ML20003H168
| ML20003H168 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 04/28/1981 |
| From: | TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18025B475 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8105050254 | |
| Download: ML20003H168 (50) | |
Text
ENCLOSURE PROPOSED CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (DOCKET NOS. 50-259, -260, -296) 8105050 W
I UNITS 1 AND 2 PROPOSED CHANGES
LIST OF TABLES (Cont'd) s Table Title Page No.
4.2.F Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Surveillance Instrumentation 105 4.2.G Surveillance Requirements for Control Room Isolation Instrumentation 106 4.2.H Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Flood Protection Instrumentation 107 4.2.J.
Seismic Monitorina Instrument Surveillance 108 171,172,172a 3.5.1 MAPLHCR VERSUS AVERAGE PLANAR EXPOSURE.
4.6.A Reactor Coolant System Inservice Inspection Schedule 209 3.7.A Primary Containment Isolation Valves 250 3.7.B Testable Penetrations with Double 0-Ring Seals......................
256 3.7.C Testable Penetrations with Testable Bellows....
257
"%g 3.7.D Primary Containment Testable Isolation Valves...
258 3.7.E Suppression Chamber Influent Lines Stop-Check Globe Valve Leakage Rates............
263 3.7 F Check Valves on Suppression Chamber Influent Lines 263 3.7.H Testable Electrical Penetrations 265 4.8.A Radioactive Liquid Waste Sampling and Analysis 287 4.8.B Radioactive Gascous Waste Sampling and Analysis..
288 3.ll.A Fire Protection System Hydraulic Requirements...
324 6.3.A Protection Factors for Respirators 343 6.8.A Minimum Shift Crew Requirements 360 N
vii e
4
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Figure Title Page No.
2.1.1 APRM Flow Reference Scram and APRM Rod Block s_,f Settings 13 2.1-2 APRM Flow Bias Scram Vs. Reactor Core Flow 26 4.1..1 Graphic Aid in the Selection of an Adequate Interval Between Tests 49 4.?-1 System Unavailability.
119 3.4-1 Sodium Pentaborate Solution Volume Contentration Requirements 130 3.4-2 Sodium Pentaborate Solution Temperature Requirements 139 3.5.2 K Factor.
173 g
3.6-1 Minimum Temperature *F Above Change in Transient Tempe ra ture...................
191 3.6-2 Change in Charpy V Transition Temperature Vs.
Neutron Exposure 192 6.1-1 TVA Office of Power Organization for Operation of Nuc1 car Power Plants.............
361 6.1-2 Functional Organization..............
362 6.2-1 Review and Audit Function.
363 6.3-1 In-Plant Fire Program Organization 364 1
A l
viii v
I l
LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.6 PRIMARY SYSTEM BOUNDARY 4.6 PRIMARY SYSTEM BOUNDARY H.
Seisnic Restraints, Supports H.
Seismic Restraints, Supports and and Snubbers Snubocrs 1.
During all modes of The surveillance requirements of operation except Cold paragraph 4.6.G are the only require-Shutdown and Refuel, ments that apply to any seismic all seismic restraints, restraint or support other than supports and snubbers snubbers.
shall be opecable except as noted in Each safety-related snubber shall be 3.6.H.2 and 3.6.H.3 demonstrated OPERABLE by performance below. All safety-of the following augmented inservice related snubbers are inspection program and the requirements listed in surveil-of Specification 3.6.H/4.6.H.
These lance instruction snubbers are listed in surveillance BF S1 4. 6.H.
instruction BF SI 4.6.H.
2.
With one or more 1.
Inspection Groups seismic restraint, support or snubber The snubbers may be categorized into inoperable, within two major groups based on whether 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> replace or the snubbers are accessible or in-restore the in-accessible during reactor operation.
operable seismic These major groups may be further restraint (s),
subdivided into groups based on design, support (s) or environment or other features which snubber (s) to may be expected to affect the oper-OPERABLE status and ability of the snubbers within the perform an engineering group. Each group may be inspected evaluation on the independently in accordance with attached component or 4.6.H.2 through 4.6.H.9.
declare the attached system inoperable and 2.
Visual Inspection, Schedule, and follow the appropriate Lot Size LIMITING CONDITION statement for that system.
The first inservice visual inspection of snubbers not previously included 3.
If a seismic restraint, in these technical specifications and support or snubber (SRSS) whose visual inspection has not been is determined to be in-performed and documented previously, operable while the shall be perforced within six months reactor is in the for accessible snubbers and before shutdown or refuel resuming power after the first re-mode, that SRSS shall fueling outage for inaccessible snubbers be made operable or subsequent to being included in these replaced prior to specifications. The results of these reactor startup.
If inspections shall be used in the the inoperable SRSS schedule table below to determine the subsequent visual inspection period.
Snubbers previously included in these technical specifications shall continue on their previously earned inspection schedule without af fect f rom adding snubbers not within their group.
185
LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS H. Seismic Restraints, Supports, and' H. Seismic Restraints, Supports, and Snubbers (cont'd)
Snubbers (cont'd)
- 3. (cont'd)
- 2. Visual Inspection, Schedule, and is' attached to a system Lot Size (cont'd) that is required OPERABLE during the shutdown or No. Inoperable'
' Subsequent refuel mode, the appropriate Snubbers per Visual Inspection LIMITING CONDITIONS statement Inspection Period Period.
for that system shall be~
followed.
0 18 months 1 255
.1 12 months 1 255 2
6 months + 255 3,4 124 days 1 255 5,6,7
- 62. days 2.255' 8 or'more 31 days 1 255 Snubber inspection groups which are at the maximum inspection interval for two successive peri 6ds may have their visuel i.nspection lot size reduced tg 50% of the snubbers within that group fse succeeding visual inspection so long as no snubbers in that inspection group are determined to be inoperable, either as a result of-visual inspection or functional tests. The 505 sample lots are to be alternated so that all snubbers are included within two inspection intervals. If a snubber within the inspection group is determined to be in-operable, the sample size shall revert to 1005 for the current inspection and the subsequent interval.shall be in accordance with the schedule table.
The' sample size shall remain at 1005 until the provisions of this paragraph are again met..
eThe inspection interval shall not be lengthened more than one step at a time.
- 3. Visual Inspection Performance and Evaluation Visual inspections shall verify (1) that there are no visible indications of dar. age or impaired e
186
LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS H. Seismic Restraints, Supports, and-H. Seismic Restraints, Supports, and Snubbers (cont'd)
Snubbers (cont'd) 3.
Visual Inspection Performance and Evaluation (cont'd)
OPERABILITY, (2) bolts attaching the snubber to the foundation or sup-porting structure are secure, and (3) anubbers attached to sections of. safety-
- r. elated systems that have experienced unexpected potentially damaging transients since the last inspection period shall be evaluated for the possibility of concealed damage and functiona'11y tested, if applicable, to confirm operability.
