ML20032C203
| ML20032C203 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Black Fox |
| Issue date: | 11/05/1981 |
| From: | Thessin J NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8111090454 | |
| Download: ML20032C203 (14) | |
Text
7 11/05/8 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD fp fl0VO 61981 ma.
In the Matter of
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PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF OKLAHOMA,
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Docket Nos. STN 50-ASSOCIATED ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.
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STN 50-557
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AND
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WESTERN FARMERS ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE,
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INC.
(Black Fox Station, Units 1 and 2)
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MOTION OF NRC STAFF TO REOPEN THE RECORD FOR THE PURPOSE OF RECEIVING INTO EVIDENCE A SUPPLEMENTAL SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT I.
INTRODUCTION On October 14, 1981, the Licensing Board established a hearing schedule governing future proceedings on the application to construct the Black Fox nuclear power plant.1/ November 5,1981 was set as the date for filing contentions and motions to reopen the hearing record.
In this pleading, the Staff moves that the hearing record in this proceeding be reopened for the purpose of receiving the Safety D'aiuation Report, Supple-ment Number 3, for the Black Fox plant, which is scheduled to be published on December 15, 1981.
It is the staff's intent that this Safety Evaluation Supplement will evaluate the Applicants' compliance with requirements
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Order (Granting, As Modified, Joint Motion To Establish Hearing Schedule), dated October 14, 1981.
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resulting from the Three Mile Island accident and with the new emergency planning requirenents and will analyze the current status of unresolved safety issues relevant to Black Fox and of those other generic issues discussed during the previous hearing in this proceeding.
II. BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION A.
Requirements Related to the Three Mile Island Accident The accident at Three Mile Island, Unit 2 occurred on March 28, 1979, shortly after the hearing record was closed.EI The Commission suspended power reactor licensing until the assessment of that accident had been substantially completed and comprehensive improvements in both the operation and regulation of nuclear power plants had been set in motion. Although the parties had submitted proposed findings of fact,EI the Licensing Board in this proceeding did not issue a partial initial decision which addressed those matters raised in the previous hearing.
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The record was closed on February 28,1979, Tr. 8600.
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" Applicants' Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Proposed Order in the Form of a Partial Initial Decision Concerning
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Radiological Health and Safety Matters," dated March 26, 1979; "Intervenors' Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Proposed Order in the Fonn of a Partial Initial Decision Concerning Radiological Health and Safety Matters," dated April 12, 1979; "NRC Staff Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the Fonn of an Initial Decision on Radiological Health and Safety Matters,"
i dated April 13, 1979, and supplemented on May 9,1979; and "Appli-cants' Reply to Proposed FinC qs of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the NRC Staff and Intervenors.
dated April 26, 1979.
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r Later, after' detailed Staff analysis and several Staff reports,' the Staff proposed a course of action to impose new TMI-related requirements and to implement the results of the lessons learned from the TMI accident.
On May 27,1981, the Staff proposed to the Commission a final rule, amend-ing 10 C.F.R. Part 50 by adding a set of TMI-related licensing requirements to pending applications for construction permits. Although the Commission by a majority vote approved the substance of this final rule on August 27, 1981,SI the rule has not yet been published in final form in the Federal Register and is therefore not yet effective.
In addition, in June of this year the Staff published NUREG-0718, Revision'1.El This document sets forth the Staff's current guidance on how Applicants for construction permits should take into account the lessons learned from the TMI-2 accident.5/ This guidance is consistent with the requirements of the proposed final rule.
During September and October, the Applicant, Public Service Company of Oklahoma, submitted Amendments 16,17 and 18 to the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report for Elack Fox. These amendments respcnded to the TMI-related requirements and to the new emergency planning regulations found in Appendix E, 10 C.F.R. Part 50. The Staff's forthcoming Safety Evaluation Report will analyze whether or not the Applicant has complied with those
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Memorandum from S.J. Chilk to W.J. Dircks and C.C. Kammerer, dated September 4, 1981.
