ML19347F286

Staff Requirements Memo Re 800801 Briefing on near-term Requirements for Cps.Mod to Fr Notice Re SECY-80-348 & Draft NUREG Applicable to Pending CP & Mfg License Applications Requested by Commission.Related Info Encl

ML19347F286
Person / Time
Issue date:	08/04/1980
From:	Chilk S NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY)
To:	Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
Shared Package
ML19347C794	List: ML19347C793 ML19347F282 ML19347F283 ML19347F284 ML19347F285 ML19347F286
References
FOIA-81-145, REF-10CFR9.7 SECY-81-013, SECY-81-13, NUDOCS 8105180248
Download: ML19347F286 (59)

Text

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UMT aD 3TATEs.

. ' /k. M*/JF NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l

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August 4, 1980 l

m'nsorma

,S$7RETARY I

90.R BRlBlNAL MEliORANDui,1 FOR:

William J. Dircks, Act ng / '

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FROM:

Samuel J. Chilk, Secret

SUBJECT:

STAFF REQUIREMENTS - BR E "N,

ON MEAR TERti REQUIREMENTS FOR CONSTRUCTION PER111TS F0 PdVER REACTORS, 2:05 P.11., FRIDAY, AUGUST 1,1980, COMMISSIGNERS' CONFERENCE ROCl', D. C. OFFICE (SEESECY-80-348)

(OPEN TO PUBLIC ATTE!! DANCE) 4 i

The Comission-discussed the staff's preposed policy for preceeding with pending construction per' nit ard manufacturing license applications.

The Commission,'by a vote of 4-0:

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approved 'the publication in the Federal Register of the proposed licensing requirements for a 45 day public ce=nentsperiod. The Notice should be modified by adding " Cements are also requested

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regarding the extent to which the judg=ents reached by the Comission on these matters should form the basis fcr instructions to licensing.

and acpeal boards in construction :ermit and manufacturinc license

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d, U*O pr:ceedings.", as the next to last sentence en page 5.

(NRR) (SECY Suspense:

8/18/80) ihe Comission requested:

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that theJraft HUREG identifying Action Plan items applicable to pending CP and ML applications address the impertance of close utility-vender-l architect engineer integrat, ion.

(NRR) (SECY Suspense: 8/18/80) l Cc:

Chairman Ahearne Cc=issioner Gilinsky Cc=missioner Hendri.,

es-C:=issioner Bradford Cemission Staff Offices E 105180,NE e

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NRR PLAN TO RE0VIRE LICENSEE AND APPLICANTS TO DOCUMENT c

_0_E'!IATIONS FROM CURRENT STAFF FOSITIONS RELATED TO APPLICABLE SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS REGULATIONS 8

Operating Licenses I

1.

All licensees for plants issued operating licenses prior to 6/30/800 and those licensees issued operating licenses based on staff SER's or SER TMI suppliments issued prior to 1/1/82 will E

I be required to identify and justify deviations from revised SRP in accordance with Bingham amendment plan as approved by CommissionM after issuance of an operating license.

2.

All applicants for OL's for which staff SER's or SER TMI s'upplements are issued after 1/1/52 will be required to identify i

and justify deviations from revised SRP orier to issuance of an operating license.

P90R ORIGINAL I

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Date on which Singham amendment was signed by the President.

y Revised SRP is Cafined to be the existing SRP, modified to reference all applicable regulations and those Division I Regulatory Guides, staff positions and other documents currently used by the staff to interpret intent of these regulations, including requirements resulting from the TMI accident.

3/ The Bingham amendment requires identification of the means of compliance with regulations of "particular significance to the protecticn of public health and safety."

Hence, licensees for plants in this category will be required to justify deviations for only those sections of the revised SRP that implement these particularly significant regu4ations.

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P00R ORIGINAL

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9 Construction Permits and Manufacturing Licenses All applicants-for CP's and ML's for which Staff SER's or SER TMI i

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supplements are issued before 1/1/82 will be required to M and identify and justify deviations from existing SRP

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NUREG 0718U (as modified after public cominents) orior_ to i

issuance of a Coristruction Permit or Manufacturing License.

All applicants for CP's and ML's for which Staff SER's or SER 2.

t TMI supplements are issued after 1/1/82 will be required to identify and justify deviatio.ns from revised SRP orfor_ to iss.uance of a Construction Permit or Manufacturine License.

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Standard Review Plan, dated May,1980.

Proposed Licensing Requirements for Per. ding Applications for Construction I

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Permits and Manufacturing " License dated August,1980.

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Revised i

I 9/19/80 STAT 1)S REPORT ON THE EFFORTS OF THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION TO DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR THE SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION OF NUCLEAR PGWER REACTOR

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' Subsection 110(al of the FY B0 Authorization Bill, requires the NRC staff to develop, submit to Congress, and implement as socn as practicable after notice an opportunity for public coment, a comprehensive plan for the systematic saf.ety The Conference Report evaluation of all currently operating nuclear power plants.

states that the above requirement was written so as to enable the NRC to build upon the systematic safety evaluation it is. currently conducting for the oldest operating nuclear power plants.

The need to systematically assess the safety of operating reactors resulted in the establishment several years age of the Systematic Evaluation Program One of the objectives of the Program was to extend the (SEP) by the NRC. gained iri reviewing older plants to the safety evaluation of all experience operating reactors. The TMI Action Plan (NUREG-0660,"NRC Action Plan Develope as a Result of the TMI 2 Accident") appropriately recognizes, this need in Task IV.E-5, which requires the improved and expanded systematic assessmant While there are many other TMI Action of the safety of all operating reacters.

Plan tasks that are aimed at operating reactors (such as more emphasis on the review of operating experience), there are two additional tasks that are directly related to the. systematic assessment of the safety of enerating reactors.

(1) Task II.C.1 - Interim Reliability Evaluation Program (IREP),

the develcpment of an orderly classification of accident sequences suitable These are:

for qualitative analyses and for use in the probabilistic analys

- continuation of IREP on all remaining operatir plants by means of NREP (the National Reliability Evaluation Program).

Subsection 110(b) identifies. certain information that, as a minimum, must be incluced as part of the systematic safety evaluation plan. Subsections 110(b)(1) tFr identification of each current rule and regulatien, compli--

and (2) require:ance with which the Commission determines to be of particular signi protection of the public health and safety; and the determin 7

regulaticns, including an indication of where such cempliance was achieved by us of Division 1 Regulatory Guides and staff positions and where compliance was i

Subsections 110(b)(3), (4) and (5) require:

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achieved by equivalent means.

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Revised

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P00R OR BIN 2

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identification of all of the generic safety issues set for^h in NUREG-0410, "NRC l

Program for the Resciution of Generic Issues Related to Nuclear Power Plants,"

for which technical solutions have been developed; the determination of which of ther.e solutions should be incorporated into the Cc= mission's rules and regula-tions; and a schedule for developing a technical solution for the remaining generic safety issues.

The need to address generic safety. issues in a disciplined manner led to the establishment several years ago by the NRC of the program described in NUREG-0410

-l and recently to the establishment of the Generic ' Issues Branch in the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation which has the responsibility for management of the technical resolution of Unresolved Safety Issues and for tracxing the status of activities ori other designated generic issues.

The TMI Action Plan also addresses generic safety issues; e.g., Task IV.E.2 requires the early identification, assessment, and resolution of safety issues.

Maximizing the integration of the objectives and results of all of the above ongoing programs into the plan to satisfy the requirements of Section 110 will lead to a more efficient use of available resources and to a mora ecmprehen-sive and unified product than might otherwise be possible.

The prrposed plan, which is conceptually described below, acecmplishes this integration.

Subsection 110(c) requires the NRC to provide to Congress a'repcrt on the status of :ne NRC's efforts to satisfy the requirements stated above, not i

later than 90 days from the date of enactment.

This is that required status i

I report.

I Status I

As indicated above, the NRC intends that the plan for the systematic evalmien of all opt 'ating reactors efficiently utilize those aspects of the current JIP and IREP programs that are demonstrated to be effective in assuring public health and safety.

The plan will also include the NRC's determination of the extent to which each plant complies with the regulations of particular significance and the means of such compliance.

As presently constructed, the current SEP review of the oldest reactors generhily -

is focused en 157 specific safety issues or problems.

These were culled, based on experience and engineering judgment, frem a larger list of 1100 issues to fccus on these issues of greatest potential safety cignificance.

On the other hand, the IREP program is geared toward a reliability assessment of a ecmplete plant. ' These review:; involve developing ple:t-specific event and fault trees to identify those systems, subsystems, and ccmacnents that are the greatest contributors to accident sequences posing risit to public health and sa'ety.

Both the SEP and IREP programs look at the niety of the plants from cifferent perspectives, but they are amenable to integration into a single, coordinated plan of review.

However, neither of the pro vams are based on the NRC's safety regulations, per se..

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Revi n d

~, 9/19/60 Since enactment of the Ff 80 Authcrication Bill, the NRC has initiated develop-ment of an overall plan that will integrate the current SEP, IREP, and Generic Issues programs with the ipecific requirements of Section 110.

Although a detailed draft plan has not yet been developed, the principal features.of a plan have haen outlined and are described below.

Our current schedule calls l

for publication of a draft plan for public comment in late calendar year 1980, t

and submittal of the final plan, with schedules for its implementation, to the Congress in March 1981.

The draft plan will include the following elements:

1.

The NRC staff will develop a list of particularly significant applicable safety and safeguard regulations based on a screening process which would permit inclusion of regulations or combinations of regulations that could reasonably be construed to have the potential for providing substantial protection to public health and safety.

2.

Each licensee will be required to evaluate its operating plant (s) against these regulations and to determine the extent of the plant's compliance, including an indication of where such compliance was achieved by use of Division 1 Regulatory Guides and staff positions, and where compliance was achieved by other equivalent means.

To provide uniformity of response and to avoid unnecessary delays in this effort, the staff will also develop a revision of the Standard Review Plan (SRP) by March 1981.

The revised Plan will consist of the existing SRP, modif.ied to reference all applicable regulations and those Division I Regulatory Guides, staff positions, and i

other documents currently used by the staff to interpret the intent of these regulaticns, including requirements resulting from the TMI accident.

t Where the licensee asserts that compliance with an identified regulation was achieved by equivalent means to that specified in the Revised SRP, the licensee will be asked to provide the technical bases fer such assertions.

In areas where the plant does not comply with a regulation or deviates frem the intent of the SRP, the licensee will be request 2d to provide a judgment and a brief technical discussion as to the safety significance of such noncompliance or deviation, together with a request for any needed exemption.

The licensees' responses might be staggered over perhaps a two year period, based on some priority system related to public safety, if public comment reveals that a shorter time for response wculd substantially impact available industry resources.

3.

The NRC staff will review the submitted material and will take prcmpt initial action in areas where there is possible noncompliance with the regulations, including initiating action on any requests or need for exemptions.