Snubbers'which appear inoperable as a result of visual' inspections may be determined OPERABLE for the' purpose of establishing the next visual inspection interval, providing that (1) the cause of the rejection is clearly established and remedied for that particular snubber and for other-snubbers that may be generically susceptible; and (2) the
' affected snubber is functionally tested, if applicable, in the as-found condition and determined OPERABLE per Specification 4.6.H.S.
~
Also, snubbers which have been made inoperable as the result of unexpected' transients, iselated. damage or.other such random events, when the pro-visions of 4.6.H.7 and 4.6.H.8 have been met and any other appropriate corrective action implemented, shall not be counted.in determining the next visual inspection interval.
4, Functional Test Schedule, Lot Size, and Composition At least once per 18 months during shutdown, a representative sample of 10% of the total of each group of snubbers in use in the plant shall be functionally tested either in place or in a bench test.
The representative sample selected
'for functional testing shall include the various configurations, operating
\\
187 i
LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS H. Seismic Restraints, Supports, and.
H. Seismic Restraints, Supports, and Snubbers (cont'd)
Snubbers (cont'd) 4.
Functional Test Schedule. Lot Size, and Composition (cont'd) environments, and the range of size and capacity of anubbers within the groups. The representative sample should be weighted to include more snubbers from severe service areas such as near heavy equipment.
The security of fasteners for attach-ment of the snubbers to the component and to the snubber anchorage shall be verified on snubbers selected for functional tests.
5.
Functional Test Acceptance Criteria The snubber functional test shall verify that:
- a. Activation (restraining action) is achieved in bot,h tension and compression.
- b. Snubber bleed, or release where required, is present in both compression and tension.
- c. The force required to initiate or maintain motion o,f the-snubber is not great enough
~
to overstress the attached-piping or component 'during thermal movement, or to indicate impending failure of the snubber.
- d. For enubbeEs specifically required not to displace under continuous load, the ability of the snubber to withstand load without displace-
, ment shall
- fied..
6.
Functional Test Failure Analysis and Additional Test Lots An engineering evaluation shall be made of each failure to meet the functional test acceptance criteria to determine the cause of the i
failur.e.. The result of this analysis shall be uscd; if applicable, in selecting snubbers to be tested in the 188
LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS H. Seismic Restraints Supports, and' H. Seismic Restraints, Supports, and y
Snubbers (cont'd)
Snubbers (cont'd) 6.
Functional Test Failure: Analysis and Additional Test Lots (cont'd)
-subsequent lot"i an effort to detar-mine the operability of other snubbers-which may be subject to the same failure mode. Selection of snubbers for future testing may also be based on the. failure analysis. For each snubber that does not meet the functional test acceptance criteria, an additional lot equal to 1,0% of the remainder.of 'that group of snubbers,shall be functionally tested. Testing shall continue until no additional inoperable snubbers are found within subsequent lots or all snubbers of the original inspection group have been tested or all suspect snubbers identified by the failure analysis have been tested, as applicable.
The discovery of loose or missing.
3 attachment fasteners will be evaluated to determine whether the cause may be localized or igeneric.
The result of the evalua. tion will.
be used to select other suspect snubbers for verifying the attachment fasteners, as applicable.
- 7. Functional Test Failure - Attached Component Analysis For the snubber (s) found inoperable, an engineering evaluation shall be perfbrmed on the components which are restrained by the snubber (s).
The purpose of this engineering
' evaluation shall be to determine if the components restrained by the snubber (s) were adversely affected by the inoperability of the snubber (s),
and in order to ensure'that the re-strained component remains capable of l
meeting the designed service.
- 8. Functional Testing of' Repaired and Spare Snubbers
' Snubbers which fail the visual inspection or the functional best 189
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,i-,, - - - -, - - -- -- -
-=.-
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LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
~
H. Seismic Restraints, Stipperts, and -
H. Seismic Restraints, Supports, and Snubbers (cont'd)
Snubbers (cont'd) g, Functional Testing of Repaired and Spare Snubbers (cont'd) acceptance criteria shall be repaired or replaced. Replacement snubbers and snubbers which have repairs which might affect the functional test results
~
shall meet the functional test criteria before installation in the unit. These snubbers shall have met the acceptance criteria subsequent to their most recent service, and the functional test must have-been performed within 12 months before being installed in the unit.
9,
- xemption From Visual Inspection or Functional Tests Permanent or other exes;.3tions from visual inspections and/ar functional testing,for individual snubbers may-be granted by the Commission if,a jus.tifiable basis for exemption is.
presented and if applicable snubber life destructive testing was performed to qualify snubber operability for the
~
applicable design conditions at either the completion of their fabrication or at a subsequent date. Snubbers so
~
exempted shall continue.to be listed in the plant instructions with foot-notes indicating the extent of the exemptions.
0 s
S 190
P 1
, :p
+
Figure 3.6-1 1
Curve #1 i
Minimum temperature for pressure tests such as required by I I Section XI.
2 1
1200 Curve #2 9-25-80 Minimum temperature for mechanical heat up or cooldown following nuclear
~
shutdown.
1000 Curve #3 Mini.aum temperature for core operation (criticality) a j
Includes additional
=
800 margin required by 10CFR50 Appendix G, b
Par. IV A.2.C.
~
l dG Notes a;
600 -
These curves are
[$
[
shifted 30 F to the right of the original y
set of curves ta A
include a ART of 30 F.
This sNk}t will t3 400 allow these curvea to be used thru 4.0 EFPY.
x t
200 1
l 1
-BOLT UP. TEMPER ATURE O
I I
l l
l O
10 0 200 300 400 MINIMLH TDiPERATURE
( F) 191 l
ed E
2-200 C2 E
O 150
- f f
d 3
p t---
lf loo O
E
/
E<$'
d,7 E
, a E
g.
E 1 18 jo17 gets y,gg 3
NEUTRON FLUEPICE (>1 WV) (pt),nst u
FIGURE 3.6 2 CHANGE IN CHARPY V TRANSITION TEMPERATURE VERSUS NEUTRON EXPOSURE 192 s
e
\\
e PAGES 193-208 DELETED I
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w I
h
p 3.6.H/4.6.H Seismic Restraints, Supports and Snubbers i
Seismic restraints supports, and snubbers (SRSS) are designed to prevent unrestrained pipe or component motion under dynamic loads as might occur during an earthquake or severe transient, while allowing normal thermal motion during startup and shutdown. The consequence of an inoperable SRSS is an increase in the probability of structural damage to piping or components as a result of a seismic or ott. e event initiating dynamic loads.
