ML20030B710
| ML20030B710 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 07/31/1981 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS & EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA (AEOD) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUREG-0090, NUREG-0090-V04-N01, NUREG-90, NUREG-90-V4-N1, NUDOCS 8108240020 | |
| Download: ML20030B710 (33) | |
Text
,
NUREG-0090 Vol. 4, No.1 Report to Congress on Abnormal Occurrences e " 7's e'
et
~ p/e Jariuary - March 1981 o,
y-S //
ti s'R) -)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data pe %<,,
,.5, o
Dkjjjjo 810733 0090 R pgk a~
v Available from l
GP0 Sales Program Division of Technical Information and Document Control U.S. Nuclear Regulatory C m mission Washington, DC 205a5 Printed copy price:
$2.50 and National Technical Information Service Springfield, VA 22161
NUREG-0090 Vol. 4, No.1 Report to Congress on Abnormal Occurrences January - March 1981
~ ~ - - -
t.--
Date Published: July 1981 Office for Analysis and Evaluatlan of Operational Data U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 s * ** %
s 1
U. 5. liUCLE/R REGULATCRY C0lililSS10N PREVIOUS REPORTS IN THE SEPIES-Rcrott to the Cengtess on Abnotmtt Occut%cnces, Januatt!-June 1975, USNRC Report, NUREG 75/090, October 1975.
Rerett to Cengtes s on Abnerntt Occut tences, July-Septembet 1975, USNRC Report, NUREG-0090-1, Itarch 1976.
Rereit fe Congic55 en Abno'tmal Occ("tencC3, Ocicbet-pccenbet 1975, USNRC Report, NUREG-0090-2, March 1976.
l Rcrott to Cengne s s en Abnomai Occuttences, Jana.uy-httch 1976, USNRC Report, NUREG-0090-3, July 1976.
i Rcret t te Cengtes s en Abne'tmat Occutteneca, Aprit-June 19 76, USNRC Report,14UREG.0090-4, October 1976.
Reren t to Ceng%c s s en Abnointt Cccuttenccs, Jutt!-Scrtembet 1976, USNRC Report, NUREG-0090-5, !! arch 1977.
Reve% t to Cengtes s en Abnowat Occut'tences, Cc tobet-Decenber 1976, l
USNRC Report, NUREG-0C90-6, June 1977, i
Rcro'll te Ceng4c s s en Abnatntt Occu1%cnces, Janu.1%IJ-httch 1977, USNRC Report, NUREG-0090-7, June 1977.
Reret t to Cengness en Abnenntt Occuucnces, Artil-June 1977, USNRC Report, NUREG-0090-8, September 1977.
Ceren t to Congress en Abnetmat Occuuences, Juf y-Sep erbe% 1977, USNRC Report, NUREG-0090-9, November 1977 Rcret t te Ceny %cs s en Abnotmar Occuucnces, Cc tobe t-December 1977, USNRC Report, NUREG-0090-10, Marcb 1978.
Rcres t te Cengtess en Abnovat 0( cuucnces, Januaty-Ritch 1975, USNRC Report, NUREG-0090, Vol. i, No. 1. June 1978.
Rcroit to Cengics s en 'bucimat 0ccuuences, Artit-June 1976, U5NPC Report, NUREG-0090 Vol.1, No. 2, Septerrber 1978.
Repett te Cevane s s en Al nowat Occuucnces, Jutti-September 1975, USNRC Report, NUREG-0090, Vol. 1, No. 3 December 1978.
Rerett to eenotess en Abncimat Occo nc.: ca, Oc tcbc't-P: ceber 1978, USNRC Report, NUREG-0090, Vol. 1. No. 4, rarch 1979.
Rcrent te Cengtes s en Abnonntt Occuuences, January-Manch 1979, USNRC Report, NUkiG-0090, Vol. 2, No. 1, July 1979.
Rcret t to Cengics s en Abnenmat Occuncaces, Artit-June 19 79, USNRC Report, NOREG-0090, Vol. 2, No. 2, November 1979.
Repett to Ccngtes s en Abnetntt Occanences, Jutt!-Septembei 1979, USNRC Repo, t,14UREG-0090, Vol. 2 No. 3, rebruary 1980.
Repent to Ceng1cs s en Abnetrat Occuncnces, Octcbe%-Decerbet 1979, USNRC Report, NUREG-0090, Vol. 2, No. 4, April 1980.
Rcrent to Ceng%es s en Abnawat Onunences, lanuary-Hatch 1980, USNRC Report, NUREG-0090, Vol. 3, No. 1, September 1980.
Repett to Ccngtes s en Abncnmat Occanences, Artit-Janc 1960, USNRC Report, NUREG-0090 Vol. 3, No. 2, November 1980.
Rere%t ta Cengtess en Abnewat Occunnences, Juttj-Septembet 19 %,
USNRC Report, NUREG-0090, Vol. 3, No. 3, February 1981.
Repott to Congtess en Abno%ntt Occuttences, Octebet-Decembet 1980, USNRC Report, NUREG-0090, Vol. 3, No. 4, May 1981.
E
iii i
l ABSTRACT Section 208 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 identifies an abnormal occurrence as an unscheduled incident or event which the Nuclear Regulatory Commission determines to be significant from the standpoint of public health or safety and rcouires a quarterly report of such events to be made to Congress.
This report covers the period from January 1 to March 31, 1991.
The following incidents or events, including any submitted by the Agreement i
States, were determined by the Commission to be significant and reportable:
1.
There was one abnormal occurrence at the nuclear power plants licensed to operate.
The event involved an inadvertent disconnection of station batteries.
2.
There were no abnormal occurrences at the fuel cycle facilities (other than nuclear power plants).
3.
There was one abnormal occurrence at other licensee facilities; the event involved occupational overexposures.
4.
There were no abnormal occurrences reported by the Agreement States.
This report also contains information updating some previously reported abnormal occurrences.
k 4
k
v CONTENTS PAGE ABSTRACT...................
iii PREFACE............................................................
vii INTRODUCTION..................................................
vii THF REGULATORY SYSTEM.........................................
vii REPORTABLE OCCURRENCES.....................
viii 1
AGREEMENT STATEC..........................
ix i
l l
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON ABNORMAL OCCURRENCES, JANUARY-MARCH 1981............................................
1 i
1 NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS..........................................
1 81-1 Inadvertent Disconnection of Station Batteries................
