ML20004F523

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Environ Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment, Technical Evaluation Rept for Unit 2
ML20004F523
Person / Time
Site: Peach Bottom  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 11/30/1981
From: Finkel A
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20004F521 List:
References
IEB-79-01B, IEB-79-1B, NUDOCS 8106190009
Download: ML20004F523 (51)


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ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT IEB 79-01B TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT PEACH BOTTOM 2 DOCKET NO. 50-277 DATED:

NOVEMBER 1980 Licensee: Philadelphia Electric Company Type Reactor: BWR, General Electric Company Size: 1065 MWe e

Prepared by Alan E. Finkel Engineering Support Section Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Branch, RI 8.10 6 l'9 000T+

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e eb 4!b' Contents-Page 1.

Introduction...............................................

1.1 General...............................................

2.

Background and Discussion..................................

2.1 General................................................

2.2 On-Site Verification Inspections......................

2.3 Evaluation of Licensee's Report.......................

3.

General Information........................................

3.1 Identification of Class IE Electrical Equipment.......

3.2 Service Conditions...................................

3.3 -Qualification Documentation...........................

4.

Technical' Evaluation.......................................

4.1 Identification of Safety Related Equipment............

4.2 Master List...........................................

4.3 Service Conditions....................................

4.3.1 Inside Containment LOCA.....................

4.3.1.1 Radiation..............................

4.3.1.2 Submergence............................

4.3.1.3 Chemical Spray.........................

4.4 High Energy Line Breaks (HELB)........................

4.4.1 HELB Inside Containment.....................

4.4.2 HELB Outside Containment....................

4.4.3 Recirculated Fluids.........................

4.5 Margins...............................................

4.6 Aging.................................................

-4.7 Documentation.........................................

4.8 Site Verification Inspection..........................

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-4.9 Equipment Data Review.................................

4.10 Conclusions...........................................

5.

1<4:ensee Ennt Reports (LERs)..............................

6.

References................................................

Appendiy A, Test Reports and Analysis Lists................

Appendix B, Equipment Status Lists.........................

Appendix C, Licensee's Exceptions..........................

Appendix D, TMI Modifications..............................

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.1.

Introduction 1.1 General The NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement (I/E) issued Bulletin 79-01B, " Environmental Qualification of Class lE Equipment" in January 1980.

This bulletin required the licensee to perform a detailed evaluation of the environmental qualification on Class lE electrical equipment required to function under postulated accident conditions and to submit a report on this action.

This document is a report on the evaluation of the licensee's response to this bulletin.

2.

Background and Discussion 2.1 General TF' evaluation of the licensee's response was accomplished by per-foiming an on-site inspection of selected class lE equipment and by examining the licensee's report for completeness and technical accuracy.

The licensee's report used in this evaluation is dated October 31, 1980, and therefore, does not include the response to the bulletin supplement which was iss";d on 9/30/80 in the form of Generic Questions and Answers.

2.2 On-Site Verification Inspections The on-site inspection, made on selected IE equipment, verified proper i

installation of equipment, o"erall interface integrity, location with respect to flood level for

,uipment inside the containment, and manufacturers nameplate data.

The manufacturer and model number from the nameplate data was compared to information given in the Component Evaluation Work Sheets (CES) of the licensee's report.

If any discrepancies were noted between the installed equipment and the correspondent equipment addressed in the licensee's report, they are discussed in Section 4.8 of this report.

The site inspection is documented by report number 50-277/80-17.

2.3 Evaluation of Licensee's Report Each component as addressed on the Component Evaluation Work Sheets (CES) of the licensee's report was examined for completeness and accuracy to the criteria given in the bulletin.

This examination assumed qualification documents (analysis, test reports, etc.)

referenced by the licensee in their submittal are acceptable.

The results of this examination are documented in Appendix B.

3.

General Information 3.1 Identification of Class lE Electrical Equipment The licensee's list.of systems was compared to the systems list issued by the Equipment Qualification Branch (EQB) and discussed in section 4.1 of this report.

It is recognized that there are differences in nomenclature of systems because of plant vintage and engineering design, therefore, many of these systems may not exist or have different titles.

These differencer will be addressed in the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) that will be i

prepared for this site.

3.2 Service Conditions The service condition accident environment, HELB/LOCA inside contain-ment and HELB outside containment are indicated or discussed in the licensee's report and are based on the FSAR accident analysis and section 4.3 of this report.

3.3 Qualification Documentation Appendix A is a list of documents (test reports, analysis, letters, etc.) used by the licensee in determining the environmental qual-ification of plant equipment for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3.

These references have been tabulated by the licensee and are indicated on the applicable CES of their report 4.

Technical Evaluation The basis for the technical evaluation is the information provided by the licensee, Philadelphia Electric Company, for the Peach Bottom 2 Unit 3 and the inspection of the as-instsiled equip;nent of the Main Steam and Feed-water system which is locatu! in the containment, IE Inspection Report 50-277/80-17.

l Utilizing the information identified above, the reviewer assessed its adequacy in relation to the D0R guidelines 6, NUREG7 0588, and the supple-ments4 to IEB 79-01B which provides the Commission's requirements and staff positions.

The quality control measures utilized by the licensee included using exper-ienced consultants to perform the tasks required by IEB 79-01B.

Independent technical overview of each part of the effort was performed by the licensee's engineering staff.

In addition, an extensive review of the final response and sign-off approvals by various levels of the licensee's engineering management was required.

4.1 Identification of Safety-Related Equipment The licensee reviewed his documentation to establish the systems required.to achieve a safe shutdown or provide isolation for the events identified in IEB 79-018.

These systems were then evaluated against the D0R guidelines.

The systems identified and included in this evaluation are:

1.

Main Steam and Feedwater 2.

Automatic Depressurization 3.

Reactor Protection 4.

Control Rod Drive 5.

High Pressure Coolant Injection 6.

Residual Heat Removal Low Pressure Coolant Injection Mode Torus Cooling Mode Shutdown Cooling Mode 7.

Core Spray 8.

Standby Gas Treatment 9.

Containment Atmosphere Dilution 10.

Steam Leak Detection 11.

Radiation Monitoring 12.

Emergency Service Water 13.

Priniary Containment Isolation 14.

Electrical Power The list of systems including those that were excluded was provided to the Equipment Qualification Branch (EQB).

The EQB compared the list to a "Q" list developed by the staff and to the lists provided by similar facilities to determine the completeness of the licensees response.

Based on the information provided by the licensee and the reviewers comparison 2, it has been determined that the systems identified are within the guidance provided in Section 3.0 and Appendix A of the D0R Guidelines and are acceptable with this exception:

1.

"Q" List The acceptability of the licensee's list in paragraph 4.1 will be evaluated by the Equipment Qualification Branch (EQB) and addressec l

in the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) to be issued by February l

1980.

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-4.2 Master List The licensee developed a master list based on his system evaluation

.as required by IEB 79-018. of the licensee's 90 day response includes a list of references which provided the basis for fncluding or excluding specific components / equipment from having a detailed data work sheet as required by IEB 79-018.

We have reviewed the supporting basis for the inclusion or exclusion of equipment provided in the references and have concluded that the licensee's letters of March 3, 1980, Aprii 15, 1980 and June 17, 1980 are acceptable.

4.3 Service Conditions 4.3.1 Inside Containment LOCA The licensee provided temperature and pressure profiles for l

the Peach Bottom 2 containment resulting from a LOCA.

These curves, FSAR Figures 14.6.11 and 14.6.10 are included in the l

licensee's 90 Day Response Report.

Tha maximum environments l

identified are:

Temperature:

2900F Pressure:

44 PSIG i

Humidity:

100% R.H.

Chemical Spray: NA Radiation: 1.8 x 107 The delay time from the event to the initiation of safety injection for the spectrum of breaks is indicated in FSAR profiles figures 14.6.11, 14.6.10, Q5.5.6a and QS.S.6b and IEB 79-01B 90 day submittal.

