Proposed Tech Specs Upgrading Provisions Re Operation W/ Tripped or Bypassed Reactor Protection or Emergency Safeguards Feature ChannelML20009D105 |
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Site: |
Fort Calhoun ![Omaha Public Power District icon.png](/w/images/6/6a/Omaha_Public_Power_District_icon.png) |
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Issue date: |
07/22/1981 |
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From: |
OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT |
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To: |
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Shared Package |
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ML20009D100 |
List: |
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References |
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TAC-7089, NUDOCS 8107230151 |
Download: ML20009D105 (9) |
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Category:TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
MONTHYEARML20195B4441999-05-26026 May 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Relocating pressure-temp Curves, Predicted Radiation Induced NDTT Shift Curve & LTOP Limits to FCS Unit 1 RCS pressure-temp Limits Rept ML20205J7671999-03-31031 March 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Increasing Min Required RCS Flow Rate & Changing SRs for RCS Flow Rate LIC-99-0001, Proposed Tech Specs Relocating Three cycle-specific Parameter Limits from FCS TS to COLR1999-01-29029 January 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Relocating Three cycle-specific Parameter Limits from FCS TS to COLR ML20151U3871998-09-0404 September 1998 Revised Bases of TS Sections 1.3(8),2.0.1(2),2.1.6,2.3,2.4, 2.13,2.15,3.1 & 3.6 ML20217B8241998-03-18018 March 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Re Requirements for Alternate Shutdown Panel & Associated Auxiliary Feedwater Panel ML20217B8611998-03-18018 March 1998 Proposed Tech Specs 5.2 & 5.11.2,changing Title of Shift Supervisor to Shift Manager ML20217P2041998-03-0303 March 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Revising TS 2.6 & Basis by Replacing Refs to TS 3.5(4) W/Refs to TS 5.19 ML20199L8951998-01-30030 January 1998 Proposed Tech Specs,Reflecting Relocation of pressure-temp Curves,Predicted Radiation Induced NDTT Shift Curve & LTOP Limits to FCS Unit 1 RCS PT Limits Rept ML20199L7291998-01-30030 January 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Deleting Section 3.E Re License Term ML20202B0931998-01-30030 January 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Section 2.5 Re Steam & Feedwater Sys ML20203G4311997-12-11011 December 1997 Proposed Tech Specs,Adding New LCO to TS 2.15 Pertaining to Inoperable ESF Logic Subsystem ML20199K1391997-11-21021 November 1997 Proposed Tech Specs 5.19 Re Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program ML20217G4601997-10-0303 October 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Pages Revising TS Surveillance 3.9, Auxiliary Feedwater Sys, to Clarify What Flow Paths Are Required to Be Tested & Delete Specific Discharge Pressure ML20196J0851997-07-25025 July 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Implementing Option B of 10CFR50,App J & Allowing Frequency of Conducting ILRT & Local Leak Rate Testing to Be Based on Component Performance ML20137Y1801997-04-17017 April 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Administrative Changes to License DPR-40 ML20137H4941997-03-26026 March 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Incorporating Addl Restrictions on Operation of MSSVs ML20138L4361997-02-20020 February 1997 Proposed Tech Specs 5.0 Re Administrative Controls LIC-96-0183, Proposed Tech Specs 5.0 Re Administrative Controls & Table of Contents1996-11-20020 November 1996 Proposed Tech Specs 5.0 Re Administrative Controls & Table of Contents ML20129E5161996-10-24024 October 1996 Proposed Tech Specs 4.3.2,regarding Reactor Core & Control to Allow Use of Either Zircaloy or ZIRLO Cladding Proposed Additional Reference to Westinghouse Topical Report, WCAP-12610-P-A, Vantage + Fuel Assembly Rept ML20129C2621996-10-22022 October 1996 Proposed Tech Specs 5.0 Re Administrative Controls & 5.9.5 Re Core Operating Limits Rept LIC-96-0125, Proposed Tech Specs Revising Paragraph 2.B(2) of License to Allow Use of Source Matl as Reactor Fuel.Ts 4.3.2 