ML20002D071

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Proposed Tech Specs Sections 3 & 4,providing for Redundancy in Decay Heat Removal Capability
ML20002D071
Person / Time
Site: Calvert Cliffs  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 01/08/1981
From:
BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20002D070 List:
References
NUDOCS 8101190325
Download: ML20002D071 (9)


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3/4.4 FIACTOR C00Ltd:T SYSTE't i r.: ACTO? C^" ":7 LOC?S l

1 l LIMITI':1 CC"7ITIC:1 FC1 GPEP.ATIC:l 3.4.1.1 Ecth reactor coolant locos and both reactor coolant pumps in each l

locp shall be in operation.

APPLICABILITY: Modes 1 and 2*

ACTION:

With one reactor coolant puno not in operation, STARTUP and/cr con-a.

tinued PO'.JER 0?EMTION nay proceed orovided THEC"AL PONER is re-stricted to c C0; of RATED THEF"AL PC'.:ER and the setooints in Specification 2.2.1 for operation with three reactor' coolant cumps operating:

1.

Pcwer Level-High 2.

Reactor Coolant Flow-Low 3.

Thermal Margin /Lew Pressure 4

Axial Flux Offset b.

With two reactor coolant pumos in opposite loops not in operation, STARTUP and/or continued PC'.-lER OPERATIO:t may procaed provided T !E?.-

MAL P0'!ER is restricted to 4. 51.1". of RATED THER'tAL PCWER, and the setpoints for the following~ trips have been reduced to the values specified in Specification 2.2.1 for cperation with two (2) reactor coolant pumps operating in opposite locos:

1.

Power Level-High 2.

Reactor Coolant Flew-Low 3.

Thermal Margin /Lew Pressure 4.

Axial Flux Offset

  • See Special Test Exception 3.10.3.

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k'ith tua rc:ctor cccica: puuns in the same Icoa not in oceratio.,

STARTU? and/or continu2d FC:ER OPEP.ATICM may precaed providad the water icval in both steam gen:rators is raintained above the Steam Generator Uatc Level-Lcw trip setooint, the THER::AL PC'.!ER is re-stricted to 4 45.83 of RATER THER:!AL P0'.lER, and the setpoints for the following trips have been reduced to the values specified in Specification 2.2.1 for operation with two reactor coolant pumps operating in the same loop:

1.

Peaer L'evel-High 2.

Reactor Ccolant Flow-Low 3.

Thermal ftargin/ Low Pressure 4.

Axial Flux Offset SURVEILLANCE REOUIRE?!ENTS 4.4.1.1 The Reactor Protective Instrumentation channels specified in the l

applicable ACTION statement above, shall be verified to have had their trip setpoints changed to the values specified in Specifica-tion 2.2.1 for the applicable number of reactor coolant punps operating either:

Within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> af+er switching to a. different pump combination, a.

if switch is mada while operating, or b.

Prior to reactor criticality, if switch is made while shutdown.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 and 2 3/4 4-2

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e 3.h.l.2 3cth eactor coolant loops, shall be operable, and at least one reacter ecolant pt=p shall be in operation in each loop

  • APPLICABILITY: Mode 3 AC"!O:I:

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' lith less than the above required reac@ coolant loops operable, restere l

the required '.cc;s :: CPEF.C'.E statue within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT SHU--

00'.C* vithin the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

SURVEI.X!CE RE;UIRE TITS h.h.l.2

~te required c0clant icop shall be verified to be in operation and circulating reactor ecolant at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Sk dow' ca E'1 All reactor coolant pu..ps and dec-_;' Scat r-~vd. punps nay be de-engergized for up to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, provided (1) no operations are per=itted that vould cause dilution of the reactor coolant syste:a boron concentration, and (2) core 0

outlet te=perature is =aintained at least 10 F belov saturation te=perature.

CALVERT CLIFFS - U:IIT 1 and 2 3/4 h-2a

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM SHUTCC'.:N r

LI"ITI';G CONDITION FOR CPERATION 3.4.1.3 At least two (2) of the four (4) below listed coolant loops shall be operable, and at least one (1) coolant loop shall be in opera-tion:*

a.

Two (2) reactor coolant loops and one (1) associated reactor coolant pump in each loop.

b.

Two (2) shutdown coolant loops.***

APPLICABILITY: Modes 4**# and 5**!

ACTION:

a.

Mode 4 With less than the above required coolant loops operable, restore the required loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTDCWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, b.

Mode 5 1.

With less than the required shutdown cooling loops operable, initiate corrective action to return the required number of loops to OPERABLE status as soon as possible.

