ML20011E013
| ML20011E013 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 01/19/1990 |
| From: | DETROIT EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9002060229 | |
| Download: ML20011E013 (80) | |
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p UFSAR VOL XI INDEX 90 03 January 19,11,90 FERMI 2 UFSAR CHANGE REQUESTS UFSAR VOLUME XI These UFCNs/LCRs have been approved for distribution and should be added to your listing. For those who have Volume XI, please add the LCRs/UFCNs to your volume when they arrive.
LOR 88437-UFS LCR 89 210-UFS LCR 88447-UFS LOR 89-217-UFS LCR 89-045-UFS LCA 89-222-UFS LCR 89103-UFS The following UFCNs and LCRs are approved for distribution but have not yet been incorporated in the UFSAR:
UFCN 87 081 LCR 89 027 UFS LCR 89119 UFS LCR 89186-UFS UFCN 87-089 LCR 89431 UFS LCR 89-120-UFS LCR 89187 UFS UFCN 86403 LCR 89432 UFS LCR 89-122 UFS LCR 89188 UFS UFCN 88415 LCR 89 037 UFS LCR 89126-UFS LCR 89-189 UFS UFCN 88 023 LCR 89-038-UFS LCR 89128 UFS LCR 89195 UFS UFCN 88435 LCR 89443 UFS LCR 89129-UFS LCR 89196 UFS UFCN 88-042 LCR 89446-UFS LCR 89-130 UFS LCR 89198 UFS i
UFCN 88457 LCR 89 049-UFS LCR 89134 UFS LCR 89 201 UFS UFCN 88400 LCR 89451 UFS LCR 89-137 UFS LCR 89-205 UFS UFCN 89 062 LCR 89452 UFS LCR 89-140-UFS LCR 89 206-UFS UFCN 88482 LCR 89453-UFS LCR 89-144-UFS LCR 89 209-UFS UFCN 88490 LCR 89 056 UFS LCR 89146-UFS LCR 89-212 UFS UFCN 88498 LCR 89 060-UFS LCR 89-149 UFS LCR 89-213 UFS UFCN 88104 LCR 89 061 UFS LCR 89151 UFS LCR 89-214-UFS UFCN 88114 LCR 89 065 UFS LCR 89154 UFS LCR 89 221 UFS UFCN 88121 LCR 89-066 UFS LCR 89155 UFS LCR 89 223 UFS LCR 88 008 UFS LCR 89468 UFS LCR 89156 UFS LCR 89 225 UFS LCR 88409 UFS LCR 89469-UFS LCR 89158 UFS LCR 89-227 UFS LCR 88430-UFS LCR 89-070-UFS LCR 89159 UFS LCR 89-229-UFS LCR 88 033 UFS LCR 89472 UFS LCR 89-160-UFS LCR 89 230-UFS LCR 88 034 UFS LCR 89473 UFS LCR 89162-UFS LCR 89 231 UFS LCR 88446 UFS LCR 89 C4J6-UFS LCR 89-164 UFS LCR 89-232 UFS LCR 88-051 UFS LCR 89105-UFS LCR 89168-UFS LCR 89 233 UFS LCR 88 058-UFS LCR 89107 UFO LCR 89171 UFS LCR 89-234 UFS LCR 88459-UFS LCR 89110 UFS LCR 89-172 UFS LCR 89 235 UFS LCR 88461 UFS LCR 89-111 UFS LCR 89174 UFS LCR 89-236-UFS LCR 89-001.UFS LCR 89112 UFS LCR 89-176-UFS LCR 89-237 UFS LCR 89 019 UFS LCR 89113 UFS LCR 99179-UFS LCR 89 238-UFS LCR 89 021 UFS LCR 89114-UFS LCR 89183 UFS LCR 89 239-UFS LCR 89-024-UFS LCR 89-118-UFS LCR 89-184 UFS LCR 89 242 UFS These do not include the respective Safety Evaluations or referenced documents. Should you have any questions, please call E. Madsen, 6-4205.
AAMS INFORMATION S ST M}
DTC'*T)I'W L1 osN "W2 #
PAGE REV Pls
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AECIPIENT
{
APPROVAL AEQ D YES NO ;
/
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t LitaisiuG caisua aggues? j l
Lcm I 8191 - l 21 al 21 - l Ul Fl Sl )
Revision A Page / of f l
- -vI5I(N I 158 ------- l
- n. l--- ----- -- ,;WT 12 w.i&R. MAN. (Nt r _- -
A) Dooment <
UFSAR Q /]
- 5) Emotion (s), Table (s), Figure (s), etc. Afrooted (Attach marked-up pages) H Fig. 5.1-3. Sht. 1. 7.3-12. Sht. 1 and Table 5.2-6 k 3 ')
C) Reason for thange - __. _ -
G u W i r< v u u r v g ,
l E
D) Reference and Source Documents (Identify) W '
EDP 10"92 Tech Spec N/A 0 PDC 10"92 Procedure N/A ' "' I h SE (Attached) 59-0196 ABN N/n DER N/A PE (Attached) N/A *%
- y- 1 I
Test N/A '
Effectiveness Review (Attached) [ ]Yos ( X]No p, Ei-5 E %
Other N/A Q
Drawings. Design Calculations. Correspondence, etc. i
, I --- ------- -------FART 2: urEEATING LI -- -
N"- [IJEA ---------l Eg b
i A) Document Plan
( ) Operating License ( ) Tech Specs ( ) Environmental Protection fd g5"
( ) Tech Spec Clarification B) Section(s), Table (s), Figure (s), etc. Affected (Attach marked-up pages) l! <
(
C) Reference and Source Documents Attached
( ) Significant Hazards Consideration ( ) Enviro smentapAl%-- ;
Evaluation AS A w M!T ,
( ) Enviromental Impact /Categorfcal Exclusion ( ) Other ' w " m" ') 4 g D) Is UFSAR change required?
( ) Yes ( ) No LCR No. mi 1
' I E) Priority l NRC approval required by (date):
- Y>n n 9 An [ ] Emergency ( 3 Exigent condition will occur if not t;; :;;d by:
(State date):
Explanation F) Implement.ation l DER No.
IwwowwwwwwmPART 3: AFFa0iAlo;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;_;;;;;;;i;;;;;;;;;;;;I A)' Originator M. Majumder /// A // ff l MS SwwJpSW.14cys= 4rMt x.
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B) Techn16El Expert 'iL.reedw l F /h f @/Wo M f? .' Date /2//s/p?
C) Nuclear Ger.eration Unit Head N 3.bdred jDate 4'O D) General Director, Nuclear Eng ring ( INA!/v Date /1//A */
7, . 7 -
E) Plant Manager @ N , Date /2.-M-Pf F) Other Date C) Director, Nuclear Licensing Date////I H) OSRO Approval (Tech Spec Amendments) [ } NA Date II) NSRG Approval (Operating License Amendments) ( ) NA Date l Fora FIP-RA2-01 Att 1 P1/1 030159 DTC: TCLCR for UFSAR File: 1735 DTC: ( ) TDLCR for other ,
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SEAL PENETRATION .
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TABLE 5.2-6 REACTORCOOLANTPRESSURESOUNDARYMATER[ALS(Cont'd)
Welding material SFA-5.1 t t-7015, B-7016, 5-7018 ) ,
SFA-5.5 (E-7010A1, 5-7015, 8-7016, 8-7010) -
SFA-5.17, SFA-5.18 ;
i For those systems or portions of systems, such as the reactor recirculation system, which require austenitic stainless steel, the following materials and specifications were used:
I. .
Pipe SA-376 Type 304: SA-312 Type 304: SA-350 type 304 ,
Valves SA-182 Gradt F-304: SA-351 Grades CF-8 and CF-0M Pump SA-182 Grade F 304: SA-351 Credes CF A and CF-SM i
Flanges SA-152 Grade F-316 Solting SA-193 Grade 87: SA-194 Grades 7 and 2H SA-540 Grades $22, h23 and 824 Welding material SFA-5.4 (2300-15, 2300L-15, 2316-15): SFA-5.9'(ER-30s, ER-30BL. ER-316)
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' LCR I 81 91 - l 21 il 71 - l B',Fl Sl Revision 9 Pane 1 of 5
' ---,gyr 1: w.AR. PLAB. OR r--- ?" so 15I05 t ]BA --l l---
A) Document d UFSAR B) Boction(s), Table (s), Figure (s), etc. Affected (Attach marked-up pages) h UFSAR Figure 6.2 20 4 fS C) Reason for Giange Removing the float type level taumes on the two (2)' g%s, CO, tanks and replacina with a differential pressure type level g E inUicator.
) i D) Reference and source Documents (Identify) Tech Spec coNWgtLb,L) ie EDP 10666 Procedure 5" cn PDC.10666 h SE (Attached) 59-0190 M ABN PE (Attached) il E DER 89-0953 I' Test i.i h T.,
Effectiveness Review (Attached) (K)Yes ( )No Other NRC Report 89-020 '%
h prawinas, Design Calculations. Correspondence, etc.
l
- ;;;----- --- ;PART 2: uranATING LIr" N r" - - (II JRA --
_l--- . ,
A) Document ) Tech Specs ( ) Environmental Protection
( ) Operating License ( g Plan
( ) Tech Spec Clarification B) Section(s), Table (s), Figure (s), etc. Affected (Attach marked-up pages)
CTATUS C) Reference and Source Documents Atta u [ ] Enviror.igj)al m m M /x
( ) Significant Haaards Consideration Evaluation i O
) Environental Impact / Categorical Exclusion ( ) Other . CU
( gp'
~D) la UFSAR change required?
( ) Yes ( ) No LCR No.
~E) Priority -
NRC approval required by (date):
An [ ] Emergency ( ) Exigent condition will occur if not approved by:
(State date):
Explanation F) laplementation DER No.
1;;;;;;;cs;;;;;;;;;;:PART 3: APPhDVA15;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;I A) Originator D. S. Eason N r .: DateM/M/
B) Technical Expert 4,M l(14ArJ Date 12 t 4
. [. b / /l Date /h/89 C) Nuclear Generation Unit Head D) General Director, Nuclear Engine ing( }NA!/ Date /4/7M Date1 E) Plant Manager Date F) Other G) Director, Nuclear Licensing .e _ Date ///690 l NA Date H) OSRO Approval (Tech Spec Amendments) {
l NA Date _l l II) NSRG Approval (Operating License Amendments) {
TCLCR for UFSAR File: 1735 Form FIP-RA2-01 Att 1 P1/1 030159 DTC: ( DTC: _ I TDLCR for other
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' WFBCTIVEM55 IEVIgN Reference IER I 81 91 - l 2l il 71 - I Ul Fl $1 l
Revision 9 Pane 2 of 5 -
--- ------------ - - - ---RANT 1: W9AR I ]EA ---- ------ ------l l l--
A) Quality Assurance Fivo..e
[ )Yes [ ] No Does the change (s) cease to satisfy the criteria of 10CFR50, Appendix B and the UFSAR progran commitments previously accepted by the NRC? . ,
Provide the basis for each change on Attachment 2. Pate 2. l B) Fire Protection Progres
[ )Yes [IX) No Does the change (s) significantly decrease the level of fire protection in the plant? ,
[ )Yes [IX) No Does the change (s) result.in failure to complete Fire '
Protection Program approved by the NRC prior to license issue? l Provide the basis for each change on Attachment 2. Pate 2. I r:- - PLAN LI]NA --- ;l l---RANT 2: RADImanICAL Z --; m-- r A) L J Yes [ ] No Does the change (s) decrease the effectiveness of the 4
RERP Plan?
L [ ] Yes ( ) No Does the RERP Plan, as changed, cease to meet the l
standards of.10CFR50.47(b) and 10CFR50 Appendix E?
' Provide the basis for each change on Attachment 2. Page 2.
Ix;;;;;--- ;;;;;;- ;;;;PART 3 m ITY PLANS LEIJNA ----- ;- ;;;--- ****l 4
A) Document ,
I A) [ ] Yes [ ] No Does the change (s) decrease the effectiveness of the Physical Security Plan or Security Personnel Training
' and Qualification Plan prepared pursuant to ,
- j. [ ] Yes [ ] No Does the change (s) decrease the effectiveness of the l'
' first four categories of Informational Background, Generic Planning Base, Licensee Planning Base, and/or ,
responsiblity matrix of the Safeguards Contingency Plan prepared pursuant to 10CFR50 34(d) or 10CFR737 Provide the basis for each change on Attachment 2. Page 2.