Revision Would Include Depleted U in Describing Reactor Core1996-08-23023 August 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Revising Paragraph 2.B(2) of License to Allow Use of Source Matl as Reactor Fuel.Ts 4.3.2 Revision Would Include Depleted U in Describing Reactor Core ML20115G0041996-07-15015 July 1996 Proposed Tech Specs 4.3.2 Re Reactor Core & Control ML20112D3211996-05-31031 May 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Re LCO for Trisodium Phosphate & Increasing Min Required Amount of Trisodium Phosphate Contained in Containment Sump Mesh Baskets ML20117H6981996-05-20020 May 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Clarifying Surveillance Test Requirements Found in TS 3-1,Tables 3-1,3-2,3-3 & 3-3A ML20117H5931996-05-17017 May 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Relocating Operability Requirements for Shock Suppressors (Snubbers) to USAR & or Plant Procedures & Incorporating Snubber Exam & Testing Requirements Into TS 3.3 ML20097C3081996-02-0101 February 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Allowing Increase in Initial Nominal U-235 Enrichment Limit of Fuel Assemblies That May Be Stored in Spent Fuel Pool LIC-96-0008, Proposed Tech Specs Placing Sirw Tank Low Level Channels in Bypass Rather than Tripped Condition1996-01-22022 January 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Placing Sirw Tank Low Level Channels in Bypass Rather than Tripped Condition ML20094N8631995-11-16016 November 1995 Proposed Tech Specs,Adding LCO & Surveillance Test for Safety Related Inverters & Deleting Nonsafety Related Instrument Buses ML20092G0771995-09-0606 September 1995 Proposed Tech Spec 2.7,extending Allowed Outage Time from 7 Days Per Month to 7 Days W/ Addl Once Per Cycle 10 Day Allowed Outage Time ML20087E0281995-08-0404 August 1995 Proposed Tech Specs Reducing Minimum Operable Containment Radiation High Signal Channels ML20086D5341995-06-27027 June 1995 Proposed Tech Specs Re Reformation & Clarification of TS Re Chemical & Vol Control Sys ML20091G3601995-06-26026 June 1995 Proposed Tech Specs Re Extension of Allowed Outage Time for an Inoperable Low Pressure SI Pump ML20086D3851995-06-26026 June 1995 Proposed Tech Specs Re Audit Frequencies for Plant QA Program ML20084G7751995-05-31031 May 1995 Proposed Tech Specs,Requesting Amend to Provide Addl Restrictions on Operation of CCW Sys Heat Exchangers ML20083C0091995-05-0808 May 1995 Proposed Tech Specs,Incorporating Proposed Revs Per GL 93-05 to Specs 2.3,3.1,3.2,3.3 & 3.6 ML20087G9691995-04-0707 April 1995 Proposed Tech Specs Re Relocation of Axial Power Distribution Figure for License DPR-40 ML20082J0851995-04-0707 April 1995 Proposed Tech Specs Re Administrative Changes to License DPR-40 ML20080S0291995-03-0101 March 1995 Proposed Tech Specs Reflecting Administrative Revs to TS 5.5 & 5.8,per GL 93-07 & Revs Unrelated to GL 93-07 to TS 2.5, 2.8,2.11,3.2 & 3.10 ML20078P8251995-02-10010 February 1995 Proposed Tech Specs 2.10 to Relocate Requirements for Incore Instrumentation Sys ML20077S1691995-01-0909 January 1995 Proposed Tech Specs,Reflecting Deletion of Requirements for Toxic Gas Monitoring Sys ML20078G8981994-11-11011 November 1994 Proposed Tech Specs 5.2 & 5.5,reflecting Administrative Changes ML20024J3921994-10-0707 October 1994 Proposed Tech Specs,Deleting SRs in TS 3.6(3)a for Eight Raw Water Backup Valves to Containment Cooling Coils,Deleting SRs in TS 3.2,Table 3-5,item 6 for 58 Raw Water Valves & Revising Basis of TS 2.4 to Reflect Changes ML20069H9261994-06-0606 June 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Incorporating Changes to Credit Leak Before Break Methodology to Resolve USI A-2, Asymmetrical Blowdown Loads on Rcps ML20069D8451994-05-25025 May 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Requesting one-time Schedular Exemption from 10CFR50.36a(2) ML20062N4211993-12-28028 December 1993 Proposed TS Tables 3-1 & 3-2 Re Min Frequencies for Checks, Calibrs & Testing of RPS & Min Frequencies for Checks, Calibrs & Testing of ESFs & Instrumentation & Controls, Respectively LIC-93-0228, Proposed Tech Specs Incorporating Changes to Leak Before Break Methodology to Resolve Unresolved Safety Issue A-2, Asymmetrical Blowdown Loads on Reactor Primary Coolant Sys1993-08-20020 August 1993 Proposed Tech Specs Incorporating Changes to Leak Before Break Methodology to Resolve Unresolved Safety Issue A-2, Asymmetrical Blowdown Loads on Reactor Primary Coolant Sys ML20045H1791993-07-12012 July 1993 Proposed TS 2.14,Table 2-1,Item 6.b Re ESF Sys Initiation, Degraded Voltage Setting Limits LIC-93-0159, Proposed Tech Specs Incorporating Administrative Changes1993-06-17017 June 1993 Proposed Tech Specs Incorporating Administrative Changes ML20128E5341993-02-0808 February 1993 Proposed Tech Specs Deleting Section 5.9.4 Re Radioactive Effluent Release Rept.Draft Chemistry Manual Procedure Encl ML20128C0461993-02-0101 February 1993 Proposed TS Figures 2-1A & 2-1B Re pressure-temp Limits for Heatup & Cooldown,Respectively 1999-05-26
