ML20032B403
| ML20032B403 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 10/14/1981 |
| From: | Doerflein L, Kister H, Linville J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20032B391 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-333-81-21, 50-333-81-22, NUDOCS 8111050510 | |
| Download: ML20032B403 (15) | |
See also: IR 05000333/1981021
Text
-
,'
DCS NUMBE'IS
'
.
50333-610804
50333-810805
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
3-
0.-
CE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
5%33-810816
Region I
50333-810821
50333-810828
Report No.
81-21
50333-810924
Docket No.
50-333
License No.
Priority
Category
C
--
Licensee:
Power Authority of the State of New York
P. O. Box 41
-
Lycoming, New York 13093
Facility Name:
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear fewer Station
Inspection at:
Scriba, New York
Inspection conducted:
September 1-30, 1981
Inspectors
M1
/0
Y
/
c
d. L. Linville, Resident Inspector
date signed
N8 ML
/o/M/r/
C
L.
l. UOBEtiein, Hesident Inspector
date ' signed
date signed
Approved by:
du
/b </
/
H. B. KisEr, Chief, Reactor Projects
(dats si@ned
Section 1C
Inspection Summary:
Inspection on September 1-30, 1981 (Report No. 50-333/81-21)
Areas Inspected: Routine and reactive inspection during day and backshift hours by
two Resident Inspectors (122 hours0.00141 days <br />0.0339 hours <br />2.017196e-4 weeks <br />4.6421e-5 months <br />) of licensee action on previous inspection findings;
licensee event report review; operational safety verification; surveillance observations;
review of plant operations; QA audit observations, and licensee event followup.
Results: Of seven areas inspected no items of noncompliance were observed in six
areas. One item of noncompliance was noted in one area.
(Failure to follow operating
procedure, paragraph 4)
Region I Form 12
9111050510011Q$$3
(Rev. April 77)
PDR ADOCK 0500 pg
0
_-__
. _ _ _ _ _ _
. - _ .
--
.
.
.
DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
- R. Baker, Superintendent of Power
- P. Bayne, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Generation
- G. T. Berry, President and Chief Operating Officer
- J. W. Boston, Executive Vice President, Procedures and Performance
N. Brosee, Maintenance Superintendent
- R. A. Burns, Assistant to Superintendent of Power
- V. Childs, Assistant to Resident Manager
- R. Converse, Operations Superintendent
M. Cosgrove, Site Quality Assurance Engineer
W. Fernandez, Technical Services Superintendent
H. Keith, Instrument and Control Superintendent
- J. D. Leonard, Resident Manager
E. Mulcahey, Radiological & Environmental Services Superintendent
C. Orogvany, Reactor Analyst Supervisor
D. E. Tall, Tra.ning Coordinator
T. Teifke, Security & Safety Superintendent
The inspectors also inteviewed other licensee personnel during this
inspection including Shift Supervisors, Administrative, Operators,
Health Physics, Security, Instrument and Control, Maintenance and
Contractor Personnel.
- Denotes those present at an exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
(Closed) INSPECTOR FOLLOWUP ITEM (333/81-12-06): The licensee was
cited for failure to follow Radiation Work Permit requirements in
inspection report 50-333/81-18.
Additional followup will be done by the
inspectors on that item of noncompliance.
(Closed) SEVERITY LEVEL IV VIOLATION (333/81-12-03): The licensee was
cited again for failure to barricade 'he high radiation area made
accessible by gate RW 272/12 in inspection report 50-333/81-18. Additional
followup will be done on the new item of noncompliance.
(Closed) INSPECTOR FOLLOWUP ITEM (333/80-03-04):
The licensee has built
an additional concrete wall around the condensate storage tanks vSich has
reduced dose rates in the parking lot and on the sidewalk approaching
the administration building to acceptable levels.
(Closed)
INFRACTION (333/80-03-02):
The licensee issued Plant Standing
Order No. 2, JAFNPP Alara and Respiratory Protection Policies, Revision 1,
dated November 4, 1980 and signed by the Resident Manager during the Health
Physics Appraisal Inspection.