I Ix;;;;x;;;;;;;;;;;;PART 4: FE= " vun mm. rnuuiAN IKXJNAM;;;;;;;;;;'l A) [ J Yes [ ] No Does the change (s) reduce the overall conformance of '
the selidified waste product to existing criteria for solid wastes in accordance with Technical
- Specification 6.137 4 Provide the basis for each change on Attachment 2. Page 2.
1;-;;;;;- x ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; FART 5: 93 III]MA L;;;; R x;;;;;; ; ;;;;l l A) { ] Yes i j No Does the change (s) reduce the accuracy or reliability of the dose calculations or setpoint determinations in in accordance with Technical Specification 6.14?
Provide the basis for each change on Attachment 2. Page 2. ,
T88F e********
- H M 'PART 6: AFFndi AIJ::::::::::;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;*IMH l A) Originator D. S. Eason h Date /bMM B) Technical Expert M N Date / N M [
C) Quality Assurance (For Security Plans only) Date ID) OSRO (Not required for UFSAR Changes) Date I
~
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l WFBCTIM IETIEW DONATION neforenceLCRJ,__8l91- l El il 71 - l Ul Fl Sl <
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Thocument UFSAR l
Listed below is each change by section and page; the reason for the change; and the basis for concluding that the revised plan or program continues to ,
i satisfy the criteria for that plan or progras. .
Section/Page I Change I. Basis UFSAR Figure l .
l lFor each CO, tank level lThis new type of level '
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188888888855888FHF1: W5AR, PLAN. OR resuunAN nasTI5 ION I !EA C--- ;:l
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B) Section(s), TableTal, Fig' ure(s)
S.S'-7(LS5-7(sh 5.5-/ofi), C5-13(2), etc. ArJ(poted
> 7.S-Icti 'T.3-7 ( Attach marked-up pages)
C? panna ror chanae 8tve8e F'foro red ew cdME. T usATUS w wy .w s ,.m . . w m e.u einw.; u ,,+ : w D) Reference and Source Beauments (Identify)
EDP l'IO 8 M 8 V. D Tech Spec Y #j, ' ~ .
PDC Procedure '
'i M 14149Q ABN SE (Attached) 959-O/50 -
DER PE (Attached) i" Test . ; $
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. Effectiveness Review (Attached) ( ]Yes [ ]No IdE m_3m , w/ _j Other Drawings, Design Calculations, Correspondence, etc.
tese****seeeeeeeeeeWPART 2: wrunATING LIw mae,CBAmusa L K ]MA ;;;;;! M I A) Document
( ) Operating License [ ] Tech Specs [ ] Environmental Protection Plan d 7
[ ] Tech Spec Clarification u'l <
B) Section(s), Table (s), Figure (s), etc. Affected (Attach marked-up pages) 31!ri V o-C) Reference and Source Documents Attached
] Significant Hazards Consideration [ ] Environmental l:$n*
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{ l Yes [ ] No LCR No. enMrppn1 LED O
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An [ 3 Emergency [ ] Exigent condition will occur if not approved by: 9'W 6 (State date): , k Explanation h F) laplementation der Nn.
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E) Plant Manager h Date /d / 47 i
F) Other . 3 Date G) Director, Nuclear Licensing - -
Date ((/hM/
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17.!NSULAT10N CLASS 9H'M0 TOR REPLACED WITH CLASS 9'PER EDP-4874.
18.0 PEN & CLOSE BACKLIGHTED POSISlffTONS WITH RED & GREEN DOICATING LIGHTS AT DEDICATED SHUTDOWN PANEL H21-P825 FOR M0 F889, hb 9
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L See continuation sheet 2. '
1 C) Reason for Change 'the RPS annual scras trip loaic has been revised to eliminate the backup annual scraa systes and incorporate four annual scran pushbuttons into existing-RP5 scram logic.
1 D) Reference and Source Documents (Identify).
EDP 1011"! Test 1 l PDC Tech Spec LCR 59-055-OPL I L ABN Procedure l .
DER SE (Attached) 59-0053 I l Effectiveness Review (Attached)
Other Drawings, Design Calculations, Correspondence, etc. I leeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeePART 2: OPERATING LICENSE CHANGES (I ]NA #eee#eeee l l A) Document
- l
[ ] Operating License ( ) Tech Specs ( ) Environmental Protection l Plan I
( ) Tech Spec Clarification l B) Section(s), Table (s), Figure (s), etc. Affected (Attach marked-up pages) J 1' -
C) Reference and Source Docttments Attached
( ) Significant Hazards Consideration S ATUS l
[ ] Enviromental Impact - Categorical Exclusion Agg CcOpi; i! .*f /t
[ ] Environmental . Evaluation DIST. & /9,/f9a
[ Other D) Is Ut3AR change required?
}y Sn
[ } Yes ( ) No LCR No.
REV l- ! E) Priority i r.4
. NRC approval required by (date):
I
- g An ( ) Emergency ['- ] Exigent condition will occur if not approved by g (State date)
lG h Explanation _ m t , ,- m i i r n w.,..,----
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F) Director, Nuclear Licensing ,dm Date /// 9g'/
G).OSRO Approval { l NA _ _,
Date lH) NSRG Approval [ ] NA ,
Date l Ew. r7p_na9 n1 att 1 P1/1 cou RR_, DTr ? - . File; m- . __
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T.3.1.1 - =kar h akaakten awakam emat r nkakinn mad aa'atrai avatam namarinu an .
7 3.1 1.1 Brakam identifiaation 1 3.1 1.1.1 identifination
-The remotor protestica system I,RFS) inelades the motor-generator sensors relays, bypass oitsuitry, and evitches powersuppliesloinsettleneisentroltods(seras)toshutdown that cause rep
. the roastor. It also &aeludes outputs to the asocess ocaputer system (PCS) and annuasiators, although these latter two systgas are not part of the RP8. 9:19 funettons are summarised la Figure 7.3=1.
A completely redundant capability, the alternate red insertion .
funct&on of the senteel rod drive (CRD) system is provided to attigate aatteipated transient without seras (ATW8) events (see Subsection 7.8.1.18).
7.3.1.1.1.3 clamalfination TheSIPSiselassifiedasBatatyClass3, Category 1,andQuality Group 3.
7 3.1.1.1.3 mataranea Baaien The Fermi 2 RPS is similar, except for system sise, to the ,
Edwin I. Hatch, Unit i RPS. There are no differences other than those instrument panel locations within the plant and manual scram logic arrangement.
7.3.1.1.3 Rover seurama The RPS receives power from two highalaertia as actor-generator sets (Figure 7 3-3). A flywheel provides high taertia sufficient to as,ntain voltage and frequency within 8 percent of rated values for at-least 1 see followlag a total loss of power to the drive motor.
Alternate pesar is available to reach the RPS buses. The 130-V as supply bus A is available to RPS bus 'A, and the 130-7 ao alternate supply bus 3 is available to RPS bus B.
The RPS power sucelies have been modified to prevent the inadvertent app 1Feation of out-of-toleranse voltage or. frequency power to the kP8 relay trip legio. The electrieel protect &on assembly consists of a 08 type TFJ-178A sistuit breaker with an under-voltage release controlled by a protection legie etreuit card. The protection legte disconnects the RPS logie from the 7.3-1
' 4
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P6 f oF 8Vl44 aps power supply whenever weitage er frequemer onesses neraal tolerances. ,
The reteetten is redundant and Laeludes each alternate power l eu as shown in F1 re 7.3-3. The electrieel protection ass $1esarepeaks in emelosures that are nomhted aeis-siestly on the outsi e wall et each SpS actor-generator set subi-ele. Two assemblies are conateted la elastrieel series between each source of RPS power and the despective are distribution panel. Controls for testine and operation are provided on each essembly alone with status Indication for the particular trip parameters. Following a trip, the breaker must be reset locally.
. The proteetion assemblies are qualified to meet IEEE 344-1975 and -
ZEER 333-1974. ,
! The protection trip setpoints are 110 percent of nominal ac volt-L age and -5 pereent of the nominal.Yrequency of 60 Is.
Each protection logic has an independent time delay adjustable .
from D.1 to 3.0 eso to prevent spurious trips and the resulting scrams.
7.3.1.1.3 asuinannt Damien 7 3.1.1.3.1 Initiatina circuits '
Meutron monitoring system instrumentation (1988)ifies the is described relationship between in lets Section 7.8. Figure 7.3-3 olar channels,1988 logies, and the RPS logies. The 1988 channels are part of the Ibis. The 1988 logies are part of the RPS. As shown In Figure 7.3-4, there are four 1548 logies associated with each trip system of the RPS. Each RPS logic receives inputs from two 1948 logics. Each 1948 logie receives signals from one intermedi-
'ste ranse monitor (Imat) ohannel and one average power range meni-tor (APiet ohannel. The position of the mode swlteh determinesThe .
which inpu)t signale effect the output signal from the logie.
3B48 legios are arranged so that fallure of any one logie sannot prevent the initiation of a high neutron flus seram. The RPS legio is a 'one-out-of-two-taken-twise" system as discussed in Subsection 7 3.1.1.3.3. ,
Reactor pressure is seasured at two locations. A pipe from each loostion is routed through the primary containment and terminates in the reaeter building. Two phael-mounted presJure transmitters sonitor the pressure in each plpe. Cables from these trans-mitters are routed to the main control room. One pair of the transmitters is physically separated from the other pair. Each transmitter provides a high-pressure signal to one channel. The transmitters are arranged so that two transmitters provide an input to tris system A and two transmittore provide an input to trip system 9, as shown in Figure 7 3-5. The ysical esperation ene the stenal arrangement ensure that no eine e physical event aan prevent a seram seuses by nuclear system 6 gh pressure.
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i l' Resotor pressure vessel (RPV) low-water-level stenals are ini=
tieted from differential pressure transmitters t6at eense the difference between the pressure due to a constant reference .
solumn of vetor and the pressure due to the actual water level in the vessel. The tranesitters are arranged on two sets of tape in i
the same way as the aselear systen high pressure transmitters .
l (Figure 7.3-8).
Two instrument lines attaohed to tape on the RP7, one above and one below the water level, are regulred for the differential pressure measurement for each transmitter. Who two pairs of lines terminate outside the primary containment and inside the reactor building. They are physically separated feca each other and tap off the RP7 at widely separated points. Other systems sense pressure and level from these same pipes. The physical separation and signal arrangement ensure that no single physical l l event can prevent a eoram due to RFV low water level.
Turbine stop valve closure taputs to the RPS come from valve stem i position swltches mounted on the four turbine stop valves. To .
rovide the earliest positive indication of closure, each of the Iouble-pole, single-throwswitchesopensbeforethewalveismore than 10 percent closed. Either of the two channels associated with one stop valve can signal valve closure, as shown in Figure 7 3-6. The logic is arranged so that closure of three or more (
stop valves in&tiates a soran, when the reactor is operating above 30 percent of rated power.
Turbine control valve fast closure inputs to the RPS come directly from contacts ol' the relays that effect control valve fast closure. Operation of any two of these relays will initiate control valve fast closure. Fast closure of one control valve in each RPS locio will initiate a scram whenever the reactor is l operating a5ove 30 percent of rated power.
Position switches mounted on the eight main steam teclation '
valves (msIve) signal Msty closure to the RPS. To provide the l
earliest positive indication of closure, each of the double-pole, I single-throw switches is arranged to open before the valve is incre than 10 percent closed. Sither of the two channels asso-
- ciated with one isolation valve can signal valve closure. To facilitate the description of the logic arrangement, the position-sensing channels for each valve are Identified and assigned to RPS logies as follows:
trip Position-Sensing Channel Valve Idantification ekannain ...Balara h Main steam line A, F032A (1) and (2) A, 8 A1, 31 inboard valve Main steam line A, F028A (1) and (2) A, 8 A1, 31 outboard valve 7.3-3
' " ...,....F m
- ee,.r. o..
