ML20010F440
| ML20010F440 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 09/04/1981 |
| From: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Finfrock I JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| TASK-15-19, TASK-RR LSO5-81-09-016, LSO5-81-9-16, NUDOCS 8109100190 | |
| Download: ML20010F440 (5) | |
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r w-September 4,1981 Docket No. 50-219 LS05-81-09-016
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S-T Vice President Jersey Central Power & Light Company e
Post Office Box 388 4
f Forked River, New Jersey 08731
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Dear Mr. Finfrock:
SUBJECT:
OYSTER CREEK - SEP TCPIC XV-19, LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENTS RESULTING FROM A SPEr.TRUM 0F POSTULATED PIPING BREAKS WITHIN THE REACTOR COOL ANT PF.5c!P.E BOUNDARY In your letter dated May 7,1981 you submitted a safety assessment report on the above topic. The staff has reviewed your assessment and our con-clusions are presented in the enclosed safety evaluation report. Our report completes this tonic evaluation for Oyster Creek.
The enclosed safety evaluation will be a basic input to the integrated safety assessment for your facility.
The assessment may be revised in the future if your facility designsis changed or if NRC criteria relating to this topic are modified before the integrated assessment is completed.
Sincerely, Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 Division of Licensing l
Enclosure:
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Docket No. 50-219 LS05-81-08-033 Mr. I. R. Finfrock, Jr.
Vice President Jersey Central Power & Light Company Post Office Box 388 Forked River, New Jersey 08731 i
Dear Mr. Finfrock:
SUBJECT:
OYSTER CREEK - SEP TOPIC XV-19, LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENTS RESULTING FROM A SPECTRUM 0F POSTULATED PIPING BREAKS WITHIN THE REACTOR COOLANT PRESSURE BOUNDARY In your letter dated May 7,1981 you submitted safety assessment report on the above topic. The staff has reviewed your assessment and our conclusions are presented in the enclosed safety evaluation report. Our report completes this topic evaluation for Oyster Creek.
The enclosed safety evaluation will be a basic input to the integrated safety assessment for your facility. The assessnent may be revised in the future if your facility design is changed or if NRC criteria relating to this topic are modified before the integrated assessment is completed.
Sincerely, Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 Division of Licaising
Enclosure:
As ste.ted cc w/ enclosure:
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cc G. F. Trewbridge, Esquire Gene Fisher Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge Bureau Chief 1800 M Street, N. W.
Bureau of Radiation Protection Washington, D. C.
20036 380 Scotts Road Trenton, New Jersey 08628 J. B. Liebernan, Esquire Berlack, Israels & Lieberman Comnissioner 26 Broadway New Jersey Departrent of Energy New York, New York 10004 101 Commerce Street Newark, New Jersey 07102 Natural Resources Defense Council 91715th Street, N. W.
Licensinq Supervisor Washington, D. C.
20006 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station J. Knubel P. O. Box 388 BWR Licensing Manager Forked River, New Jersey 08731 Jersey Central Power & Light Company Madison Avenue at Punch Bowl Road Resident Inspector Morristown, New Jersey 07960 c/o V. S. NRC P. O. Box 445 Joseph W. Ferraro, Jr., Esquire Forked River, New Jersey
- 08731 Deputy Attorney General.
State of New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety 1100 Raymond Boulevard Newark, New Jersey 07012 Ocean County Library Brick Township Branch 401 Chambers Bridge Road Brick Town, New Jersey 08723 Mayor Lacey Township P. O. Box 475 Forked River, New Jersey 08731 Commissioner Department of Public Utilities State of New Jersey 101 Commerce Street Newark, New Jersey 07102 U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Region II Office ATTN: EIS COORDINATOR 26 Federal Plaza New York, New York 10007
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TOPIC XV-19 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENTS RESULTING FROM SPECTRUM OF POSTULATED PIPING BREAKS WITHIN THE REACTOR C0OLANT i
PRESSURE B0UNDARY 0YSTER CREEK I.
INTP0 DUCTION The objective of this review is to assure that the consequences of Loss of Coolant Accident: (LOCA) are acceptable, i.e., that the requirements of'10 CFR 50.46 and Appendix K to 10 CFR 50 are met. Loss-of-coolant accidents are postulated accidents that would result from the loss of reactor
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coolant, at a rate in excess of the capability of the reactor coolant
=U make-up system, from piping breaks in the reactor coolant pressure boundary.
The review consists of evaluating licensees' analysis of the spectrum of 4
loss-of-coolant accid ents including break locations, break sizes, and initial conditions assumed, the evaluation nodel used, failure modes and the acceptability of auxiliary systems used.
II. EVALUATION Assuming the most pessimistic combination of circumstances which could lead to core uncovery and excessive heatup following a loss-of-coolant accident, fuel cladding integrity is maintained by successful operation 'of the Emercency Core Cooling System. The following systems in the Oyster Creek Plant provide '
the necessary protection to mitigate the consequences of a loss-of-coolant accident:
(1) Isolation Condenser System initiation on reactor low-low water level or reactor high pressure. Either of two independent condensers is capable of providing, the heat removal function.
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(2) Core Spray System initiation on either low-low reactor water level or high drywell pressure.
(3) Automatic Depressurization Systems (ADS) initiation by simultaneous occurrence of triple low reactor water level and high drywell pressure.
C:her systems, such as the reactor feed ;ater system and control drive hydraulic tys:E provide ccc ing water to t,e core during a LOCA; however, these systems are n:t considered part of the ECCS.
Tne licensee has analyzed the performante of the emergency core coo' ling sfstem in accordance with the requirements of Section 50.46 of 10 CFR Part 50.
The analyses considered a spectrum of postulated break sizes and locations and
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were performed with the evaluation model described in Appendix K to 10 CFR Part 50.
T Oyster Creek does not have a 'high pressure injection system, the lack of which 2
could make small breaks (< l.0 ft ) more limiting than large breaks.
- However, the present EXXOff 1;JP-BWR-EM model, approved by the staff, gives calculated results which show that the highest peak clad temperature is reached for the large break.
Therefore, small breabare bounded by the large break analyses.
The worst lacge break was determined to be the complete double-ended guillotine break (C =0.4) of a recirculation pump discharge line downstream of the venturi.
D The worst single failure is loss of one isolation condenser.
III. C0fiCLUSIONS As part of the SEP review of Oyster Creek, the loss-of-coolant accident was revievied against the acceptance criteria of SRP Section 15.6.5 and Section 6.3.
The initial conditions related to limiting single failure, break size and location, pcuer level, and operating conditions have been reviewed and found to conform to the requirements of the SRP.
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