ML20004F522
| ML20004F522 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 06/05/1981 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20004F521 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8106190006 | |
| Download: ML20004F522 (29) | |
Text
o
't U
.pn ""009 UNITED STATES
'8
- o,
)'j'g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION E'i WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555.
. g.'
J. j -
"(..s, /
SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT BY THE
-0FFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION BRANCH FOR THE PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH BOTTOM UNIT 2 DOCKET NO. 50-277 8106l'90009,
CONTENTS Page 1
Introduction...............................................
1 2
Background.................................................
1 2.1 Purpose.....................................-.........
2 2.2 Scope.................................................
2 3
S ta f f Eval ua ti o n...........................................
2 3.1 Completeness of Safety-Related Equipment..............
2 3.2 Service Conditions....................................
3 3.3 Temperature, Pressure, and Humidity Conditions Inside Containment....................................
4 3.4 Temperature, Pressure, and Humidity Conditions Outside Containment...................................
4 3.5 Submergence...........................................
5 3.6 Chemical Spray.......
5 3.7 Aging.................................................
5 3.8 Radiation (Inside and Outside Containment)............
6 4
Qualification of Equipment.................................
7 4.1 Equipment Requiring Immediate Corrective Action.......
7 4.2 Equipment Requiring Additional Information and/or Corrective Action....................................
7 4.3 Equipment Considered Acceptable or Conditionally Acceptable............................................
5 5
Deferred Requirements......................................
9 6
Conclusions................................................
9 APPENDIX A Equipment Requiring Immediate Corrective Action..
A-1 APPENDIX B Equipment Requiring Additional Information and/or Corrective Action................................
B-1 APPENDIX C Equipment Considered Acceptable or Conditionally Acceptable.......................................
C-1 APPENDIX D Safety-Related Systems List......................
D-1 iii
o SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION BRANCH FOR PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH BOTTOM UNIT 2 DOCKET NO. 50-277 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 1 ' INTRODUCTION General Design Criteria 1 and 4 specify that safety-related electrical equip-ment in nuclear facilities must be capable of performing its safety related function under environmental conditions associated with all normal, abnormal, and accident plant operation.
In order to ensure compliance with the cri-teria, the NRC staff required all licensees of operating reactors to submit a reevaluation of the qualification of safety related electrical equipment which may be exposed to a harsh environment.
2 BACKGROUND On February 8, 1979, the NRC Office of Inspectioa and Enforcement (IE) issued to all licensees of operating plants (except those included in the systematic evaluation program (SEP)) IE Bulletin IEB 79-01, ' Environmental Qualification of Class IE Equipment." This bulletin, together vith IE Circular 78-08 (issued on May 31, 1978), required the licensees to perturm reviews to assess the adequacy of their environmental qualification programs.
Subsequently, Commission Memorandum and Order CLI-80-21 (issued on May 23, 1980) states that the DOR guidelines and portions of NUREG-0588 (which were issued on January 14, 1980, as enclosures 4 and 5 to IEB-79-01B) form the requirements that licensees must meet regarding environmental qualification of safety-related electrical equipment in order to satisfy those aspects of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC)-4.
This order also requires the staff to complete safety evaluation reports (SERs) for all oper-ating plants by February 1, 1981.
In addition, this order requires that the licensees have qualified safety-related equipment installed in their plants by June 30, 1982.
Supplements to IEB 79-01B were issued for further clarification and definition of the staff's needs.
These supplements were issued on February 29, September 30, and October 24, 1980.
In addition, the staff issued orders dated August 29, 1980 (amended in September 1980) and October 24, 1980 to all licensees.
The August order required that the licensees provide a report, by Movember.1,1980, documenting the qualification of safety related electrical equipment.
The October order required the establishment of a central file location for the maintenance of all equipment qualification records.
The central file was mandated to be established by December 1, 1980.
The order also required that all safety related electrical equipment be qualified by June 30, 1982.
In i
.e response, the' licensee submitted information through letters ciated Marr.h 3, April 15, August 26, and October 31, 1980.
2.1 Purpose The purpose'of this SER is to identify equipment whose qualification program does not provide sufficient assurance that the equipment is capable of performing the design function in hostile environments.
The staff position relating to any identified deficiencies is provided in this report.
2.2 Scope The scope of.this report ~is limited to an evaluation of the equipment which must function in order to mitigate the consequences of a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) or a high energy-line-break (HELB) accident, inside or outside containment, while subjected to the hostile environments associated with these accidents.
3 STAFF EVALUATION The staff evaluation of the licersee's responses included an onsite inspection of selected Class IE equipment e,d an examination of the licensee's report for completeness and acceptability.
The criteria described in the D0R guidelines and in NUREG-0588, in part, were used as a basis for the staff evaluation of the auequacy of the licensee's qualification program.
The NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement performed-(1) a preliminary evaluation of the licensee's response, documented in a Technical Evaluation Report-(TER) and (2) an onsite verification inspection (June 4-5, 1980) of selected safety-related electrical equipment.
The main steam and feedwater system was inspected at "each Bottom Unit 2 to verify proper installation of equipment, overall interface integrity, and manufacturers' nameplate data.
The manufacturer's name and model number from the nameplate data were compared to information given in the Component Evaluation Work Sheets (CES) of the licensee's report.
The site inspection is documented in report IE 50-277/80-17.
No deficiencies were noted.
For this review, the documents referenced above have been factored into the overall staff evaluation.
3.1 Completeness of Safety-Related Equipment c
In_accordance with IEB 79-01B, the licensee was directed to (1) establish a list of systems and equipment that are required to mitigate a LOCA and an HELB and (2) identify components needed to perform the function of safety-related display information, post-accident sampling and moriitoring, and radiation monitoring.
