Text

Proposed Tech Spec Sections 3.1,3.3,3.5,4.3,4.5 & 4.6 Changing Borated Water Sources Limiting Conditions for Operation,Surveillance Requirements & Bases
	ML20002C054
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	01/05/1981
From:	; TOLEDO EDISON CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20002C053	List: ML20002C052; ML20002C054;
References
	NUDOCS 8101090029
	Download: ML20002C054 (17)
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Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 Attachment A O Serial No.

January 5, 1981 625 I. Changes to Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 1 Technical Specifi-cerions Appendix A, changes pages:

3/4 1-17 3/4 3-21 3/4 5-?

3/4 3-10 3/4 3-48 3/4 6-11 3/4 3-11 3/4 3-50 B 3/4 1-2 3/4 3-13 3/4 5-3 3/4 3-20 3/4 5-6

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See proposed changes attached A. Time Required to Implement -

It's expected that this could be implemented within 90 days of NRC issuance.

B. Reason for Change (Facility Change Request 80-278) these changes have been

'propos&d-during' disc'ussion with-NRC to address pot'ential problems resulting from inadvertant or premature actuation of SFAS Level 5.

C. Safety Evaluation - attached.

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8101090# .

Safety Evaluation for FCR 80-278 At present, the suction to the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) pumps is automatically transferred from the Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) to the Containment Emergency Sump on a Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) trip of incident level 5. This occurs at a BWST level between 49.5 and 55 inches. This FCR proposes the above described automatic transfer of ECCS pumps be changed to manual.

The safety function of this transfer is to protect the ECCS pumps from cavitation for lack of proper net positive suction heads and to transfer these pump suction to the containment emergency sump during the recir-culation mode of operation. The following table shows the BWST levels

.! required by this an21ysis for the ECCS suction transfer to be successfully performed by a manual transfer.

Table 1 BWST Level BWST Volume Description (Inch'es) ~ (Callons')

l Develop Minimum Level to Transfer Suction to

, . Containment. Emergency Sump , , .. ,. . . .

1) Ac.cident Analysis minimum le. vel.to start ,

36 the transfer per the original analysis

2) Instrument String Inaccuracy for Indication 13.5

3) Lowest Indicated Level to Start Transfer 49.5

4) Drawdown in one minute for operator action 11.3

5) Lowest safe indicated reading to start 60.8 operator action to transfer

6) Set Annunciator alarm at 72 Develop Minimum Contained Volume

1) Annunciator alarm 72 l

1

2) Alarm Dead band J i

3) Highest indicated level that alarm can occur 75

4) Instrument string inaccuracy 13.5

5) Highest actual level that alarm can occur 88.5 95,314 (this volume may not be available for the decay heat or containment spray pump)

6) 360,000 gallons required to be added 334.3 360,000 for ECCS analysis

7) Lowest indicated level for ECCS Analysis 422.8 455,314 in Modes 1, 2, 3 & 4 As shown in the above table, the operator will manually transfer the ECCS suction when the safety grade level indicator in the control room indicates 72 inches of BWST level. Since the plant under the conditions existing at this point will be in an emergency situation for a minimum of 23 minutes, the station procedures will instruct the operator to be looking at the BWST level indicator and it will take him not more than one minute to initiate the manual transfer. As observed from the above calculation table, the minimum level requirements of BWST will be met even with this one minute manual action.

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The operator will manually perform this transfer about 23 minutes after the initial SFAS trip that started all high pressure injection, low pressure injection and containment spray pumps at their maximum flow. The accident analysis requires 360,000 gallons to be added for ECCS analysis when in.

modes 1, 2, 3 & 4. As shown.in the above table this condition will still be met and the attached Technical Specifications.are changed.

accordingly.

This change to manual transfer will provide the same safety function as is performed by the present automatic transfer as discussed above. Hence, no adverse environment will be created by the change and the safety function of the ECCS will not be affected.

Pp b/1-2 (

ll^2-l81

& R Demac.h 79L t/z. m l

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l REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS B0 RATED WATER SOURCES - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i 3.1.2.9 Each of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. The boric acid addition system and associated heat tracing with:

1. A minimum contained borated water volume in accordance with Figure 3.1-1,

2. Between 7875 and 13,125 ppm of boron, and A m'inimum solution temperaturd of 105'F.

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b. .The borated water storage tank (BWST) with:

A contained b' orated water vo' ume of vrbetween 1:',E3 0:0 and '

1. l 550.000 gallo.ns,

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2. Between 1800 and 2200 ppm of boron, and

3. A minimum solution temperature of 35'F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

a. With the boric acid addition system inoperable, restore the storage system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to 1% ak/k at 200*F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; restore the boric acid addition system to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months ,

b. With the borated water storage tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDONN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 1-17