1 FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES (Other than Nuclear Power Plants).......
3 OTHER NRC LICENSEES (Industrial Radiographeas, Medical Institutions, Industrial Users, Etc.)........
3 81-2 Occupational Overexposures........................
3 AGREEMENT STATE LICENSEES.................................
5 REFERENCES.......................................
7 APPENDIX A - ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE CR'TERIA....................
9 APPENDIX B - UPDATE OF F9EVIOUSLY REPORTED ABNORMAL OCCURRENCES....
13 NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS.....................
13 APPENDIX C - OTHER EVENTS OF INTEREST.....................
19 REFERENCES (FOR APPENDICES)........................................
21
vil o
PREFACE INTRODUCTION The Nuclear Pcgulatory Commission reports to the Congress each quarter under provisions of Section 208 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 on any l
abnormal occurrences involving facilities and activities regulated by the NRC.
An abnormal occurrence is defined in Section 208 as an unscheduled incident or event which the Commission determines is significant from the standpoint of public health or safety.
Events are currently identitled as abnormal occurrences for this report by the NRC using the criteria delineated in Appendix A.
These criteria were promul-gated in an NRC policy statement which was published in the Federal Register (42 FR 10950) on February 24, 1977 (Ref. 1).
In order to provide wide dis-semination of information to the public, a Federal Register notice is issued on each abnormal occurrence with copies distributed to the NRC Public Document Room and all local public document rooms.
At a minimum, each such notice contains the date and place of the occurrence and describes its nature and probable consequences.
The NRC has reviewed Licensee Evant Reports, licensing and enforcement actions (e.g., notices of violations, civil penalties, license modifications, etc.),
generic issues, significant inventory differences involving special nuclear material, and other categories of information available to the NRC.
The NRC has determined that only those events, including those submitted by the Agreement States, described in this report meet the criteria for abnormal occurrence reporting.
This report covers the period between January 1 to March 31, 1981.
Information reported on each event includes:
date and piace; nature and probabic consequences; cause or causes; and actions taken to prevent recurrence.
THE REGULATORY SYSTEM The system of licensing and regulation by which NRC carries out its responsi-bilities is implemented through rules and regulations in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
To accomplish its objectives, NRC regularly conducts licensing proceedings, inspection and enforcement activities, evaluation of operating experience and confirmatory research, while maintaining programs for establishing standards and issuing technical reviews and studies.
The NRC's role in regulating represents a complete cycle, with the NRC estoolishing standards and rules; issuing licenses and permits; inspecting for compliance; enfot-cing license requirements; and carrying on continuing evaluations, studies and.esearch projects to improve both the regulatory process and the protection of the public health and safety.
Public participation is an element of the regulatory process.
I
viii In the licensing and regulation of nuclear power plants, the NRC fol uws the philosophy that the health and safety of the public are best assured through the establishment of multiple les-1s of protection.
These multipic levels can be achieved and maintained through regulations which specify requirements which will assure the safe use of nuclear materials.
The regulations include design and quality assurance criteria appropriate for the various activities licensed by NRC.
An inspection and enforcement program helps assare compliance with the regulations.
Requirements for reporting incidents or events exist which help identify deficiencies early and aid in assuring that corrective action is taken to prevent their recurrence.
After the accident at Three Mile Island in March 1979, the NRC and other groups (a Presidential Commission, Congressional and NRC special inquiries, industry, special interests, etc.) spent substantial efforts to analyze the accident and its implications for the safety of operating reactors and to identify the changes needed to improve safety.
Some deficiencies in design, operation and regulation were identified that required actions to upgrade the safety of nuclear power plants.
These included modifying plant hardware, improving emergency preparedness, and increasing considerably the emphasis on human factors such as expanding the number, training, and qualifications of the reactor operating staff and upgrading plant management and technical support staffs' capabilities.
In addi-tion, each plant has installed dedicated telepho.ie lines to the NRC for rapid communication in the event of any incident.
Dedicated groups have been formed both by the NRC and by the industry for the detailed review of operating experi-ence to help identify safety concerns early, to improve dissemination of such information, and to feed back the experience into the licensing and regulation process.
Most NRC licensee employees who work with or in the vicinity of radioactive materials are required to utilize personnel monitoring devices such as film badges or TLD (thermoluminescent dosimeter) badges.
These badges are processed periodically and the exposure results normally serve as the official and legal record of the extent of personnel exposure to radiation during the period the badge was worn.
If an individual's past exposure history is known and has been sufficiently low, NRC regulations permit an individual in a rest 7cted area to receive up to three rems of whole body exposure in a calendar quarter.
Higher values are permitted to the extremities or skin of the whole boc3 For unre-stricted areas, permissible levels of radiation are considerably smaller.
Permissible doses for restricted areas and unrestricted areas are stated in 10 CFR Part 20.
In any case, the NRC's policy is to maintain radiation exposures to levels as low as reasonably achievable.
REPORTA3LE OCCURRENCES Since tha NRC is responsible for assuring that regulated nuclear activities are conducted safely, the nuclear industry is required to report incident" or events which involve a variance from the regulations, such as personnel over-exposures, radioactive material releases above prescribed limits, and malfunc-tions of safety related equipment.
Thus, a reportaole occurrence is any incident
ix or event occurring at a licensed facility or related to licensed activ' ties which NRC licensees are required to report to the NRC.
The NRC evaluates each reportable occurrence to determine the safety implications involved.
Because of the broad scope of regulation and the conservative attitude toward safety, there are a large number of events reported to the NRC.
The information provided in these. reports is used by the NRC and the industry in their continuing evaluation and improvement of nuclear safety.
Some of the reports describe events that have real or potential safety implications; however, most of the reports received from licensed nuclear power facilities describe events that did not directly involve the nuclear reactor itself, but involved equipment and components which are peripheral aspects of the nuclear steam supply system, and are minor in nature with respect to impact on public health and safety.
Many are discovered during routine inspection and surveillance testing and are corrected upon discovery.
Typically, they concern single malfunctions of com-ponents or parts of systems, with redundant operable components or systems continuing to be available to perform the design function.
Information concerning reportable occurrences at facilities licensed or other-wise regulated by the NRC is routinely disseminated by NRC to the nuclear industry, the public, and other interested groups as these events occur.
Dissemination includes deposit of incident reports in the NRC's public document rooms, special notifications to licensees and other affected or interested groups, and public Inaddition,abiweeklycomputerprintoutcontaininginformation announcements.
on reportable events received from NRC licensees is sent to the NRC s more than 120 local public document rooms throughout the United States and to the imC Public Document Room in Washington, D.C.
