ML19347D249

Forwards LER 81-008/01T-0

ML19347D249
Person / Time
Site:	Peach Bottom
Issue date:	02/25/1981
From:	Cooney M PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC
To:	Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML19347D251	List: ML19347D249 ML19347D252
References
NUDOCS 8103110654
Download: ML19347D249 (3)

Text

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f PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY 2301 MARKET STREET P.O. BOX 8699 PHILADELPHI A. PA.19101 121518414000 February 25, 1981 Mr. Bo yce H. Grier , Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region I US Nuce ar Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue '

King of Prussia, PA 19406

SUBJECT:

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION

Dear Mr. Grier:

The following was reported to Mr. C. Cowgill, Region I, Office of Inspection and Enforcement on February 11, 1981.

Reference:

Docket No. 50-278 ,

Report No.: 3-81-08/1T Report Date: February 25, 1981 l Occurrence Date: February 11, 1981 Facility: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station RD #1, Delta, PA 17314 Technical Specification

Reference:

Technical Specification 3 7. A.2 states in part that " Primary containment integrity shall be maintained at all times when the reactor is critical..."

Technical Specification 6.9.2.a(3) requires prompt reporting of " Abnormal degradation discovered in fuel cladding, reactor coolant pressure boundary, or primary containment."

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i-8103.130(cff' 3 .

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Page 2 Description of the Event During the installation of a new penetration test connection to a 1" containnent atmospheric dilution line (CAD), primary containment integrity was breached for a short time. 'dith the unit at full load, a safety block was applied to a p.--tion of the CAD system to install a new test connection. A sectiot. of the

'A' loop CAD system piping to be modified should have been isolated by closing the manual valve between antainm en t and the location where the pipe was to be cut. Due to an incorrect location identification for the manual valve on a system check-off list, the manual isolation valve was closed on the 'B' CAD loop instead of the isolation valve on the ' A' loop. Th e construction work force then proceeded to cLt the 'A' loop piping and to install a new welded tee connection. The slight differential pressure which existed between primary containment and secondary containment alerted the craf tsmen to the proble=.

Probable Consecuence of the Occurr ence Primary containment was breached to secondary containment for approximately 90 minutes. The 1" pipe was cut in two locations for the installation of the welded tee connection. Due to the very small differential pressure between primary and secondary containment , the leakage was mini =al during the 90 minute period thus making it difficult to identify the problem.

A manual valve was available between pri=ary containment and the work location which could have been used to isolate the line had a significant differential pressure occurred. Con tai nm en t integrity was reestablished promptly after the problem was identified.

j Cause of the Event: .

The occurrence was due to improper designation of valve location on a system procedure which resulted in an operator being directed to close a manual isolation valve on the incorrect loop. The isolation valves in the location did not have identification _ tags.

Corrective Actions:

Immediate corrective action was taken upon recognition of the problem to isolate the leax by closing the 'A' loop manual isolation valve. This re-established primary containment integrity. Until the valving associated with this work was corrected, both CAD penetrations remained isolated. This condition is permissible for a period of 30 days.in accordance with paragraph 3.7.A.6.a.

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Operability of the 'B' CAD system was re-established within one hour. The equipment locations on the incorrect system check-off list have been corrected and identification tags have been installed on the manual isolation valves.

Very truly yours, 4/C M. J. Cooney Superintendent

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Generation Division - Nuclear Attachment ~

cc: Director, NRC - Office of Inspection and Enforcement -

Mr. Norman M. Haller, NRC - Office of Management &

Program Analysis l

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