ML19350E140
| ML19350E140 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 04/08/1981 |
| From: | Bryant J, Vandoorn P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19350E131 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-413-81-06, 50-413-81-6, 50-414-81-06, 50-414-81-6, NUDOCS 8106170039 | |
| Download: ML19350E140 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000413/1981006
Text
'
.
pa4
,
9'o
UMTED STATES
~
<8'
~
TORY COMMISSION
NUCLEAR REGU@ ION 11
o
q$
E
REG
)Q
[
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303
s
++.**
Report Nos. 50-413/81-06 and 50-414/81-06
Licensee: Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, NC 28242
Facility Name: Catawba
Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414
License Nos. CPPR-116 and CPPR-117
Inspection at Catawba site near Rock Hill, South Carolina
Inspector:
, Jm
8
/
P.K.VanDop
j
'
D&te Signed
Approved by:
/
m,b
+[/eI/
J.
Bfy'anE,dFction Chief, Division of
[Wte Signed
esident and Rea'ctor Project Inspection
-
SUMMARY
Inspection on ebruary 26 - March 25,1981
Areas Inspected
This routine unannounced inspection involved 163 resident inspector-hours on site
in the areas of safety-related piping
observation of weldi:g and non-welding
work activities (Units 1 anri 2); reactor coolant pressure boundary piping -
observation of welding work activities; (Units 1 and 2) containment (structural
concrete) - observation of work and work activities (Unit 2); observation of
-
housekeeping and storage / protection of equipment (Units 1 and 2); safety-related
pipe support and restraint systems (Unit 1); and observation of the Local Public
Document Room.
_
Results
Of the six areas inspected, no violaticns or deviations were identified in five
areas; two violations were found in one area (Failure to document corrective
action' concerning inadequate design of a hanger paragraph 9.c. and Failure to
follow procedure for installation of hangers and to provide appropriate
qualitative criteria on a hanger drawing paragraph 9.d.).
8106170 @
._
.
.
.
.
.
r
DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
D. G. Beam, Project Manager
S. R. Dressler, Senior Construction Engineer
L. R.-Barnes, Manager Support / Restraints
- E. C. Wall, General Superintendent
- R. A. Morgan, Senior QA Engineer
- T. D. Mills, Construction Engineer Mechanical
A. R. Hollins, Construction Engineer Hangers
K. R. Webber, Mechanic Superintendent
- J. C. Shropshire, QA Engineer Supervisor
T. A. Evans, Hanger Engineer
- H. D. Mason, QA Engineer Supervisor
- M. R. Hemphill, QA Engineer
D. H. Llewellyn, Welding Engineer
Other licensee employees contacted included 12 construction craftsmen, 4
technicians, 3 inspectors, and 3 office personnel.
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 25, 1981 with
those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
The unresolved items and
violations described in paragraphs 5 and 9 respectively were discussed in
detail.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (413, 414/80-18-01) - Pipe design and inspection
clearance requirements. This item concerned the fact that the licensee had
not defined requirement.s for clearances between piping _ systems / components.
As a result an NRC inspector noted two examples of ',nons&fety-related piping
_
in contact with safety-related pipe / components.
On March 18, 1981, the
inspector noted that non-safety-related Hanger No.1-CWL-6656 was in contact
with the operator of Class A valve No. INV11-3. This is considered to be
another example of the previously identified pi ablem.
Licensee personnel
indicated that the requirements have been defined and procedures are being
developed for implementation. This item remains open until procedures are
issued and implemented.
I
.
- - - - - - - - - - - - -
-
,
.
.
'
.
2
4.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to
determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or
deviations. One new unresolved item identified during this inspection is
discussed in par & graph 5.
5.
Independent Inspection Effort (Units 1 and 2)
a.
The inspector conducted general inspections of site work and work
activities and observed equipment protection / storage and housekeeping
in the auxiliary building, containment buildings and storage areas.
b.
The inspector observed the Public Document Room in Rock Hill,
South Carolina, to verify that NRC and facility documents are being
filed in an orderly manner and are available to the public.
c.
The inspector observed portions of the Unit 2 containment dome
structural concrete placement for conformance to requirements in the
areas of preplacement preparation; adequacy of crew, equipment and
l
techniques; control of special technique requirements implemenced for
l
the dome pour; preparation of construction joints and curing.
d.