The staff developed a generic master list based upon a review of plant safety analyses and emergency procedures.
The instrumentation selected includes parameters to monitor overall plant performance as well as to monitor the per-formance of the systems on the list.
The systems list was established on the basis of the functions t. rat must be performed for accident mitigation (without
' regard to location of equipment relative to hostile environments). _
o The list of safety-related systems provided by the licensee was reviewed against the staff-developed master list.
Based up)n information in the licensee's submittal, the equipment location reference:,, and in some cases subsequent conversations with the licensee, the staff has verified and determined that the systems included in the licensee's submittal a:- those required to achieve or support:
(1) emergency reactor shutdown, (2) containment isolation, (3) reactor core cooling, (4) containment heat removal, (5) core residual heat removal, and (6) prevention of significant release of radioactive material to the environment.
The staff therefore concludes that the systems identified by the licensee (listed in Appendix D) are acceptable, with the exception of those items discussed in Section 5 of this report.
Display instrumentation which provided information for the reactor operators to aid them in the safe handling of the plant was not specifically identified by the licensee.
A complete list of all display instrumentation mentioned in the LOCA and HELB emergency procedures must be provided.
Equipment qualification information in the form of summary sheets should be provided for all components of the display instrumentation exposed to harsh environments.
Instrumentation which is not considered to be safety related, but which is m u tioned in the emergency procedure should appear on the list.
For these instruments, (1) justi-fication should be provided for not considering the instrument safety related, and (2) assurance should be provided that its subsequent / failure will not mis-lead the operator or adversely affect the mitigation of the consequences of the accident.
The environmental qualification of post-accident sampling and minitoring and radiation monitoring equipment is closely related to the review of the TMI Lessons-Learned modifications and will be perfomed in conjunction with that review.
The licensee identified 569 items of equipment which were assessed by the staff.
3.2 Service Conditions Commission Memorandum and Order CLI-80-21 requires that the D0R guidelines and I
the "For Comment" NUREG-0588 are to be used as the criteria for establishing the adequacy of the safety-related electrical equipment environmental qualifi-cation program.
These documents provide the option of establishing a bounding pressure and temperature condition based on plant-specific analysis identified in the licensee's Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) or based on generic profiles using the methods identified in these documents.
On this basis, the staff has assumed, unless otherwise noted, that the analysis for developing the environmental envelopes for Peach Bottom Unit 2, relative to the temperature and pressure has been performed in accordance with the requirements stated above. The staff has reviewed the CES to ensure that the qualification data envelope the specifications established by the licensee.
During this review, the staff assumed that for plants designed and equipped with an automatic containment spray system which satisfies the single-failure criterion, the main-steam-line-break (MSLB) environmental conditions are enveloped by the large-break-LOCA environmental conditions.
The staff assumed,
p.
3 and requires the licensee to verify, that the containment spray system is not subjected to a disabling single-component failure and therefore satisfies the rei irements of Section 4.2.1 of the 00R guidelines.
Eatiipment submergence has also been addressed where the possibility exists tt
"~ of equipment may result from HELBs.
.ature, Pressure, and Humidity Conditions Inside Containment 3.3 i t..
The l_icensee has provided the results of accident analy:>es as follows:
Max Temp ( F)
Max Press (psig)
Humidity (%)
LOCA 297 49 100 MSLB (not provided)
(not provided)
(not provided)
The staff has concluded that the minimum temperatt.re profile for equipment
_ qualification purposes should include a margin to account for analytical uncertainties in the calsulated temperature profiles for postulated accidents.
A margin of 20 F above saturation is considerd to be appropriate for either a
_ postulated LOCA or MSLB, whichever is controlling, as to potential adverse environmental effects on equipment.
The licensee's specified temperature (service condition) of 297 F does not satisfy the above requirement.
The licensee should update his equipment summary tables to a temperature margin of at least 20 F above saturation.
If there is any equipment that does not meet the staff position, the licensee must provide either justification that the equipment will perform its intended function under the specified conditions or propose corrective action.
3.4 Temperature, Pressure, and Humidity Conditions Outside Containment The licensee has provided the temperature, pressure, humidity and applicable environment associated with an HELB outside containment.
The following areas outside containment have been addressed:
Room Description (1) 2, 3, 4, 5, 101, 102, 103, 104 RHR pumps (2) 6 HPCI pumps (3) 7 RCIC pumps (4) 8 Reactor sump pump (5) 9, 10, 11, 12 Core spray pumps (6) 33 SGTS room (7) 105 Cooling water equipment room (8) 107, 108 Vacuum breaker area (9) 201 Control rod drive (10) 203, 204 Isolation valve room (11) 205 CRD equipment area (12) 207 Drywell access (13) 208 Steam tunnel (14) 209 Corridor (15) 210 Neutron monitoring room (16) 212 CRD equipment area _.
(17) 220, 221 Feedwater heater room (18) 223 Piping area
-(19) 400 Isolation valve room (20) 403 Operating area (21) 404, 405 RWCU pump room (22) 407 RWCU regenerative heat exchanger (23) 408, 409 RWCU nonregenerative heat exchanger (24) 410 Transfer pump room (25) 430 Backwash receiving pump room (26) 500 Holding pump compartments (27) 501 Laydown area (28) 502 New fuel storage (29) 504 Source storage and calibration (30) 505 Holding pump compartment (31) 506 Reactor building vent equipment area (32) 507 Steam separator and dryer storage pit (33) 508 Laydown area (34) 509 Filter denineralizer compartments (35) 510, 511 Prefilter and HEPA compartments (36) 529 Ventilating equioment area (37) 601, 603 Laydown area (38) 604 Washdown area The staff has verified that the parameters identified by the licensee for the MSLB are acceptable.