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j! TABLE 3.3-3 2

! Y' SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION E

8; MINIMUM

!" TOTAL N0. UNITS UNITS APPLICABLE c: FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF UNITS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION

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1. INSTRUMENT STRINGS

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, a. Containment Radiation -

High 4 2- 3 All MODES 97

b. Containment Pressure -

High 4 ? 3 1,2,3 9#

c. Containment Pressure -

High-High 4 2 3 1,2,3 9#

d. RCS Pressure - Low 4 2 3 1, 2, 3* 9#

e. RCS Pressure - Low-Low 4 2 3 1, 2, 3** 48 50 (3L BWST Level - Low 4 2 3 1,2,3 9i])2 bell EE'[k5 l 2. DUTPUT LOGIC Es a. Incident Level #1:

Containment Isolation 2 1 2 All MODES 10

b. Incident Level #2:

High Pressure Injection and Starting Diesel Generators 2 1 2 1,2,3,4 10

c. Incident Level #3:

Low Pressure Injection 2 1 2 1,2,3,4 10

d. Incident Level #4:

_ rnn1:c inment Spray 2 1~ 2 1,2,3,4 10 fe. Inc'ic ent Level fb:

Containment Sump -

EHELJEll( Recirculation 2 1 2 1,2,3,4 10 w ,

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n j I TABLE 3.3-3 E SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM. INSTRUMENTATION sn MINIMUM ky TOTAL NO. UNITS UNITS APPLICABLE '

TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF UNITS

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3. MANUAL ACTUATION

a. SFAS (exceit Containment ALL MODES 11 Spra hn imer ncy Su@ 2 -2 2 (Hecirculatio .g LE.TE ,

2 2 2 1, 2, 3, 4 11

b. Containment Spray -

4 2*** 4 1,2,3,4 97

4. SEQUENCE LOGIC CHANNELS

5. INTERLOCK CHANNELS 1 1 1,2,3,4,5 127

$ a. Decay' Heat Isolation Valve 1 i

'2 2 3,4,5 13#

U b. Pressurizer Heaters 2

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E TABLE 3.3-4

" SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

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$ FUNCTIONAL UNIT TRIP SETPOINT ALLOWABLE VALUES C

5 s

IllSTRUMENT STRINGS

" < 2 x Background at RATED < 2 x Background at

a. Containment Radiation iiATED THERMAL POWER, TIIERMAL POWER

< 18.4 psia < 18.52 psta#

b. Containment Pressure - Higi Containment Pressure - liigh-liigh . < 38.4' psia < 38.52 psta#

c. _

> 1620.75 psig > 1615.75 psig#

d. RCS Pressure - Low _

u 'DE LETh' > 420.75 psig > 415.75 psig q

i e. RCS Pressure - Low-low _

u > 48.3 and BWST Level > 49.5' and < 55.0 in.1I20

f. , _ _

<56.7in.H0]

7 SEQUENCE LOGIC CllANNELS Essential Bus Feeder Breaker Trip (90%) > 3744' volts for > 3558 volts

'a. for 7 + 1.5 sec, 7 + 1.5 sec k b. Diesel Generator Start, load Shed on

'> 2071 and < 2450 volts > 2071 and < 2450 R. Essential Bus (59%) ~ ~

M for <0.5 + 0.1 sec

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volts for 0.5 + 0.1 sec#

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P INTERLOCK CilANNELS

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ro a. Decay lleat Isolation Valve < 438.psig < 443 psigp

l and Pressurizer Heater

- g Allowable Value for CilANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CllANNEL CALIBRATION. !

n e- -- 2 . a- --..i,--, nun ..a nun

e de TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued)

SAFETY FEATURES SYSTEM RESPONSE TIMES INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS

6. Containment Radiation - High

a. Emergency Vent Fans < 25*

b. HV & AC Isolation Valves

1. ECCS Room < 75*

2. Emergency Ventilation 7 75*

3. Containment Air Sample 7 30*

4. Containment Purge 7 15*

5. Penetration Room Purge <

75*

c. Control Room HV & AC Units < 10

h.

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Borated Water" Storage' Tank-Low

a. . Containment Sump . Suction Valves < 90*

b. BWST Outlet Valves _ 90*

TABLE NOTATION DEL 6IE

Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays included when applicable. Response time limit includes movement of valves and attainment of pump or blower discharge pressure.

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DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 3-20 l

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i E TABLE 4.3-2

, SAFETYFEATURESACTUATIONSYSTEMINSTRUMENTATIONSURVNILLANCEREQUIREMENTS P3 f4 CilANNEL 'H0 DES IN WillCI

. CilANNEL , CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CilECK Call _BRATION TEST R_EQU_lRED

[ 1. INSTRUMENT STRINGS .

