ML20004D257
| ML20004D257 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 06/02/1981 |
| From: | Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| GL-81-10, NUDOCS 8106090080 | |
| Download: ML20004D257 (37) | |
Text
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY N
CH ATTANOOG A, TENNESSEE 37401 4
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400 Chestnut Street Tower II D
JUN 0 ff.1981
- h June 2, 1981
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u.s. rextra ** C comisson Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director T, s Office br Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Washington, DC 20555 Dear Mr. Denton!
In the Matter of the
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Docket Nos. 50-259 Tennessee Valley Authority
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50-260 50-296 In response to D. G. Eisenhut's letter to All Licensees dated February 18, 1981, (Generic Letter 81-10), enclosed is,information regarding TVA's conceptual design for the energency response facilities (Enclosure 1) and appropriate implementation dates (Enclosure 2). This response is a section-by-section review of NUREG-0696 as it relates to TVA's plans for upgraded emergency response facilities in support of an emergency situation at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant.
Based on NRC's approval in concept of TVA's centralized emergency management system (reference D. G. Eisenhut's March 19, 1981 letter to H. G. Parris), we hereby request exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50.47(b) and Part 50 Appendix E regarding a near site EOF at Browns Ferry.
Because changes or modifications to the conceptual design described in this submittal could delay implementation at Browns Ferry, we request prompt review of this submittal so that we may proceed with our efforts to meet the proposed implementation dates. We are available to meet with you to further discuss this submittal and address any questions or concerns to assist in a prompt approval of our conceptual design. Your cooperation in this matter is greatly appreciated.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AITTHORITY
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. M. Mills,tManager Nuclear Regulation and Safety
- Subscri d sworn to before me thi day o 01h 1981.
O Hotary Public My Commission. Expires
-b EncJosures 81060'900T4 An Equal Opportunity Employer
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ENCLOSURE 1 CONCEPTUAL DESIGN OF EMERGRNCY RESPONSE FACILITIES BR0hNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Since the accident at Three Mile Island, TVA has recognized the need for a, highly reliable and effective emergency management system. During the past year, TVA has proceeded in upgrading its existing emergency facilities and communications and planning for future systems in'an effort to meet the emergency management functions as defined in NUREG-0696, these three functions being:. (1) nanagement of the overall emergency response, (2) coordination of radiation assessments, and (3) management of recovery operations. To perform these functions, TVA is very confident that well-prepared emergency plans and well-trained emergency staffs, coupled with the existing TVA emergency facilities and proposed facilities (as defined in this submittal), provide a viable system for managing and responding to a'n emergency situation at Browns i
Ferry Nuclear Plant.
The following sections define TVA's existing and proposed emergency response facilities, communications, data systems, etc., and show how TVA's overall Integrated emergency management system will indeed comply with the functional' criteria defined in NUREG-0696.
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- 2.. : TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER 2.1 Func' ion t
'The onsite technica'l support center (TSC) will-provide the following functions:
Provide plant management and technical support to plant operations personnel ~during emergency conditions Relieve the reactor operators of peripheral duties and communica-tions not directly related to reactor system operation Prevent congestion in the control' room Conduct detailed off-line analysis of plant conditions and trends to support and augment control room analysis
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- Serve as a primary communication link to the control room for obtaining additional plant data
' R5trieve ~ accident data for postaccident assessments and plant recovery The TSC will be the emergency operations work area for designated.
technical ~ engineering, and management personnel; and a small staff of NRC: personnel. The TSC supervisor will use the resources of the TSC to provide guidance and. technical assistance to the control room durinc in emergency. The TSC will have facilities to support plant management and technical personnel who will be assigned there during
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an emergency.
~2.2 Location The onsite TSC at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFNP) will be located adjacent to the control room in the control building (refer to Figure 1). -The walking time from the TSC to the control room will be well within the recommended 2 minute guideline. This proximity will also provide access to information in the control room that is not
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available in the TSC parameter set.
'Since the_TSC is located in the same building as the control room there can be safe and timely movement of personnel between the TSC and control room under emergency conditions. There will be no major security barriers between these two facilities other than access control stations. However,' adequate access to the main control room-
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will be established and maintained.
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~2.3' Staffina and Training L
. The staffing and training of personnel assigned to the TSC will be in accordance with the NRC approved Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFNP) i Radiological Emergency-Plan (REP) and REP Implementing Procedures r
Document (REP-IPD).
