ML19350D283
| ML19350D283 | |
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|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/18/1981 |
| From: | NRC - PEER REVIEW GROUP |
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PEER REVIEW GROUP MEETING ON REVIEW OF DRAFT REPORT ON TECHNICAL BASES FOR ESTIMATING FISSION PRODUCT BEHAVIOR CURING LAW ACCIDENTS A mci SESSICN n
18, 1981 m. March
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354-412 Washington, D. C.
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1 AFTERNOON SESSIOS -
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3 MR. SIL3ERSERG:
We are now going to hear from 4
Chapter 8 from the lead author, Italt Pasedag from NRR, who e
5 participated actively in the report, along with work on the N
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chapters in the report by Postma and Adams.
R 74 tiR. PASEDAG:
I think you ought to get the order nj 8
straight, to begin with.
The primary authors of the chapter
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9 are Mr. Postma and Mr. Adams, so I did the editing and I get Y
10 to do the presenting.
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ishat we wanted to do in Chapter 8 was to take a z=
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15 sort of the outccme.cf previous evaluations of accidents, w=
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17 (Slide. )
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19 iie ::erced in on those features which are immortant in the an 20 removing of fission products as opposed to the energency core 21 ccoling syst'em, which is a feature designed to prevent this, 22 to begin with.
But we looked at those which would have a 23 substantial effect on the consequences, and this effect may be 24 achieved by either containing the fission products, the 25 pii= arf example being the containment itself, or by reducing i
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'the driving force, the differential between the containment 2 l and the outside as one location, or by removal of the airborne i
31 contaminants from the ef fluent stream.
4 That is, for example, filtration.
If we know what 5!
the pathway is, we can filter it.
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(Slide. )
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On that basis, we selected these engineered features A
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to look at.
The containment is sort of an obvious one, and we n
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put it in there primarily to restate what several people have Y
10 said, and I think Jim Gieseke is the last one who mentioned Ej 11 it, that as long as the containment is intact, we have a very 3
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So the containment is an cbvious thing that z=
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Along with the containment we have several systems
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Secondary containments are one of these systems.
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17 The process here is that we collect the leakage w=
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l 20 Containment sprays, suppression pools, and ice 21 condenser, all are designed to smove energy from the contain-22 ment, to reduce the pressure and tamperature in that containment.
23 In that process, they may and do remove airborne 24 contaminants, and so we locked at those, and then we looked a 25 seme engineered safety features which are scr of of f to the l
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side; that is, thev. treat one particular leak path.
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2 For exa=ple, if we have leakage through recirculating 3
fluid syste=s in the auxiliary building, then an engineered 4
safety feature that wculd treat that leak path would be the 4
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filters in the auxiliary building ventilation systa=.
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a very specia.9 case o.g ::*ns tyc.e of engineered e
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safety feature that treats one pa--4-1ar leak cath is the
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8 last one d at stands for =ain steam line ' isolation val.ve leak n
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collection system.
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10 The crecess here is that we exhaust to s= ace between
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12 in the boiler, the idea being that any leakace path to de z
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range frem very small, benign ones to larger accidents.
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l'argest one in ter=s of de fissien product release is de I
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one specified in 10 CFR part 100 for siting purposes, and da 's 22 the one we use as the basis for designing de engineered safety l
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And, of course, dat source term is f a=iliar to all I
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Il We assume as a design basis that you have a release 2l of all the noble gases in the core, 50 percent of the iodine --
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50 percent released from the core, and 25 percent assumed to be 4
available in the containment for leakage from the containment 5'
g atmosphere.
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Guides 1.3 and 1.4.
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One thing I wanted to say, which I neglected, is l
13 that one ground rule for the engineered safety feature design 3
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basis is that containment, by definition, stays intact, That's i::0 15 ig one of the ground rules.
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for the pu:. pose of defining the environment for scme of these
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20 i we just say that much is released.
There is no specific 2I '
accident sequence that leads up to that kind of source term.
U And this is intentionally so because we did not want to zero in 23 on one specific accident squence and then he told a little 24 while later that was the wrong sequencing.
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design purposes, pressure, temperature and so forth.
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would specify the containment environment for the engineered g
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7l What we wanted to do now was to say realizing that
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was the design basis accident -- I mean the design basis source c
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safety features, what we want to do now is say if we look at it z=
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Will they function
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We want to do that in a realistic way.
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And we wanted to take a look at a
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This is an obvious statement you've heard before, 24 but the containment does make a big difference.
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3 I will start with the containment spray.
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out of an examination of the performance of the system for R
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these various accidents.
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As far as aerosols are concerned, if the source d
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we find that the wash-out of the fission products of the n
20 aerosols is expected to be somewhat slower than what we would 21 see for elemental iodine, and the particle size of the element 22 j
is small.
23 Conversely, for a large particle size, we would 24 see a wash-out that is comparable to or perhaps just slighcly t
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We have looked at the possibility of clogging the 2
sump with the aerosols released for some of these sequences 3l and concluded that was not really something to be concerned 4
about.
There was not much chance that the aerosols being g
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pumps.
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It's a different matter to consider wear and tear s
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the containment as a result of having some debris and aerosols
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3 12 The drawbacks are we need the power supply and,
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we look at a sequence that doesn't have any power, obviously i
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the sprays don't do us any good, and we do need to maintain
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18 (Slide. )
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20 ness of aerosol wash-out compared to elemental iodine, what I 21 have on this slide here is a calculation of the time constant 22 '
in a first order rate equation, and that is calculated as a l
23 function of particle size.
That is the aerosol particle i
24 size and for comparisen purposes we put on here the lambda 25 or the time constant you would calculate for very ncminal l
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spray system.
2 I would like to emphasize here that for most current 3'
generation plants, we have higher flow rates than 1500 gpm.
4 We have usually higher fall heights than 90 feet, and we may 5
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about here or better.
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same range of effectiveness as for elemental iodine, and may 3::
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even exceed it scmewhat.
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3 (Slide.)
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Next let me talk a little bit about the 3WR suppres-l E
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Like the spray spray,.it's a system that is 19 4
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design :or removal of fission product.
The positive aspects 21 of that system in terms of its capability to remove airborne 22 contaminants on the top, the pressure suppression function, of 23 course, reduces the driving force for all fission products, no 24
=atter what form, and no =atter what chemical form.
That 25 would even include the noble gases, for that matter.
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Again, assu=e that we have reasonable centain=en:
2 integrity =aintained. ' Elemental iodine scrubbing is expected 3
to be rather good for de suppression pccl.
The aerosci 4
scrubbing effectiveness similar to a s=. rav. system wculd be a g
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6 about a pool that is subccoled as opposed to the saturated l
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The ele = ental iodine scrc hing i
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again would be a function of d:cp size, siriilar to dat cbserved
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Another benefit of dis system is it dces no:
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It is a passive system.
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reduced effectiveness and we did not atte=p: := quantify da:
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The reduced effectiveness at high water te=peratures i n
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The ice condenser system is very imilar to the 2
suppression pcol.
It is a passive system, this time for a PWR, 3,
that is designed to condense the steam flowing through it.
4 So once again, the pressure reduction would rsduce the driving g
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expected to be good.
It has been tested and demonstrated to Xj 8
perform well and, furthermore, the effectiveness for elemental d
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iodine removal is enhanced by adding sodium hydroxide to the 10 fee.
This gives you the additional benefit if the ice is E
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For most of these systems you take sone water used 5:j 15 and spray it back in, so you have the additional benefit of a
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This is a good example of being an engineering 2
response to the licensing requirement that resulted from --
3 resulting in a design that is tailored specifically to the 4
reg guide source term.
As long as we hue elemental lodine, s
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hydrogen burning.
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hydrogen burn would damage the ventilation systems -- I mean s
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they all have that common element of treating one specific n
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So, again, if reasonable containment integrity is 22 maintained, then these systems would function well to collect 23 contaminants, either in the annulus or reactor building, in case 24 '
of a boiler, around the primary containment.
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train that is used to process the flow prior to discharging to 2
the environment.
So it would effectively re=ove elemental 3
iodine the same way. Because of the EEPA filters in the filter 4
train, you would also effectively remove the aerosols that would g
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secondary contain=ent and the standby gas treatment associated
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The sa=e thing would be true for the main standhv
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If there were no other lea'< paths, it m
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But if you have a hole in the containment,
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And the same is true for the auxiliarv. buildin9
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that system to be the predominant engineered safety feature, 21 na=ely in Event V, where we discharged filter products directly 22 to the building, in that case the system is not expected to 23 function because of the fact that the building walls would 24
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So the auxiliary building is not designed to contain 2
the discharge f c= the pri=ary system.