3.5 Submergence The maximum submergence levels have been established and assessed by the licensee.
Unless otherwise noted, the staff assumed for this review that the methodology employed by the licensee is in accordance with the appropriate criteria as established by Commission Memorandum and Order CLI-80-21.
The licensee's value for maximum submergence is the 123 ft elevation.
No equipment has been identified as being below this level.
It is not clear from the information submitted that submergence of safety-related electrical equipment outside of containment was addressed.
The licensee should address this area more specifically in the 90-day response and upgrade the CES as appropriate.
3.6 Chemical Spray The licensee has not identified containment spray as a safety related system, and credit has not been taken in the analysis.
The system is manually operatec' and uses demineralized water.
Because spray is available and could be used, any equipment upon which it impinges must be qualified for the spray parameter.
The licensee should provide additional information to resolve this concern.
3.7 Aging Section 7 of the 00R guidelines does not require a qualified life to be estab-lished for all safety-related electrical equipment.
However, the following actions are required:,
-(1) Make'a detailed comparison of existing equipment and the materials identi-fied in Appendix C of the D0R guidelines.
The first supplement to
.IEB-79-01B requires _ licensees to utilize the table in Appendix C and identify any additional materials as the result of their effort.
(2) Establish an ongoing program to review surveillance and maintenance records to identify potential age-related degradations.
(3) Establish component maintenance and replacement sc M ules which include considerations of aging characteristics of the installed components.
The licensee indentified a number of components for which a specified quali-
.fied life was established (for examples, 5 years, 15 years, or 40 years). In its assessment of this submittal, the staff did not review the adequacy of the methodology nor the basis used to arrive at these values; the staff has assumed that tne established values are based on state-of-the-art technology and are acceptable.
For this review, however, the staff requires that the licensee submit supple-mental information to identify and verify the degree of conformance to the above requirements.
The response should include all the equipment identified as required to maintain functional operability in harsh environments.
The licensee indicated that this phase of their response is outstanding and that the review is in progress.
The staff will review the licensee's response when it is submitted and discuss its evaluation in a supplemental report.
3.8 Radiation (Inside and Outside Containment)
The licensee has provided values for the radiation levels postulated to exist following a LOCA.
An acceptable methodology that may be employed to determine these values were presented to the licensee as part of the NRC staff criteria contained in the D0R guidelines, in NUREG-0588, and in the guidance provided in IEB-79-01B, Supplement 2.
Therefore, for this review, the staff has assumed that, unless otherwise noted, the values provided have been determined in accordance with the prescribed criteria.
The staff review determined that the values to which equipment was qualified enveloped the requirements identified by the licensee.
The value required by the licensee inside containment is between 2.64 x 106 to 6.24 x 107 rads for the integrated dose.
These values do not envelope the D0R guideline requirements (4 x 107) and therefore are not acceptable.
The radia-tion service condition provided by the licensee is lower than provided in the guidelines for gamma and ben radiation.
The licensee is requested to either provide justification for using the lower service condition or use the guide-lines for both gamma and beta radiation.
If the former 9ption is chosen, then the analysis, including the basis and assumptions used in the analysis and a sample calculation, should be provided.
A required value outside of containment of 9.6 x 106 to 3.35 x 107 rads has been used by the licensee to specify limiting radiation levels in the RHR pump room.
These values appear to consider the radiation levels influenced by the source term methodology associated with post-LOCA rec'rculation fluid lines' and are, therefore, acceptable.
4 QUALIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT The following subsections present the staff's assessment, based on the licensee's submittal, of the qualification status of safety related electrical equipment.
The staff has separated the safety-related equipment into three categories:
(1) equipment requiring immeCiate corrective action, (2) equipment requiring additional qualification info.mation and/or corrective action, and (3) equipment considered acceptable if the staff's concern identified in Section 3.7 is satisfactorily resolved.
In its assessment of the licensee's submittal, the NRC staff did not review the methodology employed to determine the values established by the licensee.
However, in reviewing the data sheats, the staff made a determination as to the stated conditions presented by the licersee.
Additionally, the staff has not completed its review of supporting documentation referenced by the licensee (for example, test reports).
It is expected that when the review of test reports is complete, the environmental qualification data bank established by the staff will provide the means to cross reference eacn supporting document to the referencing licensee.
If supporting documents are found to be unacceptable, the licensee will be required to take additional corrective actions to either establish qualification or replace the item (s) of concern.
This effort will begin in early 1981.
An appendix for each subsecuan of this report provides a list of equipment for which additional information and/or corrective action is required.
Where appropriate, a reference is provided in the appendices to identify deficiencies.
It should be noted, as in the Commission Memorandum and Order, that the deficien-cies identified do not necessarily mean that equipment is unqualified.
- However, they are cause for concern and may require further case-by-case evaluation.
4.1 Equipment Requiring Immediate Corrective Action Appendix A identifies equipment (if any) in this category.
The licensee was asked to review the facility's safety-related electrical equipment.
The licencee's review of this equipment identified one area of concern requiring immediate corrective action; therefore, a licensee event report (LER) was subaitted.
In this review, the staff has not identified any additional safety-related electrical equipment which is not able to perform its intended safety function during the time in which it must operne.
4.2 Equipment Requiring Additional Information and/or Corrective Action Appendix B identifies equipment in this category, including a tabulation of deficiencies.
The deficiencies are noted by a letter relating to the legend (identified below), indicating that the information provided is not sufficient i
for the qualification parameter or condition...
Legend R
- radiation T
- temperature QT qualification time RT - required time P
pressure H
- humidity CS - chemical spray A
- material-aging evaluation; replacement schedule; ongoing equipment surveillance S
- submergence M
- margin I
- HELB evaluation outside containment not completed QM qualification method RPN - equipment relocation or replacement; adequate schedule not provided EXN - exempted equipment justification inadequate SEN - separate effects qualification justification inadequate QI - qualification infor;ation being developed RPS - equipment relocation or replacement schedule provided As noted in Section 4, these deficiencies do not necessarily mean that the equipment is unqualified.
