, bear the burden of proof on, an issue which has not been clearly framed.
Because Intervenors have not made any attempt in Contention 8 to indicate how or why Applicants' design as described in PSAR Amendment 17 is inadequate or does not comport with the requirements of the pending rule, this contention must be rejected.
l l
l I
. PROPOSED CONTENTION 9:
WATER LEVEL MEASUREMENT The Applicant has not demon-strated compliance with 10 CFR 50.34(e)(2)(xviii) and the requirement for an unambiguous indication of inadequate core cooling because it relies mainly on several vessel water level
- asurements which may be mis-leading because they do not have a common reference level.
The Applicant has failed to provide sufficient preliminary design information to show that its design will provide an un-ambiguous indication of water level under all transient and accident conditions.
Contention 9, like Contention 8, relates to section (2)(xviii) of the proposed rule.
Unlike the pre-vious contention, however, this one does state a basis, as Intervenors assert, that Applicants' proposal is inadequate "because it relies mainly on several vessel water measure-ments which may be misleading because they do not have a common reference level."
Applicants, while disagreeing with the conclusion drawn by Intervenors, agree that the first sentence of Contention 9 properly sets forth a litigable issue.
The second sentence of Contention 9 is another matter, however.
There, Intervenors contend that:
I
, The Applicant has failed to provide sufficient preliminary design information to show that its design will provide an unambiguous indication of water level under all transient and accident conditions.
It is unclear to Applicants whether Lhis sentence is simply a rentatement of the idea expressed in the pre-vious sentence, in which case it can be dismissed as mere verbiage, or whether Intervonors are attempting to put forth an additional issue concerning water level measurement.
If the latter is true, Applicants object to the second half of Contention 9 because it lacks a basis set forth with specifi-city, as required by 10 C.F.R. S 2.714(b).
Although it is 4
obvious that that sentence is addressed generally to Ap-plicants' design for water level indication, it is far from obvious in what particular respect Intervenors believe that design to be inadequate.
Absent further explication, the 4
second sentence ;f Contention 9 does not present an issue which can be litigated in this proceeding.
PROPOSED CONTENTION 10:
DOCUMENTATION OF DEVIATIONS Applicants object to Contention 10 in its en-1 tirety.
Contention 10 seeks to place into controversy a i
question as to "the need to document deviations from current i
i I
. regulatory practices."
This asserted requirement is based on, among.other things, Section 110 of Public Law 96-295 (the NRC Authorization Bill for fiscal year 1980).
Section 110 directed the NRC to develop a plan for the systematic safety review of all operating nuclear power plants.
The NRC, pursuant to this Congressional. directive, developed a plan and published it for comment on October.9, 1980, in the form of a proposed rcle.
45 Fed. Reg. 67099 (copy attached as Exhibit A).
The proposed rule would extend the plan for a systematic safety review to all ap-plicants for construction permits.
A final rule has not yet been approved and issued by the NRC.
Since the subject of Contention 10 is in the throes of rulemaking, it is not appropriate for litigation in an individual licensing proceeding.
Potomac Electric Power Cp. (Douglas Point Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-218, 8 AEC 79 (1974).
The Appeal Board stated that " licensing boards should accept in individual license proceedings contentions which are (or are about to become) the subject of general rulemaking by the Commission."
Idl at 85.
This holding was recently affirmed in Sacramento Municipal Utilitv District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station),
A LAB-6 5 5, 14 NRC (October 7, 1981).
Thus, Contention 10 should be rejected.
PROPOSED CONTENTION ll:
GENERIC SAFETY ISSUES Contrary to the principles of the River Bend decision (ALAB-444),
the Applicant has failed to in-clude in its PSAR an adequate action plan for BFS with respect to the following unresolved safety issues which the Staff identified as a result of inves-tigations of the TMI-2 accident:*
1.
Shutdown Dec r Heat re-moval Requireinents, Task A-45.
2.
Safety Implications of Control Systems, Task.3-47.
3.
Hydrogen Control Measures and Effects of Hydrogen Burns on Safety Fquipment, Task A-48.
Applicants object to Contention 11 in its entirety because it does not set forth an issue which is properly within the scope of this proceeding.
The thrust of Con-tention 11 is that Applicants have not satisfied the re-quirements laid down by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board
(" Appeal Board") in Gulf States Utilities Company (River Bend, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-444, 6 NRC 760 6 NRC at 775.
The NRC Staff has stated that it intends to fulfill this obligation for Black Fox by the submis-sion of Supplement No. 3 to the Safety Evaluation Report, which will discuss both unresolved safety issues and other generic safety concerns.
" Motion of NRC Staff to Reopen the Record the the Purpose of Receiving into Evidence a Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report," November 5, 1981.
. (1977), in that Applicants have not included in the PSAR an action plan for Black Fox with respect to three specified unresolved safety issues.
The simple response to this contention is that River Bend impcses no such requirement upon an Applicant.
On the contrary, even the most cursory reading of River Bend 2 eveals that the Appeal Board's words concerning the treatment of unresolved generic safety prob-lems were directed to the NRC Staff.
What the Appeal Board did require in River Bend was that the Staff provide the Licensing Board with "a summary description of those generic problems under continuing study which have both relevance to facilities of the type under review and po-tentially significant public safety implications. "
6 NRC 760, 775.
No similar duties devolve upon the applicar.*.s.