3 So all of these systems then treat only =inor 4
leakage paths.
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area of the syste= for the auxiliary building filters, C
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as long as it stays intact.
Containment spray, suppression
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pools and ice condenser are all very effective in reducing 1
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fission products, either in ele = ental or aercsci for=.
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So these systems would be effective not only for the
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24 auxiliarf building filters and the is - : collection syste=,
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the effectiveness is =edium because of what I just said, that I
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1 they only treat one leak path, and that range is medium.
That 2
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properly in.the containment.
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Then last, the black sheep on this list, the internal 5
containment recirculation filters.
Their effectNeness is icw A
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for any conditions other than their design basis, and their g
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They don't work for anything even slightly t.
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more severe than a design basis accident.
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10 I not in a bad shape in spite of the fact that the source cerm z
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which was used as a source term as a design basis was quite a a
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bit different from this report.
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- 3 MR. SILBERSERG:
Thank you, Walt.
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10 My comment is that where everyone has gone after i
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abstract No. 4 that we ought not to overlook and that is i
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the report that we should not forget about.
21 :
With that, we will open the presentation to discus-l l
22 j sion.
23,
MR. SHERRY:
You might note of the three engineered 24 '
safety features which look to be the most effective, two of i
25 them, their design basis did not include a fission product i
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One of them.
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Okay, one of them.
And the primarf 4
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MR. SII.BERBERG:
Dick Wallace.
Concerning the additives to the spray 3
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than iodine?
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That's correct, if there were no i:
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That would have made the clean-up
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I4 MR. PASEDAG:
That may be the case, but 'everybody is 1 Cj 15 very happy with Three Mile Island because the iodine was dis-
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Some of that is by design.
The spray system did function well n
20; enough, even though it was turned off af ter a few minutes, it 21l functioned well enough to adjust the pH of the water in the i
22 sump, giving you some assurance that the iodine partitioning 23 would be high and would stay high.
I 24 So there is that ber.efit to it.
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realiza that there is sort of a messy aspect to adding sodium 2
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you have boric acid all over the place.
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Dave Torgerson?
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Just a comment.
I think we always
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have to keep in mind with respect to whether it is iodine or I2 17 lll that is released, a lot of these coefficients are calculated
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At equilibrium it doesn't matter what
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sure that you keep the pH basic enough to stay away from the 21 so-called volatile forms.
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So even though you're starting off with iodine which 23 '
is involatile, if you got up to acid enough conditions, the 24 <
conditions will not be contained.
In the long term you get 2'5 '
the same equilibrium no matter where you start.
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3 everyone says hydro:ine is a great thing to use.
Chemists 4
always use it as a reducing agent, they use it to buffer the pH, g
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It's a pretty unstable substance.
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What happens to it in the radiation field?
Is there information a
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I would like to turn to the father 9'
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We demonstrated that retention 23 in about 10 or 15 engineering experiments and four large-scale 24 experiments in the CSTF.
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Will it survive if you go through 3
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So you really are injecting a large 10 5
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I think for corresion --
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1 24 and we specifically were looking at that question, what 25 i
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Our reference plant was indeed Grand e
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design basis, again, because of the high aerosol loading, your 2
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No.
If I follow :::y pathways properly 21 '
in either Mark I, II or III, I presu:ae if the primary containment 22 '
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Okay?
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Don Nitti?
21 '
MR. NITTI:
Don Nitti, B&W.
22 i I have two questions or comments:
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One is a curve that you showed where you show 24 particle size on the bottom and spray removal effectiveness 25 m the ordinant.
Basically you showed good removal above 3 or l
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MR. NITTI:
You're not saying it yet.
23 (Laughter. )
24 MR. SILBERBERG:
Jim.
25 MR. SMITH:
Here again --
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Dee Walker, Offshore Power Systems.
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Maybe I should make one clarification.
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Let =e mention how this curve was 25 calculated.
~4e accounted for, I think, all of the important i
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mechanisms on the lef t for the very s=all particles.
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don't have a problem.
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45 MR. SII.3ER3 ERG:
Jim Smith.
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But let me just note that we have two reviewers who 2
have to leave early, and so if there is much more on Cb=pter 8, 3
what I may do is temporarily suspend it and give those two 4'
people an opportunity to make any closing remarks.
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Just one final comment here.
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That's a good point, and we have 3
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I wish I did.
Let =e address the 3
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That is fixed, as it usually is, not much 5
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report won't be all that specific, I don' t think.
It will just II point out the general area -- the subject areas which will be 22 affected by any changes that we might postulate in the source 23 term.
It will not recommend a new source term.
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And that was also an ACRS recc==enda--
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4 Tow 3.et me thank you, Walt.
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turn to Dave Torgerson and ask him if he wishes to make any
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Just one very brief one, and I think 9
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congratulate everybody who worked on this document.
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time that was'available.
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reali:e it's for improving the report.
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And Cave, thank you for ccming a j
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21 i Okay, let's see.
I believe Dick Vogel is getting 22 itchy to be leaving, too, so if he has some comments, we will take them new.
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I'm an itchy type.
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can just do.that through mentioning key words.
2 First off, congratulations to NRC.
3 Second, assu=ptions, clarification.
4 Third, should we spend so much on low probability a
5 accidents.
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cooperate with you in rounding out the document.
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appreciate your cc= cents, and we will certainly give them 17 3
due consideration.
And have a good trip home.
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Thank you.
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MR. SILBERSERG:
Okay.
n 20 MR. SHERRY:
Could we discuss one of the itam?
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low probability events.
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16 MR. SILBER 3 ERG:
Cee Walker?
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24 so if we are going to spend a lot more =oney en these 25 kind of accidents, this is one place that =eney needs to focus.
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1 MR. SILBERBERG:
We can go into final comments now, 2
if you would like, and then as far as su= mary of key points, in-l 3
addition to those from yesterday, depending on the time, I can 4
quickly go through what stands out in my notes, and I'm sure 5
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I would like to make some general comments sj 8l for the report.
During a very limited time period, which has
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tions as a basis for estimating the behavior of primarily iodine m
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draft report.
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technical topics, and I will in due time give some further 21 details by letter or Telex.
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1 to my mind.
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the fuel is mainly cesium iodide, that the report demonstrates i
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24 Thank you.
25 MR. SILBER 3 ERG:
Thank you, Mr. Devell.
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Further cicsing cc=ments er general ec=ments of any 2
kind?
3 Brian Ainscough.
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20 what we ca=e here to do, and really we do think it's a very goed 2I review, particularly bearing insind the ti=e scale that you had 22 to work to.
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that we are new seeing recognition of the time variable being 25j i=portant.
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ficsion products are released in relation to the core i
2 temperature history, seeing this being taken = ore into account.
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which inevitably progress te core =eltdowns, such as we had in g
5 WASH 1400, to those which arrested part way to that.
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which really does lead to breach of containment and substantial 3
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loss of fission products.
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22 particularly the later chapters, are only as good as the input 23 data and the models and the codes that are being used.
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think of.uRCH, TRAP-MELT and CORRAL, and hundreds of others 25 that have been used.
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So I would like to emphasi::e that there is a need 2
to spell out both the input data that's being used and the 3
limitations of those codes, so many people who aren't with it 4
believe the codes are perfect.
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MR. S!*.3EEEEEG :
Thank you, Brian.
2 Chris?
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I would like te da.k NEC for its 4
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avoid such incidents could degenerate into a more severe
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13 MR. SILBERSERG:
Thank you very much.
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soon, and it cannot have everything perfect.
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l 24 As a technical cen:=ent on the cesium iodide, I think 25 there is a lot of streng evidence as far as stability of the ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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gas form, that cesiu= iodide would be -- the other iodides 2
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Thank you.
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consequences.
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look at which are the key parameters and guide the reader to 2
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literature, but in the haste of preparing the report, it seems 22 apparent that the authors did not have the time to go back and 23 verify that they had considered all the shortcomings of previous 24 analyses and that, indeed, the analyses perfor=ed specifically l
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1 MR. iG.LKIR:
Cee Walker, Offshore Pcwer S.vs =-=,
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25 MR. S-~3ERSIRG:
~ hank ycu verf =uch.
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Any other questions?
