ML20031E533
| ML20031E533 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi |
| Issue date: | 09/10/1981 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-1885, NUDOCS 8110160078 | |
| Download: ML20031E533 (28) | |
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DATE ISSUED: 9/10/81 l U f A//fl 4/8t
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ACRS ENRIC0 FERMI 2 PLANT SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING MEETING MINUTES JULY 24, 1981 WASHINGTON, DC PURPOSE On July 24, 1981 the ACRS Enrico Fermi Plant Subcommitee held a' meeting in' Washington, D.C.
The purpose of the meeting was to review the Application of the Detroit Edison Company for a license to operate the Enrico Fermi 2 Atomic Power Plant.
Notice of the meeting was published in the Federal Register on July 14, 1981.
ATTENDEES:
Principal attendees of the meeting are noted below:
ACRS NRC STAFF Derr, Chairman L. Kintner M. Carbon L. Phillips D. Moeller J. Knight J. Ray E. Pedersen I. Catton, Consultant Z. Zudans, Consultant P. Boehnert, Designated Federal Employee DETROIT EDIS0N GENERAL ELECTRIC L. Schuerman R. Hill W. Colbert E. Griffing E. Lusis bv,' ',
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n Enrico Fermi-2 Meeting July 24,1981 A complete list of attendess and all slides and handouts are attached to the office copy of the minutes.
1.
Mr. Les Kintner (NRC LPM) presented an overview of the NRC OL review for Fenni 2.
The plant is located on a 1120 acre site about 30 miles south of Detroit on Lake Erie. The BWR/4 generates a core power of 3292 MWt-1134 MWe.
He noted the OL review has been conducted in three periods:
(1) from FSAR docketing in April 1975 to construction delay in September 1976; (2) from June 1978 to March 1979 (TMI-2 accident);
and (3) from April 1981 to the present.
There are 19 open items as of the Subcommittee meeting date (July 24, 1981 - Figures 1-2).
Of these, 14 are scheduled to be addressed in an SER Supplement due on August 31, 1981 and 5 will be addressed prior to 0L issuance. There are 7 items listed as license conditions (Figure 3). Fuel load is projected for November 1982, as is the OL issuance.
Discussion of the above open items led to the following questions (answers are provided in parenthesis):
(1) Dr. Kerr asked how many NRC reviewers of plant emergency operating procedures are licensed operators.
(One or two - most have nuclear Navy experience);
(2) Dr. Moeller asked why the LaSalle routine release rate exceeds the Fermi routine release rate.
Both plants meet NRC requirements thus both release rates are acceptable to NRC.
Note:
Further communication from NRC indicated that offsite dose rates are controlling thus release rates can vary from plant to plant); (3) Mr. Ray asked what was the maximum plant power that can be generated with use of one of the two main cooling towers.
(Plant suffers a derate of approximately 33% or to 700 MWe.)
2.
Mr. H. Tauber and Mr. W. Jens (Detroit Edison Vice Presidents). discussed the Applicant's organization and management structure. Both speakers emphasized the long history of Detroit Edison in development of nuclear power dating to the " Atoms for Peace Program" in the 1950's. Detroit Edison noted that since they are the designer and constructor of the plant, there is extensive engineering experience in the operating organization.
Enrico Fermi-2 Meeting July 24,1981 s
The Nuclear Operations (NO) and Safety Organizations (Figures e and 5) were highlighted.
Mr. Jens noted the following significant organiza-tional changes / actions:
' Nuclear and fossile operations are completely separated.
4
'All safety functions are controlled in the N0 organization.
'There is a strong emphasis on training.
'A close relationship exists between designers and operators.
' Detroit Edison has purchased a plant simulator.
Detroit Edison will analyze all LERs that are screened by INP0/NSAC.
In response to questions from Drs. Catton and Carbon, Mr. Jens said Detroit Edison does review the EPRI Notepad publication, but has not made a formal commitment to do a complete review of LERs.
The Nuclear Safety Committee will be composed of a Subcommittee of the Board of Di rectors.
An Independent Review and Audit Group will review LERs and other information for potential USIs referred to it by the Onsite Re-view Organization (Figure 5.)
NRC discussed concerns raised during its audit of the plant organi-zation and management. One result will be the addition of a GE representative on each operating shift during startup to address the Staff concern over lack of Detroit Edison's BWR operating experience.
3.
Detro,it Edison discussed their operator selection and training program.
Detroit Edison seeks ex-nuclear Navy people, preferably with eight years of experience, and who are qualified engineering watch supervisors.