!
- .
- -
- -
-
.
'
.
3
(Closed) UNRESOLVED ITEM (333/80-01-02): The inspector has observed no
instances of self monitor personnel in high radiation areas without dose
rate instrumentation.
(Closed) UNRESOLVED ITEM (333/79-02-08): The inspector verified that all
instrumentation which provides input to the process computer calculation
of heatup and cooldown rates to meet the requirements of Technical Specification 3.6.A.1 is included in the licensee's calibration program
with the exceptions of the thermocouples and the barometer used to convert
reactor pressure gage to atmospheric for entry into the steam tables. The
licensee'immediately added the barometer to the balance of plant calibra-
tion program.
(Closed) SEVERITY LEVEL IV VIOLATION (333/81-12-05):
This missed portion
of a diesel generator surveillance test appears to have been an isolated
case.
(Closed) SEVERITY LEVEL III VIOLATION (333/81-07-02): The inspector
reviewed Quality Assurance (QA) Surveillance Reports 700, 703, and 704
which stated that licensee QA auditors reviewed all PORC reviewed Occurrence
Reports and LER's from 1979,1980, and 1981 for similar oversights
regarding Technical Specification requirements.
None were identified.
(Closed) SEVERITY LEVEL V VIOLATION (333/81-07-04): The inspector
verified that the licensee revised paragrapn 6.9 of QAP 10.1, " Inspection
of Quality Related Activities," Revisian 0, dated July 15, 1981, to require
documentation of Quality Control Inspection Reports of deficiencies
resolved by the work supervisor and the quality control supervisor. The
inspector also reviewed the memorandum issued by the QA superintendent
requiring documentation of all noncompliance in Deficiency and Corrective
Action Reports regardless of verbal approvals by either himself or his
supervisors.
(0 pen) UNRESOLVED ITEM (333/81-12-04): On September 4, 1981, the inspector
witnessed the performance of ISP 12-1, RCIC Steam Line Low Pressure Instrument
Functional Test / Calibration. The inspector noted that the licensee had
implemented a temporary change in the procedure to ensure that at least one
valve in the isolation logic is operable while testing. Although this is
safer than the previous practice of making both isolation valves inoperable
while testing, it still does not conform to the Technical Specification 3.7.D
requirement that one valva in the line be in the isolated mode if either
valve is inoperable.
This item remai.ns unresolved pending development of an
NRC position on this issue.
.-
_
_
- .- . _ _ _ - -
.,
.
.
.
.
4
3.
Review Licensee Event Report (LER)
The inspector reviewed LER's to verify that the details of the events were
clearly reported. The inspector determined that reporting requirements had
been met, the report was adequate to assess the event, the cause appeared
,
accurate and was supported by details, corrective actions appeared
appropriate to correct the cause, the form was complete and generic
applicability to other plants was not in question.
The inspector reviewed '.ER's 81-62*, 81-63*, 81-64, 81-65*, 81-66*, 81-67,
81-68, and 81-69".
- Report selected f'r onsite followup.
Irtpection report 81-18 contains followup information on LER 81-66.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
4.
Operation Safety Verification
a.
Control Room Observations
(1) Using a plant specific checklist, the inspectors verified
selecte.d plant parameters and equipment availability to ensure
compliance with limiting conditions for operation of the
plant Technical Specifications.
Items checked included:
-
Power distribution limits
-
Availability and proper valve lineup of afe+y systems
-
Availability and proper alignment of onsite and offsite
emergency power sources
-
Reactor Control panel indications
-
Primary Containment temperature and pressure
-
Drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure
-
Standby Liquid Control Tank level and concentration
-
Stack monitor recorder traces
(2) The inspectors directly observed the following plant operations
to ensure adherence to approved procedures:
l'
%---
- - - - . -
- - -
- - -
. - -
- - -
-- .
- - .
-
- - - -
.
.
.