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" Licensing Requirements for Pending Applications for Construction Permits and Manufacturing License."
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Id. p. iii.
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TMI-related and emergency planning requirements which the Staff believes should be met before a construction permit can issue.
This Staff evalu-ation-is relevant to a determination of whether or not the facility "can be constructed and operated at the proposed location without undue risk to the health and safety of the public."2/
B.
Generic Safety Issues The NRC Staff continuously evaluates tot safety requirements used in its review against new information which becomes available.
From time to time this evaluation results in the identification of issues of a generic character, having applicability to a number of proposed and operating nuclear power plants.
Some of these generic concerns pose important unre-solved questions concerning the adequacy of existing safety requirements and identify conditions not likely to be acceptable, if they should persist, over the lifetime of the plants they affect.8/ These issues have come to be known as " unresolved safety issues."
In its River Bend decision,E/ the Appeal Board noted the obligation 4
of a Licensing Boa d to inquire "into whether the staff review satis-factorily has come to grips with any unresolved generic safety problems i
2/
10 C.F.R. 6 50.35(a)(4).
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NUREG-0510, " Identification of Unresolved Safety Issues Relating to Nuclear Power Plants--A Report to Congress", dated January 1979.
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Gulf States Utilities Company (River Bend, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-444, 6 NRC 760 (1977).
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which might have an impact upon operation of the nuclear. facility under consideration."El In this way the Licensing Board could assure itself that the proposed facility, in the face of these unresolved issues, could indeed be constructed and operated at the proposed location without undue risk to the health and safety of the public, as required by 10 C.F.R.
S 50.35(a)(4).
The Staff, for its part, was required to provide the Licensing Board
-- through a Safety Evaluation Report or other evidence--with "a summary description of those gener'c :.oblems under continuing study which have both relevance to facilities s.
one type under review and potentially significant public safety implicatims."E As the Appeal Board saw it, the furnished i
information could shed light on several important considerations before the Licensing Board in a construction permit proceeding, such as (1) whether the generic problem has been resolved for the reactor under review, (2) whether a reasonable basis exists for concluding that a satisfactory solution will be obtained before the reactor is put into operation, and (3) whether the problem will have safety implications for the first time l
several years after reactor operation and, if the problem is not resolved before these longer-term safety implications develop, whether alternative means will be available to ensure that the plant does not pose an undue risk to the public. E!
i 10/ Id., at 774-775.
11/ Id., 'a t 775.
12/ Id.
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During the previous hearing in this proceeding the Staff elected to comply with the River Bend requirements by filing testimonyE rather than by issuing a Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report. The Staff presented evidence on a broad range of generic issues identified at that time as potentially relevant to the Black Fox plant:
A-1 Water Hammer A-2 Asynmetric Blowdown Loads on the Reactor Coolant System A-9 Anticipated Transients Without Scram A-10 BWR Nozzle Cracking A-11 Reactor Vessel Materials Toughness A-13 Snubber Operability Assurance A-14 Flaw Detection A-16 Steam Effects on Core Spray Distribution A-17 System Interactions in Nuclear Power Plants A-18 Pipe Rupture Design Criteria A-23 Containment Leak Testing A-24 Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment A-29 Nuclear Power Plant Design for the Reduction of Vulnerability to Industrial Sabotage A-30 Adequacy of Safety-Related DC Power Supplies A-31 Residual Heat Removal Requirements A-32 Missile Effects A-35 Adequacy of Offsite Power Systems A-36 Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel A-37 Turbine Missiles A-39 Detennination of Safety Relief Valve (SRV) Pool Dynanic Loads and Temperature Limits for ifE Containment A-42 Pipe Cracks at Boiling Water Reactors 13/ The majority of the unresolved generic issues were addressed in the February 1979 hearings.