The staff also will make informed judgments as to areas where (if any) non-

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e Revised P00R ORIGINM

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compliance with the regulations, the licensees' assertiens of equivalence with the SRP, or deviations from the SRP represent a pote,tial safety prob-l em.

For any' prcblems that appear to have substantial safety significance, further imediate actions will be taken on an ad hoc basis.

Decisions in thesa areas will be made by use of judgmesit -- supported to i large extent by experience gained from the current SEP program, a risk perspect,ive supplied by the IREP program, and the results of any appropriate ongoing research, rulemaur.a. and gener.f c issues activities.

4.

After completion of the initial review cf all responses in step 3 above, the staff will initiate plant-by-plant evaluations according to priorities established for the systematic evaluation program.

During these evaluations, the safety significance of all identified potential safety issues will be established.

It is expected that most such areas wi',1 inherently already be scheduled for a routine safety review as part of the NREP program or as a result of the experience gained from the currer.iiEP program.

These evaluatiens will be completed for all operating slants in about five to eight years.

5.

After the above full safety assessment is completed for a plant, appropria' e t

cackfit determinations will be made to resolve the remaining significant safety issues, including any issues associated with any, areas of noncompliance with the regulations.

6.

In parallei with the above steps, the staff will review and evaluate the generic issues identified in NUREG-0410; and generic issues identified in the TMI Action Plan, the ACRS Generic Issues List, and new issues identified from operating experience or the systematic evaluation pregram.

Plans and schedules will be developed for those isstres determined to require resolution within the next several years.

A response will be prepared to meet the requirements of Subsections 110(b)(3), (4), and (5).

As a matter of information to the Congress, the Ccmmissien has agreed, subject to public comments, on a program similiar to Section 110(b)(1) and (2) of the FY 80 Authorization Bill for all pl3nts in the construction permit (CP) or operating license (CL) review process.

The elements of this program are:

. For plants receiving an operating license after June 30, 1980, where NRC's safety evaluation report is issued before January 1,1982, documentation and evaluation against the regulations of particular significance (referencing pertinent sections of the revised Standard Review Plan as described above).

will be required after issuance of an operating license.

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P00R OllGINAL

. men For plants in the OL review process where the NRC's safety evaluation report is issued after January 1,1982, decumentation and evaluation against all regulations and all sections of the revised Standard P.eview Plan will be required prior to issuance of an operating license.

For plants in the CP or Manufacturing License r + 2ew process where the NRC's safety evaluation report is issued before January 1,1982, documentation and evaluation of deviations from th.e May 1980 Standard Review Plan and NUREG-0718.

" Proposed Licensing Requirements for Pending Applications for cps and MLs" (as modified after public comment) will be required before issuance of the Construction Permit or Manufacturing License.

For plants in the CP or Manufacturing License review process where the NRC's safety evaluation report is issued after January 1,1983, documentation and evaluations of deviations from the revised Standard Review Plan will be required before issuance of the Construction Permit or Manuf acturing License.'

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ENCL.05URE 6 4

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ENCLOSURE 6

SUMMARY

AND EVALUATION OF PUBLIC COMMENTS On October 9,1980, the NRC publithed a notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the Federal Register i.45 FR 67099). The proposed rule would require all commercial nuclear power plant licensees and applicants to document deviations from,the StandardReviewPlan,NUREG-75/087(SRP).

Inte:Nsted persons were invited to submit written coments to the Secretary of the Commission by November 24,

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1980.

i A total of 34 organizations or individuals provided coments in response to the Federal Register notice. Also, curing the same period there were two letters to Gnatrman Anearne anc one to Presicent Carter that dealt, in part, witn the same matter covered in the Federal Register notice.

The comments in all of the above letters can be groupea reasonably well in the following five major categories:

(1) The use of the SRP is not appropriate to evaluate whether olcer plants comply with the current NRC regulations; (2) More meaningful coments could be orovidea if the Comission identified the regulations of particular interest; (3)

The plan goes beyond the intent of Section 110 of Public Law 96-295; (4) The dates that establish different documentation requirements for various classes of plants are abritrary; (5) The safety benefits of the preposed metnod of complying with Section 110 of Public Law 96-295 are not commensurate with the large amount of resources f

that will be required.

A listing of the erganizations and individuals that provided coments is pre-sented in Table 1, along with an indication of which of the above five categories their comments could be reasonaoly placed.

The five major categories of comments, with appropriate sub-categories, are discussed below in a format that first paraphrases the comments and then presents the staff evaluation of these comments.

1.

Use of SRP is not Appropriate a.

Comment: SRP should be consistent with the regulations.

Staff Evaluation: Section 110 of Public Law 96-295, in part, requires tnat each current rule and regulation which the Comission determines j

to be of particular significance to the protection of public health i

and safety be identified, and that a determination be made of the extent to which each operating facility complies with these rules and regula-tions.

Subsection 110(b) specifically states that "...an indication of where sucn compliance was achieved by use of Dhisica 1 regulatory guices and staff tecnnical positions and where compliance was achieved

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by equivalent means...' should be provided.

The use of the Standara i

Review Plan (SRP) apoears to be the most efficient means of satisfying the intent of this legal requirement.

i To aid in the documentation process, the SRP will be revised to reference the applicable regulations. Therefore, the revised SRP will clearly show the current staff interpretation of the licensing review process 1

acceptance criteria usea to judge the conformance of the plant design l

to the regulations. In providing docutaentation regarding now a parti-cular plant conforms to a particular regulation, une licensee or appli-l cant nas the option of showing that the plant meets tne SRP acceptance l

criteria relevant to tnat regulation, or snowing that the intent of tne acceptance criterit is satisfied oy an equivalent iaetnod, or stating that tne plant desiates from the acceptance criteria.

b.

Comment: The SRP tnat is used to responc to Section 110 of Puolic

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Law 9c-295 snoula be the SRP used in licensing tne inaividual plants.

Staff Evaluation: The staff generally agrees with this comment for plants to be licensed in tne future. Tnose plants will be fully evalu-ated dgainst the SRP during the licensing process. However, many ptants currently operating were licensed prior to development of the SRP. /ur-ther, the SRP has been revised previously and will be revised again in l

April 1981. In order to document and later evaluate the extent to whicn

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an indivicual plant complies with the regulations, it is necessary to have a base docuraent tnat sets forth tne Commission's current guidance i

on how tne regulations are interpreted. The staff believes tnat tne i

April 1981 revision to tne SRP should be tnat base document.

However, as discussed in NUREG-0745, " Plan for tne Systematic Safety Evaluation of Nuclear Power deactors," plants for wnicn the staff Safety Evaluation Report (SER) is issued after April 1982 will be evaluated against the l

SRP revision used in tne licensing process for tnat plant.

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Comment: The SRP is not a regulation, only guidance to the staff.

l Staff Evaluation: The cormnent is correct.

There is no intent to require l

previously licensed plants to meet all of tne SRP acceptance criteria.

l In fact, ais stated in NUREG-0745 It is expected tnat most deviations from the SRP acceptance criteria will innerently already be seneauled for a routine safety review as part of the National Reliaoility Evaluation Program uREP) or will eitner be resolvea or seneaulea for review as a result of the experience gainea from the cur ent Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP).

Only in those cases where a potentially significant safety issue is ioentified will the staff propose a oackfitting of tne SRP acceptance criteria.

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Connent: The standard fonnat should be revised.

Staff Evalvation: The SRP revision scheduled for the Spring of 1981 is expected to require little or no additi0nal information in the PSAR and/or l

FSAR submitted by the licensee. Where changes to the Standard Format are found to be naeded, however, necessary revisions will be made.

y e.

Connent: The SRP should be reviewed by the Regulatory Rxulrements l

Review Consnittee and then issued for public comment.

Staff Evaluation: The SRP to be issued in the Spring of 198l' is expected to contain only those revisions that: (1) reflect new requirements already l

imposed by NUREG-0660, "NRC Action Plan Developed as a Result of the TMI-2 Accident," (?) reference appropriate regulations, (3) reflect changed organization..I responsibilities within NRR, (4) reflect the staff's current licensing practice, and (5) make minor editorial changes.

The new requirements imposea by NUREG-0660 have alreacy received public comment and have oeen approved by the Conaission. Any other new require-ment will be subject to public conaent before inclusion in the SRP, unless the Director of NRR makes a specific decision to the contrary cn each such requirement.

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2.

The Commission Should Identify the Regulations of Particular Significance a.

Connent : Many organizations stated that they could provide more meaning-ful connents if they had a list of the regulations that the Commission had detencined to be of particular significance to public healtn and safety.

Staff Evaluation: The proposed list of regulations of particular signifi-cance is incluced in Table I to NUREG-0745, " Plan for Systematic Safety Evaluation of Nuclear Power Reactors," which is being publishec "for comment."

l 3.

73a Plan Goes Beyond the Intent of Section 110 a.

Comment: The plan to require documentation to the SRP should apply only j

to operating plants.

Staff Evaluation: Basically, this is the net effect of NUREG-0745.

NRR i

Office Letter 9 (issued in final form ir. January 1977) requires that deviations from tne SRP requirements be identifiea and justified for cps docketed after Septemoer 1,1976 and for OL applications docketed after sanuary 1, 1977.

Therefore, many plants now in the licensing pro-cest.sould have to provide essentially the same documentation as part of tne licensing process. (See also Comment 4b, below, and the staff evaluation of that connent).

b.

Comment: The proposed program applies further burden on the engineering rescurces of an industry already straining to satisfy the requirements stemming from the accident at Three Mile Island.

Staff Evaluation: We generally agree with these coments and have modi-fled the schedule to spread the required industry resources over a seven year period and therefore ease the resource requirements during the next several years.

c.

Coment: Plants being reviewed under the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) and the plants scheduled to be issued an operating licensee in the near term (NT0Ls) should be exempted since documentation already exists.

Staff Evaluation: Complete documentation does not exist for the SEP plants or for tne NT0Ls. Where appropriate documentation h ; been pre-viously submitted to the NRC, these can be referenced in r esponding to the requirements of NUREG-0745.

d.

Coment: The FSAR update rule will provide sufficient documentation.

Staff Evaluation: The FSAR u;;date rule requires the licensee to update the FSAR to reflect a variety of plant changes and analyses performed by or for the licensee. However, the FSAR update rule does not explictly require the licensee to provide documentation regarding meeting of regulations. The FSAR update rule requires documentation only in speci-fic cases of plant or procedure modifications, license amendments, or analyses performed at the request of the Comission.

e.

Coment : The NRC's General Counsel has sta ;ed that, "the review process does.C establish a legally adequate basis for a Comission finding for compliance with tne regulations."

Staff Evaluation: As noted by some of the orgaaizations making this com-ment, the NRC General Counsel also recomended that the staff more clearly document the relationship between the review process and compliance with the regulatior.s.

Also, Section 110 requires a finding relative to current regulations, not the regulations in effect at the time of licensing. Certainly the intent of Section 110 would not be satis-fied by a mere statement of the legal adequacy of the relationship of f

the review process and the regulations.

f.