5
-
Routine power operations
-
Issuance of RWP's and Work Re<1uest/ Event / Deficiency forms
(3) Selected lit annunciators were discussed with control room
operators.to verify that the reasons for them were understood
and corrective action, if required, was being taken.
(4) Shift turnovars were observed to ensure proper control room
and shift manning.
Shift turnover checklists and log review by
the oncoming and offgoing shifts were also observed by the
inspectors.
(5) No items of noncompliance were identified.
b.
Shift Logs and Operating Records
(1) Selected shift logs and operating records were reviewed to:
-
Obtain information on plant problems and operations
-
Detect changes and trends in performance
-
Detect possible conflict with Technical Specifications or
regulatory requirements
-
Determine that records are being maintained and reviewed as
required
-
Assess the effectiveness of the communications provided by
the logs
(2) The following logs and records were reviewed:
-
Shift Supervisor Log
-
Nuclear Control Operator Log
-
Night Orders
-
Shift Turnover Check Sheet
-
Protective Tag Record Log
-
Jumper Log
-
Daily Core Surveillance Checks
.
.
.
.
6
-
Liquid Radwaste Discharge Log
-
Gaseous and Particulate Sample Logs-
-
Weekly Chemistry Status Log
(3) No items of noncompliance were identified.
c.
Plant Tours
(1) During the inspection period, the inspectors made observations
and conducted tours of plant areas including the following:
-
Control Room
-
Relay Room
-
Reactor Building
-
Turbine Building
-
Diesel Generator Rooms
-
Electric Bays
-
Pumphouse-Screenwell
-
Standby Gas Treatment Building
.
-
Radwaste Building
,
-
Crescent Rooms
-
Cable Tunnels
-
Torus Room
-
Protected Area Perimeter
(2) During the plant tours the inspector conducted a visual inspection
of selected piping between containment and the isolation valves
for leakage or leakage paths.
This included verification that
.
manual valves were shut, capped and locked when required and that
motor operated or air operated valves were not mechanically
blocked. Othe items verified during the plant tours included:
-
General plant / equipment conditions
. __.,
. , -
.
_
_
.
.
.
7
- -
Operability of selected personnel monitors, area radiation
-
monitors and air monitors
Proper completion and use of selected radiation work permits
-
-
Proper use of protective clothing and respirators
-
Proper personnel monitoring practices
-
Proper control of ignition sources and flammable material
-
Equipment tag outs in conformance with controls for removal
of equipment from service
-
Normal security practices
-
Plant housekeeping and cleanliness practices
.
(3) During plant tours at 2:20 p.m.,
on September 18, 1981 and at
3:50 p.m., on September 29, 1981, the. inspector fo"nd the fire
door between the emergency diesel generator switchgear rooms,
door DG 272/2 was open. Technical Specification 6.8 requires
that procedures and administrative policies be implemented.
Operating procedure F-0P-22, Diesel Generator Emergency Power,
Revision 4, dated June 26, 1980, paragraph C.2 says to " ensure
doors between DG rooms are closed when the DG's are required to
be operable." Failure to maintain door DG 272/2 closed is an
item of noncompliance.
(333/81-21-01)
The inspector further noted that the licensee committed to check
the closure of door DG 272/2 once per shift until the door
l
position indication system is installed.
The licensee had made
this required check during the shift. However, the inspector
questioned the adequacy of this once per shift check since he
found the door open on two consecutive tours.
The licensee
acknowledged this concern at the exit interview and stated that
more frequent checks would be made.
d.
Physical Security
The inspectors made observations and verified during regular and off-
shift hours that selected aspects of the plant's physical security
systems and organization were iri accordance with regulatory require-
ments, the physical security plan and approved procedures.
_ _ . _
. . - - .
.
_.
_.
. . - . ,
_
.
. . .
-
.
.
.
8
(1) Physical Security Organization
-
Observations indicated that the security organization was
properly manned.
All security personnel observed appeared to be capable of
-
performing their assigned tasks.