However, the deficiencies are cause for concern and require further case-by-case evaluation.
The staff has determined that an acceptable basis to exempt equipment from qualification, in whole or part, can be established provided the following can be established and verified by the licensee:
-(l)
Equipment does not perform essential safety functions in tha harsh environ-ment, and equipment failure in the harsh environment will not impact safety-related functions or mislead an operator.
(2a) Equipment performs its function before its exposure to the harsh environ-ment, and the adequacy for the time margin provided is adequately justified, and (2b) Subsequent failure of the aquipment as a result of the harsh environment does not degrade other safety functions or mislead the operator.
(3) The safety-related function can be accomplished by some other designated equipment that has been adequately qualified and satisfias the single-failure criterion.
(4) Equipment will not be subjected to a harsh environment as a result of the postulated accidant.
The licensee is, therefore, required to supplement the information presented by providing resolutions to the deficiencies identified; these resolutions should include a description of the corrective action, schedules for its completion (as applic'able), and so forth. The staff will review the licensee's response, when it is submitted, and discuss the resolution in a supplemental report.
It should be noted that in cases ~whue testing is being conducted, a condition may arise which results in a determination by the licensee that the equipment does not satisfy the qualification test requirements.
For that equipment, the licensee will be required to provide the proposed corrective action, on a timely basis, to ensure that qualification can be established by June 30, 1982.
4.3' Equipment Considered Acceptable or Conditionally Acceptable Based on the staff review of the licensee's submittal, the staff identified the equipment in Appendix C as (1) acceptable on the basis that the qualifi-cation program adequately enveloped the specific environmental plant parameters, or (2) conditionally acceptable subject to the satisfactory resolution of the staff concern identified in Section 3.7.
For the equipment identified as conditionally acceptable, the staff determined that the licensee did not clearly (1) state that an equipment material evaluation was conducted to ensure that no known materials susceptible to degradation because of aging have been
- used, (2) establish an ongoing program to review the plant surveillance and main-tenance records in order to identify equipment degradation which may be age related, and/or (U propose a maintenance program and replacement schedule for equipment identified in item 1 or equipment that is qualified for less than the life of the plant.
The licensee is, therefore, required to supplement the information presented for equipment in this category before full acceptance of this equipment can be established.
The staff will review the licensee's response when it is sub-mitted and discuss the resolution in a supplemental report.
5 DEFtRRED REQUIREMENTS IEB 79-01B, Supplement 3 has relaxed the time constraints for the submission of the information associated with cold -hutdown equipment and TMI lessons-learned modifications.
The staff has r d red that this information be provided by February 1, 1981.
The staff will pr'.de a supplemental safety evaluation addressing these concerns.
6 CONCLUSIONS The staff has determined that the licensee's listing of safety-related systems and associated electrical equipment whose ability to function in a harsh environment following an accident is required to mitigate a LOCA or HELB is I
complete and acceptable except as noted in Section 3 of this report.
The staff has also determined that the environmental service conditions tu be met i
by the electrical equipment in the harsh accident environment are appropriate, except as noted in Section 3 of this report.
Outstanding information identified in Section 3 should be provided within 90 days of receipt of this SER.
l
.g.
~
The staff has reviewed the qualification of safety-related electrical equipment to the extent defined by this SER and has found no outstanding items which would require immediate corrective action to ensure the safety of plant opera-tion.
However, the staff has determined that many items of safety-related electrical equipment identified by the licensee for ti.is review do not have adequate documen~tation to ensure that they are capable of withstanding the harsh environmental service conditions.
This review was based on a comparison of the qualification values with the specified environmental values required by the design, which were provided in the licensee's summary sheets.
Subsection 4.2 identified deficiencies that must be resolved to establish the qualification of the equipment; the staff requires that the information lacking in this category be-provided within 90 days of receipt of this SER.
Within this period, the licensee should either provide documentation of.the missing cualification information which demonstrates that such equipment meets the DDR
{,uidelines or NUREG-0588 or commit to a corrective action (requalification replacement, relocation, and so forth) consistent with the requirements to establish qualification by June 30, 1982.
If the latter option is chosen, the licensee must provide justification for operation until such corrective action is complete.
Subsection 4.3 identified acceptance and conditional acceptance based on noted deficiencies.
Where additional information is required, the licensee ssould respond within 90 days of receipt of this SER by providing assurance that these concerns will be satisfactorily resolved by June 30, 1982.
The staff issued to the licensee Sections 3 and 4 of this report and requested, under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(f), that the licensee review the deficien-cies enumerated and the ramifications thereof to determine whether safe operation of the facility would be impacted in consideration of the deficiencies.
The licensee has completed a preliminary review of the identified deficiencies and has determined that, after due consideration of the deficiencies and their ramifications, continued safe operation would not be adversely affected.
Based on these considerations, the staff concludes that conformance with the above requirements and satisfactory completion of the corrective actions by June 30, 1982 will ensure compliance with the Commission Memorandum and Order of May 20, 1980.
THe staff further concludes that there is reasonable assurance of contained safe operation of this facility pending completion of these corrective actions.
This conclusion is based on the following:
(1) that there are no outstanding items which would require immediate corrective action to assure safety of plant operation (2) some of the items found deficient have been or are being replaced or relocated, thus improving the facility's capability to function following a LOCA or HELB (3) the harsh environmental conditions for which this equipment must be qualified result from low probability events; events which might reasonably be anticipated during this very limited period would lead to less demanding service conditions for this equipment.
