ML20008E014
| ML20008E014 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/21/1980 |
| From: | METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20008E012 | List: |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-SP, NUDOCS 8010240060 | |
| Download: ML20008E014 (28) | |
Text
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Docket No. 50-289 Restart Licensee's Exhibit No.
TMI-l EMERGENCY FEEDWATEP SYSTEM 0 0102400GD
d OUTLLVE The purposes and objectives of this exhibit are to describe the Emergency Feed-water System at TMI-1, and thereby to support Licensee's answers to Board Question 6 on Emergency Feedwater Reliability. The exhibit describes the EW system prior to recent modifications, the restart modifications being made to the TMI-1 EW system, and the long-term modificacions planned for the system.
The exhibit discusses the reliability of the EW system both before and af ter these modifications, and compares the system against the General resign Criteris directly applicable to the system design.
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INDEX P,age A.
Susanary Description of Pre-Modified Emergency Feedwater (EN) 1 Systen.
1.
Overall Configuration.......................
1 2.
Suction.
1 3.
Pumps and Discharge Crosstie.
1 4.
Flow Control Valves.
2 5.
Steam Supply for the EFW Iurbine.
2 6.
Support Systems and Backup Water Source.
3 7.
Power Source.
4 8.
Instrumentation and Control.......
4 9.
Operator Actions................
5 B.
TMI-l EFW System Restart Modifications.
6 1,
Emergency Feedwater System Auto Start--Control Grade.
6 2.
EFW Flow Indication in the Control Room.
6 3.
Change of Failure Mode of EFF Flow Control Valves.
6 i
4.
Manual Control of EFW Flow Independent of the Integrated Control System.
6 5.
Two Hour Air Supply for EFW System Controls.
7 6.
Condensate Storage Tank Low-Low Level Alarm in Control Room.
7 7.
OTSG Level in Control Room Independent of the Integrated Control System, ICS.
7 C.
EFW Requirements for Small Break LOCA..
8 D.
Improvements to EFW System Reliability.
8 1.
Availability of EFW Supply to Each OTSG.
8 i
2.
Capability of EFW Flow Control.
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4 INDEX (Continued)
P,., age, i
3.
Reduction of the Possibility of OTSG Overcooling and Overfill Conditions.....
9 4
i 4.
Condensate Storage Tank Level Alarm.
9 E.
Reliability Evaluations....
9 F.
THI-l Long Term E W System Modifications............
10 References..
12 Figures Table l
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TMI-l Emergency Feedwater System A.
Summarv Description of Pre-Modified Emergency Feedwater (EFW) System 1.
Overall Configuration A diagram of the TMI-l Emergency Feedwater System (EFWS) prior to the modifications is presented in Figure 1.
The system consists of two feed trains supplied by one turbine-driven pump and two motor-driven pumps with common suction sources. This system could feed emergency feedwater to either or both steam generators under automatic initiation of the turbine-driven pump or manual initiation of the motor-driven pumps by the operator when steam pressure was not available and provided that the loss of off-site power did not occur concurrent with ESAS actuation.
2.
Suction The primary water source for the EFWS consists of two interconnected condensate storage tanks. Each tank has a capacity of 250,000 gal-lons; each tank is required by Technical Specifications to contain a minimum of 150,000 gallons for EFW use.
A common suction header for all three EFWS pumps is supplied with water via two 10-inch lines frem the two condensate storage tanks.
These lines contain normally-open AC motor-operated valves (CO-V10A and B), and check valves (CO-V16A and B).
J Another water source is the 165,000 gallon condenser hoewell. Water can be acquired from this source by manually opening either air-operated valve CO-V8 or AC motor operator valve CO-V12 and breaking condenser vacuum by opening AC motor operated valve VA-V8.
A backup source of river water is available via the Reactor Building Emergency Cooling Pumps. This source is described in Section 6.
The common suction header contains normally-open AC motor-operated sectionalizing valves (EF-VlA and B)..
The suction connection for each pump contains a flow element for use in controlling recirculation flow, locked open valves, and strainers.
3.
Pumos and Discharge Crosstie Emergency feedwater is supplied to a common discharge crosstie by three pumps:
a turbine-driven pump (EF-P1) and two motor-driven pumps (dF-P2A and B).
The turbine-driven pump is rated at 920 gal-lons per minute at 1020 p.sig with the recirculation control valve closed. Each motor-driven pump is rated at 460 gallons per minute l
at 1020 psig, with the recirculation control valves closed.