Coment: The requirement to document and justify deviations from the SRP amounts to a re-licensing of operating reactors.

Staff Evaluation: It is not the intent of the plan presented in NUREG-0745 to require conformance with all aspects of the SRP. See response to Item ic,above.

( g.

Coment: The burden of documenting compliance with the regulations should Eplaced on the staff, not the licensees and applicants. It is the staff's, not the licensee's responsibility.

Staff Evaluatice: The plants currently operating have been licensed over approximately a 20-year period. The regulations have changed significantly during that period. Further, the staff's interpretation of the intent of the regulations has become more specific basad on the knowledge gained during the review proceis and on experience gained during the construction and operation of nuclear power plants. The documentation submitted to the staff during the licensing review varied greatly from plant to plant, depending on the period when the plant was being licensed because of changes in the regulations and in the depth of the staff's review over the twenty year period.

Further, the staff performs basically an audit review. Neither the f

NRC staff nor the Comission claims that the review process attempts I

to independently ascertain that each regulation is correctly applied to each applicable plant component, system, or structure.

i Because of the lack of uniform documentation and the audit nature of the staff's review, the licensees and applicants, not the staff, must initially be responsible fcr documenting compliance with the regulations.

As stated previously in the response to 3c, previously submitted appli-cable documentation may be referenced by the licensees and applicants in responding to the requirements of the plan presuted in NUREG-0745.

4.

The Recuirement Dates are Arbitrary a.

Coment: The staff slips SER dates and if this occurs on a specific operating license (0L) or construction permit (CP) application review, the affected plant applicant may have to submit the documentation requirements prior to licensing instead of after licensing. Therefore, a slight slippage in SER date could have a major adverse impact on the licensing schedule.

Staff Evaluation: Tht. Comission has previously stated that if a partic-ular licensing review slips such that the SER was issued after April 1, 1982, instead of prior to that date, that the specific situation will be reviewed on a " case-by-case" basis and that the more stringent documentation requirements would not be automatically applied.

b.

Coment: (1) Construction Permit (CP) applications should not have l

documentation requirements that are different than Ols; (2) SRP documen-tation should not be a precondition of licensing for currently docketed CP applications; (3) the January 1, 1982 date does not provide sufficient

! l time to document against the SRP; and (4) the Shoreham nuclear power plant should be required to identify all deviations from the SRF prior to granting of an operating license.

Staff Evaluation: The different documentation requirements for cps than OLs, proposed ir, [45 FR 67099] were intended to reflect the re' quire-ments of Section 110 and an updating of existing NRR policy as cocumented

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in Office Letter 9.

Section 110 specifies that the Commission determine which regulations are of particular significance and the extant to which operatin6 plants meet these regulations. On the other hand, Office Letter 9 requires that all deviations from SRP ba identified and justified I

for cps docketed after September 1,1976 and Ols docketed after January 1, 1977.

l Office Letter No. 9 was issued in final form on January 3,1977 and i

included a listing of plants already in the licensing process that

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were exempt fran the documentation requirements. However, the anti-cipated licensing dates for some plants in the licensing process in January 1977 have changed significantly during the past four years.

Construction was deferred by applicants because of financial reasons and decreases in projected needed generating capability, and licensing progress was slowed considerably by the diversion of staff resources i

needed to resolve safety issues arising from the accident of Unit 2 I

of the Three Mile Islaad Nuclear Power Plant. As a result, the 1977 list of plants exempt from the documentation requirements of Office Letter No. 9 is no longer rational in all cases. Therefore, at this time, it appears much more reasonable to satisfy the intent of both Section 110 of Public Law 96-295 and of Office Letter 9 by considering the current status of plants in the licensing process, not their status some fcur years ago.

The proposed rule has been modified significantly to reflect the corrents received in response to 45 FR 67099. The major changes are:

1.

The SER date which determines whether pre or post licensing documentation of deviations from the revised SRP is required was changed from January 1, 1982 to April 1,1982 for both construction permit and operating license applicants. This is to allow at least one year from publication of the revised SRP in April 1981 to publication of the SER. This is sufficient t

time for the applicant's analysis and the NRC staff's evaluation.

I 3.

Pre-licensing requirements for documenting deviations from the May 1960 version of the SRP were eliminated at the construction permit stage for those plants where the NRC Staff's Safety Evaluation Report TMI Supplement is issued before April 1,1982, since these applicants will later be required to provide complete documentation of deviations l

from the revised SRP before issuance of an operating license.

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In regara to tne comment regarain, tne Shoreham nuclear power plant,

'aare appears to be no basis for treating Shoreham cifferently tnan any other plant. The Shorenam plant was exempt from the requireuents of Office Letter 9; therefore, the proposed rule does not represent any relaxation of documentation requirements.

Currently, the staff SER is scneauled to be issued in tne Spring of 1981; therefore, post rather than pre-licensin9 documentation will oe required by the final rule.

5.

The Safety Benefits of the Overall Plan are questionable ana not Commensurate with tne kesources Requirec a.

Cocinent : A large numoer of inoividuals anc organizations made the aoove comment in various forms, including references to ongoic] programs like SEP and Interim Reliaoility Evaluation Program (IREP) and tne National Reliability Evaluation Program (NREP).

Staff Evaluation: The staff has attemptea to propose a plan tnat minimizes tne resources necersary to comply with Section 110 while maxi-mizing tne anticipated safety benefits. A major aspect of the proposed plan is its integration with ensoing programs sucn as SEP, IREP/AREP, ana tne resolutter of generic issues.

The plan anticipates that most of the significant safety issues tnat will be icentified by determining deviations from tne regulations will innt.rently already be schedulea for a routine safety review as part of tne dREP or will eitner be resolved or seneculea for review as a result cf tne experience s ined from tne current dEP program. Tne staff a

intenas to propose ao noc oackfit requirenents only in those rases wnere tne idencified aeviation involves a significant safety issue.

Assuming tnat WRC staff resources allocated to unis pro 3 ram are maintained at reasonaole levels, the program will not ce completed until aoout 1990.

Therefore, to alleviate tne imeciate impact of tne plan on industry resources, the plan has Deen revisea to require evaluations from tile operating plants in discrete groups over a seven year period (an avera;;e of aoout 13 plants a year). Also, as experience is 3ainea in tne imple-mentation of tnis program, the results will be reviewed from the stanapoint of tneir contrioution to reduction of risk to puolic nealtn ano safety.

Judgments could be mace tnat further docunentation against certain SRP acceptance criteria or staff review of certain of the responses liKelf woula not lead to the icentification of any new safety issues, either generically or plant-specific; anc the program could be suitaoly mocifiea.

The evaluation required of applicants wnose plants are relatively early in tne licensing process will De accomplisned as part of tne licensing process and snould have little or no impact on either resources or licensing senedule, since a similar documentation program was already plannec l

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W ENCLOSURE 7 l

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ENCLOSURE 7 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR PART 50 RULE TO REQUIRE LICENSEES AND APPLICANTS TO DOCUMENT DEVIATIONS FROM THE STANDARD REVIEW PLAN AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission ACTION: Final Rule

SUMMARY

The Nucle &r Regulatory Commissi0n (NRC) is issuing a rule that will require all nuclear power plant licensees and all applicants for construction permiti and manufacturing licenses to identify and justify deviations from the acceptance criteria of tne applicable revision of the Standard Review Plan, h0 REG-75/087 as part of a comprehensive systematic safety evaluation.

EFFECTIVE DATE:

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Malcolm L. Ernst, Assistant Director for Technology, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, 'J. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C.

20555,(301)492-8016 SUPPLEMENTARY lNFORMATION: On October 9,1980, the NRC published in the Federal

. Recister [45 FR 67099] a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking which would require all commercial nuclear power plant licensees and applicants to document deviaticas from the Standard Review Plan (SRP).

Interested persons were 'nvited to submit written comments to the Secretary of the Commission by November 24, 1980.

Numerous comments were received. After consideration cf the comments and other factors involved, the Commission has amended the requirement as published for public comment and added explanatcry statements to further define the appli-cability and implementation schedule for the requirement.

Many of the comments pointed out that the proposed plan wculd have a major impact on engi9ciring resources during the next several years. To alleviate this short term impact, and recognizing that the staff could not review all of the responses within the next several years, the plan to implement the proposed rule

. nar been revised to senedule the responses in groups over a period of seven years. This revised schedule applies to born licensees of plants tnat nad an operating license as of June 30, 1980 and applicants for an operating licanse for which the NRC Staff's Safety Evaluation Report is issued before April 1982.

A large group of comienters questionea the time penuitted for response and why applicants for construction permits were subject to significantly different accumentation requirements than applicants for operating licenses for the situa-tion wnere an liRC staff safety evaluation report was scneauled to be issued witnin I

about, the next 18 months. To correct this apparent inequity, the following signif-icant changes were made in tne proposea rule.

f 1

i (1) The SER date, wnich aetenaines mether pre or post licensing cocumentation is required, was chan:ca from January 1,1982 to April 1,1982 for botn construction permit and operating license applicants. This is to allow at least one year from puolication of the revisea SRP in April 1981 publication of the SER.

(2) Pre-licensing requirements for documentins deviations from the May 1980 version of the SRP were eliminated at the construction permit stage for those plants wnere the NRC Staff's Sefety Evaluation Report TMI Supple-ment is issued oefore April 1,1982, since these applicants will later De requirea to provide complete documentation of deviations from the revisec SRP Defore issuance of an operating license.

'l

' Copies of the comments, a sunmary of the consients, ano tne staff responses are available for inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room at 1717 H Street, N. W., Wasnington, D. C.

Single copics may be obtained on request from the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Weshin9 ton, G. C. 20555, Attention:

Document Control.

The requirements presented in this Final Rule are part of a comprehensive systent-atic safety evaluation of operating raclear power reactors wnich is requirea oy Section 110 of Public Law 96-295, the NRC FY-80 Autr.orization Bill. The elements of the plan required by Section 110 of the Public Law were specified as the ainimum acceptable in orcer to develop a significant safety evaluation.

The plan developed by the Commission adds to the minimum requireuents of the Public Law and integrates it with already existing or planned safety programs.

This will lead to a more compre-nensive and unified safety evaluation. The systematic safety evaluation plan, aevelooed in response to ne requirements of Section 110 of the Puolic Law, nas tne following as its principal conceptual eleiaents.

(1) Tae ioentification of tne regulations of particular significance to the protection of the puolic health and safety by the NRC staff.

(2) Tne revision of tne SKP oy the NRC staff.

The revised SRP will consist of the existing SRP modified to reference all applicable regulations and tnose Division 1 Resulatory Guides, staff positions and otner documents, including tne TMI-related requirements, useo by tne staff to interpret the intent of these resulatiens.

The revised SRP is scheculed to be issued by April 1981. It is anticipated snat the SRP will oe periccically revised in the future.

- l (3) Licensee and applicant analysis and documentation of compliance witn the regulations of particular significance.