Depending on the system combinat used, the service conditions in the containment will return to levels that existed prior to the event in less than 30 minutes.

4.3.1.1 Radiation The 1.8 x 107 Radiation level 3 ident "ad t'"

the licensee

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is less than the 2 x 107 radiation le.

tified as acceptable in the 00R guidelines, Sec*

2.

The licensee data sheets indicate that for que

'i.stion testing radiation levels higher than the 1.o x L 7 level were used.

Components that were tested for less than the required level of radiation will b sisted in the Appendix B section of this report.

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The reviewer has concluded that the above information is acceptable.

The staffs position in relation to radiation analysis is provided in the second supple-ment 4 to IEB 79-018.

In addition, the supplement expanded the scope to include the environmental effects on electrical equipment being evaluated in accordance to NUREG-0578.

4.3.1.2 Submergence The licensee identified no equipment below the flood level in the IEB 79-01B response.

4.3.l.3 Chemical Spray The licensee stated that no chemical solutions are used in systems required for the accidents' presently under consideration.

The consideration of chemical sprays is included in Section 4.9 of this report.

4.4 High Energy Line Breaks (HELB) 4.4.1 HELB Inside Containment The licensee has stated, in their letter of August 26, 1980, that each class IE equipment item located in primary containme was reviewed against the LOCA profiles which are provided in the FSAR and against a 3400F Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) temperature.

FSAR question 5.5.6 identifies NEDO 10320 as the analytical model used to evaluate the Loss of Coolant Accident conditions.

In the absence of a specific plant MSLB environmental analysis, the 3400F criteria of the Division of Operating Reactors guidelines was used in consideration of the specific equipment operating time requirements.

The acceptance of this approach by the licensee is considered unresolved and is classified as a category IV item.

4.4.2 HELB Outside Containment The licensee in their August 19, 1980 IEB 79-01B update included the revised environmental equivalent room tabulations The programs that were used to generate the data for the various areas outside containment are listed in Philadelphia Electric Company's References 62, 63, and 65, Appendix A.

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We have concluded, based on the profiles representing the HELB conditions outside containment that the licensee meets the requirements of the 00R guidelines, Section 4.3.1.

The acceptability of the licensee's basis for specific equipment subjected to HELBs outside of containment is included in Section 4.9 of this report.

4.4.3 Recirculated Fluids The licensee indicated that the hostile environments, BLP 21544PBAPS Environmental Conditions Radiation Dose Study, in the various areas containing post LOCA recirculating flows have been reviewed and included as part of the above reference study.

The acceptability of the parameters identified and the basis for specific equipment qualifications are included in Section 4.9 of this report.

4.5 @rgins The D0R Guidelines indicate that special consideration was given to the time required to remain functional when establishing the criteria in Section 5.2 of the guidelines.

The normal operating temperature inside containment is approximately 1200F and the profiles indicate that tr.e temperature returns to 1200F within 27 hours3.125e-4 days <br />0.0075 hours <br />4.464286e-5 weeks <br />1.02735e-5 months <br /> of the event.

NUREG-0588, Section 3(4), requires that a type test be for a minimum of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> in duratior, when the functional requirement is within the first seconds or minutes of an event and the DOR guidelines, Section 5.2, requires that the test duration be at least as long as the period from initiation until the service conditions return to the level that existed prior to the event.

Therefore, any type test that exceeds the functional operability time by 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or longer meets the requirements defined in NUREG-0588 and the D0R guidelines for margin in relation to test duration for this facility.

The other consideration identified in the D0R guidelines in relation to the methods of qualification, other than identified specifically in this report will be addressed in the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) which will incorporate an audit of selected analysis and test reports identified in Appendix A.

4.6 Aging The licensee indicated that a study of the components subjected to harsh environments is still an outstanding item.

Details of the licensee's effort is included in their submittal 3.

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The licensee has identified the components which arc still listed as requiring data.

The 00R guidelines, Section 7, does not require a qualified life to be established for all safety-related electrical equipment, however, the following actions are requiredi 1.

Detailed comparison of existing equipment to the materials identified in Appendix C of the 00R guidelines.

The first supplement 4 to IE8 79-018 requires the licensees to utilize the table and identify any additional materials as the result of their effort.

-2.

Establish an ongoing program to review surveillance and main-tenance records to identify potential age related degradations.

3.

Establish component maintenance and replacement schedules which include considerations of aging characteristics of the installed components.

We, therefore, require that the licensee provide the details of a program which will include a continuing effort to obtain data on existing materials and address the actions identified above.

In addition, we require the licensee provide a schedule for implementation of the program that identifies problem components.

4.7 Documentation The second supplement 4 to IEB 79-018 and the order,5 No. CLI-80-21, requires the licensee have the documentation and data identified in the detailed worksheets which supports the qualification of the safety related electrical equipment available for NRC audit.

The second supplement 4 identifies the type of information required and the locatior where th6 records are to be maintained.

The staff requests the licensee provide a response to the order and supplement which discusses their compliance and identifies eny deviatior Reference Appendix C of this report.

4.8 Site Verification Irspection An inspection of the installed components associated with the Main Steam and Feedwater Syscem was conducted on June 4-5, 1980 at the Peach Bottom Atomic Peser Station, Unit 2.

The details of this inspection are documented in IE Inspection Report 50-277/80-17.

The detailed identification of the components and the observations recorded will be addressed in the SER which will incorporate an audit of selected analysis and test reports referenced in Appendix A.

4.9 Equipment Data Review The equipment listed in Appendix B is the status of the latest data submitted by the licensee in their response to IEB 79-01B.

Appendix B identifies the licensee data 3 in a format that allows the reviewer a quick look status of each listed component.

The first four columns are self explanatory while the next three columns are defined as follows:

Environment - The listing in this column identifies the environinent; that appears to have some question as to whether or not its in compliance with the requirements of the licensee.

Category - As listed below a category I thrc'gh V has been assigned to the environment for a specific c aponent or group of components as listed.

Remarks - The remarks column was used to identify the environmental condition associated with the category number, or identify the system location when the licensee indicated that data was being looked for or an analysis was in progress.

An example of this lack of data environment information in the licenseee submittal is the requirement for aging.

The equipment has been listed and identified in one of the following categories:

I Qualified for Plant Life II Qualified With Restrictions III Exempted From Qualification IV Qualification of Equipment Unresolved, and V Equipment Not Qualified The number in the ( ) in the component block on the table indicates the number of identical components listed, but may have a different title within the report.

Except for equipment being in different rcom locations, which is identified by the licensee, the equipicent appears to be the same in both units 2 and 3.

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4.10 Conclus'on

-This evaluation is based on the on-site inspection, the information supplied by the licensee in their submittal 10, their FSAR,'and the assumption that the Qualification Documentation (Test Reports, Analysis Letters, etc.) are acceptable.

The Region I reviewer using the guidance 9 and instructions 8 for the evaluation of licensee's data submittals and the site verification inspections that were performed to verify the IE Bulletin 79-01B, January 1980 data submittal information, finds the licensee to be in acccrdance with the NRC direction 4,5 except as listed in Appendix B anc; C of this report.

The results of this evaluation does not necessarily imply that the equipment is unreliable, unsafe or represents a significant safety issue; it does imply that additional information is required and that the items in Appendix B and C will be evaluated by the Equipment Qualification Branch (EQB) and addressed in the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) to be written for this licensee by February 1981.

5.

Licensee Event Reports (LERs)

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5.1 The following LER was submitted and documented as follows:

Reference:

Docket Nos.

50-277 and 50-278 Report No:

LER 2-80-8/IT Report Date:

May 1, 1980 Occurrence Date:

April 17, 1980 Reported:

To Resident on April 17 and 22, 1980 Facility:

Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, RDI, Delta, PA 17314 Description of Event - Preliminary calculations associated with high energy line breaks as requested in IE Bulletin 79-01B indicated that guillotine failure of the HPCI steam supply piping in the outboard isolation valve room would result in a peak pressure (12 psig) within the room which is in excess of the capabilities of the concrete block wall (7.2 psig).