See Tr. 8291-8564. The procedure of pre-senting testimony as an alternative to filing a Safety Evaluation Report was clearly envisioned by the Appeal Board in R_ ver Bend, at 775, footnote 28, and found acceptable by the Licensin'J Board in its Order of September 29,1978, at 2.
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Station Blackout gy Sump Reliability Containment Emerg A-43 A-44 B-30 Design Basis Floods and Probability B-34 Occupational Radiation Exposure Reduction B-55 Improved Reliability of Target-Rock Safety Relief Valves B-63 Is'Jlation of Low Pressure Systems Connected to the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary B-64 Decommissioning of Reactors For certain of these generic concerns, testimony was presented both to satisfy the requirements of River Bend and to address specific conten-tions and Board ouestions.E
-14/ During the previous hearing on the issue of Station Blackout, the Staff had testified that "a loss of all AC power does not have a significant safety impact on plants such as Black Fox Station."
(Tr. p. TAP 41, fol. Tr. 8309).
The Board requested that the Staff in the course of any reopened hearings, respond to the following questions:
a.
Was the conclusion as cited [above] based upon probability considerations from the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-li:0)?
b.
If not, on what was it based?
c.
If so, how does the Staff justify this basis in view of the Commission's warning (Policy Statement of January 18, 1979 at p. 3) that, with regard to accident probabilities,
... absolute values of the risks presented by WASH-1400 should not be used uncritically... in tne regulatory process
..."?
The Staff will. address these Board concerns in its forthcoming Supple-mental Safety Evaluation Report.
~~-15/ For example, Task Action Plan (TAP), 9, ATWS; Contenthn 65: The analysis by the Applicants and the Staff of the facil'.ies' response to certain anticipated transients with simultaneous failure of the scrani system (ATWS) have underestimated both the consequences of such (F0OTNOTE CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
Ir the intervening period since the record was closed, the status of several of these generic issues has changed from that presented in the Staff's testimony. Some issues have been technically resolved and the resolution is in varying stages of implementation; for other issues which are still unresolved, the projected timetable for a technical resolution has been altered.
In addition, four new unresolved safety issues have 15/ (F0OTNOTE CONTINUTED FR&i PREVIOUS PAGE) events and their likelihood, to such an extent that-the facilities
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present an undue hazard to the health and safety of the public.
TAP A-16, Core Spray Distribution; Board question 2-3:
What bearing has TAP A-16 upon the Black Fox Station ECCS evaluation?
TAP A-28, Spent Fuel Pool Capacity Increase, and TAP A-36, Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel; Board question 12-2: What is the relevance to Black Fox Station on TAP 28 and TAP 36, and, if they have relevance here, what is their status?
TAP A-29, Sabotage: Board ques; ion 66-1:
What relevance does TAP A-29 have to the construction permit proceedings for BFS?
If it has relevance, what is its status?
TAP A-32, Missile Effects, and TAP A-37, Turbine ilissiles; Board question 6-1:
What relevance do task action plaas, TAP-32 and TAP-38, have to BFS and, if they have relevance, what is their status? and Board question 19-1:
What bearing, if any, do TAP-32 and TAP-37 have upon the review of BFS, and, if they do bear upon that review, what is their status?
TAP A-34, Post-Accident Monitoring; Board question 13-1: What revision, if any, of Reg. Guide 1.97 applies to BFS? If no revision applies, what evaluation of the post-accident monitoring plan has been made and against what standard was it judged?