The analysis will be made by demonstration of confonnance with or equivalence to tne acceptance criteria of identified SRP sections. Conformance witn or equivalence to the accepthace criteria of the revisea SRP will be a satisfactorily cemonstration of compliance with tne regulations.

(4) iiRC Staff evaluation of licensee responses.

(5)

Integration of evaluations witn the results of otner Commission safety programs (the Systewatic Evaluation Program, an engineering issue oriented safety pro 9 ram; and tne dational Reliaoility Evaluation Program, 6 reliaoility-risk assessment oriented safety prograw) to ictntify and resolve any possiole significant safety issues.

Tne entire program would be completed by 1990 for all currently operating reactors and reactors expected to receive operating licenses in the near term.

Tne details of the systemat c safety evaluation plan are presentee in a draft i

report, NUREG-0745, " Plan for the Systematic Safety Evaluation of Nuclear Power Reactors." Tnis report has been issueo for public conment, witn the comment period encing on After Commission consiceration of tne comments on tne plan, a fina? plan will oe issued wnicn will identify the rules of particular significance to whicn the requirements of tnis rule refer. The issuance of the final plan is tentatively scneauleo for late spring 1981.

l Pursuant to tne Atowie Energy Act of 1954, as anenceo, tne Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amenced, and Sections 552 and 553, Title 5 of the United States Codt the following rule is published suoJect to cocification.

I

. I.A.

Socumentation Requirements All nuclear power plants required to be licensed under Section 103 or Section IC4(b) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, will be required to document deviations from the acceptance criteria of the SRP.

The specific requirements for each plant have been categorized as follows:

Category 1 All licensees for nuclear power plants issued operating licen:es on or before June 30,1980,l/ and all applicants for a nuclear power plant operating license issued after June 30, 1980, but for which an NRC staff Safety Evaluation Report will be issued on or before April 1, 1982, will be required to evaluate the plant against the SRP revision in effect one year prior to the date on which the NRC requires documenta-tion. The licensee or applicant is to:

(1) document conformance with the SRP acceptance criteria, (2) justify equivalence to the SRP acceptance criteria, or (3) identify deviations from the SRP acceptance criteria and pro-vide an analysi of the safety significance of these deviations. The de umen-tation is required only for those SRP acceptance criteria that the Commis-sion has identified as 1mplementing the regulations that the Commission has determined to be of particular significance to the protection of public health and safety.

Category 2 All applicants for a nuclear power plant operating license, construction permit, or manufacturing license for which a NRC staff Safety Evaluation 1/ The date on which Public Law 96-295 became effective.

a l

. is issued after April 1,1982./ will be required to <! valuate the 3

2/

Report plant against the SRP revision used during the staff feview, but in no case an SRP revision issued before April 1931.

The applicant is to:

(1) docu-ment conformance with the SRP acceptance criteria, (2) justify equivalence to the SRP acceptance criteria, or (3) identify deviations from the SRP accep-tance criteria and provide an analysis of the safety significance of these deviations. The documentation is required for all of the SRP acceptance f

criteria that the Comission has identified as pertinent to the specific type of license or permit.

B.

Response Schedule The documentation requirod under Part A of this rule shall be provided according to the following schedule:

1.

Thosc plants included in Category 1 sheti suumit the required documentation on a staggered schejule. The first group of plants required to respond will be the eleven plants identified in Phase II of the Comission's Systematic Evaluation Program. These plants will be required to submit l

the required documentation within one year after publicatf an of the next revision to the SRP, currently scheduled for April 1981, or publication of the final version of NUREG-0745, whichever comes later. The remaining plants in this grouping will be scheduled to respond before 1990, at an average of about 13 plants per year. These plants will be notified by NRC of their response date at least fifteen months prior to that date.

2.

Those plants included in Category 2 will submit the required documenta-tion before the issuance of the license or permit.

2j For the case of construction permit or manufacturing license, the applicable document is NRC':: Safety Evaluation Report TMI Supplement.

3/ Or one year after publication of the next revision to the SRP, currently expected in April 1981, whichever is later.

i

. C.

C)mpliance with Regulations In situation: wnere there are deviations from the SRP acceptance criteria (i.e., there is neither confonaance nor equivalence), a licensee snoeld request any needed exemptions to the regulations.

D.

Clarifications 1.

As used in this rule, e deviation is defineu as a lack of conformance of a plant feature to a provision of the acceptance criteria of the SRP. An alternate and acceptacle (equivalent) approach to satisfying tne SRP acceptance criteria is not considered to be a aeviation, but a justification of equivalence to tne 5RP acceptance criteria must be documented in the response.

2.

As used in tnis rule, tne regulations of particular significance are those identifiec in the final version of fiUREG-0745, as pernaps modified in the suosequent NRC letters requesting documentation.

3.

The rule contemplates that the licensee of each plant in category 1 acove, would assess tne plant design against the regulations tnat would apply to a new applicant. Further, licensees or applicants for an OL, (as defined in category 1 or 2 aoove), will oe required to adcress not only tnose SRP acceptance criteria nonnally applicable to an OL, but also those SkP acceptance criteria normally applicable only to cps, unless the plant was previously evaluated curing tne CP or at review as requireo under category 2 aoove. However, applicants for a CP or ML, in cate3ory 2, will only nave to acdress those SnP acceptance criteria normally appli-cable to tneir stage of licensir ', since the plants will be evaluated against the OL acceptance criteria curing the OL licensing review, as specified for category 2 plants.

.a.

4.

As used in this rule, justification of equivalence to or ceviation from tne acceptance criteria of the SRP shall be a summary statement identifying the area of equivalence or deviation, a description of actual or designed area in question, and the basis for equivalence or

~

the basis for continued safe operation in liv t of the i.viation.

n 5.

If a slippage in the SER issuance date occurs such that significant 4

changed or increased documentation will be required before license or permit issuance, tne Commission may grant relief from the char.ge in documentation requirements and response seneoule upon request.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, tnis day of

, 1981.

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FOR ThE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, L

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ENCLOSURE 8 STAFF ANALYSIS OF THE REGULATIONS OF "PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE" Section 110 of the FY 80 Authorization Bill requires that the NRC develop and implement a comprehensive plan for the systematic safety evaluation of all currently operating utilization facilities required to be licensed under Section 103 or 104(b) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Subsection 110(b)(1) requires that the Comission, as a part of this plan, identify each current rule and regulation, compliance with which the Commission determines to be of particular significance to the protection of the public health and safety.

Subsection 110(b)(2) requires that the Comission determine the extent to which each operating plant complies with the particularly significant rules and regulations, including an identification of where compliance was achieved by use of Division 1 Regulatory Guides and staff technical positions and where compliance was achieved by equivalent means.

This enclosure describes the complexities involved in determining which regu-i lations are "particularly significant" in terms of public health and safety.

A general discuss 4n is provided in Section A below, and the results of an NRR staff review using different criteria are described in Section B, including the NRR staffs recomendations of the listing of rules of "particular signi-ficance" to be addressed by the operating plants.

A.

General Discussion _

The conference report (Congressional Report No. 96-1070) accompanying the Authori-zation Bill notes that the scope of the legislation was limited to those regula-tions having particular significance in order to reduct: the burden on the NRC in preparing the plan, and to ensure that the irformation gathered will be useful in asussing the overall safety of the operating plants.

It was assumed that by thus limiting the sccpe of this study, it could be accomplished in a timely manner.

The NRC staff has initiated efforts to identify those of the Comission's rules and regulations that are particularly significant to the protection of the public health and safety. The efforts performed show that the criteria used to determine "particular significance" and the degree of conservatism u:ed in judgments as to which regulations meet the criteria both strongly impact the number of reguli-l tions that are so identified. Thus, the staff has found the task of determining those of the Comission's rules which are of particular significance is a diffi cult and subjective process.

There are two basic problems associated with the identification of regulations of particular significance. The first ir.vovies the matter of judgment as to the degree of increase in risk to the public that would warrant such a categori-zation. This manifests itself in two ways:

I 1.

Words sucn as " substantial" increase in consecuences or frequency of an accident, or " major" degradation of a boundary, are subject to wide varia-tions in interpretation.

The lack of explicit, quantifiable safety goals or criteria and the uncertainties surrounding the quantification or risk add to this problem.

3

a 2.

Application of the criteria to test a particular regulation may be done with varying degrees of conservatism and whether a regulation passes the test depends, in large part, on the "what if" scenario developed by the person doing the categorization. This is further complicated because some regula-tions themselves interpret or define certain aspects of brcader regulations.

I The following example dealing with containment systems is provided to illustrate the difficulties and subjective judgments that are involved. The first judg-ment is whether or not the coatainment system, as a whole, qualified as a major protection to public health and safety. Valid arguments can be advanced from either point of view. One point of view is that containment is only required if two relatively low probability events both occur. First, there has to be a significant loss of reactor coolant inventory, either through an accident like a LOCA, stuck cpen PORV, or failed pump seal, or through a slow boil-off of reactor coolant because a decay heat removal path is not maintained.

In addition, the redundant mitigating systems that are provided to maintain reactor coolant inventory and provide a decay heat removal path must fail or be erron-eously shut off, resulting in severe damage. Only if these events cccur does the containment provide a significant protection to public health and safety.

The opposite point of view is that the events described have occurred and, in the case of the TMI accident, the containment was the safety system that did not provide substantial protection to the public.

If one reaches the judgment that the containment system is very important to public health and safety, then GDC-16, which establisnes the requirement to have a containment and GDC-50 which defines the design basis for the containment, would be identified as regulations of particular significance.

GDC-51 through 57 also establish important requirements pertaining to parti-cular aspects of containment design. These regulations are clearly important.

However, it is a high judgmental decision whether or not all or some of these other GDCs are of "particular significance."

f A second difficulty in identifying which regulations are deemed to be of particular significance is that such a designation does not mean, or even imply, that all deviations from these important requirements are of safety i

significance. Such a determination of safety significance can only be made by considering the specific deviation in the context of the overall plant i

design. Considered by itself, a specific requirement may be judged to have j

particular significance.

l Later, when plant specific designs or operating requirements are reviewed, it may be found that the impact of 11oncompliance upon public health and safety is very small.

This may be the result of a number cf factors. Overall riant design may have incorporated other features, the presence of which serves to reduce i

the importance of features called for by the specific requirement which was l

Judged to be particularly significant. Good engineering practius utilized l

in the plant design may have been the prMecessor of a later requiremerit which l

has been categorized as "particularly significant," but the particular plant feature may not fully meet all of the detailed requirements of the formal staff position. However, the design of the particularplant feature may have gone far enough to reduce risk to the public to a negligible level.

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. _ _ ~ _,

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i A general illustrative example might be the problem of pipe breaks inside of containment. GDC 4 requires, in part, "Structurer, systems and components i

important to safety shalll be designed to accomodate the effects of... pipe j

whipping and discharging fluids..." To assure compliance with the intent l

of this regulation, the staff has generally taken the position that all pipes containing high energy fluids inside of containment must be structurally I

supported to a sufficient extent that a postulated break in one pipe would not cause failure of other piping systems because of pipe whip or. jet impingc-ment forces. However, some plants were designed and constructed p'rior to promulugation of the staff position.