It is therefore required that all SRSS required to protect the primary coolant system or any other safety system or component be operable during reactor operation.
Because the SRSS protection is required only during relatively low probability events, a period of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is allowed to replace or restore the inoperable SRSS(s) to operable status and perform an engineering j
evaluation on the supported component er declare the supported system l
inoperable and follow the appropriate limiting condition for operation l
statement for that system. The engineering evaluation is performed to determine whether the mode of failure of the SRSS has adversely affected I
any safety-related component or system.
224
3.6/4.6 BASES All safety-related snubbers are visually inspected for overall integrity and operability. The inspection will include verification of proper orientation, adequate fluid level if applicable, and proper attachment of the snubber to piping and structures. The removal of insulation or the verification of torque values for threaded fasteners is not required for visual inspections.
The inspection frequency is based upon maintaining a constant level of snubber protection. Thus, the required inspection interval varies in-versely with the observed snubber failures. The number of inoperable snubbers found during a required inspection determines the time interval for the next required inspection. Inspections performed before that interval has elapsed may be used as a new reference point to determine the next inspection. However, the results of such early inspections performed before the original required time interval has elapsed (nominal time less 25 percent) nay not be used to lengthen the required inspection interval. Any inspection whose results require a shorter inspection interval will override the previous schedule.
When the cause of the rejection of a snubber in a visual inspection is clearly established and remedied for that snubber and for any other snubbers that may be generically susceptible and operability verified by inservice functional testing, if applicable, that snubber may be exempted from being counted as inoperable. Generically susceptible snubbers are those which are of a specific make or model and have the same design features directly related to rejection of the snubber, or are similarly located or exposed to the same environmental conditions such as temperature, radiation, and vibration. Inspection groups may be established based on design features, and installed conditions which may be expected to be generic. Each of these inspection groups are inspected and tested separately unless an engineering analysis indicates the inspection group is improperly constituted. All suspect snubbers are-subj ect to inspection and testing regardless of inspection groupings.
To further increase the assurance of snubber reliability, functional tests shall be performed at least once each 18 months during shutdown, usually during the refueling outage.
These tests will include stroking of the snubbers to verify proper movement, activation, and bleed or release. Ten percent represents an adequate sample for such tests. Observed failures on these samples will require an engineering analysis and testing of additional units.
A thorough inspection of the snutber threaded attachments.o the pipe or components and the anchorage will be made in conjunction with all required functional te:ta.
225
Page 226 Deleted b
l I
f
UNIT 3 PROPOSED CHANGES I
~v
s 4.2.E Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Drywell Leak Detection Instrumentation 101 4.2.F Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for surveillance Instrumentation 102 4.2.G Surveillance R0 quire ents for Control Room Isolation Instrumentation 103 4.2.H Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Flood Protection Instrumentation 104 4.2.J Seiemic Monitoring Instrument Surveillance Requirements 105 4.6.A Reactor Coolant System Inservice Inspection 3 5.I MAfbG
. Average Planar Exposure 1 1,182 3.7.A Primary Containment Isolation Valves 262
- 3. 7. B Testable Penetrations with Double O-Ring Seals 268 3.7.C Testable Penetrations with Testable Bellows 269 3.7.D Primary Containment Testable Isola tion Valves 3.7.E Suppression Chamber Influent Lines stop-Check Globe Valve Leakage Rates 279
- 3. 7. F Check Valves on Suppression Chamber Influent Lines 280 3.7.G Check Valves on Drywell Influent Lines 281 3.7.H Testable Electrical Penetrations 283 4.8.A Radioactive Liquid Waste Sampling and Analysis 310 4.8.B Radioactive Gaseous Waste Sampling and Analysis 311 6.3.A Protection Factors for Respirators 373 6.9.A Minimum Shif t Crew Requirements 390 vii Amendment No.
s LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS f.ig u.T_t 110.2 IAE2 2.1-1 APRM Flow Reference Scram and APRM Rod Block Settings 14 2.1-2 APRM Flow Bias Scram delationship to Normal Operating Conditions 25 4.1-1 Graphic Aid in the 9 election of an 7.dequate Interval Between Tests 48
- 4. 2-1 System Unavailability 117 3.4-1 Sodium Pentaborate Solution Volume Concentration Requirements 141 3.4-2 Sodium Pentaborate Solution Temperature R equirements 142 3.5.2 Kp Factor vs. Percent Core Flow 183
- 3. 6-1 Temperature-Pressure Limitations 204 3,6-2 Change in Charpy V Temperature vs.
Neutron Exposure 205 6.1-1 TVA Of fice af Power Organization for Operation of Nuclear Power Plants 391 6.1-2 Functional Organization 392 6.2-1 Review and Audit Function 393 6.3-1 In-Plant Fire Program Organization 394 viii Amendment No.
4
'~
T w
LIM (TING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.6*PRIMAR'Y SYSTEM BOUNDARY 4.6 PRIMARY SYSTEM BOUNDARY II. Seismic Restraints, Supports, H.
Seismic Restraints, Supports and and Snubbers Snubbers 1.
During all modes of The surveillance requirements of operation except Cold paragraph 4.6.G are the only require-Shutdown and Refuel, ments that apply to any seismic all seismic restraints, restraint or support other than supports and snubbers
- 3. 6.11.2 and 3.6.H. 3 demonstrated OPERABLE by performance below. All safety-of the following augmented inservice related snubbers are inspection program and the requirements listed in surveil-of Specification 3.6.H/4.6.H.
These lance instruction snubbers are listed in surveillance BF SI 4.6.H.
instruction BF SI 4.6.H.
2.
With one or more 1.
Inspection Groups seismic restraint, support or snubber The snubbers may be categorized into inoperable, within two major groups based on whether 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> replace or the snubbers are accessible or in-restore the in-accessible during reactor operation, operable seismic These major groups may be further restraint (s),
subdivided into groups based on design, support (s) or environment or other features which snubber (s) to may be expected to affeet the oper-OPERABLE status and ability of the snubbers within the perform an engineering group. Each group may be inspected evaluation on the indcpendently in accordance with attached component or 4.6.H.2 through 4. 6.H.9.
declare the attached system inoperable and 2.
Visual Inspection, Schedule, and follow the appropriate
_Lo t Size LIMITING CONDITION l
statement for that system.
The first inservice visual inspection of snubbers not previously included 3.
If a seismic restraint, in these technical specifications and support or snubber (SRSS) whose visual inspection has not been r
l is determined to be in-performed and documented previously, operable while the shall be performed within six months l
reactor is in the for accessible snubbers and before i
shutdown or refuel resuming power after the first re-I mode, that SRSS shall fueling outage for inaccessible snubbers be made operable or subsequent to being included in these replaced prior to specifications. The results of these l
reactor startup.