(2) Physical Barriers
-
Physical barriers in the protteted and vital areas were
frequently observed to assure that they were intact and
randomly checked by patrolling guards.
-
Isolation zones were observed to be free of obstructions and
objects that could aid an intruder in penetrating the
protected area.
-
The inspector observed that compensatory measures were
employed when required by security equipment failure or
impairment.
(3) Access Control
-
The inspector frequently observed that explosive and metal
detectors were operable and used as required.
4
-
Often persons and packages were observed to be properly
searched prior to entry i to the protected area.
-
Vehicles were observed to be nroperly searched and escorted
or controlled within the protected area.
-
Persons within the protected area displayed photo identifica-
tion badges, persons in vital areas were properly aut.iorized
and persons requiring escorts were properly escorted.
(4) No items of noncompliance were identified.
e.
Emergency System Operability
The inspector verified operability of the High Pressure Coolant
Injection, Low Pressure Coolant Injection and Containment Spray Systems.
The following were included in the system verification:
-
Confirmation that each accessible valve in the primary flow path
was in the ccrr ct position.
,
.
.
.
9
-
Confirmation that power supplies and breakers are properly
aligned for components that must activate upon an initiation
signal.
-
Visual inspection of the major components for leakage and other
conditions which might prevent fulfillment of their functional
requirements.
The inspector also verified the operability of the Emergency Service
Water (ESW) system by performing a complete walk down of the accessible
portions of the system. The following were included in the ESU
system verification:
-
Confirmacion that the licensee's system lineup procedurer, match
plant drawings and the as-built configuration.
-
Verification that vtives are in the proper position, ,iave power
available, and are locked (sealed) as required.
-
Verification that system instrumentation is properly valved 19.
-
The radioactive waste system is operated in accordance with
approved procedures.
-
Verification that there are no obvious deficiencies which might
degrade system performance such as inoperaole hangers or supports.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
f.
Radioactive Waste Systems Controls
The inspector witnessed selected portions of a liquid rad oactive
release to verify the following:
-
The required release approvals are obtained.
-
The required samples are taken and analyzed.
-
The release control instrumentation was operable and in use
during the release.
.
.
.
10
-
The radioactive waste system is operated in accorda.tce with
approved procedures.
On September 18, 1981, the inspector observed the release of batch
3317 of Laundry Drain Tank A.
The inspector found that a three order
of magnitude error was made in transferring the sample activity from
the computer printout to the discharge permit.
This error was
corrected prior to making the release.
In addition, the inspector
found that the procedure for the Laundry Drain Tank discharge was
missing fro.a the Radwaste Control Room copy of Operating Procedure
F-0P-49, Liquid Radioactive Waste System, Revision 8, dated July 10,
1981. The licensee immediately took action to replace the page in
the procedure.
5.
Surveillance Observations
The inspectors observed portions of the surveillance procedures listed
below to verify that the test instrumentation was properly calibrated,
approved procedures were used, the work was performed by qualified
.
personnel, limiting conditions for operation were met, and the system was
correctly restored following the testing.
-
F-ISP-l?-1, RCIC Steam Line Low Pressure Instrument Functional Test /
Calibration, Revision 6, dated March 1981, performed September 4,
1981.
-
F-ISP-3, Reactor High/ Low Water Level Instrument Functional Test /
Calibration, Revision 7, dated March 1981, performed September 9,
1981.
-
F-ISP-24, Rod Block Monitor Instrument Calibrations, Revision 7,
dated March 1981, performed September 29, 1981.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
J
6.
Review of Plant Operations
a.
Prccurement and Storage
The inspector toured the licensee's warehouse areas to ensure that
safety related components are traceable and that the area is
maintained as required by approved procedures.
The inspector
reviewed the following procedures:
-
- - .
.
f
.
.
.
11
WACP 10.1.4, Procurement of Materials and Services, Revision ?,
-
dated August 28, 1979.
WACP 10.1.5, Control and Identirication of Purchased Material
-
and Services, Revision 4, dated May 5, 1980.