[Table view] Category:TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS & TEST REPORTS
MONTHYEARML20195B4441999-05-26026 May 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Relocating pressure-temp Curves, Predicted Radiation Induced NDTT Shift Curve & LTOP Limits to FCS Unit 1 RCS pressure-temp Limits Rept ML20205J7671999-03-31031 March 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Increasing Min Required RCS Flow Rate & Changing SRs for RCS Flow Rate LIC-99-0001, Proposed Tech Specs Relocating Three cycle-specific Parameter Limits from FCS TS to COLR1999-01-29029 January 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Relocating Three cycle-specific Parameter Limits from FCS TS to COLR LIC-98-0141, SG Eddy Current Test Rept for 1998 Refueling Outage. with1998-10-27027 October 1998 SG Eddy Current Test Rept for 1998 Refueling Outage. with ML20151U3871998-09-0404 September 1998 Revised Bases of TS Sections 1.3(8),2.0.1(2),2.1.6,2.3,2.4, 2.13,2.15,3.1 & 3.6 ML20217B8611998-03-18018 March 1998 Proposed Tech Specs 5.2 & 5.11.2,changing Title of Shift Supervisor to Shift Manager ML20217B8241998-03-18018 March 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Re Requirements for Alternate Shutdown Panel & Associated Auxiliary Feedwater Panel ML20217P2041998-03-0303 March 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Revising TS 2.6 & Basis by Replacing Refs to TS 3.5(4) W/Refs to TS 5.19 ML20199L7291998-01-30030 January 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Deleting Section 3.E Re License Term ML20199L8951998-01-30030 January 1998 Proposed Tech Specs,Reflecting Relocation of pressure-temp Curves,Predicted Radiation Induced NDTT Shift Curve & LTOP Limits to FCS Unit 1 RCS PT Limits Rept ML20202B0931998-01-30030 January 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Section 2.5 Re Steam & Feedwater Sys ML20203G4311997-12-11011 December 1997 Proposed Tech Specs,Adding New LCO to TS 2.15 Pertaining to Inoperable ESF Logic Subsystem ML20199K1391997-11-21021 November 1997 Proposed Tech Specs 5.19 Re Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program ML20217G4601997-10-0303 October 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Pages Revising TS Surveillance 3.9, Auxiliary Feedwater Sys, to Clarify What Flow Paths Are Required to Be Tested & Delete Specific Discharge Pressure ML20211N7591997-10-0202 October 1997 Rev 0 to Fort Calhoun Station Unit 1 Operating Instruction, OI-ES-3, Engineered Safeguard Controls Normal Mode 1,2 & 3 Alignment Check ML20211N7521997-09-21021 September 1997 Rev 2 to Fort Calhoun Operations Dept Policy & Directive OPD-6-04, Annunciator Marking ML20211N7471997-09-12012 September 1997 Rev 2 to Fort Calhoun Operations Dept Policy & Directive OPD-6-08, Plastic Label Usage ML20211N7661997-08-25025 August 1997 Rev 4 to Fort Calhoun Station Unit 1 Annunciator Response Procedure ARP-1, APR-1 Annunciator Response Procedure ML20211N7411997-08-24024 August 1997 Rev 0 to Fort Calhoun Operations Dept Policy & Directive OPD-5-14, Test Monitor Program ML20196J0851997-07-25025 July 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Implementing Option B of 10CFR50,App J & Allowing Frequency of Conducting ILRT & Local Leak Rate Testing to Be Based on Component Performance ML20137Y1801997-04-17017 April 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Administrative Changes to License DPR-40 ML20137H4941997-03-26026 March 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Incorporating Addl Restrictions on Operation of MSSVs ML20138L4361997-02-20020 February 1997 Proposed Tech Specs 5.0 Re Administrative Controls ML20134J6841997-01-20020 January 1997 Rev 5,Change a to Security Training & Qualification