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A recirculation line is provided for each pump. This path consists of a 2-inch line (for IF-P1) or a 1 1/2 line (for EF-P2A and B) containing a check valve, an air-operated control valve, a flow orifice and a normally-open valve. All three recirculation lines are connected to a conson recirculation line.
Recirculation for each pump is controlled by a flow element in the pump suction line which provides a signal to the air-operated recirculation control valve. As pump suction flow decceases below a certain point, the control valves open to maintain a minimum recirculation. The control valves fail open on loss of control air. However, with these valves fully open, pump EF-P1 can continue to provide a flow of 385 GPM to each steam generator (total flow of 770 GPM) and either pump EF-P2A or EF-P2B, can provide a 400 GPM discharge (total flow of 800 GPM when both motor-driven pumps are operating).
Each motor-driven pump discharges to a common discharge crosstie via check valves and normally-open valves. The turbine-driven pump discharges directly to the crosstie between normally-open AC motor-operated sectionalizing valves (EF-V2A and B).
The crosstie permits any of the three pumps to feed either or both of the steam genera-tors through a piping system that is independent of the normal main feedwater system.
4.
Flow Control Valves The flow of emergency feedwater to each steam generator (A&B) is controlled by air-operated modulating flow control valves EF-V30A and EF-V30B respectively.
Positioning of these valves is via electric to pneumatic converters that receive control signals from the Integrated Control System (ICS). The valves are modulated to maintain desired steam generator water levels at their respective steam generator. These valves fail half open on loss of electric control signal and f ail "as-is" on loss of instrument air. Control for these valves is described further in Section 8.2.
The valves are also interlocked with pressure switches so that emergency feedwater (and main feedwater) is cut cff to a given steam generator if a low pressure (less than 600 psig) is detected within that generator.
5.
Steam Supp1v for the EFW Turbine Steam for the EFW turbine is obtained from a crosstie between the two main steam lines from each steam generator upstream of the main stream isolation valves (MSIV). The steam supply line from each steam generator contains a normally-open AC motor-operated valve (MS-V2A or 2B) and a check valve (MS-V9A or 9B). Also con-nected to the steam lines are the ICS-controlled atmospheric dump valves (MS-V4A & B) and main turbine-bypass. valves.
Ths steam supply lines are connected to the EFW turbine inlet line via a network of steam admission valves.
As shown in Figure 1,
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steam can be admitted to the EFW turbine by automatic opening either of the air-operated valves MS-V13A or MS-7138 or by manual opening either of the DC motor-operated valves MS-V10A or MS-V10B. The air-operated valves are in 2-inch lines whi' h are designed to admit c
a sufficient quantity of high pressure steam to permit a smooth startup of the turbine and avoid turbine overspeed. The air-operated valves are opened automatically by the EFWS initiation logic discussed in Section 8.1.,
The air-operated valves are interlocked to prevent their opening if steam pressure in the corresponding steam generator is below 100 psig. Valve MS-V13A opens preferentially; if Steam Generator A pressure is above 100 psig, MS-V13A will open on initiation and MS-V13B will remain closed. MS-V13B opens only if there is low pressure in Steam Cenarator A and the pressure in Steam Generator B is above 100 psig. Low pressure in both steam generators will cause both valves to remain closed.
As decay heat is removed and steam generator pressures decrease to 200 psig, it may become desirable to obtain a less restrictive steam admission path to the turbine. This can be accomplished by manually
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opening either of the two DC motor-operated valves MS-V10A or MS-V10B which are in 6-inch lines.
The EFWS turbine may also be driven from the 200 psig auxiliary j
boilers if the auxiliary boiler supply is available.
After the steam admission valves, the steam supply to the turbine is regulated by a pressure control valve, MS-V6, that controls steam pressure to 200 psig, to the turbine governor valve. Tuo overpressure relief valves (MS-V22A and 3) are provided with setpoints of 495 and 505 psig, respectively. Turbine exhaust is vented directly to the atmosphera.
6.
Support Systems and Backup Water Source A support system affecting EFWS reliability is the air supply for certain EFWS air-operated valves. The TMI-1 air supply system con-sists of two 60 hp compressors, IA-PIA and IA-PIB.
Power for com-pressor IA-PlA is derived from diesel generator backed 4160 VAC bus "1D".
The power for compressor IA-PIB is derived from diesel generator backed 4160 VAC bus "12".