Unit 2 and 3 are of similar design.

A more refined analysis shows that the calculated peak pressure in the outboard isolation valve room of 5.01 psig (4.97 psig if the steau line isolation valves are throttled to 75% closed).

Since the ultimate wall pressure capability based on the type of anchor bolts used is approximately 7.2 psig, safety factor of 1.4 exists.

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The inspection of the results of the licensee corrective action will be discussed in IEB 80-11.

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References t

1.

IEB 79-01B, Memo to V. Thomas (NRC) from A. Finkel (NRC) dated May 2, 1980.

2.

EQ Branch Comparison of systems and parameters.

(Systems List GE BWR) 3.

Philadelphia Electric Company, Revised and Updated Response to IEB 79-018, dated August 19, 1980.

'4.

Supplement Information to IEB 79-01B, dated February 29, 1980, September:

30, 1980, and October 24, 1980.

5.

Order requiring licensees implement requirements of Commission Memorandt:

and Order of May 23, 1980 (CLI-80-21).

6.

Division of Operating Reactors (DOR), " Guidelines for Evaluating Environmental Qualification of Class IE Electrical Equipment in Operatir.

Reactors", Enclosure 4 to IEB 79-018.

7.

NUREG-0586, " Interim Staff Position on Environmental Qualification of Safety Related Electrical Equipment", dated December 1979.

8.

Inspection Requirements for Verifying Reactor Licensee Responses to IE Bulletin No. 79-018, dated April 25, 1980.

9.

IE Support and Review of Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment at Operating Reactors, dated October 10, 1980.

10.

Philadelphia Electric Company, Responses to IEB 79-01B, dated March 3, 1980, April 15, 1980, August 26, 1980, and October 31, 1980.

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APPENDIX A

TEST REPORTS AND ANALYSIS LISTS

1.

Res 5-3 (Qualification Drywell Equipment) 2.

G.E. Co. Cover letters G-HE-8-198 and G-HE-9-106 3.

ASCO letter 8/17/78 4.

-Franklin Institute Test Report F-C5022-1 5.

Franklin Institute Test Report.F-C5022 6.

Franklin Institute Test Report F-C2750 7.

G.E. Co. Cover Letter G-HE-8-153 8.

Vendor Print #6280-E106-113-1 9.

G.E. Co. Cover Letter G-HE-8-54 10.

Vendor Print #6280-E40-124-2 11.

a.

Limitorque Test Report 600198 b.

Limitorque Test Report 600376 c.

Limitorque Test Report 600376A d.

Limitorque Test Report 80003 12.

Franklin Institute Test Report for Pyle-National Co. F-C3451 13.

G.E. Co. Cover Letter G-HE-7-154 (FDI-123) 14.

Rosemount Test Summary #3768A 15.

Rosemount Report #37327B 16.

Burns Engineering Certified Drawing #10528 17.

Deleted 18.

Deleted 19.

Deleted 20.

Deleted 21.

Deleted 22.

Deleted 23.

Deleted 24.

Deleted 25.

Deleted 26.

FSAR Fig. 14.6.10 and Fig. Q.5.5.6a 27.

FSAR Fig. 14.6.11 and Fig. Q.5.5.6b 28.

Bechtel Power Corporation Study 29.

FSAR Section 14.6.3.3.2 30.

Special Study-Operating Requirements for Safety-Related Equipment 31.

G.E. Co. Environmental Qualification Test Summary-NSE79013 32.

G.E. Co. Environmental Qualification Test Summary-NSE79019 33.

G.E. Co. Environmental Qualification Test Summary-NSE79020 34.

G.E. Co. Environmental Qualification Test Summary-NSE79022 35.

G.E. Co. Environmental Qualification Test Summary-NSE79023 36.

G.E. Co. Environmental Qualification Test Summary-NSE79024 37.

G.E. Co. Environmental Qualification Test Summary-NSE80002 38.

G.E. Co. Environmental Qualification Test Summary-NSE80003 39.

G.E. Co. Environmental Qualification Test Summary-NSE80004 40.

G.E. Co. Environmental Qualification Test Summary-NSE80005 41.

G.E. Co. Environmental Qualification Test Summary-NSE80006 42.

G.E. Co. Environmental Qualification Test Summary-NSE80008 43.

G.E. Co. Environmental Qualification Test Summary-NSE80010 44.

G.E. Co. Environmental Qualification Test Summary-NSE80011 45.

G.E. Co. Environmental Qualification Test Summary-NSE80012

J 46.

Amerace Corp. Te'st Report QTR-TR-2 Rev. A 47.

G.E. Co. Cover Letter G-HE-9-146

48.. Qualification of Firewall III Class IE Electrical Cable Report July 7, 1977 49.

Rockbestos Company letter from G. S. Buettner to J. J. Ferencscik 50.

Franklin Institute Test Report F-C4033-3 51.

FSAR Table 6.5.1 52.

FSAR Section 14.6.5.1.2 53.

FSAR Figures 6.5.1 through 6.5.23

'54.

FSAR Section 5.3.4 55.

Amerace Letter to N. J. Wood (5/13/80) 56.

Amerace Spec. EGP 57.

GECO Licensing topical report-NEDO-21617-A 58.

GEC0 data sheet 22A1378AB 59.

ELMA letter to W. W. Bowers (3/15/77) and Telecon to Mr. Ryland of ELMA (2/25/80).

60.

Viking test report #30592 and Telecon to L. Hane of Topaz (6/7/76) 61.

Limitorque letter to W. H. VanBuskirk 2/22/80 62.

BLP 21568 PBAPS Environmental Conditions LOCA temperatures BLP 21606 P8APS Environmental Conditions HELB Temperatures 63.

BLP 21544 PBAPS Environmental Conditions Radiation dose study 64.

Appendix "C" NRC Bulletin 79-018 65.

PBAPS MAX LOCA/HELB pressures 66.

ASCO letter-to W. H. VanBuskirk 6-6-80 67.

FSAR Table 7.3.1 68.

Rosemount Test Report #127770 69.

ASCO Test Report #AQS-12678/TR, Rev. A 70.

Qualification of NAMCO Controls Limit Switch Model EA-740 dated 2-22-79 71.

Letter from S. L. Daltroff to B. H. Grier 72.

HVAC Design Criteria for Reactor Building, 8/21/73.

73.

BLP-21679, Equipment TID 74.

FSAR Supplement 1, Section 7.1.7 75.

QSR 002-A-01, 002-A-02.

76.

Rosemount Analysis-DJT 77.

ASCO Analysis (Therman)-DJT, 10/20/80 78.

ASCO Analysis (Humidity)-DJT, 10/20/80 79.

GEC0 NED0-10698

.80.

Physical Sciences Analysis-WJC, 10/20/80 81.

GECO Specification 22A2928 Rev. 1.

82.

SLD Analysis-DJT, 10/21/80 83.

QSR-080-A-01

84. -Target Rock Corporation Analysis-A. Spector, 10/22/80 85.

Bechtel Specification 6280-M-242 86.

Delphi Catalog 201-A 87.

EPRI NP-1558 Project 890-1 Final Report, 9/80 88.

QSR-027 89.

QSR-037

90.

QSR-029-A-01 91.

QSR-032-A-01 92.

UL-510 93.

3M Research Report-3410175001-003 94.

3M Report 54C3082 95.

QSR-111 96.

Agastat Analysis - AS, 10/27/80 97.

Dwyer Bulletin E-50 L

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O APPENDIX B

EQUIPMENT STATUS LISTS I

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a ' n ~. p s [ s q p f'

Legend:

Notes i

The notes referenced.in the remarks column of the component evaluation work sheets (CES) reference the licensee's Notes Nos. I through 33.

Referances i

The references identified in the remarks column are those listed in Appendix A Nos. 1 through 97.

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I' art /

lCowitagn' Invison-IM enent ISnuf.

De ftemarks arlal weit unt v ry lIS cui Pressure Switch (2)

Uarh dale P.21 -f t-l ?-

X AnInq If thte I Retstret elate c{ analysts frrre licensee.