- oo.$. coa.e.=. . o oo s .l. A. N
' L &lL[ 81 - tes-or's
,'.. + nyen4y
- w. reap position-Seastag= Chamael-Daiva taant\fiaation, ma*==ia _Balaw.a Aaatamaant '
B, D A1, 83' 1 Nata steam line a,- '90338 (1)'and (3)' .
&nboats valve .
A1, 88 o
Nata steam line 8, 30388 (1) and (3) 8, 9 outheard valve rotacL(1) and (3) C, F AB, 31 mata steam'aime ce inboard valve
- Nata steam 1&ne C, 7038C (1) and (t) Ce F AB, 81
.-outboaro valve- -
0, 5 A3, 83
': main steam line'D, 7033D-(1) and (3) inboardLvalve 0, E A3, 83
- .: l main steam line:D, 90389 (1) and (3) '.-
outboard velve m us, each logie: resolves sienate iton thervalves associated the. arrangement of with two steam 11aes as shown la Pieure 7 3=7.
signals within each 1 to requires closing of at least one valve-to cause a-La each of.the steam For 1 aos associated esemple, with of closure that the1 i ed valve of-trip of that loeie.
steam line:A and the outboard valve of steam line C sauses a trip of-logie B1. this-in tura causes' trip system 8 to trip.!a:no 30-
- seraa occurs because-no trips oseur-in trip system A.
case does olosure of two valves or isolation of two steaa linesscause-a scran due to valve-closure. Closure of one valve in any three steam lines causes a-scram.
Wiria 'for the posittenasensing ebannels face one sition to switch duplicate is sica11y'separatedLin the same way that wirl -
senaers on a ocanoa: process tap is separated. The varine for position-senstag channels.feedlas the different trip Sogies of one trip-system is also separated.
The M82V elosure seram feastion is effective only 12 the roastor made switch is la RUN.
The effects of the logie arrangement and separation provided for the'R81V elosure estam are as follows:
~ a. Closure of one valve for test purposes with one steam line already isolated will not sause a scram-resulting from valve closure ,
- b. Automatie scram will coeur on isolation of any three ateam. lines 7 3=4 l f
8"
- "- *b6 0958885818 8 5
WIff 'OYllWB = 981thersburgiB6 8 9-88-88 8 til8PN 1
' . i fB 84-/03-UF3 7 f4 8 of 48p
- e. Bo single failure saa prevent an automatie screa esquired for fuel protection due to MSN closs,re.
I l
pour acaindicating level switchee (see for each channel) provide seras dischar RPS channels.ge volume (899) highawateratevel taputs to the four&a with transmitter, in each channel is redundant to the level switch in that channel. This arrangement providee diversity to ensure that no single event could prevent a seram caused by itDV high water level. With the seras setting listed la Table 7.2-1 and in the technical Specifications, a seram is taitiated when auffacient capacity remains in the tank to assommodate a sotaa.
Both the amount of water discharged and the volume of air trapped above the free surface during a sotaa have been considered in the
- selection of the trip setting.
Drywell pressure is monitored by four Thepressure transmitters transmitters as are physi-describeB in subnestion 7 8.1.13.
cally separated and eleottisally conneeted to the RpS eo that no -
single failure san prevent a seram caused by primary containment high pressure.
Main steam line radiation is monitored by four radiation moni-tora, which are discussed and evaluated la Section 11.4. Baeh monitor provides a trip signal to one channel when high ganaa radiation is detected la the vicinity of the main steam lines (yigure 7 3=5).
Main sondenser low vacuum trip will be effected indirectly through main steam line isolation. A main condenser vacuum of approat.mately e.osure, which 7inin. Becauses tura will cause steam reactor line isolation valve trip.
your turbine firatastage pressure transmitters are provided to initiate the automatie bypass of the turbine control valve fast -
closure and turbine stop valve closure seraas when the first-stage pressure is below some preset fraction of rated pressure corresponding to 30 percent of rated power. The transmitters are arranged so that no single failure can prevent a turbine stop valve closure scram or turbine control valve fast closure scram.
Channel and logic relays are fast ~ response, high-reliability relays. power relays for interrupting the screa pilot valve The solenoids are type CR105 magnette contactors, made by 08.
system response time, face the opening of a sensor contact up to and including the opening of the trip actuator contacts, is less than 50 mese. The time requirements for control rod movement are aircussed in Subsectica (.5.2.
Sensing elements have enclosures to withstand conditions re-sulting from a steam or water line break long enough to perform i satisfactorily. Environmental s of the RPS are given in Table 3.pecifications for the instruments 11-1.
1 7.3-5
- -- An
g .o. . . . 2. .... - . . . . . . . . . . . . - .
4 eR. 69 -/03-yf3 V
n sof 45 :
1
" to gain access to ethese estibration and trip setties oestrels-asin sentrol rosa, operations personnel aust loosted outside ate, assess ..
remove a sever be adjusted. plug, or sealing device before any trip settles .
i i
Wirtag foresa thela Ryg,id enteide of the emeleseres la the asia sentrol rig meta 111e sendaits seed for no other-L '
L rosa, is i sistag.
are run inh seaarate e stres from dus11 esadults.eate sensors se a osanoa process tap l
Wires fees sensors of dlfferent eariables la lhe same Sps legie saa be rua la the same esaduit.
D e seras pilot valve solenoids are powered free eieht setsator four streutte from trip erstem A an4 four fres ;
leste trIn system 3. e four etreutts assestated with any one trip streutts, D l
.sysles are sua la separate esaduits. j Electrieel panels Circuits entering junetten Leoninently fied by nameplates.
identl. $uastion homes, and eesponents ses er pull boses are conspienously marked taside the bones.
L Wiring ans sabline outside sabinets and panels are identified by -
solor, tag, or et5er eenspievous means. ..
1 3 1.1.3.s & asis The basic arrangement of the RPS actuators and actuator logic is illustrated in Figure 7 2-8. The systes is arranged as two separately ;
powered trip systems. rach trip systen has two automatic trip logics, as ebown in Figure 7.2-9. Each logic used for automatic trip receives l
3 input signals from at least one channel for each monitored variable. At least four channels for each monitored variable are required, one for each of its four automatic trip logica.
Each logic provides two inputs into each of the actuator logics of one trip systes, as shown in Figure 7 2-8. Thus, either of the two automatic trip logics associated with one trip system can produos
- t. trip-systen trip. The logic is a 'one-out-of-two" arrangement. To l produce a scraa, the actuator logics of both trip systems must be tripped.
The overall logic of the RPS is termed 'one-out-of-two taken twice.'
1 2.1.1.3.3 seram avnamana a number of manual and automatie seras bypasses are provided.
D ese secount for the varying protection reeniremente that depend on reactor conditions. He during remotor operations.Ally manual also a11ew bypass forswitches instrumentare inservicethe-main sentrol rosa under the direct contrl o of the main control room operator. D e bypass status of trip system oceponents is continuously indientes in the main control rosa. ,
'to properly reset the aps at plant shutdown and during initial plant startup, a bypass is required for the M51V elosure screa to 7 3-8
~
e- r *+=W . , , , , , . ,
SINT BYtIRS - tattherstweite I pipes i Users i _masseeA==:s~cE- ZGnNi? 7 Y
L CR BVic.9-off N lo of 44p trip. This bypass has been tosi to be in effect eben the asse switch le in the SEUTDONE, , or StARSUp posi, tion.
sense, the bypass is assessary to provide for-preser spS reset setion whenever the metVs are elesed during very les poser .
operaties. ,
In the terms of the power generation design bases pressureserassetpolatisestablishedfreeesasidetheactual rations of reducing remotor everpressure in the event of isolaties at high power levels.
Since the high-pressure seras and remotor relief. valves provide frotectionagainstoverpressure,therewouldbeaosafetyproblea f the re'aetor were hele at moraal operating pressure sat at a low power level with the NSIVs closes.
The seras initiated by placing the mode switch in SEUTDOWN is automatically bysesses after a short time delay. The bypass allows the CRD Wydrau11e system valve lineup to be restored to .
normal. An annunelater la the asia centrol room isdieetes the bypassed condition. The turbine control valve fast elesure seram and turbine stop valve closure scram are automatieelly bypassed
' if the turbine rirst-stage pressure is less then 30 percent of its rated value. Closure of these valves from a low initial l power level does not threaten the integrity of any radteactive asterial release barrier.
Turbine and generater trip bypass is effected by four pressure switches associated with the turbine first stage. Any one chan-nel in a bypass state produces a main control room annunciation.
S sees for the 1848 channels are described la Subsection 7 1.13.
The scram discharge high water level trip bypass is contes 11ed by' '
the manual operatton-or two keylocked switches, a bypass switch, and the mode switch. The mode switch must be in eitner the SIUT-Four bypass channels essaate from
! DONW or the REFUEL position.
the four banks ofThis the RPS mode bypass switch allows theand are each operator connected to reset the RPSinto the RPS logie.
seram relays so that the system is restored to operation while the operator drains the seram discharge volume. In addition, actuating the bypass initiates a control red bleek. Resetting the trip setustors opens the seras discharge volume vent and drain valves. An annuneinter la the main sentrol rosa indleates the bypass sendition.
The RPS reset switch is used to mesentarily bypass the. seal-in contacts of the final actuators of the remeter shutdown systems.
These seal-in contacts are located downstream from the protection '
channel outputs. The reset is effected in conjunction with ausiliary relays. If a single channel is tripped, the reset isOn acocaplished immediately upon operation of the reset switoh.
7 3-7
.,,,,rn--
ei ne m u .. ,
p shni et.nn - eenurosure,se . e=ss-se . s.nra e
. . ?CR M-MS-VM '
P4 u of 44r
'the other head, if a reseter seras situation is present, annual reset is prohibited for a 10-see perted.to permit the sentrol rods to achieve their fully &aserted position. -
1.3.1.1.3.4 tatarianka The seras discharse volume high-weter-level trip se signal to tai-u L interiesks taate with a red the remeter annual osatrol systesThe interlook is performed usine iso bleek.
relay contacts se that ne failure in the sentrol sy6 ten een pre-vent a seras.
l The RFV tow water level, primary sentainment high pressure, and i
- turbine stop valve position signals are shared with the primary
. ,sentainment and reseter vessel isolation-control system (CRVICs). The sensors feed sensor relays in the RPS. Contacts i
l from these relsys interleek to the primary sostainment and reno-ter vessel isolaties system.
7.2.1.1.3.5 amenadana,and niversity ,
i The RPS is divided into two divisions. Each division duplientes the function of the other to the estent that either any perform the required function regardless of the state of operation or failur.e of the other.
Functional diversity is provided by monitoring dependent RPV variables. Pressure, water level, and neutron flus are-all l
interdependent and are separate inputs to the system. Also, MSIV elosure, turbine stop valve closure, and turbine sentrol valve fast closure are antleipatory of an RPV high pressure and are l separate inputs to the system.
7.2.1.1.3.4 Aatuated naviana The actuator logie opens when a trip signal is received, and then '
doenereises the seras valveBoth Dilotsolenoids solenoids. There are two pilot
- solenolds per sentrol red. must deenergise to open the talet and outlet scram valves to allow drive water to o scram a control rod. One solenoid receives its sienal from trip
- i. system A and the other from trip system 5. The failure of one eentrol rod to soran will not prevent a semplete shutdown.
[
The individual control rods and their controls are not part of
, the RPS. Further information on the scram valves and control rods is sentained in Subsection 4.5.2.
7.3.1.1.3.7 Senaratian Four sensor channels monitor these various process variables listed in Subsection 7.3.1 1.3.1. Sopration criteria for the sensors are given in Section 3.13. The sensor devices are l separated in such a way that no single failure can prevent a i scran. All protection system wiring outside the control system 7.2-0
'stri svuus - C:ithwetweise I #-se-se i riswa i .n, unem.oio .,
- 468 M-toS-vFs fra 12 of4Q' embinets is raa in risid metal eseguit. Sin testir samarated sabinet bars are stevIded for the four seras los. therT two "
RPS ehannels of the same trip system enter the some bar they are esperated by barriers.
The made evitch, seven diesharge volume highauster-levet trip .
bypass evitet, scram reset switsh, and asneal scran ewsteh are all asunted es one sentre1 panel. Bach devise is monated la a i sen and has a suffielsat number of barrier dev&oes to estatain adotuate separation. Conduit is provided from the sans to the legie cabinets.