If inspections shall be used in the l
the inoperable SRSS schedule table below to determine the subsequent visual inspection period.
Snubbers previously included in these technical specifications shall continue on their previously earned inspection schedule without affect from adding snubbers not within their group.
198
LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION
~ '
SURVEILLANCS REQUIREMENTS H. Seismic Restraints, Supports, and' --
H. Seismic Restraints, Suppor's, and t
Snubbers (cont'd)
Snubbers (cont'd)
- 3. (cont'd)
- 2. Visual Inspection, Schedule, and is' attached to a system Lot Size (cont'd) that is required OPERABLE during the shutdown or No. Inoperable'
' Subsequent refuel mode, the appropriate Snubbers per Visual Inspection LIMITING CONDITIONS statement Inspection Period Period.
for that system shall be followed.
0 18 months 2 25%
.1
.12 months + 25%
2 6 months I 25%
3,4 124 days 25%
5,6,7
- 62. days 2.255' 8 or more 31 days 2 25%
j Snubber inspection groups which are at the maximum inspection interval for two successive periods may have their visual 1.nspection lot size reduced to 50% of the snubbers within that group for succeeding visual inspection so long as no snubbers in that, inspection group are determined to be inoperable, either as a result of-visual. inspection l
or functional tests. The 50% sample lots are to be alternated so that all snubbers are included within two I
inspection intervals. If a snubber within the inspection group is determined to be in-operable, the sample size shall revert to 100% for '
the current inspection and tiie subsequent interval shall be in accordance with the schedule table.
The' sample size shall remain at 100%
until the provisions of this paragraph are again met..
eThe inspection interval shall not be lengthened more than one step
'at a time.
l
- 3. Visual Inspection Performance and Evaluation Visual inspections shall verify 1
-(1) that there are no visible l
indications of damage or impaired e
l
/
199
LIMITING C0dDIT10NS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS H. Seismic Restraints, Supports, and:
H. Seismic Restraints, Supports, and Snubbers (cont'd)
-Snubbers (cont'd) 3, Visual Inspection Performance-and Evaluation (cont'd)
OPERABILITY, (2) bolts attaching the snubber to the foundation or sup-porting structure are secure, and (3) snubbers attached to sections of_ safety
- r. elated systems that.have experienced unexpected potentially damaging transients since the last inspection period shall be evaluated for the possibility of concealed damage and functionally tested, if applicable, to confirm operability.
Snubbers which appear inoperable as a result of visual inspections may be
. determin.ed OPERABLE for the purpose of establishing the next visual inspection interval, providing that (1) the cause of the rejection is clearly established and remedied for that particular snubber and for other-snubbers _that may be generically susceptible; and (2) the
' affected snubber is functionally tested, if applicable, in the as-found condition and determined OPERABLE per Specification 4.6.H.S.
Also, snubbers which have been made inoperable as the result of u'nexpected'
~
tran_sients, isciated damage or other
-such random events, when the pro-visi'ons of 4.6.H.7 and 4.6.H.8 have j
been met and any other appropriate
[
corrective action implemented, shall~
not be counted.in determining the next visual inspection interval, t
4, Functional Test Schedule, Lot Size, and Composition At least once per 18 months during l
shutdown, a representative sample of 10% of the total of each group of l
snubbers in use in the plant shall be functionally tested either in place or in a bench test.
The representative sample selected i
'for functional testing shall include the various configurations, operating l
200
..~ :....-
I'
LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS H. Seismic Restraints, Supports, and-H. Seismic Restraints, Supports, and Snubbers (cont'd)
Snubbers (cont'd) i 4.
Functional Test Schedule, Lot Size, and Composition (cont'd) environments, a:ni the range of size and capacity of snubbers within the groups. The representative sample should be weighted to include more anubbers from severe service areas such as near heavy, equipment.
The security o'f fasteners for attach-ment'cf the snubbers to the component and to the snubber anchorage shall be verified on snubbers selected for
~
~
i functional tests.
"'5.
Functional Test Acceptance Criteria The snubber functional test shall verify that:
- a. Activation (restraining action) -
is achieved in both tensicc.
,and compression.-
~
~b. Snubber bleed, or release where required, is present in both compression'and tension.
- c. The force required to initiate
.or maintain motion o,f the.
I snubber is not great enough
~
~
I to overstress the attached piping or component 'during r
thermal movement, or to indicate i
impending failure of the snubber.
1
- d. For snubbeEs specifically required not to displace under continuous load, the ability of the snubber to withstand load without displace-
, ment shall be verified.,
6.
Functional Test Failure Analysis and Additional Test Lots An engineering evaluation shall be i-made of each failure to meet the functional test acceptance criteria to determine toe cause of the failur.e.. The result of this analysis shall be used, it' applicable, in selecting snubbers to be tested in the 201
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LIMITINT, CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS H. Seismic Restraints, Supports, and' H. Seismic Restraints, Support's, and Snubbers (cont'd)
Snubbers (cont'd) 6.
Functional Test Failure: Analysis and Additional Test Lots (cont'd) subsequent lotin'an effort to deter-mine the operability of other snubbers which may be subject to the same failure mode. Selection of snubbers for future testing may also be based or the. failure analysis. For each snubber that does not meet <the functional test acceptance criteria, an additional lot equal to,1,05 of the remainder.of'that group of snubbers, shall be functionally Testing shall continue until tested.
no additional inoperable snubbers are found within subsequent lots or all snubbers of the original inspection group ha.ve been tested or all suspect snubbers identified by the failure i
analysis have been tested, as applicable.
The discovery of loose or missing.
attachment
- fasteners will be evaluated to determine whether the cause may be locnlized or generic.
The result of the evaluation will be used to select other suspect snubbers for verifying the attachment fasteners, as applicable.
~
~
'7, Functional Test Failure - Atte.ched Component Analysis
-For the snubbei'(s) found inoperable, an engineering evaluation shall be performed on the components which are restrained by the snubber (s).
The purpose of this engineering
' evaluation shall be to determine if the components restrained by the snubber (s) were adversely arffected by the inoperability of the snubber (s),
and in order to ensure'that the re-strained component remains capable of meeting-the designed service.
- 8. Functional' Testing of Repaired -
and Spare Snubbers
' Snub'ers which fail the visual inspection er the functional test l
l 202 l
l l
- t
~~ '
LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS H. Seismic Restraints, Supports, and-H. Seismic Restraints, Supports, and Snubbers (cont'd)
Snubbers (cont'd)
- 8. Functional Testing of Repaired and Spare Snubbers (cont'd) acceptance criteria shall be repaired or replaced. Replacement snubbers and snubbers which have repairs which might affect the functional test results shall meet the functional test c'riteria
~
I before installation.in the unit. These snubbers shall have met the acceptance criteria subsequent to their most recent service, and the functional test must have-been performed within 12 months before being installed in the.
unit.
