ML20003H823
| ML20003H823 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/02/1978 |
| From: | Clark R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17209B280 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-REGGD-05.012, RTR-REGGD-5.012 NUDOCS 8105070503 | |
| Download: ML20003H823 (2) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Reactor Safeguards Licensing Branch FROM:
Robert A. Clark, Chief Reactor Safeguards Licensing Branch PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR CAS OR SAS USING THE EQUI-
SUBJECT:
VALENT INFORMATION CONCEPT-REVIEW GUIDELINE NUMBER 16 g73.55 requires, inpar*., the assessment of a threat; response to detection of a penetration or an intrusion; and a capability of observing isolation zones and the physical barrier at the perimeter of the protected area.
Tne detection aids, comunications and response requirements in g73.55 (e), (f) and (h) were intended to assist the licensee by providing him Paragraph with an acceptable means of meeting these responsibilities.
(e) requires two continuously manned al' arm stations so that a single act cannot remove the capability of calling for assistance or otherwise responding to an alarm; that all alarms shall annunciate in both stations; Paragraph (f) and shall indicate the type and location of each alarm.
requires that both alarm stations shall have two-way voice comunications as well as conventional telephone comunication. Pa;agraph (h) requires a surveillance capability. These requirements have been interpreted to mean that the licensee must provide for the receipt and display of equi-valent alarn and surveillance data plus comunications capability in both not neces:arily the same level of surveillance alarm stations but monitoring display.
The following are the regulatory requirements for the CAS & SAS:
(1) Both stations shall be continuously manned.
All alams must annunciate in both stations.
(2)
Annunciation shall indicate type and location of alam.
(3)
(4) Both stations must have two-way voice (wireless) as weil as conventional telephone capability.
(5) Both stations must have equivalent alarm and surveillance data.
All alarm devices and alarm transmission lines for both (6) stations must be self-checking and tamper-indicating.
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FEB 0 21576 Since 373.55 does not provide guidance on how these stations are to i
interact, protecting against the threat of an insider operating from either station will have to be dealt with through licensee developed procedural checks designed to insure against successful malevolent actions by either alarm station operator.
However, criteria have evolved that appear essentia in establishing a defensive frame work against this threat.
Consequently the following additional licensee implemented measures, used individually or in combination, when coupled with the regulatory requirements set forth above, are acceptable in satisfying the high assurance provisions of 373.55 (a)(2).
(1) Random selection of CAS/SAS operators at the beginning of each shift.
(2)
Use of the two-man rule in CAS.
(3) Each station to have independence of action to call for assistance when suspicious of the action (s) of the other station.
(4) The secondary station must have the capability of confir-ming the appropriateness of the CAS operators actions in response to alarms (e.g., radio contact with responders, sur-veillancemonitoring,etc.).
(5) Strict control of access to the security computer software programs.
(6) Strict control of access to either station.
(7)
Insuring that one station cannot inhibit the flow of infor-mation to the other.
The foregoing are not meant to be all inclusive. They are listed as the most desired licensee actions that when coupled with the regulatory requirements set forth above will provide the high assurance protection that is being sought.
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,k Robert A. Clark, Chief Reactor Safeguards 1.icensing Branch
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