Dr. Carbon asked if an operator is allowed to use his own judgment in
Enrico Fermi-2 Meeting July 24,1981 an emergency situation. Mr. Griffing (Detroit' Edison) said the operator will generally follow procedures but the procedures allow some flexibi-lity of action.
Dr. Kerr asked how Detroit Edison decides if a candidate should become an operator or not.
Detriot Edison replied that this is a group decision made at management level.
Detroit Edison plans to use evaluation boards to aid this decision.
Detroit Edison discussed the use of a simulator in their training program.
The simulator will be used for operator training and will also be used to train maintenance and I&C personnel. Managers /
supervisors will also train on the simulator.
The maintenance worker training program was descrioed. All maintenance workers will be journeymen.
Detroit Edison has a general maintenance journeyman program in which all personnel have a " primary" and " secondary" skill. This is designed to increase the job scope and enhance job satisfaction.
Progression through the training program is tied to pay increases, and skill level evaluation is performance baseo.
4.
The control room (CR) design was reviewed.
Detroit Edison stated that they recognized early-on (1965) that man-machine interface is an important factor in CR design. The Fermit 2 CR makes extensive use of mimics, color coding, and shape coding. The CR was examined by the BWR Control Room Committee and NRC.
No major human factor problems were found.
CR habitability was reviewed. For accidents beyond the design basis accident, Detroit Edison said that the thyroid dose may double -(if all the iodine is released) which would put CR doses at or near the NRC limit (30 rem). The whole body dose should be the same (1D0% of noble gas release already assumed) and the assumption of 1% of solids being airborne is believed by Detroit Edison to be a conservative upper limit.
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0FFICIAL USE ONLY Enrico Fermi-2 Meeting July 24,1981 5.
The Subcommittee discussed installation of instrumentation to follow the course of a serious accident. The discussion centered on the requirement to install core thermocouples (T/C) in BWRs in general, and Fermi-2 in particular.
GE made a presentation that argued against installing core T/Cs. The main points were:
(1) T/Cs will not be useful for monitoring core cooling except when there is no ECC inject)on; (2) T/Cs are not cost effective and result in high man-rem dosages for installation and maintenance; (3) GE is conducting a probabilistic risk evaluation for installation of core T/Cs; (4) GE showed calculations that indicated the cost of T/C installation is high (N 5600,000 per plant) and the cost per man-rem is also very high (N56000/ man-rem).
Both Drs. Kerr and Zudans questioned and rejected the methodology used to obtain the cost-per-man-rem figure.
Mr. Larry Phillips (NRC) discussed the requirement for incore T/Cs.
Reasons given for requiring T/Cs for BWR's included:
(1) diverse level indiction, (2) monitor core cooling effectiveness, and (3) operability of core spray.
Dr. Carbon questioned the basis for item (3).
Dr. Moeller requested that in the near future NRC provide a written report detailing its bases for determining the costs (both 5 and health) vs benefits for instrumentation required for a given plant system. The report should also discuss over what period of time costs are amortized.
6.
Plant seismic design was discussed in the context of the NRC requirement for reanalysis of structures, systems and components required for safe shutdown.
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On March 1981 NRC requeste; the seismic reanalysis using either the Regulatory Guide 1.60 spectrum shape anchored at 0.19G, or development of a site-specific ground response spectra representative of earthquake j
histories of magnitude 5.3 - 5.5 applicable to a rock site (Femi-2 0FFICIAL USE ONLY
o Enrico Fermi-2 Meeting July 24,1981 is founded on bedrock). For the reanalysis loss of all offsite power is assumed, but a LOCA is not assumed in combination with the earthquake.
The reanalysis was completed and a final report was docketed with the Staff on July 15, 1981. Major conclusions of the study are:
(1) the plant can be safety shutdown; (2) one cable tray hanger would see stresses slightly over yield; and (3) 25 items (not identified) requir'e further evaluation, requalification, retesting, or replacement.
Mr. J. Knight (NRL) noted that an NRC review team conducted an onsite audit c the plant's seismic design last week. The 711minary con-clusion of the audit team was that no major changes will be required and the reanalysis showed low stress levels in the equipment and structures.
7.
Mr. W. Colbert (Detroit Edison) discussed the available normal and degraded decay heat removal modes. The normal mode is via the main condenser and, at lower power levels, the RHR shutdown system (Figure 6).
In response to a question from Dr. Zudans, Detroit Edison noted that for various degraded cooling modes, a total of 8 pumps are available (2 divisions of low pressure core spray, or 2 divisions of RHR pumps - 2 pumps per division).