2 Dick Wallace.
3 MR. WAttACE:
I think the report was a very good 4
one and very well written in the time in which it was done.
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that cesium iodide is -- rather than elemental iodine --
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whether it's there as iodine or cesium iodide.
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24 MR. SIL3ERSERG:
Thank you, Dick.
I 25 4
other corents?
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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Jim Smith.
MR. SMITH:
Smith, General Electric.
1 3
We appreciate the opportunity to participate in 4
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We also see our work as not over yet, and we
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to assist in whatever way we can.
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I may want to join them.
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Bob Hilliard?
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20 l MR. HILLIARD:
I just wanted to add my congratulations, t
21 j I do think this is a significant contribution, and I realize 22 j the effort that went into it.
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detailed comments.
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believe what he was talking about is the fact we had so much II sodium at TMI, then when you go to ion exchange out the cesium, 22 '
the sodium pretty much is a blocking agent and you can't 23 effectively remove it.
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2 MR. SIL3ERSERG:
Harry Morewitz?
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MR. MOREWITZ:
Morewitz, Rockwell, EPRI.
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I realize that a lot of work went into the preparation 3
of this document, but I get the general impression that a lot 4
more work is required before it's a usable document, and that g
5 I is that there are many inconsistencies and other odd things a
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y 12 that is carved in granite for all time, but at least so it is
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internally consistent and reasonably up to date with the
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Jim?
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MR. SMITH:
Just a reminder on an item that I n
20 mentioned yesterday, and that is, I think these two days have 21 been very valaable, and the most valuable part of that 22 physically will be the transcript, and I was wondering, can 23 you give us any guidance or direction.
What do we do to get a 24,
transcript by Monday morning?
And do we have to pay semebody, 25 or hcw do we do this?
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hR. SILBERBERG:
Well, there are many different 2
ways to do this.
One is we can make copies, you can go 3
directly to the reporters, to the contractor who is doing this 4
4 and, I think, get copies quickly also.
We will be somewhat S
5 limited in our ability to do this.
I am going to have to limic N
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6 it to a very strict need-to-have basis, because it just gets R*S 7,
involved for'us, and, you knew, I can see maybe a few organiza-8l Nl tions or something like this, but considering the logistics d
9 of all this and our time problem, I suspect I would prefer zo g
10 that you might want to go back through the contractor, as one 5
II possibility.
i 3
12 '
!E (Discussion off the record.1 1
5" 5
13 MR. SILBERSERG:
John, the man with the problem.
3 o
E I4 I MR. MATUSZEK:
I would like to thank you all -- I Ej 15 haven't las c =y Alabama accent frca my years down there -- for a
E I0 having invited a generalist in chis collection of specialists.
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17 And with that, I would like to make just a couple of comments.
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think it's very important not only to include the parameters II l
that you use, but to hignlight those which come from good l
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24 '
I think guys like myself who have to translate thia 25 kind of document to a physician -- and God knows that's really ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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something to try, let me tell you -- the physical evidence is 2
an important parameter, and if you hang a lot of your conclu-3 sions on somebody's -- I think it's called " engineering 4
judgment," Jim, is that a good word?
e 5
(Laughter. )
9 j
6 If you hang a lot of your conclusions on engineering R
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9 what to do in an emergency.
3 5
10 Thank you.
3 3
II MR. SILBERSERG:
Thank you.
3 I
I2 Further comments?
Bob Ritz =an.
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13 '
MR. RIT*:WI:
Ritzman, SAI.
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.,E 15 said.
The report has some very useful additional information z
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I realize a lot of effort has gone into it, but there
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I also recognize the interest and urgency,of getting e=
s 19 l what is there available.
I just hope that this is maybe the a
20 l first of a series of reports, and oll.trs will update and 21 continue to expand the information base as we get more 22 experimental work done, or analytical work.
23 MR. SILBERBERG:
Thank you.
24 Further comments?
I D
Let me make a few closing co==ents and a few i
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housekeeping ite=s, tec, at the end.
2 First of all, it's clear to us that we would like l
3 to publish the report in a short ti=efra=e, but we also l
4 recogni:e there are certain things that we can address f c=
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the cc==ents, frc= the very censtructive ec==ents, particularly nn
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in de ar'as of clarifications, and ass"- tiens, and things e
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We will certainly try cur best to do that.
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In these areas where clearly one gets beycnd that 9
kind o f a ti=efra=e, then we will have to be very careful and 20 10 t
exclain and indicate and cualifv where indeed =cre work is z
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needed.
Sat is =ct -- particularly en fellcw-en type of a
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pecple expressed that th:.s is really just a beginning.
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evolve and infor=atien becc=es available f== or r=-=
at.~:CE, a
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19 this, in which to =eet on a six to nine.m.onth basis, er what-n 20 have-ycu, to periodica.y go thrctgh these areas and see where i
21 I
we have indeed =ade p cgress.
22 I
"'his clearly is a =cving technolce.v..
I think a lot t
23 of things de=enstrated in the last two days indicates that it 24 is, and these things where progress is =ade in the next six :
I 25 nine =enths that is wcrthwhile, we can even se
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supplement out.
But at some point in time, we have to recogni::e 1
2 that there is a balance, there is a choice that one'has to 3
make and continuing to describe the past and the state of 4
technology, and then as opposed to having the people who are e
5 l
k doing that represented here in this room, not be able to go
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6 back and start to get back into those areas that really need l
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7 the attention, the priority areas that we identified on a x
j 8l longer-term basis.
Even on an expedited basis, certainly.
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It's a two-sided 3
10 coin because one can come back a year from now and say, well, I
h II gee, what have we accomplished in the past year?
And we 3
f I2 i say, well, we've spent the year writing this report.
So there's 13 a real balance needed here, and certainly it is our intention m
14 ]
to provide the necessary clarifications in the report as we kj 15 can to allow us to go on and do that.
z si l'
Now in your comments back to me, I would very much t
f I7 appreciate -- I mantioned this yesterday and I will mention it 18 again -- where you can delineate in your own mind where work is g" 19 needed, where you think things have been identified, where 20 '
additional work is needed on the subject -- not only on the 21 report, but on the subject itself -- we certainly want to hear 22 that.
23
~
Now 1et me note that we have additional Xerox M,
materials on Chapter 7 that is in back of me.
We are trying 25 to get a revised attendance list just updated, and that may be ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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available.
If not, we'll send it out, i
2 Also, there is a list of handouts that have been 3
available to everyone, so that everyone knows what is availab'e, 4
as has been suggested.
e 5
If it is not available in time, we can mail that out.
j 6
In closing, let me thank a few people.
Let =e R
2 7
thank the participants frem the lab for their effort today, a
j 8
and I think most everyone has expressed their understanding d
9i of the effort that was involved in putting the report out, I
i 10 but they have really been on the front lines here, not only 2_
~
j 11 during the report, but last week.with the ACES, and now this 3
y 12 week here.
,=
=
13 So I personally want to record for the record ttit
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14 I appreciate the fact that they have been standing on the
-=
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front line like good soldiers, and we certainly appreciate it, az j
16 I want to also thank the reviewers not only for no i
17 their interest, but their helpful and constructive com=ents.
5 is 18 We think they certainly will make for a better understanding of e.
19 g
the subject, and better understanding of your needs in this
~n 20 '
report and in future work.
21 :
I want to thank you, the reviewers, for taking the 22 time to come and leave your own busy schedule and for putting i
23 in the kind of time that you have put in already, and 24,
certainly to thank you for any additional future time that 25 you would put in on final comments.
l l
l l
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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I believe that you have certainly brought out the 2
key points that you wanted to bring out, and they have been 3
made, they are certainly there for us to use and to look at.
4 When someone had asked me to what extent would 4
g 5
people be able to put in this kind of time on such a short 2
6 notice, I said that from my conversations with people when I R
7 had requested them to participate in this very important X
j 8
activity, and from my own personal knowledge of a number of d
- i 9'
the people here from the past, that I told a number of people, z
9 5
10 including management, that I was very confident that the 2_)
11 reviewers we had chosen were very capable and professional, in I
12
- and I know that they would do just the best job they could, and E
g 13 l they were not goin'g to use time as an out in their review.
m
=g 14 And you haven't, and I recognize it, and I certainly thank you 2
15 for i?.
m g
i j 16 And so, to some extent, as long as one is handing si
(
17 out compliments, my compliments to you for that.
E 3
18 i
I especially want to thank our reviewers frcm other 19 g
countries fvr traveling a long distance to be here for this review.