The outputs fram the legte sabinets to the seras valves are run in four senduits for trip erstes & and four conduite for trip system 3. The four conduits mateh the four seras groups shown in Figure 7.3-3. The groups are selected so that the failure of one group to seras will set prevent a reactor shutdown.
7 3.1.1.3.8 6 .
I l
The RPs een be tested durine reactor operation by five se rate tests. The first of these Is the manual setuater test.
depressins the manual seras button for one trip shannel, e i,
manual ter uree toelos. actuators manual After trip channelsare the first are doenergised, trie enannea tested se resetopening sequentially,tthe sentacts remaining in a similar.
404 in th manner. The total' test verifles the ability to deenergize ~
all eight groups of scran pilot valve solenoids by~using the manual scram pushbutton swltches. In addition to main sentrol i room and sequence recorder printout indications, scram group indicator lights verify that the actuator sentacts have opened.
The second i a.L as the automatie actuator test. It le seson-11shed by s e m ing the kerlooked test suitehes one at a time 1oreachautuu.elegie. The switch doenergises the actuators -
' for that legno and sauses the assestated actuator contacts to 1 open. The test verifles the ability of each legio to doenergise l
the actuator logies asseoisted with the parent trip system. In i
. addition to annunciator and eenputer printout indications, the i actuator and sentact action een be verified by observing the physical position of these devices. 1 The third test includes salibration of the IBt3 by means of sia-ulated inputs from salibration signal units. Subsection 7 6.1.13 do.ioribes the salibration procedure.
The fourth test is the single rod seras test, which verifies i espability of each red to seras. It is secomplished by operating a toggle switch en the RPS test cabinet in the control eenter partloular CRD. Timing traoas can be made for each red
! scrammed. Prior to the test, a physios review must be senducted '
I to ensure that the red pattern during scram testing will not create a rod of esoessive reactivity worth.
l I
7 3-9
. . s
[ .
.asm ennus - ennaeresore, se . e-u-.. . ..on . o. ......... -
3 $ CS M-jo3-oft V P4 !! of 4$
L' The fifth test tevolves tea a est et.nal to each SpS chan-t4i totrip*resIIts. the test "'
".t,1Inturnandobseret ma. .a ***
" *
- 1,r.t'*.**i * -
e me .. &dm.r.a . . w'"r.'go ".'attr='*!."a" tape. -
g r apS r . use. .. v if1 4 . . 1 h.si. ring m e- .
eperationa l testing and esa be verift thereafter e&atler fa all esses, essent mostres ins and radia sensors, i
tests.
the priesty senser respeast time to insleded this in therespease asseured messaramenttime le t
of overall channel tessense time.
edded to an attesense Ier tastrument line Getty, as appreeriste, for each ap this asereseh to sessistent with the dettaition patostion.of ressoase time, H ieh is the assieme altomable time
- free ehen the verlable betag asasure6 just esseeds the tras set-asint to the seenergisind of the seateel red moras soleme&Rs.
he appateable test eriterien to that the ed$usted testabased value must met eseced the value seed for the safety analysis.
During eroeperettenal testing, and subsequently on a surve!!1ance
- basis, the senser response time se seasured usine a hydrau11e ,
rasy= test method etailer to that described la 816etrie power Research Institute Report No. WP-387, Seneer Response Time Verification. To the results of this asasurement Le added the ;
j delay for instrument line length as appropriate for each
' appileation.
l The response time of the trip semiparators and tras delays is determined usine the transient surrent sourse test method deseribed la us60 31617-A, Analog Trasemittere/this Triptest Unit is System per-for Engineered Safeeuard Senser trip Inputs.
4 termed as parttesting.
surveillance of the proeperational test and during subsequent I the belanes of the SpS channel legte response time is tested usine assented settees that are doeunsated in esisting preop-4 eratIenal test procedures. ;
7 3.1.1.4 8avirar.sankai saaniderati===
s Electrical modules for the RPS are lesated in the stimary con-tainment, la the reactor building, and in the turblas building.
The environmental conditi4as for these areas are shown in Tables 3.11-1 and 3.11-4.
Cabling for the Rps stal be run in senduit er in an snelosed fortemagnette sable tray. Separation will be in asserdance with Section 3.18 and Subsection 8.3.1.
7.3.1.1.5 anaratis.nal canaidayatiana .
7.2.1.1.9.1 3E881 ,
purine normal operation, all sensor and trip eentaets essential p
to safety are elesed: shannels, logies, and actuators are 7.t-10 i
7-- * " " " " " " -
88WT pflms - tattherature.ed I ett 48 I stI?Ps i vsovevosisu L
s CA 89-l&vH l N /v sp #$
esereised. In sentr we, however, trip esatset se channels coaslet of moraally open contact ceteorks that e to, bypass.
( 7.3.1.1.5.3 saram hamilana The following seragraphs discuss the innettonal seasiderations .
for the variables or conditions monitored by the RPS. Weble 7 8-1 lists the preliminary specifications for lastruesats that !
rovide stenals for the systeh. Figure 7 3 1 summarises the foostionsfromwhichtheRP8anyresetteasignalthatcausesa l sotaa.
There are two pilot setaa valves and two scram valves for each control rod, arranged as shown in Figure 7.3=3. Sach pilot seram valve is solenoid operated with the solenoids normally ener- i gised. Thepilotsotaavalvessentroltheairsupplytothe seras valves for each control rod. When either p110t serasThe valve j is energised, air pressure holds the sotaa valves closed. !
seras valves sontrol the supply and discharge paths for CRD water. As shown in Figure 7 3-3, one of the seramles pilot valves for each control rod is controlled by actuator A, and the !
other valve is sontrolled by actuator legios 3. re are two de I solenoid-operated baokup seraa valves that provide a second means l of controlling the air supply to the seras valves for all control rede.. The de solenoid for each backup seras valve is moraally
! doenergised. The backup serna valves are energised (ie.itiate j l estas) when trip systems A and B are both tripped.
The funettonal m ineament of ser. sors and abannelsAthat non-simplified statute a single Aoele is shown in Figure 7.2-3.
logie schematie is Included in Figure 7 3-9. Den a channel sensor contact opens, its sensor relay doeneralses, causing contacts in the logie to open. The opening of contacts in the angle doenergises Its actuators. M en doenergised, the notuators open sentacts in all of the actuator logies for that trin system. This action results in doenergising the seram pliot valve solenoids assoaisted with that trip system (one seras pilot
- valvevalve solenoid for each control Bowever, the other scram rod . also l
1 pilot solenoid for each rod mu)st be doenergised before the rods can be sernamed.
If a trip also occurs in any of the logies of the other trip sys-tea, the remaining scram pilot valve solenoid for each rod le doeneralsed. This permits the air to vent from the seras valves j and allows CRD driv 9 water to act on the cad piston. Thus, all I control rods are serammed. The water displasto by the movement of each rod piston is vented into a seram discharee volume. When the solenoid for each backup seras valve is energised, the backup scram valves vent the air supply for the seras valve. A'his action initiates insertion or any arrant sontrol rods regardless of the action of the scram pilot valves (Figure 7.8-3). ,
A seram can be initiated manually. There are two sets of manual scran pushbuttone loested on the surface of the sata operating j 7 3-11 l
- ~~ggyigd.a - esimerweridii 0 ta=.eTsieor.T~~~~~evir~~~~~~ vmw.m- .7 46R GW tesWJ i M tr of 4%
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uiu.= asi ..a a. ...
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. . .h . . .. -
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trip Wh.n .n RPs ..n..r trip., it light. . rint.4 th.t r.4 .anun.
v.riab1., whi.htat.rindi- i i
wine.v, n.n t. i i emten the nut-ap.14att 11 th. .hann.1. .r9hta winone ia toested on .ha vartshie. :
Sa.h trip .
s...t.t ntr.1 p.n.1 1. th. 1. att.1 r .
I 1 A. tripp.e.
b.6 RPS .h.nn.1 trip .1.. ..u.d. . be...r .r.h.y.t11 nua.Let.r vi d tn 1 i
)
l th.t .an b. 41.n..e by th. .p.t.t.r. R...t 1. .
i l
light.
..t lat.h until p.ssibl. 1. until th. th. nditi.a initiating ing th. trip
.au.e.nta.t 1. ha. r...t.b..a ;
l .1..r.4. & ..qu.n..-.f-...nt. print.ut id.ntift.. .a.h tripp.4 -
e l ,
l
,.3-13
_ . . _ . - __. _ ~ _ _ . . _ .
o.. - ..........-.............. ..
C U 89-/of-Uk fca H of 4b ,
1 Duition of the apS telays ear cheansa,howwr[denti the also be need to the istivitaat penser that 4:1 En a "
of e apait i esse certable. She sea of vi persats retor to estekly identify the cause o RPS tr De ate to evalue the threat to the feel et Seelear systes pretoss barrier. ,
All RPS trip events are recorded es a sequesse-of=evoets tesorder that !aeledes caly these suelear steen essply erstem (5888)
Saputs. this record permits analysis of 4peratlesal transient events that seest too rapidly for operator resegattles.
The seguense-of events reeorders print the time and alara type of sash event and aan resolve the etter of escurrence down to 1 ases. A lesser time difference causes the events to be treated as stauttaneous, as diosussed la Subsection 7 8.1.11.
Use of the events recorder is not required for plant safety. The stintout of trips is particularly useful la routinely veritying the eerrest operatten of pressuret level, and valve position
- evitehes as trip pelate are passes during startup, shutdown, and asintensase operations.
Roseter protection system taputs to annuneitters, reeerders, and the eenputer are arranged se that ao malfuastica of the annun=
eisting, recording, or eemputing equipment een functionally dis-able the RPS. Direct signale from RPs sensore are not Relay used as sentact inputs to annunelating er data-legging equissent.
isolation is provided between the primary algnal and the interas-tien output.
7 2.1.1.5.3 paaration Information Indinatara Indie4ters are installed in the assual seras switches to indicate *
- a trip system annual trip. Seram group indicators estinguish when an actuator legte opens. Process ladicaters for all RPS trip variables are available in the main sentre1 rees.
ARRERELA1REA Baeh RPS input is provided to the annunciater system through isolated rela sentacts. Manual and automatie trip system tripe j sitesignaltgeannunciatorsystem. ,
)
7.2.1.1.5.4 33131g&&
Nominal values for trip system setpoints are summarised'la i j
Table 7.3-1.
In response to the NRC 1etter from J. F. 4tels to W. E. Jens that defined specific requirements for j dated april it, instrument trip setpo 1977, int values, Edison has instituted a formal j
?.2-13
. . . . . ,- - - ,.-.._-m ...---_.,_-__.m..-.--- - - . - , . - ,
-__seur snaus - esmusews.es$$-se-seAApel TauuCT4.~~sas.us,s.nmg
- 4 eil $t-/o3-vF.T '
I l'4 l1 of 4h oerna with the eesperation of es te devotes the reestred tesh-r1e61 data. S e referenced setpotat data art presently inelated -
in the Weehniest speciftsations. ,
gnuaram namikarina avasam fram '
to pr test the feel against hiah beat generation rates, neutron ghe lets '
21us e asaltered and used to Initiate a resetor estas.
setpe ate sad their bases are discussed la Suheestion f.6 1.13.
m .sma, n : tan atah ornamura !