Further, as we have previously pointed out, there is a significant distinction Shich must be drawn between litigated contentions and the Licensing Board's limited responsibility under River Bend as to uncontested generic I
issues, to determine whether the Staff's review has been adequate.
Applicants agree that this Board must undertake the latter inquiry with respect to these three new Unre-solved Safety Issues.
But if Intervenors are not satisfied
(
with-this limited inquiry and seek to introduce a litigible m
. contention for the Board to resolve, River Eend makes it clear that they must do more than merely identify the generic technical matters, which is all that has been done here.
PROPOSED CONTENTION 12:
CONTAINMENT DESIGM CHANGE The Applicant has made a sub-stantial structural change to the containment design by adding a concrete wall as backing for the steel containment shell in the area of the annulus surround-ing the suppression pool.
This change is mentioned in Amendment 17 (pages 1.2-15, 3.8-2, through 3.8-26, and also in Figures 3.8-la and 3.8-lb).
The Applicant has not provided sufficient prelimi-nary design information to show how it will irpact the following design factors:
(a)
Thermal transients in the suppression pool and lines during blow-down and LOCA events.
(b)
Heat transfer from the sup-pression pool.
(c)
Stress levels in the welds and joints of the lining and connected piping.
(d )
Connections with the base mat and shield wall.
(e)
Vibratory motion transmitted to other structural components.
. (f)
Ability to perform in-service inspection and leak rate analy-sis of the suppression pool lines.
Without the foregoing analyses, there is no assurance the present suppres-sion pool and containment design is adequate to protect containment inte-grity during accidents and LOCA con-ditions.
Applicants have no objection to subsection (e) of Contention 12.
This subsection raises the phenomenon of containment vessel " ringing" which formed the basis for Applicants' decision to add the concrete wall as a backing for the containment vessel.
Applicants, of course, contend that the proposed wall is a safety improvement, as will be shown when that issue is litigated on its merits.
Applicants object to subsections (a), (b), (c).
(d ), and (f), for the following reasons.
Subsection (a) lacks specificity in that the use of the phrase " thermal transients" is ambiguous.
As Ap-plicants' previous testimony in this proceeding explained, there are many phenomena which may occur in the suppression pool during blow-down and LOCA events.
It is not at all clear which of these phenomena are being referred to in subsection (a).
Further, no basis is given for supposing that the thermal effects associated with any of these pheno-mena may be modified by the presence of the proposed con-crete reinforcement outside the suppression pool.
. Similarly, subsection (b) provides no basis in-dicating that heat transfer from the suppression pool may be affected in any significant way by the proposed concrete reinforcement, or any reason why such an effect would be important to safety.
Subsection (c) calls for further preliminary design information on containment vessel welds and joints and connected piping.
The contention, however, ignores Applicants' commitments to meet applicable codes and standards, as set forth in great detail in 10 C.F.R. S 50.55a and the PSAR, as modified by Amendment 17.
At the construction permit stage, Applicants are not required to do more than agree to meet such codes and standards; following issuance of construction permits, adherence to such commitments is monitored by the NRC Staff and confirmed at the operating license stage.
On the other hand, if Intervenors have a specific question concerning the adequacy or sufficiency of the codes and standards for welding and piping set forth in 10 C.F.R.
S 50.55a and in the PSAR, this issue should be raised with more specificity and basis, and, if the chal-lenge is to 10 C.F.R.
S 50.55a, it should be made in ac-cordance with the procedures outlined in 10 C.F.R.
S 2.758.
v c.-,
,m
,,, - -, - - -., - - - + -. - - -. -.. - - - -
d
. Subsection (d) also lacks specificity and basis in in that no attempt is made to indicate why the discussion of base mat and shield building connection in PSAR Amendment 17 is deficient.
This is true even though the contention itself refers to the relevant pages of PSAR Amendment 17.
Therefore, there is no reason why Intervenors could not-have supplied a basis for this subsection, if indeed there is'any valid concern.
Subsection (f) is inadmissible because no basis is given for the assertion that in-service inspection and leak-rate analysis of the suppression pool lines is required or desirable.
For the foregoing reasons, subsections (a), (b),
(c), (d), and (f) should be rejected as lacking the re-quisite specificity and basis required by section 2.714.
PROPOSED CONTENTION 13:
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN Proposed Contention 13 begins:
The Applicants and Staff have failed to account properly for local emergency response needs and capabilities in establishing boundaries for the plume expo-sure pathway and ingestion path-way Emergency Planning Zones for BFS, as required by 10 CFR 50.34(a) and 10 CPR Part 50, Appendix E.
. Specifically, Applicants and Staff have failed to consider adequately or to account properly for the effect of the following factors specific to BFS on local emergency response needs and capabilities, and, hence, on the appropriate size and configuration of the BFS EPZ's.
NRC regulations state that:
The size of the EPZs for a nuclear power plar.t shall be determined in relation to local emergency resporse needs and capa-bilities as they are affected by such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries....
Generally, the plume exposure pathway EPZ for nuclear power plants with an authorized power level greater than 250 MW thermal shall con-sist of an area about 10 miles (16 km) in radius and the in-gestion pathway EPZ shall con-sist of an area about 50 miles (80 km) in radius.
10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E n.2.
Consistent with ' this NRC requirement, the Black Fox site plume exposure EPZ is 10 miles in radius and the ingestion exposure is 50 miles in radius.
PSAR Amendment 16, Section 1.3.