On March 5,
1981, during a discussion with licensee . personnel
concerning interim valve storage requirements the inspector noted that
some requirements were contained in a Design Engineering Department
letter dated August 19, 1980.
These requirements had not yet been
implemented at the Catawba site.
The specific requirements of the
letter were of minimal safety significance.
However, additional
'
inspection is necessary to verify that this was an isolated case and to
determine if a control system is necessary to assure timely
implementation of design requirements.
This is Unresolved Item
.
413/414/81-06-01, Delay 1. Implementation of Design Requirements.
No violations or deviations were identified.
-
6.
Safety-Related Piping (Welding) - Ooservation of Work and Work Activities
(Units 1 and 2)
.
The applicable code for installation of safety-related piping is the ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III,1974 Edition plus addenda
through summer 1975. The inspector observed in process welds at various
'
,
stages of completion and reviewed records for conformance to code and
'
procedure requirements in the areas of docun,entation of pertinent infor-
,
mation and QC signoffs via a weld traveler, availability of pertinent
-
!
instructions, use of appropriate qualified welding procedure, provisions for
,
weld repair provided, certification of filler material, verification of base
!
material certification, control oi welding parameters, verification of
l
t
.
.
-
. .
. .
._
.-
. _ _ - . - -
-
- . . . - - . -
-
-
. , . - .
.
.
.
3
-
.
welder qualification, use of specified shielding.and purge gas, condition of
welding equipment, provisions for voltage and amperage checks, verification
of proper fitup, control of preheat and interpass temperature, condition of
weld and base metal surfaces, and verification that appropriate inspections
were being performed.
The following welds were observed:
Weld No.*
Size (In. Dia.)
Stage of Welding Observed
1-RN224-3
20
Bevel repair
2-KF60-2
8
Intermediate
2-KF60-3
8
Final
2-KF111-3
10
Intermediate
2-ND27-11
8
Intermediate
2-N025-11
8
Fitup
2-CA74-15
1
Intermediate
2-NI15-1
32
Bevel repair
- First number of weld number indicates Unit number.
No violations'or deviations were identified.
7.
Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping (Welding) - Observation of Work and
Work Activities (Units 1 and 2)
The applicable code is delineated in paragraph 6.
The inspector observed
internediate welding and in process weld records of Weld Nos. 1-NC230-3 and
2-NI91-3 for conformance to code and procedure requirements in the areas
delineated in paragraph 6.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Safety-Related Piping - Observation of Work and Work Activities (Unit 2)
The applicable code is delineated in paragraph 6.
The 1.u,pector observed
handling of piping for installation of Weld Nos. 2-KF40-16, 2-KF60-8,
-
-
2-KF111-3 and 2-FW42-20 for conformance to procedure and code requirements
in the areas of control of tools for grinding, brushing and filing; use of
appropriate handling and rigging equipment; control of cleanliness; and
,
_
control of cold spring where applicable.
The inspector noted on March 9,
l
1981 that internal Jacking was being employed for fitup of Weld No.
l
2-FW42-20. This is another example of the use of internal Jacking which has
been previously questioned (See Unresolved Item 413/414/81-03-02).
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Safety-Related Pipe Support and Restraint Systems (Unit 1)
!
l
a.
The applicable code for safety-related support and restraint instal-
!
lation is the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III,
,
Subsection NF,1974 Edition plus addenda through summer 1975.
The
inspector observed various activities associaLed with installation of
r
i
l
l.
L
. - -
_ _
. -
.
.
-.
.
-
,
,
4
supports and restraints to determine if code and procedure requirements
were being met. The inspector observed warehouse storage areas,.the
hanger fabrication shop and hanger pre-stage area to determine if
requirements were being met in the areas of storage / protection of
materials, control of prefabrication and presetting of cold load on
spring hangers.
During this inspection the inspector checked
approximately 20 snubbers for smoothness of shaft travel, verified cold
load settings for 6 spring hangers and observed shortening in progess
of the sway strut for Hanger No. 1-A-NV-8367.
In addition, the
inspector observed installed hangers for conformance to requirements ,
(as applicable) in the areas of deterioration and corrosion; de#or-
mation of materials; tightness of bolts, nuts and fasteners; use of
lock nuts where required, cold load setting of snubbers, installation
clearances, control of materials and appearance of welds.
The
following hangers were observed:
Hanger No.