9, 0xemption From Visual Inspection or Functional Tests 1
Permanent or other exemptions from visual inspections and/or functional l
}
testing,for individual snubbers may be j
granted by the Commission if.a jus,tifiable basis for exemption is.
l presented and if applicable snubber
{
life destructive testing was performed to qualify snubber operability for the applicable design conditions at either l
the completion of their fabrication or at a subsequent date. Snubbers so exempted shall continue.to be listed in the plant instructions with foot-
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notes indicating the extent of the l
exemptions.
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Figure 3.6-1 Curve #1 Minimum temperature for pressure tests such as required by Section XI.
"7 1'
Curve #2 1200 Minimum temperature 9-25-80 for mechanical heat up or cooldown following nuclear shotdown.
1000 Curve #3 Minimum temperature for core operation (criticality) c Includes additional
=
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600 -
These curves are g6
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M right of the original set of curNes to y
include a ART of A
30"F.
ThissNS[ twill g
D 400 allow these curves to be used thru 4.0 EFPY.
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-BOLT UP. I'vRPER ATURE C
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10 0 200 300 400 MINIMIT.i TDf?ERATURE
( F) 204
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FIGURE 3.6-2 CHANGE IN CHARPY V TRANSITION TEMPERATURE VERSUS NEdTRON EXPOSURE 1
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205
Table 4.6.A F R C001A W SYSTEM INSERVICE INSPECTION SCisEDULE AREAS OF INTEREST ACCESS 1 INSP. IN INSP. IIFFERVAL FRE)0ENCY MrTHOD A.
Deactor vessel 1.
W itudinal and Those welds above 105 of accessible longitudinal Code (1)
Volumetric circumferential sacrificial shield and welds outside core all in closure head SE of accessible circumferential region and in ves-are accessible from sel head vessel o.d.
2.
Vessel-to-flange Fros flange surface 1005 Code (2)
Volumetric circumferential weld Head-to-flange From o.d. of head 1001 code (2)
Volumetric circumferential weld 3.
3rimary nossle-to-All nossles 4 inches 1001 welds Code (2) vessel welds and and greater will be nossle-to-vessel in-accessible from vessel side radii o.d.
Inside radii at the 6 and 12 code (2)
Volumetric o' clock positions 3a.
CRD tousing-to-stub During refueling from 1005 At time of visual tube and stub tube-CBD area for signs of system hydro-stat to-vessel welds and leakage incore penetration 4.
Primary nossles to All nossles 4 inches 1005 Code (2)
Visual, surf ace,
and volumetric safe-end Dissimilar and larger will be Netal welds accessible 5.
Closure studs and Studs in place, nuts 1001 Code (2)
Visual, s.urface, and volumetric nuts on removal l
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Table 4.6.A RI. ACTOR COOIANT SYSTEM INSDVICE INSPECTION SCHEDULE AREAS OF INTEREST ACCf.SS 5 INSP. IN INSP. INTERVAL F1t EQU ENCY MET 900 6.
Closure washers, On removal 1005 Code (2)
Visual Bushings In place, when stude When made accessible Visual are removed 7.
Integrally welded Two sections 2 feet one foot mini. mum length Code (2) volumetric vessel supports long each, 18* apart, 180* apart - two spots accessible in support skirt to vessel weld 8.
vessel cladding During refueling -
6 predetermined patches Code (2)
Visual vessel 1.d.
(36 in.a each) 9.
vessel internals Accessible areas Accessible areas first refuel-Visual and integrally during normal re-ing and every third refueling welded internal fueling thereafter supports 10.
vessel flange-During refueling 1005 Code (2) volumetric ligaments between threaded stud holes B.
PiDin(I Pressure Boundary 1.
vessel, pump, and From pipe o.d.
1005 Code (2) visual and sur-face and valve saf e ends-to-voltanetric primary pipe dissimilar metal welds and safe ends in branch piping welds 4 inches and larger
Table 4.6.A REACTOP C001AM SYSTEM INEERVICE INSFECTIO4 SC5EDULE AJtEAS OF IMEREST ACCE.S$
% XNSP. IN INSP. INTERVAL F1tEQUENCY METM00 2.
Circumferential and Removable insulation 255 of circumferential welds Code (2) visual and longitudinal pipe plus 1 foot of adjacent volumetric welds 4 inches and longitudinal welds over Circumferential-Removable Insulation All those listed in Section Code (1)
Visual and type welds 4.6.G.4 of Technical volumetric
- pipe 34 Lip Specifications protection 3.
Pressure-retaining 2 inches and larger 2005 Code.(1)
Visual and volumetric bolting Bolting under 2 1001 Signs of inches on piping 4 leakage dur-Visual inches and over ing normal maintenance y
4.
Piping supports and co hangers a.
Integrally Scaffolding - as 1005 visual, Code (2)
Visual and welded required 255 vol. (if suitable geometry) volumetric b.
Nonintegrally Scaffolding - as 1005 Code (2)
Visual welded supports required C.
Pump Pressure Boundary 1.
Pump coming
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Table 4.6.A atAcToa cooturr sYstm IMszavier INspectrop seweputz AREAS OF INTrREST ACCESS 1 INSP. IN INSP. INTERVAL Pump Fressure boun-FREDUENCY METHOD dary interier From pump i.d. only one pump with or without when maintenance Code (1) visual requires removal of welds if disassembled if disassembled i
internals 2.
Pressure-retaining bolting 2 inches and larger 2005 Code (1) visual and volumetric Solting under 2 1001 inches Signs of visual 1
leakage dur-ing normal maintenance 3.
Support s outage i
- a. Integrally scaffolding as 251 9
welded o
required Code (2) visual and
- b. Monintegrally scaffolding as 1005 volumetric welded required Code (2) visual 4
Mossle-to-safe end dissimilar metal welde Demovable insulation 2005 Code (2)
Visual and D.
Valve Pressure h d= q volumetric 1.
valve body seen welde From valve o.d.
2005 Code (1)
Visual and volumetric l
2
Table 4.6.A REACTOR COOIAPT SYSTBf INERVICE IteFPECTIOW SCEEDULE AREAS OF INTEREST ACCESS 5 INSP. IN INSP. INTIFA FREQUENCY METHOD valve pressure boun-From valve 1.d. only One valve with or without Code (1)
Visual dary interior then maintenance welds if disassessled if disassembled requires r ooval of internals 2.
valve-to-safe end Removal insulation 1005 code (2)
Visual and dissimilar metal volumetric welds 3.