We are very grateful for the new information and data 21 !
and thoughts from your own work that you shared with us," and 22l we regard that in a very special way.
23 Finally -- almost finally, she's not here -- I want 24 '
to personally thank and note the special help and extra effort 25 that we received frem my secretary, Einda Eaag, for all the work ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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1 she has done during this =eeting.
I think she has certainly 2
done an excellent job in keeping up with the paper flow and 3
i all the other things.
I 4
Finally, please recall the co==ents are due to me 4
5 by April 1st at close of business.
The = ore I can receive n
it 2
6 earlier, the better, certainly.
That wculd be a big help.
R 7
Finally, I want again ' to note particularly people
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at NRC and NRC Staff who have also been on de front line on
- J 9
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this recort and this effort -- ceocle li'<e Rick Sher v and z
E 10 j
Mark Cunningham and certainly last, but not least, Walt Pasedag
=
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d 12 i
fine work of Mr. Postma, is also in de throes of co=pleting
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j 13 the Regulatory Impact Docu=ent.
So he's really had double duty, 3
14 2
and I thin'< he certainiv deserves a special vote of thanks for a
m 9
15 2
- that, z
16 si And with that, I wish you all a safe journey hc=e, l
C 17 3
and pleasant stay in Washington before it snows, and we'll
=
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=_
certainly be looking forward to talking with you and working 19 i
with you in the future, in future =eetings of this type.
n 20 Thank you again.
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l 21 '
(Whereupon, at 3:45 p.s., the =eeting was 22 adjourned. )
23 24 25 1
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LARGESh u MS Nuclear power i
A progress report:
clean.ing up TMI
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On the second anniversary of the accident at Three Mile Island's d
nuclear reactor, decontarnination is progressing slowly
[
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Without warnmg, the predawn stillness at de reactor facility is had spent about.10 person-hours inside dat buiWr, examinmg interrupted by a cacophony of alarms, lights, shouted orders, its condition and gatherms information to plan recovery opea-and franuc activity. Hours later, the gnm truth is apparent.Dree tions Gig.1).
men are dead, and t!'e mulnmdion. dollar reactor plant is Remamms work incfudes the fonowmg:
l damaged beyond repair. The reactor is intact, but there are very
- About 2.3 milhon liters of highly radaoacuve water flooding high leveis of surfxe and arborne radioacuve comammarma the comamment building await prnment, and thee is not a eveywhere. A long and difficuh deanup process begms.
definite date when that will bestn.
After 20 months, the work is complete. The reactor has been
- The design and construccon of support faciliues for use in defuefed, dismantled, exammed, and buried. F =dMe liquids deaning up the contamment buildmg have been susperded.
have been collected and processed. Contammated equipment has
- Removal of damaged fuelis sti!!in the earfy planning stages.
g been dmned of, and the -,.., - -ed sinacure has been deaned
- There are no decsions yet as to the utnmare disposal of up and normal access restored. There have been numerous post-r=dm=e"ve waste matenal.
e mortem invemgarmas, and both the smde e and the recovery Finding techrucal solutions to technical problems is only a program have been thoroughly drenacarad small part of the problem. Political, public re!ations, and fman-Three Mile Island? Otmously not. The ser dem at ut!.2 on cial considerauens have contro!!ed the rate of recovery at Ut!.2.
March 28,1979, w hile the worst in the U.S. nudear industry, did Because of these uncet-arm es, the schedule for and cost of the not kill nor even injure anyone. However, the scenario just nt!.2 recovery program carmot ce established with any degree I
decnbed is not fictitious; it is a facnaal summary of a scious of confidence Carrently published schedules show core removat nuclear accdent and its aftermath in the Idaho desat dmost 20 in 1985, already two.and.one. half years later than first planned.
years ago. The facility was SL 1, one of the many test and -
The company is evamarms ways of d ing this schedale.
I demonstracon reactors operated by the U.S. Gu emment. In the but progress to date has not been encourag=g. Allowing for in-v carty hours of Jan. 2,1%1, SL.1 was wracked by a violmt explo-flation, de total cleanup bill could run as high as $1 biI! ion. Of saon caused by operator error.
this, GPU's insurance will cover $300 mama. Where the re-In many respects, the TMI.2 and SL.I ao:idems are danmhr mamde will come from is not dear.
SL.1 was a much smaller una than Dil.2. It was openmemal Beyond the GPU system, the impact of the TMI accident and and operated in a remote area by the mitrary. And the SL-1 acci-recovey, on other unlices and on the nuc! car industry, has been dent happened when people used the word "aton:ac" instead of senous. Utility companies, recosmzmg the tectascal, regulatory
" nuke," and the subject did not arouse fear, controversy or cvil and political impact of TMI-and, most of a!!, the stagger:ng di.Mance financal nsk assocated wuh owmng and operatmg a nudear Ahhough it is not the iment of this artide to compare in detail unit in this e imare have undestandably backed away from the s
the Dil-2 and SL-1 incdents, their umilar:tses are worthy of nudear option. The U.S. nuc! car industry, already in a senous
-I note. From a technical and managerial eade, the problems slowcown when the 3-de-r occurced, is showmg no signs of facng the recovery crews wee ident. cal. They had to contend recovery. In recent years, there have been no orders for new wuh.he same kinds of contam4 nation, the same fission products, nuclear umts-only cance!!ations.
and they used the same types of protective clothing and decon-tammation techmques. The major difference between the SL.1 Earh dorts:======% the Ms status and de TMI.2 deanup is one of scale.
For the engineers at TMI, the first month after the ac= dent I. ass than two years after the SL.I accdent, the cleanup was was bectic and intense. All efforts were foczsed on the irnmedi2re complete and the evem was history. Nearty two years after the problems of controlling 2e reactor and ehmmating and prevent-TMI mer-dent, the desnup, in some respects, has bare!y started.
ing releases of rsdemenytty. But, as plant condirmas stab Lzed.
',i There has been progress at TML The auxihary building, vir-the longe. range situacon became more dear.
tually inmemtible right after the =mdear Mrsme of radioactive The GPU recovery team leamed the foDowmg:
coe.rsmmanon, is now more than 80 pecent decomaminated.
- The reactor core was stable. It was being cooled and was we!!
More than two milhon liters of sigmficantly conemmmared water enough instrumented to penrjt ensmeers to monzor ss ccad=
have been pram **d and the cor ramme r buildmg atmosphere
- The contamment buddmg was comp etefy inaccessible. It held l-has been purged of fission product gases. By the end'of January, large amounts of histdy rsdm* ve water and gas. The auxiliary 7
workers trom the operacng utility, the Metropohtan Edison Co.,
and fuel. handling buildmss were also heavdy contammated, LI theeby se trefy limatmg access to key auxWary equrpment.
- Contarainated water was everywhee. About 1900 cubic meters y1 John C, DeVine Metreoclitan Edison Co.
wee in the reactor building and about 1500 cubic meters in de 44 colg.9:33/st/tnoo.co64sco *5 c19st IEEE
- xzassarem macust
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auuhary buildmg. He quanuties and radioactivity of the water vetoed use of the decay heat removal system, because its opera-9 far exceeded the normal design capabdity of the installed plant tion would cause extremely high radiation in the auxiliary building, renderms systems throughout that budding m-ible systems.
A survey of the nontechnical scene by GPU's management for maimenance.
proved equally depressing. Independent accdent investigations To provide an alternative forced-cooling capability, a com-began see mng!y at every Icvel of the state and Federal govern-pletely new system was designed for decay heat removal under ments. Political opposition to Dt!- recovery and the restarting the unique condinons in the Dil-2 pnmary plant, and its con-of an adjacent, undamaged nuclear plant, Bt!-1, was growing struction began. In the meanume, the enginces shifted the reac-rapidly. Dil dearly had become the focal point for antmudcar tor's cooling from a forced crc.dation mode to a natural one. In this, flow is induced by the diffeence in densities between the hot activmes.
When the smoke on the battlefield cleared, GPU found that and cold water. Reactor coolant pumps were no longer needed.
the real battle std1 lay ahead. The ut:lity had to restore the As of last December, no extemal heat smk has been required.
damaged B!l unit safely ahile contending with a shaken and The core's decay heat has decreased to such a low rate--about 50 aroused public, an uncertain regulatory climate, and a dismal kW--that the reactor's cooling system transfers that heat naturally to the containment building atmosphere. The (mancal outlook.
g tempeatures inside the core have been quite moderate, too, Nmfy oMections &M averagmg about $PC.
