ML17209B279

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Forwards Review of Guideline 17 Re Definition of Vital Areas,Revision 1
ML17209B279
Person / Time
Issue date: 01/23/1978
From: Clark R
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML17209B280 List:
References
RTR-REGGD-05.012, RTR-REGGD-5.012 TAC-51587, NUDOCS 8105070505
Download: ML17209B279 (12)
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR R E GULATORY COMMISSlON WASHINGTON, O. C. 20555 I:NI"LOS"RE 1

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NEIIORANDUH FOR:

Reactor Safeguards Licensing Branch

Hembers, DOR FROH:

SUBJECT:

Robert A. Clark, Chief Reactor Safeguards Licensing Branch, DOR DEFINITION OF VI AL AREAS, REVISION 1

REVIEW GUIDELINE NO.

17 inclosed is Review Guideline Number 17, i.e., the revised de.inition of vital areas.

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Robert A. Clark, Chief Reactor Safeguards Licensing

Branch, DOR

Enclosure:

As stated

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DEFINITION OF YITAL AREAS AND EgUIPblENT Revision 1

A.

Applicable Sections of 10 CFR 73 73.SS (c) 1 "The licensee shall locate vital equipment only within a vi,tal area, wh'.ch in turn, shall be located wi h'.n a protected area such tt at access to v'ta'i equipment requires passage through a. least two physical barriers of suf icient strength to mee the performance I

requirements of paragraph (a) of this section.

Nore than onc vital.

area may be located within a single protected area."

73.2 (il):

"Yi.al area means any area which contains vital equipment within a k

s.ructure, the walls, roof, and floor of which constitute physica',

barriers of construction at least as substantial as walls as described in paraoraph (f)(2)."

73.2 (i):

lital equi.pment means any equipment,

system, devi ce, or materi al failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly

. endanger

.he public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

Equipment or sys

.ems which would be required to function to protect public health and safety following such failure, destruction or release are also considered to be vital."

B.

Assumptions and Definitions In the application of these regulations to a typical LMR plant, the following considerations and assumptions are made:

1.

Paragraph 73.55 (c) requires vital equipment to be enclosed by two barriers.

The combination of barriers, in conjunction with other components of the security system, mus provide a

sufficient delay to an intrusion to meet the performance require-ments of 73.55 (a

2.

To "endanger the public health and safety by exposure'o radiation"

, requires a signi,icant off-site release of radioactivity.

For LMR's the following sourc s of significant quanti ties of radio-activity should be considered:

a.

The reactor core, b.

Spent fuel, c.

Radwaste:systems, if the total radwaste inv ntory is greater than nxC, where:

n is the ratio of the appli cabl dose guideline of 10 CFR 100 to the dose computed or accidental releases in Chapter 15 of the

FSAR, and c

is the release

(.curies) assumed in the accidentaT release calculation of the FSAR.

3.

Yital Areas fall into two,general categories:

a.

Type I vital areas, i.e.,

those areas wherein successful sabotage can be accomplished by compromising or destroy>ng

the vital systems-or components located within this area.

1/

(By definition, an area containing systems or components whose failure or destruction results in a direct re1ease, is a Type I vital area.)

b.

Type II vital areas, ie., those areas which contain systems or components whose fai lure or destruction 'would lead to successful sabotage only in conjunction with additional sabotage activity in at least one other, sepa.ate-vItal 2/

area.

(Safety related eouipment designed

.o mitigate the conseouences of ailures of other sys.ems usually.alls into thi s category, )

4.

Mhen classifying vital equipment as Type I or I., the following assumptions apply:

a) 'he concurrence of violent na ural phenomena with a security

'> contingency need not be considered.

b)

Random (accidental) failure of equipment concurrer t with a

security contingency need not be considered.

However, a

security contingency duri ng routine or planned outages of equipment, as permitted by.the technical specifications, must be considered.

1/ "System" refers to a11 components, mechanical and electrical, inc'lud-ing piping, cabling, power supply, and other suppo. t systems to carry out the design unction provided by the system.

2/ For the purpose of this discussion, a vital area may be cons'.dered "separate" if it is separated from the area under consideration by a barrier or distance suf,icient to delay the saboteur's access long enough to demonstrate interception and engagement by the secur',ty response force.