The Congress is routinely kept informed of reportable events occurring at licensed facilities.
AGREEMENT STATES Section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, authorizes the Commission to enter into agreements with States whereby the Commission relinquishes and the States assume regulatory authority over byproduct, source and special nuclear materials (in quantities not capable of sustaining a chain reaction).
Comparable and compatible programs are the basis for agreements.
Presently, information on reportable occurrences in Agreement State licensed activities is publicly available at the State level.
Certain information is also provided to the NRC under exchange of information provisions in the agree-ments.
NRC prepares a semiannual summary of this and other information in a document entitled, " Licensing Statistics and Other Data," which is publicly available.
In early 19.77, the Commission determined that abnormal occurrences happening at facilities of Agreement State licensees should be included in the quarterly report to Congress.
The abnormal occurrence criteria included in Appendix A
.1
x is applied uniformly to events at NRC and Agreement State licensee facilities.
Procedures have been developed and implemented and abnormal occurrences reported by the Agreement States to the NRC are included in these quarterly reports to Congress.
l l
l
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON ABNORMAL 0,CCURRENCES JANUARY-MARCH 1981 NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS The NRC is reviewing events reported at the nuclear powr plants licensed to operate during the first calendar quarter of 1981.
As of the date of this report, the NRC had determined that the following was an abr.armal occurrence.
81-1 Inadvertent Disconnection of Station Batteries Preliminary information pertaining to this incident was reported in the Federal Register (Ref. 2).
Appendix A (one of the general criteria) of this report notes that major degradation of essential safety-related equipment can be considered an abnormal occurrence.
Date and Place - On Janeary 6,1981, the NRC was notified by Consumers Power Company that the breakers from both station batteries to their 125-volt DC buses at the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant had been inadvertently opened for about one hour.
The Palisades plant utilizes a pressurized water reactor and is located in Van Buren County, Michigan.
Nature and Probable Consequences - On January 6, 1981, while performing monthly surveillance tests on both station batteries, maintenance personnel inadvertently opened the breakers from both s',ation batteries to their 125-volt DC buses and left them open for approximately one hour.
When the event occurred, the plant was operating at 99 percent power.
Since the plant was in a normal mode of operation, DC power was being supplied by the 6C systam via the battery chargers; therefore, DC power was never interrupted during the period the battery breakers were left open.
Nevertheless, the safety of the plant was degraded.
A loss of offsite power during this period would, in the absence of manual action, result in the loss of all control power, thus blocking the automatic transfer of power to the onsite diesel generators and resulting in a complete station blackout.
The station blackout would persist until the battery breakers were manually reclosed or manual actioris taken (e.g.,
manually closing the t:reakers from the diesel generators to the emergency buses and thel additionally closing the load breakers for the required safety systems).
During this time the ability of the plant to remove decay heat would be severely restricted.
Since the tripping of the battery breakers is not annunciated in the Palicades control room, a subsequent loss of offsite power could lead to an undetected common mode failure.
Such a failure would be difficult to diagnose, thereby limiting the operator's ability to take timely corrective action.
Consequently, an inordinate amount of time could be required to bring the plant to a normal mode of decay heat removal.
2 Cause or Causes - The batteries were disconnected because of the failure of two electricians to follow the surveillance test procedure.
The procedure involves placing the two battery chargers, which had been in standby, in service and placing the two operating battery chargers in standby.
The electricians incorrectly disconnected the batteries, while connecting the two additional battery chargers.
This resulted in an incorrect operating configuration where all four battery chargers were in service supplying the two 125-volt DC buses (two battery chargers connected to each bus) and the batteries were disconnected.
The test procedure was examined by the NRC and found to be adequate.
The two I
electricians who performed the test procedure had a copy of the procedure, had performed the test previously, and had been briefed on the work by their super-visor prior to beginning the test.
Actior.s Taken to Prevent Recurrence Licensee - When the error was discovered by the licensee at the conclusion of the test procedure, the batteries were again connected to the plant's DC buses.
Additionally, the licensee is planning to install annunciators in the control room that will alert the operator whenever a station battery has been discon-nected from its bus.
NRC - The personnel error and possible consequences were investigated by the EC resident inspectors at the Palisades plant.
In addition to this event, there have been several previous incidents of personnel errors by the licensee's staff, which involved safety-system valve positioning.
Because of the licensee's history of personnel errors, several short-term measures were required by the NRC including a verification by a second qualified individual of work in safaty-related areas; daily checks of plant operations by a member of licensee corporate management staff; a review of procedures for work in safety related areas; additional training of plant personnel; and review of the possible need for control room indication to show battery circuit operability.
These measures were agreed to by the licensee and confirmed by an Immediate Action Letter issued by NRC Region III (Chicago) on January 9, 1981 (Ref. 3).
A Notice of Violation, involving procedures and technical specifications, was issued to the licensee on June 12, 1981 (Ref. 4).
Based on this event, and previous regulatory performance and personnel erro w,
the NRC concluded that continued operation of the plant over the long term requires significant changes in the control of licensed activities.
The NRC (Region III cffice) met with the licensee on February 18, 1981 to discuss short-and long-term actions which the licensee has taken, or interds to take, to upgrade the regulatory performance of the Palisades facility.
Confirmation of the licensee's commitments was forwarded by an Order to the licensee dated March 9, 1981 (Ref. 5).
IE Information Notice 81-05, " Degraded DC Systems at Palisades," was issued on March 13, 1981 to all holders of operating licenses and construction permits to provide them with early notification of a possibly signif+ cant matter (Ref. 6).
This incident is closed for purposes of this report.
- - - - - - ~ ~ - - ' - - '
FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES (Other than Nuclear Power Plants)
The NRC is reviewing events reported by these licensees during the first calendar quarter of 1981.
As of the date of this report, the NRC had not determined that any were abnormal occurrences.
OTHER NRC LICENSEES (Industrial Radiographers, Medical Institutions, Industrial Users, etc.)
There are currently more than 8,000 NRC nuclear material licenses in effect in the United States, principally for use of radioisotopes in the medical, industrial, and academic fields.
Incidents were reported in this category from licensees such as radiographers, medical institutions, and byproduct material users.
The NRC is reviewing events reported by these licensees during the first calendar quarter of 1981.
As of the date of this report, the NRC had determined that the following was an abnormal occurrence.