From the confusion, dear objectives emerged, and these have Searching for substitutes for failing sensors guided every phase of the recovery program. Withm the undely-g ing goal-Ho protect the health and safety of de public and Throughout the recovery program, engmeers had to maintain l
deanup workers-GPU has set these objectives:
survedlance of the primary system without some of the key in-t i
- Regaming and mamtaming control of We reactor smamems normally used for that purpose. V* tually all pnmary u
i a Regammg access to buildings, equipment, and systems necced system insmunents use se ssors, mechanical and efectrical con-nectors, transminers, and cables inside the reactor building. Key to control the reactor
- Collecting and disposing of fission products in water and gas pnmary system water level and flow instruments, area radiation r
- Prepanns for and removmg the reactor's fuel detectors, and one of the two neutron source range detectors fail-Regaining reactor control From the inical alarm on the moming of March 28,1979, the M Twi engineers Wchael L Benson OetQ and WHuem H. Sehrte prepare to steo into the TE2 reactor buikling on July 23, 900.This first order of busmess at Dil has been to reestablish control of is the first human entry of the budding since the accident on Maech the plant. Even after the reactor,s tmtial stabilization, the s 1979. Engineers Senaan and Behrte are wearing scoras isyers 1
operators faced substantial control problems. The condition of of protective clothing and fue respirators, and they carry redios, the reactor core, though dearly subcrtrical and apparently stable, radiation rnessurement equioment, photographie equiornent, and soperatus for taking surf ace contarninathan sampies. At their roer was uncertam. Instruments normally available were inopeative b DeM h an asseng heam physics techruciad or considered to be undependable because of their hostile
" " ] ~]
l environment inside the containment building. Bt! engmeers e.
adapted equipment, systems, and procedures to meet the a-s,.
b*a' i
snuanon.
Core cooling is a prime concern in the control of any reactor u
shutdown. Nudear cores contmue to generate substantial heat k:
lim after shutdown because of radioictive fission product decay. To
(
remove this heat, plant systems must continually circulate water t
l through the reactor cere. First, the reactor coolant pumps k
l l
--huge pumps inside the containment building-creulate the
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l water and den, after an initial cooling period, the decay heat l
removal system tocated in the auxsary building, near the con-f
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tamment does it.
After the Dil-2 accident, both of these normal cooling modes g
l were operable, but condicons in the plant made it unwise to use n
4 da.
.The plant's secondary system was available as a heat sink, but the pnmary reactor coolant pumps were inamible for main-s h'
tenance or inspection in the highly racioacuve environment and were theefore considered unreliabic for extended use. Another
,,v' 9
y; reason for not operatmg the reactor coolant pumpt was de
. e cal, across the damaged core. Because the reactor core might be h ;~W I
relatively high flow rate, and consequent high pressure diffeen-w y
fragde, Bil engineers feit that hydraube force on the core y~'
should be muumtzad 1
The decay heat removal system at BtI-2 connects to the feac-y y A tor's coolms system inside the conniment via piping through
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budding walls and floors. However, it is not designed for opera-non with the highly radioactive water that was present in the reac-i 'i
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tor coolant system after the ac= dent. Eng:ne=s, theefore, 45 om 4
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ed because of se assorted effects of chemical spray, submer-doses to personnel, the power plant syvems cannot be monitored gence, high humidity, and high radation.
or mamtamed. nis leaves an increasmg risk of failure, and the In each case, the engmeers set up alternauve instrumentation possibility of further adverse effects on the plant.
to measure important parameters inside the containment The second reason, of longer range, is that ultu,mtely the building. Some of these instruments have been rather im-removal of fuel wiD requ2re extensive human effort inside the agmauve, involving sensmg through interconnected systems, comamment building. This is inconceivable in a highly con-calibration *,thout access, and the like.
tammared envrionment. Therefore, a substantial reduction in
[
radauon contammanon is necued inside the conts.nment area.
Ucuid radwaste exceeded piant's capacity ne situation radng se first a.ml.ary bmidmg comammanen l
The TMI accident produced substannal quantities of waste crews a few months after the accdent was cha!!cngmg. to say the water contammated with fission products, induding tntium, least. The building was barely accessible. By that nme, airborne i
cesium 134 and 13* strontium 89 and 90, and other isotopes.
contamination there had been reduced both by ve mlarma of the The amounts and radioactive concentrations of these wastes are building, via a speca!!y instaDed filtration system, and by natural l
well beyond the desaga capabilities of plant systems normally decay of the tuote toxic but short.;ived conta.'unants, such as
~
used for storage, processmg. recydmg. and 6sposal of waste.
noc:ne-131. However, residual radioacuve comammarma coated Consequently, a major waste managemem program was imtlated all interior su-faces, as we!! as efecmcal and mechanical equip-at TM1 shortly after the acc: dent and, even today, it is a prunary mem pipmg. cables, and the like. Particularly contaminated were the lower levels of the building, stuch had been submerged area of recovery work.
Immediately after the accdent, Metropohtan Edison needed in radioactive water that had overflowed sumps in that bu3dmg to provide expanded storage space for both unprocessed and dunns de early stages of the accident. The building elevator processed water. Toward this end, the ut2lity instaHed storage shaft acted as a large sump, collecting rnhive water to a r
tanks with a capacty of more than 3800 cubic meters. Radioac-depth of 3.6 meters. Access for decontaminarma was furser uve water is stored in shielded areas inside the plant, while the complicated by massive direct radianon from radioacuse water new tanks for dean processed water are outdoors.
in pipes and tanks wuhin the building.
(
l Within seven months after the ac= dent, Metropolitan Edison Deceptsmmarion of radioacuvely contanunated surfaces is a I
instaDed a new system-EPICOR II-for processing con-relatively straightforward matter, consistmg principaHy of tammated water to relanvely low radioactivny levels (Eg. 2.
hands.on scrubeing of surfaces with water and detergents or i
table). The system removes dissolved fission products by ion ex-treated cloths. Other techniques, such as high-pressure water change. Radioacuve water is pumped through a series of large spray, collection by special wet vacuum macfunes, and-for i
portable carmdges that have been preloaded with orgame resm small, removable components-electropoRnmt. are also used.
media. The synem uses an existing bmlding and two 380. cubic-By and !arge, decontaminanen is a slow, tedious job requinns meter tanks. The tanks were imnaDy intended for che mcal clean-
'nore elbow grease than high technology.
ing of the seam generator, but had not yet been used. The new To minm up individual exposures, GPU made extensive use of use required venulation systems and other additions.
Metropolitan Edison personnel from nonnuclear fields. Meter By January, this system had decontaminated two miDion liters readers, linemen, mechames, and others volunteered to partici-of radioactive water in the auxcary build.ng. The expenence and pate in the TMI.: deanup for two *cek penods at the:r usual confidence that the work crew gained doing this will be usefulin wages. They were tramed in decontammation techniques and processmg the more highly contaminated water in the contain-rn62non protection, and have become a skiHed work force.
ment building basement.
By tast October. the aux 2hary buJding was largely decontamm-ated, with more than 90 percent of open areas and nearly 90 per-wak a saW m cent of enclosed cubicies desned to an extem permitung virtuaDy ne presence of about 2.3 minion liters of radioacuve water in unreuncted access.
the comminment building basement remams the most sig:uficant potent:a! hazard to public health and safety in the TMI.2 Mirirftizirg leaks fmTi the cocairitet recovery program. A syuem for removal and decontammarmo When the accident oc=zrred, the reactor bm%r:g was scaled.
g of this water is beinginstaDed.
