05000339/LER-1994-001, :on 940105,steam Driven Afp 2-FW-P-2 Inlet Trip Valve Closed When Manual Trip Level Accidentally Actuated Rendering Pump Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Maint Engineer Counseled on Proper Work Practices
| ML20063B740 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 01/17/1994 |
| From: | Kane G VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| LER-94-001, LER-94-1, NUDOCS 9402020266 | |
| Download: ML20063B740 (4) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function |
| 3391994001R00 - NRC Website | |
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10 CFR 50.73 Virginia Electric and Power Company North Anna Power Station P. O. Box 402 Mineral, Virginia 23117 January 17,1994 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NAPS:MPW Document Control Desk Docket No. 50-339 Washington, D.C. 20555 t_icense No. NPF-7
Dear Sirs:
Pursuant to North Anna Power Station Technical Specifications, Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report applicable to North Anna Unit 2.
Report No. 50-339/94-001-00 This Report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be forwarded to the Management Safety Review Committee for its review.
Very Truly Yours, m
. E.
ane Station Manager
Enclosure:
cc:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta Street, N.W.
Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 R. D. McWhorter NRC Senior Resident inspector North Anna Power Station 9402020266 940117 i
PDR ADOCK 05000339
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MCluTY NAME (4 DOCAET NWBE R i2, PAM Q North Anna Unit 2 05000 338 TIT 1.E l4)
TWO OF THREE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS INOPERABLE EVENT DATE (5)
LER HUMBER (6)
REPORT DATE (7)
OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)
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LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME mE PnONE NuuE ER amciuoe Area Coosi Greg Kane, Station Manager (703) 894-2101 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) 0 REPORT AB E "j"o y*,TgE
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ABSTR ACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., apprOximEely 15 single-spaced typewntien lines) (16) i On January 5,1994, at 1600 hours0.0185 days <br />0.444 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.088e-4 months <br /> with Unit 2 operating at 100 percent power (Mode 1) the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump (2-FW-P 2) inlet trip valve closed when the manual trip lever was accidentally actuated rendering the pump inoperable. The 2J Emergency Diesel Generator had been previously tagged out for scheduled maintenance which administratively rendered a second motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump inoperable per Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.5 when 2-FW-P-2 was isolated. The inlet trip valve was reset within five minutes and 2-FW-P-2 was returned to operable status. Although the requirements of the TS were satisfied it was determined that this event alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the system's safety function to mitigate the consequences of an accident. A four hour report was made to the NRC at 1757 hours0.0203 days <br />0.488 hours <br />0.00291 weeks <br />6.685385e-4 months <br /> pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iii)(D). The event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(v)(D).
Actuation of the inlet trip valve was due to personnel error while a maintenance engineer was performing an inspection of the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump packing glands.
No significant safety consequences resulted from this event since one AFW subsystem remained
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operable and 2-FW-P-2 was promptly reset. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected at any time during this event.
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eeare wac p mase,(17) 10 Descriotion of the Event On January 5,1994, at 1600 hours0.0185 days <br />0.444 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.088e-4 months <br /> with Unit 2 operating at 100 percent power (Mode 1) the steam driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump,2-FW P-2, (Ells System BA, Component P) inlet trip valve (Elis System BA, Component ISV) closed when the manualinp lever was accidentally actuated. This condition isolated 2-FW-P-2 rendering the pump inoperable. The 2J Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) (Ells System EK, Component DG) had been previously tagged out for scheduled maintenance. The 2J EDG is the emergency power supply for one of the motor driven AFW pumps (2-FW-P-38). With the emergency power supply unavailable for 2-FW-P-38. Combined with the 2-FW-P 2 being inoperable, the motor driven AFW pump is also considered inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification 3.0.5. Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.1.2 requires the unit to be in hot standby within six hours and in hot shutdown within the following six hours when two of three AFW pumps are inoperable. The inlet inp vane was reset within five minutes and 2-FW-P-2 was returned to operable status. Although the requirements of TS 3.7.1.2 were satisfied it was determined that this event alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the system's safety function to mitigate the consequences of an accident. A four hour report was made to the NRC at 1757 hours0.0203 days <br />0.488 hours <br />0.00291 weeks <br />6.685385e-4 months <br /> pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iii)(D). The event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(v)(D).
A Containment Depressurization Accident with a Loss of Offsite Power was considered when determining the ability of the system's.afety function to mitigate the consequences of an accident. With the steam dnven AFW pump,2-FW-P-2, inoperable and the emergency power supply to one motor driven AFW pump,2-FW-P-3B, unavailable that would only leave the second motor driven AFW pump,2-FW-P-3A, to feed a steam generator. The AFW system is designed to provide adequate capacity with only one pump.
However, if the CDA was caused by a break in the steam generator (SG) feedline, supplied by 2-FW-P-3A, all SG feeding capabilities will be defeated.
20 Sionificant Safety Consecuences and lmolications No significant seiety ccnrequences resulted from this event since one AFW subsystem remained operable. The 2-FW P-2 ink trip valve was promptly reset rendering the pump operable thereby satisfying TS requirements. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected at any time during this event.
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Cause of the Event
Actuation of the manual trip lever for the 2-FW-P-2 inlet trip valve was due to personnel error, A maintenance engineer was performing an inspection of the 2-FW-P-2 packing glands. During the inspection the engineer's shirt sleeve came in contact with the manual trip lever causing the inlet trip valve to close rendering 2-FW-P-2 inoperable.
40
immediate Corrective Actions
The maintenance engineer, cognizant of the actuation and resulting equipment actions, immediately notified the control room. An operator was dispatched to investigate and the trip valve was promptly reset.
5.0 Additional Congetive Actions The event was evaluated and determined to be reportable. A tour hour report was made to the NRC at 1757 hours0.0203 days <br />0.488 hours <br />0.00291 weeks <br />6.685385e-4 months <br /> in accordance 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iii)(D).
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VEAR NVWBER NUWlW.R North Anna Unit 2 05000 339 3 OF 3 94 001 00 TEXT in mee space 4 f4Swed wee aeggens hMC Perm 3&&& m {l 7) 6.0 A.ctions to Prevent Recurrence The maintenance engineer has been counseled on the importance of proper work practices when around sensitive equipment. This action is considered sufficient to prevent recurrence.
7.0
Similar Events
None 80
Additional Information
Unit 1 was operating at 100 percent power (mode 1) when the steam driven AFW pump trip valve actuation occurred and was not affected by this event.
NMG Form MA (5-vi;