Program LIC-96-0183, Proposed Tech Specs 5.0 Re Administrative Controls & Table of Contents1996-11-20020 November 1996 Proposed Tech Specs 5.0 Re Administrative Controls & Table of Contents ML20129E5161996-10-24024 October 1996 Proposed Tech Specs 4.3.2,regarding Reactor Core & Control to Allow Use of Either Zircaloy or ZIRLO Cladding Proposed Additional Reference to Westinghouse Topical Report, WCAP-12610-P-A, Vantage + Fuel Assembly Rept ML20129C2621996-10-22022 October 1996 Proposed Tech Specs 5.0 Re Administrative Controls & 5.9.5 Re Core Operating Limits Rept LIC-96-0125, Proposed Tech Specs Revising Paragraph 2.B(2) of License to Allow Use of Source Matl as Reactor Fuel.Ts 4.3.2 Revision Would Include Depleted U in Describing Reactor Core1996-08-23023 August 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Revising Paragraph 2.B(2) of License to Allow Use of Source Matl as Reactor Fuel.Ts 4.3.2 Revision Would Include Depleted U in Describing Reactor Core ML20115G0041996-07-15015 July 1996 Proposed Tech Specs 4.3.2 Re Reactor Core & Control ML20112D3211996-05-31031 May 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Re LCO for Trisodium Phosphate & Increasing Min Required Amount of Trisodium Phosphate Contained in Containment Sump Mesh Baskets ML20117H6981996-05-20020 May 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Clarifying Surveillance Test Requirements Found in TS 3-1,Tables 3-1,3-2,3-3 & 3-3A ML20117H5931996-05-17017 May 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Relocating Operability Requirements for Shock Suppressors (Snubbers) to USAR & or Plant Procedures & Incorporating Snubber Exam & Testing Requirements Into TS 3.3 ML20129C5351996-03-0101 March 1996 Rev 0 to Incore Instrumentation Operability Requirements ML20097C3081996-02-0101 February 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Allowing Increase in Initial Nominal U-235 Enrichment Limit of Fuel Assemblies That May Be Stored in Spent Fuel Pool LIC-96-0008, Proposed Tech Specs Placing Sirw Tank Low Level Channels in Bypass Rather than Tripped Condition1996-01-22022 January 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Placing Sirw Tank Low Level Channels in Bypass Rather than Tripped Condition ML20108A7161995-12-19019 December 1995 Rev 7 to CH-ODCM-0001, ODCM, Incorporating TS Amend 171 for Section 3.1 Update/Reflect Changing Environ ML20094N8631995-11-16016 November 1995 Proposed Tech Specs,Adding LCO & Surveillance Test for Safety Related Inverters & Deleting Nonsafety Related Instrument Buses ML20092G0771995-09-0606 September 1995 Proposed Tech Spec 2.7,extending Allowed Outage Time from 7 Days Per Month to 7 Days W/ Addl Once Per Cycle 10 Day Allowed Outage Time ML20091P4011995-09-0101 September 1995 Rev 3 to Fort Calhoun Station ISI Program Plan Third Ten-Yr Interval 1993-2003 ML20087E0281995-08-0404 August 1995 Proposed Tech Specs Reducing Minimum Operable Containment Radiation High Signal Channels ML20086D5341995-06-27027 June 1995 Proposed Tech Specs Re Reformation & Clarification of TS Re Chemical & Vol Control Sys ML20091G3601995-06-26026 June 1995 Proposed Tech Specs Re Extension of Allowed Outage Time for an Inoperable Low Pressure SI Pump ML20086D3851995-06-26026 June 1995 Proposed Tech Specs Re Audit Frequencies for Plant QA Program ML20085M0081995-06-15015 June 1995 Rev 2 to ISI Program Plan for 1993-2003 Interval ML20084G7751995-05-31031 May 1995 Proposed Tech Specs,Requesting Amend to Provide Addl Restrictions on Operation of CCW Sys Heat Exchangers ML20083C0091995-05-0808 May 1995 Proposed Tech Specs,Incorporating Proposed Revs Per GL 93-05 to Specs 2.3,3.1,3.2,3.3 & 3.6 ML20087G9691995-04-0707 April 1995 Proposed Tech Specs Re Relocation of Axial Power Distribution Figure for License DPR-40 ML20082J0851995-04-0707 April 1995 Proposed Tech Specs Re Administrative Changes to License DPR-40 ML20108A7121995-03-15015 March 1995 Rev 6 to CH-ODCM-0001, ODCM, Incorporating New TS Amend 164 ML20080S0291995-03-0101 March 1995 Proposed Tech Specs Reflecting Administrative Revs to TS 5.5 & 5.8,per GL 93-07 & Revs Unrelated to GL 93-07 to TS 2.5, 2.8,2.11,3.2 & 3.10 1999-05-26
[Table view] |
Text
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-P.0 . LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.15 Instrumentatio. and Control Systems l
Applicability Applies to plant instrumentation systems.