1 Padlation IV Phle 3 Pressure Switch (0)

Barton 288 X

Aqing IV Note I Retaires date of cen pletion frtre licensee.

t tev:1 Indicating Switch Yarway 4410C X

Aging IV liote I Require date of analysis frca licensee.

(2)

Lcrel Indicating Switch roseront 510fU I

T irre V

Specificatici required 15 minutes. Quallf fcation test was for (7)

I hour. f;ote licensec cocments in Appendix C.

Pilot Solenoid Valve (11 - Au tona t ir.

WC-C-X Aning IV Nnte l Require state of analysis frne licensee.

Valve Co.

9 50 i

Valve Arte' tor t irii tergi*a

'Jt". rm Y

Terrai a t en e IV iMte 7 Airihnfrold(1)

Wtematic X

Aqing ly Note 1 Require date of analysis from licensee.

Valve fo.

m Solenoid Valve (Afr)(7)

Asto 18100 X

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Y 5:ecifiution retstres 10 secnnds operating. Qualification g

test wn for 10 seconds. Old not meet I hour test tiee.

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3 d'r# 6* M M&semem apWGG-

-M N***'se 9

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Part/

'fontain' inviroo-Resurks ConPonent Ibms f.

taie9nry ggay

< it F*ng 1r.t wr Inverter (2) forAZ 500MR X

Aging IV trote 79 Power Sulply (2)

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5965-3, 4 X

Iies IV hat!ficatinn tire not sPectifed.

Aging IV ilote 29

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Pressure Sw!tch (12)

Static 12:1-Ar.1 J

Tire IV t nte l } Paquire date of analysis fron: Itctnsee.

Ring Pressure IV Note 4 )

Scienold Valve (2)

CEC 0/ASCO IIV 4-9010 x

ilsne V

Stccifiution requires 80 sernsds of 9:ellfication test 5-2J was for E0 seconds. Did not ecet I hour requirement.

Prpssure Switch (4)

Lirnsdale Pitf-t1110 I

Radiation IV tiota i p Require date of analysis from Ilcensee.

%-V Aginq Note 1-Presturc Switch (14) 5tatic 0-iN-f41 X

P.ojistinn IV tbte 3 Requite date of aralysis fen't licensec.

Ring Aqin; IV

'htte !

Q f low % itch (3)

Parten 289 X

Radiation.

IV flote 3 Require date of analysis from licensee.

Aalnq l

IV flote I Flow Trantmitters rirC0 553122 X

All IV f!nte 11 g

lovel %ltr.h (2) teartshaw 8303s-A2 X

Padhtien IV F:nte 3{ Pequire date of analysis from licensee.

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C<>nta f xf r>n=lrom.

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,ggldt T se t vit c'Firy 171 etir IIPCI hep /furbite (2)

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All IV flote 13

f. I'ress. Iru!. % Itch tia r tori 2nv.A s

ps,419 tion IV flota 3 flote I} Require date nt antlysis f ran licensee.

J w-=

Time IV Srecification required test time of 101 days. Qualift-

,' i w

cellon tin? was 2 tours.

, c;-_,

.. ~..

s~*

..-- ~

m,.-,

. 7,g l'unp flotor (4)

GECO SK634Ti X

Radiation IV tiote 3 Renuire date of analysis fro:n If tensee.

Valve Actuator (6)

Limitorger 5tfM-7-40 4

All IV tinte 7

,[j' {j n

JD -%

Vahe A. teater I.imitorgon

$fp.4 200l X

PHiailCH IV ff' te 3 Require date of analysis frors licensee.

Va h e f.ctuator t 1,i ter qtv 513 4 X

Tcretssture IV tiote 70 Require date of insistion frorn licensee.

I

,g Yalve ehtuator (2)

L ir.'I torque

' !!3 150 x

All jy rio;c y VJIve 14 tu.3tnr (2) l ini tor qua W.5T..Y 0 X

All flute 7 c3

X:3 O

3m=

W-

--~,-n-

Past/

l Cc,:st s in.8.

I ne l e tin-Remarks Ceepnent lurasf.

,'i,c,r I a 1 cue r nt Id IP'8C'T ill ot3T Valec As.tuator (2)

Limloique

  • )tc. J. t'u x

All gy p;og, y Diff. Press. Switch (20)

Dryer 1621-1 X

T fne IV flote 6. 73. 30 Temp IV flote 73. 30 Pressure XY fiote 23. 30 PJi IV flote 71. 30 Require sch:dule from Radiation IV flote 3. 73. 30 licensee.

Aalnq IV flotes 1. 23, 30 s

~..

Pa unutic-Elect Switct; Johnson r 7230 X

flote 9 Itequire schedule fras Itcensee.

lloater A M rican X

lire IV finta 22 Air Filter Tcrn;cra ture IV Pote 22 Pec'.sure IV finte ??

R!!

IV flote 22 Radiation IV

'intes 3. 72 g

Aoing IV flotes 1. ??

O m

f an Ibtor (2)

GECO

R32f, Y

[iw l IV flote 13 TeT IV flete 13 l'ressure IV flote 13 R'l IV flota 13 Padiation IV finto.'

O A fn1 IV flotes 1,13 9

w p

1 r-1

~

~

ew -.e l

t l'crt/

' C, tat.iln fin iron-remarks

,?at w ry Owponrnt ihnuf*

8 p,3rict r -n t sw ni til 'cui

~

.solenolf Valve (19).

ASCO 8316 X

Time Y

5pecification for time was 15 minu* 2s. Its gi.tllfication Solenoid Yalve (4)

A5f.0 8320 I

tir? m s'15 minutes,

%1enoid Valve (19)

ASCO 030051-1 X

f la.c V

Srecification for time was I seinute. The qualification 8300G61 X

Time Y

test tire was 1 minute.

r,.. _

Analyrer Rack (4)

Conisfr/

K1 X

Agini IV flote i Require date of analysis from licensee.

.., }.S, -

~

Delphi

.m,,.

9,-.

Tewperature Elt nent (28)

Purna "l A l -5's X

All IV entlfication was rerforned using the analysis reethod for all c.

naineering 2A-D'iAI.

env ironnent s Reference licensee ros. 62 and 82.

'j;'

% se

[

I?adiation Elenent (8)

CtC0 194Y971 I [ Tice IV tiotes 6, 13 1ere IV I;ote 13 Pressure IV ilote 13 RH IV flote 13 Radiation IV Note 13 Aging IV Note 13 Asca fooler (18)

.lo y, It. r.

10m)

Y All IV IJetes 11,16. Raquire sche <lule f ran licensee.

Porter 9

c:p 9W$

rf Nf9 '*4mme MS-p** g e

  • sur=e+ _

___-w 9

ar Imtoin

[ndn+

Rtwark.s Corimnent thrwaf.

{,, m ry g}glal en t

    • n t Iri cur Control 5tatinn Switch 6t CO CR.Mo K

R II.ition IV fiote 3 Pequire date of analysis from licensee.

UR?O lli Time Daley Relay (4)

Anastat x

All IV flote 30 Fequire schedule froni IIcensee.

f.UX Rel3y (634 System)(4)

GECO CR120 X

Padiation IV tiote 31 Require schedule from licensee.

'7' Aging flote 31

. ~.

l m

m d'.s.e Ualee Actuator Limitorque SifD-000 X

1emperature V

rioto 18 Require schedule from licensee. Plant 10 flo.

MO-2-11-IS.

..].f

-t Air [ rated Solenoid Atkoratic Dif X All IV ilote 9 Require schedule from Ilcensec 4

Alkomatic Dyfl0-15 x

All ly I'M lotal of (15) Valves.

Atkomatir Dyr0 y All p

633C low Yoltage rower - (a) r.ECO 100 X

Aoinq IV

'tiote 1 Require scledule from licensee' Control renetration q

O C3 lllXl3

'c :3 1

N 3:=

r--

=

3 a A 4 M~

~

Par

'fontalm' Environ-Prenarks 7Qg3,t/

lategory Cecronent stinu f.