As the recovery program began, it was obvious that reentry To provide shie! ding from high rsM=m4vity in the process steam, the system is to operate underwater in the fuel pool of i
TMI.2. Called a submerged demmerahzer synem, it is an ion-p1 hvo maior systems take part in the program for cieening up i
exchange system, similar in concept to EPICOR II. The sub-radioactive wsta sodied in Three Mile istand unit 2 durtng tt'e aoci-f dont in March 1979. ECCR 11, an ion exchange system for clean, merged deminerahzer system will be ready to operate this Spnng, mg up wetw contannated up to e nwemcuna ow rnsw. has but the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm ssion has advised CPU been used to remove dissolved redloac*Jve impunties from the I
that, under the Nanonal Environmental Policy Act, approval to watw conected in the auxstary bunding. The submwged dominer-operate &c synem must awan release of the final Environmental agze system (sest now being completed, wm be used to eseen up Impact Statement by the NRC for the entire recovery program.
the mor, highty contaminated wetw atm in the containment
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buW Os BCCHMs an ion exchange system, but pas The schedule for this is uncertain, but in view of the importance (norganic media (called Zeollte) and it will operate under of deamns up the contamment building water, CPU is pro water-features deemed appropriate for handung contaminations ceedmg with inenflation of the demmershzer system.
up to 250 microcuries per mduiter,in these procuses, virtua#y ad Along with the deanup of radioacuve water, regaming and of the dissolved radioactive Irnpurttles deposkt on the len an.
n amtaming access to the contaminated areas of the plant are im-change media inside steel canisters. After use, these cardsters of concentrated radioactive sooid waste are removed from their portant for two reasons. Erst, a vancty of c!cctncal and mechan, respective systems and placed in interim storage f ac: lit'es on the ical synems in the atr'iliary buildmg and reactor containment are orte. Anal dispesas s4te elsewhere has not yet been sedected.Wator used for controlling ie damaged core. As long as these rea s:"
processed by an SCS wm be sent to EPiCCR 11 for further efeamng.
i mammble, or accesable only at the expense of high rzharmn C'eened water from EPtCCR II ;a stored on site for :suse.
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i would be difficult. The building's physical condition was uncer.
Federal levels. Alternatives were raised, discussed, and misun-tain. Hydrogen gas had ignned inside, but the effects of this were derstood. Fin'a!!y, when not eve the most violent objectors were not known Radsanonlevels as high as 10 000 roentgens per hour able to produce credible technical evidence suggestmg any had been indicated, and while these were generally consideed to r=#W harm, officials agreed to aDow the verms take
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be unrealisucally high, it was very difficult to esumate the actual place.
raannno fields.
Metropolitan Edison vemed the krypton last July to the ac-The atmosphere inside the building was known to contain compamment of extraorinary media coverage. In the fmal large amounts of fission product gases, pnmanly krypton 55, analysis, the maxzmum total raamten exposure caused at any which has a redatively !ong half. life of about 10 years. The radio-point offsite over the entire period of venting was 0.02 active water-determined in time to be deeper than 2.40 meters Imlhrem-isss than the r=&2rma dose a person receives from the over the ennte 39-meter diameter of the building-was unques-radioacuvity in nantral gas in an average single day's cooking I
tionably a major radiation source.
using a household gas range.
Step one in the containment recovery program was to prolong the buildmg's effectiveness as a container for radioactive gas and
% h ccMaW liquid for as long as possibie. A strucure as large and complex as The next step to contamment recovery, one stillin progress, is the conta:runent building could never be absolutely leak-tight.
to develop as complete a picture as possible of conditions inside but it was possible to prevent Icaking of rshive gas from the the bmktng De most direct way to accomplish this is, of buildmg if lower.than. atmospheric pressure could be m=WM course, via human entry. Many employees of Metropolitan inade. This was accomplished through cooling of the interior at-Edison and GPU volunteered for tbc imial entry. From these, mosphere by the remote operacon of an inside fan system. But, GPU sciected several qualified candidates and prepared them for for two reasons, this approach could not be employed indermite-the job.
ly. First, the fan coolers were inau:sssible for mamtenance and Simuhaneously, a separate enginecing team collected infor.
would ufumately fail. Second, with the contmual ! caking in of mation abota the conts.nenent conditions, using spare penetra.
air, the butidma's air mass would increase to the point whee, tions through its wall. The team collected water from the sump, under certam meteorological cond:nons, it wouki become im-measured radiation levels and their spectra, and sampled the con-possible to prevent the leaking out of air.
tamination on equipment surfxes near penetrations.ne team also inspected the reactor building for the first time after the aca-VeMmg W M dent by using a remoce!y controlled mmi-TV camera.
Krypton 85 is a re!atively benign.radioacave matenal that On July 20, 1980, after months of planrung, two TM1 decays by beta and low-energy gamma rays. More important. :t is engineers, Wilham H. Berhie and Michael L Benson, stepped a noble gas, chemkally 'nert and, theefore, has no mah=
throush an airlock into the TMI.2 reactor building for a for biological or environmental reconcemration. In concentrated
- D-nunute inspection (Fig. 2). Their walk was largely uneventful.
form, such as in the contsmment buildms, krypton 85 is a direct Conditions in the buildmg wet as predicted W carlier exanuna.
l l
rnaarmn hazard. In sufficiemly dilute form, it is harmless. To tions and by reconstruenon of the acodet. However, the l
knowledgeable scientists, the solution to the problem of high psychological effect, on and off nroe Mile Island, was sigrufi-krypton 85 concentration in the containment building was cant. The entry was the first event since the accident that the straightforward: The gas should be released to the annosphere in general public perceived as " good news.**
controi!cd amounts. Once reicased, it would dzsperse to concen-Since the July containment entry, more ambitious data-trations that were predicable and unquestionably safe. And once gathering inspections have been made. By this January, four en-diluted in the atmosphee, krypton cannot be reconcentrated to tries totalir4 about 40 person-hours inside the contamment dangerous !cvels; the hazard is gone forever. After careful eval-buildmg wee completed. De e.ncrgmg picture has been en-uncon, GPU suggested releasing the gas in just such a manner, couragms Buildmg integr:ty is now unquesuoned-the only complyms fu!!y with a!! applicable standards and regulations.
signs of damage inside the buikima are a few instances of local To the public, to poHerant and to antmuclear groups at sheet metal deformanon (a bent door and a few collapsed metal large, however, the solution was not at all obvious. Ventmg was drums), discoloranon of transparuit light and gauge covers viewed as a quick and dirty method proposed by the utilhy to rid (materials known to be sensnive to radianon) and the melting of l
itself of.,, ty problem at public and w sal expecse some heat.sensinve thermoplastic materials (telephones and plas-l TMI's kry wi venung became a cmoe chibre. Thee ensued tic barrier ropes, for example). Radwren !cvels are somewhat ninemonths,.2 rguments, accusations, confrontations,legaltc.
lower than estimated. For example, in the basement, Mr. Behle t
tions, poimcal fsn'rms, and general chaos at local, state, asd menwed 40 rem per hour, one third of an eartie eenste. Thus, S
P=da=ctivity of spilled water at TMf 2 before and after processing with EPICOR 11 system, compared with the Federal law 10 CFR 20 levels i
l Radio nuc!ide Before orocessing, nCA After orocesemg, nCR 10 CFR 20. nCE i
Caesum 137 45 900 000 4.4 20 l
Cearum 134 8 300 000 6.6 9
-l Strontium 89 1 200 000
.1 3
[ l Strontium M 313)000 29 0.3 Trttlum 440 000 440 000.00 300 Grose beta and gamma emiassons 67 000 000 -
E3 None
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entries of one hour or tonger have been possible, and evaluations prior to d:sposal, but solidification technology is not yet ad-are under way to reconsider the timing and sequence of recovery vanced enough to do this. To comply, subwanrtal dwi.,Wtal tasks, based on the more favorable environment than previous work is required planning had assumed.
- The NRC mamtamt that the wanes from the submerged deminerahze synem are not suitable for disposalin sha!!owland Dewing h mactor bunal. Rather, it wants them kept in a condition that "does not The u!!imate objecuve in the containmec recovey program preclude the:r uhimate disposal as high-level wastes." However, is, of course, removing and encapsulaung the nuclear core. M.21e to date, thee are no approved entena for d:sposal of high-level the probcbility of a fuel-related accident is very low, the core still wastes, so the means of compliance is undm
- entams a significant amount of fission products, and virtua!!y
- Only one commercal disposal site is available for Dt!.2 sl! of its origmal fissionlike matenal is in uncertam condition and wastes at Richland, Wash., and it probably will be unavailable geometry. It is being monitored by damaged and temporary after July, due to a recent state referendum vote fortidding fur-instruments.
ther Bil.2 disposal there.
The core of the TMI.2 reactor is also the subject of k. en in.
In view of these uncertamties, Metropolitan Edison has terest to the enure nuclear industry. The accident is unique n that designed and instaIIed several high-intesnty, high.capacty in-l it is the only one in which alarge core has been out of water br an terim radwaste storage faclities at TMI.2, so the recovery work l
extended time. Detailed exar unation and evaluation of the cre can proceed independent of resolution of the waste. disposal wtil provide valuable data for methods to irrerose designs and issues.
safety analyses.