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.; a. Coritainment Radiation - High S~ R H All MODES

b. Containment Pressure - High S; R M(2) 1, 2, 3

c. Containment Pressure - High-High S R H(2) 1, 2, 3 i RCS Pressure - Low S R H 1, 2, 3 J

5 R H 1. 2. 3

(%_,_RCSPressure-Low-Low d BWST Level - Low 5 H H 1, 2, 3) , ,

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DELEI6

2. O'"'" i,0GIC ,

a. Incident Level #1: Con tainment M'

.. isolation S R H All N0 DES

b. Incident Level #2: Hinh "ressure -

Y Injection and Startlw r 'sel O Generators , S R H 1, 2, 3, 4

c. Incident Level #3: Low Pressure Injection S. R H 1, 2, 3, 4

d. Incident Level #4: Containment ,

Spray S. . R H 1, 2, 3, 4

e. Incident Level #S: Containment -

Sump Recirculation 5 R . H 1, 2, 3,

3. MA*luAL ACTUATION gg gLET6 'a . SFAS(ExceptContainmentSpray) NAI NA H(1) All H00ES '

Mnd Emergency Sump Rectrculatioj)

b. Iontainment Spray NA NA H(1) 1, 2, 3 ,

4. SEQUENCEj0GICCilANNELS S NA H 1, 2, 3, 4

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g TABLE 3.3-10 (Continued)

Us POST-ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

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Cl MINIMUM NI C"ANNELS INSTRUMENT OPERABLE z

Q 15. Low Pressure Injection (CHR) Flow 1/ Channel

16. HPI System Pump and Valve Status -

1/ System

17. LPI System Pump and Valve Status' . 1/ System 18.- Containment Spray Pump and Valve Status 1/ System

19. Core Flood Valve Status 1/ System y 20. BWST Valve Status 1/ System Y 21. Containment Emergency Sump Valve Status 1/ Valve 8

22. Containment Air Recirculation Fan Status 1/ Fan

23. Containment Air Cooling Fan Status '

1/ Fan

24. EVS Fan and Damper Status 1/ System

25. 8WsT Level 2. l

'No$: This papc is odso affecgt.

W Toledo EcMr.ern G. :

MW ta 1h. N Rc MN 6 % otofc2g/g/f. .

~ $ W # tA.lo w i;lk o k, TABLE 4.3-10 (Continued)

POST-ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATI0fl LSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CHANNEL CHANNEL G CHECK -

CALIBRATION m INSTR'JMENT y 15. Low Pressure Injection (OHR) Flow M , R

'M NA E 16. HPI System Pump and Valve Status '.

17. LPI System Pump and Valve Status 'M NA M NA

18. Containment Spray Pump and Valve Status M NA

19. Core Flood Valve Status M NA

20. BWST Valve Status M NA

21. Containment Emergency Sump Valve Status .

M NA

22. Containment Air Recirculation Fan Status -

Y NA

$ 23. Containment Air Cooling Fan Status M .

EVS Fan and Damper Status M NA 24.

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25. 8WST" LEUEL .

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' EMERGENCY CORE COO'.ING SYSTEMS ECCS SUESYSTEMS - T.v,3 > 2S0*F s

LIMIT!.NG CONDITION FOR ODERATION 3.5.2 Two indecencer.- ECCS subsystems shall be OPERAELE wi:n each subsystem comprisec of:

a. One OPERABLE high pressure injecticn (HPI) pu=;,

b. One OPE *A3LE Icw pressure injection (L?I) pump,

c. One OF{RAELE decay heat c:oler, and

d. An OPERA 5LE flow path capable of taking suction from the

-borated water storace tank (SWST) on a safety injection signal (aduall[K ---- '..' b trans ferring suction to the containment su=p during the

- 5n;_;-... ... _,. ....-.-....7...

retirculation phase of opera-icn.

A::LI CA5 :*_ ITY : MCbis 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION: .

a. With one ECC5 subsystem inece-able, res:cre tne inocerable subsystem tc OPERA 5LE status wi:nin 7E hours er be in HOT SH'J730WN within the nex- 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

b. - In :ne even; the ECCS is actuated and injects wa er inic the Reac ce Ocolan: System, a Scecial Recer sna11 be prepared and submi: ed to the Can.ission pursuant to Specifica:icn 6.9.2 witnin 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the tstal accumulated actuation cycles to date.

j 5L9VIILL ANCE RE0'JiREMECS 4.5.2 Each 'EC.5 subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. A least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, pcwer operated or autcmatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealec or otherwise secured in position, is in i s correct pcsition.