Eigh pressure eithin the suelear systen threatens A austear to rupture the systes pressure austest erstes process barrier.taeresse caring reaeter operation esepre This causes results in a positive reset 191ty tasettica.ineressed eere heat gen A seram senatorsets a pressure and system overpressurisation. The ineresse by quickly reducing core fission heat eeneratlen. '
suelear systen hish-pressure seras settise se chosen e11 operation without spurious seran, yet provides aDe wies marain of lesation to the mastaua allevable nuolear systes pressure.as eenpared to the lesation of highe the pressure seasurement austearerstenpressuredurinetransients,hasaisebeensena The sidered in the selostion of the high-pressure seram setting.
suelear system high-pressure scraa setting mise protests t i during events that soeur when the reaeter is operating below rated power and flow.
manakar Wassel t =_ water Laval Low water level ta the RPV ladicates that the fuel is in SaneerDeereas '
of being inadequately seeled.the remotor is operating at power decrea
- inlet subeoeline. The effect is the same as raisine feedwater temperature. Should water level deeresse tee far, fuel damage seule result. A reaeter seres protects theThe fuelRyv by low-water-level reducing the fission heat generation within the sere.
seram setting has been selected to prevent fuel damage followingThes abaermal operattenst transients.
either single equipment malfunctions er single Beoperater errors,is seras setting and result in a deeressing RFV water level.
far enough below neraal operational levels to avoid spuriou serans.
fuel to ensure that enough water le available to secount for evaporation less and displacement of seelant following the most severe doorease.
abnormal operational transient involving a levels e sele thermal-hydravlle limits. The limits set operational limite en -
the thermal power level for earlous eeelant flew rates.
l 7 3-14 l
sert svisus - entsnweswe,t) : MMe i :aws i em.... a .. ..........
4 4 84-tos -off M to of 43)
(~ fpthina Skan Walen Eleanpra r een l Caesure restit ta aofsignitieast the turbineedlitica stes valve eith the toast of positive resetor 191at ge the Les to
! sore as the suelear ersten esaure time causes steen '.
se11 apse. The turbine e valve elesare seven Aal.4$atos a seraa i
earlier It than does either MS er austear erstem h&gh es-sure. stevides a satisteeter margia teles sore the 1-tran-hydraulie limits for this eat y of abnerast rations sleats. h e seren eeuntersets addittoa of itive reactiv-sty resuittee from increastas pressure bythe taser negative l
reactivity wIth esatret reds. 41though esolear eyeten high-stessure seram, la esajusetten with the pressure relitt systes, la adequate to steelude overstesouristag the austear erstem, the turbine step valve elesure stram provides The asettional turbine step margia valve to .
ele-the nuclear system pressure limit.
l sure seres settlag )tevides the earliest positive ladioation of l valve stesure.
Turbina a==kral Walva Paak elanura With the reaeter andvalves turbine generator fast sleeure of the turbine control can result laatapowerlfisant sign additten of positive roastivity to the core as austear systes pressure rises. The turbine sentrol valve fast elesure saran laitiates a seras earlier than either the MS er auslear system high pres-sure. It stevides a satisfactory margin to sore thermal-hydraulle limits for this eategory of abnormal operational tran-elents. The seras sountersets the addition of positive roastiv-ity resultane from increasing pressure by inserting negative reactivity with control rede. Altheueh the suelear system high-sressure seras, in conjunetten with the pressure relief systes, laedequatetopreoluteoverpressuristagtheaustearsystes$ the turbine sentrol valve fast elesure seras provides additiona margin to the auelear systes pressure 11 alt. The turbine sentrol.
valve fast closure seram settlns is selected to provide timely ,
indiention of eentrol valve fast elesure. '
main staan t.ina raaintien The NSIV elesure scran protests the reaeter en less of the heat sitk. The NSIV elesure initiates scran earlier than the RMS er auslear system high pressure. Automatie elesure of the NSIVs The mata is initiated when senditions indicate a steam line break.
steam line isolation seras setting is selosted to give the The earliest positive ladioation of testation valve elesute.
legie allows funetienal testing of main steam line trip shannels with one steam line isolated. ,
seran Blamharma Val === miah Water Laval Water displeoed by the CR0 pistons during a screa eens to theIf the seras seram discharse volume.
the water se that insuffleient espasity remains for the water 7.3-15
~
"'~
eeneodaminess,a od?cGo%s;,~ SX.~ e, ... , , , , , , , . . . . . ,
l t Clt 81* DS MS i-R H of 4h
, . di during a seras, sostrel red assement weste be biadored de seras. Se prevent this eitmetten, the teneter is set when the seter 1evel la the dischstge values le filling .
no, yet is los anos e ensure that the remataing sepseity in *~
the gelume can to a seras.
h
- l grinare aantalamank Riah ggpaanra .
l sigh pressure inside the primary sentaiensat as saiteate a break ta the aselear systen steseos bit:1er. ft is seent to saran
, the remotor ta esen a httuaties, to sintaise possibility of seel damage and to rodsee energy transfer from the sore to the
! soolant. He drywell hieh-pressure seres setting to selected to be as now as possible without inducing spurtees serans.
~ pain staan Lima miah naatakian sich radiation in the vistaity of the mala steam lines any indi-este a eress fuel fallure in the sore. Hon hiah radiation is l .
detestet near the steam itse, a seram to initiated to 11 sit the 4' release of fiesten protests from the fuel. H is sendition aise sienals the primary chv1Cg to taittate sentainment of the
, released fission products. He high radiatica trip setting to selected high enough above background radiation levels to avoid '
spurious screas, yet new enough to promptly detest a gross releaes of fission produets from the fuel. More information en the trip settlag is available in Subsection 11.4.3.8.3.3.
I panual seram pushbuttons are loested in the main senteel resa to enable the operator to shut down the reaeter by initiattag a seras. l maan suitah in annymous J When the modo switch is in SEUTDOWN, the reaeter is to be shut -
4ewn with all control rode laserted. This seras is not een- -
sidered a protective function because it to met required to pre-test the fuel or auslear systes process barrier, and it bears no l relationship to sinimising the release of radienstive asterial from any barrier. He seram signal le resswed after a short !
delay, permittine a seras reset that restores the normal valve lineup la the ch5 hydrau11e system.
7.f.1.1.5.5 made avikah l A senveniently located, multipositten, keyleek mode switch is i provided to seleet the necessary seras functions for various plant sendittens. De mode switch selects the appropriate '
sensors for seren functions and provides appropriate bytasses.
The evitch also interlooks such runettens as sentrol th5 blocks l which are not eensidered !
and hererefueling as part ofequipment the RPS. restriottens,to The switch designed to provide l separation between the two trip systems. The mode switch 3 i
. 7 3-18
---,..-.,.,_i-
50er svant - C stwsterl es p st-ce 1 listse t sti " "*" * " setssenetsie -
' K$l 99-b3-Ofs i G PG to of $$p i
sesittene and their related seres insettens are shows in pigure 7 3-9. they are .
, ]
i
- a. - tattiates a resetor estems bygeseos asaa ne testatten seras *
- b. - Seleets 200 seren ter 1sw mestres fles level re ions bypasses main stesa Stae isolaties seven
- e.
- Seleets mas seres for See neutres flus level re ese bypasses mata stesa &&as testation seras
- 4. M - Seleets WIS seram ter power range operation.
~
7 3.1.3 amaien-nania rafarmakian l
the design-basis information required by Seatten 8 of Iaas '
879-1971 to provided la subsection 7 1.3.1.1.
7.3.3 Analtain 7 8.3.1 Sanazal presented below are analyses to demonstrate how the various general fumettenal requirements and the speelfte regulatory requirements listed-under the Ry8 design bases described ta Su5eestion 7 1.3.1.1.1 are satisfied. Considerations of less et instrument air and less of seeling water te vital equipment are discussed la Chaptes 18.
7 3.3.3 maastar pratantian sentaa )
j 7.3 3.3.1 g farmamma With ammatal punaki===1 *- air-- ata i The RPS is designed to provide timely ersteetten against the . i eneet and sensequenses of eendittene that threaten the integrity . !
of the fuel barrier and the austear systen process barrier. l Chaetor 15 identities and evaluates events that $eopardise the fuel barrier and austeer system steseos barrier. The methods of i assessing-barrier donate and reeleastive asterial releases, aieng with the methods by whleh abneraat events are eeught and iden-tified, are presented in that shapter. ,
Design precedure has been to seleet tentative serna trip setting such that spurious screas and operating ineenveniones are avoided. It is then verified by analysis that the resetor fuel and mustear systen stooess barrters are stateeted. In ett esses, i
the spesifie seram 1:1p point esteetee 14 a value that prevents damage to the fuel er auslear systes process barriers, taking -
into seasideretten previous operettag esperlease. ,
Theseranstattistedbymasvariables,suelearsystenhafhpressure, i elesure, sad RPV low water level, prevent fuel damage felleving 7 3-17
_-.e_.. , ~ , , . . . , a e
y gp ng . ga nseessure.se e e-as-w
- o* *'" ' g g.gy.vg M 2/ Of &
abnorasi operational treasients. Speelfically, these seres faae=
tions initlete a seras in time to prevent the more from esseeding .
the theras1*brdrau11e safety limit during abnormal operational ~
transients. Chapter 18 14entifies and evaluates the threats to En no esse fuel integrity posed by abnormal operational events.
does the more esoted the thermal-hydraulie safety limit. .
The seras initiated by nuclear systen high pressure, in eenjune-tion with the pressure relief system, is entfielent to prevent damage to the avelear system prosess barrier as a result ofFor turb internal pressure.
closure screa and turbine control valve fast closure seres pre-vide a greater margin to the austearCh4pter erstem pressure safety Il identities andlimit than does the high pressure seras.
evaluates aseidents and abnorant operstlomst events that result in nuetear systes pressure increasou. In no ease does pressure esoeed the suelear system safety limit.
The normas initiated by the main steam line M8tv elDeure, and RPV 10w water level satisfactorily limit the radiological con-i sequeness of gross failure of the fuel or auslear system prosess barriers. Chapter 15 evaluates nuclear system process barriers.
fa no case gross does thefailures release ofof the fuel i
radioactive material to the environs result in esposures that j esosed the guideline values of applicable pubitsbed regulations.
Neutron flus is the only essential variable of significantThe basis spatial dependence that orovides inputs to the RPS.for the nu The other requirements are ful-I sussed in Subasetion filled through the combination 7 6 1.13. of logic arrangement, channel power supply redundaney, wiring schose, physical isolation,llties.
redundaney, and ocoponent environmental capabi I
Theoretleally, The RP8 uses 'one-out-of-two-taken-tutes' logic.
itsreliabilityisslightlyhl!herthana"two-out-of-three'sys- The dit l tem and slightly lower than a one-out-of-two' s nowever, because l
forenees can be neglected in a practical sense, ystem.
are slight. The dual trip system is advantageous because it l
they can be thoroughly tested during resotor operat m without causing I
a scraa. This ospability for a thorough testing program sig-nificantly increases reliability.
The use of a different channel for each legio taput allows the I system to sustain cny channel failure without oreventing other sensors that monitor the same variable from taltiating a seram.
l Any maintenance operation, calibration operation, or test results in only a single trip system trip. This leaves at least two I
i The resistance to spurious serans contributes to plant safetysh I because reduced eyeling of the remotor through its operating modes decreases the probability of error or failure. 1 7 3-18 ,
l
asst sy ms - esithwwwe.es : 4-te-se : 3:aps i et* aa*a *a ogssasseisto 6eIl8tws-UFs t N az of 43) m en an esseattal asattered wariable asesses its eeras trip tat, it is sensed by at least two i nient eeneers.in eneh
- rip system. Only ese channel anat tr a each tri system to .
sitiate a seras. Whose the arrangenen of two is per trip eFotos ensures that a geras will eseur as a asalter variable
- esseeds its scraa setting. .
aseh control red is sentre11ed as sa tedividual salt. A failure of the sentrole for one rge weste met affeet ether reds. me i
bookup seras valves provise a sesend method of wenting the air even if either seras pilot salve pressure solenoid for any senteel red fa to deemergies when a seras is from the seras waives,ils required.
- Sensors, channels, and logies of the Rps are not used for sentrol of process systems. Therefore, failure in the lastrumentation and sentrol of stesess systems sannot laduos failure of any per-tien of the protection system.
! at worst, -
Pallure in a single of either trip systemRPS ester-generator t:13 setpower Alternative wouldisresult,ilable ava to the RFS buses. A semplete, sustained less of electrieel both buses would result in a seras, delayed by the aster = power to j
1 generator set flywheel inertie.
! Alara trip settings for each least power reage monitor (LPRM)
' shannel are revised as necessary by the steeees saaputer. These setpoints are based on osaputer salculatlens of the eere power distributions and appropriate reactor operating Limit eriteria.
i Upon alara trip settlag revisions by the process osaputer, an alarm is sounded to alert the operator to the assessary l adjustment.
Durine normal operating sendittens, LFRN readings are made once ser minute. During power level changes the scanning frequenew is .