In an emergency, air can also be supplied from the two station service air compressors SA-PlA/B through valve IA-V1 (open at 75 to 80 psig) provided off-site power l
is available. Under normal conditions instrument air is supplied to the emergency feedwater and turbine plant components by the two main instrument air compressors IA-PIA and IA-PIB.
During loss of off-site power conditions, the main instrument air compressors,will continue to be supplied power from the diesel generators provided an ESAS actuation has not occurred. Under loss of off-site power with concurrent ESAS actuation, these instrument air compressors are automatically shed from the diesel generator.
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When the normal air supply is not available, the key emergency feedwater and turbine plant equipment automatically receives air from back-up 5 hp air compressors and their.80 gal. air reservoirs.
These back-up compressors remain loaded on the diesel generator supplied bus even during loss of off-site power and concurrent ESAS actuation conditions. Compressor IA-P2A feeds a common supply line which provides air to the flow control valves (EF-V30A and B), the atmospheric dump valves (MS-V4A and 4B), the EFW turbine pressure control valve (MS-V6), and the turbine driven pump recirculation control valve (EF-V8B). The other back-up air compressor supplies air to the main turbine bypass valves.
A backup supply of river water is available from the Reactor Build-ing Emergency Cooling pumps. This water supply enters the EFW pump common suction header between sectionalizing valves EF-VlA and EF-V1B.
The backup water supply is shown in Figure 2.
Manual actions are required to access this backup water supply.
Motor-operated valves EF-V4 and EF-V5 are normally kept locked closed and the motor control center breakers for these valves are locked open; these locks must be removed and the breakers closed.
Then an RB emergency cooling pump must be started to satisfy interlocks within EF-V4 and EF-V5.
Finally, these valves must be opened along with pump discharge valves (RR-VIA and B).
7.
Power Source AC power for EFW components necessary to achieve emergency feedwater flow is derived from 4160VAC diesel generator backed busses ID and IE.
All motor-operated valves in the EFW system are AC powered with the exception of MSV-10A and MSV-10B and solenoid actuated MS-V13A and B which are DC powered. All. motor-operated valves are position indicated and controllable from the control room.
The power supply for the inst rument air compressors and service air compressors is described in Section 6.
8.
Instrumentation and Control 8.1 Initiation Logic The emergency turbine driven pump EF-P1 is started automatically either on loss of both main feedwater pumps or on loss of all four reactor coolant pumps. This is accomplished by sensing the differential pressure across the main feedwater pumps and by utilizing contacts from the reactor coolant pump l
power monitors. The EFWS initiation signal will also I
automatically open either air-opersted valve MS-V13A or MS-V13B i
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depending on the upstream steam generator pressure as described in Section 5.
The turbine may also be manually started from the control room console by opening valves MS-V13A or B.
In the case where the turbine driven emergency feed water pump is not available, the two motor-driven pumps must be started manually by an operator. The two motor-driven pumps can be powered from 4160V, ID or 15 engineered safeguards bus as described in Section 7.
8.2 EFWS Flow Control The flow of emergency feedseter to the steam generators is controlled by air-operated control valves EF-V30A and EF-V30B.
These valves modulate the flow to maintain desired steam generator levels under direction of ICS-controlled elec-tric/ pneumatic converters.
If all four RC pumps are tripped, the valves will open and control to the setpoint for RC pump trip.
If at least one RC pump is operating, but both main feedwater pumps have tripped, the valves will open and control to a lower setpoint.
If at least one RC pump and one main feedwater pump is operating, both valves are directed to remain closcd. Manual control of valve position is also available in the ICS from the control room.
Operation of the flow control valves is interlocked with steam line rupture detecting logic. If a steam generator pressure of less than 600 psig is detected by this logic, the respective flow control valve will close to shut off emergency feedwater flow to that steam generator.
8.3 Instrumentation EFWS instrumentation in the control room, in addition to valve positions previously described, includes:
a.
Condensate storage tank level for both tanks.
b.
EFW pump discharge pressure for all three pumps, c.
Steam generator pressure and level for each steam generator.
9.
Operator Actions Several operator actions may be required to maintain flow af ter some interval following system initiation. These actions include opening of valves MS-V10A and MS-V10B to assure a continuing adequate steam supply to the EFWS turbine and opening of CO-V8, CO-V12 and the con-denser vacuum breaker valve if required to obtain EFWS suction from the condenser hotwell. The manual actions described in Section 6 are required to obtain suction from the backup river water source.