The decontarn namn of containment surfaces will produce a To date, the bulk of TMI-2 defueling work has consisted of hundred or so cubic meters of trash, clothms, and scrap planrung. The particpants in the program include CPU and its materials.Except foritsvolume,tlusmatenalisindiein uishable pnme contracor, Bechtet: Babcock & Wilcox, the builder of the from that normally generated in the operation of nudear power reactor, the U.S. Department of Energy: the Elecnc Power plants. This matenal wd! be compacted, packaged, and stored at Research Institute of Palo Alto, Calif., and others.
the site unul a disposal area is available.
The general feeling is that much of the reactor internal struc-Waste disposal indefinitely postponed ture that supports ce core ws!! not be reusable at TMI.2. This The major radioacive wastes that will result from the cleanup matenal, which consists pnmanly of radioac:ively contammated operanons are:
stainless steel, wul also be stored at the site pendmg fmal
- Krypton.85 gas (released in the Summer of 1980 and no longer disposal.
a problem)
The disposal of the core itself is unresolved. P!ans are to place
- Premd water the contents in several hundred canisters and store them in the
- Concentrates.from processing of water, prunanly fihers and spent fuel pool.
ion exchangers The situation at TMI.2 is truly unique, not so much in techni-
- Decontammanon trash and scrap :naterials cal respects (for industry expenence in recovering from SL-1 and
- Reacor internals other accidents is transferrable ta the TMI situauon), but in non-
- Nudear fuel technical areas which have proved so difficult and frustraung.
Because only a small part of the reac:or's fuel was bumed up Nonetheless, the cleanup is proceeding. Some very important pnor to the accdent, part of it is recoverable. However, it must milestones have been achieved, and there 's progress toward be reprocessed, and this would create high-level rad 2cactive others. Many questions remam. but it is clear that the job must-and can-be done.
wastes.
l EPICOR !! has essentially removed all radic: ion acivities N
M*d"9 from the processrst water. cxcept that caused by tntium, a mild beta emitter. The tritium concentrations in the pr~~d water at Dr rft Programatic EnvironmentalImpoer Statement Related TMI.2 are higher than those normally produced in an operatmg to Decontammar:on and DuposalofRadionerrw Wastes Result-pressunzed water reactor. Through use of normal dilution within ingfromMarch28,1979, Accdentat TMINuclearStation, f.,*mt the plant, the processed water could be released in compliance 2, Nuclear Regulatory Comnussion, NUREG4683. This is a
- 1th normal regulatory requirements. However, respondmg to comprehensive evaluarinn of the entire recovery program. The public concerns, the NRC has prohibited such a release indefin-statement was prepared by the Argonne National Laboratory ite!y. The utility is therefore storing the processed water in large under contract to the NRC.
tanks on the site. Metropolitan Edison plans to reuse the water NRCplan for deanup or Three MITE Island Unir 2. Nuclear for such purposes as flushing of surfaces or equipment and pip-Regulatory (N iaina NUREG4696. This report deals wuh ing systems to clean them, as weil as for defueling. Although the regulatory aspects of the recovery program.
ultimate disposition of the water is uncertam, the utility feels that Assessment ofpotenraalradiologic Ihestth effectshom redon ne:ther its disposal not its retention on the site presems a signifi-andnaturalgar. Environme stal Protectica Agency, Report No.
cant radiological problen.
5201-73 004. Here, the EPA discusses natural radiacon sources The processms of auxiliary buildmg water with EPICOR !!
and resultant human exposures and the submerged deminerahzer system is expeced to f!Ef)0 to MMN 300 vesseis wuh ion exchange matenalladen wnh fisaan products.
The radiation density in about half of these vessels will be 10 to John C. DeVine is manasmg the engmeenng ac:ivities in 1000 times greater than that normally rw.hd at nuclear recovenng and cleanms up Three Mile Island's damaged nuclear power plaitts. Under existing regulanons, this matenal would power plant near Middletown, Pa. Prior to fouung General qualify for disposal as low.ievel waste, but no Minn has yer Public Utilities in 19~0, he worked with the U.S. Navy on con-been made on its disposition for the following reasons:
struenon and operation of a nuclear submanne. He graduated
- The NRC has required das EPICOR 11 resins be solidified from the U.S. Naval Academyin 1%5.
+
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5 EN ER A L h ELECTRIC u 4..
.- o w e n semmAt et.eCymC CCWeAW,17S CURTNCR AVE., RAN.70flP, CAI reQmetA eH PS MC 682 (408) 925-5722 MFM-044-81 Merch 17, 19M1 M.
S 11 be rt>e rg. Chler E m pe r i ame n t a l Advanced Safety Technology Res= mech Branch U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Coawninston Wa s h i ng to n.
D.C.
20555 D e e r-Mr. S i l be rbe rg:
SUBJECT:
CD*9 DENTS ON DRArr OF HUREC-0772 Thfa letter rovides Geners? Electrie Co-pany c o===e n ts on the dreft of p'Techn i c al Deses for Estimating Fission P roduc t Behavior hURCG-0772 ducir,g LWR Accidents" which was prov i ded wi th your letter of March G, 1981 The report is reprasented as a com endfu=e of the tre e t technical infomention available for e s t i rma t i ng the release of radioactive mas te ri al during postulated severe accidents in licht water reactors.
General Electric considers that the draft report nas helped to focus on a sw a s of unC arta i n ty rega.dtng fisglon product behavior from reactor accidents.
In general. however, the spec 1f1C conclusions re g a rd i ng fission product.
Pe t.e n ti o n av e based on i nc nafs i s-t e information on accident sequences and plant design cherecteristics.
The various sections of the report require t'e t t a r-integention to insure consistent unambiguous suppcet f o v-the conclus1ons.
General Electric considers that the draft emport does not present technically supportable conclusions be**d on factuel inputs, but insteed presents results based on spectfic input a s s u==p t i o n s.
The following three g e n uasp t l o n g arreme to have the Qepatest f r-p e c t on the re p o s-t results:
1) 5thiter behavice of iodine and 1odide for severe accident condittons 2)
The c=agnitude nf the decontaminetton factors utilized in acCfdent scenerlos 3)
Characteristics of dominant accident Sequence 5.
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SE ME M At O f tEc7RIc M.
511herberg Sage 2
~
CE belfewes that todine and todfde behave di f f erantly in the suppeession pool under accident conditions and that the p re d omi na te lodine form (iodids) will he effectively retained in the pool water.
F u rt he r. it is GE's beller that the decontamination factoes a s s umed e r, overty con =
servative and do not reflect current data.
Finally. assumptions on the transport patWways, time to containment failure and low p res s ure emergency cooling system performance are in error.
Additional information is p ro v i d ed in the attachment.
The infor=ation relating to the Mo411ng Water Reactor (QWR) is not comOlete and results in misleading conclusions on the BWR capability to contein and attenuate fission product relense.
Spectfice11y. the foll& wing areas have not been adequately addressed:
l')
The BWR geo-etry was not nopeopriately considered in assessing potential attenuntion of flssion product release.
The multf compartments in the various OwM contain=ent designs and the capability of the EWR suppress 9on pont were either n=glected or only superficially treated.
The suppression poof 1s espected to provide sc eubbi ng c apab i l i ty to capture fission products released fena degrad*d Cor* accidents for dominant SVR containment failues modes.
The internal design of the EWM containments with thei r mul tiple ba rri ers for f i s s i on product eclease (i.e.
syste= pipino, drywell, primary contain=ent) provida Significa**t eurface eres for fission product removal by natural processag.
2)
The e a o = e l== n t.= I rf a t a welative to pool scrubbing was not est 11 f 7 *d.
The draft report cited t.n l y a single reference for pool sceub61nc d=ta.
Additlnnel refarances are peovided in the attach = ant to tble lett=e.
These references support the use of deconta=ination facters dacadas higher than those docu=nnted in the denft repoet.
(
3) the evaluetton of DwR dominent accicent sequences is etsleadin0 The report sunjectively assesses three categories of accidents and makes a s s ee=n t l ona un plant conditions.
containment failura modes and resu1*ing fission product temnPport and r= lease.
As d==cnetrat-d by th= most recent BwR probabilistic risk esse **=ent s tutt i cs, this s utsj ec ti ve cone t dara t i on-do*
- not prop =rty cons i d es-the BwR capability to prevent severe cure degrenetton ered =lt10nte the C ort *
- Q uanc e s of such degradation.
Rased on the enneerne adde====d bee-in.