2.4 Size
.The TSC will be large enough to provide:
i Working space for the personne1~ assigned to the TSC Space for the TSC data display equipment
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l Space for communications equipment
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I Space for storage' of and/or access to plant records j
A separate room for private NRC consultations
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l The proposed physical arrangement of the technical support center conceptual design is'shown in Figure 1.
It is composed of three distinct. a reas: an operations room, a conference room, and a private NRC office area. The operations room is the heart of the TSC.
.It contains the data displays (three CRT's), high-speed line printer, telecopier, videocopier, and up-to-date plant drawings,
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l records, emergency plans, procedures, etc., necessary to carry out j
the TSC support function. Seating and work space is provided for 20 people. Additional seating can be provided at the work tables around the outer wall. The conference room with seating capacity for eight will provide a location where technical discussions and debates can l-be. conducted without disturbing personnel working in the operations In addition, a private office area for NRC is provided.
room.
This area is shown with two desks, and seating capacity for three people.
r The arrangement has seating capacity for 31 people with the option of i
adding additional seating capacity around the outer work tables. The working space for the TSC complex is approximately 1065 square feet.
2.5 Structure
.The TSC will be located in a seismic category I structure.
2.6 Habitability p
The habitability system for this area is the same one provided for the main control room.
The air supply is filtered by an Engineered Sa fety Features (ESP) system and.is monitored for contaminants. Stay times for the'TSC are the same as the main control room.
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2.7 Communications The TSC.shall be the primary.onsite communications center'for th'e plant during an emergency. Primary and backup voice communcations shall be provided in the TSC to communicate with all.TVA emergency facilities. Communications shall also be available between-the TSC and plant main control room and operations support center.
l TVA will provide the following communications in the TSC:
TVA microwave telephone system Bell. telephones-i-
Priority access dedicateil voice communications circuit (4-way tic
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> for the Central Emergency. Control Center (CECC), Knoxville
' Emergency. Control Center (KECC), Muscle Shoals Emergency Centrol Center (HSECC), and BFNP TSC) l
-Extension off dedicated voice circuit from the Emergency Control Center (Main control-room) to the'CECC Intercom to' tie the TSC-to the main control rooms, shift
-engineer's of fice, auxiliary control rooms, and the main control
-room electrical-control desk l
Connections to the sound-powered telephone system l
l Extension ofi the NRC dedicated communications circuits.(ENS and l
HPN)
Two phone lines dedicated for NRC personnel 1
Facsimile machine and required phone line j
'2.8 -Instrumentation, Data System _ Equipment, and Power Supplies The technical support center data system will be a computerized, current generation, real time monitoring system.
It will provide the capability to gather, store, and display information needed to support the TSC function. The system will operate independent of l
actions in the control room.- As such, it will not disrupt or interfere with control room operations. When signals to the data system are derived from sensors providing input to safety equipment or displays, isolation will be provided to ensure that the TSC system will not degrade the. performance of safety system equipment or H
displays.
Figu.e 2 sh'ows the TSC data system configuration. There are three major hardware subsystems:
input,-processor,.and display subsystems.
With the exception of the processor (computer), a multiple or dual component design scheme'is utilized. This conceptcminimizes the ef fect of component ' failure on system functions.
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The input subsystem consists of two intelligent multiplexers. Each-multiplexer will contain a microprocessor, memory, and point cards for_ analog or discrete inputs. This conf (guratlon will:-
i Allow variations and/or changes in sampling fregeeney for both analog and digital inputs Improve data throughput by utilizing direct memory access between computer and multiplexer Permit extensive data error checking to verify accurate data
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transfer betwecu multiplexer and computer To the extent practical, like or redundant inputs are divided between
.each multiplexer to minimize data loss if a multiplexer were to fail.
In addition, spare communication cables will be installed between each multiplexer and the processor to minimize repair time should a cormunications cable fail.
The processor subsystem consists of a small computer with data storage unit and required peripheral devices. This system will
. process _and; store plant data for use in the technical support center and control room.
Scan rates for analog inputs will be 1/10, 1, 2, 5, 10, 20, or 60 seconds.- The scan rate for digital inputs will bc ; second.