APPENDIX A-Equipment Requiring Immediate Corrective Action (Category 4.1)
-Item Equipment Manufacturer Model Deficiency No Equipment in this category for Peach Bottom Unit 2.
s A-1
,my, v
7 r-e,-
,, - y
, r,,,..., -. - - - - -
~
-<e.
c--.
.-,.--,.--ac,
.-m...
2,.--
y APPENDIX B Equipment Requiring Additional Information and/or Corrective Action (Category 4.2)
LEGEND:
R - Radiation T - Temperature QT - Qualification time -
RT - Required time P - Pressure H - Humidity CS - Chemical spray A - Material aging evaluation, replacement schedule, ongoing equipment surveillance S - Submergence M - Margin I - HELB evaluation outside containment not completed QM - Qualification method RPN - Equipment relocation or replacement, adequate schedule not provided EXN - Exempted equipment justification inadequate SEN - Separate effects qualification justification inadequate QI - Qualification information being developed RPS - Equipment relocation or replacement schedule provided Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiency Differential Pressure Switch Rosemount DPIS-2-116A,B T,P,A Differential Pressure Switch Rosemount DPIS-2-116C,D T,P,A Differential Pressure Switch Rosemount DPIS-2-117A,B T,P,A Differential Pressure Switch Rosemount DPIS-2-117C,0 T,P,A Differential Pressure Sw tch Rosemount DPIS-2-110A,B T,P,A i
l Differential Pressure Switch Rosemount DPIS-2-118C,D T,P,A Differential Pressure Switch Rosemount DPIS-2-119A,8 T,P,A Differential Pressure Switch Rosemount DPIS-2-119C,0 T,P.A Differential Pressure Rosemount DPT-2-116A,B T,P,A Transmitter B-1 l
r APPENDIX B (continued)
Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiency Differential Pressure Rosemount DPT-2-116C,0 T,P,A Transmitter
. Differential Pressure Rosemount DPT-2-117A,8 T,P,A Transmitter Differential Pressure
'Rosemount DPT-2-117C,D T,P,A Transmitter Differential Pressure Rosemount DPT-2-118A,B T,P,A Transmitter Differential Pressure Rosemount DPT-2-118C,0 T,P,A Transmitter Differential Pressure Rosemount DPT-2-119A,B T,P,A Transmitter Differential Pressure Rosemount DPT-2-119C,0 T,P,A Transmitter Position Limit Switch Namco P05-02-86A,B,C,0 T,QT,P,H,A Pressure Switch Barksdale PS-2-3-52A R,T,P,A Pressure Switch Barton PS-2-3-52B,0 T,P,H,A 4
Pressure Switch Barksdale PS-2-3-52C R,T,P,A Level Ind. Switch Yarway LIS-2-3-57A,B R,T,P,H,A Level Ind. Switch Yarway LIS-2-3-58A,B R,T,P,H,A Level Ind. Switch Rosemount LIS-2-3-83A,8 T,Qf,P, A Level-Ind. Switch
~Rosemount LIS-2-3-99A,B,C,0 T,P,A Level Inc Switch Rosemount LIS-2-3-101A,B,C,0 T,P,A Level Ind. Switch Rosemount LISH-2-3-72A,B,C,D T,QT,P,A Level Switch Rosemount LSL-2-3-72A,B,C,0 1,QT,P,A Level Switch Rosemount LSLL-2-3-72A,B,C,0 T,QT,P,A Level Transmitter Rosemount LT-2-3-72A,B,C,0 T,P,A B-2
m
)
' APPENDIX B.(continued)
Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiency Level Transmitter Rosemount LT-2-3-83A,B T,P,A Level Transmitter Rosemount LT-2-3-99A,B,C,D T,P,A Level Transmitter Rosemount LT-2-3-101A,B,C,0 T,P,A Pilot Solenoid Valve Automatic RV-02-71A,B,C,C,K QT,T,P,A Valve Corp.
Pilot Solenoid Valve Automatic RV-02-710,E,F,H,J,L QT,T,P,A Valve Corp.
Valve Actuator Liiaitorque MO '-38A,B QT,T,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-02-53A,B QT,T,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-02-74 QT,T,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-2-77
'QT,T,P,H,A Air-0perated Valve ASCO A0-02-39 T,P,A Air Manifold Pilot Valve Automacic A0-02-80A,B,C,D QT,T,P,A Valve Corp.
Air Manifold Automatic A0-02-86A,B,C,0 QT,T,P,A,H Valve Corp.
Air-0perated Valve ASCO A0-02-316 T,P,A Air-Operated Valve ASCO A0-02-317 T,P,A Inverter Topaz INV02-3-402 A,B R,A,H Power Supply Elma E/S-02-3-402A,B R,QT,A,H Position Limit Switch Namco P05-02-80A,B,C,0 T,QT,P,A,H Auxiliary Relay Agastat 5A-K25A,B,C,D T,P,A,H Auxiliary Relay Agastat 5A-K26A,B,C,D T,P,A,H Auxiliary Relay Agastat 5A-K28A,B,C,0 T,P,A,H Auxiliary Relay Agastat 5A-K29A,B,C,0 T,P,A,H Auxiliary Relay Agastat 5A-K30A,B,C,0 T,P,A,H B-3
APPENDIX B (continued)
Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiency Auxiliary Relay Agastat 5A-K31A,B,C,0 T,P,A,H Pressure Switch Static-0-Ring PS-5-12A,B 9,T,y i Pressur? Switch Static-0-Ring PS-5-12C,0 R,T,P,A Solenoid Valve GEC0/ASCO SV-3-13-118 T,P,QT,A,M Solenoid Valve GEC0 SV-3-13-117 T,P,QT,A,M Differential Pressure Barton DPIS-23-76,23-77 T,P,A,H Indicator Switch Pressure Switch Barksdale PS-23-68A,B,C,0 R,T,P,A Pressure Switch Static-0-Ring PS-23-97A,B R,T,P,A Pressure Switch Static-0-Ring PS-23-84-1 R,T,P,A Flow Switch Barton FS-23-78 R,T,P,A Flow Transmitter GEC0 FT-23-82 R,T,QT,P,H,A Level Switch Robert Shaw LS-23-91A&B R,T,P,A HPCI Pump / Turbine GEC0 MPL23-1&2 R,T,QT,P,H,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-23-14 T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-2-23-15 T,P,QT,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-23-16 T,P,QT,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-23-17 T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-23-19 T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-23-20 T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-23-21 T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-23-24 T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-23-25 R,T,QT,P,H,A Valve Actuator Limitorqye M0-23-31 T,QT,P,A B-4
je APPENDIX B (continued)
Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiency Valve Actuator Limitorque-M0-23-58 T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-4245 T,QT,P,H,A Air-0perated Valve ASCO A0-23-42 T,P,A Air-0perated Valve ASCO A0-23-43 T,P,A v
Auxiliary Relay Agastat 10A-K150C,D P,T,A,H Auxiliary Relay.