In the above degraded cooling mode, the vessel is flooded to the main steam line and fluid is relieved through the S/RVs to the suppression pool from which vessel water makeup is also taken (Figure 7).
Figure 8 illustrates core cooling for a LOCA situation. Detroit Edison noted that for LOCA cooling, only 1 of 4 RHR pumps and 2 of 4 service water pumps are required.
8.
Station electrical power reliability was described by Mr. T. McKelvey (Detroit Edison). Fermi-2 has 2 separate offsite power systems:
120 KV and 345 KV system (Figure 8A). These systems are in turn interconnected
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Enrico Fermi-2 Meeting July 24, 1981 s
to at least 9 separate power stations and/or netghboring power grids.
The two separate offsite systems are bruught in to the plant by 5 individual lines via a 5 mile corridor.
In response to questions by Mr. Ray, Detroit Edison said one 345 KV tower can disable 4 of the 5 lines into the plant, but the off-site syctem does remain stable under these conditions. The on site AC auxiliary system contains 2 divisions of emergency power with 2 diesel generators per division (Figure 9).
The safety-related DC system consists of 2 divisions of 260/130 V batteries (Figure 10). There are three battery charges, one per each division, and a " floating spare". For a station blackout situation Detroit Edison cells on four combustion turbine generator peaking units on site. One of the four peakers is equipped for " black-start" capability.
s 4
In response to a question from Dr. Kerr, Detroit Edison said they estimate the probability of a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> loss of all offsite power to be N 10-5/ year.
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- 10. The status of the Mark I contain[nent modification program was reviewe'd.c 1
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1 Detroit Edison has completed most of the major modifications required' _
as a result of the NRC generic program (Figure 11). The remaining modifications should be completed by October 1982 (Figure 1?).
- 11. Cetroit Edison's response to the requirements of NUREG-0588 - equipment environmental qualification - were discussed. The review is concentrat-ing on equipment exposed to such harsh environments as LOCA and high energy line breaks both inside and outside primary containment. Detroit Edison will analyze, test, relocate, or change-out the impacted equipment as necessary. Edison is working with EPRI and the BWR Owner's Group on joint qualification programs of common items (used by 3 or more utilities).
Detroit Edison hopes to complete this program by July 1982.
- 12. Mr. J. Green iiscussed hydrogen control measures. The containment will be inerted during operation. There is a H /02 m nitoring system that 2
Enrico Fermi-2 Meeting July 24,1981 s
is redundant (2 divisions) and is a Seismic, Class I system (Figure 13).
Two thermal recomMners are available, as part of the ESF system (Figure 14).
In response to questions from Drs. Moeller and Kerr, Mr. Green said the a
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purge system has debris screens on the exhaust openings to prevent clogging and that purging can. be accomplished in about 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> if rapid containment access is'necessary.
- 13. Detroit Hison discussed their ATWS emergency procedure.
In the event of an ATWS. ~ Detroit Edison relys on the above procedure, their SLCS system, and their highly trained operators. Detroit ~ Edison noted that, there is a company directive that emphasizes " safety first"
'above any economic considerations (in the context of SLCS actuation).
s In ~ rcoponse to questions from Dr. Kerr, Detroit Edison said their y,
simulator will be ust.d to test the ATWS procedure noted above.
Dethoit Edison also said that it would take 6-10 minutes to get to x
hot shutdownTaf ter5LCS activation.
Regardjng.the concerns raised by AE00 on the consequences of a pipe break in the SDV portion of the rod drive system, Detroit Edison N
said 7, hey are awaiting the issuance of a Staff NUREG that addresses the AE0D concerns and liste remedial actions to be taken by licensees.
The Fermi-2 SDV system was ' described (Figure 14A).
- 14. Emergency planning for Fermi-2 was dsicussed. The principal emergency support facilities are the control room (CR), technical support center
)+
(TSC), operational support center (OSC) and emergency operations facility (E0F). Figure 15 shows the relative location nf the CR, CSC and TSC. A unique item is the use of high-resolution color TV cameras in the CR to allow TSC personnel to monitor CR pannels. The E0F will be constructed on site about 3/4 mile from the plant.
Enrico Fermi-2 Meeting July 24,1981
- 15. The radiological emergency response plan was reviewed. The province of Ontario Carada just intersects the 10-mile emergency protection zone radius.
In response to questions from Dr. Moeller, Detroit Edison said that FEMA handles US/ Canadian coordination of emergency planning, and joint action is now underway in developing plan details.