Applicant accepts the premise of Interventors' pro-posed contention 13 that this Licensing Board could require different EPZ's if local conditions specific to the Black Fox site warranted a departure from the 10-mile and 50-mile
. zones generally preseqibed by Appendix E.
However, despite the fact that this proposed contention alleges the existence of local factors " specific to BFS," only subsections 13 (a )
and 13 (e) set forth such factors with reasonable specificity and basis.
Applicants do not concede the merits of 13(a) and 13 (e) by acknowledging that said subsections meet the requirements of section 2.714.
Each of the subsections of proposed Contention 13 is discussed below.
Subsection 13(a)
(a)
The proximity of the proposed plant site to Verdigris River and the groundwater conditions and soil composition including the underclay layers on said site, with their resulting im-plications for travel of radionuclides through a liquid pathway in the event of a reactor melt-down accident at BFS;*
Applicants have no objection to the admission of proposed Contention 13(a).
(Footnote from original contention)
See, NUREG/CR-
- 1596, "The consequences from Liquid Pathways on a l
Reactor Meltdown Accident,"
June, 1981.
. Subsection 13(b)
(b) -The number, location, and capacity of local sheltering f acilities and the degree of protection from radio-nuclides afforded thereby; This subparagraph' lacks specificity and basis.
The term " sheltering facilities" is adbiguous in that is could refer to ordinary housing or to special facilities constructed in the purpose of providing protection to the public during radiological emergencies.
If the former interpretation is correct, Intervenors provide no hint why the degree of protection afforded by existing housing surrounding the Black Fox site is " specific to BFS" or different from the assumed by the NRC in specifying the presumptive 10-mile and 50-mile EPZ 's or how the EPZ boun-daries should be changed to account for whatever special housing conditions Intervenors believe exist.
If Inter-venors believe that specially equipped fallout shelters should be built, this was a proposal that was expressly rejected by NRC and EPA emergency planners in NUREG-0396 (at
- p. 14).
Special sheltering facilities are not contemplated by 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, and therefore Intervenors should provide a basis why such unique facilities are ne-cessary for Black Fox, and what effect such facilities would have on the size and configuration of the Black Fox EPZ's.
4 Subsection 13(c)
(c)
The heightened sensi-tivity to radiation (over that of the average healthy adult male) of children and pregnant women.
This subparagraph is clearly a generic challenge to NRC and FEMA emergency planning requirements and as such should not be entertained in this proceeding.
Intervenors provide no basis supporting the view that the " heightened sensitivity to radiation.
. of children and pregnant women" is a factor " specific to BFS," nor do they provide any basis for believing that there are unusual numbers of pregnant women and children near the Black Fox site.
- Thus, this subsection lacks the requisite basis required by section 2.714.
Subsection 13(d)
(d )
Local meteorological conditions, including the distribution of wind directions and speeds and the frequency of tornados; This contention lacks specificity and basis.
Des-pite the fact that Applicants have provided voluminous information on local meteorological conditions in the PSAR and ER, Intervenors make no attempt to specify what it is
. about Black Fox site meteorology that requires different EPZ 's for Black Fox, or how the EPZ 's should be changed.
Similarly, Intervenors fail to explain why or how the
" frequency of tornados" should influence the choice of EPZ's.
Obviously weather conditions at the time of an accident would influence the decision whether evacuation should take place, but Applicants are at a loss to under-t stand how Intervenors would change EPZ boundaries tc take into account the probability of concurrent reactor accidents and tornados, or what good redrawing EPZ boundaries would do.
Applicants should not be forced to guess what Inter-venors have in mind, if indeed Intervenors have any rpecific proposal for different EPZ 's in mind.
Subsection 13(e)
(e)
Radionuclides which will be significant contri-butors to dominant ex-posure modes for prompt and latent effects in the event of a BWR-1,
-2, and
-3 accidental release as described in the NRC's Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400), or its equivalent, at BFS.*
(Footnote from original contention)
NUREG-0396 and NUREG-0654, arriving at their generic guidance on the size of EPZ 's, rely on the potential consequences of a spectrum of accidents, such as the BWR-1,
-2, and -3
. Applicants have no objection to the admission of subparagraph 13 (e).
Subsection 13(f)
(f)
The consequences of a BWR-1,
-2, and -3 accidental release at BFS, or its equiva-lent, at harvest time.
This subparagraph lacks specificity and basis.
Intervenors fail to specify what crop or crops being har-vested specific to the Black Fox site, and providt no basis explaining why :his harvest renders the conventional 50-mile emergency planning zone inadequate.
accidents described in WASH-1400.
See NUREG-0396, pp.
4-6; NUREG-0654, pp.
5-7.
The BFS TIssion product inventory, however, exceeds the inventory of the 3200-megawatt thermal reactor used as the model for WASH-1400's estimates of accident consequences.
And the BFS average fuel burn-up will likely exceed the 17,600 megawatt-days (thermal) per metric ton assumed in WASH-1400.
Thus, the generic guidance of NUREG-0396 and NUREG-0654 is based on estimates of accident conse-quences which fail to account for radionuclides which will be significant contributors to dominant exposure modes for prompt and latent effects in the event of a BWR-1 and -2 and -3 release at BFS.
. PROPOSED CONTENTION 14:
ALLEGED INADEQUACY OF PSAR AND EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES Proposed Contention 14 can be divided into three general categories.
Subsections 14 (a ), 14(b), 14(c), 14(d) and 14(h) argue in various ways that the PSAR is inadequate because it does not contain a plant-specific, site-specific WASH-1400 type study of Black Fox Station.