In such cases, there were not sufficient l

structural anchor points to protect against every conceivable location where l

a pipe might break. However, additional preventive features may be deemed to provide adequate compensatory safety features for a limited nufanar of possible pipe break locations that could not be protected against by adequate structural support of the piping system.

Such features might include more frequent inser-vice inspection of welds at the unprotected locations, better weld preparation to obtain more sensitive ultrasonic measurements during inservice inspection, j

and a more sophisticated leak detection system.

l To add to the complexity of the overall problem, not only can some deviations

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from requirements of "particular significance" be of little safety consequence, l

but also there may be situations where a given regulation might not be judged to be of particular significance if taken alone. However, a substantial 3

deviation from this requirement in combination with deviations from closely l

related requirements could result in a significant reduction in public health and safety. One example might be the requirement that the condensate storage tank (the primary source of water for the auxiliary feedwater system) be designed to Category I seismic standards. This might not be deemed " parti-cularly significant" because there is also a requirement for a seismically designed connection to the safety grade component cooling water system.

However, if the latter requirement were also determined to be not of parti-cular significance, the review of the plant against the particularly signi-ficance regulations would not address assurance of a supply of water to the auxiliary feedwater system following a severe seismic event.

The net result of the difficulties discussed above has been much subjectivity in the determination of regulations of particular significance, with a strong tendency toward a lenient interpretation. While a probabilistic risk-based assessment of the regulations might help part of this problem, the staff l

has not had time to consider such an analysis. Also, any risk-based analysis would suffer from the same inability to address initially the effect o' a i

range of deviations from these regulations.

B.

Preliminary Results of Staff Evaluations of Regulations The staff initiated a program to identify those of the Comission's rules anti regulations which are particularly significant to the proteci. ion of the public health and safety. A soall task force of NRC technical specialists was formed to perform this effort. The fit'st step in this program was to identify all of the Consnission's rules and regulations which 6re: (a) safety-related and (b) applicable to plants having received a license under Section 103 Or 104(b) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The results of this screening are shown in

l t,

Table 1 under the column identified as Applicable Rules. This list was then further screened by the task force, using two sets of screening criteria--

one of which might be construed as a somewhat lenient interpretation of "particular significance," and the other a more restrictive interpretation.

s The more lenient set of screening criteria (Criteria Set A) used by the task force was defined as follows: A rule was to be identified as "particularly significant" if it advances technical or administrative requirements, the

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sbsence of which might result in a significant increase in the likelihood of:

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1.

0"fsite consequences 10 CFR 100 for the design basis event and most I

limiting sirgle failure, or-L 2.

Loss of Safety Function by assuming single equipment failure, or; 3.

Major Degradation of fuel integrity, primary coolant boundary or l

primary containment boundary, or;

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4.

Large onsite releases or staff personnel axposures A.

Restricted areas 25R whole body 150R whole body skill 375 extremities B.

Unrestricted areas 0.5 R/yr. whole body 500 x 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, Table II release These criteria were based on the criteria for the reporting to Congress of abnormal events which has been adopted by the Commission (ref. NUREG-0090).

The more stringent set of screening criteria (Criteria Set B) used by the task force was as follows: A rule was to be identified as "particularly significant" if it advances technical or administrative requirements, the absence of which might result in a significant increase in the likelihood of major degradation of two or more of the three barriers in the defense-in depth concept (i.e., fuel integrity, reactor coolant system pressure boundary).

As is evident, this screening criteria set was based upon assumptions of severe challenge to the Commission's defense-in-depth concept.

In both cases, the task force used the screening criteria conservatively to test the applicable safety-related regulations; i.e., if there was a reason-able question as to the importance of a regulation, it was judged to pass the test of "particular significance." The results of the task force screening activities is shown in Table 1.

l i

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f After completion of the task force review of the Commission's Rule and Regu-lations the listings were subjected to an NRR staff peer review and a review by the Advisory Committee en Reactor Safeguards. The If sting shown in Table 1 reflects the results of these reviews. Where the tcsk force listing has been expanded by the comments received from the NRR staff and the ACRS thp change is indicated by an asterisk in the appropriate column.

After review of the comments received from the ACRS and the NRR staff regarding the criteria used to screen for Rules of Particular Significance the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation recommends that the listing of the staffs requiations obtained using Criteria A be adopted as the Commissions interpre-tation of the intent of Subsection 110(b)(1). However, it should be noted that one division of NRR, although not voicing strong objections to this recom-mendation, preferred the use of all of the Applicable Rules listed in the first column of Table 1.

Before issuance of NUREG-0745, " Plan for Systematic Safety Evaluation of Nuclear Power Plants," the list of regulations contained in that report will be reviewed b.y the other NRC offices.

6 l

TABtE 1 i

TECHNICAL RULES Applicable Rule Criteria A Criteria B 10 CFR 20.101-20.108 X

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10 CFR 29.201 -20.207 X

j 10 CFR 20.301 - 20.305 X

i 10 CFR 50.34a i

10 CFR 50.36 X

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10 CFR 50.36a 10 CFR 50.44 I

10 CFR 50.46 X

X 10 CFR 50.55a X

X 4

10 CFR, Appendix A

@C1 X

X GDC 2 X

X GDC 3 X

X GDC 4 X

X

@C5 X

X GDC 10 X

GDC 11 X

X*

GDC 12 X

GDC 13 X

X GDC 14 X

X GDC 1E X

X l

GDC 16 X

X

• Added per imR staff and ACRS coments

. 1 Applicable Rules Criteria A Criteria B t.

GDC 17 X

X f

GDC 18 X

X GDC 19 X

X 4

GDC 20 X

X GDC 21 X

X GDC 22 X

X GDC 23 X

X GDC 24 X

X i

X GDC 25 GDC 26 X

GDC 27 X

X GDC 28 X

X GDC 29 X*

X*

GDC 30 X

X i

GDC 31 X

X GDC 32 X

X GDC 33 X

GDC 34 X

GDC 35 X

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GDC 36 X

X GDC 37 X

X GDC 38 X

X GDC 39 X

X r

GUC 40 X

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Applicable Rules Criteria A Criteria B j

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GDC 41 X

X GDC 42 X

X I

GDC 43 X

X GDC 44 X

X GDC 45 X

X

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GDC 46 X

X GDC 50 X

X*

l GDC 51 X

X GDC 52 X

GDC 53 X

t GDC 54 X

X GDC 55 X

X GDC 56 X

GDC 57 X

GDC 50 X

GDC 61 X

GDC 62 X

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GDC 63 X

GDC 64 X

10 CFR 50, Appendix G X

X 10 CFR 50, Appendix H X

X 10 CFR 50, Appendix I i

10 CFR 50, Appendix J X

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Applicable Rules Criteria A Criteria B 10 CFR 50, Appendix K X

X 1

10 CFR 70.24 10'CFR 71.31 - 71.42 X

10 CFR 71, Appendix A 10 CFR 71, Appendix B 10 CFR 71, Appendix D 10 CFR 73.40 - 73.60 10 ciR 73.67 10 CFR 100 X

10 CFR 100, Appendix A X

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ADMINISTRATIVE RULES Applicable Rules Criteria A Criteria B 10 CFR 19 X

10 CFR 20.401-20.409 X

10 CFR 21 X

X 10 CFR 30 10 CFR 50.10 10 CFR 50.34 10 CFR 50.37 10 CFR 50.40 10 CFR 50.54 X

X 10 CFR 50.59 10 CFR 50.70 X

X 10 CFR 50.71 X

X 10 CFR 50.80 X

4 10 CFR 50.81 X

X 10 CFR 50.82 X

X 10 CFR 50.109 X

X 10 CFR 50, Appendix B X

X 10 CFR, Appendix E X

10 CFR 51 10 CFR 55 X

X 10 CFR 55, Appendix A X

X 10 CFR 70.52 i

10 CFR 71.51-71.64 Applicable Rules.

_ Criteria A Criteria B 10 CFR 71, Appendix E 10 CFR 73.70 - 73.72 10 CFR 73. Appendix B

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10 CFR 73, Appendix C

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4 CONTENTS Page Abstract............................................................

iii Abbreviations.......................................................

vi 1.

Genera 1.........................................................

1 2.

Background......................................................

1 3.

Di scussion of the Proposed Pl a n.................................

3 3. 1 P a rt I......................................................

3 3.1.1 i:les and Regulations of Particular Significance.....

3 3.1.2 Revi sion to Standa rd Re view P 1 an.....................

3 3.1.3 Licensee / Applicant Determination of Compliance.......

4 3.1.4 NRC Evaluation of Licensee / Applicant Determination of Compliance......................................

7 3.2 Part 11.....................................................

8 3. 3 P a rt I I I....................................................

9 3.4 Part IV.....................................................

10 4.

Schedules.......................................................

11 References..........................................................

12 1

ABSTRACT The plan presented in Inis report is part of a comprehensive systematic safety evaluation of nuclear power reactors, which is required by Section 110 of Public Law 96-295, the NRC FY-80 Authorization Bill. Section 110 of the Puolic Law specifiec the minimum acccptable elements of a neaningful safety evaluation.

This plan, developed by the Commission, adds to the minimum requirements and integrates it with already existing or planneo safety programs, which wilJ leac to a nore conpreaensive and unified safety evaluation.

Tne Systematic Safety Evaluation Plan, developed in response to the requirements of Section 110 of the Public Law, has the following principal conceptual elements.

A.

Compliance with tne Regulations of Particular Significance 1.

The identification of the re9ulations of particular significance to the protection of tne puolic health and safety by the NRC staff.

2.

The revision of the Standard Review Plan (SRP) by tne NRC staff. The reviseo SRP will consist of tne existing SRP modified to reference all applicaole regulations and those Division 1 Regulatory Guides, staff positions and other documents, includinr the TMI-related requirements, used by the staff to interpret the intent of tnese regulations. The revised SRP is scheduled to be issued oy April 1981.

3.

Licensee and applicant analysis and cocumentation of compliance with, or deviation frcm, the identified regulations. The determinations will oe made by demonstration of confonnance with, equivalence to, or deviations from tne acceptance criteria of the SRP sections associated with each of tne identified regulations.

4.

Staff evaluation of licensee responses.

5.

Integration of evaluations with the results of other Commission safety programs to resolve any potential significant safety issues.

B.

Generic Issues 1.

Tne identification of all of the generic safety issues for whicn techni-cal solutions nave been developed.

2.

Periccic icentification of new generic issues.

3.

Periocic prioritization of new and existing, generic issues.

4.

Resolution of issues and the determination of which of tnese should be incorporated into the Commission's regulations.

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l l

ABBREVIATIONS i

CFR - Code of Federal Regulations CP -

Construction Permit IREP - Interim Reliability Evaluation Program

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ML -

Nanufactuiring License NRC -

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Consission NREP - National Reliability Evaluation Program NRR - Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC OL -

0perating License SEP - Systematic Evaluation Program SRP - Standard Review Plan USI - Unresolved Safety Issue 4

vi

PLAN FOR THE SYSTEMATIC SAFETY EVALUATION OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 1.