If experience shows that the rates chosen are inappropriate, the scan rate can be adjusted for any input parameter.
All processed data, analog and digital, will be tagged: " good,"
" bad," " questionable," or " entered." Good or bad will be based on sensor quality checks and data transfer error checks. Entered data This data v.11dity check will, to the will be tagged " entered."
3 extent possible, ensure that accurate information is provided to the TSC and control room.
Two hours of pre event and 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> of post-event data storage will be provided. The scan rate (storage rate) chosen for each parameter will be consistent with the use of that parameter in post-accident' analysis.
Spare computer capacity will be provided to accommodate a reasonable amount of additional function. The system will also be designej with the capability to expand the input and output subsystems.
The display system lwill be the primary man-machine interface.
Included will be graphics CRT's with keyboards, videocopiers,
- and a.high-speed printer.
The videocopier produces a black and white copy of CRT screens and will be located-in the-TSC. The high-speed printer will operate at
-285 lines per minute'and will be located in the TSC.
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The technical support center output devices will'he arranged in d'
. separate work stations in order to allow task groups to gather around.
.the different stations to analyze and request various data.
The power system for the TSC data system has been developed using a reliable, high-quality ~ system comparable to that for similar type j
Emain control room equipment..This system will supply power to all components required for the TSC data handling system (refer to Figure 3).
The-TSC power system equipment will not meet safety grade requirements but will be implemented using field tested.
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-commercial grade products. All power system components will be qualitatively comparable to that type component supplying power
'for similar type main control room equipment. The TSC power system will not interfere with the standby emergency system; therefore, it will not degrade the capability or reliability for the safety-related power systems.
The TSC data system will receive power from an uninterruptible power supply (UPS). The UPS will normally receive 480-volt ac power from a unit board. A manual switch will be provided to transfer the power supply from one unit board to another unit board. However, in the event the 480-volt supply is lost, the UPS will automatically be y
transferred, via a diode autioneered circuit, to a 250-volt dc battery system. In addition, circuit transients or power-supply failures and fluctuations will not cause a loss of any store? Jata vital to TSC functions.
In the unlikely event power is. unavailable for more than'30 minutes, the TSC data acquisition system will be designed to resume ritorage and display upon TSC power system restoration.
The TSC data system reliability is designed to achieve an operational unavailability goal of 0.01 during all plaiit operation conditions above cold shutdown.
The design of the TSC data system equipment will incorporate human factor. engineering.
2.9 -Technical Data-and Data System s
The TSC technical data system will receive, store, process, and display information acquired from different areas of the plant as needed to perform the TSC function. The data available for display in the TSC-will provide plant management, engineering, and technical i
personnel information to aid the control room operators in handling t
emergency conditions. The data system will provide access to accurate and reliable information sufficient to determine:
l Plant steady-state operation conditions prior to the accident Transient. conditions producing the initiating event Plant ~ system dynamic behavior throughout the course of the event
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1 In developing the parameter set, the following list of events were considered.
Large Break LOCA
. Intermediate Break LOCA Small Break LOCA Interface LOCA TMI. Type Transient /LOCA Loss of Generator
. Loss of AC Power Loss of DC Power Turbine Bypass Valves Open Loss of Feedwater Steamline Break Rod Ejection It is recognized that this listing does not encompass all possible abnormal or emergency events (known and unknown) that could occur at a nuclear plant. However, we believe that the events ICsted cover such a broad spectrum that a parameter set derived from this listing would provide sufficient information to support. the role of the TSC.
In addition, the location of the TSC (within 2 minutes of the control room) will permit ready access to data not included in the TSC parameter set.
To support the role of the TSC, the parameter set must be adequate to permit:
(1) evaluation of mitigation efforts, (2) validation of mitigation efforts, and (3) evaluation of plant status. These functional requirements of the parameter set are explained below.
Evaluation of Mitigation Efforts--These are the parameters used to assess the accuracy of event identification and the ef fectiveness of manual and automatic actions that are taken to mitigate the event.
Validation of Mitigation Efforts--These are the parameters used to validate the effectiveness of operator action to mitigate the event or provide an alternate means of assessing the effectiveness of mitigation efforts should the primary indicator fail. These parameters will be used independently or in combination to verify the response or trend of a primary indicator; they are not intended to verify numerical values. i
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4 Evaluation of Plant Status--These parameters are used to assess the nuclear and thermal-hydraulic state of the plant, to estimat e damage to fuel and radioactivity barriers, and assist the control room in determining the cause of the event. Verifying operability of safety.
systems and determining the cause of the event are the principal plant status evaluation functions performed by the main control room.