Subsections 14(e), 14(f) and 14(g) contend that the evacuation time estimates calculated by Oklahoma State University contained in the PSAR fail to account adequately for various factors.
Subsections 14 (i), 14 (j ) and 14(k) allege miscellaneous other inadequacies in PSAR discuasions of emergency response planning.
E5ch of these categories is discussed separately below.
Subsections 14 ( a ), 14(b), 14(c), 14(d) and 14 (h) state:
Subsection 14(a)
(a)
The PSAR contains no evidence of plant-specific probabilities of BWR-1,
-2 or -3 releases.
Subsection 14(b)
(b)
The PSAR contains no evidence of site-specific consequences in the event of BWR-1,
-2 or -3 releases.
. Subsection 14(c)
(c)
WASH-1400's estimates of accident probabilities and consequences are not sufficient evidence of the probabilities and consequences in the case of BFS because:
1.
WASH-1400 provides insufficient evidence of accident consequences where evaucation is restricted, as may be the case under the current emergency plans for BFS, to a ten-i mile radius.
2.
WASH-1400 provides insufficient evidence of the consequences re-
.sulting from releases through liquid pathways in the event of a reactor meltdown accident, which omission is particularly critical in the case of BFS given to the proximity of the proposed plant site to Verdigris River and the ground-water conditions and soil composition on the site.
3.
The PSAR contains insufficient evidence that WASH-1400's assump-tions regarding medical treatment sre applicable to BFS.
4.
'2here is a large degree of uncer-tainty associated with WASH-1400's estimates of accident probabilities.
5.
The assumptions upon whic's WASH-1400 's estimates of accident probabilities and consequences are based are not conservative for BFS and are in-consistent with the following factors specific to BFS:
. (i)
BFS fission product inventory; (ii) BFS fuel burn-up; (iii)
The heightened sensitivity to radiation (over that of the average healthy adult male) of children and pregnant women.
(iv) Meteorological conditions specific to BFS site, including the distribution of wind directions and the frequency of tornados.
6.
The PSAR contains insufficient infor-mation to assure that the assumptions upon which WASH-1400's estimates of accident probabilities and consequences are based are consistent with the following factors specific to BFS.
(i)
The degree of protection afforded by the protective action of sheltering in the event of an accident at BFS.
(ii)
The latcnt consequences of a BWR-1,
-2, and -3 accidental release at BFS, or its equivalent, at harvest time.
.iii)
The difficulty in restric-ting livestock feeding on contami-nated feed,' confiscating contami-nated cattle and confiscating and destroying contaminated milk and crops.
Subsection 14(d)
(d)
Because of the large degree of un-certainty associated with WASH-1400's estimates of accident probabilities, the probabilities of exposures ex-ceeding Protective Action Guides (PAG's) set forth in NUREG-0396 may be seriously understated for BFS.
, Subsection 14(h)
-(h)
The evacuation time estimaces. contained in the PSAR and those calculated by Oklahoma State University for PSO are sufficiently high to warrant the con-duct of a full plant-specific accident consequences analysis and con--
sideration. of design modifications and other preventive and mitigation t
measures.
This has not been done j
for BFS.
Intervenors' suggest that a Black Fox-specific WASH-1400 type study be performed prior to issuance of construction permits.
No such requirement exists in 10 C.F.R. Part 50, ' Appendix E, or any other NRC regulation, and accordingly the foregoing subsections represent a rule challenge.
A challenge to NRC regulatons mustineet the requirements of 10 C.F.R. S 2.758.
Intervenors have failed to meet these requirements, and for that reason, subsections 14(a), 14(b), 14(c), 14(d), and 14(h) must be rejected.
l In addition, each of these subsections lack the j
requisite basis required by section 2.714.
Subsections 14(a) and 14(b) merely observe that the Black Fox PSAR does not contain evidence of plant-specific probabilities and site-specific consequences in the event of "BWR-1,
-2, or -3 releases."bl But as we have seen, the Commission's regulations I
i
-6/
"BWR-1, - 2, and -3 releases" are a reference to certain release categories postulated in WASH-1400.
I
, do not require ~ such studies for emergency planning purposes,-
or otherwise, and subsections 14 (a) and 14 (b) provide no basis explaining why such a study is needed for Black Fox.
Subsection 14 (c) argues that WASH-1400 's estimates of accident probabilities and consequences are not suf-ficient for Black Fox Station for various reasons, but again, Intervenors provide no basis for the underlying premise that a WASH-1400 type study is needed for emergency response planning at Black Fox.
Absent such a basis, their Licensing Board should not be side-tracked into an investi-gation of the adequacy or inadequacy of WASH-1400.
Subsection 14(d) argues that because of the large degree of uncertainty in WASH-1400, the probabilities of exposures exceeding Protective Action Guides set forth in NUREG-0396 may be seriously understated for BFS.
The applicability of this criticism to Black Fox Station is speculative and without basis, in that no specific reason, pertinent to the Black Fox site, is given why general NRC emergency planning guidance "may be seriously understated for BFS," any more than for any other nuclen power station.
Subsection 14(h) amounts to a naked assertion that PSAR evacuatic'a time estimates are "sufficiently high" that they warrant a WASH-1400 type study for BFS and also " con-sideration of design modifications and other preventive and
, mitigation measures. "
The latter phase is hopelessly vague; Applicants have no idea what specific " design modifications" or "other preventative and mitigative measures" Intervenors have in mind.