Inerossed to ones every 5 see. The Le described in subseetten 7 6.1 9. preesse saaputer system (Dc8) .
The environment in which the instruments and equipment of the RPS aunt operate was sensidered in setting the environmental spesifi=
eations elven la tables 3.11-1, 3.11-3, and 3.11-4. The seecifi-eations for the instruments loosted in the reaeter er turblae l buildings are based on the worst espected ambient senditions.
1 Design of the system to sospiy with safety elass requirements and
- the fail-safe snaracteristies of the system ensure safe shutdown of the remotor during earthquake ereune action. The system fails in a direstion that causes a reasier setta only when subjected to outremes of vibration and shoek.
! To ensure that the RPS remains functional, the number of operable channels for the essential monitored variables is maintained at
- or above the minimus elven in Tables 7.3-3 and 7.3-3. The mini-aus applies to any unfripped trip systems a tripped trip system 7 3 19
nu
- ?
! " 1st s e n - i r .e a i e n.n i niu m i unanimi e ewms-ur.:
ts zs of 4 6 any bevg any number of iesperative to. Seessee reester-eteet&es requiremonte very with the in skish the reseter '
j rates, the tables shoe 4&fferent feast seat r it sh shfor l
RON ans paha90y sedes. phase are the emir aore them one esatrol ret saa be withdrawn from the it -
Asserted positten. .
fa esse of a 34CA, remotor shutdeva escure same41stely fe11 ewing i the'aee& dent, se one or more prosese variables esseed their speettled setpoint. Operstica verifisetten that shutdown hae l p guered mer to ende by observing one or more of the fe11 ewing !
&astsattenee r
- a. Sentrol red status taape indleating each red fu11y -
I inserted
- b. Centrol red seras pilot valve status temps ladiesting epen valves sentrea saattering poser range shannele sad recorders o.
downesale
- 4. Annuneisters for RPS variables one trip legte la the tripped state
- e. Sequense-of-evente recorder leg of tripe
- f. Centrol red positten leg on the protese eesputer.
7 3.3.3.3 eaafermanea en m alfie mamuistarv maeutramanka 7 3.3.3.3.1 tadustry Atandarda j IEtt 279-1971 is satisfied as follows: (except for manual scras, which is cddressed below)
W5D0-10139, ' Compliance of Protection systems to Industry criteria:
General tiectric BWR Nuclear Stena Supply Systes," demonstrates compliance of the RPS with Ittt 279-1968. The following paragraphs address the differences between Itts 279-1968 and Itts 279-1971 standards:
- a. Paragraph 4.7 - Control and Protection Systes Interaction. The RPS intsrlocks to control systems only through isolation devices such that no failure or combination of failures in the control system will have any effect on the RPS.
- b. Paragraph 4.22 - Identification of Protection Systes. Each systes cabinet is marked with the words " Reactor Protection Systen" and the '
particular redundant portion is listed on a distinctively colored marker plate. Cabling outside the cabinets is identified by color :
coding (as discussed in Subsection 8.3 1).
e.
7 3-30
$ Q $f*/01*0f5 fYr zy of M Esact design comparisons with the testability requirements of IEEE 279-1971 4.9, 4.10, and 4.11 are given in NEDD-10139:
- a. Soras discharge volume Pages 2-26, 2-27
- b. Main steam line isolation valve Page 2-39 . .
l c. Turbine stop valve Pages 2-56, 2-57 j d. Turbins sontrol valve Pages 2-69, 2-70
- e. Reactor water level Page 2-99
- f. Main stems line radiation Pages 2-112, 2-113
- s. Neutron monitoring systes Page 2-125 l h. Drywell pressure Page 2-138
- 1. Reactor pressure Page 2-146
- j. Mode switch Pages 2-164, 2-165 i
- k. Discharge volume bypass Pages 2-170, 2-171
- 1. Main stens line valve bypass Page 2-178 Turbine trip bypass M. Page 2-186 '
De RPS annual scras function satisfies IEEE 279-1971 as follows: .
- 1. 31nale Failure Criterion (IEEE !?9-1971.-Paraaraoh 4.2)
RPS annuc.1 controls comply with the single failure criterion. Four manual scran pushbuttons are arranged into two groups on one main control room Sanch Board and the switches are provided with physical and electrical separation.
- 2. Quality of Components and Modules (IEEE 279-1971. Paranraph 4.3) he RPS manual switches are selected to be of high quality and reliability.
l j 3 goutosent Qualificatan sIEEE 279-1971. Parascash 4.4) i 1 Manual switches and trip logic components are certified by the vendor' I that they perform in accordance with the requirements listed on the
- i purchase specification as well as in the intended application. This !
certification, in conjunction with the existing field experience with I these components in this application serve to qualify these components.
- 4. Channel Intearity (IEEE 279-1971 Paraaraoh 4.5)
The manual switches and components are specified to operate under normal and abnormal conditions of environment, energy supply -
malfunctions, and accidents.
- 5. Channel Independence (IEEE 279-1971 Paratraoh 4.6)
The manual scran pushbutton is a channel component. he trip channels are physically separated and electrically isolated to comply with this design requirement.
7.2-21'
ladQR 69*MS* Y PG sf f & l l .. 1 i 6. Canbrol and Protection gystes {pterac.tionJ M Ift-1ffL_farmargpi i 5da l The annual scram pashbutton has ao control interaction. l l 3
- f 7. Derivation of Systed Insuts (IEEE 279-1971. Parearash 4.8).
I
- Not appliamble
' 1 S. Cnambility for Sensor w = (IEEE 279-1971. Parmarash 4.9) I l I i
Not appliasble. 1
- 9. Onambility for Test and Calibration (1 - 279-1971. Paraarash 4.10) ;
. A manual scram switch paraits each individual trip legio, trip actuator, and trip actuator logic to be tpstod on a periodic basis. 1 et. m1 h -u ar 0=-J Ee= D:xdufNng-m ham.4.nd )
- 10. aines actest1on or one annual scrat puanoutton places as nrs trap f1
- system in a tripped condition, it is in complianoe with this design l requirement.
l l 11. Coeratina Dreasses (IEEE 279-1971. Parnaraoh 4.12)
Not applicable.
l 12. Indication of Bra =---- (IEEE 279-1971. Parmarach 4.13) !
i Not applicable.
l 13 Access to Neans for'Bynassina (IEEE 279-1971 Paraaresh 4.14)
Not applicable.
- 14. Multiole set Points (IEEE 279-1971 Paranrach 4.15) -
j Not applicable.
- 15. C===letion of Protective Action once it is Initiated (IEEE 279-1971 Paraaran) 4.16)
L Once the annual seras pushbuttons are depressed, it is only necessary to maintain thes in that condition until the scram contractors have de-energised and open their seal-in contacts. At this point, the trip actuator logic procedes to initiate reactor scram regardless of the state of the manual scran pushbuttons.
j 7.2e21-1 ,
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ._ _.___ _ ___.___ _ _ + .s ___._________,-__.______.__m - -
- - --w-we+.,-m .----ww--
4 .
\
t tR GHe193 l L' f% E6 of 449 l I
- 16. annualpetuation(Isus 379-1971. pyearash 4.17) ]
pour annel seres puestotten sentrols are provided en see main sentrol i reos annah soard to posit annuma initiation of remeter seres at the i systes level, me eeur annum 1 aores pusedettene (ame in each of the i feur WS trip legies) eesply with this design requireuset.. De legio -
i for the annual acres is eno-eut-of-tue tulos. Se stagne th11ere in the manual or automatie portions of the RPS sen provost either a .
annual or automatto mores.
1 1
- 17. Aooess to Set Point ad ^ --ts. M ihrat 9=. - ' M t paLats (f " i j r7e-le71. w a= ann 4.' 5) !
Not appliamble.
l
- 18. Identifiestion of Protective actions (I m 379-1971. Parearaoh 4.19)
When any annual seras pushbutten is depressed, a eentrol teos annunciation is initiated and a prooems computer rooerd is produced to identify the tripped RPS trip legio. - .
19 Inforestion Readout (IEEE 279-197 h Parasrash 4,80)
The annual scras function complies with this requirement. !
i
- 20. Systee Renair (IEEE 279-1971 Paraaraoh 4.21) !
the manual seras function complies with this requirement. j the RPS is fail-safe and its power supplies are thus unnecessary for scran. A total loss of power causes a seren. A loss of one power source causes a trip systes trip. IEEE 308-1971 does not apply to the RPS. '
. t
" General Guide for Qualifying Class ! Electric Equipment" is satisfied by ,
t complete qualification testing and certification of all essential components. '
Records covering all essential components are maintained. For a complete >
summary of how the RPS oceplies with IEEE 323-1971, refer to NED0-10698. See also Section 3 11.
IEEE 336-1971 l " Installation, Inspection, and Testing Requirements for Instrumentation and l Electric Equipment During Construction of Nuclear Power Generating Stations" is ,
I satisfied except as modified by the Edison Quality Assurance Procedures.
" Periodic Testing of Protection Systems" is complied with by being able to test the RPS from sensors to final actuators at any time during plant operaticp.
The test must be performed in overlapping portions.
IEEE 344-1971 Conforance to IEEE 344-1971 is described in Section 3 10.
7.2.21-2
.-..,,,..,.,-.-,._._.m-.._.,-,,_m, ,. ,..-w-,---,,,._,,.._.,..m_, _ . . , , _ , . _ _ , . _ . . . . .- - -_ _ _ _ _ _ _
m sert ef8mm - C'amermore,t3 e t M e : 3:seps : ctasseetsgesasse tsesessises *!
&t/t M-Mi~USS PG E7 of 43,1 l 3MLan=M21 '
- pria1=ese estes der the testies of the slag 1er .
iteries to amatear power rattag staties et ens' l to W estasfied by the aPs destga eriteria -
in 189.
7.3.3.3.3.3 amatarmanas en annuimmar,auldas ama le esa na
- the RpS se desi se that it any be tes duri t opera-t$en from sensor Lee to final totuator toe 11anse with Regulatory Guide 1.33. The test must to per ta over-lag portions so that en setsal remotor seven dose not escur
. as result of the teettag.
The RPS is judged te ly with Regulatory Seide 1.83 stase all of the additional pres e one of Segulatory Guide 1.83 as app 11ed to 1835 379 are met er eseeoded by the astmal design.
la een so. Ammandia a
'Ouality Assurates criteria for sustear power plaats.' & Ouality Assuranee program has been establiehod that imelades goality sentrol at th6 eesponent vender, at the suelear stesa supp11er, and during insta114tica at the et various stages of suelear power plant site. seestreetion, Systes design te sentinuelty shoeked for eenfermenee to the applicable Ladustry ersteria. Periedte testine ensures that the system te available and at to te perfort its latended purpose. Guality tesuranse r see are asintained by the suelear steam espeller and at the sustear power plant site. For a eseplete deteri) tion of the Ouality Assurance program, see chapter 17.
ammarmi haalan Erikaria af is GFR as. "-- nfim a
- a. Criterion 13 - Bash RPS tapet is monitored and .
. annunciated
- h. Criteries 19 = taattementation and sentrel is provided la the asin control reen. The resoter can slee be shut deva from oute&de the asia sentrol rosa by opening breakere
- e. Criteries it - The RPS seastantly moatters the appr riste plant variables to asintata the fuel berrier sat inerv teclant pressure boundary. It autenatieelly ,
l tatt atos & seram when the variables enseed the
- established setpointe , , l
- d. Criteries 31 - The RPe le designed with foer andependent l and seperated output channels. me eisele failure er* l sperator setten saa prevent a seras. The erstes een be l tested during plant operation to ensure its availability 1
7 3-33 ,
l
s . . <
m ei.mo - annw6ews,se . coco. . .sem . .- - --
=..
tell M@9-t43 l futo # O j
+
4
- e. criteries 33 . the t sortiene of the are ;
rated seek that se 1e'fa11ere or e e .
Si ter een t a seren. msnet 1 rios f&as, messente, and tevel '. !
tai t var es) La the reester vesset
- f. esitertem 33 - 1e sa11=eafe. & tese of'onestri-post-
-i est power er air v111 met arevent e seras.
maated adverse ese te v111 tot prevent a seres l
- g. ersteries 34 - m e RFS has as sentret feastica ,
- h. Criteries SS - the RFS to highly re11thie se that it le !
able to seren la the event of anticipated operational escurreases.