- The above criteria were' used to develop the parameter set listed in Table 1.
. Data storage and recall capability will be provided. This will include at least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> of pre-event data and 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> of post-event data. 'The sample frequency will be consistent with the use of the data.
A srfficient number of data display and printout devices will be i
pr9vided in the TSC to allow all TSC personnel to perform their assigned tasks (refer to Figure 2).
Trend information display'or time-history display capability will be provided to give TSC personnel a dynamic view of the plant status during abnormal
. operating conditions. The TSC displays will be designed so that call up, manipulation, and presentation of data car. be easily performed.
2.10 -Records Availability and Management The TSC will have a repository of plant records and procedures l
l at the disposal of TSC personnel to aid'in their technical analysis and evaluation of emergency conditions. The following l
reference materials will be provided in the TSC.
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant FSAR Ilrowns Ferry Nuclear Plant Technical Sperifirations
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Surveillance Instructions (Selected)
Technical Instructions (Selected) i Radiological Control Instructions
. Hazard Control Instructions Operating Instructions General Operating' Instructions HFNP-REP and REP Implementing Procedures !)ocument Plant Functional Drawings Emergency Operation Instructions I
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3.0 OPERATIONAL SUPPORT CENTER The Operational Support Center (OSC) has already been provided to NHC in the NRC approved BfNP REP and REP-IPD.
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- 4.0i CENTRALIZED EMERGdNCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF).
.TVA utilizes a; centralized emergency management system in support.of' f.-owns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFNP)..The centralized EOF design consists of three corporate emergency centers and includes a near-site local recovery center to accomodate TVA, NRC, and other emergency response personnel.
- This system includes Lproper assignment of responsibilities and facilities
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for carrying out the following functions -in an emergency situation:
Management 'of Overall TVA emergency response, Coordina'. ions of' radiological and environmental assessments, Recommendations of public protective actions, and Coordination of_ emergency response activities with Federal
.and State agencies.
Following is a description of the four facilities which make up TVA's centralized EOF design.
4.' t. Central Emergency Control Center (CECC) 4.1.1 Function The CECC houses the staff responsible for the management of-the overall emergency response and providing direct technical support to the affected plant. This staff is composed of a CECC Director, Technical Assistants, the Operations Duty i
Specialist,lthe Division of Nuclear Power Emergency-(DNPE)
Staff, Information Office Staf f, and representatives of key TVA organizations.
The CECC Director is responsible for coordinating the TVA emergency response and is the primary interface with state
-agencies, making appropriate recommendations in regards to public protective action.
The CECC provides the essential coordination activities with State and Federal agencies as necessary.
_4.1.2_
Location, Structure, and Habitability The CECC is located on the first floor of a 17 story office
. building in Chattanooga, TN.
This building provides offices for the Manager of. Power, Power Public Information, the -
RegulatoryfStaff, and all of.the corporate personnel for the
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Division of Nuclear Power.
The CECC is located far enough' away from any nuclear: site so
'as notito: require any,special habitability considerations.
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4.1.3. Staffing and Training.
- St'affing and training requirements for the CECC are in
'accordance with the NRC approved BFNP REP and REP-IPD.
,4.1.4'. Size >
The CECC provides working space and facilities for all assigned staff.- Some 4,600 square feet of floor space has 1
.been allocated - for;the staf f to. carry out its role (refer to Figure 4).
Included is 1,500 square feet of-dedicated space for the CECC staff, a 300 square foot conference room, 700 square feet. dedicated for operations duty specialist functions, the duty speciali3t being the 24-hour per day manned position assigned as initial contact for radiological L
emergencies, and.2,100 square feet of of fice space that can be made immediately available for NRC and other agency representatives.
In addition, a 3,000 square foot room is J
set aside for media briefing during exercises and actual caergencies and is' located adjacent to the secured area of the CECC.
4.1.5 Radiological Monitoring Due to the location of the CECC, radiation monitoring systems H
are not required.
