05000369/LER-1981-127-01, /01T-0:on 810814 & 16,reactor Was Started Up W/ Control Area Ventilation Sys Train B Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Personnel Cautioned to Read & Interpret Tech Specs Carefully

/01T-0:on 810814 & 16,reactor Was Started Up W/ Control Area Ventilation Sys Train B Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Personnel Cautioned to Read & Interpret Tech Specs Carefully

ML20010F290
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire
Issue date:	08/31/1981
From:	Nardoci P DUKE POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20010F281	List: 05000369/LER-1981-127, Forwards LER 81-127/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl 05000369/LER-1981-127-01, /01T-0:on 810814 & 16,reactor Was Started Up W/ Control Area Ventilation Sys Train B Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Personnel Cautioned to Read & Interpret Tech Specs Carefully
References
LER-81-127-01T, LER-81-127-1T, NUDOCS 8109090570
Download: ML20010F290 (1)

LER-1981-127, /01T-0:on 810814 & 16,reactor Was Started Up W/ Control Area Ventilation Sys Train B Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Personnel Cautioned to Read & Interpret Tech Specs Carefully

Event date:
Report date:
3691981127R01 - NRC Website

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