2.

The provisions of Specifi ation 3.

3 are not applicable.

o c a.cyc for up to I hour, provided (1) no operations are permitted that would cause dilution of the reactor coolant system baron concentration, and (2) core cut-let temperature is maintained at least 100F belcw saturaticn temperature.

    • A reactor coolant pumo shall not be started with one or more of the RCS cold le. temperature 4 2750F, unless (1) the pressurizer water volume is less than 600 cubic feet, cr (2) the secondary water temoerature of each steam cenerator is less than 46 F (340F when measured by a surface contact instrument} above the coolant temperature in the reactor vessel.
  1. See Special Test Exception 3.10.5.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREME?iTS 4.4.13 The required coolant loop shall be verified to be in operation and circulating reactor coolant at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 and 2 3/4 4-2b

I REFUELING OPERATIONS COOLANT CIRCULATION LIMITING CONDITICN FOR OPERATICN 3.9.8.1 At least ene shutdown eccling lcop snail be in cperation.

APPLICASILITY: Mode 6

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With less than one shutdown cooling loop in operation, except as pro-a.

vided in b. below, suspend all operations involving an increase in the reactor decay heat load or a reduction in baron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System.

Cicse all centainment penetrations pre-viding direct access frcm the containment atmosphere to the cutsice atmes::here within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

The shutdcwn ecoling pumps may be de-energi:ed during the time intervals required for local leak rate testing of containment penetraticn number 41 pursuant to the require-ments of Specification 4.6.1.2.d, provided (1) no operations are per-mitted which could cause dilution of the reactor coolant system boren concentration, (2) all CORE ALTERATIONS are suspended, and (.3). all containment penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere are maintained cicsed, b.

The shutdown cooling loop may be removed frem operation for up to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> per 8-hour period during the perfomance of CORE ALTERATIONS in the vicinity of the reactor pressure vessel hot legs.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

c.

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.9.8.1 A shutdcwn ecoling loop shall be detemined to be in cperation and circulating reactor coolant at a ficw rate of > 30C0 cpm" at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, k

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>1500 gpm when the Reactor Coolant System is drained to a level below the iiiidplane of the hot leg.

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CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 and 2 3/4 9-8 6 6'"-d AA-<<f e>2'4 4/3ee 9-4

i REFUELI!!G CPERATICi:S

' CCOLA:T CIF.CL'LATIC:

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FCR CPERATIO:t 3.9.8.2 Two (2) independent shutdown cooling loops shall be OPERABLE.*

APPLICABILITY: Mode 6 when 'cne water level above the too of the irradiated i

fuel assemblies seated within the reactor pressure vessel is less than 23 feet.

ACTION:

I With less than the required shutdown cooling loops OPERABLE, initiate a.

corrective action to return loops to OPERABLE status as soon as possi-lt ble.

b.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not app!icable.

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I SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS i

4.9.8.2 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than these required by Specification 4.0.5.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 and 2 3/4 9-2a

3/4.4 REACTOR CMLA"T SYSTEM W E5 a);

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The niant is desicned to acerate with hoth reactor coolant icops and

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ciated reactor coolant pucps in operations, and maintain D:!SR above during all nonral operatiens and anticipated transients. STARTUP an P0.:ER OPERATIC:1 may be initiated and may proceed with one or two reactor coolant pumps not in operation after the setooints for the Power Level-Hich, Reactor Coolant Flow-Low, Thennal Piargin/ Low Pressure and Axial Flux Offset tries have been reduced to their specified values.

Re-i d= Lino these tric setnoints ensures that the D?!BR will be maintained above

/j(within the core and thereby prevent premature 0::B.

i 1.33hrinc thr-a r;, cperation and that durinq two pu~p operation the care voici fr--tion will be limited to ensure parallel channel flow stability h

A sincie reactor coolant loop with its steam generator filled above the lou level trip setpoint provides sufficient heat removal capability Q,

g derations recuire that two leops be OPERACLE.

for core cooling while in MOCES 2 and 3; however, sinple failure consi-In MODES a and 5, a sinole reactor coolant loop or shutdown cooling loop I

l orovides sufficient heat reroval capability for removing decay heat; but

' single failure considerations require that stleast two loops be OPERABLE.