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l 4.1. 6' Communications Advanced communications have been provided in the CECC for dissemination of information to responsible emergency organizations. The CECC contains primary and backup systems to communicate with the Muscle Shoals Emergency Center l
(NSECC), Knoxville Emergency Control Center (KECC), Local
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Recovery Center (LHC), Browns Ferry Technical Support Center I
(TSC), all corporate information of f ices, and the primary emergency centers for the State of Alabama (located in Montgomery, AL, and Decatur, AL.)
These communications systems are as follows:
Priority access dedicated voice communications (established between'the CECC, MSECC, KECC, plant control room, plant.TSC, Corporate Information Offices, and the primary emergency centers for the State l
of Alabama).
Bell Telephones
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.TVA Microwave Telephone System Federal Telephone System (FTS)
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NAWAS F
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TVA's Power Systeas Operation Radio p'
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' Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) System (To transmit hard-J I
copy information between.all TVA emergency centers
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and State emergency _ centers)
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Personne1' pagers (personnel pagers have been (assigned to emergency support personnel) l_
Further description of the CECC communication systems are provided in the NRC approved BFNP REP and REP-IPD.
In addition to the above,'TVA requests that the NRC install extensions off the NRC's ENS and HPN circuits in the CECC.
4.1.7. Instrumentation, Data System Equipment, and Power Supply The CECC instrumentation design consists of CRT's to provide the necessary data, as processed through a CECC central processor, to analyze and. exchange information on plant conditions.
4.1.8 Technical Data and Data System l
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The entire plant TSC data base and SPDS display capability (plant system data as well as meteorological and radiological data) will be data-linked to a CECC central data processor (refer to Figure 9).
This data will be available "Real Time" to CECC personnel. Access to this data base will allow for quick assessments of' environmental conditions, proper coordination of radiological monitoring activities, and
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appropriate recommendations to off-s.
authorities for
,public protective actions.
i Records Availability and Management L
4.1.9 1
The CECC has ready access to up-to-date plant drawings, records, procedures, cuergency plans, Vendor material, etc., for assisting in _overall management of emergency response resources. A corporate document control center-is located in the same building as the CECC. This center is accessible in the event of an emergency.
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~4.2. Muscle Shoals Emergency Control Center (MSECC)-
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4.2.1 Functions-The MSECC houses the' staff responsible for performing-
' radiological and environmental assessments, dose proje.ttons, and -for m-king protective action recommendations to the CECC.
.TVA provides well-equipped emergency vans for each plant with additional vans available at Muscle Shoals, Alabama and Vonore, Tennessee, to respond to radiological emergencies at any plant site. These
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vans are radio equipped and carry extensive environmental
-monitoring equipment. One van can be operating immediately with others available within about an hour. of notification. These vans are directed through
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I the field operations command center of the MSECC.
The NSdCC is responsible for environmental and radiological assessments and formulating ' recommendations for off-site protective actions. Provisions have been made for a media
'1 briefing center in close proximity to the MSECC. Security will be provided to the MSECC as necessary.
4.2.2-Location, Structure, and Habitability The MSECC is located in the River Oaks Building in Muscle-Shoals, Alabama, headquarters of TVA's Office of Health and Safety.
The MSECC is located far enough away from any nuclear site so as not to require any special habitability considerations.
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4.2.3 S_taff_ing and Training
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Staf fing and training requirements for the MSECC are in accordance with the NHC approved BFNP REP and REP-IPD.
. 4.2.4-Size t
The HSECC provides adequate working space and facilities for all assigned staff.
Some,1,500' square feet of floor space has been allocated for this staff to carry out its role (refer to Figure 5). Included is 1,000 square feet of space i
for the MSECC director and support staff.
4.2.5 Radiological'Monitorin.g l
E Due to the location of the MSECC, radiation monitoring -
sy tems are not required.
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y,a 4.2.6Ecommunications Ad0ance communication systems have been provided in'the MSECC for: receipt of data from field monitoring teams and for dissemination of information to responsible organizations.
Priority access dedicated telephone communications have been
-established between the MSECC, CECC, KECC, Browns Ferry TSC, Lall corporate information offices, and the State' of Alabama.
. emergency centers.. Redundant-communications are provided through other installed systems as mentioned.for the CECC.
Addit.ionally, key-response personnel.from the MSECC are also on pagers.