?,3.3.3.3 ramtrammat ammana and antamista l
&=tre==t ;
.he 4 1!aen=&t.ria med wlae11=
a f.ty-related =1=t1'Iisa ==1*=osa
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- f. r., .
- a. S e solestica of tastrument rance to based on kneeledge of the espected veristica of th6 presees variebte being l monitored. In all esses the range selected is greater :
thantheespectedvariableeseursione ,
- b. The assuracy et each trip setpoint le greater than er ;
equal he the assuracy assumed la the sosident analreie performed for the Persi 3 plant destga I
- e. Trip setpotate are seras11y toested to the portion of the instrument range of greatest soeuracy. Sa sia pasos, the setpotat le 1esated in the portion of the :
&astrument's range that le sensistent eith the required assuracy
- d. All of the safety-related trip setpelate are chosen to allow for the moraal essested Laettament setpotat drift without esseeding asseelated feehateal Speelsteettene.
- e. 411 setpointe are verified en a prescribed schedule se ,
outlines la the Toshaisal Specifloations.
i 6
9 I
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i chanhole ser matripped trip erstem requires to as stata l j
j unettomal 34rformance.
Shanaal Banariation g ges l seutron monitoring erstem (Aran) 3 3 ,
l agutron asattering erstes (san) 3 3 mustear system high pressure 3 3 ,
- 1 a a l Primary sentalement high pressure )
3 3 arv tow water level Seran &&seharge volume high water level 3 3 l
3 3 manuel seren aneh anta steam 1&ne toelation valve ,
positten gh,,g3 1
i apuring testine et eenoore, the channel should be trissed when the tattial et, ate et the seneer le set essential to He test. .
suosinal values given for information. See voehnical speetti-sations for operational requiremente.
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Who 'Weras 11ste the acrest number ed ama suuher l tras system. ' solume 1&ste the atal ehaabele per gets te system requires te ashat&&a asetional ptriesmance.
j M M ot 3 3
, Westrea statterlag erstem (Apan) 3 3 l Waelear ersten high pressure 3 3 Primary eestatement high pressure 3 3 RFV tow water level 3 3 .
Seram Sischerge volume high water level 3 3 l f Naasal seras Seek main steen ilme testation 4 4 j
valve position 4 4 i
Esch terbine stop valve position 3 8 turbine sentret valve fast elesure Turbine first-stage pressure 3 3 (hypees channel)
- i l
i aparing testing of sensors, a channelesadition, may be sleeed in an without lastag that et the trip systen la the tri la the same trip least ese operable channe l stattde treten to monitoring that parameter.
teosiaal values given for inforestion. See technical Spesifi-estions for operational requiremente.
p 7.3-27
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Al At St R .
AtAttetPtottefloNIYtitutestes l TYPICAL LOGIC & CHANNEL CONFIGURATON FOR: MN STEAN Lmt MON SWA@
SCR AW DISCHARGE VOLUME NIGN TATER LEVEL PmIIARY CONTAINutNT mcN PRtssynt TUR$iNE CONTROL VALyt FAIT CLO6ung 4-l
' NUCLEAR SYSTtu NIGN PRt31utt ,
REACTOR VttstL Lov TATER LEVEL a
Fermi 2-l
,- ' UPDATED FINAL SAPETY ANALYSIS REPORT .-
l pieune 7.s i y
TYPICAL ARRANotMENT OF CHANNELS AND LOGICS .
- 4
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Fermi 2 L
upoArno nwAt sArm mAtysis Raeont 1
Pl0URE 7J 4 TYPICAL CONFIGURATION FOR TURSINE STOP CLOSURE REACTOR TRIP
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t 4
Fermi 2 UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT rseuRn u.,
( TYPICAL CONFIGURATION FOR MAIN ITRAM LINE 680LAtl0N REACTOR TRIP l
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[
LIMIEl(EAER WEST .J l .IAR 18191 - 1014151 - lUlFJl, P y _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - --- -dRT I t wdd. PIM. EE r---
Revision 1 Pane 1 of 21
- -m- I B ------ :l i
j A) ananment_
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) g) section(s).- (s), Figure (s), etc. Afreoted (Attach marked-up pages) g.
(See Pate 2 of- 21 s/, 7
= CJ Reason for (Elange To eliminate crose-tie flood control VIL.vt e i (T4500F602 thru F606) '.n the sub-basement of the Reactor Bu. J,d. .nt as '
i detai;,ed in EDP-5299. ; lov. E : l D) Reflerance and source Documenta (Identify) g EDP 5299. Rev. & Test N/A PDC Tech 5pec N/A ,i g ,
ARBI N/A DER 55-1576. 59-0097 Procedure N/A SE (Attached) 59-0025 25' 9
l$s
~ ,,
Effectiveness Review (Attached) N/A 3 g.'$y Other SCP-5299. Rev. A Draw: .n l::::::::::::::::::gs, Design .:PARTCalculations, 2: (WERATIE3 Correspondence, LIM (EAMES [ 154 etc. #########ljh E ge
- A) Document g) - <
[ ] Operating License [ ] Tech Specs -( ) Environmental Protection <J Plan
[
] Tech Spec Clarification h.
) !
B) Section(s), Table (s), Figure (s), etc. Affected (Attach larked-un - es) _ _ w' akv ATI Ig i. B! lt T ASB-f l C) E . n + and Bource nanammats Attached
( ) Significant Hazards Consideration u 1,aq,fy
[ ] Enviromental Impact - Categorical Exclusion
[ ] Environmental' Evaluation gM sq, fqqo
[ Other _- m s w r- n t f rn ~
(GV D) Is W15AR change required? " ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' - -
l y~ [ ] Yes [ ] No LCR No.
- B) Priority
'~
NRC approval required by (date):
An [ lEnergency [ ] Exigent condition will occur if not approved by:
(State date):-
l Explanation F) Implementation DER No. 88-1876
- ;;;; - 22; ;;;l geweeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeFART 3
- APPM7 TAU; M.ttnnws MV- &^'d Gan Maest A) Originator I.Dhingra ML S, #W'&& /GJMdhroetdanjtts
/S&N Date #7//&d4(n//fes4M,65/t B) Technical Expert -/,).boda+-r . Date /3//U C) Nuclear Organizat' ion Unit Head N Date [-/ 6 D) Director, Nuclear Engineering [ ]NA / Date[///8 E) Plant Manager Date k F) Director, Nuclear Licensing Ir-Date ///
r c)
G) OSRO Approval { l NA Date l
IH) NSRG Approval { l NA Date l
' Form.FIP-RA2-01 Att 1 P1/1 092188 DTC:
gg File:
nas
1 cartugaften susT 1AR 18191 - 1014151 - IUlFISl
. Tac i i 1 - 1 1 l l Reviaton # Fame 2 of 21 )
A) ann.mmat ~
UFSAR I l B) Section(s).-flable(s). F1aure(s), etc. Affected (Continued) mL sei mL S ection 9.3.3. Table 9 3-5. Fiaures 5.5-7. 5.5-1L 7.3-1.
" " 7.3-7. 9.3-5.
m g.
9.3-6. 9.3-7, 11.2-16.and 3.8-44 Sectfon 9.3.3.1 'Desian Bases" See name 3 and 4 l og Section 9.3.3.2 'Systes Description" See saaes 3.thru 7
- (%
Table 9.3-5 ' Reactor Buildina: See paae 8 Flood-Control talves" .
Flaure 9.3-5 'souisment Drains in Auxiliary See omnes 9 and 10 M1aL 3103 and Reactor Buildina" Flaure 9.3-6 ' Floor Drains in Auxiliary See names 11 and 12 ,
4 % \-0301 and Reactor Buildina" l.
Figure 9 3-7 " Floor and Eautpoent Drains See name 13 1mul W8 (Full size sylar)"
in Reactor Building Sub-basement" Flaure 5.5-7. Sht. 2 Disaram - Reactor Core See pages 14 and 15 c%\ ob% -
Isolation Cooling System Barometric Condensor Flaure 5.5-13. Sht. 1 Residual Heat Removal See page 16 f.n1Ri DOE 3 l
Systes Division II Flaure 7.3-1. Sht. 2 -Disaras Hiah Pressure See pase 17 cnWt>O Coolant In.iection Systes Figure 7.3-7 Dinaran Core Spray System - See name 18 on W Ocuj l-CSS Reactor Building
)
I Flaure 11.2-16. Sht. 1 Sump Pump Diaaram See page 19 LM19\-Gob 9 Radwaste System Figure 1.8-44 RHR Pump Foundation Details See pages 20 and 21 L
l: 4Wl- 7131 and Drain Piping l Form FIP-RA2-01 Att 5 P1/1 092188 DTC: File:
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. stream is moraally recycled to the 600,000 gal condensate return ,
tank. Floor drain water of relatively low purity is collected in ,
separate sumps and periodically discharged to the radweste floor drain collector tank and cleanup train. If this water is of satisfactory quality, the purified stream may be ashaus'ted to the plant circulating water reservoir decanting line that flows into L Iake Brie. , ,
ADD ,
ont drain connections are generall through open funnels N M.,3 qui (sig drains) at those locations Where t is considered desir-able to verify performanceIat a glance, Where periodic tempera-ture observations may be required, or Where the ooolant water system is a high pressure system and sight overpressurise drain lines and equipment. -
Drain system piping offacting drywell isolation is constructed to meet standards for Quality moup 3 components. Rey are designed l 'to ASNE Section III, Class 2 code requirements. ghe balance of the drain system is Quality toup C and is designed to ASKE sectiun III, Class 3 code requirements, esoept for the recircula-l ting sump heat exchangers. Reir piping is designed to AME section VIII and to ANSI 331.1.0 code requirements.
' ADD ,9. 3. 3.2 System Description MSEM'8 The Fermi 2 drainage system is designed for accumulation of
- discharges from equipment and floor drains inside the reactor building, auxiliary building, turbine building, and radwaste building, and for periodic transfer of these accumulations to the liquid redweste system.
Within the reactor building, seven separate drain collection systems operate, each with an independent sump. Se reactor and auxiliary buildings drain systems are shown in Figures 9.3-5 and 9.3-6.
l An equipment drain collection system from primary coolant compo-
! nonts terminates in a '1100-gal acainal onpacity sump located in the drywell area meer the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) with
. twin parallel 50-gpa* transfer pumps that discharge to the rad-waste waste collector tank. De sump is closed and wanted, with a recirculating bypass capability from the transfer pump dis-charge header line returning to the sump. Bis bypass flows through a heat exchanger cooled by BBCCW. The sump fluid is automatically recirculated on signal from a temperature sensor in the sump. The sump liquid setpoint is 117'F. periodic sump dis-charge is initiated automatically on -a signal from the sump level controller. The discharge header to the radwaste waste collector l tank penetrates the primary containment wall. In order to pre- i' serve the integrity of primary containment, this line is sealed by the submerged pump suction lines inside primary containment.
e
- Pump nameplate rating.
943-9
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ghese lines are also protected by one air-operated isolation b '
I valve and one motor-operated isolation valve lastalled in tandes la the disobarge headeri one valve is located 1aside containment, the other outside. Each valve is fee from a different division.
Rose isolation valves are automatically closed by a rise in pressure inside primary containment and by other primary son-tatament isolation signals. - (see hble 6.3-2.)
Equipment drains from secondary containment opmoes la tire reactor i_ bui141ag and aus111ary building are also collected and discharged to the redunste maste collector tank. gwo drata sumps, each
- holding 1500 gal (nominal espaatty), are provided, each with twin 1 submersible pumps and bypass heat eschangers. , ,
he dourth drain system la the reactor building draws from a <
treach drata sad an undervessel drain and ashausts to the red-unste floor drain oo11ector tank. Bis system is stallar to the equipment drain systems located in the drywell discussed provi-ously. Dual isolation valves ensure the integrity of primary
- containment, but the bypass cooling heat eschanger is omitted. 1 sump onpacity is 1000 gal (nominal onpacity).
Se fifth and sixth drain systems in the reactor building onllect from the floor drains in secondary containment areas and exhauct through twin parallel pumps to the redunste floor drain collector
- tank. These systems, like the other floor drain system, have no sump oooling provision. Each sump has a 1500-gal nominal '
capacity.