Type
1-A-NV-8255
Trapeze
1-R-N1-1399
1-R-BB-1092
Sway Strut
1-R-BB-1093
Sway Strut
1-R-BB-1094
Sway Strut
1-R-N1-1351
Sway Strut
1-R-N1-1487
1-R-NV-1768
Rigid
1-A-N1-4135
Rigid
1-R-NV-1764
b.
On March 16, 1981, the inspector noted that cold load settings on
spring hangers located in the hanger pre-stage area were not in
accordance with the requirements of procedure CP-353, Rev.
8,
Adjustment, Installation and Modification of Pre-Engineered Hanger
Components. Procedure paragraph 1.B. requires the hanger feb shop to
set cold load per design requirements with no tolerance allowed.
-
Examples noted are as follows:
Hangor No.
Actual Setting (Ibs.)
Required Setting (lbs.)
1-R-NI-50
425
427
1-R-NV-240
24
25
1-R-CM-2138
505;
4991
1-R-SM-1552
11315
12387
1-A-NV-3C/1
212
211
1-R-NV-107
97
105
On March 18, 1981 the inspector noted that cold load settings on
snubbers for two hangers also were not in accordance with the require-
ments of procedure CP-353. Procedure CP-353, paragraph 2.D. requires
craft person :1 to stroke the snubbers upon installation to the cold
setting required by design drawings with no tolerance allowed. Hanpr
. _ . . -
,
- - . - . -
---
. . . .
.
.
.
.
5
Nos. 1-R-N1-1487 and 1-R-BB-1093 were set at 14 inch and 1
inch
respectively. The requirement for both hangers is 15/16-inch. Licensee
personnel indicated that the cold load settings required by CP-353 are
for fabrication purposes and not intended to be the final setiting.
Licensee personnel also indicated that some initial snubber settings
will change as additional hangers are added to the line. In addition,
the inspector noted that the applicable specification (CN-1206.-
00-04-0003, Rev. 6) does allow a 210% tolerance for spring hanger
settings and 2 -inch tolerance for snubbers. However, it appears that
settings made during fabrication can be made more accurately resulting
in improved final quality of the systems. Until the licensee addresses
the improvement of practices for initial cold load setting and until
the inspector can verify that a system to assure proper final cold load
settings is being implemented, this will
be Unresolved Item
.
413/414/81-06-02, Control of Hanger Cold Load Settings.
c.
On March 12, 1981 the inspector nr.ted that completed Hanger No.
1-A-NV-8255 was not supporting the piping it was designed to support.
It appeared that the design was such that the trapeze portion of the
hanger could easily become dislodged from the clamp around the pipe.
Licensee personnel indicated that this inadequate design had been
recognized and a drawing change had been issued for this hanger.
The
inspector verified that this hanger has been redesigned. However, it
appears- that this condition was not documented and reported to
appropriate levels of management as required by ' Criterion XVI of
Appendix B to 10 CFR 50. This could have resulted in additional design
problems not being identified. However, after the inspector questioned
the design, the licensee reviewed all possibly affected hanger designs.
This review, completed en March 23, 1981, indicated that the inadequate
design was an isolated case.
This is Violation, 413/81-06-03, Failure to Document Corrective
Action Concernin- Inaaewate Design of a Hanger.
d.
On March 18, 1981, examples of failure to ccmply with Criterion V of
-
Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 were identified. These are as follows:
(1) Hanger Nos.1-R-NI-1487 and 1-R-NV-1764 were installed without
-
'
meeting the angular tolerance allowed by procedure CP-385, Rev. 8,
[
Support / Restraint Erection Tolerances. The tolerance, allowed per
procedure CP-385, paragraph 2.11.2, is + 4*.
The measured angle
in both cases was 11.
.
(2) The drawing approved and issued for Hanger No.1-A-NI-4136 did not
specify the weld to shorten the sway strut assembly as an ASME,
Section III, Subsection NF weld as required by paragraph NF-1130.
This is Violation, 413/81-06-04, Failure to Follow Procedure for
Installation of Hangers and to Provide Appropriate Qualitative
Criteria on a Hanger Drawing.
,
I
. .
.
-
- - - - - - - .
.
- - - ~ -
-.
, , , -
,
w
-
-
.
-
.
.
..
.
6
No violations or deviations, except as described in paragraph 9.c. and 9.d.,
were identified.
'
.
m
S
l
l
l
,.-4