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4 B.
TMI-1 EFW System Restart Modifications 1.
Emergency Feedwater System Auto Start-Control Grade The original system design allowed only the turbine driven EFW pump to start automatically on loss of both MFW pumps or loss of four (4) reactor coolant pumps. The motor driven EFW pumps had no provision for automatic starting and they had to be manually started under all conditions. The motor driven pumps were capable of manual starting on loss of offsite power provided ESAS actuation was not present.
The loss of offsite power concurrent with ESAS actuation inhibited starting of the motor driven EFW pumps.
The EFW system, as modified for restart, will automatically start the turbine driven pump and both motor driven pumps upon:
(i) loss of both main feedwater pumps (MFyP's), or (ii) loss of four reactor coolant pumps (RCP's)
(iii) either of the above events with loss of offsite power (iv) either of the above "i" and "ii" events concurrent with ESAS actuation with or without loss of offsite power In addition to the automatic starting, all EFW pumps have the capability to be started manually from the control room. The EFW system, as modified for restart will not result in the lost of the EFW system function durir.g a loss of coolant accident due to a single failure.
2.
EFW Flow Indication in the Control Room The original EFW system design did not have any provision for indication in the control room of EFW flow.
Safety grade redundant indication of EFW flow to each steam generator will be provided in the control room.
The flow instrumentation consists of a pair of flow transducers, corresponding flow display computers (i.e, transmitters) and control room indicators.
3.
Change of Failure Mode of EFW Flow Control Valves In order to assure that EFW can be delivered when required, the failure mode of EFW flow control valves EF-V30A/B has been changed.
In the original system design these valves failed
" half open" on loss of control power and failed "as-is" on loss of instrument air. The change consists of modifications such that on loss of air, the valve will fail in the open position and remain in that position.
4.
Manual Control of EFW Flow Independent of the Integrated Control System, ICS I
Manual control' of the EFW flow to each steam generator independent of the ICS will be provided in the control room.
When this manual control is selected all active components of the ICS are bypassed. The new manual controls will be totally separate from the ICS. Power from the redundant Class 1E power system will be provided to the new controls.
5.
Two Hour Air Supply for EFW System Controls This modification will provide a redundant two hour air supply system that will supply instrument quality air to valves MS-V6 and EF-V30A/B for a two hour period in case of loss of all A.C.
power (i.e., loss of off-site and on-site A.C. power except that of the uninterruptible power sources). Valve EF-V30A will receive power from train A of the air supply system and EF-V30B from train B.
Valve MS-V6 will be provided air from both trains.
6.
Condensate Storaga Tank Low-Low Level Alarm in Control Room The low-low level condition at each of the two condensate storage tanks (CST's) will be annunciated in the control room.
A dedicated annunciator window will be provided for each CST low-low level alarm. The alarm setpoint shall be such that the operator will have a minimum of twenty minutes before any of the CST's is pumped dry, giving the operator ample time to realign the EFW pumps suction to an alternate source of EFW.
The input signal for each alarm will be derived from the respective tank existing level transmitter. The existing level transmitters are not safety grade and have a common power supply.
(A qualified level transmitter (1 per tank) and associated alarm hardware will be added as a part of long term modifications. At that time a separate power supply for each transmitter loop will also be provided.)
7.
OTSG Level in Control Room Independent of the Integrated Control System, ICS Redundant, single failure proof control room indication of each steam generator (OTSG) level will be provided. This indication will be independent of the ICS. The level indication signals will be derived from the level transmitters for Remote Shutdown Panel (RSP) instrumentation.
The level indication will assure that the operator can properly control the OTSG level, via the new manual loaders added for EFW control valves, in the event of ICS/NNI malfunction. All hardware used in this modification will be safety grade.
C.
EFW Requirements for Small Break LOCA The requirements for the emergency feedwater system during a small break LOCA have been addressed in the exhibit 8 to Licensee's testimony on UCS Contention 8.
In summary this information says that:
i) for breaks in which EFW is continuously available a flow of at least 300 gpm EFW is required within 40 seconds of an EFW initiation signal.
ii) for breaks in which EFW is not continuously available, a flow of 550 gpm is required within 20 minutes (subsequently shown to be 500 gpm for a plant of the TMI-l power level).
D.
Improvements to EFW System Reliability As a result of restart modifications on the EFW system, the reliability of the EFW system will be improved in the following areas:
1.
Availability of EFW supply to each OTSG.