General The Nuclear Regulatory Comission is proposing a plan for the systematic safety evaluation of all currently operating nuclear power plants, as well as all nuclear power plants that are in the operating license (OL), constrec-tion permit (CP), or manufacturing license (ML) review process. The plan also details the procedures for resolving identified generic safety issues. Parts of this plan reflect the Comission's effort to develop a comprehensive plan to satisfy the requirements of Section 110 of Public Law 96-295 (NRC FY 80 Author-ization Bill). Coment is sought on the proposed plan and on the method of implementing such a plan. The coment period expires within 45 days from the date of the Notice of Availability of NUREG-0745 in the Federal Register.

===2.

Background===

Subsecticn 110(a) of Public Law 96-295 (NRC FY 1980 Authorization Bill) requires the U.S Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC) to develop, submit to Congress, and implement as soon as practicable after notice and opportunity for public coment, a comprehensive plan for the systematic safety evaluation of all currently operating nuclear power plants. The Congressional Conference Report, Report No. 96-1070, (Reference 1), states that the above requirement was written so as to enable the NRC to build upon the systematic safety evaluation it is currently conducting for the oldest operating nuclear power plants.

The need to systematically assess the safety of operating nuclear power plants resulted in the establishment several years ago of the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) by the NRC.

One of the objectives of that program is the exten-sion of the experience gained in reviewing the oldest plants to the safety evalu-ation of all operating nuclear power plants. The TMI Action Plan (Reference 2) appropriately recognizes this need in Task IV.E.5, which requires the improved and expanded systematic assessment of the safety of all operating plants. Although there are many other TMI Action Plan tasks that are aimed at operating plants (such as more emphasis on the review of operating experience), there are two additional tasks that are directly related to the systematic assessment of the safety of operating plants. These are:

(1) Task II.C.1--Interim Reliability Evaluation Program (IREP), the development of an orderly classification of accident sequences suitable for qualitative analyses and for use in the pro-babilistic analyses of core melt accidents of a few representative operating nuclear power plants and (2) Task II.C.2--continuation of IREP on all remaining operating plants by means of the National Reliability Evaluation Program (NREP).

Subsection 110(b) of Public Law 96-295 identifies certain information that, as a minimum, must be included as part of the systematic safety evaluation plan. Subsections 110(b)(1) and (2) require: the identification of each current rule and regulation, compliance with which the Comission determines to be of particular significance to the protection of the public health and safety; and the detemination of the extent to which each currently operating plant complies with these identified rules and regulation, including an indication of where such compliance was achieved by use of Division 1 regu-

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latory guides and staff positions and where compliance was achieved by eouiva-lent means. Subsections 110(b)(3), (4), and (5) require: the identification of all of the generic safety issues set forth in NUREG-0410 (Reference 3) for which technical solutions have been developed; the determination of which of these solutions should be incorporated into the Comission's rules and regu-lations; and a schedule for developing a technical solution for the remaining generic safety issues.

Several years ago, the need to address generic safety issues in a disciplined manner led the NRC to establish the program described in NUREG-0419; recently the Generic Issues Branch was established in the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR). This branch is responsible for managing the technical reso-lution of Unresolved Safety Issues (USIs) and for tracking the statt:s of activities on other designated generic issues. The TMI Action Plan also addresses generic safety issues resulting from the lessons learned from the TMI accident; for example, Task IV.E.2 requires the early identification, assessment, and resolution of safety issues.

Subsectio-110(c) of Public Law 96-295 requires that, within 90 days of enact-ment of t'iis legislation, the Comission report to Congress on the efforts to carry out Subsection 110(a). By letters of September 30, 1980, from the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Comission to the President of the Senate (Reference 4) and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives (Reference 5),

the Comission has fulfilled this requirement.

As stated previously, the information specifically called for in Section 110(b) of Public Law 96-295 is the minimum information that Congress reouired to be included in the expanded systematic safety evaluation program. The Commission's plan to satisfy Section 110 will not only explicitly fulfill the requirements, but, in an effort to minimize resources and to maximize plant safety, the Comission will also integrate this plan with certain aspects of other existing or planned safety programs. The proposed Comission plan, as well as its inter-relationship with other programs, is discussed below.

This proposed plan for the systematic safety evaluation of nuclear power plants has the following as its objectives:

(1) conforming to Section 110 of Public Law 96-295; (2) integrating the results of pertinent existing or planned pro-grams into this plan to form a more comprehensive and unified product; (3) maxi-mizing the enhancement of plant safety; (4) minimizing the NRC and industry resources necessary to implement this plan; and (5) minimizing the time needed to implement this plan.

The proposed plan described below was developed by NRC staff with the intent of satisfying these objectives to the maximum extent practicable, realizing that some objectives are in partial conflict with each other. For example, accomplishing the entire plan with several years would have a major unaccept-able short-term impact on both NRC and industry resources. i

3.

DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSED PLAN The plan, as currently formulated, has been divided into four distinct parts:

(I) identification and evaluation of compliance with the regu-lations of particular significance; (II) assessment of safety issues or problems at operating plants in the SEP and IREP programs; (III) the Generic Issues Program and (IV) the integration of the results of Parts I-III to enable comprehensive decision making.

Figure 1 depicts the major tasks for each part of the overall plan. These parts are discussed'indivi-dually below.

3.1 Part I Depicted on the flowchart in Figure 1 is Part I of the plan, which covers the requirements of Subsections 110(b)(1) and (2) of Pubife Law 96-295.

These requirements specifically call for the identification of the regu-lations of particular significance to the protection of the public health and safety, and for the determination cf the extent to which each operating plant complies with these regulations.

4 i

The major aspects of this plan are:

(1) identification of the rules and regulations of particular significance; (2) revision to the Standard Review Plan; (3) licensee / applicant determination of compliance; and (4) NRC evaluation of licensee / applicant determination of compf f ance.

3.1.1 Rules and Raoulations of Particular Sionfficance The implementation of Part I of the plan, as presented in Figure 1, has already been initiated; the NRC staff has prepared a list of those regulations that are particularly significant to the protection of the public health and safety. This was accomplished by evaluating Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). A list of all administrstive and technical regulations which the staff deemed to be of particular safety significance is presented in Table 1.

3.1.2 Revision to Standard Review Plan In a related effort, the staff is presently in the process of updating the Standard Review Plan (SRP), NUREG-75/087 (Reference 6). The SRP, first published in 1975, was prepared to guide NRC staff reviewers in performing safety reviews of applications to construct or operate nuclear I

power plants.

The principal purpose of the SRP is to ensure the quality and uniformity of the staff reviews and to present a well-defined base from which pro-posed changes in the scope of these reviews may be evaluated. The SRP also serves to make information about regulatory matters widely available, and to improve understanding of the staff review process by interested members of the publ.ic and nuclear power industry. i

Current techniques for the safety evaluation of nuclear power plants as set forth in the SRP are the result of years of experience. As this experience is incorporated into the regulatory process, regulatory guides and the SPP are periodically reviewed and revised to reflect the current state of the art. This results in a varying basis for staff acceptani:e over time. Also, there has been a lack of uniform documentation of each plant's conformance with SRP acceptance criteria in effect at tte time of review. This lack of a comon basis and of uniform documentation makes it difficult to det: ermine the extent to which plants reviewed some time ago deviate fMm current SRP acceptance criteria, and the safety significance of any such deviations.

As a result of the accident at Three Mile Island, many regulatory requirements have been revised and new requirements have t een promul-gated.

Accordingly, the staff has begun to revise the SRP to reflect these new requirements. This next revision of the SRP, scheduled for completion in April 1981, will consist of the May 1980 version of the SRP, modified to reference all applicable safety and safeguards regulations and those Division 1 regulatory guides, staff positions, and other documents curren*.ly used by the staff to interpret the intent of these regulations, including requirements resulting from the TMI accident.

3.1.3 Licensee / Applicant Cetermination of Compliance In a matter related to the requirements of Section 110(b)(1), the Com-mission recantly published a notice of proposed rulemaking (Reference 7) which would require documentation of deviations from the Standard Review Plan acceptance criteria. This proposed rulemaking, as subse-quently modified by the Comission after considering public comments, requires all' operating plants, and plants for which an OL, CP, or ML is pending, to be evaluated by the licensees / applicants in the following manner:

Categorv 1 All licensees for nuclear gwer plants issued operating licenses on or before June 30, 1980-and all applicants for a nuclear power plant operating licensee issued after the Jur,e 30, 1980, but for which April 1,1982,gfety Evaluation Report will be issued on or before an NRC Staff S _f will be required to evaluate the plant against the SRP revision in effect one year prior to the date on which the NRC requires documentation. The licensee or applicant is to:

(1) document confor-mance with the SRP acceptance criteria, (2) justify equivalence to the 1

SRP acceptance criteria, or (3) identify deviations from the SRP acceptance criteria and provide an analysis of the safety significance of these deviations. The documentation is required only for those SRP acceptance 1/ The date on which Public Law 96-295 became effective 2/ The basis for the April 1,1982 date is to permit adequate time after

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issuance of the revised SRP for a licensee / applicant to document and justify deviations and for the NRC staff to incorporate evaluations of the more safety significant deviations into the staff Safety Evaluation Reports.

4

criteria that the Comission cas identified as implementing the regulations that the Comission has detemined to be of particular significance to the protection of public health and safety.

Category 2 All applicants for a nuclear power plant operating license construction Report 3pr manufactu:ing license for wpch a NRC staff Safety Evaluati permit is issued after April 1,1982-will be required to evaluate the plant against the acceptance criteria of the SRP revision used during the staff review, but in no case an SRP revision issued before April 1981.

l The applicant is to:

(1) document conformance with the SRP acceptance criteria, (2) justify equivalence to the SRP acceptance criteria, or (3) identify deviations from the SRP acceptance criteria and provide an analysis of the safety significance of these deviations. The documentation is required for all of the SRP acceptance criteria that the Comission has identified as pertinent to the specific type of license or permit.

The revised SRP will reference all pertinent safety regulations and Divi-sion 1 regulato,ry. guides, staff positions, and all other documents used by the staff to interpret the it. tent if these regulations; and thus, demonstra-tion of conformance or equivalence to every SRP section that references a specific regulation will constitute a satisfactory means of demonstrating full l

compliance with the regulation.

l Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations is in the process of being revised by the NRC sk that the regulations will appear in a more logical order and --

in compliance with Executive Order 12044, " Improving Government Regulations" --

so that the regulations will be as simple and clear as possible. This program to revise the regulations is scheduled to be ccmpleted in about five years and, therefore, for consistency of review, the SRP references to the regulations

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will be interpreted to be these regulations in effect on June 30,1980. To facilitate future detenninations of compliance to the revised regulations, a list cross-referencing the existing regulations to their revised counterparts will be prepared by the staff. These revisions to the regulations will not nec-essitate future duplicative demonstrations of plant compliance by the licensee /

applicant.