81-2 Occupational Overexposures Preliminary information certaining to this incident was reported in the Federal Register (Ref. 7). Appendix A (Example 1 of "For All Licensees") of this report Iiotes that exposure of the feet, hands, or forearms of any individual to 375 rems or more of radiation can be considered an abnormal occurrence.
Date and Place - On February 2, 1981, Automation Industries, Inc., reported a possible overexposure to the thumbs of two individuals at their Nuclear Encap-sulation Facility in Phoenixville, Pennsylvania.
During the investigation of the overexposures to these two individuals, the NRC inspectors ideatified a third individual who had received an overexposure.
Nature and Probable Consequences - Automation Industries, Inc., is a licensed manufacturer of sealed sources containing radioactive material which are l
distributed to other licensees for use in industrial radiography.
Prior to -
shipment, the sources are placed in a shielded container and cleaned of any loose surface contamination.
In this operation, the licensee had been employing a procedure where the sources were withdrawn from a fully shielded position during cleaning This caused the thumb and finger of the individual performing the cleanir.1 to be exposed to a pencil-like beam of radiation of sufficient intensity to cause a radiation overexposure.
As a result of cleaning and wipe testing of sources, two employees may have received hand exposure in excess of regulatory limits for several years prior to 1980, possibly for as long as seven years.
The doses in previous years were such that either no injury was evident or was so slight as to be ignored.
During the Summer of 1980, the licensee received a shipment of iridium 192 with higher than normal loose contamination; in addition,
5 during the period of February 3-18, 1981, covering circumstances pertaining to the overexposures and to the licensee's notification of suspected radiation-overexposure to employees (Ref. 8).
Three items of noncompliance were identifed:
exposure in excess of the limits of 10 CFR 20.101(a) to the hands of three individuals; failure to provide dosimetry required by 10 CFR 20.202(a); and failure to make immediate notification as required by 10 CFR 20.403(a)(1).
On February 3, 1981 an Immediate Action Letter (Ref. 9) was sent to the licensee by the NRC Region I off"c6 which documented mutual understandings regarding the prohibition of use of a particular device for decontaminating i
and wipe testing sources, providing proper fingertip dosimetry, changing and evaluating the dosimetry on a daily basis, and removing the two overexposed I
employees (who were originally identified by the licensee) from all radiation j
work except for the use of remote manipulators.
On February 12, IS81 an Immediate Action letter (Ref. 10) was stat to the licensee by the NRC Regier-I office which documented mutual unders andings regarding use of only an approved Automation Industries, Inc., rautography exposure device for decontamination and leak testing of sources until the NRC had approved alterate procedures, and that the licensee would submit all such procedures to ;1RC "eadquarters by February 20, 1981 for approval.
The procedures were submittea and are under review by the NRC.
On February 17, 1981 the NRC served upon the licensee an Order Suspending the License and Order to Show Cause Why the Suspeasion Should Not Be Continued, Pending Further Order (Ref. 11).
On February 27, 1981 the licensee responded to the Show Cause Order and described changes in the management of the facility and its radiation safety program together with revised procedures for cleaning and wipe testing sources.
On March 6,1981 th NRC rescinded the suspension of the license and ordered the licensee to implement the commitments contained in the licensee's February 27, 1981 response to the Show Cause Order (Ref. 12).
Frequent inspections will be performed by Region I inspectors to ensure the effective implementation of the licensee's commitments.
The Department of Justice has been requested to determine whether a criminal prosecution should be started in view of the licensee's willful noncompliance with NRC regulations.
NRC Inspection and Enforcement Information Notice No. 81-18 was issued to appropriate licensees to inform them of this event (Ref. 13).
This incident is closed for purposes of this report.
AGREEMENT STATE LICENSEES Procedures have been developed for the Agreement States to screen unscheduled incidents or events using the same criteria as the NRC (see Appendix A) and report the events to the NRC for inclusion in this repset..
During the first calendar quarter of 1981, the Agreement States reported no abnormal occurrences to the NRC.
l b
?
7 l
REFERENCES l
1 l
1.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Abnormal Occurrence Reports:
Imple-mentation of Section 208, Energy Reorganization Act of 1974; Policy State-ment," Federal Register, Vol. 42, No. 37, February 24, 1977, 10950-10952.
2.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Abnormal Occurrence:
Inadvertent Disconnection of Station Batteries," Federal Register, Vol. 46, No. 95, May 18, 1981, 27206-27207.
3.
"Immediate Action Letter" from James G. Keppler, Director, NRC Region III Office, to R. C. Youngdahl, Executive Vice President, Consumers Power Company, Docket No. 50-255, January 9, 1981.*
4.
Letter from Janes G. Keppler, Director, NRC Region III Office to R. B. Dewitt, Vice President, Nuclear Operations, Consumers Power Company, forwarding a Notice of Violation, Docket No. 50-255, June 12,1981.*
5.
Letter from Victor Stello, Jr., NRC, to R. C. Youngdahl, Executive Vice President, Consumers Power Company, forwarding an " Order Confirming Licensee Actions to Upgrade Facility Performance," Docket No. 50-255, March 9, 1981.*
6.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Inspection and Enforcement Information Notice No. 81-05. " Degraded DC System at Palisades," Mat d. 13, 1981.*
7.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Abnormal Occurrence:
Occupational Overexposures," Federal Register, Vol. 46, No. 121, June 24, 1981, 32713-32714.
8.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I Inspection Report No. 30-5998/
81-02 at Automation Industries, Inc., Phoenixville, Pennsylvania, for period of February 3-6, 1981, Docket No. 30-5998, License No. 37-611-09. to the report covered a further inspection for the period of
. February 3-12, 1981. Attachment 2, Addendum, covered a further inspectfon for the period of February 13-18, 1981.*
9.
"Immediate Action Letter" from Boy.e H. Grier, Dire.ctor, NRC Region I Office, to M. P. Santoro, General Manager, Automation Industries, Inc.,
Docket No. 30-5998, February 3, 1981.*
10.
"Immediate Action Letter" from Boyce H. Grier, Director, NRC Region I Office, tom.P.Santoro,GeneralManager,AutomationInc9stries,Inc.,
Docket No. 30-5998, February 11, 1981.
"Available in NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW.
Washington, D.C.
20555, for inspection and copying for a fee.
8 11.
Letter from Victor Stello, Jr., NRC, to John Dwight, President, Automation Industries, Inc., Danbury, Connecticut, forwarding an " Order Suspending License and to Show Cause Why Suspension of the License Should Not Be l
Continued, Pending Further Order," Docket No. 30-5908, February 17, 1981.*
12.