As described in previous sections of this exhibit, the original (prior to restart modifications) design of the EFW system had
, the following features:
i Only the turbine driven pump was started automatically by the EFW system initiation logic.
ii Flow control valves EF-V30A/B failed "as-is" on loss of instrument air and were normally closed.
iii.
No EFW flow indication was provided.
The modifications for auto initiation of all three EFW pumps, change of failure mode of control valves from fail "as-is" to i
fail open on loss of instrument air and the provision of i
redundant EFW flow indication for each OTSG provide assurance that adequate EFW flow will be delivered to each OTSG in a timely manner in the events of loss of the turbine driven pump or loss of instrument air.
2.
Capability of EFW Flow Control.
l The capabil'ity for EFW flow control has been improved by the following modifications:
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i)
Provision of a redundant two hour air supply for EFW l
control valves (EF-V30A/B) and the turbine driven pump main steam pressure control valve (MS-V6) in the
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event of loss of all A.C. power. The redundant two hour air supply system will enhance the availability of equipment and control functions associated with the EFW system and hence will improve the system availability, ii) Provision, in the control room, of a separate Class 1E powered manual EFW control station independent of the Integrated Control System (ICS) for each EFW control valve. The addition of a manual control station for each contrui valve will allow the operator to control flow to either OTSG in the event of failaure of the ICS.
J iii)
Addition of redundant OTSG level indication in the control room that is independent of ICS. This redundant OTSG level indication will ensure that the operator has sufficient information on OTSG level for use of the EFW flow manual control station in the event of ICS/NNI malfunction.
3.
Reduction of the Possibility of OTSG Overcooling and Overfill Conditions.
The additions of the backup Class 1E powered manual control station in the control room and the redundant backup two hour instrument air supply for each EFW control valve ensures that control of EFW~ flow will be available in the automatic or manual mode of operation from the control room for prevention of OTSG overcooling and overfill conditions.
4.
Condensate Storage Ta.nk Level Alarm Provision of a low-low level alarm for each condensate storage tank in the control room will give the operator at least twenty minutes warning before any of the condensate storage tanks are pumped dry or result in insufficent available Net Positive Suction Head (NPSM) at the EFW pumps and therefore~give operator ample time to transfer to an alternate water supply.
E.
Reliability Evaluations _
The Babcock & Wilecx Company (B & W) has prepared a report for GPU Service Corporation on the reliability of the EFW system.1 The report was issued in December 1979 and submitted to NRC by letter l
dated February 7,1980 (E&L-2102).
-Based on this, and similar reports generated by B & W for other B &
W plants, B & W produced a generic reliability report for plants with B & W reactors.2
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For TMI-1, the three major component failures which contribute to system unavailability are:,
Failure to obtain emergency feeduster flow because of actuation s.
circuit failures common to both trains.
b.
Potential failure of MS-V6 because of loss of instrument air leading to degraded steam supply and/or turbine overspeed trip.
Potential plugging of EFW pump suction strainers.
c.
As indicated previously, the system design, as modified for restart, will assure adequate air supply to the system control valves and will provide instrumentation and control capability independent of the ICS.
In addition, Licensee has committed to make modifications to protect the EFW turbine drive from valve MS-V6 failing open (see Restart Report, Supplement 1, Part 1, Response to Questinn 10i).
The pump suction strainers have been removed.
Additional failures identified in these reports are the result of operating error and/or maintenance outages. Licensee has revised appropriate procedures to assure protection against loss of system function due to either of these circumstances.
As a result of the previously identified plant modifications and procedural changes Licensee believes the reliability of the EFW system has been improved sufficiently to permic restart of the unit.
Table 1 demonstrates the degree of EFW system compliance with those General Design Criteria of 10CFR50 Appendix A that are directly applicable to the system design. Compliance of the EFW System to the GDC is considered separately for LOCA and all other accidents or transients. Where non-complicance has been identified for a GDC it has not been repeated for instances where that non-compliance would affect compliance to another GDC.
F.
TMI-1 Long Term EFW System Modifications For the long term Licensee has committed to modify the EFW system to Nieve a single failure proof safety grade design.
Included within the u
scope of that effort will be:
1.
Safety grade automatic system start.
2.
Safety grade system flow indication in the control room (being done as a restart modification).
3.
Safety Grade EFW Flow Control System for each OTSG i
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4.
Addition of cavitating venturi in each emergency feeduster line.
5.
