ML20010F290

LER 81-127/01T-0:on 810814 & 16,reactor Was Started Up W/ Control Area Ventilation Sys Train B Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Personnel Cautioned to Read & Interpret Tech Specs Carefully

ML20010F290
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire
Issue date:	08/31/1981
From:	Nardoci P DUKE POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20010F281	List: ML20010F280 ML20010F290
References
LER-81-127-01T, LER-81-127-1T, NUDOCS 8109090570
Download: ML20010F290 (1)

Text

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, l o 6 21 l on 8/17/81, it was discovered that during the Zero Power Physics Test T/rogram, r

,3,3, jthe reactor was started up(changed from mode 3 to mode 2) on 8/14 uiid again on, los.118/16/81 with train "B" of the Control Area Ventilation (VC) System inoperable. ;

,,,,,i This violates TS 3.0.4 which is reportable per TS 6.9.1.12(f). Since the outside

#2to1! air filters on train "B" of VC were functional throughout the incident as veri 7 g fied by subsequent testing, train "B" l

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