The first phrase lacks any basis; Intervenors-do not identify an objective or relative standard which supports their assertion that the time estimates presented in the PSAR are "sufficiently high."
Nor do Intervenors explain the logical connection between the allegedly high evacuation times and the perceived need for a WASH-1400 type s tudy.
Subsections 14 (e ), 14(f), and 14 (g) state:
Subsection 14(e)
(e)
The evacuation time estimates contained in the PSAR have been limited to a geo-graphical are determined without re-ference to local emergency response needs and capabilities.
Subsection 14(f)
(f)
The evacuation time estimates contained in the PSAR have not been' properly cal-culated so as to estimate accurately the time required to evacuate the population within the plume exposure pathways EPZ proposed by the Applicants.
Specifically, i
those evacuation time estimates fail to:
1.
Account for the full public j
transportation-dependent population; 2.
Account properly for notifica-titn, preparation and mobili-zation time; i
, 3.
Account fully and properly for the effect on evacuation times of adverse weather conditions, including tornados; 4.
Account for the possibility that multiple-car families will evacuate in more than one car; 5.
Use realistic assumptions with respect to the information avail-able to evacuees when choosing evacuatien routes.
Subsection 14{g)
(g)
The evacuation time estimates contained in the PSAR Amendment 16 underestimate actual evacuation times because they fail to adequately account for any of the following possibilities:
1.
vehicles breaking down or running our of fuel; 2.
traffic accidents; 3.
abandoned vehicles; 4.
disregard of traffic control devices; and 5.
evacuees using inbound traffic lanes for outbound travel.
Subsection 14(e) essentially states that Appli-cants' evacuation time estimates are wrong because the 10-mile plume exposure EPZ is wrong.
The subsection adds nothing to proposed contention 13; it can not stand alone because it provides no basis (other than a reference to proposed contention 13) for the assertion that Applicants' e
,-., EPZ is inadequate.
Therefore, subsection 14(e) should be dismissed as redundant.
Subsection 14(f) alleges that Applicants' evacu-ation time estimates have not been properly calculated, and lists five purported deficiencies in such calculations.
However, none of these deficiencies provide adequate speci-ficity to allow meaningful litigation.
For example, it is alleged that Applicants have. failed to " account for-the full public transportation-dependent population."
This enigmatic statement fails to give Applicants reasonable notice as to what group of people-Applicants are alleged to have missed,
~
or what A pplicants should have done to account for such
}
people.
If Intervenors have a specific evacuation problem l
in mind, they ought to be more forthcoming; -if Intervenors 4
i do not have a specific concern there is no basis for a i
l litigable contention.
Similarly enigmatic claims arc made i
that Applicants have failed to " account fully and properly" for " notification, preparation, and mobilization time,"
" adverse weather conditions," " multiple car families," and i
have failed to use " realistic assumptions with respect to I
the information available to evacuees when choosing evacuation-
[
routes."
In light of the detailed explanation of Appli-f I
cants' evacuation models provided in PSAR Amendment 16, i
l Intervenors ought to be required to do more than simply l
,.. - allege that some facet of the calculations have not been handled correctly.
The spacificity and basis requirement in the Rules of Practice demands that Intervenors provide an intelligible explanation of what Applicants allegedly did wrong and what the proposed issue is.
Intervenors have failed to do this, and subsection 14 (f) should be dismissed.
Applicants do not object to the admission of.
subsection 14 (g).
Subsection 14(i)
(i)
The PSAR contains insufficient evidence of the availability and adequacy of local shel-tering facilities to assure the feasibility of sheltering as a protective eation in the event of a BWR-1,
-2, and -3 release at BFS.
This subsecticn covers the same gound as proposed l
contention 13 (i).
The subsection lacks specificity in that it is not clear whether.Intervenor is advocating (contrary i
to NRC guidance in NUREG-0396) that special fallout shelters i
be built around Black Fox Station, or merely that the sheltering capability of existing housing surrounding Black
(
Fox has not been described adequately.
If the former inter-pretation is correct, Intervenors have provided no basis why such extraordinary measures are necessary for Black Fox i
Station but not other plants.
If the latter interpretation l
l l
l y
,.o i is correct, Intervenors have provided no basis for asserting that Applicants' proposed shielding factors for existing housing surrounding the Black Fox site inadequately reflect local housing conditions.
See PSAR Ameadment 16, Section 4.3.1.2 and Reference 12 thereco, "Public Protection Strate-gies for Po'.2ntial Nuclear Reactor Accidents:
Sheltering Concepts with Existing Public and Private Structures," SAND-77-1725, D. C.
- Aldrich, D.M.
Ericson, and J.
D.
- Johnson, Sandia Labs (February, 1978).
In light of this wealth of material, Intervenors should provide some reasonable basis why the proposed use el the Sandia guidance for emergency planning will inadequately account for the sheltering pro-perties of Iccal housing near Black Fox Station.
Subsection 14(j)
(j)
The PSA contains insufficient assurance of prompt protective action decision-making and notification.
The PSAR con-tains no letters of agreement providing for prompt (15 minute) protective action decision-making on a 24-hour basis by off-site agencies.
Contrary to the apparent assertion in this pro-posed contention, there is no requirement in NRC regulations that protective action decision-making take place in a 15-minute period.
This 15-minute requirement applies only to notification of the public once a decision to do so is made.