Each licensee / applicant would be required to review its plant (s) against the acceptance criteria of the SRP, and indicate (1) where there is conformance with the SRP acceptance criteria; (2) where conformance is achieved by equiva-lent means, including a summary justification as to why the current plant design or operating procedures provide an equivalent ceans of meeting the 3/ For the case of construction permit or manufacturing license, the applicable document is NRC's Safety Evaluation Report TMI Supplement 4/ Or one year after publication of the next revision to the SRP, currently expected in April 1981, whichever is later. i

SRP acceptance criteria; and (3) where there is a deviation from (neither conformance or equivalence) the acceptance criteria of the SRP. In the latter case, the licensee / applicant will be required to provide a technical discussion as to the safety significance of the deviation. The licensee / applicant should also request any neede(

exemptions to the regulations.

It should be noted that when certain regulations were ;romulgated they did not require plants that had already passed a specified point in thb licensing process to comply. However, because Section 110 of Public

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Law 96-295 requires identification of each current (emphasis added) regulation that the Comission determines to be of particular signi-ficance, the plan contemplates that the licensee of each plant in category 1 above, would assess the plant design against the regula-tions that would apply to a new applicant. Further, licensees or applicants for an OL, (as defined in category 1 or 2 chove), will be required to address not only those SRP acceptance criteria nomally applicable to an OL, bt.t also those SRP acceptance criteria normally applicable only to cps, unless the plant was previously evaluated during the CP or ML review as required under category 2 above. How-ever, applicants for a CP, or ML, in category 2, will only have to address those SRP acceptance criteria normally applicable to their stage of licensing, since the plants will be evaluated against the OL acceptance criteria during the OL licensing review, as specified for category 2 plants.

For each regulation that is determined by the Commission to be of particular significance to the protection of public health and safety, the NRC staff will prepare a list of the associated SRP acceptance criteria in the April 1981 revision to the SRP. As stated above, conformance with the identified acceptance criteria is an acceptable means of demonstrating ccmpliance with the regulation.

The schedule for responses by the licensee /epplicant is shown on Figure 2.

The NRC will request in the spring of FY 81 that all opera-ting reactor and near-term OL licensees document conformance with, equivalence to, or justify deviations from, the SRP acceptance criteria related to the regulations of particular significance. This response will be staggered to be compatible with the to-be-established schedule for the systematic safety review of all operating reactors. The 11 SEP Phase II plants will be scheduled to respond first, by the spring of FY 82. The remaining plants will be scheduled to respond before i

1990, at an average of about 13 plants per year. The priority of response will be determined by factors such as the age of the plant, design differences from plants already reviewed, and popu-lation density.

It is expected that further revisions to the SRP will be made periodi-cally. Those licensees whose plants are in category 1, above, will be required to provide documentation based on the SRP revision in effect one year prior to the date that the Comission requires the documentation i

to be submitted.

( '

For any new licensing requirement established after tne spril 1981 revision to tne SRP, the staff will make a oefinitive cecision as to tne appifcability of the requirement to CP applications to be subnitted ir the future, CP applications under review, OL applications to De submi~.ted in tne future, OL applications under review, and plants alreauy issued an OL. Revisions of the SRP after the april 198! SRP revision will reflect these decisions.

For eacn future SRP revision, tne ARC staff will prepare, for each regulation that nas been detenuined to be of particular significance, a list of SRP acceptance criteria similar to tnat prepared for the April 1981 revision to the SRP. Tnese future lists will reflect tne decisions made on the applicability of new requirements to plants tnat alreacy had been issued an OL and, in general, licensees will not have to address SRP licensing requirements tnat were not oackfit to tnis class of piants.

As oiscussed in Section 3.1.4 below, the NRC review of the licensee's evaluations might result in some reauction of the number of SMP acceptance criteria requireo to be addressea by those licensees tnat are scneaulea to sumait evaluations towara tne end of the SEP.

3.1.4 NRC Evaluation of Licensee / Applicant Determin& tion of Compliance After each group of licensees' evaluation have been receiveo, tne NRC staff will review tne documentation submittea ano will cetennine those areas (if any) where assertions of equivalence snould be evaluatea furtner bor possible safety significance and those areas wnere deviations from tne SRP present a potential safety program. As snawn on F1 ure 1, 3

if tne deviation involves a potentially significant safety issue, tne staff will promptly resolve the issue and implement, on an ac noc basis, any necessary oackfit.

as experience is gained in tne implementation of tnis program, tne results will be reviewed from the stanapoint of their contrioution to tne reduction of risk to public health and safety. Juagments may be hade tnat cocumentation against certain of tne 5dP acceptance criteria has not led, or is not likely to lead, to the identification of any new potential safety issues, eitner generically or plant-specific. Therefore, flexibility will be provided regarding HRC staff evaluation of licensee's responses in these areas, which proDaoly will reduce the numoer of follow-on detailed questions sent to licensees.

Also, since tne initial licensees responses will be stag 3ered, tnis coulo result in a reduction of the number of SRP acceptance criteria requireo to be accressed in the initial licensee responses, at least for tne plants in the latter half of tne SEP.

In effect, this would represent a umaification to the list of regulations of "particular significance" (or at least some parts of tnose regulations) basec on experience gained in implementing the program.,

l

After cumpleting tne initial review of each group of responses, tiie staff will initiate plant-oy-plant evaluations according to priorities estaolisned for tne resolution of issues in tne plan for tne systewatic sarety evaluation of operating reactors.

It is expected that most deviations from the SRP acceptance criteria will innerently alreacy. oe scaeduled for a routine safety review as part of the NREP or will either be resolved or seneduled for review as a result of tne experience gained from the current SEP. These plant-by-plant evaluations will be completea for all operating plants oy about 1990.

f After the full safety assessment is completed for a plant, appro-priate integratea backfit detenainations will be made for any significant safety issues, incluaing any issues associated witn any areas of deviation from the SRP acceptance criteria.

As shown on Figures 1 and 2, after the comprenensive plan is published and the revision of the SRP is complete, the NRC staff will nold werkshops for the Itcensees/ applicants for tne purpose of clari-fying tne specific provisions of tne plan anc to indicate tne fona and minimum content of their submittals. These workshops will bene-fit tne licensees / applicants and NRC staff, in that a uniform response containing the required information snould reduce the conformance aeter-mination ano evaluation time to a minimum.

3.2 Part II Part II of the. staff plan as shown on Fi9ure 1 depicts the nature anc interplay of the otner two inaJor programs to evaluate plant safety, which nave alreacy oeen briefly iaentifieo.

Tnese approaches are an engineering issues approach (SEP) ano a plant reliaoility-risk assess-ment approach (tne IREP/NREP). As presently constructec, tne SEP review of ruclear power plants generally is focused on 137 specific safety issues or proolems.

These were culleo from a larger list of 1100 issues to focus en those issues of greatest potential safety significane, baseo on experience and engineering audgement. On the otner aana, IREP/addP is geared toward tne reliability-risk assessment of a cumplete plant. These reviews involve developing plant-specific event and fault trees to iaentify those systems, suosystems, ana components that are the greatest contrioutors to acciaent sequences posing significant risk to public healta ano safety. Botn SEP and IREP/NREP look at the safety of tne plants from aifferent perspectives; nowever, they are amenaole to integration with the plan to satisfy t

the requirements of Section 110 into a single, cooroinated plan of I

review. The results of SEP and IREP/NREP will be used to prioritize tne review of SRP deviations found as a result of Part I of the plan; and they also will be used in an inte3 rated manner, as cepictea on Figure 1, to develop a coherent backfit program and to detenaine i

l wnether enanges or additions are necessary to the regulations or I

the SRP requirements.

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4 3.3 Part III Part III of the staff plan as shown on Figure 1 depicts the nature and covers the implementation of Subsections 110(b)(3), (4), and ~(5) of Public Law 96-295. As stated in Section 2, Background, Subsections 110(b)(3), (4), and (5) require:

(1) the identification of all of the generic safety issues set forth in NUREG-0410 (Reference 3) for which technical solutions have been developed; (2) the determination of which of these solutions should be incorporated into the Commission's

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rules and regulations; and (3) a schedule for developing a technical solu-tion for the remainf og generic safety issues. The staff plan is designed to satisfy the requirements of these three subsections and 4

to prioritize aay new safety issues with due consideration of those previous issues identified in NUREG-0410, the TMI Action Plan (Reference 3), the ACRS Generic Issues, as well as any new issues resulting from IREP, NREP or SEP, Part I of the staff plan, research results, or operating experience. After all the issues have been ranked as to tesortance on the basis of relative risk reduction and estimated benefit-cost (value-impact) ratios, detailed plans will be developed and completion schedules project:d for those issues that require resolution within the next several years.

As shown on Figure 1, it is our intention to remove from the generic safety issues list those issues that are determined to have relatively l

low safety signi#icance. The ongoing development of an NRC safety goal will aid in distinguishing the important from the unimportant generic issues. The active list of generic safety issues will, therefore, be reduced in number, enabliag a realistic projection of resource alloca-tions and completion schedules to be developed. For each issue that was not included on the active generic safety issues list, a justifi-cation for its inactive status will be made together with a recommended priority f u any future consideration.

As shown on Figure 1, Part III of the staff plan will be a continuing effort. That is, as new issues are identified and existing generic safety issues are resolved, priorities will have to be changed periodi-cally and new schedules will be developed.

Since this is an ongoing l

program, a yearly report will be prepared that will identify (1) the current generic safety issues, (2) the action plans and schedules for resolution of each issue under active review, and (3) those generic safety issues whose technical resolution will likely require either a change to the Comission's rules and regulations or new rules and regulations.

It should be noted that some generic safety issues have been designated as Unresolved Safety Issues (USIs) because of their poten-tially significant impact on safety and the need for enhanced manage-ment controls. Task Action Plans and schedules for developing techni-cal resolutions to the USIs have already been established, and progress has been reported to Congress in the NRCs Annual Report (Reference 9).

Accordingly, we believe that the requirements of Subsections 110(b)(3) and (5) have been satisfied for those generic safety issues that are currently designated as USIs. _

Witn respect to Subsection 110(o)(4), rule changes are being proposea for certain of the USIs. as technical resolutions are developec for tne remaining ubls anc for otner generic issues, tne criteria cescrioea below will be used to recommena to tne Commission whether any of these snould be incorporatec into the NRC rules anc regulations.

In Decemoer 1978 the staff issuea HUREG-0449, " Preliminary Statement on General Policy for Rulemakin3 to Improve Nucledr Power Plant

• Licensing" (Reference 10), to provide preliminary suicance requireo

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tnat an issue satisfy the followin9 criteria before 9uins to rule-naking:

(1) the issue must be generic; (2) there suust be a reason-able likelinouu of a useful, cefinitive rule (for example, provices a specific Seneric acceptance criteria, or provices a final specific requirement so that the issue woulu not be acuresseu at all or only in a minor way in plar..-specific licensin3 actions); (3) there must be a reasonaole likelinouu of a staule rule (tnat is, not likely to require change for some reasonable time period); (4j tne rulemakin3 woulu achieve s. ore ettective public input; (b) tne rulemakins snoulc be cost-effective re3 arcing use of NRC resources; to) the rulemakins should be cost effective from an overall stanapoint.