Letter from Victor Stello, Jr., NRC, to John Dwight, President, Automation Industries, Inc., Danbury, Connecticut, forwarding an Order which (1) terminated the February 17, 1981 Order to Show Cause Why the Suspension i
l of the License Should Not Be Continued, Pending Further Order, (2) rescinded the February 17, 1981 Order Suspending License, and (3) amended the license to incorporate certain requirements.
License No. 37-611-09, March 6, 1981.*
13.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comniission, Inspection and Enforcement Information Notice No. 81-18, " Excessive Radiation Exposures to the Fingers of Three Individuals Incurred During Cleaning and Wipe Testing of Radioactive Sealed Sources at 3 Sealed Source Manufacturing Facility," June 23, 1981.*
1
.4 j
s "Available in NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW., Washington, D.C.
20555, for inspectico and copying for a fee.
i 1
W t
9 APPENDIX A ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE CRITERIA The following criteria for this report's abnormal occurrence determinations were set forth in an NRC policy statement published in the Federal Register on February 24, 1977 (Vol. 42, No. 37, pages 10950-10952).
Events involving a major reduction in the degree of protection of the public Such an event would involve a moderate or more severe health or safety.
impact on the public health or safety and could include but need not be limited to:
1.
Moderate exposure to, or release of, radioactive material licensed by or othe-wise regulated by the Commission; Major degradation of essential safety-related equipment; or 2.
3.
Major deficiencies in design, construction, use of, or manage-ment controls for licensed facilities or material.
Examples of the types of events that are evaluated in detail using these criteria are:
For All Licensess_
Exposure of the whole body of any individual to 25 rems or more of 1.
radiation; exposure of the skin of the whole body of any individual to 150 rems or more of radiation; or exposure of the feet, ankles, hands or forearms of any individual to 375 rems or more of radiation (10 CFR Part 20.403(a)(1)), or equivalent exposures from internal sources.
An exposure to an individual in an unrestricted area such that the 2.
whole body dose received exceeds 0.5 rem in one calendar year (10 CFR Part 20.105(a)).
3.
The release of radioactive material to an unrestricted area in concentrations which, if averaged over a period of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, exceed 500 times the regulatory limit of Appendix B, Table II, 10 CFR Part 20 (10 CFR Part 20.403(b)).
4.
Radiation or contamination levels 'n excess of design values on packages, or loss of confinement of radioactive material such as (a) a radiation dose rate of 1,000 mrem oer hour three feet from the surface of a packane contair.ing the raaicactive material, or (b) release of radioactive material from a package in amounts greater than the regulatory limit (10 CFR Part 71.36(a)).
(
f 10 5.
Any loss of licensed material in such quantities and under such circumstances that substantial hazard may result to persons in i
unrestricted areas.
l 6.
A substantiated case of actual or attempted theft or diversion of licensed material or sabotage of a facility.
7.
Any substantiated loss of special nuclear material or any substantiated inventory discrepancy which is judged to be significant relative to normally expected performance and which is judged to be caused by theft or diversion or by substantial breakdown of the accountability syr, tem.
8.
/,ny substantial breakdown of physical security or material control (i.e., access control, containment, or accountability systems) that significantly weakened the protection against theft, diversion or sabotage.
9.
An accidental criticality (10 CFR Part 70.52(a)).
10.
A major deficiency in design, construction or operation having safety implications requiring immediate remedial action.
11.
Serious deficiency in management or procedural controls in major areas.
12.
Series of events (where individual events are not of major importance),
recurring incidents, and incidents with -implications for similar facilities (generic incidents), which create major safety concern.
For Commercial Nuclear Power Plants 3.
Exceeding a safety limit of license Technical Specifications (10 CFR Part 50.36(c)).
2.
Major degracation of fuel integrity, primary coolant pressure boundary, or primary containment boundary.
3.
Loss of plant capability to perform essential safety functions such that a potential release of radioactivity in excess of 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines could result from a postulated transient or accident (e.g., loss of emergency core cooling system, loss of coni.rol rod system).
4.
Discovery of a major condition not specifically considered in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) or Technical Specifications that requires immediate remedial action.
11 5.
Personnel error or procedural deficiencies which result in loss of plant capability to perform essential safety functions such that a potential release of radioactivity in excess of 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines could result from a postulated transient or accident (e.g., loss of emergency core cooling system, loss of control rod system).
For Fuel Cycle Licensees 1.
A safety limit of license Technical Specifications is exceeded and a plant shutdown is required (10 CFR Part 50.36(c)).
2.
A major condition not specifically considered in the Safety Analysis Report or Technical Specifications that requires immediate remedial AC? ion.
3.
An event which seriously compromised the ability of a confinement system to perform its designated function.
4
)
13 APPENDIX B UPDATE OF PREVIOUSLY REPORTED ABNORMAL OCCURRENCES During the January through March 1981 period, the NRC, NRC licensees, Agree-ment States, Agreement State licensees, and other involved parties, such as reactor vendors and architects and engineers, continued with the implementa-tion of actions necessary to prevent recurrence of previously reported abnormal occurrences.
The referenced Congressional abnormal occurrence reports below provide the initial and any updating information on the abnormal occurrences discussed. Those occurrences not now considered closed will be discussed in subsequent reports in the series.
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS The following abnormal occurrence was originally reported in NUREG-0090-5,
" Report to Congress on Abnormal Occurrences:
July-September 1976," and updated in subsequent reports in the series, i.e., NUREG-0090-8, Vol. 1, No. 4, Vol. 2, No. 3, Vol. 2, No. 4, Vol. 3, No. 1, Vol. 3, No. 2, and Vol. 3, No. 4.
It is further updated as follows:
76-11 Steam Generator Tube Integrity On November 28, 1980, the NRC staff authorized Southern California Edison Company to begin production sleeving of the San Onofre Unit 1 steam generators.
Shortly thereafter, production sleeving was begun.
Inspections of early field repairs indicated that actual production sleeving was not as successful as the laboratory process.
As a result, the licensee and their vendor elected to change to a
" hybrid" sleeving process that did not involve the proprietary process that appeared to be causing most problems.
Results using the " hybrid" sleeving process are much more acceptable.
The results of the staff review of the sleeving repair program and associated changes to the plant Technical Specifications were issued on June 8,1981 which authorized the restart of San Onofre Unit 1 (Ref. B-1).