,..- Further, in light of the extensive information provided in PSAR Amendment 16, Sections 3.2 and 4.2 with respect to Applicants' commitments to provide immediate, 24-hour-manned communication systems and the careful description of notifi-cation scenarios, and in light of the letters in Appendix A which reflect the commitment of responsible state and local agencies to fulfill their emergency respon?e obligations, Intervenors should do more than merely assert that there is
" insufficient assurance" of prompt protective action decision-making and notification.
Intervenors have failed to iden-tify any specific problem in Applicants' PSAR discussion of proposed communicstions facilities, any specific govern-mental agency which cannot be relied upon to make prompt decisions, or any other basis for believing that a problem exists.
The contention thus fajls to inform the Board or the parties of what specific concerns Intervenors have with respect to the present arrangements.
Subsection 14(k)
(k)
There are no established quanti-tative or qualitative standards by which one can assess the feasibility of protective action in the event of a BWR-1,
-2, or -3 release at BFS.
,..' PSAR Amendment 16, Section 4.3 discusses the protective actions which will be taken in the event of substantial releases of radioactivity from Black Fox Sta-tion.
As that discussion points out, the basis for pro-tective actions will be the EPA " Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents," the BFS evacuation time estimates in PSAR Appendix C, and other referenced documents, all of which provide quantitative and qualitative criteria.
Therefore, the assertion in Con-tention 14 (k) that such criteria do not exist is without basis.
To the extent that the contention calls for specific protective action criteria for the specific BWR-1,
-2, and -
3 release scenarios postulated in WASH-1400, this is in-consistent with NRC guidance in NUREG-0610 and followed by Applicants in PSAR Amendmnnt 16, which contemplates four
" Emergency Action Levels" (Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Emergency, General Emergency).
Intervenors have provided no basis or explanation why emergency planning for the specific WASH-1400 release categories BUR-1,
-2, and -3 is necessary at Black Fox Station, but not other nuclear power plants, nor have they provided any hint as to what specific " quantitative or qualitative criteria" they believe is necessary.
Accordingly, Contention 14 (k) should be dismissed.
' L PROPOSED CONTENTION 15:
{
Subsection 15(a)
(a)
The TSC Location does not meet the requirements for rapid access from the control rocw (i.e.,
2 minutes as required in NUREG-0696),
nor is it designed to withstand tornado force winds.
Subsection 15(b)
(b)
The EOF is not designed to with-stand tornado force winds and the backup EO7 is beyond the 20 mile siting requirement of NUREG-0696.
Applicants have no objection to proposed Con-tention 15 insofar as it alleges that the TSC and EOF do not meet the two-minute and 20-mile Fiting recommendations in NUREG-Oi96.
Applicants object to the portions of Contention 15 which observe without explanation that the TSC and EOF are not designed to withstand " tornado force winds."
The referenced NRC guidance document specifically states that the TSC and EOF should be designed to withstand "high winds (other than tornados)" (Sea, NUREG-0696 Sections 2.5 and page 18, Table 2, n.2).
Intervenors fail to provide any basis for their suggestion that the Black Fox TSC and EOF should be designed to withstand tornado winds.
- Moreover, because safety-related structures at Black Fox Sta*. ion
~ --.-
...~ (including the control roomi sre designed to withstand tornados, Applicant is forced to speculate as to what need there is for tornado-proof, TSC's and EOF's.
It is not clear whether Intervenors are postulating that, despite the design of Black Fox Station, a tornado causes a reactor accident and also disables the TSC and EOF, or whether their hypvthesis is the simultaneous occurrence of two unlikely, independent events (a reactor accident and a tornado).
Nor do Intervenors attempt to address what safety significance loss of theTSC Tnd EOF would have, taking into account that the TSC and EOF are merely support facilities.
In short, Intervenors have failed to provide any support whatsoever for the proposition that TSC and EOF should withstand ter-nado force winds.
IV.
CONCLUSION In view of the foregoing, all of Intervenors' proposed contentions should be rejected except for 9, 12(e),
13(a), 13(e), 14(g), and the siting aspects of 15.
1 i Respectfully submitted, ephfallo EA E Y/94 Mart
-E. Si
'/
/
/
- k
/k
~
ilip P/Steptog
^
Three of the Attorneys for Applicants ISHAM, LINCOLN & BEALE Suite 325 1120 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.
C.
20036 y
(202) 833-9730 ISHAM, LINCOLN & BEALE Suite 4200 One First National Plaza Chicago, Illinois (^503 (312) 558-7473 Dated:
November 20, 1981 l
I I
i l
I l
EXHIBIT A 4
n KETED 67099 m-r d-d x 1
[3roposed Rules Vol. 45. No. m
)
'81 NOV73 PS:20 Nrsday. October 9.1980 N & SERV E T us secsen of tne IET?ERAL REGISTER FmHA before the solicitation is Technology. OfBce of Nuclear Reactor announced at the time of publication of Regulation. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Washington D.C. 20555, contans nooces to tne put$e of the propoems issuance of ruks and the Final Regulations.
regdadona. W purpose of these nonces '
In general, the FmHA has jurisdiction (301) 492-0016.
b to y,e awressed persons an over pm}ects below 15 million gallons of sumzuerrany ucmassaTioec The opportswy to paracapate in the rule annual capacity and the Department of SwM Rew PWSRPk NUREG-pnor to tne soopnon of *ne find Energy has jurisdiction over projects 75/087. first publMhed in 1975, was runs.
with annual capacity of15 mi!! ion prepared for the guidance of NRC staff gallons and larger, except for projects g
g gg, JEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE using forestry feedstocks or projects of applications to construct or operate owned and operated by agricultural nuclear power plants.ne principag -
P rmers Home Administration cooperative which can b( considered 'Oy purpose of the SRP is to ensure the quality and uniformity of the staff either FmHA or DOIL reviews and to present a well-defined 7 CFR Part 1990 Dated. October 6.1980-base from which proposed changes in James E.bmsoa. '
Associate Adaunistator. Farmers Home the scope of these reviews may be Biomass Energy and Alcohof Fuels evaluated.De SRP also serves to make Loans and Loan Guarantees; Ad:nutiscutloo.