,,,g Ill 00T lead Center (1)

IIL I

l iv,e IV flote 6

.'[~,'[

I wp IV frole 14

.cca, l'e r.sur e IV floto 14 Requis e uhedule frien licensec.

w...

Dil IV flote 14 lt9 Rad i.i t ;on IV flote 14 Aging IV flote 1

[,C]"i flotor Control Center (8)

utler/ Ham-Ifnitrol X

Tien

V Note 6

((['s rner Typa B Temp IV Note 14 Pressure IV Note 14 Pequire schedule from licensee.

ftit IV flote 14

,**C,1 Radiation IV Note 14 j.

r.x Aalng IV f80te 1

~ ~, '

< ~ ~., -

Teminal nlocks larathon 1600 X

X Aping IV Note i Sealant Scotch Scotch /rnt X

X Aging IV flote 1 Pequire schedule from licensee.

Tape Scotch 10 X

X Aalng IV Note i Terminal Blocks GfC0 CR-151 1

X Radi='fon IV Hote 3 Aqinq IV Note 1 Require schedule fron li'ensee.

c:P c#:P W$

9f O

e

_9_

WM WM w

MmMMO e

Gyp lq p j 7P.z

' Peach,3cttes Atesic ?

o j

Unit 0 2

i

...su42 Class II Iqui?:en: Lis.

3. 9, Systa=:

"'MI Modif'icatien:

C l

r,.. 4 ~,

e Ites Iquip.

Inside cut:ide Fri.C:nt.

I'c.

ID iso.

Generi: ?*ane

?"i. Cont.

20c= M Accustic socitor I

t$74-1

? cam-2 7CA' cre-,tso 209 1

c Am-2-703

?os I

M575-1 e

[4575-2 PcAm-2-71A 205 205 M575-2 Fem-2-713 205

_M,575-2

?d2-2-71c 205 L

M575-2 PcAs-2-71D 205 M575-2 Pces-2-71I 2c5 M575-2 Pdm-2-717 M575-2

?ds-2-71G 2c5' l PcAs-2-713 205 M575-2 2c5 M575-2 PcA=-2-71J 205 M575-2

?cA=-2-717.

205 M575-2

?c.4m-2-71L Acoustic =cnitor s5 5-3 pct-2 7CA sensor X

575-3

?c;-2-7Ca X

M575 !>

pot-2-71A X

675 h

?oc-2-713 X

M575 h FoT-2-71C X

M575 h Po T-2-71D X

M575 h FoT-2-712 X

M575 h Fo!-2-71F X

M575 h pct-2-71G X

M575 h

?cT-2-713 X

M575 4 l pct-2-71J X

t u

e

..e.,..

'The TMI modifications. for Peach Bottom 3 are_ listed in this Appendix but the component data sheets were not supplied by the licensee.

Reference Appendix C.

for,]!censee status on the TMI modifications effort.

.f

. 3 f:

U i () e

"' I ~i j, T

.l e

I E

~-.,-.. - - -

...,. ~.-,-.

\\

4.

e k h k

APPENDIX 0

TMI MODIF.ICATIONS 1

i i

}-

(

cm-

a...

The LOCA and HELB temperature profiles are based upon very conservative assumptions.

The HELB temperature-profiles for the secondary containment equipment rooms represent the worst case conditions which result from a particular HELB accident.

The HELB profiles are not the environmental effect of.a single postulated accident, but rather, they are the effect of the spectrum of each of the postulated' system line breaks. _This spectrum includes several break locations for each of the system line breaks.

The environmental specifications listed on the component evaluation work sheets for secondary ~ containment are conservative because they represent the composite bounding conditions for the reviewed accidents.

The HELB accident temperatures and pressures for a given room are not necessarily the result of the same accident and the radiation dose reflects the post-LOCA total integrated dose.

This basis for establishing environmental specifications results in further conservatism in our evaluation.

The effect of the peak HELB temperatures on equipment is mitigated by the short duration of the' peak and by the heat transfer characteristics of the construction materials resulting in lower effective peak temperatures.

A study is available to demonstrate that equipment temperatures due to HELB transients will not exceed the area saturation temperature.

Since HELB pressure transients exist for only a few seconds, equipment temperatures would not exceed 2120F which corresponds to the saturation temperature at atmospheric pressure.

Also it shou!d be noted that our review indicates that equipment located in secondary containment need not maintain its pressure integrity with respect to ambient pressures and therefore qualification of secondary containment equipment for the HELB pressure conditions is not significant.

A review of the installed PBAPS Class 1E equipment application indicates that the equipment is of high industrial quality.

The design and purchase specifi-cations for this equipment were in accordance with applicable NEMA and IEEE industry standards which existed at the time of purchase.

Even considering the conservatism of the HELB analyses, it is estimated that Class 1E equipment inaccessibility due to the postulated accidents would be approximately 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> or less.

Therefore, we believe the ability to perform maintenance in a reasonable amount of time is an important factor in assessing the operability of equipment during post-accident conditions.

In conclusion, a failure-modes-and-effects analysis of the Class lE equipment required to mitigate the postulated accidents has been conducted in concert with the considerations identified above, and it is our judgment that the remaining items do not constitute undue risk to the public health and safety.

Philadelphia Electric Company has work which is actively in progress to resolve the outstanding-items as expeditiously as possible.

m r

-~

N:

^.

8 4

y PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY ENVIRONMENTAL-QUALIFICATION OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT Th'e conditions considered in our review are steam line break (SLB) or loss of coolant accident (LOCA) in primary containment and high energy line break (HELB) in secondary containment.

All Class lE equipment located-in primary containment has been reviewed, and-

- the results show that this equipment is environmentally qualified for a SLB or LOCA.

The Class IE equipment inside primary containment has been qualified to 3400F for the time period required to mitigate the effects of the postulated accidents.

Although all this equipment is required for only a short time, it has been qualified for a minimum of one hour.

All Class lE eqripment located in secondary containment has been reviewed and documentation is available to support the environmental qualification for most of this equipment.

In addition to the systems which have a majority of equipment located in secondary containment, several additional systems with equipment that is t

located primarily outside containment is available to mitigate the effects of the postulated accidents.

Those systems include Condensate /Feedwater High Pressure Service Water and Control Rod Drive.

These systems could be used in conjunction with the Safety Relief Valves to achieve safe shutdown during post acrioent conditions.

The LOCA and HELB temperature analyses used to generate the temperature profiles for our review are based on assumptions which include loss of normal ventilation,i a three hour linear decay lof heat rejection from all normally operating plant equipment, continuous heat rejection from all safety related equipment, and an initial 950F outside air temperature coincident with the postulated accident.

The HELB accidents considered in our review are listed below:

I 1.

Main Steam Line Break 2.

HPCI Steam Line Break l

3.

RCIC Steam Line Braak 4.

Feedwater Line Break 5.

Reactor Water Cleanup Break l

A review of the LOCA and HELB temperature profiles for the HPCI, RCIC, RHR, i

Core Spray and Standby Gas Treatment System equipment rooms indicates that

~

- the room temperatures are substantially below the normal operating design temperature limits.

Exception to this would occur when a SLB is postulated t

in the RCIC or HPCI equipment rooms because a steam line break would prevent the operation of the turbine driven pumps causing the respective systems to

-tna inoperable.

Therefore, it can be concluded that the equipment in these rooms 7

would be available under the postulated accidents except for the conditions j

stateu above for the HPCI and RCIC rooms.

a 1>

e 7T-e e

F-W

(

2

)

APPENDIX C

(

LICENSEE EXCEPTIONS

g 19.

Limitorque actuator will be inspected to verify that components are nuclear In-Containment grade.

20.

Limitorque actuator will be inspectedEto determine if intermittent gear frame is bronze.

Zinc or aluminum gear frame assemblies will be replaced with bronze gear frame assemblies.

21.

Johnson Controls will be requested to supply applicable documentation.

