ML20003H812
| ML20003H812 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 01/31/1978 |
| From: | Clark R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17209B280 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-REGGD-05.012, RTR-REGGD-5.012 NUDOCS 8105070484 | |
| Download: ML20003H812 (2) | |
Text
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m MEMORANDUM FOR: Reactor Safeguards Licensing Branch Members, 00R FROM:
Robert A. Clark, Chief, Reactor Safeguards Licensing Branch, DDR ACCEPTAS'.E COMPENSATORY MEASURES FOR INTRUSION DETECTION
SUBJECT:
HARDWARE OUTAGE (E.G., ZONE. SYSTEM) PROTECTED AREA VITAL AREAS - REVIEW GUIDELINE NUMEER 9 The objective of perimeter intrusion detection hardware is to detect the unauthorized entry or attempted entry of individuals or vehicles into tre protected area and to provide an " alert" to the security organiza-tion so that response by a response force will be initiated at the time of penetration into the protected area.
In the event of a hardware outage the compensatory measures must satisfy this objective by providing a means for detecting unauthorized entry and for alerting the security organization or by providing a response force to control all paths from the area of outage to all vital areas.
Acceptable measures compensatory to perimeter intrusion detection outage are:
a) Back-up intrusion detection system of equal capability.
b) Dedicated CCTV with continucus monitoring of the perimeter zone (s) affected by the outage.
c) On-the-spot guards visually monitoring the perimeter zone (s) affected by the outage, Response force deployed to control all paths from the peri-d) meter zone (s) affected by the outage to all vital areas.
The objective of the vital area intrusion detection hardware is to de-tect the unauthorized entry of individuals (and at some facilities -
vehicles) into vital areas and to prcvide to the security organization an " alert" so that response b) a recponse force will be initiated at the time of penetration into the vital area.
In the event of a hardeare outage the compensatory measures must satisfy this objective by either providing a means for detecting unauthorized s105070 -
Rea,ctor Safe uards Licensing Branch Members entry and alerting the security organization or providing the response force to control the path: to tne affected vital areas. Acceptable ceasures compensatory to a vital area intrusion detection outage are:
a) A back-up intrusion detection system of equal capability.
b)
Dedicated CCTV with continuous monitoring of the portals affectec by the outage.
c)
On-the-spot guards visually monitoring the portals affected by the outage.
d)
Response force deployment to control all approaches to the affected vital areas.
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.,\\..' T ) A. (h E. ~ ~ l Robert A. Clark, Chief Reactor Safeguards Licensing Branch Division of Operating Reactors e
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