Agastat 10-K150E,F,G,H T,P,H,A Auxiliary Relay Agastat 10A-K150J,K,L,M T,P,A,H Differential Pressure Barton DPIS-10-121A,B,C,D R,T,QT,P,H,A Indicator Switch Pressure Switch Static-0-Ring PS-10-100A,B,C,D R,T,P,A Pressure Switch Static-0-Ring S-10-101A, B, C,0 R,T,P,A Pressure Ssitch Static-0-Ring PS-10-120A,C,E,G R,T,P,A.
. Pressure Switch Static-0-Ring PS-10-120B,D,F,H R,T,P,A Pump Motor GEC0 2AP35 QT,R,T,P,A,M Pump Motor GEC0 28P35 QT,R,T,P,A,M Pump Motor GEC0 2CP35 QT,R,T,P,A,M Pump Motor ~
GEC0 2DP35 QT,R,T,P,A,M
.i Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-10-13A,B,C,D R,T,QT,P,H,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-10-15A R,T,QT,P,H,A 1
Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-10-15B,C,0 T,QT,P,A L
Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-10-16A,B,C,0 T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-10-17 R,T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M02-10-18 T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-10-25A,B T,QT,P,A i
B-5
APPENDIX B (continued)
Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiency
-Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-10-33 T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-10-34A,B R,T,QT,P,H,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-10-38A,8 T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-10-39A,B T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque MO-10-154A,B R,T,QT,P,H,A Valve Actuator Limitorque MO-10-174 T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-10-176 T,QT,P,A Pressure Transmitter Rosemount PT-10-100A-D T,P,A Pressure Indicator Switch Rosecount PISHH-10-100A-D T,P,A Pressure Switch Rosemount.
PSH-10-100A-D T,P,A,M Auxiliary Relay Agastat 10A-K158A,B,C,0 T,P,H,A AuxiliaryRelay Agastat 10A-K159 T,P,H,A Auxiliary Relay Agastat 10A-K160 T,P,H,A Auxiliary Relay Agastat 10A-K161 T,P,H,A Auxiliary Relay Agastat 10A-K162 T,P,H,A Auxiliary Relay Agastat 10A-K158E,F,G,H T,P,H,A Pressure Switch Barton DPIS-14-81A T,P,H,A Differential Pressure Switch Barton DPIS-14-81B,C,D T,P,A,H Pressure Switch Static-0-Ring PS-14-044 A, B, C,!1 R,T,P,A l
Motor GEC0 2AP37 T,P,A Motor GEC0 2BP37 T,P,A Motor GEC0 2CP37 T,P,A t
l Motor GEC0 2DP37 T,P,A l
l Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-14-005A,B,C,0 T,QT,P,A
\\
B-6
APPENDIX B (ctntinuia)
Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiency Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-14-007A,B,C,0 T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-14-11A,B R,T,QT,P,H,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-14-12A,B R,T,QT,P,H,A Valve Actuator Lir.ii.orque M0-14-26A,B T,QT,P,A Differential Pressure Switch dwyer DPS-00014,15 R,T,QT,P,H,A Pneumatic-Electric Switch Johnson PS-00012,13 R,T,QT,P,H,A,RPN Heater American 0A&BE65 R,T,QT,P,H,A Air Filter Fan Motor GEC0 0A,B,CV20 R,T,QT,P,H,A Solenoid Valve ASCO SV-0009,10,11 T,P,A,M Solenoid Valve ASCO SV-00012,13 T,P,A,M Solenoid Valve ASCO SV-00475-1,2 T,P,A,M Solenoid Valve ASCO SV-00476-1,2 T,P,A,M Solencia Pilot Valve ASCO SV-20452,53,61,62 T,QT,P,A,M Solenoid Pilot Valve ASCO SV-20457,58 T,P,A,M Solenoid Valve ASCO SV-20459,60,63,64, T,P,A,M 67,68 Solenoid Valve A3C0 SV-20465 T,P,A,M Solenoid Valve ASCO SV-20466 T,P,A,M Solenoid Pilot Valve ASCO SV-20469-1,2 T,P,A,M Solenoid Valve ASCO SV-20470-1,2 T,P,A,M Solenoid Valve ASCO SV-20479-1,2 T,P,A,M Time Delay R: :,
Agastat 2-ATDPU T,P,H,A,M Solenoid Valve Target Rock SV-4948A,B T,P,A Solenoid Valve Target Rock SV-4949A,8 T,P,A B-7 i
p~
APPENDIX B (continued)
Quipment Description Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiency Solenoid Valve Target Rock SV-4950A,B T,P,A
. Solenoid Valve Target Rock SV-4951A,8 T,P,A Solenoid Valve Target Rock SV-4960A,B,C,0 T,P,A Solenoid Valve Target Rock SV-4961A,B,C,D T,P,A Analyzer Rack Comsip Delphi, AS215 T,RT,P,H,A Inc.