22.

American Air Filter will be requested to supply applicable documentation.

23.

Dwyer will be requested to supply applicable documentation.

24.

H. K. Portor will be requested to supply applicable documentation.

25.

Target Rock Corp. will be requested to supply applicable documentation.

26.

See specification documentation reference.

27.

Table C-1 of the 00R Guidelines indicates there is no known radiation degradation below 1.0E4 rads.

28.

A comparison of the materials used in this device with those listed in Table C-1 of the D0R Guidelines indicates there is no thermal degradation for the conditions to which this equipment is subjected.

29.

The equipment has been relocated to a benign environment area and no additional review will be included under the scope of IE Bulletin 79-01B.

30.

A modification will be initiated to eliminate the ESW differential pressure switches (Dwyer 1627-1) and the Agastat time delay relays.

31.

The application of the G.E. CR 120 relays will be modified to fail safe operation.

32.

This device contains no pressure sensitive components.

33.

Reliance Electric has been requested to supply applicable documentation.

Purchase order has been issued 10/9/80.

i

?

l E

~.'t

- g.

e Notes 1.

Aging was not previously considered, however, an analysis will be performed.

~ 2.

An environmental analysis for outside primary containment HELB accidents is being conducted and is scheduled for completion by' April-10, 1980.

3.

Radiation was not included in original qualification tests, however, an analysis will be performed.

Radiation TID at the device will be

~ determined.

4.

Pressure was not included in original qualification tests, however, an analysis will be performed.

5.

Relative humidity was not_ included in original qualification tests, however, an analysis will be performed.

6.

Operating Time Specification will be identified later.

7.

Limitorque is researching qualification of actuator.

8.

These limit switches will be replaced with NAMC0 EA-740 limit switches.

9; This equipment will be replaced.

10.

ASCO will be requested to supply applicable documentation.

11.

This equipment will be relocated.

12.

13.

GECO has been requested to provide documentation or perform an analysis for this equipment.

14.

Letter has been sent to Cutler Hammer requesting documentation.

15.

Comsip Delphi has been requested to supply documentation (10/4/79).

16.

An analysis will be performed.

17.

ASCO solenoid valve will be replaced.

18.

Limitorque actuator motor will be replaced.

The environmental qualification values listed for this actuator do not apply to the drive motor.

APPENDIX A Equipment Requiring Immediate Corrective Action (Category 4.1)

Item Equipment Manufacturer Model Deficiency No Equipment in this category for Peach Bottom Unit 3.

A-1

APPENDIX B Equipment Requiring Additional Information and/or Corrective Action (Category 4.2)-

LEGEND:

Designation for Deficiency R - Radiation T - Temperature QT - Qualification Time RT ' Required Time P - Pressure H - Humidity

' CS - Chemical spray A - Material aging evaluation, replacement schedule, ongoing equipment surveillance S - Submergonce M - Margin I - HELB evaluation outside containment not completed QM - Qualification method RPN - Equipment reincation or replacement, adequate schedule not provided EXN - Exempted equ'.pment justification inadequate SEN - Separate effects qualification justification inadequate QI - Qualification information being developed RPS - Equipment relocation or replacement schedule provided

~

Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.

Deficiency Differential Pressure Switch Rosemount DPIS-2-ll6A,B T,P,A Differential Pressure Switch Rosemount DPIS-2-116C,0 T,P,A Differential Pressure Switch Rosemount DPIS-2-117A,B T,P,A Differential Pressure Switch Rosemount DPIS-2-117C,D T,P,A D;

ential Pressure Switch Rosemount DPIS-2-118A,B T,P,A Dii.arential Pressure Switch Rosemount DPIS-2-118C,0 T,P,A Differential Pressure Switch Rosemount DPIS-2-119A,B T,P,A Differential Pressure Switch Rosemount DPIS-2-139C,0 T,P,A Differential Pressure Rosemount DPT-2-116A,B T,P,A Transmitter I

B-1

7 APPENDIX B (continu:d)

Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.

Deficiency Differential Pressure Rosemount DPT-2-116C,0 T,P,A Transmitter Differential Pressure Rosemount DPT-2-117A,B T,P,A Transmitter Differential Pressure Rosemount DPT-2-117C,D T,P,A Transmitter Differential Pressure Rosemount DPT-2-118A,B T, P,'A Transmitter Differential Pressure Rosemount DPT-2-118C,0 T,P,A Transmitter Differential Pressure Rosemount DPT-2-119A,B T,P,A Transmitter Differential Prassure Rosemount DPT-2-119C,0 T,P,A Transmitter Position Limit Switch Namco POS-02-86A,B,C,D T,QT,P,H,A Pressure Switch Barksdale PS-2-3-52A R,T,P,A Pressure Switch Barton PS-2-3-52B,D T,P,H,A Pressure Switch Barksdale PS-2-3-52C R,T,P,A Level Ind. Switch Yarway LIS-2-3-57A,B R,T,P,H,A Level Ind. Switch Yarway LIS-2-3-58A,B R,T,P,H,A 3

Level Ind. Switch Rosemount LIS-2-3-83A,b T,QT,P,A Level Ind. Switch Rosemount LIS-2-3-99A,B,C,0 T,P,A Level Ind. Switch Rosemount LIS-2-3-101A,B,C,D T,P,A Level Ind. Switch Rosemount LISH-2-3-72A,B,C,D T,QT,P,A Level Switch Rosemount LSL-2-3-72A,B,C,0 T,QT,P,A Level. Switch Rosemount LSLL-2-3-72A,B,C,0 T,QT,P,A Level Transmitter Rosemount LT-2-3-83A,B T,P,A Level Transmitter Rosemount LT2-3-72A,B,C,D T,P,A B-2

e APPENDIX B (continued)

Equipment hscription Manufacturer Component No.

Deficiency Level Transmitter Rosemount LT-2-3-99A,B,C,0 T,P,A Level Transmitter Rosemount LT-2-3-101A,B,C,0 T,P,A Pilot Solenoid Valve Automatic Valve RV-02-71A,B,C,G,K QT,T,P,A Corp.

Pilot Solenoid Valve Automatic Valve RV-02-710,E,F,H,J,L QT,T,P,A Corp.

Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-2-38A,B QT,T,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-2-53A,8 QT,T,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-2-74 QT,T,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-2-77 QT,T,P,A Air Operated Valve ASCO A0-02-39 T,P,A Air Manifold Pilot Valve Automatic Valve A0-02-80A,B,C,D QT,T,P,A Corp.

Air Manifold Automatic Valve A0-02-86A,B,C,D QT,T,P,A,H Corp.

Air Operated Valve ASCO A0-02-316 T,P,A Air Operated Valve ASCO A0-02-317 T,P,A Inverter Topaz INV.02-3-402A,B T,R,A,H,P Power Supply Elma E/5-02-3-402A,B P,R,QT,A,H,T Position Limit Switch Namco P05-02-80A,B,C,D T,QT,P,A,H Auxiliary Relay Agastat 5A-K25A,B,C,0 T,P,A,H Auxiliary Relay Agastat 5A-K26A,B,C,0 T,P,A,H Auxiliary Relay Agastat 5A-K28A,B,C,D T,P,A,H Auxiliary Relay Agastat 5A-K29A,B,C,0 T,P,A,H Auxiliary Relay Agastat 5A-K30A,B,C,0 T,P,A,H Auxiliary Relay Agastat 5A-K31A,B,C,0 T,P,A,H B-3

I

. APPENDIX B (continu:d)

-Equipment Description' Manufacturer

-Component No.

Deficiency Pressure' Switch Static-0-Ring PS-5-12A,B R,T,P,A Pressure Switch Static-0-Ring PS-5-12C,D R,T,P,A Solenoid Valve GEC0/ASCO SV-3-13-118 T,P,QT,A,M Solenoid Valve GEC0 SV-3-13-117 T,P,QT,A,M Differential Pressure Ind.

Barton DPIS-23-76,23-77 T,P,A,H Sw.