-The;MSECC also has radio communications in place for directing use of the emergency monitoring vans. TVA requests that the NRC provide communications circuits for the NRC's ENS and LHPN telephone communication system as appropriate.
4.2' 71 Instrumentation, Data Systems Equipment, and Power Supplies
.The MSECC instrumentation design consists of CRT's to provide the:necessary data, as processed through the CECC central processor, to analyze and exchange information on environmental conditions. There is also a dedicated "line print ing" terminal for. executing dose assessment
-models.
4.2.8. Technical Data and Data System The MSECC.will have access to all meteorological and radiological data.necessary.for directing field monitoring teams-and. for executing predictive dose models (refer to p '
' Figure 9).
These codes are executed remotely by the MSECC staff on the CECC central processor to allow for complete
- assessment of direct readings and sample analysis, i
- 4.2.9 Records Availability and Management The MSECC contains and/or has ready access to all applicable records and documents necessary for carrying out dose and environmental assessment functions.
' Included _is environs radiological monitoring records,
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employee. radiation exposure histories, as well as off-site population distribution data.
-4.3. Knoxville Emergency Control Center (KECC)
. 4.3.'1 Functions The KECC.is'a support center to the CECC which
- houses the staff responsible for providing detailed
. technical; support.in such' areas as-accident analysis, source term analysis, and engineering / material / logistic support:during implementation of corrective' actions during a nuclear; plant emergency and through subsequent recovery.
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operations, _ by drawing upon - the technical resources of the L
entire Division of Engineering Design.
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-The KECC provides technical support to the CECC or MSECC as requested. The.KECC also serves as the communications center for'other essential TVA Knoxville offices.
Provisions have been made for a-facility in close proximity
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to the KECC.for media briefing. LSecurity will be provided for these areas as necessary.
- 4'.3.2 Location, Stru'cture,~and Habitability L
The KECC is located in Knoxville, TN in an office building complex which houses the Office of Engineering Design and I
Construction, the TVA General Manager, and the TVA Board
. o f; Di rectors.
I-The KECC is located f ar enough away f rom any nuclear site so as not to require any special habitability considerati'on.
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4.3.3 Staffing and Training-Staf fing and training requirements for the KECC are in accordance with the NRC approved BFNP REP and REP-IPD.
~4.3.4 Size I
l The KECC provides working space and facilities for all assigned staff. A 500 square foot conference room has been adapted for this staf f to carry out its role (refer.
to Figure 6).
- 4.3.5 Radiological Monitoring l
Due to the location of the KECC, radiation monitoring systems are not required.
4.3.6 Communications Advance communication systems have been provided in the KECC for dissemination of information to other emergency organizations. Priority access dedicated telephone communications have been established between the KECC, CECC, MSECC, Browns Ferry TSC, all corporate information
' offices, and the State of Alabama emergency center
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l in Montgomery, AL.
Redundant communications are i
provided through other installed' systems as mentioned for the CECC.
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.,4.3.7 ' Instrument stion, Data Systems Equipment, and Power S3) plies
- The KECC. instrumentation design consists of CRT's t o provide the necessary data for accident analysis,' source term analysis, and engineering support. This. data will be extracted from the CECC central processor.
-4.3.8, Technical Data and' Data System
' Appropriate data will be provided_to the KECC staff, as necessary, to allow for timely assistance in engineering-support (refer to Figure 9). '
4.3.9 Records' Availability and Management The KECC has ready access to up-to-date platit drawings, records, emergency plans, procedures, vendor materials, etc., necessary to carry out their function to support the CECC. A corporate document control center is maintained within the same office complex.
4.4. Local Recovery Center _(LRC) 4.4.1 Functions
.The function of the LRC is to provide a near-site facility for TVA recovery management as well as NRC emergency response personne1~ and other emergency and/or recovery personnel.
The LRC provides adequate space for-TVA and others who will locate there to support the CECC in providing recovery support.
The LRC will provide dedicated space for NRC personnel containing.
adequate supplies, communications, and data necessary for them to carry out appropriate functions.
4.4.2 Location, Structure, and liabitability
'The LRC for Browns Ferry will be the existing NRC resident inspectors office complex and the adjacent TVA operations training facility. This facility is -located approximately 200 feet from the plant main.of fice building and main gatehouse. There are no special habitability considerations.
for the LRC.