Objective-To delineate thegonditions 'of the plant instrumentation and
- control' systems necessary to assure reactor safety.
Specifications The-operability of the plant instrument and control syste=s shall
.be in accordance with Tables 2-2 through 2-6.
~
In the event the number of channels of' a particular system in
. service falls one below the total number of four channels, the inoperable channel shall be pla.:ed in either the bypassed or tripped condition within eight leurs. For the purpose of testing and maintenance, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> from time of initial. less of operability; however, if -
the inoperability is determined as the result of malfunctioning
- RTD's or nuclear detectors supplying signals to the high power level, thermal margin / low pressurizer pressure, axial power distribution, and high rate trip-vida log trip units, these
- channels may be bypassed for up to T days from time of initial loss of operability. .If the inoperable channel is not restored to operable status after the allowable times for bypass, it shall be placed-in the tripped position. If required for active mainte-nance and surveillance testing to establish operability and place a channel back in service, the trip unit may be installed and by-
. passed after the 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or 7 day period, whichever is appli-cable.
In the event the number of channels of a particular system in service falls to the limits given in the column entitled " Minimum Operable Channels", one of the inoperable channels must be placed in the tripped position at the time of initial loss of oper-ability. The second inoperable channel, for purposes of testing and' maintenance, may be bypassed for up to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. If the channel has not been restored to operable status after h8 hours, the reactor'shall be placed in a hot shutdown condition within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />; however, operation can continue without containment iso-lation_ signals available if the ventilation isolation valves are closed. If after 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> from time of initiating a hot shutdown procedure the inoperable channel has not been restored to oper-able status, the reactor shall be placed in a cold shutdown condition vithin 2h hours.
~ Amendment No. $, 20, 54 2-65 ATTACIMENT A 8107230151 810722 l PDR ADOCK 05000205 rs PDR,
2.0 LIMITIUG CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.15 Instrumentation and Control Systems (Continued) in the event the number of channels of a particular system in service falls below the limits given in the columns entitled
" Minimum Operable Channels" or " Minimum Degree of Redundancy",
except as conditioned by the column entitled " Permissible Bypass Conditions", -the reactor shall be placed in a hot shutdown con-dition within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />; however, operation can continue without containment isolation signals available if the ventilation iso-lation valves are closed. If minimum conditions are not met within 2h hours, the reactor shall be plcced in a cold shutdown condition within 2h hours.
If, during power operation, the rod block function of the second-ary CEA position indicatien system and rod block circuit are inoperable for more than 2h hours, or the plant computer PDIL alarm, CEA group deviation alarm and the CEA sequencing function are inoperable for more than h8 hours, the CEA's shall be with-drawn and maintained at fully withdrawn and the control rod drive system mode switch shall be maintained in the off position except when manual motion of CEA Group 4 is required to control axial power distribution.
Basis During plant operation, the complete instrumentation systems will normally be in service. Reactor safety is provided by the re-actor protection system, which automatically initiates appro-priate acticn to prevent exceeding established limits. Safety is not compromised, however, by continuing operation with certain instrumentation channels out of service since provisions were made for this in the plant design. This specification outlines limiting conditions for operation necessary to preserve the effectiveness of the reactor control and protection system when any one or more of the channels are out of service.