AdditionalInformation infonnation about mgulatmy manen A"' "" N **'* 'uw widely a railable, and improves AGENCY *. Farmers Home Administration.
mae coca ano or.a undentaneng of me staN myiew USDA.
process by interested members of the AcTroec Proposed rule: additional
. NUCLEAR REGULATORY public and the nuclear power industry, information. -
COMMISSION The NRC's current techniques for the suefuARY:At 45 FR 51818. August 5.
10 CFR Part 50 -
safety evaluation of nuclear power facilities as set forth in the SRP. are the 1980, the Farmers Home Admmatration Plan To Require Ucensees and result of years of experience. A great (FmHA) published a proposed rule Applicants to Document Deviations deal of propress has been made in the regarding biomass energy and alcohol From the Standard Review Plan methods of review and in the fuels.The purpose of this document is to provida additionalinformation AczMcy: Nuclear Regulatory development of regulatory guides and nsanling this program.
Commih other staff positions referenced in the rca runTwaR INFORM ATloM CONTACT:
acTicec Notice of proposed rulemaking.
SRP.
Mr. Weldon Bartrm. Director. OfSce of As this experience acquired over the Renewable Resources' Fr_HA. Rm. 5175 suusaAnv:The Nuclear Regulatory years is incorporated into the regulatory South BIdg USDA.14th and Commission is considering requiricg all process, regulatory guides, including the Independence Ave. SW., Washington.
nu : lear power plant lic+.nsees and all SRP, are periodically reviewed and D.C.:c:50. phone: 202-447-7195.
applicants for construction permits and revised to reflect the current state-of-sum.suenTany IMroRMAT! ope The manufact.ri ag licenses to identify and the-art. This results in a varying scope Biomass Energy and AlcoholFuels Act justify deviations from the acceptance of review over time and tends to lead to of19tu ('ntle II of the Energy Security criteria t,f the applicable revision of the lack of uniform documentation of each -
Standard heview Plan. NUREG-75/087.
plant's conformance with current staff Act. Public Law 96-2S4) provides for the his program will provide the NRC with acceptance criteria. Some plants, for solicitation of appli:ations for h="cial assistance under. Subtitle A within10 uniform documentation of the extent to instance, have been reviewed against l
days after enactment (i.e October 28.
which each plant deviates froa ci.rrent the SRP at the OL stage but not at the 1980). Farmers Home Administration licensing acceptance criteria. Comment CP stage, while stdl others, although l
(FmHA). USDA has published (45 FR '
la sought on the proposal and on the reviewed against the SRP at both the CP 51818. August 5.1980) proposed preferred method of implementing such and OL stage, lack uniformity because l
regulations to establish guidelines for a proposal.
- of updating of the SRP after the CP solicitation of such applications and is DATE:The comment period expires on review was completed.This lack of reviewing ccmments received pursuant November 24.1980.
na doc 2mentatima makes a Mcult to such publication and related hearings. Aconessas: Comments should be, to determine the extent h which plants FmHA expects to publish Final submitted in writing to the Secretary of reviewed some time ago devia.e from
. Regulaticus and to initiate the the Commission. U.S. Nuclear current acceptance criteria, and if so.-
solicitation of applications as part of-Regulatory Commission. Washington.
e safety st ance a such such Mnal Regulations on or before D.C 20555. Attention: Docketing and October:3.1980. Apphcants wishing to Service Branch. All commments As a result of the accident at Three underu.o prelimmary preparatory work received will be available for public We Island, many mgulatmy on such applications may consult the inspection in the Comminsion's Public mquimmgnts have been revised and l
Proposed Regulaticus but are advised Document Room at 1717 H Street. NW.
new requirements have been l
that some changes wdl be made in them Washington, D.C.
promulgated. Accordingly. the 2.aff has I
when the Final Regulations are FOR mRTHER mFoMaAAN CONTACT begun to revise the SRP to reflect these published on or about October 28,1980.
Malcolm I,
- nst. Assistant Director for new requirements.This next revision of Applications will not be accepted by.
i
p 671i)0 Fednal Register / Vcl. 45. No.198 / hrsday Oct;ber 9.1980 / Proposed Rules
~
h thi StandI.rd R:;viiw Plan. scheduled f r Specifically, thi NRC is consid: ring rev'aitu scheduled to be issued in April i
completion in April 1981 will consist of imposing the following requirements:
1981.
E ths May 1980 version of the SRP.