L 4.4.3 Staffing and Training Staf fing and training requirements for LRC personnel will be in accordance with the revised BFNP REP and REP-IPD = upon I
implementation of ' the LRC.
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4.4.4 Size-L The existing NRC resident inspectors offices shall be dedicated solely to NRC personnel in the event of an emergency. This area contains approximately 700 square
' feet of office space. Adjacent to these offices is the operations training complex and offices. This area, approximately 2,400 square feet of space, shall also be available as an overflow work area for NRC as well.as TVA and other response personnel necessary to carry out required recovery efforts. Sufficient supply of desks, chairs, tables, etc., are available. Figure 7 shows the physical layout of the facilities and their relationship to the plant, gatehouse, and each other.
Figure 8 shows the floor plan for the resident inspectors offices.
4.4.5 Radiological Monitoring No permanent radiation monitoring system is installed in the LRC.
4.4.6 Communications The LRC will have voice communications to enable personnel to communicate with the CECC, KECC, MSECC, and Browns Ferry TSC.
The following voice communications are available:
.NRC dedicated communications (ENS and HPN) are in place in the resident inspector's offices Bell Telephones TVA Microwave Telephone System A copy machine and facsimile machine are available in the resident inspector's offices.
4.4.7 Instrumentation, Data System Equipment, and Power Supplies The LRC instrumentation design consists of CRT's to provide necessary data to all recovery personnel.
-4.4.8 Technical Data and Data System The LRC will have access to the TSC data base and SPDS display capability (plant system data as well as meteorological and radiological data), as necessary, from the CECC central. processor (refer to Figure 9). i o
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4.4.9~ Records Availability and Management A plant' document control center is adjacent ' to the rear t,
'- of the.' resident inspector's offices (refer to figure 7).
This center would provide any needed documentation (drawings, manuals, procedures', etc.) required by NRC
. personnel.'
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n"i 5.0 SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM 5.1 Function
.The purpose of the safety parameters display system (SPDS) is to assist control room personnel in evaluating the safety status of the plant. The SPDS will provide an indication of plant parameters or derived variables representative of the safety status of-the plant via CRT dimplay. The primary functions-of the SPDS will be to aid the operator in the rapid detection of abnormal operating conditions. He will use the SPDS for an initial " quick look".
Confirmation will be achieved by surveying the other control room instrumentation before taking action.
As an operator aid, the SPDS serves to concentrate a minimum set of plant parameters from which the plant safety status can be assessed. liuman-factors engineering will be incorporated in the various aspects of the SPDS design to enhance the functional effectiveness of control room personnel.
The SPDS wfil be in operation during normal and abnormal operating conditions. The SPDS will be capable of displaying pertinent information during steady-state and transient conditions.
5.2 Location The SPDS will be located in the mntrol room.
The SPDS may be physically separated from the normal control board; however.it will be readily accessible and visible to the control room operators.
5.3 Size The SPDS will be of such size as to be compatible with the existing space in the control room.
It will not interfer.'
with normal movement or with visual access to other control room operating systems and displafs.
5.4 Staffing the SPDS will be of such design that no operating personnel in addition to the normal control room operating staff will be required for its operations.
5.5 Display Considerations
'The display will be responsive to transient and accident sequences and will be sufficient to indicate the status of the plant. Flexibility to allow for interaction by the operator will be included 'into the display design. The SPDS will have expansion capability and the flexibility to allow for ' future modifications and additions. V
The important plant functions related to the SPDS display shall include:
Reactivity control Reactor core cooling and heat removal from primary system Reactor coolant system integrity Radioactivity control Containment integrity Table 2 lists the SPDS data set developed to aid the operator in detecting or inferring the status of the above functions.
He will use the displayed information to aid in quickly identifying abnormal events and determining required actions.
Before taking any action the operator will consult the primary indicators on the control board to verify the SPDS indications.
5.6 Design Criteria The total SPDS will not be Class IE or meet single-failure criteria. Most of the sensor signals for the SPDS will be taken from existing control room instrumentation. All safety circuits monitored will be appropriately isolated.
The isolator design will preserve channel independence and ensure the integrity of the safety system in case of SPDS malfunction.