Analyzer Rack Comsip Delphi, BS215 T,RT,P,H,A Inc.
Analyzer Rack Comsip Delphi, CS215 T,RT,P,H,A Inc.
Analyzer Rack Comsip Delphi, DS215 T,R1,P,H,A Inc.
Temperature Element 6arns TE-4931A,B,C,D R,T,QT,P,H,A Engineering Temperature Element Burns TE-4936A,B,C,D R,T,QT,P,H,A Engineering
. Temperature Element Burns TE-4937A,B,C,D R,T,QT,P,H,A Engineering Temperature Element Burns TE-4938A,B,C,D R,T,QT,P,H,A Engineering Temperature Element Burns TE-4939A,B,C,D R,T,QT,P,H,A Engineering Temperature Element Burns TE-4941A,B,C,0 R,T,QT,P,H,A Engineering Temperature Element Burns TE-4942A,B,C,0 R,T,QT,P,H,A Engineering Temperature Element Burns TE-4943A,B,C,0 R,T,QT,P,H,A Engineering Temperature Element Burns TE-4944A,B,C,0 R,T,QT,P,H,A j
Engineering Radiation Element GECO RE-17-430A,B,C,0 R,T,QT,RT,P,A l
Radiation Element GEC0 RE-17-432A,B,C D R,T,QT,RT,P,A B-8
^ h APPENDIX.B (continued)
Equipment-Description ~
' Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiency Area Cooler-
- Joy, 2EV24, 2FV24' R,T,QT,P,H,A H. K. Porter, Reliance Motor Area Cooler
- Joy, 2GV24, 2HV24 R,T,QT,P,H,A H. K. Porter, Reliance Motor Area Cooler
- Joy, 2AV25, 2BV25 R,T,QT,P,H,A H. K. Portt Reliance docor Area Cooler
- Joy, 2CV25, 2DV25 R,T,QT,P,H,A H. K. Porter, Reliance Motor Area Cooler
- Joy, 2EV25, 2FV25 R,T,QT,P,H,A H. K. Porter, Reliance Motor Area Cooler
- Joy, 2GV25, 2HV25 R,T,QT,P,H,A H. K. Porter, Reliance Motor Air-Operated Valve ASCO A0-2334A,B T,P,A,M Air-0perated Valve ASCO A0-2335A,B T,P.A,M Air-0perated Valve ASCO A0-2335C,D T,P,A,M Air-0perated Valve ASCO A0-23;5E,F T,P,A,M Air-0perated Valve ASCO A0-2335G,H T,P,A,M Air-0perated Valve ASCO A0-2: 36A,B T,P,A,M Air-0perated Valve ASCO A0-2336C,0 T,P,A,M Air-0perated Valve ASCO A0-2336E,F T,P,A,M Air-Operated Valve ASCO A0-2336G,H T,P,A,M Control Station (Switch)
GEC0 N-3682, N-3683 T,P,H,A,M Control Station (Switch)
GEC0 N-3692, N-3693 R,T,P,H,A,M
- Control Station (Switch)
GEC0 N-3772, N-3773 R,T,P,H,A,M B-9
m APPENDIX B'(continued)
Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiency Control Station (Switch)
GECO N-3783, N-3784 R,T,P,H,A,M Control Station (Switch)
GEC1 N-3792, N-3793 T,P,H,A,M Control Station (Switch)
GEC0 N-3861, N-3871 T,P,H,A,M Control Station (Switch)
GEC0 N-3884, N-3885 R,T,P,H,A,M Control Station (Switch)
GEC0 N-3991, N-3992 T,P,H,A,M Control Station (Switch)
GEC0 N-3994, N-3995 R,T,P,H,A,M Differential Presrurr Switch Dwyer DPS-20400-3,4 R,T,QT,P,H,A Differential Pressure Switch Dwyer DPS-20400-5,6 R,T,QT,P,H,A Differential Pressure Switch Dwyer DPS-20400-7,8 R,T,QT,P,H,A Differential Pressure Switch Dwyer DPS-20400-9,10 R,T,QT,P,H,A Differential Pressure Switch Dwyer DPS-20400-11,12 R,T,QT,P,H,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-14-70&71 T,QT,P,H,A Differential Pressure Switch Dwyer DPS-20400-13,14 R,T,QT,P,H,A Differential Pressure Switch Dwyer DPS-20400-15,16 R,T,QT,P,H,A Differential Pressure Switch Dwyer DPS-20400-17,18 R,T,QT,P,H,A Differential Pressure Switch Dwyer DPS-20400-19,20 R,T,QT,P,H,A Area Cooler H. K. Porter, 2AV23, 2BV23 R,T,QT,P,H,A Joy, Reliance Motor Area Cooler H. K. Porter, 2AV24, 2BV24 R,T,QT,P,H,A Joy, Reliance Motor Area Cooler H. K. Porter, 2CV24, 20V24 R,T,QT,P,H,A Joy, Reliance Motor Time Delay Relay AC132, BC132, R,T,QT,P,H,A (6?-0400-3 thru 20)
CC132, DC132 Aux. Relay (63X-system)
GECO AC132, BC132, R,T,P,H,A,M CC132, DC132 i
B-10
3 APPENDIX B (continued)
Equipment Descri9 tion Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiency Differential Pressure Barton DPIS-12-124A,B R,T,P,A Ind. Switch Differential Pressure Barton DPIS-13-83,84 T,P,A,H Ind. Switch Valve Actuator Limitorque M02-12-15 T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-12-18 T,QT,P,A Va ve Actuator Limitorque M0-12-68 T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M02-13-15 T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-13-16 T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-13-27 T,QT,P,A
.~
Valve Actuator Limitorque MO-13-30 T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-13-41 T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-2200A,B T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-2201A,B T,QT,P,A Valve Actuator Limitorque M0-4244 R,T,QT,RT,P,H,A Air-0perated Valve ASCO A0-2505 T,P,A,M Air-Operated Valve ASCO A0-2506 T,P,A,M Air-Operated Valve ASCO A0-2507 T,P,A,M Air-Operated Valve ASCO A0-2509 T,P,A,M Air-Operated Valve ASCO A0-2510 T,P,A,M Air-0perated Valve ASCO A0-2511 T,P,A,M Air-Operated Valve ASCO A0-2512 T,P,A,M Air-0perated Valve ASCO A0-2513,14 T,P,A,M Air-0perated Valve ASCO A0-2519 T,P,A,M Air-0perated Valve ASCO A0-2520 T,P,A,M B-11
APPENDIX B'(centinuid)'
Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiency Air 0perated Valve ASCO A0-2521A,B T,P,A,M Air-Operated Valve ASCO A0-2523 T,P,A,M Air-0perated Valve ASCO A0-2968 T,P,A,M Air-Operated Valve ASCO A0-2969A,B T,P,A,M Plug Connectors Pyle National Model No.