The restrictions on startina a Reactog Coolant Pump durino MODES 4 II and 5 with one or core CCS cold legs < 275 F are provided to prevent RCS pressure transients, caused by eneroy~ additions from the secondary system, which could exceed the linits of Appennix G to 10 CFR Part 50. The RCS will ha protected acainst overpressure transients and will not exceed the limits of Appendix G by either (1) restricting the water volume in the pressurizer and thereby providing a volune for the primary coolant to exnand into or (2) by restricting startino of the RCPs to when tge secondary water tercerature of each stean generator is less than 46 F 0

(34 F when measured by a surface contact instrument) above the coolant temoerature in the reactor vessel.

3/4.4.2 and 3/4.4.3 SAFETY VALVES The pressurizer code safety valves operate to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2750 psia.

Each safety valve is desianed to relieve 7.6 x 105 lbs per hour of saturated steam at the valve setpoint. The relief capacity of a single safety valve is adequate to relieve any overpressure condition which could occur during shutdown.

In the event that no safety valves are OPERABLE, an operating shutdown coolino loop, connected to the RCS, provides overpressure relief capa-bility and will prevent RCS overpressurization.

During operation, all pressurizer code safety valves must be OPERABLE to prevent the RCS frcn beinc pressurized above its safety linit of 2750 psia. The combined relief capacity of these valves is sufficient to CALVERT CLIFFS - U::IT 1 and 2 8 3/a 4-1

PFniELIM GrEPATIO!!S

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The CPEI/IILITY recuirements 4r the refuelinq machine ensure that:

1) the refuelinc machine will be used for movccent of CEAs and fuel assemblies, 2) the refueling machine has sufficient load capacity to lif t a CEA or fuel asse..bly, and 3) the core internals and cressure vessel are protected from excessive lifting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged during lifting operations.

3/a.9.7 CPA'!E TRAVEL - SPE:!T FUEL STOPAGE BUILDI!!G The restriction on ::ve. ent of loads in excess of the ncainal weicht of a fuel assenbly and CEA over other fuel assemblies in the storage cool ensures that in the event this load is dropped (1) the activity releese uill be limited to that contained in a single fuel assenbly, and (2) any possible distortion of feel in the storage racks will not result in a critical array. This assumption is consistent with the activity release assumed in the accident analyses.

t b3/4.9.8 CO^LA*!T CIRCULiTIO:1 The requirecent that at least one shutdown cooling loop be in operation ensures that (1) sufficient coolina capacity is available to l recove decay heat and maintain the water in the reactor pressure vessel l elow 140"F as required durino the REFUELIt!G MODE, and (2) sufficient b

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coolant circulation is reintained.throuch the reactor core to minini:e the effects of a baron dilution incident and prevent baron stratificatien.

The reeuirement to have two shutdown coolina loops OPERABLE when there is less than 23 feet of water above the core, ensures that a sincie failure of the ccarating shutdown cooling loco will not result in a conclete loss of decay heat removal capability, Uith the reactor vessel hqad removed and 23 feet of water above the core, a large heat sink is available for core cooling, thus in the event of a failure of the operating shutdown cooling loop, @quate time is provided to initiate emergency procedures to cool the c M 1

i CALVERT CLIFFS - U: LIT 1 end 2 B 3/4 9-2

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RFRJELIM OEPATIO"S H e/. c,o cm :7s -""-*:7 au-r ";.L'!E IPL? TIC:: SYSTE'1 fl The OPEP.ADILITY of this system ensures that the contaircent purce i

valves will be autenatically isolated upon detection of hiah radiation levels within the containcent. The OPERADILITY of this systen is required to restrict the release of radioactive material from the containment atmosphere to the environment.

3/4.9.10 and 3/4.9.11 t>ATER LEVEL-REACTOR VESSEL Ai!D SPEf!T FUEL POOL I

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The restrictions on mini un water level ensure that sufficient I water depth is available to remove 993 of the assumed 10; iodine cap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assenbly.

The minimum water depth is censistent with the assumptions of the accident analysis.

1 3/4.9.12 SPEtlT FUEL POOL VE!!TILATIO!! SYSTE!4 L

The limitations on the spent fuel pool ventilation system ensure that all radioactive raterial released from an irradiated fuel assenbly will be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber prior to discharce to the at. osphere. The OPERABILITY of this system and the i

resultinq iodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions of the accident, analyses.

3/4.9.13 SPEitT FUEL CASX HATIDLIt!G CRANE The restricticn on novement of the spent fuel shippino cask within one cask lenath of any fuel asse.-bly ensures that in the event this load is dropoed (1) the stored spent fuel assemblies will not be diraced, and (2) any possible distortion of fuel in the storage racks will not result is a critical array.

l CAL"ERT CLIFFS - U::IT 1 and 2 C 3/4 9-3 (RESET)

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