.g-been identified which are relevant to boiling water reactors of the type that will be employed at Black Fox.EI Although changes have occurred in tne status of various items for which testimony was presented and although new unresolved safety issues have subse-quently arisen, none of these changes and additions appear to raise matters of major significar.ce to plant safety which might affect the outcome of the proceeding.EI As such, these changes and additions would not satisfy the test of significance required to justify reopening a closed evidentiary record.E However, in the spirit of the River Bend decision the Staff believes tha'
.n update ir the forthcoming Safety Evaluation Supplement of these generic concerns would assist the Licensing Board in judging the ade-quacy of the Staff's review. EI'
-16/ NUREG-0705, " Identification of New Unresolved Safety Issues Relating to Nuc'. ear Power Plants--Special Report to Congress." The four new issues are: Shutdown Decay Heat Removal Requirements ( A-45);
Seionic Qualification of Equipment in Operating Plants (A-46);
Safety Implications of Control Systems (A-47); and Hydrogen Control Measures and Effects of Hydrogen Burns on Safety Equipment (A-48).
E/ These considerations, among others, will be elaborated upon in the Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report.
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_E_.g_., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (Vemont Yankee),
8 Al.AB-124, 6 AEC S58, 365; subsequent opinions in ALAB-126, 6 AEC 394; ALAB-138, 6 AEC 520, 523; and ALAB-161, 6 AEC 1151 (1973).
Georgia Power Company (Vogtle, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-291, 2 NRC 404, 413 (1975).
Public Service Co. of Oklahoma (Black Fox, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-573, 10 NRC 775, 804 (1979).
H/. River Bend, supra, at 775.
The Staff has asked the Applicants for information on how they intend a) to implement those ceneric issues resolved since the previous hearing and b) to deal with subsequently designated unresolved safety issues.
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C.
Norgeneric Issues Considered in the Previous Hearing In addition to reviewing generic issues of relevance to the Black Fox plant, the Staff is attenpting to detemine whether any information on other issues has come to light subsequent to the closing of the hearing EI record which either warrants notification to the Licensing Board or by its significance meets the standards for reopeling the evidentiary record.
To date, the Staff's review has uncovered no new infonnation whose signifi-cance warrants reopening the record, b although the length of the transcript in the previous hearing precludes a final Stafi judgment on this question.22/
g/
Eg., Duke Power Company (McGuire, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-143, 6 AEC 623, 625 (1973).
-21/ Because the Staff was aware that the Applicant intended to move to re-open the record on four previously litigated neatters (Board question 10-3, Board question 13-1; Board question 15-1 and the issue of load combination methodology), the Staff made no attempt independently to assess whether or not there existed any new information with respect to these four issues which warranted reopening the record. The Staff will analyze the merits of Applicants' motion in its reply brief.
-22/ The Appeal Board, in reviewing the Licensing Board's decision senc-tioning a limited work authorization for the Black Fox site, directed the Licensing Board to consider whether the discovery of " geological anomalies" at the Black Fox site warranted reopening the record on this matter. ALAB-573, 10 NRC 775, 796 at note 85 (1979).
Both the Applicant and the Staff represented that these anomalies, considering the rules of Appendix A to 10 C.F.R. Part 100, were of no significance in defining the earthquake ground motion for which the plant must be designed. See letters to the Appeal Board, from L.D. Davis (Staff Counsel), dated September 29, 1978; from J. Gallo (Applicant's Attorney), dated November 14, 1978; and fi am W.D. Paton (Staff Counsel), dated November 22, 1978.
In view of the lack of any information that these geologic anomalies represent an iacrease in seism,1c hazard over that found by this Licensing Board or for that matter have any relationship to the geologic mechanisms causing earthquakes, there is no basis for a conclusion that a significant safety issue could possibly exist with respect to them.
As such, the Licensing Board would err if it reopened the record on this matter.
o,
10 C.F.R. 9 2.743 states that the Statf shall offer into evidence any safety evaluation prepared by it.EI The duty imposed by this regulation does not torn on first satisfying the heavy burden required for reopening closed hearing records. This means that the content of the Safety Evalu-ation Report so offere' need not qualify as material which in its own right would meet the significance tests for reopening the evidentiary record. Thus, the record in this proceeding must include any Safety Evaluation Report issued in connection with this application, even if the Board does not reopen the record on the motion of any other party, p/ 6 2.743(g) reads as follows:
(g)
Proceedings involving applications.
