ML20003G047
| ML20003G047 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone, Calvert Cliffs, Palisades, Saint Lucie, Maine Yankee, Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 09/12/1978 |
| From: | Conner E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18046B409 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-7089, NUDOCS 8104280131 | |
| Download: ML20003G047 (5) | |
Text
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O ENCL.0SURE 1 umTED *T/.T E:
f
-;e, NUCLEAR REGULATORY cC*a".*lss1CN
.5 3. E'7 #,' -.'3 WASHINGTON. D. C, 70555 September 12, 1978 Dockets !!as.:
50-255, 50-285, 50-309, 50-317, 50-318, 50-335 and 50-336 LICENSEES:
BALTIt10P.E GAS & ELECTRIC C0t:PAtiY (BG&E), CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY (CP), FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT C0!'PANY (FP&L), itAINE YAt:KEE AT0t1IC P0'c!ER COMPAUY (MYAP), NORTHEAST t!UCLEAR Et:ERGY COMPANY (NilECO), AND OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT (OPPD)
FACILITIES: CALVERT CLIFFS UNITS tiOS.1/2, FORT CALHOUN, MAINE YANKEE, MILLSTONE UNIT NO. 2, PALISADES AND ST. LUCIE UNIT tt0. 1.
SUBJECT:
111NUTES OF MEETING HELD ON AUGUST 2,1978 WITH THE ABOVE LICENSEES TO DISCUSS THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS)
CHANNEL IN0PERABILITY.
A meeting was held on August 2,1978 with the above licensees and representatives of Combustion Engineering (CE) to discuss the length of tima a single failed RPS char.nel should be bypassed before requiring it to be tripped. Attachment.1 is a list of attendees.
The NRC made opening remarks (fi. Conner) and a hkstory of thc inoperable RPS channel subject (J. Burdoin).
In a similar meeting on March 16, 1976, we determined that the RPS had been reviewed and approved for a two-out-of-four logic only.
In a followup letter to each facility, we requested that each license propose Technical Specifications (TS) to include a failed RPS to be placed in'the tripped condition within one hour.
!!e also stated that we would undertake a detailed review of the particular RPS that could result in a two-out-of-three trip logic requirement.
NNECO (A. Roby) pointed out that they wil'1 be the lead spokesmen on this subject.
His important comments were:
1.
The flRC approved the RPS design at the operating license stage.
2.
There is no change in the requirements of the revised IEEE applicable standards.
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. 3.
They don't believe this tc be a safety ccncer..
4.
titlEC0 believes that events following an inadvertent reactor shutdown,because of operating with one RPS channel tripped, might be a greater problem than one channel bypassed.
5.
The licensees do not agree with this requirement.
6.
They believe this should be a generic issue for all facilities.
We next had a general discussion of the agenda items (Attachment 2).
We asked FP&L and BG&E if the TS authorizing 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> to repair an inoperable RPS channel had affected their operating efficiency.
FP&L (G. Shamblin) stated that St. Lucie has not experienced any RPS failure that has resulted in outage time.
BG&E (R. Olson) said he had not checked into such records for the Calvert Cliffs units. MYAP (J. Garrity) said it must result in a definite value impact.
The f1RC (D. Tondi) discussed agenda items 1 and 2 pointing out that the RPS's at Calvert Cliffs and St. Lucie do not have adequate separation to justify a two-aut-of-three system. He also stated that he saw no evidence that the other CE designed facilities would meet this criteria. The staff (J. Burdoin) presented notes on the RPS channel separation inspection of Calvert Cliffs (Attachment 3).
After a utility caucus, the licensees requested:
1.
That we continue the plant RPS inspections to determine if a two-out-of-three logic was justified; and 2.
That we consider this a long term generic issue for all facilites.
The staff (D. Tondi) said we would schedule the visits to begin within one month. Since the containments should be accessible for the RPS inspection, we discussed visiting Maine Yankee first. The staff (M. Conner) committed to schedule the visits and notify each licensee of such scheduling.
hr: ^1 E.L. Conner, Project Manager Operating Reactors Branch #4 Division of Operating Reactors Attachments:
1.
List of Attendees 2.
Agenda 3.
RPS Channel Separation at Calvert Cliffs
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O ATTACH!iENT 1 MEETING HELD Oil 8/2/78 HITH CE FACILITIES 0: RPS NRC G
it. Conner D. Sente11 D. Tondi R. Bockhorst D. Thatcher J. McGough BG&E D. Brinkman
.'J. Burdoin R. Olson i
S. Breon R. Silver FP&L G. Shamblin CP, D. Hoffman F. Butler MYAP J. Garrity G. Dowd P. Yandow N. Pillsbury OPPD B. Hickle S. Khan G. Peterson NNECO R. Kacich E. Farrell H. Haynes J. Clark A. Roby O
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I ATTACHliEf:T 2
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RPS CHANiiEL Tit 0PERABit.ITY HEETillG AGEfDA AUGUST 2,1978
SUBJECT:
REACTOR PROTECTIO t SYSTEM (RPS) CHAfillEL Ift0PEPACILITY I
1.
Single failure criteria as it applies to two penetration areas and as it applies to energizing RPS channels from redundant vital buses, for 2-out-of-3 system.
2.
Separation / single failure in CE RPS cabincts as it applies to terminal blocks, logic units and co=on wireways in bottom of cabinets.
3.
Separation of Conduit routing for RPS.
4.
Separation of cable tray routing for RPS.
5.
System reviewed as a 2-out-of-4 system and not reviewed as a 2-out-of-3 system.
6.
Millstones RPS is functionally identical to Calvert Cliffs.
7.
Operating experience as it applies to frequency and duration of j
RPS channel outage.
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ATTACHMENT 3 RPS - CHAfit!EL SEPARATION CALVERT CLIFFS 1.
Separation of Sensors 2.
Sensing Lines & Transmitters in Containment are Vulnerable to Pipe Whip, Jet Impingement and Other High Energy Events 3.
Conduit for Circuits from Transmitters in Containment, Ditto Item 2 above 4.
Circuitry Termination at RPS Panel
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5.
Separation at Penetrations 6.
Separation in Cable Spreading Areas 7.
Split in Logic Matrix to Eliminate Consequences of a Hot Short on l
Scmm Actuate Relays (K
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8.
Sensor Channels:
a) Pressurizer b) RWST Level c) Steam Generator Level & Pressure d) Ex-core Neutron Detectors i
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