A FEMA respresentative also noted that a 1967 agreement between the US and Canada allows aircraft overflights in an emergency situation (plume tracking, etc.) as necessary. The NRC/ FEMA-monitored full scale emergency plan exercise is scheduled for February 1982.
Pr. Moeller asked it there are any public drinking water intakes near the plant and what provisions exist for interdiction given a large radiological release into Lake Erie.
Detroit Edison said that the Monroe County intake is near the site and the intake water is monitored via a sampling point on the pipe.
16.
In response to an earlier question from Dr. Moeller, Mr. Kintner said there was a Staff differing technical opinion on fire ?rotection pro =
visions for the plant and this difference was resolved at the Branch level (details not discussed).
Dr. Carbon asked the NRC to address the significance of not allowing the Applicant to operate the plant under natural circulation conditions.
17.
The Detroit Edison plant security plan was discussed in closed session.
Detroit Edison described the security provisions installed on-site.
In response to a question from Dr. Carbon, Detroit Edison noted that the guard force will be comprised of Detroit Edison emoloyees.
Provisions for protection against insider sabotage were also discussed.
18.
Ine Subcommittee recommended the Project be brought before the tull Committee for review at the August meeting.
- 19. The meeting was adjourned at 5:05 p.r.i.
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Enrico Fermi-2 Meeting July 24,1981 4
A transcript of the open portion of the meeting is available in the NRC 1
l Public Document Room at 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., or can be obtained at cost from Alderson Reporting, 400 Virginia Avenue, S.W.,
Washington, D.C. 202/554-2345.
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Enrico Fenni-2 Plant Mtg July 24,1981 9
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I Reference Material Provided for the Meeting.
l.
" Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of Enrico Fenni Atomic Power Plant, Unit No. 2" NUREG-0793, dated July 1981.
2.
Vu Graphs Used at Meeting:
a.
NRC -11 b.
Detroit Edison - Folder Containing all Slides and Handouts Used Plus Narritve of Each Presentation.
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A.2 SER ONN ISSUES 10 BE C0ffLETED IN SSER (AUGUST 31,1981)
CONFOR#4CE TO 10 CFR 20, 50,100
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. SEISMIC REASSESS E T OF DESIGN PARGIN
, PRESERVICE TESTING OF PLIPS & VALVES
.SEISMICQlnLIFICATIONREVIEWTEAMAUDIT
. BURIED PIPE FUJOATION C0f0lTIONS
. CONF 0P7ANCETOAPPSOIXG&H,10CFR50
. CONTAltFSIT LEAPAGE TESTS
. Pf0CEDURE FOR TESTING RHR ISOLATION VALVE INTERLOCKS
. LDSS OF INSTRMIATlG4 & CONTROL POS (IE BL".1ETit4 79-27)
. FIPF. PRDIECTitT1 (CONTROL R00M)
. PHYSICAL SECLRITY PLAN
. BERfBr.Y OPEPATING PROCEDURES (l.C.1, l.C.8, ADS)
. TEFDPACK OF.0PEPATING EXPERIBEE (I.C.5) t
. CONTROL R003 DFSICW (l.D 1)
. DEGPADED CORE TPAINING (ll B.4)
. CONTAltFaiT fhRGE OPERABILITY (ll.E.4.2) l l
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TO BE COWLEED PRIOR 10 OL ISSURCE (tD/.1982)
. DESICfi 0F PDDIFICATIUi TO DIESS. BiGINES
. EN/lRXE4TAL QlMLIFICATIUi 0F EQUIRET
. UPGPADED BGGBEY PREPAPIIIiESS (Ill.A.1.1,Ill.A.I.2,III.A.2)
.1%RK 1 CDNTAlttBT PLAhT UNIQUE #MLYSIS TORUS - ATTACH 8 PIPING A'MLYSIS
. SAFETY #MLYSIS NO PROCEDURES FOR TPAINING DURING LD4 POWERTESTING(1.G.1)
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-6, 10 BE CU?LETED AFTER LICBSE ISSLMCE (LICENSE C0falT10NS)
. ANALYSIS OF FISSION GAS IN FUEL
. TESTS OF FUEL DATiEL BOX DEFECTION
. ANALYSES OF HYDRODYtRTC STABILITY
. #M.YSIS OF fu.TIPE C0ffm0L SYSTEM FAILURES
. #MLYSIS OF EFFECT ON HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK ON CDNTRO
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. INSPECTim 0F LOW PRESSURE 1URBINE DISCS
. DESIGN OF POST ACCIDENT SA'PLING SYSTEM
, DESIGN OF INSTRi.IsiTATION FOR INADE0 ATE CORE COOLING
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