Pressure Switch Barksdale PS-23-68A,B,C,D R,T,P,A Pressure Switch Static-0-Ring PS-23-97A,B R,T,P,A Pressure Switch Static-0-Ring PS-23-84-1 R,T,P,A Flow Switch Barton FS-23-78 R,T,P,A Flow Transmitter GEC0 FT23-82 R,T,QT,P, H.A Level Switch Robert Shaw LS-23-91A&B R,T,P,A HPCI Pump / Turbine GEC0 MPL23-1&2 R,T,QT,P, H,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-23-14 T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-2-23-15 T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-23-16 T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-23-17 T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-23-19 R,T,QT,P, A,H Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-23-20 RT,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-23-21 T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-23-24 T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-23-25 R,T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-23-31 T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-23-58 T,QT,P,A B-4

APPENDIX B (continued)

Equipment.

Description Manufacturer Component No.

-Deficiency Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-4245 R,T,QT,P,H,A,M Air Operated Valve ASCO A0-23-42 T,P,A Air Operated Valve ASCO A0-23-43 T,P,A Auxiliary Relay Agastat 10A-K150C,0 T,P,A,H Auxiliary Relay Agastat 10-K150E,F,G,H T,P,A,H Auxiliary Relay Agastat 10A-K150J,K,L,M T,P,A,H Differential Pressure Ind.

Barton DPIS-10-121A,B,C,D R,T,QT,P,H,A Sw.

Pressure Switch Static-0-Ring PS-10-100A,B,C,0 R,T,P,A Pressure Switch

-Static-0-Ring PS-10-101A,B,C,0 R,T,P,A Pressure Switch Static-0-Ring PS-10-120A,C,E,G R,T,P,A Pressure Switch Static-0-Ring PS-10-120B,D,F,H R,T,P,A Pump Motor GEC0 2AP35 QT,R,T,P,A,M Pump Motor GEC0 2BP35 QT,R,T,P,A,M Pump Motor GEC0 2CP35 QT,R,T,P,A,M Pump Motor GECO 2DP35 QT,R,T,P,A,M Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-10-13A,B,C,0 R,T,QT,P,H,A Valve Actuator Limitorque MO-10-15A R,T,QT,P,H,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-23-57 T,P,QT,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-10-15B,C,0 T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-10-16A,B,C,0 T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-10-17 T,QT,P,H,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M02-10-18 T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-10-25A R,T,QT,P,H,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-10-258 R,T,QT,P,A l

l Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-10-33 T,QT,P,A,H l

B-5

/

j g.

~

APPENDIX'B (continu:d)'

Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.

Deficiency Valve Actuator-

'Limitorque M0-10-34A,B R,T,QT,P,H,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-10-38A,B T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator

-Limitorque M0-10-39,A,8 T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-10-154A,8 R,T,QT,P,H,A Valve Actuator Limitorque MO-10-174 T,QT,P,A

+

Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-10-176 T,QT,P,H,A Pressure Switch Barton DPIS-14-81A T,P,A,H Diff. Pressure Switch Barton DPIS-14-81B,C,D

.T,P,A,H Pressure Switch Static-0-Ring PS-14-044A,B,C,0 R,1,P,A Motor

.GEC0 3AP37 T,P,A,H l

Motor-GEC0 3BP37 T,P,A I

Motor GEC0 3CP37 T,P,A Motor.

GECO 3DP37 T,P,A, Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-14-005A,B,C,0 T,QT,P,A 1

' Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-14-007A,B,C,0 T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-14-11A,B R,T,QT,P,H,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-14-12A,B R,T,QT,P,H,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-14-26A,8 T,QT,P,A i

Solenoid Pilot Valve ASCO SV-30452,53,61,62 QT,T,P,A,M i

Solenoid Pilot Valve ASCO SV-30457,58 T,P,A Solenoid Valve ASCO SV-30459,60,63,64,67,68 T,P,A

. Solenoid Valve A5C0 SV-30465 T,P,A Solenoid Valve ASCO SV-30466 T,P,A Solenoid Pilot Valve ASCO SV-30469-1,2 T,P,A,M Solenoid Valve ASCO SV-30470-1,2 T,P,A,M j

B-6

APPENDIX B (continued)

Equipment

Description Manufacturer Component No.

Deficiency Solenoid Valve

'ASCO SV-30479-1,2 T,P,A,M

- Solenoid Valve Target-Rock

.SV-5948A,B T,P,A

Solenoid Valve Target Rock SV-5949A,B T,P,A

- Solenoid Valve Target Rock SV-5950A,B T,P,A Solenoid Valve

. Target Rock SV-5951A,B T,P,A Solenoid Valve

' Target Rock

'SV-5960A,B,C,0 T,P,A

~ Solenoid Valve Target ~ Rock SV-5961A,B,C,0 T,P,A Analyzer Rack Comsip Delphi, Inc. AS215 T,RT,P,H,A Analyzer Rack Comsip Delphi, Inc. BS215 T,RT,P,H,A Analyzer Rack Comsip Delphi, Inc. CS215 T,RT,P,H,A Analyz'er Rack Comsip Delphi, Inc. 05215 T,RT,P,H,A Temperature Element Burns Engineering TE-5931A,B,C,0 R,T,QT,P,H,A Temperature Element Burns Engineering TE-5936A,B,C,0 R,T,QT,P,H,A-

. Temperature Element Burns Engineering TE-5937A.B,C,D R,T,QT,P,H,A Temperature Element Burns Engineering TE-5938A,B,C,D

.R,T,QT,P,H,A Temperature Element Burns Engineering TE-5939A,B,C,0 R,T,QT,P,H,A Temperature Element Burns Engineering TE-5941A,B,C,D R,T,QT,P,H,A Temperature Element Burns Engineering TE-5942A,B,C,D R,T,QT,P,H,A Temperature Element Burns Engineering TE-5943A,B,C,0 R,T,QT,P,H,A Temperature Element Burns Engineering TE-5944A,B,C,D R,T,QT,P,H,A Radiation Element GEC0 RE-17-430A,B,C,0 R,T,QT,RT,P,A Radiation Element GEC0 RE-17-432A,B,C,0 R,T,QT,RT,P,A Area Cooler Joy, H.K. Porter 3EV24,3FV24 R,T,QT,P,H,A Reliance Motor

~ Area Cooler Joy, H.K. Porter 3GV24,3HV24 R,T,QT,P,H,A Reliance Motor L

e B-7 y

APPENDIX B (continu:d)~

E uipment 1

Description Manufacturer Component No.

Deficiency Area Cooler Joy, H.K. Porter 3AV25 R,T,QT,P,H,A Reliance Motor Area Cooler Joy, H.K. Porter 3CV25,3DV25 R,T,QT,P,H,A Reliance Motor Area Cooler Joy, H.K. Porter 3EV25,3FV25 R,T,QT,P,H,A Reliance Motor Area Cooler Joy, H.K.- Porter 3GV25,3HV25 R,T,QT,P,H,A Reliance Motor Air Operated Valve ASCO A0-3334A,8 T,P,A,M Air Operated Valve ASCO A0-3335A,8 T,P,A,M Air Operated Valve ASCO A0-3335C,0 T,P,A,M Air Operated Valve ASCO A0-3335E,F T,P,A,M Air Operated Valve ASCO A0-3335G,H 1,P,A,M

~

Air Operated Valve ASCO A0-3336A,B T,P,A,M Air Operated Valve ASCO A0-3336C,0 T,P,A,M Air Operated Valve ASCO A0-3336E,F T,P,A,M Air Operated Valve ASCO A0-3336G,H T,P,A,M Control Station (Switch)

GEC0 N-3682,N-3683 T,P,1,A,M Control Station (Switch)

GEC0 N-3692,N-3693 QT,R,T,P,H,A,M Control Station (Switch)

GEC0 N-3772,N-3773 QT,R,T,P,H,A,M Control Station (Switch)

GEC0 N-3783,N-3784 QT,R,T,P,H,A,M Control Station (Switch)

GEC0 N-3792,N-3793 T,P,H,A,M Control Station (Switch)

GEC0 N-3861,N-3871 T,P,H,A,M Control Station (Switch)

GEC0 N-3884,N-3885 R,T,P,H,A,M Control Station (Switch)

GEC0 N-3991,N-3992 T,P,H,A,M Control Station (Switch)

GEC0 N-3994,N-3995 R,T,QT,P,H,A Diff.- Pressure Switch Dwyer DPS-30400-3,4 R,T,QT,P,H,A B-8

-+y's

APPENDIX B (continued)

Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.