Tnese criteria are being iraprovec and issuec in final form uncer in! Action Plan Task IV.t.4, final criteria are expectea to be issueo early in calen-dar year 1981. These final criteria will be issuea in ceter;aining when tecnnical resolutions to generic safety issues snould the incor-purated into NRCs rules and re3ulations.

J.4 Part IV as snown in Figure 1, Part IV uf this plan, tne inte3 ration of the ecommencations of Parts I, II and III, ceals witn the issuance of backfit oruers or rules.

The commission nas alreauy cecioec in the course of its celiuerations on SECY-8-43UB (Reference 11) tnat tne cevelopment of safety goals will incluce a generally dpplicaule cri-teria for oackfit orcers or rules. The reconiaencations stemming from tne evaluations performeu in Parts I, II, ano III of tne plan wil. De assessed rebarains their safety significance anc for applicaoility to tne Coisaisstun's statement of backtit policy, or against tue criterio 1

set fortn in 50.109. backfit cecisions will be maae accoruin9 y.

Also, as inoicateu on Fi ure 1, tne statt itay be proposing new resu-3 lations as a result or completins Parts I, II, ana III of tnis plan.

l Other new regulattuns, not associateu wita this plan, will also De promul atec as a result of enan9es in tecnnology or from tne staff's 3

increasing tacerstanuin3 of plant operatturis by meatis of evaluation of operating experience ano systens interactions. Eacn new preposeu regulation will incluoe specific impleraentation requireuerus for operating plants ano for GP, OL and hL applications currently unaer 10 l

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staff review, ano fcr sucn applications that :aay be suci.itteu in tne future. This implementation program will ensure tnat every plant will accress new re3ulations anc requirements as tney are issueo.

Thus, eacn plant, whether in the operating, construction, or design stage, will be continually upgraceu (as appropriate) to the current regulations, as interpretec Dy tne SRP acceptance criteria. There-fure, this implenentation pru3 rara will likely eliminate the neeu for any periodic, comprehensive, plant-specific safety reviews in tne future.

4.

dCHeuuLES F1 ure 2 is tne statt's proposea scnecule for accomplisning eacn of 3

the plan's ha or tasks. as statec previously, portions of tne staff a

plan will De accomplisnec by i.iakin3 use of alreauy existing or plantiec p rograhis. Specifically, these pro 9raias are IKEP, NKEP, SEP, and tne Generic Issues tru3 ram.

Work on dEP, the Generic issues Pru9 ram, anu IKEP is alreauy in pru9ress. also, work on tne list of particularly significant regulattuns has oeen partially cosupleted; that is, tne draft list is provideo in Table 1 for public comaent.

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REFERENCES 1.

Congressional Conference Report, Report No. 96-1070.

2.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, "NRC Action Plan Developed as e Result of the TMI-2 Accident," USNRC NUREG-0660, May 1980.

3.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "NRC Program for the Resolution of Generic Issues Related to Nuclear Pcwer Plants," USNRC Report NUREG-0410, 4.

Letter from J. F. Ahesrne, Chairman of NRC, to Walter F. Mondale, President of the Senate, dated September 30, 1980.

5.

Letter from J. F. Ahearne, NRC, to Thomas P. O'Niell, Jr., Speaker of U. S.

House of Representatives, dated September 30, 1980.

S.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, " Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclet.r Power Plants -- LWR Edition," USNRC Report NUREC-75/087.

7.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, " Plan to Require Licensees and Appli-cants to Document Deviations from the Standard Review Plan," Federal Register, Volume 45, No.198, October 9,1980.

8.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, " Proposed Licensing Requirements for Pending Applications for Construction Permits and Manufacturing Licenses,"

USNRC Repcrt, NUREG-0718, August 1980.

9.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmission, "1979 Annual Report."

10.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, " Preliminary Statement on General Policy for Rulemaking to Improve Nuclear Power Plant Licensing," USNRC Report NUREG-0449, December 1978.

11.

SECY-80-2308. !

l l

TABLE 1 RULES OF PARTICULAR '.!GNIFICANCE TO THE PROTECTION OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY 10 CFR 20.101 - 20.108 GDC 21 GDC 44 10 CFR 20.201 - 2012.07 GDC 22 GDC 45 10 CFR 20.301 - 20.305 GDC 23 GDC 46 10 CFR 50.36 GDC 24 GDC 50 10 CFR 50.46 GDC 25 GPC 51 10 CFR 50.55a GDC 26 GDC 52 10 CFR S0, Appendix A GDC 27 GDC 53 GDC 1 GDC 28 GDC 54 GDC 2 GDC 29-GDC 55 GDC 3 GDC 30 GDC 56 GDC 4 GDC 31 GDC 37 GDC 5 GDC 32 GDC 60 GDC 10 GDC 33 GDC 61 GDC 11 GDC 34 GDC 62 GDC 12 GDC 35 GDC 63 GDC 13 GDC 36 GDC 64 GDC 14 GDC 37 10 CFR 50, Appendix G GDC 15 GOC 38 10 CFR 50, Appendix H GDC 16 GDC 39 10 CFR 50, Appendix J GDC 17 GDC 40 10 CFR 50, Appendix K GDC 18 GDC 41 10 CFR 71.31 - 71.42 GDC 19 GDC 42 10 CFR 100 GDC 20 GDC 43 10 CFR 100, Appendix A l I

TABLE 1 (Cont'd)

ADMINI?TRATIVE 10 CFR 19 10 CFR 50.71 10 CFR 50, Appendip B 10 CFR 20.401 - 20.409 10 CFR 50.80 10 CFR 50, Appendix E 10 CFR 21 10 CFR 50.81 10 CFR 55 10 CFR' 50.54 10 CFR 50.82 10 CFR 55, Appendix A 10 CFR 50.70 10 CFR 50.109 V

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C h O O 9 .e d ENCLDSURE 10

EtiCLUSuHt 10 HUCLEAR REGULATORY CVmISSION PLAN FOR TriE SYSTEmTIC EVALuATIOH OF ALL NUCLhaH POWER REACTORS Tne Nuclear Re9ulatory Cosaaission (tne Cuianission) has prepared a report entitled "The Plan for the Systeiaatic Evaluation of all Nuclear Power Reactors" (NUREG-u745), dated January 1961. This report provides tne Conmission's pro-posed detailed plan to satisfy the requireraents of Section 110 of Puolic Law 90-295 (the n8C FY-bu Autnorization Bill). The first part of the prvposea plan concerns docuu.entation of cosapliance with the re9ulations for all currently operatins nuclear puwer plants, as well as all nuclear power plants that are in the process of an operating license, construction per:dt er ;aanuf acturiny license review. Tnis part of tne plan requires all licensees and applicants ta docuinent deviations 'frous tne Stancara Review Plan, NUREG-7s/067, as detailec in a final rule puolisned in the Feceral Resister (F.R. , cated ). Tnis rule was issuea witn cue consideration given to cosaaents receivec of the Cotaaission as requesteu by a not.1ce for pro-posed rulemaking on the salae subject (F.R. 67099, dated Octocer 9,1980). Taole 1 of NUREG-u745 presents a list of tnose Cosaaission's regulatic s which have been deter:ained to be of particular significance to the protection of public health ano safety, anc against whicn all operating nuclear power plants will be evaluated, as well as some reactors in the final stages of review for an operatin9 license. The second part of tne proposeo plan cetails tne interrelationsnips tnat exist between the first part of the plan anc atner existin3 or planned NRC pro-9rasas, i.e., tne Intertia Helido111tj Evaluation Pru3raia, the National ReliaDility Evaluation Pro 3raia, ano the Systentatic Evaluation Pro 9 rata.

. The third part of tne proposeo plan cetails the procecures for the icenti-fication of generic issues, tne resolution of tne issues, and the incorporation, as appropriate, of the resolutions into tne Comission's rules and regulations. The fourth part of the proposed plan details how the reconsnendations of the first three parts of the plan wil} be assessed ano integrated for the purpose of issuing any necessary backfit orders or rules. NUREG-0745 is being issued in its present craft forra to involve the puolic in the development of the final plan. Puolic comments are being solicited. All consaents shoulc be sent to the Secretary of the Conraission, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Washington, D. C. 20555, Attention: Docketin9 and Service Branen,'oy ,1981. Copies of the report will be availabic after January 1981. Copies will be sent directly to utilities, incustry groups ano associations, and iceritified intervenor 9roups. Utner copies will be available for review at the NRC Puolic. Document Room,1717 H Street, N. W. Wasnington, D. C.; ano tne Comission's Local Public Docunent Rooms locatea in tne vicinity of existing nuclear power plants. Audresses of tnese Local Puolic Document Roous can be ootained oy contacting the Chief, Local Public Document Rooms Brancn, hail Stop 309, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Washington, D. C. 20655, Telephone (301) 492-7536. Other copies may be purenased directly from the NRC, oy contacting the Director, Division of Tecnnical Inforination and Document Control, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Consnission, Wasnington, D. C., 20555. DATED AT BETHESDA, nARYLAND, THE DAY OF 1980. FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, Thomas E. Murley, Director Division of Safety Technology Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

( e e e se e ENCLOSURE 11 I I i = - W

i ENCLOSURE 11 PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT To be prepared by Public Affairs when F.R. Notice and Final Rule is approved.

T e 9 e .e ENCLOSURE 12. t 0 e 9 -/. 4 y g w** w p- = = -g y sr

v m. ( ENCLOSURE 12 1 The Honorable (EitherMondaleorBushdependingon President of the Senate the date of issuance) Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. President:

As part of our effort to keep the Congress informed of the Comission's progress in meeting the requirements of Section 110 of Public Law 96-295, I am pleased to submit a draft report, NUREG-0745, detailing the proposed comprehensive plan for the systematic safety evaluation of nuclear power plants and a copy of a Federal Register Notice describing the final plan requiring nuclear power plant licensees to document deviations from the Standard Review Plan, NUREG-75/087. The Commission will continue to keep the Congress informed of its progress in these matters. Sincerely, John F. Ahearne

g m ^ The Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. Speaker of the United States House of Representatives L'ashington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Speaker:

As part of our effort to keep the Congress informed of the Commission's progress in meeting the requirements of Section 110 of Public Law 96-295, I am pleased to subnit a draft report, NUREG-0745, detailing the proposed ] comprehensive plan for the systematic safety evaluation of nuclear power plants and a copy of a Federal Register Notice describing the final plan requiring nuclear power plant licensees to document deviations from the Standard Review Plan, NUREG-75/087. The Commission will continue to keep the Congress informed of its progress in these matters. Sincerely, John F. Ahearne r b_}}