Pre ssure-retaining 2 inches and larger 1005 code (1) visual and bolting volumetric solting eder 2 inches 1005 signs of Visual leakage during nor-N mal maiatenance 5
outage 4.
Supports and hangers -
- a. Integrally scarfolding - e1 255 Vol. (if suitable geometry) code (2) visual and welded required 1005 visual volumetric
- b. Monintegrally scaffolding - as 1005 Code (2)
Visual wolded required t
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Table 4.6.A REAcTop CODIANT SYSTDI IIISERVIct IMspacTION scutDULE MM OF NT ACCESS 1 INSP. 13 rumD-INTERVAL FPEDogeCY MET 300 Inspection Frequency:
Code (1) - Program such that all areas of interest will be inspected during the inspection interval.
- Program such that at least 25% of the required examinations shall have been completed af ter one-third Code (2) of the inspection interval has expired (with credit for no more than 33-1/35 if additional examinations I
are completed) and at least 505 after two-thirds of the inspection interval ikts espired (with. credit for no more than 66-2/35). The remainder shall be completed by the end of the inspection interval, i
i NwW
D Pages 212-219 Deleted l
7.6/4'6 BASES It it intended that the required examinations and inspection be complet'rd during each 10-year interval. The periodic examinations are to be done during refueling outages or other extended plant shutdown periods.
Only proven nondestructive testing techniques will be used.
More frequent inspections shall be performed on certain circumferential s
pipe welds as listed in Section 4.6,C.4 to provide additional protection against pipe whip. These welds were selected in respect to their distance from hangers or supports wherein a_failu.c of the weld would permit the unsupported segments of pipe to st rike the drywell wall or nearby auxiliary systems or control systems. Selection was based on judgment from actual plant observation of hanger and support locations and review of drawings. Inspection of all these welds.during each 10-year inspection interval will result in three additional examinations above the requirements of Section XI of ASME Code.
REFERENCES 1.
Inservice Inspection and Testing (BFNP FSAR Subsection 4.12) 2.
Inservice Inspection of Nucluar Reactor Coolant Systems,Section XI, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code 3.
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III (1968 edition) 4.
American Society for Nondestructive Testing No. SNT-TC-1A (1968 edition) 3. 6. 11 / 4. 6. 11 Seismic Restraints, Supports and Snubbers Seismic restraints, supports and snubbers (SRSS) are designed to prevent unrestrained pipe or component motion under dynamic loads as might occur during an earthquake or severe transient, while allowing normal thermal motion during startup and shutdown. The consequence of an inoperable SRSS I
is an increase in the probability of structural damage to piping or components as a result of a seismic or other event initiating dynamic loads.
l It is therefore r2 quired that all SRSS required to protect the primary coolant system or any other safety system or component be operable during reactor operation.
Because the SRSS protection is required only during relatively low probability events, a period of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is allowed to replace or restore the inoperable SRSS(s) to operable status and perform an engineering evaluation on the supported component or declare the supported system inoperable and follow the appropriate limiting condition for operation statement for that system. The engineering evaluation is performed to determine whether the mode of failure of the SRSS has adversely affected any safety-related component or system.
228
3.6/4.6 BASES _
All safety-related snubbers are visually inspected for overall integrity The inspection will include verification of proper.
and operability.
orientation, adequate fluid level if applicabic, and proper attachment of the snubber to piping and structures. The removal of insulation or the verification of torque values for threaded fasteners is not required for visual inspections.
The inspection frequency is based upon maintaining a constant level of snubber protection. Thus, the required inspection interval varies in-versely with the observed snubber failures. The number of inoperable snubbers found during a required inspection determines the time interval for the next required insp9ction. Inspections performed before that interval has elapsed may be used as a new reference point to determine the next inspection, llowever, the results of such early inspections performed before the original required time interval has elapsed (nominal time less 25 percent) may not be used to lengthen the required inspection interval. Any inspection whose results require a shorter inspection interval will override the previous schedule.
When the cause of the rejection of a snubber in a visual inspection is clearly established and remedied for that snubber and for any other snubbers that may be generically susceptible and operability verified by inservice functional testing, if applicable, that snubber may be exempted from being counted as inoperable. Generically susceptible snubbers are those which are of a specific make or model and have the same design features directly related to rejection of the snubber, or are similarly located or exposed to the same environmental conditions such as temperature, radiation, and vibration.
Inspection groups may be established based on design features, and installed conditions which may be expected to be generic. Each of these inspection groups are inspected and tested separately unless an engineering analysis indicates the inspection group is improperly constituted. All suspect snubbers are subject to inspection and testing regardless of inspection groupings.
To further increase the assurance of snubber reliability, functional tests shall be performed at least once each 18 months during shutdown, usually during the refueling outage.
These tests will include stroking of the snubbers to verify proper movement, activation, and bleed or release. Ten percent represents an adequate sample for such tests. Observed failures on these samples l
will require an engineering analysis and testing of additional units.
l A thorough inspection of the snubber threaded attachments to the pipe or components and the anchorage will be made in conjunction with all required f unctional tests.
229 l
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4 Page 230 Deleted i
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... __.. ENCLOSURE 2 JUSTIFICATION TVA has maintained at Browns Ferry, in addition to the Technic 2.
Specification required surveillance program for hydraulic snubbers, a surveillance program for mechanical snubbers. The progrcm for mechanical snubbers includes both vidual inspections and functional tests intended to verify operabilitiy in a manner similar to inspections and tests of hydraulic snubbers. It is implemented by plant instruction,BF-MMI 59D, which replaced the earlier instruction BF-MMI 36.
In scme respects, these instructions have required a more stringent survcillance progran than does the technical specifications for hydraulic snubbers.
In the proposed revision to the Browns Ferry Technical Specifications, we have deleted the modifying word " hydraulic" when referring to snubbers so that the scope of the Technical Specification is increased to include all safety-related snubbers regardless of design.
ReJognizing that there are differences in design within the broad family of hydraulic snobbers and within the broad family of mechanical snubbers, the proposed technical specification will permit the establishment of inspection groups based on design differences which may be expected to affect the operability of the snubbers within that group. IE Bulletin No. 81-01 also i
apparently recognizes these differences in that different inspection criteria and inspection schedules are specified based on the manufacturer (i.e., design) of the mechanical snubbers covered by that bulletin.
L
' The proposed Technical Specificaticn also permits the establishment of v
inspection groups based on the application, considering such factors as environment or duty cycle imposed on the snubbers. This approach meets the intent of the Standard Technical Specifications provisions for selecting 25% of the functional test representative sample from three specific catagories relative to the application of the snubbers within the plant.