The seventh reactor building drain system consists of a sump in the- torus area (with no collection piping) . Bis system dis-charges through twin parallel transfer pumps and an esternal water esal to the redwaste floor drain collector tank. His sump has a 900-gal nominal' onpacity. 4EWKar MA /NSEfT'C
- Equipment and floor drains in the emergency more cooling system (BCCS) pump rooms, in the subbasement of the reactor building, have been physically separated to prevent possible flooding between ECCS Division I and Division II equipment through the drain' lines in the event of an accident that causes one of the rooms to flood.
Motor-operated, auto olose flood-control valves have been speci- -
fically installed in the floor and equipment- drata lines that connect the ECCS equipment rooms in the subbasement, . to prevent crossfloodian between thase r & =. These f1 W -control vaives will aormally be open, but will close on high-high sump level to preventwaterfrombacktNvup e paent drain he v into11the subbasement floorovel. and Se Mg oopenongowe "f/
of inIsly
- Wmalco A f/S w ?4 corner rook'or the EPCI room due to f57 W/ m e/
line brea't in either room enn be confined to that corner room (list of t:nese valves and easps and their particular level N#h pei. ,
g i,t p
EREWSE JDER /NSER7'.ZY g l g.3-10 1
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" {(switch.e is givin. in tion are shown Figures g.3-4 and 9 3-7. _
j motor-operated flood-oontrol valv[and imit switchee are )
MNEEdWed te periodically to ensure their satisfactory performance. !
,, This testing is done as required by the Performance Svaluation j procedures of the overall plant surveillance program. Mainte-nance procedures cover the testing of the valves. Switches and -
,other portinent instrumentation are sovered by a section of the :
overall balance-of-plant (BOP) preventive maintenance program. l l
The turbine building has eight separate radioactive drain colleo-tion systems, each with an independent susp. Se drain system is shown la Figures g.3-0 and g.3-g.
l- -
Two equipment drain sumps, with nominal onpacities of 400 and 4400 gal, collect oil-free radioactive liquide from equipment and piping systems. Each sump has twin 50-gpm* sump pumps that peri-odically discharge to the unste collector tank in the redunste building.
A third 2300-gal nominal-capacity servios unter drain sump is provided to collect nonradioactive liquids from such systems as the general service water (GSW) system, and TBCCWS piping. This sump is emptied into the liquid unste holding pond in the yard. .
Two floor drain.- sumps, with nominal 1600-gal and 4400-gal capacities, are provided to collect oil-free liquids, and each has twin' 50-gym
- sump pumps discharging to the floor drain col-1ector tank in the radwaste building.
Finally, three sumps, with approsisate capacities of 1900, 2200, and 3000 gal, are provided to collect oil-contaminated liquide.
These sumps are each provided with twin 50-gys* or 60-gpm* pumps
, se un11 as a 200-gys* or a 250-gym
- emergency pump. He dis-l oharge is normally routed to an oil separator prior to treatment I in the-radweste building. Se emergency pumps empty the sump rapidly, in case of fire, to the liquid unste holding pond. The high-capacity pumps are operated by a level switch separate from the switch used to operate the lower capacity pumps.
1 The radweste building contains an equipment and a floor drain sump, each.with a 900-gal nominal onpacity. pirst-floor leakages-drain directly into the waste collector tank or into the floor drain collector tank located in the basement. Basement leakages are collected in the appropriate sump and pumped out by twin '
50-gpa* pumps. The system drains are shown in Figures 9.3-10 and 9.3-11.
The RER comples drain system is segregated into two types of wastes, oil-free unter and oil-contaminated water. Equipment and e
- Pump nameplate rating.
9.3-11 I
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A; saammt gpg/At. CONTROLLED N) Bestion(s), M ble(s), Figus{s), etc. STrested (Attach earned-up pages) ,) . EDE832e Test PDC-R/4 7 Tech spec - ABN - Procedure -
. DER - SE (Attached) E E - a m E o ,
Effectiveness Review (Attached)- Other M B 326 Drawin tc. l::::::::::::::::::p:pAny .
, Dw3: ign Calculations, gg3ATIg; Corr lim u (333E5 pondence,,p]EA
[X e########l A) Dooment [ ] Operating License [ ] Tech Specs [ ] Environmental Protection Plan [ ] Tech Spec Clarification
- 5) section(s), Table (s), Figure (s), etc. Affected (Attach marked-up pages)
C) Reference and Source Documents Attached I [ ] Significant Hazards Consideration STATUS l [ ] Enviromental Ispact - Categorical Exclusior [ ] Environmental Evaluation ASB h w.o/n [ Other _6.'o m N'-'~ '^'N D) Is W"5AR change required? , [ ] Yes [ ] No LCR No. ani w L.,smJ E) Priority NRC approval required by (date): An [ ]Seergency [ ] Exigent condition will c r - " - 6 -===d hv i (State date): l Explanation l F) Implementation DER No. geeewowwweveeeeeeeeeePart 3: AiesidAls ;; ;; ;;;;;;;;;; ;;;;;;;;;;;;;I A) Originator T. E MNKHM [/NU = /M# NMh B) Technical Expert l N!_h 0 Date it./ti ht3 C) Nuclear Organization Unit Head - [M4/.bDate / M!b[ D) Director, Nuclear Engineering [ ]NA Date / 1 4 E) Plant Manager Datelh>Jo F) Director Nuclear Licensing - Date /,//5ff8 . C) OSRO Approval l 3 NA Date H) NSRG Approval [ NA Date_ l l' ore FIP-RA2-01 Att 1 l'1/1 092155 DTC: q File: f7gg-
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- =::=j x x_ xx _ _2 xx: FART 1: UFSAR. PLAN, OR PROGRAM REVISION I M& A =2 " ~2 A) Document CONTRUL'"
B) Sect 6en(s). Table (s). F6eure(s), etc. Affected (Attach marked-up pages) SCCT\oth 8 . 3 . \ a ?. $W,b T \ C:, . '1 3 - \ ta m b t. :,w,t < C) Reason for Change ABt@co or A wwwt-Les Ast_ w<f u_ u m r (P5002 betoS two\% t\% oci m e n Me 1: etieo- ( P5002 ho 211 Nn M Ts SM7 6 re o ( Ps50c)2.bc.2.3 3 Tc, TME \ b3TETRu PTIIblE A\t? $U PP V S YLTt:M D) Reference and Source Documents (identify) EDP 5"62"6 N.A Tech Spec WA PDC
' Procedure SE (Attached)
M - 0 2 7.3 ABN ts/ A DER tu / tt PE (Attached) oc/A
. Test g /A Effectiveuss Review (Attached) [ ]Yes [ ]No Other Drawings. Des 69n Calculations. Correspondence etc.
F*** **** * * * **** ** * ***"** ***
- P A R T 2 : OPERATING LICENSE CHANGES psfN 4 ***";"=::"********* I A) Document
[ ] Operating License ( ) Tech Specs [ ] Environmental Protection Plan [ ] Tech Spec Clarification B) Sectinn(s), Table (s), Figure (s), etc. Affected (Attach marked-up pages) C) Reference and Source Documents Attached [ ] Significant Hazards Consideration ( ) Environmental Evaluation [ ] Enviromental Impact / Categorical Exclusion [ ]Other
~D) is UFSAR change required?
I [ ] Yes [ ] No LCR No. =- E) Priority b.I.. NRC approval required by (datti: An [ } Emergency [ ) Exigent condition will occur if not approved by: g ; fla r.J eky;M (State date): g Explanation 7,r F) implementation '5E -oad DER No. P** * ****"**"** * * * * * * * * * * * *
- P A R T 3 : A P P R O V A L S* * * * * * * " * * "* * * **** * *** ***** * ** * **
A) Originator R,7A%ER U Nsc Date / 7-IS -B f
- 3) Technical Expert E"T A% E tt 92 />$gfc , 2 Date 72-(949 C) Nuclear Generation Unit Head [. M.Lt J lb l_- _ d veens/s / Date /t-/f ff D) General Director. Nuclear Engineering [ )NA f Date /A I E) Plant Manager Date /t Date F) Other ,
O) Director, Nuclear Licensing ,x. D te / 4 7 / 9 6)
/
H) OSRO Approval (Tech Spec Amendments) W NA Date lf) NSRG Approval (Operating License Amendments) [ ]NA Date l DTC: E TCLCR for UFSAR File: 1735 l form FIP-RA2-01 Att 1 P1/1030189 DTC: [ ] TOLCR for other
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psamuauraan 8 cay.p,g. gry M61 4 ha near sonatant pressure 1100 poig) in the air reeelvers by auto yff aatte regulation of each of the scopressors through aussessive unloading steps. One soapressor remains ca standby to provide assurance against loss of espacity due to a single sempressor estage. prom the station air receiver, the station air is distributed throughout the plant via the station air header / riser systes. ghe station air system is oised to sintaise the pressure loss of air at the point of use. The monanterruptible sentrol air portion of the system consists of two 100 percent-espacity 100 sefa, single-stage scaleriaated reciprocating air ecapressorer two 100 pereant-eapacity parallel strings ot' oil filters, air dryers, and afterfilters two sentrol air receivers r an8 associated piping, fittings, and valves. During neraal plant operation, the soures of montaterruptible and
&aterruptible sentrol air is thro intereoanections between the station and opntrol air systems. pressed air tros the station air system is supplied through one of these intersonnections to the Division I and Il nominterruptible control air manpressor discharge headers. The air then flows feca each header through its divisional 100 percent-eapacity filter and dryer dere it is cleaned of all particles of digt 3,0.5sa and then dried by a regenerative destesant-type dryer to a =40*F dowpoint (at pressure) . After leavlag the litter / dryer, the aoninterruptible control air flows to its divisional control air receiver tros gg each itmoninterruptible sional eventually flows to itsairpoint control of neesystem.
distribution through its divi- Jf / gk Another station air sonnection pupplies the interruptible sentrol 4fgg p air sy/dryst, dich funettons to meet the same air quality eri-stem through filter (merggl3 the inte teria as the moninterruptible filter / dryers. The interruptible sostrol air flows to the laterruptible control air reeelver, afhich supplies the interruptible control air distribution system. The station and control air ocepressors, air receivers, filters, ano dryers are designed to operate in an ambient temper-ature range of 60*F to 100'F, a range of 30 percent to 100 per-and a radiation field _ of 1 mR/_hr. The control air distribution system to divided into two distinct partss interruptible and monanterruptible. Boninterruptible sontrol air is supplied through two separate distribution systems (Divisions I and II) to the emergency equipment ecoling, water system (RECWS), standby gas treatment system (SOTS), sortrol center air conditioning system (CCACS), primary sentainment atmospheric monitoring system, and the residual beat removal (RER) system. Control the is also supplied to the reactor more isolation cooling (RCIC), high pressure ecolant tajection (SPCI). the control rod drive (CRD) system, the safety / relief valfg ~ (SRV), and the main steam isolation valve leakage control sysjes (M81VLC8). All other control air uses are connected to an interruptible control air distribution system that is supplied 1 9 3-2
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. *- tec I I l - 1 I I i 1 Revision d pane d'ef'NB 6" 47 Dooment d 4 UHAR nk Tau e,1 1 E l i i Another station air connection sueolies the interruptible senteel air ! V,W'/ ; states. The interruptible control air erstee -~cmrnmp~ t t &^ two#4005 redundant dryers. Each dryer has its own arefilter. afterfilter,and
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1Mtraentatten, gegh (rytr Unit 16 gassble of supplying the anse 4 eumlity of instroent air as the noninterruptible sentrol air systes. Redundancy allows for esintenance to be performed on one unit without i h rdisina the erstes's air auslity or auantity, Dryer redundancy - l 1mproves the reliability of the interruptible sentrol air erstes. The i interruptible control air flows to the interr etible sentrol air receiver, which sueelles the interruptible control air distribution ! systes. The station and control air cosoressors, air receivers filters, and drrors are desianed to coerste in en ambient lesserature rante of , 60*F to 100*F. a rente of to sorcent* to 100 seroent relative humidity, and a radiation field of 1 mR/hr. L l =_. l
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