T,QT,P,A P-A-207499 P&R thru P-A-207503 P&R Air-Operated Valve ASCO A0-4235 T,P,A,M Air-0perated Valve Atkomatic SV-2671A,B,C,D,E,F R,T,QT,P,H,A,RPN Solenoid Valve ackomatic SV-2671G T,QT,P,A,RPN Solenoid Valve Atkomatic SV-2978A,B,C,D,E,F,G T,QT,P,H,A,RPN Solenoid Valve Atkomatic SV-2980 T,QT,P,A,RPN Solenoid Valve ASCO SV-20-82,83,94,95 T,P,A,M Low Voltage Power and GEC0 2N105A,B,C,0, A,M Control Penetration 2N106A,B,C,D High Voltage Penetration Physical N101A,B,C,0,E,F A,M i
Science Load Center ITE 20B10,11,12,13 R,T,QT,P,H,A Motor Control Center Cutler Hammer 20836 R,T,QT,P,H,A Motor Control Center Cutler Hammer 20B37 R,T,QT,P,H,A Motor Control Center Cutler Hammer 20B38 R,T,QT,P,H,A Motor Cor. trol Center Cutler Hammer 20839 R,T,QT,P,H,A l
Motor Control Center Cutler Hammer 20011 R,T,QT,P,H,A l
Motor Control Center Cutler Hammer 20011A R,T,QT,P,H,A l
Motor-Control Center Cutler Hammer N210025A R,T,QT,P,H,A l
Motor Control Center Cutler Hammer N210025B R,T,QT,P,H,A l
L B-12
w APPENDIX B (continu;d)
Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiency Cable Rockbestos Model No.
T,QT,P,A Firewall III Cable Rockbestos Model No. Pyrotrol T,QT,P,A Wire GECO Model No. SIS T,QT,P,A Splice Insulation Raychem Model No. WCSF-N T,QT,P,A Connectors
' Burndy Model No. HYLINK-YSV T,QT,P,A Terminal Block Bechanan Model No. 28100 T,QT,P,A Splice Insulation AMP flodel No. 603325-1, T,QT,P,A 603328-1, 603329-1 Terminal Block Marathon Model No. 1600 T,QT,P,A Sealant Tape Raychem Model No. 5-1024 T,QT,P,A Tape Scotch Model No. 17 T,QT,P,A Sealant Scott h Model No.
T,QT,P,A Scotch-Kote Tape Scotch Model No. 27 T,QT,P,A Tape Scotch Model No. 130C T,QT,P,A Plug Connectors Pyle National Model No.
T,QT,P,A P-A-207499 P&R thru P-A-207503 P&R Tape Scotch Model No. 70 T,QT,P,A Terminal Block GECO Model No. CR-151 R,A,M B-13
APPENDIX C Equipment Considered Acceptable or Conditionally Acceptable (Category 4.3)
None in this category C-1
o APPENDIX D Safety-Related Systems List 1 Function System Emergency Reactor Shutdown Safeguards Actuation Reactor Protection Control Rod Drive Containment Isolation Primary Containment Isolation 2 Main Steam Main Feedwater Residual Heat Removal 4
Reactor Water Cleanup Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Emergency Service Water High Pressure Coolant Injection Reactor Core Cooling High Pressure Coolant Injection Residual Heat Removal (Low Pressure Coolant Injection Mode)
Core Spray Automatic Depressurization Containment Heat Remcval Residual Heat Removal (Torus Cooling Mode)
Emergency Service Water TThe NRC staff recognized that there are differences in nomenclature of the systems because of plant vintage and engineering design; consequently, some systems performing identical or similar functions may have different names.
In those instances, it was necessary to verify the system (s) function with the responsible IE regional reviewer and/or the licensee.
2 Includes other systems with isolation valves which are not given below.
3To be covered as part of TMI-2 lessons learned.
D-1
APPENDIX D'(Continued)
Function System Core Residual Heat Removal Residual Heat Removal (Shutdown Cooling Mode)
Emergency Service Water Prevention of Significant Containment Atmospheric Dilution i
Release of Radioactive Material to Environment Standby Gas Treatment Radiation Monitoring 3
Radiation Sampling Steam Leak Detection Supporting Systems Electrical Power Control Room and Safety Equipment j
Area Ventilation t
t i-i I
f f
l
(
g-g
.-- -