St i= cacna= ended that the dreft egpoet be =edtfled to incfude n more rvt***% e est a t t ** eese ly s ! $ of f1sston product retention ha**d en tha use of realia?Ie decantamination factoes.
If current avaltable deta Is found tn De I m*J k i n g In n
- g ee*c i f i c a r e a. an assessmeet s hou t cl ha made te Idant9fy the retantially attainnete de-Contamination factors and tNp reQuislt= test procra=4 n* Cess 9Py to l
7
=
=
"7 y
an.
n M
C C E N t m AL O ELE CTRf C M.
Stibarberg Page 3 define them.
If the draft report 15 Drosent.*d to the Coconission in its curmnt state, appropefate cherecterization of its inco*olete s ta t.u s suurt be highlighted.
I T. is Gt.'s concern that the report m f s rvp re s e nts Current. LWR fission product retention capability.
It is General Electric's intent to p* ovide the MRC with c o===e n t s on the draft of NUREG-0772 in the peer review meetinct Meech 17 and 18 1981 i n Washington, D. C.
CE will provide additional c - nts p r i o '- to A p '- 1 1 1 19#.
we would be pleased to provioe f ur the'- ce ta i l s on t.h e f nro rmation
/
p ro v i de-J hacein.
Specific ou*stions mey be enddrwssed to Mr.
M.
W.
Holtzclaw (405) T Z 'J-25 06 o r M'.
J.
M.
Sm1*h (408) 925-5722 of ary staff
............ ~........
Very truly.yours..
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H.
Buchholz. Manager 9 h"R Systees Licent.ing
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Attachement to GE Letter MFM-Da4-si GENERAL ELECTRIC CCM9AMY CDP 98ENTS ON NUREG-0772 (DRAFT)
I.
CE COKwFNTS ON REPORT CONCt.USIONS Cui or H1 doeninent form, b ut, so=* I in somme situations.
2 CE a e*** - miscept we do not, agree that I I'I'***"**I)
I'*
l like y for= fn any BVR accident scenarlo 2
l I od i ne che== 1 c = 1 fors= coes not have a = Joe i ni'1uence on consequences, l
GE" disagrees even under saturated conditions the pool DF for lodide is r=uch higher than e l e=== n t a l I.
If proper credit had t>e e n civen for the soturated pool todide DF. t.h i s conclusion wu 1d not move been reach-o.
Consecuences have not baan overestf= ted by orders t.? smoon t tude.
~
GE disagre%
since this conclusion is based on the a s s u-e t i on that the pool is only worth a f actor of 1 to 10 for the worst accident scenarios.
The factor of 1-10 is basM on a saturated pool and e l ea en te ) 1odine; however, as noted in the repo v-t, 1 is not t he do== t n a n t form.
Also es not+5 in AM e nd t >: E.
even 2
f o r-a saturat=d pool e n ef for e l -n ta l iodine, the 01: 1a at least 100 for OWR accident conditions.
Acid i ti nna l C W nte Tha rat *o r t Tn e nt.aatta r of er et in1femtas e ganarel l o c k. Of unrterTtanding of t ie. RWrt na r rie rs, g eo,ne t e i n g, and co*part-c.e n t. e t I ge n,
t.v er ey tt e l eig te in t.*
- w s of release fee fuel or RPV affrer. tty t o ** t he contmi ment **. as if all contain= nts were open, dry c e n t a l tra e t* t daylons.
- 4 e understsending 19
- Dp e t'e n t that Ma r ts III h ;= = ewtra barefoe (drywell and pun 1) within prienery containeent.
II.
CE CO**4 E N T S ON REPORT A 5 5 tfMr*T I O N E The above enneluetone are b e = p ri on t-h
- following a s u s.e=p t i o n s wt:4 c h are nnt s u opo r* t ed by the data Q1ven in thg report Ocef t:
Behavior of iodine a nr1 fodfde en the sut press ion pool is similar u ncia r-
- veea a c c i cf e n t conditiens.
} ncf i ne and i n.'f i de behave ti l f f e ran t l y in satserated pools, t
cartition coaf rtct ents for Iodine see > 100 ond for lodtde are neders of reaCn t t scle creater, appr.ach1Tig infintty for en=.
res.
(see r== e n s-t p
S. 7 f".
m mf F 4).
Thi=
p*
m n = that wasanttally all t oos i de will l> e ac culiha t f r**== mall nonconfianstno hubbles for T. h e Cales#1mtad huhMte
- ime
*==.
m 9d-a
...-.....-..-q.--..-====:=~+r-
.=
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.----.-r-.------
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..=.-h. 6.. =..: ?::::.i; 1;:? n.... "...'""l{L..: ;
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A s s tame d d ec on tmei n n t i o n factors (DFs):
The DF's a s s t.mme d for the saturated pool accident scenerfos are far too ConSetvettve end 60 mot reflect cureent data.
The values u=ed for the analysis a r=t 1-10 wheroes information pressnted in Chapter 5 and Appendix Ei s uppo rt DF's grea te r than 100: gther data (see attached references) support DF's as high as 10 Modeling and assumptTone used for dos =1nent severe accident s equences:
The transport pathways were not adequately descriptive of the di f fe rence s in the l a rge dry contei-w==nts and Msek I and Mark Ill destens.
For p ae= ole. sequences ended with tran s po rt, to the drywell without mention of transport through the suppression pool (p.
A.
13).
The time t.o conta f rument failure in Table S.2 1o too short for the Masek I AE secuence. tt should be s 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> not. 81 hours9.375e-4 days <br />0.0225 hours <br />1.339286e-4 weeks <br />3.08205e-5 months <br />.
Also, in the Marts I TV secuence the low p re s s ure co re cooling systev=s ( 1.PC1/LFCS ) f o t-narwer sv5t/4 designs erve atT BWN/5 and swM/6 designs will rvot cavitete under e stura ted conditions.
III. CE C N EMT5 0**
r#* pac 7 OM RIs3 Geneeal Electe?c cwiculates that the b*st estlemate attenuation factors f o r-the savac= accidant ta sacu a n c e show factors which m ese orders of emagnitude ge-etar thsn the 2-10 stated in the report conclusions.
Using the prepar OF's, the consequences of these accidents will be decades less then those peesented in WASH-1*CO.
F o r ama ny sites, no acute retaitties new ewected foe these sequences.
RHS:cf/736-7 70 3/17/81 I
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_ POOL S C RU B B I P*C TEST' REFERENCES 1.
" Fission Product Entratr=ent Evaluation Tests for t% Pressure Suppewusfon Systeau," GEAP-3206 (J959), General ElsH-trf c Coweny.
7.
Pecoff. J.J..
Rodgers.
S.J.. " Sir utetton of Container Venting UWe*
c Seawater," Technical Report 59 Contract e'33 5 - 6 54 2 6, Mine Setety Anp11ances Co.. Gallery. PA ( De co==be r 1957) 3.
Stewarth.
O.P.,
S t eg l e= e,
M., " Scale Model Fission-Product Re=ovel in Suppression Pools." GEAP-13172. Acet1 1971 General Electric Cow eny.
4
- Hillary, J.J.,
et.n1, " Iodine Rmoval by e Scale Model of thw S.C.H.W.
Ranctor Venteo S tomai s up p e=e s s i o n Sy s te==, " TRG Report 1:56 (19ss).
5.
D t t' f ey. H.R..
et.al. "Todin. C 1 annup in a Stem Suppress 1on Syst e," CONF-65040 7 I (1 ?65 ) 776 6.
Pu t i nr>w s tr I,
D.D.,
et.a1, A arti n t eg i ca l Consetauenc=S o f' a Fuel Hane111ng Ass 1 cent." wf: A p-7 80.Pt. D a r ea*% e r 197I. Weetinghouse Electric Corpoent1on.
7 "En cuy Sierpe. s t os, e nr1 r t'es ton pe netue t T rensonet in Pressure Suppression 8' c o l s. " S t -Mo r-d.
- t.. E. ; Wety s t e e.
C.C..
0 8c'* L-TM-3 4 46,
Aor11 1972.
8.
Getuse.
C.. "D9ffusion of Indina in Water." CEA-R-3199, AEC Lib.
Temns 623 ( Ape l l 1967).
9.
Dave 11 L..
et.a1 "leatping of Indina in Water Pools at 100*C Contatment w*
S ' '. ? n ry af Nuc1==e Pnwar Plants Peoe.
of Sywostum IAEA 1967 (vienne) Cour c70402.
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