This authorization includes schedules for submittal of steam generator tube monitoring and revised operating limits resulting from the repairs and the attempt to slow or prevent further degradation of the steam generator tubes.
This incident is closed for purposes of this report.
W The following abnormal occurrence was originally reported in NUREG 0090, Vol. 2, No. 1 " Report to Congress on Abnormal Occurrences:
January-March 1979," and updated in subsequent reports in this series, i.e., NUREsi-0090, Vol. 2, No. 2, Vol. 2, No. 3, Vol. 2, No. 4, Vol. 3, No. 1, Vol. 3, No. 2, Vol. 3, No. 3, and Vol. 3, No. 4.
It is further updated as follows:
1
. ]
14 79-3 Nuclear Accident at Three Mile Island Reactor Building Entries Four reactor building entries (the sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth since the March 28, 1979 accident) were made during the first calendar quarter of 1981.
The sixth reactor building entry was made on February 3 and 5, 1981 with a total of 32 persons entering the reactor building during the 2-day period During the entry, a total of 8 closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras were installed inside the reactor building, seven of which operated properly.
The inoperable camera was scheduled for repair during a future entry.
Additional work was also performed on the source range neutron monitor and associated cables-in an attempt to locate.the cause for its inoperability.
Decontamination experiments using various decontamination solutions and strip-pable coatings were performed as planned.
These experiments were recorded on video tape using the newly installed CCTV system.
-The maximum individual whole body exposure during this entry was 710 millirems (mr).
Approximately 12 man rem of exposure were accumulated by the 32 entry personnel.
During the pre-entry purge,11 curies of kr-85 were released.
The seventh entry into the Unit 2 reactor building commenced on Tuesday, March 17, 1981, and was completed on Friday, March 20, 1981.
During the entry, three 1-liter samples of sump water were obtained for analysis.
Also, a 150-milliliter sample of sump water was obtained for archive storage.
Valves inside the reactor building were serviced and a lighting circuit was repaired.
A zeolite ion exchange column was set up to collect sump water for subsequent cation ion exchange media testing.
Initially, difficulties were encountered in equipment designed to pass sump water to test zeolite filter material similar to that originally proposed for the Submerged Demineralization System (SDS).
A submersible pump, which was to pump water to the filter test column, became stuck as it was being lowered into the sump.
The pump was freed; but soon after the experiment was activated remotely from the command center, it was apparent that some of the components were not functioning properly.
Two trouble shooters were sent into the reactor building and the problem was corrected.
Approximately 5 gallons of sump water was pcssed through the zeolite column and collected.
A total of 13 men entered the reactor building during the seventh entry.
The total exposure was 4.91 man rem with a maximum individual exposure being 600 mr.
Two men became exhausted and were examined by the TMI medical staff.
One was sent to an offsite doctor for observation.
To reduce the likelihood of radio-active contamination, all the entry team members wore plastic protective clothing.
Although the temperature inside the reactor building was approximately 64 F, the plastic protective clothing retains body heat and humidity and increases physical discomfort significantly. Modifications in clothing are being evaluated for future entrfes.
15 The eighth :eactor building entry lasted 40 minutes and occurred on Wednesday, Aprii 8, 1981.
The objective of this entry was to survey the area in the vicinitu of the ooen stairwell for the installation of a floating pump on a future entry.
This pump will be used to transfer the sump water to the SDS for process tng and also to pump sumr> water to storage tanks in the event that leakage from the sump occurs.
Total exposure for the engineers on this entry was 1.78 man-rem with the maximum individual dose being 820 mr.
The ninth entry into the Unit 2 reactor building was completed on Thursday, l
April 30, 1981.
During this entry, preparations were completed for a decon-tamination experiment that will take place on a subsequent entry.
Also, the floating pump was successfully placed in the reactor building sump water.
Prior to this entry, the building was purged to reduce the airborne krypton concentra-tions.
Air samples taken in the reactor building before and after the purge indicate that 3 curies of kr-85 were released to the environment.
Eight persons entered the reactor building during the entry and based on preliminary indicators (dosimeters), the maximum individual exposure was 670 mr with the total exposure for the entry team being 3.04 man-rem.
Reactor Cooling The TM1 Program 0ffice staff reviewed the licensee's proposed procedures for utilizing the loss to ambient mode for core cooling.
In this mode, decay heat is transferred through the reactor coolant system piping and components directly to the reactor building atmosphere.
These procedures were approved and on January 5, 1981 the licensee modified appropriate valve positions to put the system in the loss to ambient mode.
This mode has been successful in removing decay heat as predicted.
Source Range Neutron Monitor As as result of work done on the source range neutron monitor, cables, and the preamplifier, a second neutron monitor which had been inoperable since the March 28, 1979 accident was returned to service.
Repairs on this monitor began during the third reactor building entry.
Following the repair of the preampli-fier and cables inside the reactor building, an extensive calibration program was performed by the licensee and'the licensee's consultants.
The monitor has been giving satisifactory results which are close to that of the previously operating monitor since March 1980.
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) and NRC Statement of Policy The Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) for the cleanup at Three Mile Island was issued on March 9, 1981 (Ref. B-2) after an analysis of extensive comments from governmental agencies, other organizations, and the general public.
The statement is an overall study of the activities necessary for decontamination of the facility, defueling, and disposition of the radioactive wastes.
16 Subsequent to the issuance of the Final PEIS, the NRC issued a Statment of Policy dated April 28, 1981 (Ref. B-3).
This statment delineated the areas of responsi-bility within the NRC for the approval of major cleanup activities.
The NRC staff may approve those activities whose impacts fall within the scope of those assessed in the PEIS with the exception of disposal of processed accident generated water into the Susquehanna River which will be referred to the Commission for 5
approval.
It was also reiterated that the licensee will not be excused from compliance with any order, regulation, or other requirement imposed by the Com-mission to protect the health and safety of the environment.
Advisory Panel The NRC's Advisory Panel for the Decontamination of Three Mile Island Unit 2 held public meetings on February 4, 11, 19 and March 16, 30, 1981.
The main issue at these meetings centered around the disposition and definition of accident-generated water and contaminated water generated since the accident.
Five recommendations which were unanimously approved by the Panel were presented to the Commission at a public meeting in Washington, D.C. on March 16, 1981.
These recommendations are:
Recommendation 1 The radioactive contaminated water located in the reactor building be decontaminated as rapidly as possible using the licensee's proposed Sub-merged Demineralizer System (SDS) currently being constructed.