- 1. All nuclear power plants issued The Commission published a Federal modified to reference all applicable operating licenses on or before June 31 Register Notice on October 2.1980 (45
['
'ety and safeguards regulations and 1980,3 would be required to identify a.:(
FR 65247) inviting comment on
.ose Division 1 Regulatory Guides. staff justify all deviations from the Requirements 4 and 5 of the current k
positions. and other documents acceptance criteria of the SRP revision.
plan. The present notice reiterates those currently used by the staff to interpret scheduled to be issued in April 1981 ths.t requirements and integrates them with r
the intent of these regulations. including relate to those regulations which the the requirements for operating plants I
requirements resu! ting from the TMI Commission determines to be of and applicants for operating licenses.
l Eccident.
particular significance to the protection The Commission will consider public Requiring license applicants to of the public brMth and safety.
comments received in response to this id:ntify and justify deviations from the
- 2. All appli who are issued a notice in determinmg the appropriate acceptance criteria in the applicable revision of the SRP would enhance the nuclear power cet operating license action to be taken. including the r
quality of the staffs revi:w of after June 30, w?O. <nd for which the possible issuance of final rules on some dpplications and assist the staff m.
NRC staffs Salvv. valuation Report or all of these matters.
will be issued on'or before January 1 Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of miking the determinations required by 10 CFR part Sv. Ir addition. such 1982 8 would be required to identify and 1954, as amended, the Energy -
documentation would more clearly justify after issuance of an OL. all Reorganization Act of1974;as amended.
idIntify the bases for the acceptability deviations from the acceptance criteria and Section 553 of Title 5 of the United of the SRP revision scheduled to be States Code. notice is hereby given that of plant designs and their relationship t current heensmg cnteria. A similar post.
issued in April 1981 that relate to those amendment of the Commission's licensing requirement for currently regulations the Commission htermines regulations in to CFR Part 50 with operating plants would improve the to be of particular significance to the regard to some or all of the subjects and staffs ability to evaluate the extent and protection of the public health and issues described in this notice is safzty significance of deviations from
- safety, contemplated.
current staff acceptance criteria for
- 3. All applicants for a tiuclear power Dated at Washington. D.C. this 3d day of these plants.
plant operating license for which the October 1980.
in a related matter, the NRC is NRC staffs Safety Evaluation Report is For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
required by Section 110 of Public Law issued after January 1.1982 would be Samuel J. Chilk.
96-29",(NRC FY 80 Authorization Bill) to required to identify and atify. prior to s,cretory of the commission.
3 develop a plan for the systematic safety issuance of the operating license. all, p www g
review of all operating nuclear power deviations f om all acceptance entena
,a coog 7-s plants. This plan must include among of the SRP revision scheduled to be other things: the identification of each issued in April 1981.
rent rule and regulation compliance
- 4. All applicants for a nuclear power DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
..dh which the NRC determines to be of plant construction permit or particular significance to the protection manufacturing license for which the Federa! Aviation Administration of the public health and safety: and the NRC staffs Safety Evaluation Report l
determination of the extent to which TM1 Supplement is issued before
'14 CFR Ch.1 each currently operating plant compli's January 1.1982 would be required to with those regulations, including an identify and justify, prior to issuance of IDocket No. 20487; Petition Notice No. PR indication of whether such compliance the construction permit or 80-15) wts achieved by use of Elvision 1 manufacturing license. all deviations from all acceptance criteria of the May Petition for Rule Making of Rosenbairn
. Regulatory Guides and staff positions i
and where such compliance was 1980 version of the SRP and from the Aviation, Inc.
L tchieved by equivalent means.
"Propcsed Licensing Requirements for Actmen Federal Aviation in order to carry out the requirements Pending Applications for Constructton Administration (FAA). DOT.
L of Pub. L 96-295. to document Permits and Manufacturing Ltcenses." in Action: Publication of petition for i
devittions frort the SRP and to improve NUREG-0718. (as modified after public rulemaking: quest for' comments.
tha staffs ability to evaluate the safety comment).
significance of such deviations. the NRC
- 5. All applicants for a nuclear power -
sumuAnn By letter dated March 31, is considering requiring all n 1 clear plant construction permit or 1980. Mr. Arthur I Schmidt. D2 powrr plant licensees and license manufacturing license for which the President. Rosenh.wn Aviation. Inc.
applicants to identify and provide the NRC staffs Safety Evaluation Report is petitioned the Federal Aviation -
s:fety bases for deviations from issued after january 1.1982, would be Administration (FAA) to amend E
rpplicable revisioas of the SRP. Several required to identify and justify, prior to Ii 25.832 and 121.220 of the Federal m thods ofimplementing this -
issuance of the construction permit or Aviation Regulations (FAR) to exempt requirement are under consideration.
manufacturing license. all deviations large, cargo-only aircraft from installing c
ThIse methods are issuance of a from all acceptance criteria of the SRP-ozone control equipment or using ozone Regulatory Guide, specification of a avoidance procedures. - -
p construction permit or operating license
'ne date on which Pub. t.96-29s became DATES: Comments must be received on condition a Policy Statement. or
'#,*c'**;,,i, go,,3, g.,,,,7 3, tog d,,, i, i, or before December 10,1980.
i 3,t madng.
permtt adequate hme after issuance of the revised ADontss: Send come.ents on the I
5**'
- bc'"*" d C" ment and ksuty petition in duplicate to: Federal Aviation k
'ne revned SRP(April 1981) has been designed deviahonaand for the NRC staff to in:orporate and defined to be equivalent to Divmon 1 evaluanone of the more safety staruficant deviations Admim,stration. Office of the Chief e
disory Guides and staff posihons.
into the staff Safety Evaluauca Reports.
Counsel. Attn: Rules Docket (ACC-204),
h
(
L.
F
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