Provisions are also made to reduce the visual inspection lot size to 50%
for snubber inspection groups which have had no inoperable snubbers for two successive inspections, with the stipulations that inspe'etion lots be alternated so that all snubbers are inspected regularly, and that when a snubber within the group is determined to be inoperable, the lot size immediately reverts to 100% and the inspection interval changes in accordance with the inspection schedule table. This provision, while affording relief from inspecting snubbers, which by their performance have indicated such frequent inspections are not necessary, is expected to detect deterioration in the performance of snubbers whose aparability has previously been established.
~
Establishing snubber inspection groups based on design characteristics and upon application in the plant, and providing for reduced visual inspection lot size based on successful plant experience, we believe meets the intent of the Standard Technical Specification and incorporates the central provisions of the concensus standard being developed under the auspices of the American Society of Mechanical Engineer's Committee on Operations and Maintenance.
_3 The provisions of the Standard Technical Specifications for entering the visual inspection schedule have been adapted for inclusion in the Technical -
Specifications of the operating plants which have been performing inspection of snubbers and for including snubbers not previously included in the Technical Specifications. The inspection results for mechanical snubbers obtained in accordance with plant instructions forms the basis for entering the schedule table at whatever level the results of the first Technical i
Specification inspection dictate.
The visual inspection criteria have generally been adopted. The requirement to functionally test all snubbers to verify their operabilic' from a y
possible inoperable status has been modified to specify "if applicable."
~
Loose attachmeat bolts or missing elevis pins should not, for this reason only, require the functional testing of the snubbers. Likewise,the successful completion of an a -found functional test,regardless of the apparent fluid level at the snubber,should be sufficient to establish the operability of the hydraulic snubber. Some common reservoirs for hydraulic snubbers have long hose or piping runs whic' nay contain more than enough fluid to permit all connected snubbers to perform their required function even when the reservoir is empty. The option for as-found functional
~~
testing should always be available to verify snubber operability.
The functional testing lot size has been changed in accordance with the Standard Technical Specification from '10 or 10%, whichever is less' to 10% of each inspection group. Any required resampling will be at 10% of the remaining snubbers. This sample size will apply to a population of approximately 150 hydraulic snubbers and 50 mechanical snubbers in each unit at Browns Ferry.
4
- The sample composition within each inspection group may be more heavily weighted for snubbers from severe duty locations', and the composition of
- y sample lots resulting from failed snubbers will.be based on an evaluation of the snubber failure mode.
Functional testing criteria have been consolidated for'both hydraulic.and mechanical snubbers. Verification of drag force to establish that it is
~
not excessive relative to loads imposed on the attached components, or that there is no indication of impending failure of the snubber is also included.
Therequirementtoverifytheattachmentdasteners,bothtothecomponentand to the a ahorage, is included for snubbers selected for functional testing.
The discovery of missing or loose fasteners requires an evaluation and verification of additional fasteners, rather than additional functional tests be performed. This detailed inspection of the fasteners in conjunction with the functional tests in intend'ed to supplement the visual inspections.
\\
Functional testing is required of repaired or spare snubbers before their t
installation in the unit. This requirement in conjunction with the application of the failure analysis to the composition of lots required for additional testing from failed snubbers and te future testing lots, as spplicable, meets the concern of the Standard Technical Specification requirement to,
repeat functional tests on both repaired and spare snubbers installed in.
locations where failed snubbers have been discovered. The selection of snubbers for additional testing based on an analysis of failed snuibers will require the testing of snubbers with a suspected common de c.t and will serve the same purpose as requiring additional exclusive testing based on two specific failure modes.
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f An engineering evaluation is to be performed relative to the effect on the attached component of any snubber which fails the functional test acceptance.
criteria.
Either temporary, permanent, partial, or complete exemptions from visual inspections or functional testing are to be justiff 1 to NRC. The former blanket exemption from functional testing of snubber; with 50,000 pound and greater capacity has been eliminated. All safety-related snubbers are to remain on the listing in the Surveillance Instruction regardless of the degrce of exemption granted. The degree of exemption is to be indicated for each snubber.
The service life monitoring intent is covered by preventive maintenance programs and through the provisions of the surveillance program itself.
The consequences of the visual inspection and functional test failures are significant enough to encourage action to ensure that the snubbers remain operable within the operating interval between inspecticas and tests. The specified individual snubber maintenance and installation records review require unnecessary time that could be better spent on productive tasks.
In addition to duplication of some existing programs, a large quantity of additional paperwork would be generated with a life-of-plant retention requirement. Records of major maintenance activities currently are to be-retained for a five year minimum. In addition to the current seal replacement program for hydraulic snubbers, the monitoring of drag force on Pacific Scientific snubbers is expected to provide information in advance of a Pacific Scientific snubber wearing to the point of being inoperable.
The Bases as contained in the Standard Technical Specification have been incorporated into the proposed Technical Specification as is consistent with the provisions of the proposed Technical Specifications.
6-l
' t I'
_ In addition to the proposed Technical Specifications changes enclosed, a tabulation of the inspections of mechanical snubbers, performed in accordance with BF MMI 36 and BF MMI 59D, is included. Also enclosed are the most pertinent pages from the current revision of BF MMI 59D.
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BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT MECHANICAL SNUBBER FUNCTIONAL TEST HISTORY s.,
UNIT DATE SNUBBER TESTED NUMBER MAINTENANCE MFC.
NO.
FAILED INSTRUCTION / COMMENT 1&2 8-74 INC 14 100' 5
Reported in NRC IE Bulletin 14 100%
11 81-01 as " Unit 2 & 3"
(
JNIT 1 & 2 FIRE OUTAGE BEGAN 3/75 - NEW VERSION INC INSTALLED AND PSA INSTAli.ED ON 1SRV TAILPIPES 4/76 - RESTART FROM FIRE OUTAGE 8/76 JNIT 3 COMMERCIAL OPERATION - 3/77 1
9-77 PSA 11 25%
0 NMI 36 INC 14 100%
0 2
5-78 PSA 14 25%
0 INI 36 INC 14 100%
0 3-9-73 PSA 7
15%
0 MMI 59D INC 14 100%
0 1
11-78 PSA 7
15%
0 MMI 59D INC 14 100%
0 2
5-79 PSA 5
10%
0 211 59D INC 14 100%
0 3
9-79 PSA 7
15%
0 MMI 59D INC 14 100%
0 1
1-80 PSA 7*
15%
0 MMI 59D INC 14 100%
0 2
11-80 PSA 46 100%
0 1MI 59D INC 14 100%
0 3
12-80 PSA 41 90%
0 mtI 59D INC 14 100%
0
- UNIT 1 (2-80) 53 PSA PIPE CLAMP NUTS STAKED - WORK 0RDER 000-9190 e
Pcga 2 BF 10E 59D '
'4/17/79 f
7.0 ALARA Considerations'(Continued) v 7.2 Compare personnel exposure rates and attempt to use those people with the least exposure.