This recommendation, specific to the SDS system, is contingent upon approval of that system by the NRC.
Recommendation 2 The approximately 1.6 million gallons of decontaminated water expected as a result of the TM1-2 decontamination activities be stored initially in onsite tar'*s to permit i.ccurate assessment of its residual radioactivity content pr - to a decision regarding ultimate disposal.
Recommendatior The appropriatenes' of continued onsite storage of decontaminated water be reviewed annuall, 'y this Advisory Panel.
Recommendation 4 To the extent practicabl, Metropolitan Edison Company should minimize additional onsite water requirements by maximizing the use of recycled decontaminated water.
R_ecommendation 5 The radioactive contaminants (except tritium) in the unprocessed water at TMI-2 should be reconcentrated and immdilized as expeditiously as possible consistent with regulatory requirements,
T 17 In addition, the Panel unanimously passed a motion to recommend to the NRC that Met-Ed be allowed to ship low-level spent resins from EPICOR-II in an unsolidified form. providing all transportation and other regulations are l
satisfied.
The Commission subsequently concurred with all of the Panel's recommendations.
Submerged Demineralization System (SDS) 1 l
With the issuance of the Final PEIS, the THI Program Office, with the assis-I tance of NRC Region I specialists, began a series of me tings with the licensee i
on the Submerged Demineralization System.
On March 31, 1981 Lad April 1, 1981 discitssions were held with the licensee to obtain additional information needed for the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) which will be issued by the TMI Program l
Office. The SER will contain NRC's evaluation of the SDS along with the NRC's decision concerning the system's operation.
EPICOR-II Liners On March 25, 1981, the NRC revised the Unit 2 license te provide alternatives to onsite processing prior to the ultimate disposal of radioactive EPICOR-II resins. When the NRC approved the operation of EPICOR-II in October 1979, the NRC required that the spent resins be solidified by mixing them with a binder material, e.g., cement, prior to shipment for offsite disposal.
This special requirement was established because it was expected that the EPICOR-II resin radioactivity loadings would be much higher than normal reactor wastes and that they would be disposed of by routine low-leve; land burial practices.
- However, the curie content of the lower loaded EPICOR-II polishing resin vessels (a total of 22) are within the normal range of typical reactor resin wastes.
There-fore, there is no need for the addition of a binder material provided that the resin liners are dewatered and meet all 00T and NRC transportation rules and applicable state burial criteria.
The first of the 22 EPICOR-II liners approved for shallow land burial in dewatered form was subsequently shipped to U.S. Ecology, Richland, Washington on April 23, 1981.
Further reports will be made as appropriate.
A A A A
A A The following abnormal occurrence was originally reported in NUREG-0090, Vol. 3, No. 2, " Report to Congress on Abnormal Occurrences:
April-June 1980," ana updated in a subsequent report in this series, i.e., Vol. 3, No. 4.
It is further updated as follows:
80-6 Failure of Control Rods to Insert Fully During a Scram As stated in the previous update report, the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforce-ment issued Bulletin 80-17, Supplement 4 (Ref. B-4) on December 18, 1980 to all operating General Electric (GE) BWR power reactor fav ;ities with scram discharge volume designs similar to Browns Ferry.
This Supplement required
i 18
[__
)
w the affected licensees to provide assurance that the Continuous Monitoring i
System (CMS) installed in response to Supplement 1 (Ref. B-5) had been tested to demonstrate operability as installed, remains operable during plant operation,
_y and is periodically tested to demonstrate continued operability.
3 b5 Also as previously reported, orders were issued to all operating GE BVR power
^-
reactor facilities with scram discharge volume designs simila* to Browns Ferry on January 9, 1981. The Orders required the affected licensees to install an t-cutomatic system to initiate a reactor control rod insertion on degraded air system conditions.
On March 31, 1981, the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement issued a Temporary Instruction to verify BWR licensee action implementing commitments 1
relating to the January 9, 1981 Orders (Ref. B-6).
Once the modifications required by the January 9, 1981 Orders have been implemented, all necessary ahort-term corrective measures will be in place.
The only remaining issue is
-~;;
the long-term modifications to improve the scram discharge system reliability.
With the exception of FitzPatrick, Millstone, Nine Mile Point, and Vermont Yankee, GE BWR licensees have made acceptable commitments to long-term correc-7 M-tive leasures proposed in the staff's Generic Safety Evaluation Report dated December 1, 1980 (Ref. B-7).
Discussions with these licensees are being held 7
to resolve any outstanding technical positions.
The staff plans to issue Orders confirming the licensees' con.aitments after resolution with the remaining plants is achieved.
This incident is closed for purposes of this report.
m
~
i 19 APPENDIX C OTHER EVENTS OF INTEREST The following events are described below becausu they may possibly be perceived by the public to be of public health significance.
None of tht: events involved a major reduction in the level of protection provided f?r public health or safety; thereiore, they are not reportable as abnormal occurrences.
l 1.
Maltunctions of Teletherapy Units NRC has received reports of malfunctions of Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (AECL) teletherapy units, Models Theratron 60 and 80 and Eldorado 6 and 8.
According to these reports, malfunctions have occurred with the power cord takeup reel of the beam defining projection lamp.
The malfunctions may have two possible consequences.
First, the power cord from the malfunctioning takeup reel may jam the source drawer mechanism and prevent its return to the source "off" position.
This condition can cause unnecessary exposure to both technicians and patients.
Second, the loose cord may prevent the source drawer mechanism from going to the full "on" position.
This condition may not b2 readily detected by the machine operator and thus may result in an incorrect dose being administered to the patiers.
NRC investigators have noted that improper a.tions of operating personnel at the time of equipment malfunction could aggravate the situation sad contribute to unnecessary exposure.
However, these exposures can be minimized by licensees if their operating personnel have been trained to detect and react to equipment malfunctions promptly in accordance with approved written operating and emergency procedures.
This type of malfunction has occurred on numerous occasions throughout the United I
States during the past several years.
AECL has issued several technical bulletins, which were approved by NRC and were sent to all licensees who use AECL teletherapy units.
In addition, an IE Circular, 80-24, "AECL Teletherapy Unit Malfunctions,"
was prepared in December 1980 and sent to all applicable licensees (Ref. C-1).
The Circular enumerated the problems and reiterated the current NRC regulations and licensing requirements for teletherapy licensees.
AECL has a voluntary program underway to replace the systems involved in the malfunctions.