The inspector selected the following items in the warehouse to verify
traceability by reviewing the purchase order, receipt records,
location of the item in storage, issue record and certification
record.
20" Powell Swing Check Valve
-
-
Emergency Diesel Generator Filter Elements
i
No items of noncompliance were identified.
b.
Training
On September 11, 1981, the inspector attended a licensed operator
replacement training lecture on the Reactor Protection System.
The
lecture was conducted as scheduled and the objectives of the lesson
plan were met. The inspector noted that the instructor provided some
information on the scram air brader low pressure scram modification
installed April 5, 1931. One of the sketches in the lesson plan
had been revised to show the new pressure switches but there was no
information on the modification in the text of the lesson plan.
Technical Services department memorandum TS81-132 ca?ed April 7,
1981 made features of the modification available to all licensed
operators incleding those in the Training department, but no one
had incorporateo this information into the system lesson plan.
In
addition, training department personnel said there is no means of
assuring lesson plans are updated to reflect modifications. The
licensee acknowledged the inspector's concerns at the exit interview.
c.
On September 28, 1981, the inspectors observed the licensee's first
major emergency drill since the implementation of the new Emergency
Plan in April 1931.
The drill scenario involved a contaminated
injured man followed by an unisolable main steam line break. Although
the licensee notified the required offsite agencies, these agencies
did nat participate in the drill as required by Technical Specifica-
tior 2.13(B).
In a letter to the Director of Nuclear Reactor Reguia-
tion (NRR) dated September 18, 1981, the licensee requested relief
from this requiremer.t until 1982. This item is unresolved pending
NRR action on the licensee's request (333/81-21-02).
.
..
~-
-
.
.
.
12
During the-drill the inspectors observed the licensee oerformance
at the scene of the injury, in the control room, and in the technical
support center (TSC).
The inspectors provided comments on their
observations to the licensee at the drill critique. No items of~
noncompliance were observed.
At other times during the month the_ inspector reviewed the following
-
emergency rreparedness areas.
-
Selected emergency facilities and equipment including the
control room, the TSC, the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF),
the First Aid Room, the Ambulance Kit, the Emergency
Vehicle Kit, and all current emergency equipment inventories.
The inspector found that the TSC-EOF-Control Room dedicated
telephone line was inaperable and that channel 2 of the TSC
radio was inoperable.
In addition, the licensee had difficulty
communicating with the survey teams at all using the TSC radio
during the drill. The required emergency procedures were also
missing from the emergency vehicle kit. The inspector will
review licensee corrective action for these discrepancies later.
(333/81-21-03)
-
Means for monitoring release of radioactivity.
Based on the most recent operability surveillance, if required,
and direct observation, the inspector found the stack,
ventilation, and liquid effluent monitors; selected survey team
instrumentation; meteorological equipment; and the dose
calculators operable.
-
Onsite medical arrangements.
The inspector determined that there is an LPN on duty during day
shift on weekdays and that there are personnel trained in first
aid on shift at all times.
In addition, the inspector found
that there is an agreement between the Oswego Fire Department
and the licensee for ambulance service.
This capability will be
tested during a drill on October 23, 1981.
d.
PORC Meeting Observation
The inspector reviewed the minutes for PORC Meeting 81-054 held on
i
June 2, 1981, which the inspector attended, and reported in inspection
!
report 50-333/81-14.
The inspector determined that the minutes
accurately reflected the decisions and recommendations made by the PORC
members in the meeting.
-
.
.
.
13
7.
Audit Program
On September 9,1931, the inspector observed portions of licensee Standard
Audit SA 375 of AP2.1, Control of Operating Procedures, Revision 2, dated -
March 23, 1979.
Later, the inspector reviewed the audit report to confirm
the following:
-
It clearly defined the scope of the audit and the results.
It was conducted by trained personnel not having direct responsibility
-
in the audited area.
-
Its frequency was in conformance with Technical Specifications and
the QA Program.