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, AVIS-SESSE, UN:7 1 3/ J 3 E

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Nde ThCS petje.l 5 cdto yycrec(, h

,. Tole.do Ecu ren C.e Su.l.mitted to (Ka ,

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS N M Si l N O- 6 6'I , d et M N 4 k i O -

ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T "6 < 280*F l FcR 7 7-3 811 R aw A J LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.5.3 As a minimum, one ECCS subsystem comprised of the following shall be OPERABLE:

a. One OPERABLE high pressure injection (HPI) pump,

b. One OPERABLE low pressure injection (LPI) pump,

c. One OPERABLE decay heat cooler, and

d. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the j

- borated water storage tank (BWST) and4 transferring. suction to - -s-the containment emergency sump. duriny he vecirculd'en gg c{ oferchon- ' '

APPLICABIEITY: MODE ~4. -

, ACTION: -

a. With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE because of the inoperabil'ity of either the HPI pump or the flow path frbm the borated water storage tank, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 20 hours2.314815e-4 days 0.00556 hours 3.306878e-5 weeks 7.61e-6 months .

. b. With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE because of the inoperability of either the decay heat cooler or LPI pump, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status or maintain the Reactor .

Coolant System T"V9 less than 280*F by use of alternate heat removal methods.

In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the

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reactor coolant system, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Comission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2

- within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date.

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SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS

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_f 4.5.3 The ECCS subsystems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the '?

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applicable Surveillance Requirements of 4.5.2. .

. DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 5-6 b

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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS B0 RATED WATER STORAGE TANK LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.4 The borated water storage tank (BWST) shall be 0,P,ERABLE with:

a. MSC 3154 A contained borated water volume of between 4.4,0;C and 550,000 gallons,

b. Between 1800 and 2200 ppm of boron, and

c. A minimum water temperature of 35'F.

, . , , APPLICABILITY: .. MODES _.1, .2, . 3 and 4. ,. - - . -

ACTION:

. With the borated' water storage tank' inoperable, restore the . tank '.to OPERABLE status withi'n one t our or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLv SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.4 The BWST shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by:

1. Verifying the contained borated water volume in the tank, l

2. Verifying the boron concentration of the water.

b. At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by verifying the water temperature when outside air temperature <35"F. -

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4.5-7 .

f.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.2.1 Two independent containment spray systems shall be OPERABLE aith each spray system capable of taking suction from the CWST on a containment spray actuation signal and 2 t: :ti::"*" Transferring ~ N suction to the containment emergency sump :: : '-**^d m +ar * " :a

-' '^" '-" ' :i;ni dui'igy g reciyculafion phase of o[eyution.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

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ACTION:

dith one containment spray system inoperable, restore the inoperable spray system. to OPERABLE' sta'tus within. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .gr be ,in at lea'stL HOT '-

STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; restore the ' inoperable spray system to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in COLD SHUTDOWN dithin the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.2.1 Each contairnent spray system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

b. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:

1. Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a containment spray l test signal.

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2. Verifying that each spray pump starts automatically 'on a SFAS test signal.

DAVIS-BESSE, UN'IT 1 3/4 6-11

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.1.4 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY This specification ensures that the reactor will not be made critical with the Reactor Coolant System average temperature less than 525'F.

This limitation is required to ensure 1) the moderator temperature coeffi-cient is within its analyzed temperature range, 2) the protective ;

instrumentation is within its normal operating range, 3) the pressurizer is capable of being in an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble, and 4) the reactor pressure vessel is above its minimum RT NDT temperature.

2/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS The baron injection system ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each mode of facility operation. The components required to perform this function include 1) barated water sources, 2) makeup or DHR pumps, 3) separate flow paths, 4) boric acid pumps, 5) associated heat tracing systems, and 6) an emergency power supply from s-OPERABLE emergency busses.- - - . "

With the RCS average temperature above 200*F, a minimum of two separate and redundant baron injection systems are provided to ensure single functional capability in the event an assumed failure renders one of the systems inoperable. Allowable out-of-service periods ensure that minor component repair or corrective action may be completed without undue risk to overall facility safety from injection system failures during the repair period.

The boration capability of either system is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN from all operating conditions of 1.0% ak/k after .

xanan decay and cooldown to 200 F. The maximum boration capability requirement occurs from full power equilibrium xenon conditions and l requires the equivalent of either 7373 gallons of 8742 ppm barated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 52,726 gallons of 1800 ppm borated water from the borated water storage tank.

l yrr,3N The requirements for a minimum contained volume of >;",;;C gallons of borated water in the barated water storage tank ensures the capa-bility for borating the RCS to the desired level. The specified quantity of barated water is consistent with the ECCS requirements of Specification 3.5.4. Therefore, the larger volume of borated water is specified. r With the RCS temperature below 200'F, one injection system is acceptable without single fa.ilure consideration on the basis of the Amendment No.-}T', 3 3 -

DAVIS-BESSE UNIT 1 8 3/4 l-2

1 Docket No. 50-346 Attachm:nt B l License No. NPF-3 !

Serial No. 675 l 1

I Proposed Procedure Modification AP 3005.56 EP 1202.06 SP 1104.04 l

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ML20002C054

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