The SPDS will be implemented emphasizing human-factors engineering. The following are examples of good human-factor principles:
Integration into the existing control room to minimize disturbance to existing instrumentation interfaces, but blended into the overall architectural scheme as much as possible Consistent use symbols and alphanumeric texts Fo rma t density will be angineered considering the amount of information Ltie operator is able to perceive and understand Presenting data that can be comprehended easily and rapidly t
-xr The SPDS display function will.he supported by dual CRT's to enhance availability of the function to the control room operator.
In the event one CRT fails, a backup CRT will be available to. display the SPDS parameters.. In the unlikely event.the SPDS primary and' backup CRY's' fail, the operator will rely.on the existing, conventional instrumentation in the control room to determine.overall plant-safety status. TVA considers this'an acceptable " backup" since the operator must consult this instrumentation before taking action.
The SPDS is designed to meet an operational unavailability goal of 0.01. O
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'6.0.
NOCLEAR DATA LINK I
v.
TVA does not' intend to provide a nuclear data link. -Advanced ccommunications and data. systems'are available;in all TVA emergency-facilities. - ' Furthermore, TVA will provide for NRC's. attendance' in-
,these facilities and will provide data,'is necessary,' to NRC pe rsonnel.
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7.0 ACgUISITION AND CONTROL OF TECIINICAL DATA The acquisition and control of technical data for the EHF's has already been provided in the previous sections.
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8.0 EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITY INTEGRATION The overall. integration of TV3's emergency response facilities,
~
communications, etc., is as defined in.the BFNP REP and REP-IPD.
Overall integration of the proposed data systems into these facilities are as defined in the previous sections.
TVA will~ continue to upgrade its emergency organizations,.
facilities, and plans as required and/or as new data systems, etc.,:are implemented.
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A 9.0. VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION TVA will-employ' good engineering judgment and design and control methods-in the review and approval of systems and facilities.
' The' REP, REP-IPD, facilities, organizations, etc., are periodically -
reviewed by TVA's quality assurance organizations and nuclear safety
' review staffs.
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. DATA REQUIREMENT FOR ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT
. TECHNICAL SUPPORT. CENTER TABLE 1 Variable Mitigation Validation Status Reactor Water Vessel Water: Level X
X X
Reactor Coolant Pressure X
X X
~
Feedwater Flow X
X Neutron Flux-(Source Range)
X X
X
. Safety / Relief Valve Position or Temperature X
X liigh Pressure Coolant Injection (IIPCI) Flow X
X X
X
' Reactor Core' Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Flow.
Control: Rod Drive (CRD) Flow X
X Ccre Spray Flow X
X l
Drywell-Pressure X
Torus Temperature X
Torus-Water Level X
X X-Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) Flow X
Hain Steam 1.ine Radiation X
Oll-Gas Radiation X
liotwell' Level X
Condensate Storage Tank Level-X Drywell Temperature _
X X
Reactor Water Cleanup Flow X
X Drywell/ Torus Hydrogen Conc, X
1 Containment Radiation X
l
. Stack Flow X
' Effluent Activity at' Identified Release Points X
Residual ifeat Removal (RilR) Flow-X X
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DATA REQUIREMENT FOR ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT 2
-T SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY PANEL TAllLE 2~
Variable Neutron Flux (Source)
Reactor ' Vessel Water Level Drywell' Pressure Supression Pool Level Supression Pool Temperature Drywell Temperature Reactor Coolant Pressure Reactor-Coolant Activity (Main Steam Line Radiation)
Condenser Off-Gas Activity Gaseous Effluent Activity at Identified Release Points Primary: System Isolation Valve Position (control room only - already included on control room instrument panel)
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-;g "I ENCLOSURE 2'
- PROPOSED IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE
. 1.
TVA's centralized emergency centers are presently implemented
^
'as described in Enclosure 1, with the exception of the proposed data systems.
2.: ; The. Local Recovery Center (LRC) shall be implemented and BFNP
' Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) revised to ref1 pct this facility-by June 1,-:.1982.
3.-
Acconh 'to meteorologloal and radiological data, via the Chattanooga,
' Cent'al Emergency Control Center (CECC) central processor, shall be r
implemented at all _ appropriate emergency centers-by June 1,1982.
4.
- The_ Browns Ferry Technical Support Center (TSC), including the TSC data system, will be ' operational by July - 1, 1984. This data is based on the present outage schedule, expected delivery dates of
- material-, and implementation of the exact data base as defined in
' Enclosure 11
,