4 c)

Loss of off-site power must be assumed since it is impractical to protect transmission lines against sabotage.

C.

Discussion The definit'f vital equipment, 73.2 {i), includes equipment whose failure would lead to a di rect release, as well as equipment required to function or e

f th protection of public health and safety following a postulated sabotage attack.

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'his is analagous to the definition of sa e.y-re e"' ',

f t - elated equipment, which includes primary

11. as the systems required to mitigate fission product barriers, as we

. as h of the barrier.

There ore, e'ssentially the consequences of a breach o

~ e a

e considered vital.

In order

.o all safety related equipment must be c avoi u

i s stems listed in Reg.

Guide avoid duplication of safety analyses, the y

1-29 should be considered vital.

f lity which provides suf icier:t delay It should be noted that a ac>>

+ f r a (1) at time to permit interrup ion t-'on of the external

~hrea.

o

{. )

'f r which adequate protection against all vi al area barriers, and or w ic

( )q2} is rovided or all vital areas would the insider thr at of i(a)q

} is provi e

'ould 73.55 without the designation of any meet the requirements z ver it is to the licensee's Type i

a r

- I V t 1

A eas.

In practice,

however, o T e I and II, in order to advar.tage o sesegregate vital areas into ype that a saboteur could not achieve success ul take credit for.he fact a

a

'n additional barriers.

II vital. areas without penetrating sabotage in Type

D.

Revi ew Guidelines l.

All systems listed in Reg.

Guide 1.29 as "Seismic Category-I" are considered vital.

(A sound technical basis mus.

be pro-vided by the licensee for any deviation from this list. )

2.

Type I Vital Areas should be identified by the licensee, using the definitions and assumptions listed in B. If Type I Vital Areas are not identified by the licensee, the list provi ded in the Appendix may be used as guidance.

3.

High assurance protection against the ex.ernal and internal threa.

must be provided,or all Type I Yital Areas.

This requires a demonstration that any external Type I vital I barriers provide sufficient delay to the external threat (s(a)(l)) to permit a timely engagement by the armed response

force, and appropriately restricted access controls, controls of activity, or other methods of protection agains-the insider, to meet the internal threat (i(a)(2)).

For Type Ii Yita', Areas, a combination of multiple barriers, each o, which meets the requirements o

73.2(f)(2) or its eqvivaler t, and the associated individual access'controls, provi des high assurance 'protection against the external and internal threat.

Appendix SAMPLE LIST OF TYPE I VITAL ARcAS Primary containment 2.

Containment electrical and piping penetration areas 3.

Control room 4.,

Cable spreading room B.

Primary shutdown system (ii'utside containment) 6.

All areas associa ed with one complete decay hea. removal sys:em (including all necessary supoort

systems, e.g.,

oower supply,

cooling, and lubric tino systems.)

7.

Battery rooms (including battery charger areas)

I

U.S. NUCLEAR R LATORY COMMiSSlON P EGUMTOR'O'UIDE OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT REGULATORY GUIDE lDS SElSMlC DESlGN CLASS!FlCATlON

a. The reactor coolant pressure boundary g

y p

(2) the capabsJsTP.t~t dW'n theaeactor and maintain

c. Systems'r poruons oi systems that are it in a saic ~(doff condi(ion. or (3) the capability to required for (I) emergency core cooling, (2) postacct-deni containmcnt heat removal.

or. g3) posiacc!dent a

a

'The system boundary includes those pofnons of she system fcf(uued io accomptish the speed!ed salefy-funeuon and connected pcpusS up io and uscludsnf ihe.Cfst valvf I'sncludsnc a saieiv of scuff va(ve) that u ccihff nofmaJ>y ctoscd 0: capaoi.

0( automatic closuff v hfn the safety funcucn is fcc(usfcd.

This guide descnbes an acceptable method of identi ~

fying and dassifying those ieatufes of light wateirooled A. INTRODUCTION nuclear power plants tha: should b(; desired to with-stand the eifects of the SSF.

Genera] Desis(n Crs.erion ", "Design Bases for Protec.

tion Against

.f'atural Phenomena."

oi Appendix A, "General Design Criteria for Iuc!ear Power Plants," '.o j0 CFP. Pars 50, "acenstna of Producuon and If(i!isa.