Safety Grade Condensate Storage Tank (CST) Low-Low Level Alarm 6.
Safety Grade OTSG High Level Alarm 7.
Safety Grade Isolation of Main Feedwater (MFW) on Overfill of an Affected OTSG 8.
Upgrade the Main Steam Rupture Detection System to Meet Safety Grade Requirements 1
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References 1.
Report, entitled, " Emergency Feedvater System Reliability Analysis for Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1, Revision 1" December 1979 by Babcock & Wilcox Company.
2.
AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEMS RELIABILITY ANALYSES, A Generic Report for Plants With Babcock & Wilcox Reactors, BAW-1584, December 1979.
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+4 Page 1 of 5 Legend P = Partial Compliance 3
C = Comply TABLE I I
Evaluation of THi-! E W System Using the General Design Criteria of 10CHt 50 Appendix A*
l Restart System Rature System item Ng General Design Criteria LOCA Other thCA Other Remarks-1 CDC-2 Capability of st ructures housing the system P
P C
C a.
Licensee has become aware that some of tie valves within the EW system do not fully and the system itself to withstand the ef-f ects of natural phenomena such as earth-satisfy seismic Class ! requirements.
Licensee is reviewing the seismic quellfi-quakes, torsudoes, hurricanes and floods cations for all of Ele EW system valves in appropriate combinations of the effects of normal and accident conditions to determine if any valves or valve com-ponente need replacement to meet the seismic Class ! requirements. 1he E W f
piping system is however designed and qualified to the seismic Class I require-ments.
b.
Itedundant and physically separated condensate storage tanks are provided.
in addition the THI-! EW pumps can take suction f rom alternate water sources, I
namely condensate f rom tie condenser latwell and river water.
- 5%2)
Were non-complicance has been identified for a CDC it has not been repe.sted for instances where that non-compliance would af fect compliance to another CDC.
W b
(l Page 2 of 5 f
I' Legend F = Partial Compliance C = Comply TABLE !
Evaluation of TM1-1 EW System Using the General Design Criteria I
of 10Ctu 50 Appendix A f
Itza Restart System buture System No.
General Design Criteria
_LOCA Other LOCA Other Remarks i
2 CDC-4 L
Capability of structures housing the sys-C P
C C
a.
Licensee is curren ly reviewing thr. qual-tem and the system itself to withstand ifications and operability of the EfW com-4 the effects of external missiles, ponents and the structure housing tie EW internally generated missiles, pipe system under tie conditions of a high energy whip, forces resulting f rom jet impinge-line break in the intermediate building.
ment, and the ef fects of disclarging included in this review is a determination fluids associated with pipe breaks of the environmental qualifications of equipment in response to NRC IEB 79-018.
Maal determination of component qualifica-f tion is not yet complete b.
Licensee has identified that there may be a main feedwater line break location to the "A" OTSC that could whip and break tte EW line to the same OTSC. Licensee is evaluating if this break location meets tie NRC licensing criteria f or determining postulated pipe breaks.
c.
Licensee les identified tint a postulated break in tne main steam supply line to tie EW pump turbine could whip and damage tle common EW pumps discharge line. Licensee is providing a rupture restraint to pre-tect tie EW line f rom the. uin steam line prior to restart of THI-l.
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D* nd,
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P = Partial Compliance i
C = Comply TABl.E I Evaluation of TM1-1 EW System Using tie General Design Criteria of 10CW 50 Appendix A v
[
'i Its>
Restart System Itature System No.
General Design Criteria I.OCA Other thCA Other Remarks 3
CDC-5
(
, l Capability of stered systems and components C
C C
C Tiere are no shared emergency f eedwater t
isportant.to safety, among nuclear power components betwen TM1-1 and THI-2.
I unita, to perf orm their required safety 1
l functions 4
CDC-19 C
P C
C Means for sontrolling the EW system is Capability of system just rtamentation and provided in tie control room. Al te rna te f
control for prompt hot shutdown and sub-shutdown locations for EW control, prior to sequent cold sluitdown of the reactor completion of EW control f rom tie remote f rom the control room and f rom alternate shutdown panel, will be locally at the E W locations outside of the cont rol room regulating valves. An improved and reliable communication system betwen tie control room m
and time EW regulating valve area will be t
provided prior to restart of TM1-1 which will allow tie control room operator to direct tte operator stationed at tie valves.