Deficiency Diff. Pressure Switch Dwyer DPS-30400-5,6 R,T,QT,P,H,A Diff.' Pressure Switch Dwyer DPS-30400-7,8 R,T,QT,P,H,A Diff. Pressure Switch Dwyer DPS-30400-9,10 R,T,QT,P,H,A Diff. Pressure Switch Dwyer DPS-30400-11,12 R,T,QT,P,H,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-14-70&71 T,QT,P,H,A Diff. Pressure Switch Dwyer DPS-30400-13,14 R,T,QT,P,H,A Diff. Pressure Switch Dwyer DPS-30400-15,16 R,T,QT,P,H,A Diff. Pressure Switch Dwyer DPS-30400-17,18 R,T,QT,P,H,A Diff. Pressure Switch Dwyer DPS-30400-19,20 R,T,QT,P,H A Area Cooler H.K. Porter, Joy 3AV23,3BV23 R,T,QT,P,H,A Reliance Motor Area Cooler H.K. Porter, Joy 3AV24,3BV24 R,T,QT,P,H,A Reliance Motor Area Cooler H.K. Porter, Joy 3CV24,30V24 R,T,QT,P,H,A Reliance Motor Time Delay Relay AC132,8C132 R,T,QT,P,H,A (63-0400-3 thru 20)

CC132,0C132 Aux Relay (63X-System)

GEC0 AC131,BC132 R,T,P,H,A,J CC132,0C132 Diff. Press. Ind. Switch Barton DPIS-12-124A,B R,T,P,A Diff. Press. Ind. Switch Barton DPIS-13-83,84 T,P,A,H Valve Actuator Limitorque M02-12-15 T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-12-18 T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque MO-12-68 T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M02-13-15 T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-13-16 R,T,QT,P,H,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-13-27 T,QT,P,H,A B-9

h:

[-

-e

-APPENDIX B (continuid).

Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.

Deficiency Valve' Actuator Limitorque MO-13-30 T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-13-41 T,QT,P,A

' Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-3200A,B T,QT,P,A LValve Actuator.

Limitorque h0-3201A,8 T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-5244 T,QT,P,H,A Air Operated Valve ASCO A0-3505 T,P,A Air Operated Valve ASCO A0-3506 T,P,A Air Operated Valve ASCO A0-3507 T,P,A Air Operated Valve ASCO A0-3509 T,P,A Air Operated Valve ASCO A0-3510 T,P,A,M Air Operated Valve ASCO A0-3511 T,P,A i

Air Operated Valve ASCO A0-3512 T,P,A Air Operated Valve-ASCO A0-3513,14 T,P,A,M Air Operated Valve ASCO A0-3519 T,P,A Air Operated Valve ASCO A0-3520 T,P,A,M Air Operated Valve ASCO A0-3521A,B T,P,A,M Air Operated Valve ASCO A0-3523 T,P,A,M Air Operated Valve ASCO A0-3968 T,P,A,M t

Air Operated Valve ASCO A0-3969A T,P,A i

Plug Connectors Pyle National Model No.P-A-207499 T,QT,P,A P&R Thru P-A-207503 P&R Air Operated Valve ASCO A0-5235 T,P,A,M Air Operated Valve Atkomatic SV-3671A,B,C,D,E,F T,QT,P,A,RPN I

B-10

=

APPENDIX B (continued)

Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.

Deficiency Solenoid Valve Atkomatic SV-3671G T,QT,P,A,RPN Solenoid Valve Atkomatic SV-3978A,B,C,D,E,F,G T,QT,P,H,A,RPN Solenoid Valve-Atkomatic SV-3980 T,QT,P,A,RPN Low Voltage Power and ASCO SV-20-82,83,94,95 T,P,A,M Control Penetration Low Voltage' Power and GEC0 3N105A,B,C,D A,M Control Penetration 3N106A,B,C,D High Voltage Physical Science N101A,B,C,0,E,F A,M Penetration Load Center ITE 30810,11,12,13 R,T,QT,P,H,A Motor Control Center Cutler Hammer 30836 R,T,QT,P,H,A Motor Control Center Cutler Hammer 30B37 R,T,QT,P,H,A Motor Control Center Cutler Hammer 30838 R,T,QT,P,H,A Motor Control Center Cutler Hammer 30B39 R,T,QT,P,H,A Motor Control Center Cutler Hammer 30D11 R,T,QT,P,H,A Motor Control Center Cutler Hammer N310025A R,1,QT,P,H, A Motor Control Center Cutler Hammer N310025B R,T,QT,P,H,A Cable Rockbestos Model No.Firewall IV T,QT,P,A Cable Rockbestos Model No.?yrotrol T,QT,P,A Wire GECO Model No. SIS T,QT,P,A Splice Insulation Raychem Model No. WCSF-N T,QT,P,A Connectors Burndy Model No. Hylink-Ysv T,QT,P,A Terminal Block Bechanan Model No. 2B100 T,QT,P,A Splice Insulation AMP Model No. 603325-1,603328-1 T,QT,P,A Model No. 603329-1 i

B-11

' APPENDIX B (continued)

Equipment-Description Manufacturer Component No.

Deficiency Terminal Block.

Marathon Model No. 1600 T,QT,P,A Sealant' Tape Raychem Model No. 5-1024 lT,QT,P,A Tape Scotch Model No. 17 T,QT,P,A Sealant Scotch Model No. Scotch-Kote T,QT,P,A Tape Scotch Model No. 27 T,QT,P,A Tape Scotch Model No. 130C T,QT,P,A Plug Connectors Pyle National Model No. P-A-197499 P&R.

T,QT,P,A thru P-A-207503 P&R Tape Scotch Model No. 70 T,QT,P,A Terminal Block GECO Model No. CR-151 R,A,M I

a l

2 B-12.

y

. +,.

APPENDIX C Equipment Considered Acceptable or Conditionally Acceptable (Category 4.3)

Item Equipment Manufacturer Model Deficiency No equipment in this category for Peach Bottom Unit 3.

4 a

1 1

4 C-1 t

i

-_r

, _ _ - ~ _,

a i

i APPENDIX D l

Safety Related Systems List Function System Emergency Reactor Shutdown Safeguards Actuation Reactor Protection Control Rod Drive 2

Containment Isolation Primary Containment Isolation Hain Steam Main Feedwater Residual Heat Removal Reactor Water Cleanup Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Emergency Service Water High Pressure Coolant Injection Reactor Core Cooling High Pressure Coolant Injection Residual Heat Removal (Lew Pressure Coolant Injection Mode)

Core Spray Automatic Depressurization Containment Heat Removal Residual Heat Removal (Torus Cooling Mode)

Emergent. Service Water

'The NRC staff recognized that there are differences in nomenclature of the systems because of plant vintage and engineering design; consequently, some systems performing identical or similar functions may have different names.

In those instances, it was necessary to verify the system (s) function with the responsible IE regional reviewer and/or the licensee.

2 Includes other systems with isolation valves which are not given below.

3To be covered as part of TMI-2 lessons learned.

D-1

1 APPENDIX D (Continued)

Function

' System Core Residual Heat Removal Residual Heat Removal (Shutdown Cooling Mode)-

Emergency Service Water Prevention of Significant Containment Atmospheric Dilution Release of Radioactive Material to Environment Standby Gas Treatment Radiation Monitoring 3

Radiation Sampling Steam Leak Detection Supporting Systems Electrical Power Control Room and Safety Equipment Area Ventilation 1

D-2 i

l

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