In any proceeding involving an application, there shall be offered in evidence by the staff any report submitted by the ACRS in the proteeding in compliance with section 182b of the Act, any safety evaluation prepared by the staff and any Detailed Statement on environmental considerations prepared by the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation or Director of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, as appropriate, or his designee in the proceeding pursuant to Part 51 of this chapter.
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III.
CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, the Licensing Board should reopen the r
i record to receive the Staff's forthcoming Safety Evaluation Report, Supple-ment Number 3 for the Black Fox plant.
Respectfully subnitted.
1 J a' s H. Thessin l
Counsel far NRC Staff i
Dated at Bethesda, tietyland, this 5th day of November, 1981.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF OKLAHOMA,
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Docket Nos.'STN 50-556 ASSOCIATED' ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.
STN 50-557
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MD WESTERil FARMERS ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.
(Black Fox Station, Units 1 and 2)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of " MOTION OF NRC STAFF TO REOPEN THE RECORD FOR THE
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PURPOSE OF RECEIVING INTO EVIDENCE A SUPPLEMENTAL SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT" in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class or as indicated by an asterisk by deposit in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission internal mail system, this 5th day of November,1981:
Sheldon J. Wolfe, Esq.
4 Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ha j
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission n L ncol Be Washington, D.C.
20555 One 1st National Plaza vedu c go llinois 60606 mi ra e
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board i
tiz ns t n or afe Energy, Inc.
a hing D
P. O. Box 924 Dr. Paul W. Purdom Claremore, Oklahoma 74107 Administrative Judge Director, Environmental Studies Group Mr. Clyde Wisner Drexel University NRC Region 4 Public Affairs Officer 32nd and Chestnut Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104 611 Ryan Plaza Drive Suite 1000 Joseph Gallo, Esq.
Arlington, Texas 76011 Isham, Lincoln & Beale 1120 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Andrew T. Dalton, Jr., Esq.
Suite 325 Attorney at Law Washington, D.C.
20036 1437 South Main Street, Room 302 Tulsa, Oklahoma 74119 Mrs. Ilene.H. Younghein 3900 Cashion Place Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73112 I
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- Atomic Safety and Licensing Mr. T. N. Ewing Appeal Board Acting Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Black Fox Station Nuclear Project Washington, D. C.
20555 Public Service Company of Oklahoma i
P.O. Box 201
- Docketing and Service Section Tulsa, Oklahoma 74102 Office of the Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Dr. M. J. Robinson Washington, D.C.
20555 Black & Veatch-P.O. Box 8405 1
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Kansas City, Missouri 64114 Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Jan Eric Cartwright, Esq.
4 l
Washington, D.C.
20555 Charles S. Rogers, Esq.
Michael L. Bardrick, Esq.
Lawrence Burrell Office of the Attorney General 1
Route 1, Box 197 State of Oklahoma Fairview, Oklahoma 73737 112 State Capitol Building Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73105 Mr. Gerald F. Diddle General Manager Richard B. Hubbard Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc.
MHB Technical Associates P.O. Sox 754 1723 Hamilton Avenue Springfield, Missouri 65801 Suite K i
San Jose, California 95125 Mr. Vaughn L. Conrad Public Service Company of Oklahoma l
P.O. Box 201 Tulsa, Oklahoma 74102 Joseph R. Farris, Esq.
John R. Woodard III, Esq.
Feldman, Hall, Franden, Reed t
%[
O and Woodard l
816 Enterprise Building
\\M Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103 James H. Thessin Counsel for NRC Staff Alan P. Bielawski Isham, Lincoln & Beale One First National Plaza Suite 4200 Chicago, Illinois 60603 Mr. Maynard Human General Manager Western Farmers Coop., Inc.
P.O. Box 429 Anadarko, Oklahoma 73005 Richard F. Berger, Esq.
Office of the Attorney General State of Oklahoma 112 State Capitol Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73105
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