05000317/LER-1981-031, Forwards LER 81-031/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 81-031/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20027C830
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	05/22/1981
From:	Russell L BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
To:	Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20027C831	List: 05000317/LER-1981-031, Forwards LER 81-031/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl 05000317/LER-1981-031-01, /01T-0:on 810518,both Auxiliary Bldg 10-ft Elevation Fire Hose Stations Isolated W/O Water Supply. Caused by Instructional Error & Operator Unfamiliarity W/Isolation Valves.Personnel Counseled
References
037179, 37179, NUDOCS 8210270276
Download: ML20027C830 (2)

LER-1981-031, Forwards LER 81-031/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
3171981031R00 - NRC Website

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B ALTIMORE G AS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY P.O. B O X 14 7 5 B ALTIMOR E. M A R YL AN D 212 o3 68UCLE AR PO* ER DEPARTM ENT C ALvtRT CLIFFS NUCLC AR P3 HEM PL ANT Lulev, M A RYL AND 20417 May 22,1981 Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director Docket No. 50-317 Office of Inspection & Enforcement License No. DPR-53 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 1 631 Park A cenue King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

Per Technical Specification 6.9.1.8.b please find attached the fourteen day follow-up report for LER 81-31/IT.

Should you have any questions regarding this report, we would be pleased to discuss them with you.

Very truly yours, L. B. Russell Plant Superintendent LBR:SMD:mmr cc:

Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control M e ".rs:

A. E. Lundvall, Jr.

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8210270276 810522 PDR ADOCK 05000317 S

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81-31/IT DOCKET NO.

50-317 LICENSE NO.

DPR-53 EVENT DATE 05-11-81 REPORT DATE 05-22-81 ATTACHMENT EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEOUENCES At 1943 with Units 1 and 2 at full power,it was discovered that less than the required number of hose stations were operable on the -10 foot elevation in the Auxiliary Building (T.S. 3.7.i 4.4).. At approximately 1510, portions of the Auxiliary Building fire protection system were placed out of service to facilitate tying in new sprinkjer systems. However, both -10 f oot hose stations (HS (-)l0 -22 and HS (-)l0 - 63) were isolated and neither hose station was provided with a water supply from an operable hose station. Upon discovery, both hose stations were immediately returned to service and were. verified operable at 2010. During this event, because of maintenance being performed in the -10 foot elevation, a continuous fire watch with an additional fire extinguisher had been provided even though one was not required. Similar event: none.

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS The cause for the hose stations being isolated can be contributed to several f actors. The plant's fire protection system has been undergoing extensive modification to bring it in compliance with new NRC requirements. _Because of these modifications, the operator was unf amiliar with the location of new isolation valves. In addition, the new valves had not yet been provided with identification tags. In order to aid the operator in providing the necessary isclation for new sprinkler system tie-ins, and help him locate new isolation valves, the Fire Protection Inspector marked up drawings indicating a suggested isolation scheme and he provided marked up floor plans of the affected areas indicating the location of isolation valves and hose stations that would require a temporary water supply.

Unfor* :,ately, the Fire Protection Inspector made an error when he identified the isolatin valve that affected the (-)l0 foot and (-)l5 foot elevation hose stations. The error resulted in the operator isolating both (-)l0 foot hose stations instead of one as the isolation scheme had intended. Also, when the operator isolated the system he did not question the accuracy of the marked up drawing even though he suspected an error had been made.

A number of actions have been taken to prevent recurrence. First, all new fire protection system isolation valves have been equipped with identifications tags. Second, the Fire Inspector's supervisor has instructed him of the importance for accuracy when he is suggesting fire protection isolation schemes. Also, the Fire Protector inspector's supervisor has suggested that he seek an independent review before having fire systems isolated. The Operator who isolated the hose stations was reinstructed to stop and investigate suspected errors in instructions before he places a system out of service.

Finally, all licensed personnel will be made aware of this effort.

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