-
Appropriate followup actions had been taken and were in progress or
were being initiated.
-
The audited organization's response to the audit findings was in
writing, was timely, and adequately addresses the findings and
recommendations.
The inspector found that the operations department had not responded to
NCA 304 by the September 28, 1981 due date.
The inspector will review
this response later.
(333/81-21-04)
8.
Followup on Licensee Event
On September 22, 1981, the licensee inadvertently released about 4500
gallons of low level radioactive water through an unmonitored steam relief
vent on the radwaste building. However, the release was not discovered until
September 24, 1981, when two employees working in the vicinity of this vent
were found to have contamination on their clothing and shoes. The release
occurred over about an eleven hour period and was caused by an inadequate
startup procedure for the radwaste concentrator system.
The startup
procedure failed to include any valve lineup for the condensate receiver,
which collects the condensed auxiliary steam used to run the concentrator
and pumps this condensate to the waste collecting tank. The B concentrator
was started up at 2:30 a.m.,
September 22, 1981 with the two condenste
receiver pump discharge valves shut. While the concentrator was operating,
the condensate receiver tank filled up, backed up through the tank vent line
connected to the steam relief vent and spilled on the ground outside the
radwaste building.
The improper valve lineup was discovered and corrected
at about 1:30 p.m.,
September 22, 1981, terminating the release.
Based on
the volume of water released and the activity of water in the condensate
receiver tank, 4.68E-6 microcuries/mi, about 80 microcuries were released.
Smear surveys on the roof and the side of the radwaste building indicated
between 1600 and 2000 DPM/100 cm
Smear surveys on the ground and barrels
2
-
.
.
.
14
2
near the vent indicated between 3400 and 26,000 DPM/100 cm . A sample
taken from the storm sewer closest to the radwaste building indicated a
Cobolt 60 concentration of 1.28E-7 microcuries/ml.
On September 25, 1981, while cleanup from the first re h3=a was still in
l
progress, a second release occurred through the same tank and steam relief
vent path.
This release was caused by a. failure of the check valves on the
discharge of the condensate receiver pumps. The release occurred while
using a Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump to transfer water from the torus
to the Waste Collecting Tank, through an Equipment Drain Line to which the
condensate received pumps also discharge.
Leaking check valves on the
_ discharge of the condensate receiver pumps permit;ed the RHR pump to
pressurize the condensate receiver tank.
This forced water up the tank
vent and out on the ground beside the Radwaste Building. During this
release, about 1000 microcuries were released based on an estimated volume
of 200 gallons and a 1.38E-3 microcuries/ml activity of the water collected.
Directing the discharge of the condensate receiver pumps to the waste
collecting tank via the Equipment Drain Line was a modification of the
radwaste systems as described in the FSAR.
The licensee was unable to
provide the modification packages for review prior to the end of the
inspection period. This item is unresolved pending. review of the modifica-
tion to reroute the condensate receiver pump discharge to the waste
collecting tanks.
(333/81-21-05)
To prevent additional release the licensee has replaced the condensate
receiver pump check valves, has completed a modification which reroutes the
condensate receiver tank vent to the Waste Collector Tank or the
Waste Neutralizer Tank, and is changing the procedure for startup of
the radwaste concentrator system to include a valve lineup on the conden-
sate receiver.
In addition, the Operations Superintendent is discussing
these events with all operators.
These discussions are emphasizing the
need to follow procedures and to initiate changes to the procedures if they
are incomplete or not correct.
9.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in
order to determine whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance,
or deviations.
The unresolved items identified during this inspection are
discussed in the paragraphs 6.c and 8.
10. Exit Interview
At periodic intervals during the ccurse of this inspection, the inspectors
met with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and
findings. On September 30, 1981, the inspectors met with licensee
representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) and summarized the scope and
F
-.
s
.
.
15
findings of the inspection as they are detailed in this report. During
the meeting the inspectors discussed the unresolved items.
4
e
i
s
__
__-7 :
~ ^ ~
A