ML19347D210

LER 81-018/03L-0:on 810208,train Flow Path B Isolated from Refueling Chemical Addition Tank to Refueling Water Storage Tank.Caused by Maint on Drain Valve Leakage Due to Red Rubber Tail Hose Lodged Behind Valve Seat.Hose Removed

ML19347D210
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	03/05/1981
From:	Cartwright W VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML19347D208	List: ML19347D207 ML19347D210
References
LER-81-018-03L, LER-81-18-3L, NUDOCS 8103110468
Download: ML19347D210 (2)

Text

. LEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK / / / / / / / (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

-/0/1/ /V/A/N/A/S/2/ (2) /0/0/-/0/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/ (3) /4/1/1/1/1 (4) / / / (5)

LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NULfBER LICENSE TYPE CAT

/L/ (6) /0/5/0/0/0/3/3/9/ (7) /0/2/0/8/8/1/ (8) h /3 h h h /1/ (9)

DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

/0/2/ /'In' order to perform maintenance on a leaking drain valve, one of two flow paths /

/0/3/ / from the Refueling Chemical Addition Tank to the RWST was isolated. This event /

/0/4/ / is reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b. The Train B flow path was isolated. /

/0/5/ / Since the Train A flow path was operable and the Train B flow path was returned /

/0/6/ / to operable status in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, the public health and safety were not affected. /

/0/7/ / /

/0/8/ /

/

SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMP. VALVE CODE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE

/0/9/ /S/B/ (11) /E/ (12) /B/ (13) /V/A/L/V/E/X/ (14) /E/ (15) /P/ (16)

SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT REVISION LER/R0 EVENT YEAR REPORT NO. CODE TYPE NO.

(17) REPORT NUMBER /8/1/ /-/ /0/ /8/ /\/ /0/3/ /L/ /-/ /0/

ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME CuMP. COMPONE.VI TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER

/B/ (18) /Z/_(19) /Z/ (20)' /Z/ (21) /0/0/0/0/ (22) /JY/ (23) /N/ (24) /A/ (25) /V/0/8 H (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

/1/0/ / Leaksge past the seat of a drain valve required disassembling of the drain valve /

/1/1/ / for maintenance. The drain valve bonnet was removed and a piece of red rubber /

/1/2/ / tail hose was observed lodged behind the valve seat preventing full closure. The/

'/1/3/ / foreign material was removed from the seat and the drain valve was reassembled /

./1/4/ / using a new gasket. do further corrective actions were recuired. /

FACILITY METHOD OF STA*US  % POLER OTHER STATUS DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)

'/1/5/ /E/.(28) /1/0/0/ (29) '/ NA / (30)' /A/ (31) / Operator Observation /

. ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

/1/6/ /2/,(33) [Z/ (34) / NA / / NA /

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE' DESCRIPTION (39)

/1/7/ /0/0/_0[ (37) /2/ (38) /

NA /

PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER JESCRIPTION (41)

F /1/8/ -/0/0/0/ (40) / NA /

. LOSS TYPE OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY ( 3)

DESCRIPTION

/1/9/_ /Z/ (42) / NA _/

PUBLICITY ISSUED -DESCRIPTION (45) NRC USE ONLY

/2/0/ /N/ (44) / NA ./////////////

NAME OF PREPARER W. R. CARTVRIGHT PHONE (703) 894-5151 8108IIo gg

Virginia Electric and Power Company North Anna Power Station, Unit 2

Attachment:

Page 1 of 1 Docket No. 50-339 Report No. LER 81-013/03L-0 Description of Event A piping connection between the refueling water chemical addition tank and the refueling water storage tank allows sodium hydroxide solution to flow by gravity, from the refueling water chemical addition tank to the refueling water storage tank. The flow line splits into two branch lines down stream of the refueling chemical addition tank which recombine prior to entering the refueling water storage tank. Each branch line is isolated by a motor operated valve which opens after a 5 minute time celay following a quench spray pump start or a containment depressurization signal. -One valve receives a Train A signal and the other receives a Train B signal for corplete redundancy. On February 8, 1981, during 100% power operation, the Train B motor operat i valve, MOV-QS-202B, was electrically isolated while in the closed position and a manual isolation valve, 2-QS-42, on the same branch line was closed in order to disassemble a leaking drain valve for maintenance. This action degraded the reliability of the . refueling water chemical addition system and is reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b.

Probable. Consequences of Occurrence Since the Train A flow path was operable, and the Train B flow path

- was returned to operable status in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, th e public health and safety were not affected.

Cause of Event A drain valve leak past the valve seat required disassembling of the drain valve for maintenance. In order to work on the valve the

-Train B flow' path had to be= isolated.

Immediate Corrective Action

-The drain valve bonnet was removed and the valve inspected. A piece of red rubber tail hose was observed lodged behind the valve seat preventing the valve from closing completely. The piece of rubber was removed from the seat and the valve bonnet was reinstalled with a new

. flex gasket. The normal Train B flow path was then restored to operable

=tatus.

Scheduled Corrective Action l_ No scheduled corrective actions are required.

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence No actions to prevent recurrence are required.

Generic Implications There are no generic-implications assosciated with this event.

L _

_