The Bureau of Radiological Health has the primary responsibility for following the machine malfunctions and corrective actions.
The NRC is also following this problem closely until suiteble modifications are made to all AECL units in use.
2.
Radiation Injury On January 20, 1981, an individual was admitted to the Okmulgee, Oklahoma Hospital with significant radiation damage to the upper torso and left arm.
Medical tests disclosed that the individual had pancytopenia and had sustained
20 significant damage to the bone marrow.
The individual was transferred to 4
St. Francis Hospital in Tulsa, Oklahoma on January 25, 1981, where he received further medical care.
Samples were obtained from the individual on February 10, 1981 and sent to Oak Ridge, Tennessee for cytogenetic study to assess the radiation dose.
An investigation by NRC Region IV personnel was started on January 17, 1981 to determine the cause and extent of the exposure.
The individual has worked as a radiographer for several years.
The last radiography work performed by the individual was in early October, 1980.
The individual did not admit to being around *adioactivity since that time. The investigation did not develop any firm facts to explain the exposure.
Expert medical opinion is that the radiation exposure was incurred probably betwee.n December 20, 1980 and January 10, 1981.
The event is tot considered an Abnormal Occurrence at this time since it has not been established that the rad btion exposure resulted from material subject to licensing by the Nuclear Regulatory c mmission or Agreement States.
If o
such a connection is definitively established, the event would be reportable since the extent of the injuries would signify radiation exposures considerably above the threshold for an abnormal occurrence.
In late January, medical opinion was that the individual may have received a lethal dose of radiation.
However, in May, the individual seemed to still be improving and his blood appeared to be nearly back to normal.
21 REFERENCES (FOR APPENDICES)
B-1 Letter from D. M. Crutchfield, NRC, to R. Dietch, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering and Operations, Southern California Edison Company, " Steam Generator Repair Program and Plant Restart - San Onofre Unit No. 1,"
Dockel No. 50-206, June 8, 1981..
B-2 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement Related to Decontamination and Disposal of Radioactive Wastes Resulting from March 28, 1979 Accident Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 2," USNRC Report NUREG-0683, Volumes 1 and 2, March 1981.*
B-3 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Statement of Policy; Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement of the Cleanup of Three Mile Island Unit 2,"
Federal Register, Vol. 46, No. 84, May 1, 1981, 24764-24765.
B-4 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin No. 80-17, Supplement 4, " Failure of Control Rods to Insert During a Scram at a BWR," December 18, 1980..
B-5 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin No. 80-17, Supplement 1, " Failure of Control Rods to Insert During a Scram at a BWR," July 18, 1980..
B-6 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Inspection and Enforcement Information Notice No. 81-12, " Guidance on Order Issued January 9, 1981 Regarding Automatic Control Rod Insertion on Low Control Air Pressure," March 31, 1981..
B-7 Letters from D. Eisenhut, NRC, to BWR '; torr,s, forwarding " Generic Safety Evaluation Report, BWR Scram Discha s ip em /; dated December 1, 1980),"
December 9, 1980..
C-1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Inspectton and Enforcement Circular No. 80-24, "AECL Teletherapy Unit Malfunctions,D December 2,1980..
- Available for purchase from GP0 Sales Program, Division of Techn;.al Information and Document Control, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555 and National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161.
.Available in NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW., Washington, DC l
20555, for inspection and copying for a fee.
I
4 N ' "" 338
'^"'#'"
u.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (7 77)
BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET NUREG-0090, Vol. 4, No. 1
- 4. TITLE AND SUBinTLE (Add Volume No., of appreproatel
- 2. (Leave bem:k) j Report to Congress on Abnormal Occurrences January - March 1981
- 3. RECIPIENT'S ACCESSION NO.
- 7. AUTHOR (S)
$. DATE REPORT COMPLETED i
l MONTH l YEAR a
July 1981 9, PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND MAILING ADDRESS (/nclude 2,p Codel DATE REPORT ISSUED US Nuclear Regulatory Comission MONTH l YEAR I
Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data July 1981 j
Washington, D. C.
20555 6 (Leave 6'*"*>
j
- 8. ILeeve blanki 17, SPONSORf NG ORGANIZATION NAME AND MAILING ADDRESS (include les Codel
- 10. PROJECT / TASK / WORK UNIT NO.
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data
- 11. CONTRACT NO.
Washington, D. C.
20555 t
j
- 13. TYPE OF REPORT PE RICO Covk :'E O //ncius<ve dates) 1 Quarterly January - March 1981 l'
- 15. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14 (Leave o/stal 7
- 16. ABSTR ACT (200 words or less)
Section 208 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 identifies an abnormal occurrence as an unscheduled incident or event which the Nuclear Regulatory Commission determines to be significant from the standpoint of public health or safety and requires a quarterly i
report of such events to be made to Congress. This report covers the period January 1 to March 31, 1981.
1 There was one abnormal occurrence at the nuclear power' plants licensed t a 'oerate; the i
event involved an inadvertent disconnection of station batteries. There ere no abnormal occurrences at the fuel cycle facilities (other than nuclear power plaats). There was one abnormal occurrence at other licensee facilities; the event involved occupational j
overexposures. Tnere were no abnormal occurrences reported by the Agreement States.
l This report also contains information updating some previously reported abnormal 1
occurrences.
4 i
R j
- 17. KE Y WOHDS AND DOCUMENT ANALYSIS 17a DESCRIPTORS 1
i h
17b 10ENTIFIERS OPEN ENDED TERMS 1
- 21. NO. OF PAGES Unlimited IIncbssm na
- 20. SE CURITY CL ASS 'This ps.e/
- 22. P RICE Unclassified S
N RC F OMM 335 t 7 77) 1
(
._.-,v
UNITED STATES I
]
Z NUCLE AL 7.E CULATZlY CTMMIS$1ZN C
W A.lHINGTZ N, D. C. 20$55 po Ttte3cN2raca mi9 U.S. NUCLE A R REGUL ATOR Y Q
OF FICl#4L BUSINESS cvMM6SS80N I
PE N ALTY FOR PRlVATE USE, $300 U
C L
J e
O
<o
.e-
.u b
.o nmeo NH Ho oo 4ZNO cm
>m x v1
~<io
- Z 120555C64215 2 ANLOCYNL JS NRC h>
om ADM LO CUM ENT CONTROL DESK Z
PDR 016
-d e
WASHINGTCN PC 20555 onnC '
W W
m Znm U2 C".
M C
Co w
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _