Letter Sequence Request |
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Results
Other: L-12-049, Plan for the Onsite Audit Regarding Implementation of Mitigating Strategies and Reliable Spent Fuel Instrumentation Related to Orders EA-12-049 and EA-12-051 (TAC Nos. MF0998, MF0999, MF0986, and MF0987), ML13063A017, ML13242A012, ML13242A015, ML13338A448, ML14006A171, ML14069A009, ML14069A012, ML14112A302, ML14251A024, ML14259A458, ML15149A143
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MONTHYEARML13063A0172013-02-28028 February 2013 Overall Integrated Plan in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (Order Number EA-12-051) Project stage: Other 05000339/LER-2013-001, Regarding Manual Reactor Trip Due to Increased Vibrations on Main Turbine/Generator Bearing Number 92013-07-0202 July 2013 Regarding Manual Reactor Trip Due to Increased Vibrations on Main Turbine/Generator Bearing Number 9 Project stage: Request ML13190A3102013-07-0202 July 2013 Response to Request for Additional Information, March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirement for Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Order Number EA-12-051) Project stage: Response to RAI ML13242A0122013-08-23023 August 2013 Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order No. EA-12-049) Project stage: Other ML13242A0152013-08-23023 August 2013 Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (Order No. EA-12-051) Project stage: Other ML13280A2852013-09-30030 September 2013 Cycle 24 Core Operating Limits Report, Revision 1 Project stage: Request ML13281A6482013-11-0101 November 2013 Interim Staff Evaluation and Request for Additional Information (RAI) - Regarding Overall Integrated Plan for Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (Order Number EA-12-051) Project stage: RAI ML14015A3142014-01-0808 January 2014 Submittal of Owners Activity Report Refueling Outage N1R23 (Form OAR-1) Project stage: Request ML14006A1712014-01-23023 January 2014 Mega-Tech Services, LLC, Technical Evaluation Report Regarding the Overall Integrated Plan for North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2, TAC Nos.: MF0998 and MF0999 Project stage: Other ML13338A4482014-01-29029 January 2014 Interim Staff Evaluation and Audit Report Relating to Overall Integrated Plan in Response to Order EA-12-049 (Mitigation Strategies) Project stage: Other ML14069A0092014-02-27027 February 2014 Six-month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Project stage: Other ML14069A0122014-02-27027 February 2014 Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049) Project stage: Other L-12-049, Plan for the Onsite Audit Regarding Implementation of Mitigating Strategies and Reliable Spent Fuel Instrumentation Related to Orders EA-12-049 and EA-12-051 (TAC Nos. MF0998, MF0999, MF0986, and MF0987)2014-04-24024 April 2014 Plan for the Onsite Audit Regarding Implementation of Mitigating Strategies and Reliable Spent Fuel Instrumentation Related to Orders EA-12-049 and EA-12-051 (TAC Nos. MF0998, MF0999, MF0986, and MF0987) Project stage: Other ML14112A3022014-04-24024 April 2014 Plan for the Onsite Audit Regarding Implementation of Mitigating Strategies and Reliable Spent Fuel Instrumentation Related to Orders EA-12-049 and EA-12-051 Project stage: Other ML14251A0242014-08-28028 August 2014 Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049) Project stage: Other ML14259A4582014-09-24024 September 2014 Report for the Onsite Audit Regarding Implementation of Mitigating Strategies and Reliable Spent Fuel Instrumentation Related to Orders EA-12-049 and EA-12-051 Project stage: Other ML15138A2772015-05-18018 May 2015 NRR E-mail Capture - Fw: North Anna DD Formal Reply Project stage: Request ML15147A0162015-05-19019 May 2015 ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection Program, Proposed Inservice Inspection Alternative N1-44-SPT-006 Project stage: Request ML15149A1432015-05-19019 May 2015 Compliance Letter and Final Integrated Plan in Response to the March 12, 2012, Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigating Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order EA-12-049) Project stage: Other ML15194A0602015-07-0202 July 2015 Supplemental Compliance Information Regarding the Final Integrated Plan in Response to the March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigating Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis Project stage: Supplement ML15324A3412016-01-15015 January 2016 Safety Evaluation Regarding Implementation of Mitigating Strategies and Reliable Spent Fuel Instrumentation Related to Orders EA-12-049 and EA-12-051 Project stage: Approval 2014-01-08
[Table View] |
LER-2013-001, Regarding Manual Reactor Trip Due to Increased Vibrations on Main Turbine/Generator Bearing Number 9 |
| Event date: |
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| Report date: |
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| Reporting criterion: |
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
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| 3392013001R00 - NRC Website |
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text
1 OCFR50.73 Virginia Electric and Power Company North Anna Power Station 1022 Haley Drive Mineral, Virginia 23117 July 2, 2013 Attention: Document Control Desk Serial No.:
13-309 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NAPS:
MPW Washington, DC 20555-0001 Docket No.:
50-339 License No.: NPF-7
Dear Sirs:
Pursuant to 10CFR50.73, Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report applicable to North Anna Power Station Unit 2.
Report No. 50-339/2013-001-00 This report has been reviewed by the Facility Safety Review Committee and will be forwarded to the Management Safety Review Committee for its review.
Sincerely, Gerald T. Bischof Site Vice President North Anna Power Station Enclosure Commitments contained in this letter: None cc:
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Marquis One Tower 245 Peachtree Center Ave., NE, Suite 1200 Atlanta, Georgia 30303-1257 NRC Senior Resident Inspector North Anna Power Station
4.
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2013 (10-2010)
, the NRC may digits/characters for each block) not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to. the information collection.
- 3. PAGE North Anna Power Station, Unit 2 05000 339 1 OF 4
- 4. TITLE Manual Reactor Trip Due To Increased Vibrations on Main Turbine/Generator Bearing Number 9
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME DOCUMENTNUMBER I
NUMBER NO.
05000 05 10 2013 2013
-- 001 --
00 07 02 2013 FACILITY NAME DOCUMENTNUMBER 05000
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check al/that apply)
E] 20.2201(b)
Li 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
LI 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
Li 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
[]
20.2201(d)
LI 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
L] 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 1 LI 20.2203(a)(1)
LI 20.2203(a)(4)
L 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
[]
50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
[] 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
[
50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
[] 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
H 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL LI 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
[]
50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
[
50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
[]
50.73(a)(2)(x)
[]
20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
[]
50.36(c)(2)
[]
50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
[]
73.71(a)(4)
LI 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
[
50.46(a)(3)(ii)
[
50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
L] 73.71(a)(5)
Li 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
[
50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
[]
50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
[
OTHER 60
[]
20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
Li 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
[J 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract below or in
2.0 SIGNIFICANT SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS
No significant safety consequences resulted from this event since the Reactor Protection System (RPS) and the Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) System equipment responded as designed. As such, the event posed no significant safety implications and the health and safety of the public were not affected by the event.
On May 10, 2013, at 0820 hours0.00949 days <br />0.228 hours <br />0.00136 weeks <br />3.1201e-4 months <br />, a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> report was made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for RPS actuation and 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> report in accordance with 1 OCFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the first AFW pump automatic start. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for a condition that resulted in automatic actuation of the RPS and AFW System. The second AFW system actuation was invalid and is also being reported per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).
3.0 CAUSE
The direct cause of the event was a combination of the alignment dowel causing a ground on the number 9 bearing pedestal which allowed electrical erosion to remove material from the bearing surface causing a hydraulic rub on the number 9 bearing and improper bearing loading caused by misalignment of the number 9 bearing pedestal.
The root cause was determined to be the Fleet Turbine Group's (FTG) lack of technical expertise coupled with a less than optimal procedure for turbine activities led to an over reliance and inadequate challenging of the turbine vendor.
The cause of the second AFW system actuation when resetting AMSAC was determined to be a procedure weakness. Procedure 2-ES-0.1 did not direct the crew to observe the proper status lights that should be expected when AMSAC has been properly reset.
4.0 IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION(S)
The Control Room crew responded to the reactor trip in accordance with emergency procedure 2-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. The post trip response progressed as expected and the Control Room crew transitioned to 2-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. All equipment responded as designed.
5.0 ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Maintenance was performed to restore the equipment to proper functionality including replacement of the number 9 main turbine/generator bearing and the permanent magnet generator, fan and housing repairs, realignment of the exciter and number 9 pedestal, and proper installation of the number 9 pedestal alignment dowel. The hydrogen and air side seal oil temperature control was modified and the hydrogen and air side seal oil temperature indicators were calibrated.
6.0 ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE The controlling procedure for reassembly of the turbine generator is being revised to ensure critical steps are noted and have the appropriate verifications to ensure that there is the proper level of vendor oversight, and ensure that any as left measurements that are unsatisfactory require a Condition Report to ensure there is the proper level of documentation and evaluation. Benchmarking is being performed to determine qualification/training requirements for turbine group personnel.
With regard to the second AFW pump start, procedure changes have been initiated to improve the wording contained in both 2-ES-0.1 and 2-OP-7.1 1. Lessons learned from the event will be discussed during upcoming sessions of the Licensed Operator Requalification Program (LORP).
7.0
SIMILAR EVENTS
None.
8.0 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Unit 1 was operating in Mode 1,100 percent power on May 10, 2013 and was not affected by this event.
Description
Shoe type bearing Manufacturer:
Siemens Part No.:
613F432G01
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| | | Reporting criterion |
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| 05000339/LER-2013-001, Regarding Manual Reactor Trip Due to Increased Vibrations on Main Turbine/Generator Bearing Number 9 | Regarding Manual Reactor Trip Due to Increased Vibrations on Main Turbine/Generator Bearing Number 9 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000338/LER-2013-001, Emergency Diesel Generators Inoperable During Core Alterations | Emergency Diesel Generators Inoperable During Core Alterations | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000339/LER-2013-002, Regarding Manual Reactor Trip Due to Closure of 2-FW-MOV-250C and Auto-Start of 2-FW-P-1B | Regarding Manual Reactor Trip Due to Closure of 2-FW-MOV-250C and Auto-Start of 2-FW-P-1B | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000338/LER-2013-002, Regarding Automatic Reactor Trip Following Actuation of the 1C Station Service Transformer Lockout Relay | Regarding Automatic Reactor Trip Following Actuation of the 1C Station Service Transformer Lockout Relay | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000338/LER-2013-003, Regarding Outside Recirculation Spray Pumps Declared Inoperable | Regarding Outside Recirculation Spray Pumps Declared Inoperable | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000339/LER-2013-003, A Station Service Bus Under Frequency Protection Relay Inoperable Greater than Technical Specification Completion Time | A Station Service Bus Under Frequency Protection Relay Inoperable Greater than Technical Specification Completion Time | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) |
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