All reactor protection and almost all engineered safety feature channels are supplied with sufficient redundancy to provide the capability for channel test at power, except for backup channels such as derived circuits in engineered safeguards control system.
When one of the four channels is taken out of service for mainta-nance, the protective system logic can be changed to a two-out-of-three coincidence for a reactor trip by bypassing the removed channel. If the bypass is not effected, the out-of-service channel (Power Removed) 2-65a
y2
[9. ,-
.. TABLE'2-2 i
" Instrument Operating Requirements-for Reactor Protective System Test,-
Minimum Minimum. Permissible. Maintenance Operable .De' gree of - Bypass .& Inoperable L No .- Functional Unit Channels Redundancy Condition Bypass -
, 11 Manual (Trip Buttons) 1.. None' - None N/A 2 ~High-Power /Avel
-2(b)(c) -1(C)- Thermal Power Input.(e)(f)
Bypa,ssed Below 4% of Rated-
- Power (a)(d) 3' ;Ther=al Margin /Lov a2(D)' 1 - Below 10-45 (e)(f) s ,
, ; Pressurizer Pressure- Eated Power ( (d) y dL High Pressurizer. 2(b) 1 None (e)
. Pressure.
s
-5 Low R.C. Flow 2(b) . 1 Below:10 A% (e)
Rated Power (oa (d)
'6. = Low Steam Generator- 2/s e 1/ Steam None -(e)
Water Level Gen {DpL Gen 7 Low Steam Generator. . 2/Stegn. 1/ Steam . Below 550 psia (e)
Pressure Gen (b). Gen (a)(d) ,
8- lContainment High 2(b) - 1' During Leak Test (e)'
Pressure 9l Axial Power Dis- 2(b)(c) 1(c)- Belov 15% of Rated '(e)(f)
_'tribution Power i
"10~ High Rate Trip . 2 1 Below 10-N% and (e)(f)
Wide Range Log.
Channels Above15%o{a)
Rated Power
_11 Loss' of Load 2(b) 1 Below 15% of Rated (e)
Power Ea' : Bypass automatically removed.
b : One' of the inoperable channels must be in the tripped condition at time of initial loss of operability. - If second channel is inoperable after h8 hours a unit shutdcvn must be initiated.
e' If two channels are -inoperable, load shall be reduced to 70% or less of rated power.
d- For low pcwer physics testing this trip may be bypassed up to 10-15 of rated
, power.
e' Channel may be in bypass for up to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> from time of initial loss of
~ operability.
I 2-67 Change No. 7 February 28, 1974
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. TABLE 2 '(Continued).
.I 4
g - f; - If inoperable channel determined to be: caused by malfunctioning RTD's or Jr - '
1 .nucl ear. detectors the channel.may be bypassed for up to 7' days from time of initial loss of ' operability.
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TABLE 2-3 Instrument Operating Requ'irements' for Engineered Safety Features Test, Minimum. : Minimum . Permissible Maintenance '
s Operable. Degree of Bypass & Inoperability
'No.
- Functional Unit _ Channels Redundancy Conditions Bypass
/ "l'-~ Safety Injection
, [A Manuali :1 'None' None N/A
- B High Containment.
Pressure'A- 2(")(d) ,1- During Leak Test (f)'
B. -2(a)(d)
' C '- ' Pressurizer Low /' .
2(a)(d)-- (f)
~
Low Pressure A ~ Reactor Coolant
- B' -2(a)(d): 1 Pressure Less Than 1700 psia (b)
- 2' Containment Spray-t .-
A JManual. 1 Hone: None N/A IB- High Containmenti sPressure'A. 2(a)(c)(d) 1 During Leak Test (f)
B 2(a)(c)(d) 1 C. ~ Pressurizer Low /
Low A 2(a)(c)(d) 1 Reactor Coolant (f)
~
B- 2(a)(c)(d) 1 Pressure Less Than 1700 psia (b)
~
'3:
-Recirculation
-As. Manual--
1 Hone None N/A SB- SIRW Tank. Low Level'A 2(a)(d) 1 None- (f)
B 2(a)(d) 1
~~h IEmergeney Off-Site Power Trip Al ~. Manual' 1(e) None None (f)
'B- . Emergency Bus. Low Voltage (Each Bus)
~
- Loss of Voltage 2((d) 1 Reactor Coolant (f)
--Degraded Voltage 2 a)(d) 1 Temperature Less
, Than 300 F r a' - A'and B actuation circuits each have 4 channels.
b Auto removal. of bypass . above 1700 psia.