2.0 Instruction 8.1 General Surveillance Requirements 8.1.1 Yarway columns in each unit are equipped with a total of 14 International Nuclear Safe Guard Corporation snubbers. All (100%) of these snubbers are to be tested during the refueling outage of the unit in which they are installed.
8.1.2 All steam relief valve piping and the main steam lines A and D in the dyrwell are equipped with Pacific Scientific snubbers as follows:
Number of Snubbers Installed Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 On relief valve piping
- 49 42 44 ON MS lines A and D 4
4 4
- 53 46 48 A sufficient number of snubbers shall be tested each refueling outage so that all snubbers will be tested within ten-year periods.
For annual refueling outages ten percent (5 snubbers) and for 18 months between refueling outages.; percent (7 snubbers) are to be tested. During the end-of-cycle-test all snubbers that have not previously been tested within the previous ten-year period are to be tested. To assure that representative samples of snubbers in the system are tested, they are to be tested in the sequence in which they are listed on the d'ata sheets (the exact sequence is not required within a batch).
Figure 2 (page 22) is included as an overall location plan and the individual installations are shown on pages 23-41.
- Revision f
P:ga 3 4
9/15/78
,9. Testfnst y
9.1 See Caution. International Nuclear Safe Guard Corporation snubbers on the two Yarway columns are to be observed for freedom of movement by moving the piping with the snubbers attached. Move the pipe in d'ifferent directions in' order to more*directly activate each snubber of the cluster. The snubbers may be observed on the two vertical 3/4-inch pipes at the two locations near the core spray lines on the third 'ahd fourth elevations in the drywell. If the action of the snubber is in doubt, it is to be disconnected and stroked separate from the line.
.-CAUTION: Do not move Yarway piping to an extreme degree at locations remote from snubber attachments.
l 9.2 If any of the snubbers do not travel through its full stroke or 1
has been damaged, it is to be replaced by a snubb'er of the same configuration from Power Stores p'rior to startup of the unit.
9.3 Pacific Scientific snubbers are to be tested as follows:
9.3.1 See Caution. Disconnect the snubber from,its attachment
-by removing the four bolts from the mounting-flange (refer
~
to Figure 1.)
CAUIION: Do not rotate one end of any Pacific Scientific snub'ber reistive to its other end. This twisting will damage internal parts.
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9/15/78 S
REAR BMCEET Dust Tube COLD SETT!ttC't1 ARK 5 s.
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EX1C4SION rtrt ronvAo Al AFTER sATETY U )
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TYFICAL INSTALtATION FICURE 1 9.
Testing Continued) 9.3. (continued)
Swing the attachment and/or the snubi>e~r tilhe' 's'ils si tiid 9.3.2 i i ch stroke in both the snubber may be moved through its s x-n If the. attachment will. not pivot sufficiently, directions.
the lock nut on the threaded extension may be loosened and d
i ce,.if so equipped.
the extension screwed in to provi e c caran
'It these procedures do not provide sufficient cicarance, the pin connecting the attach :nt to the lug may be removed, us,ing a brass bar or soft-faced hanuner i.o prevent marring the end of the pin.
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BF.HNI 59D Eegh 5 9/15/78 9.
Testinz (Continued) 9.3 (Continued)
Hove the snubber through its full travel in 9.3.3 See Caution.
both directions, applying force by hand attempting to increase.
Note whether the snubber resists the speed of the snubber.
increased speed with the force applied and whether it travels smoothly through the full six-inch stroke.
Slow the snubber speed before it reaches the end CAUTION:
The internal parts of the snubber of its stroke.
rotate at high, rates of speed, and coming to a sudden stop at the end of the stroke can cause damage to the snubber.
9.3.4 Snubbers whsch lock-up preventing the full six-inch stroke or move without resistance, are inoperable and are to be replaced with new snubbers of the same configuration from 1'
Power Stores prior to startup of the unit.
'EhePSA-10Snubbersoriginallyinstalledareamodel
~ ~~~
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NOTE:
not currently manufactured by Pacific Scientific.
They are painted with white epoxy and are rated at 10,000 pounds design load. The spares in Power Stores
.--- - are--the later. design.which have, a zinc-nickel cad
~ " ' " "
- protective coating and have a 15,000 pc'und design rating. These snubbers are dimensionally and functionally interchangeable.
When a Pa'cific Scientific snubber is determined to be inoperable 9.3.5 s
an additional refueling interval batch of snubbers is to be For each snubber determined to,be inoperable an i
tested.
additional batch of snubbers shall.be tested until,no additional (The snubbers
" snubbers fail or all snubbers 1 ave been tested.
3 tested during the next refueling outage shall be insequence after any snubbers tested in compliance with this paragraph.)
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10.
Rc' turn to Service
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1 Ifpon completion of the functional test bring the snubber and J
10.1 its attachment back into alignment and into contset with each t
(If an attachment pin has been removed be sure it is l
other.
' free of burs and coate'd with an approved anti-seized compound
- I
~
before reinstallation.) Note the cold position setting'as indicated by " cold setting marks" (figure 1) paint stenciled The line through the middle of the "3" should i.
on the snubber.
be aligned with the edge of the dust tube since the cold position.
setting of all these snubbers ia " midrange",according to the If the cold position setting is detail installation drawings.
not "3," and the snubber has an ad'justable extension, adjust the extension to achieve the proper cold position setting. Many of the installations do tsot have any adjustment and the as-found i
. reading is to'be recorded.
l Make sure the locking tab is on.the bolt, apply an approved anti-10.2 f
seized compound
- to the threads, and thread the bolts through the Tighten the bolts to attachment into the flange of the snubber.
Bend the lock tab up against a flat approximately 40 foot pounds.
- of the hex head bolt and down over the edge of the flange to i
. prevent loosening the bolt.
Observe the snubber for any evidence of damage, tighten any 10.3 extension lock nuts, and check the,, clamp attachment nuts for y See that lock wires.are installed on the screws which f
i tightness.
Generally observe the snubber.and hold the dust tubss in place.
its attachments for any condition which would prevent its functioning
- Fel-Pro N-1000 or "Never Seize" pure nickle compound special nuclear rate NC-165 y
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10.
Return to Servlee (Continued) 10.3 (Continued) during its cycle between test, record and take appropriate action.
10.4 httach or update a linen tag to the snubber (or snubber location) starting by the person responsible. Fill out and submit the required data sheets.
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