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Page 4 of 5 l~
Legend i
P = Partial Compliance C = Comply TA8IE I Evaluation of THI-! EN System Using the General Design Criteria of 10C W 50 Appendix A i
Itza Restart System hture System No.
General Design Criteria LOCA Other LOCA Other Remarks k
i E.
5 CDC-44
'/
a.
Capability to transfer heat f rom C
C C
C structures, systems, and com-ponents important to safety, to an ultimate heat sink un-der normal operating and ac-l cident conditions j,
f f
b.
Redundancy in components so C
P C
C Accidents whose consequence include loss of
{
that under accident conditions EW to one OTSG allow only one EW regulating j
the safety function can be per-valve EP-V30 A or B to control the flow.
formed assuming a single active Failure of this valve to open results in component failure. This may be f ailure to automatically or remote manually coincident with the loss of control the E W flow. An operator, may etther of f site or onsite AC however, manually control tie EW regulating power for certain events valve if the intermediate building is habitable.
M Licensee has committed to provide tedundant and diversely powered E W regulating and block valve as a future modification, c.
Capability to isolate components, C
C C
C subsystems, or pig,ing if re-quired so tiut the system safety bh.
I function will be maintained J
r p
b-
(
Page 4 of 5 Legend F = Partial Compliance C = Comply TABLE I Evaluation of TM1-1 EW System Using the General Design Criteria of 10CW 50 Appendix A i
Ites Bestart System Facure System No.
General Design Criteria LOCA Other thCA Other Remarks
?
5 CD0-44 a.
Capability to transfer heat f rom C
C C
C stre-tures, eystems, and com-ponen-ip;artant to safet y, to an uatsmate heat sink un~
t der normal operating and ac-c1 dent condftions I
b.
Redundancy in components so C
P C
C Accidents whose consequence include loss of that under accident conditions E W to one OTSG allow only one E W regulating i
t he sa f et y f unc tion can be per-
. valve EP V30 A or 8 to control the flow.
formed assuming a single active Failure Jf this valve to open results in component fatture. This may be.
f ailure to automatically or remote manually h
)
coincident witti tie loss of control the EW flow. An operator, may eittwr of f site or onsite AC however, manually control tie EW regulating power for certain events valve if the intermediate building is labitable.
Licensee has committed to provide redundant
{
g and diversely powered EW regulating and block valve as a future modification.
M c.
Capability to isolate components, C
C C
C subsystems, or piping if re-quired so that the system safety function will be maintained 7M b
b t
f-
{
Page 4 of 5 Legend P = Partial Compliance C = Comply
~
TABLE I Evaluation of THI-I E FW System Using the General Design Criteria of 10CtR SO Appendix A i
i 4
I Ites Bestart System Future System
~
f No.
General Design Criteria LOCA Other LOCA Other kemarks 5
CDC-44 a.
Capability to tras.ler heat from C
.C C
C structures, systems, and com-ponents important to safety, to an ultimate heat sink un~
der normal operating and ac-cident conditions b.
Redundancy in components so C
P C
C Accidents whose consequence include loss of
~f gFW to one UTSC allow only one EDW regulating 1 152) that under accident conditions the safety function can be per-valve EE'V30 A or B to control the flow.
(',__;}
formed assuming a single active Failure of this valve to open results in c ongouent failure. This may be failure to automatically or remote manually h
])
coincident with the loss of control the E FW flow. An operator, may either of f site or onsite AC however, manually control the E DW regulating power for certain events valve if the intermediate building is tubitable.
Licensee has committed to provide redundant
[__j) and diversely powered EDW regulating and block valve as a f uture modification.
h33dil}
c.
Capability to isolate components, C
C C
C gg subsystems. or piping if re-quired so that the system safety function will be maintained b_
d'
.. +
,4med-% &M' t
a Page 5 of 5 p
I.egend P = Partial Compliance C = Comply TABLE I Evaluation of TMI-! ElW System Using the General Design Criteria of 10CHL 50 Appendia A a
' t I
Itin Restart System Mature System No.
General Design Criteria LOCA Other LOCA Other Remarks 7-6 CDC-45 l
Capabliity and provisions to permit C
C C
C periodic inservice inspection of
(
system component. snd equipment I
7 CDC-46 Capability and provisions to per-C C
C C
mit appropriate functional test-ing of the system and components to assure structural integrity
{
and leak-tightness, operability t-and performance of active com-p ponents, and capability of the integrated system to function as intended during normal, shutdown, C
and accident conditions j
i g
P49 i7 i
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA A NI NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t
do BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
)
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY
)
Docket No. 50-289
)
(Restart)
(Three Mile Island Nuclear
)
Station, Unit No. 1)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of " Licensee's Testimony of Gary R. Capodanno, Louis C.