7 c Coincident high containment pressure and pressurizer low / low pressure signals required for initiation of containment spray.
Amendment No. 41 2-68
_, i* ..:.
1 .
m ' TABLE 2-3 '-
(Continued)
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id: One of th'e inoperable, channels must-be in the tripped condition'at time
- of. initial: loss of operability. ~
If.second channel is inoperable after
, .kB hours.a unit' shutdown must be initiated.
._ .e Control. switch on incoming breaker.. ..
' f. ' Channel may be' bypassed for .up to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> from time of initial loss of operability.
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DISCUSSION A revis w of the four channel RPS and ESFAS for four channel in-dependence was requested by the NRC to determine if long term operation of a 2-out-of-3 logic configuration is acceptable. The investigation was to determine independence based on both physical and electrical separation. ~If the review revealed that sufficient channel independence
> did-not exist, a change to the Technical Specifications (TS) should be initiated.
As a result of the review at the Fort Calhoun Station, the proposed change-to the TS is being submitted. The proposed TS change would allow for a channel to be bypassed for up to h8 hours for the purposes of
- testing and maintenance. If the inoperable channel is due to malfunc-tioning of the hot and cold leg RTD's or nuclear detectors, the channel may be bypassed for up to.7 days from time of initial loss of oper-ability.
The Fort Calhoun Station RPS and ESFAS are composed of four channels.
These channels are povered from a two battery-two bus system with each channel having a separate AC power inverter. The RPS cabinets in the main control room panels are separated by partitions for fire protection; however, the panel allows for an associated circuit to be routed with another protective channel. Cabling from the panels is routed with maintained separation by trays through the cable spreading room initially and then through separate trays or conduit to the destinatie+. site.
Within containment, a possibility exists that a high energy line break could disable two redundant safety-related transmitters; however, out-side of containment the cables are not routed near high energy lines.
The TS changes are broken into the h8-hour and 7-day bypass cate-gories. These we'e chosen because of the following:
- 1. Bypassing of a channel for up to kB hours for the purpose of testing and maintenance has been approved for other four channel CE systems because they exhibit some independence.
Since the Fort Calhoun Station is a four channel CE system similar to the other units, the h8-hour bypass should be justified by precedent.
- 2. The T-day bypass is for the channels with inputs from the RTD's in the main coolant piping and the nuclear detectors. A review of each revealed the following:
- a. The RTD's in the main coolant piping could only be lost in the unlikely event of the main coolant line breaking.
There are no other high energy lines located near the main coolant piping.
- b. The nuclear detectors are housed in receptacles imbedded in concrete housing the core with maximum separation being maintained as shown in the FSAR Figure 7 5-1. The cables from the detectors are separately routed from each other, including separation at the containment pene-tration areas.
ATTACHMENT B
With these elements being located in unaccessible areas
. during operation, the 7-day bypass vould allow for thorough
- coordination and preparation fs- , heir repair or replacement.
. Because of the previous demot sted relisbility of the DC I batteries, a failure of the batteries during this 7 day period would be highly unlikely. Therefore, it is the opinion of the District that because of the increased separation and high reliability of these parameters, there would be no increased probability Cf accident during this 7 day period.
Due to the hardware installation, 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> is allowed to place channels into the tripped condition. Since some channels do not have bypass keys and bypass or trip of those channels must be ' effected by viring changes, 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> is alJoved fcr safe bypassing or tripping of the channels.
Provision is made to place a trip unit in bypass for active maintenance or surveillance testing after the h8 hours or 7 days has expired to prove operability. Hardware restrictions require channels to be bypassed to energize test functions.
The proposed change does not constitute an unreviewed safety 4 question. Since there are no equipment or setpoint changes being implemented by the proposed license changes, there is:
- 1. No probability of increased' occurrence or consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated.
- 2. No possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report being created.
- 3. No reduction in the margin of cafety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifications.
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FEE JUSTIFICATION a
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The proposed amendment is deemed to be Class.III, within the meaning of 10 CFR 170.22. It addresses-a single safety issue and does-
- not involve a significant. hazard . consideration.
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1 ATTACHttENT C