After reviewing a

@6'>Isef, o.acsobcatiora for can-

"'t s" fe'hat nu-lear ower lant sfruciion permits anal o~~ng cnscs or boilirg acid pressunzed watct.gp-wr jar pia:its. the,'RC staif has develop d

a e&~c ~:n;!asstti auon system for without loss of ca ability to rforrn their safety identiiy:ng Jlfxa;;fait ~'.utes that shou!d be desired to w:thstand.treM':e

.-. oi t e SSF. Thee structures.

system,"~ co~ents that shouid be desi~ed to remain'ffa."~ if the SSF occurs have been desig-Appendix B. "Quality Assurance Criteria for Yuclear Power Pl~ts and Fuel Reprocessing P!ants." to ) 0 CFR Part 50 establishes quabty assurance tequifements for

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C. REGULATORY POSITION the design, construction, and operauon ot nuclear power plant structures.

systems.

and components tha'. prevent '

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<<mitigate the c~n~q en<<s <<Poto' c~

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n~ts oi a f'ucleaf powef pj'nt in ieu Qe Qesf ounda.

that co uld cause undue f:sk to the health and safgy of

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tions and suooo"s are dcs(>~(ed as Seismic C-te o~

the Publ'c. T e Pertinent reqnremenis of Anoc&B 4 and sho id be designc'o w (hstard;he e'tiects oi th.

apply to all acuviues affecitng the safe(y~e~

SSF md renain iuncuona'ne fi new qua!if uons of those siru"tures, system

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assurance recuifements oi A"~noix B to i0 CFR part 50 should be applied to ao activiues a!fec 'ng the suety.re!a(ed functions oi(hese struct.es sysi ndix A. -Seismic and Ceolo '." Sil..iteria for Nuclear Powe:

Plants."

to 10 CFR Part

l00, components.

"Reactor Site Crt(erfa." requ~ that all nuclear power piarts be decigncd so t!w: 'iK the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) occurs M ~~es,

systems, ard components imporiar.

to 'ca(k(y remain functional.

These plant feature a(z 4gse accessary to ensure (!)

b. The reactor core and reactor vessel internals.

the inte rit of (ha'ieac:oraooiant ressure boundary,

'revent or ~t the consequences,.of accidents that could result in pbtfcottal offs;te exposures comparable to the guideline exposures of !0 CFR Part !00.

USNRC RKGU(.ATORYGUIOKS

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containment atmosphere cleanup (e.c.,

hydrogen re moval systemf.

d. Systems'r pcrtions ol systems that are required for (11 reactor shutdown.
12) residual heat removal. or {3) cooling the spent fuel storage pool.
c. Those poatons of the steam systems ofboIIIng water r actors extendtnz from the outermost contain.

ment isolation valve up to but not in'iudlng the turbine stop valve.

and connecied piping of "Ii" inches or larger nomina'ipe size up to and incluCing the first valve that is either normally ciused or capable of automatic closure dunng aiI modes of normal reactor operation. The turbtne stop valve should be designed to withstan'd the SSE and maintain its Intczrtty.

f. Those portions of the stcam and feedwater systems of prcssunzed water reactors cx'.ending (ron and lnciudinz the secondary side c: stcam generalors up'o and Ircludinz the outc:most c A!air.rrent isolation valves.

and cannecied "lping of 2 I'" inches or larger nomtnni pipe siz up to and inc!using the first valve fincittdtng a safeiy ar roue( valve) that is either norrally closed or wpabie ot automatic closure dunng all modes of normal reactot o'perauon.

g. Coolinz waier. component cooling, and auxii ~

iary f edwater sntems'r poruons ai'hese systems.

including the intake structures. that are t quired for (I) emerzency core coolinz. (2) postaccidcnt containment heat removal. (3) pnstacadent ccntamnent atrnospherc cleanup.

t ') residual heat temos J.'.Om ihe reactor, or (5) coohnz the spent fuel s:orage pool.

h. Ccounz water nC seal water systetnsl or poruons of these svstcns that are recuired for funcuon.

inz of reac:or coolant system omponents lr..portant io safety. such as reactor;oolart pumps.

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i. Systens'r portions of systems ihat are re.

quired io supply fuel for emcrzencr equipment.

j. All electri and mechanical devices and circuitry between the ptoc.ss and the input terminals of the actuator system involved in generating signals that initiate ptotective acuon.
k. Systerrs'r portions nf systems that are requited for (I) monttorsnz ol systems important to safctv and (") actuation of systems inpor:ant!o safety.

I. The spent fuel storage pool structure, including the fuel racks.

m. The reactivity control. I) s:erns.

e.g.. control tods, control tod drives, and boron IAJcctlon system.

'cc footnoic 1, p. 129 l.

n. The control room, including its associated vital equtpment. coolmz sysiems for vtui equipment. and life

'upport systems.

and any structures or eculpmcnt inside ot outside oi the control roon whose fat!use auiC resin:

IA IAcapacltauAz IAJL:fv to 'ihe cc upants c,'le oiitrol room

o. Pnmary and secondary reactor cor tainment.
p. System.'ther than. radioactive uaste manage.

ment systems.

not coveted by item Ia:hrough I.o above that contain or may contam radioactive materhl and whose postulated failure would res't

'm conserv-uvely calculated potential oiTs:te doses (using mete-orology as prescribe by Reguiatory Guide l.. "As.

surnpuons Used for Evaiuaur:z the Potcniial Radto-logical Corsequcnces of a Loss cf Coolant Acasient for Boiling ~Yater Reaciors."

a>d Re-.~!atory Guide 1.4.

-Assunpoons Used for Evai attng:!Ie Potenuai Radio-Iozlcal Consequences of a Lass o; Coolwt Accident for Pressunzed

%'ater Reactors") J:at are nate than 0.5 rem to the whole body or its equivalent to any p~f the body.

q. The Qass IE electnc systems.

mclucmg the auxiliary svsiems for Jte onsite electric power supplies, that provide the emerzency electric power needed for functionmg or plant featu:es include" in items Ix throu@ I.p aoove.

2. Those poruons ot structures. system. or compo-nents whose conunued;uncuon Is Aot reo'uired but whose failure could reduce th functiotunz of any plart teature Included in ttems I.a through I.q above to an unacceptable safe:y level should be desiznedtand con-siructed so that the'SSE would Aot cause such failure.
3. Seismic Category I desizn requrenents shou!d extend to the Itrst seisnic res:r-ir.t b yond the defined boundaries.

Those paruors of strdciures.

syste;.a, or components that form interfaces betwcer. Seismic Cate-gory I and non Seismic Catezory I features should be designed to Seismic Catezory I requirements..

4. The pertinent quality assurance recuirements cf Appendix B ta )0 CFR Part 0 should be applied;o aQ activities affecting the safety related func'ns af those portions of struciures, systems. and components overed under Regulatory Positions 2 and 3 abov:.

'1incs indtcalc substanavc chances ftom ptcvious Issue.'A'hctcvct

ptacucaf, sttuc;utcs and equtpmcnt

<<'nose fatfutc cauld posstbly cause such intuncs 'should bn tclocatcd or scpataicd lo lt:c extent tcquucd to cGmtnatr;hts posstbtitiy.

sSpcctfic Sutdancc on sctsm>c tcqm:cmcnts for tadtoacuvc <<ast manaacmcnt IySlcms Is undct dcvclopmcnl.

1.29 2

D. lMPLEMENTATlON The purpose of this secuon is to provide information to apphcants reeardtng the.'iRC staff s plans for ustng thts regulatory guide.

Thts guide reflects current!vRC staQ'ractict. There.

fore, except in those cases tn which th>>

applicant proposes an acceptable alternattve n:method for comply.

in" wtth spectfied porttons of the Comnusston's regula.

tions.

the method described herctn ts be:ng and wdl

'onunue to b>>

used in the evaiuat:on oi subnu'..rais for operattng Ucense or construcuon permtt appbcattons until fills gu)de ls revtsed as a restut ol su~i'esJonis irofn

he public or addiuonai staff revtew.

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ENCLOSURE 2

're These Areas/Equipment Enclosed or Ide>>ti fied In Security Plan as Vital PLANT DATE OF Emergency A/C 0/G Emergency DC Intake Power Supply Structure Cable Spreading RO0 III Scram Breaker Cabinets Control Room Containment I'LJR/BWR AMENDMENT Spent Fuel Pool Area Auxiliary Feedwater Sys tern Condensate Storage Tank Valve Motor ontrol Center List Vital Areas/Equipment Identified In Securit Plan Not Alread Covered

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