Lanese and Joseph A. Torcivia in Response to Board Questions 6.a, 6.b, 6.c, 6.g, 6.h, 6.i, 6.j and 6.k" and the accompanying exhibit "TMI-1 Emergency Feedwater System" dated October 21, 1980 were served upon the following by personal delivery at the hearing session in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania on October 21, 1980 and on those identified below with an asterisk by deposit in the U.S.
mail, first class, postage prepaid, this 21st day of October, 1980.
J Thomas A.
Baxter T)9f5
\\\\'
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING SOAR.D In the Matter of
)
)
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY
)
Docket No. 50-289
)
(Restart)
(Three Mile Island Nuclear
)'
Station, Unit No. 1)
)
SERVICE LIST Ivan W. Smith, Esquire
- Jchn A. Isrh, Esquire Cb24 an Assistant Cctr.sel Atanic Safety and %=ing Pennsylvania Public U"4'ity C3:rs'n 3 card Panel Post Of#4 e 3cx 3265 U.S. Nuclear Priciatcry N 4=sion u
d ch_- g, Pennsylvania 17120 a
Washingtc., D.C.
20555 n
Karin W. Carter, Esqcire t::. Walter E. Jordan Assistant At'
.ey Gea.eral Atanic Safety and Licensing 505 Executive Ecuse acad Panel Post Office Scx 2357 881 West Cuter Drive 4
4=h m, Pennsylvarda 17120 Cak Ridge, Tennessee 37830
- Jchn E. Minnich Dr. Linia W. Iittle C24-an, Dauphin C:enty 3 card Atanic Safety and Lie"=ing of r e i=sieners 3 card Panel hi 1"*'_T _n C=enty C c:t'Tuse 5000 Ha-4 tage Drive h and Market Streets Raleigh, n _J1 r=-a14-=
27612 was--4 =hm, Pennsylvania 17101 James R. Totr.=1' t.e, Esquire
- Walte.: W. C:: hen, Esquire Office of the Exec =tive Iagal Diah Censurer Adso:: ate U. S. P_'elae~ Begulatory N 4==icn Office of Constner Abiocate i
Washir p, D.C.
20555 1425 Strawter:y Square 1
W M urg, Pennsylvania 17127 l
- tecketing and Service Sec'#m Cffice of the Secretary l
U. S. Nuclear Pegulatcry N i==#"1 Washi v.ca, D.C..
20555 D *
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" l0 30Y M e e M M JU X/AL l
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- Jordan D. Cc.mingha:n, Esqaire
- Wi l ' ' " S. Je=8.an,
>, Esqc. ire i
AtL..ey fc Nederry hnship A:
.ey fcr Peccle Ac=d _et Naclear T.M.I. Steering C:::mittee Energy 2320 Nor h Sed Street
- Am
-n & Wa4=s
==~ish=g, Pe=sylvania 17110 1725 Eye Street, N.W., Scite 506 Washi. p, D.C.
20006 Theodcre A..M.ler, Esgaire Wideff Paager Selkcwit: & Mler
- Pebert Q. Pol' =-.i Post Office Sex 1547 609 h ge'ier S N
=> ~4=h-g, Pernsylvania 17105 Sal
- 4
- e,.v :yland 21218
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- 5'1'yn R. Weiss, ~@e
- Chauncey Kepferd AttcIney fer the D iCn Cf C " *" **
u M th'E. JChnsred Scient.ists E::vi===e.ntal C-=' i tien en N r'==~
un-,-n & Heiss
?cwer 1725 Sye Street, N.W., Suits 506 433 C ' =-dm.we=e Washingten, D.C.
20006 Stata College, Pennsylvania 16801
- Mars I. Iawis Steven C. Shelly 6504.* ?#c:d Te.. ace 304 South. var.kee Street Mechar e-=hrg, Pemsylvania 17055 Phi' =delphia, Pe=sylvania 19149 d
- Caniel w ta, ~@e
- Marjerie M. Aa::ciit ANGE R. D. 5 32 Scur.h 3eaver Street C::atasv a, Pe=sylvania 19320 d
York, Pennsylvania 17401
- Gail Bradford ANGE 245 West Philadelphia Street
. York, Pennsylvania 17404
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