ML19338C818

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Forwards LER 80-029/03L-0
ML19338C818
Person / Time
Site: Cooper Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 08/12/1980
From: Lessor L
NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To: Seyfrit K
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
Shared Package
ML19338C820 List:
References
CNSS800482, NUDOCS 8009050326
Download: ML19338C818 (2)


Text

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a l COOPER NUCLEAR STATION i

Nebraska Public Power District "

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CNSS800482 August 12, 1980 Mr. K. V. Seyfrit U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76011

Dear Sir:

This report is submitted in accordance with Section 6.7.2.B.2 of the Technical Specifications for Cooper Nucis.e Station and discusses a reportable occurrence that was discovered on July 23, 1980. A licensae event report form is also enclosed.

Report No.: 50-298-80-29 Report Date: August 12, 1980 Occurrence Date: July 23, 1980 Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station Brownville, Nebraska 68321 Identification of Occurrence:

Conditions leading to operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation as delineated in Section 3.18. A of the Technical Specifications.

Conditions Prior to Occur->ence:

Steady state power operation at approximately 99% reactor power.

Description of Occitrence:

During performance of Surveillance Procedure 6.4.5.10, fire hydrant HT-1 could e st be opened.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The subject Sk", 150#, fire hydrant was disassembled to determine the cause of the occurrence. Upon disassembly, it was noted the stem top section, which is threaded and pinned onto the stem, had broken. This allowed the stem top section and stem to separate and therefore rendered the hydrant inoperable. The stem top section was removed and appeared to have been cracked for some time before it had broken. It appeared the hydrant had received unnecessary

force to assure it was closed tightly, with the force eventually causing the failure.

8 0090 50M(p y #/

s.

Mr. K. V. Seyfrit August 12, 1980 Page 2.

Analysis of Occurrence:

Fire hydrant HT-1 is designated as tha manual fire fighting hose station for the Intake Structure Ssrvice Water Pump Room. As described, the hydrant was inoperable and could not have been used for this purpose. If a fire had occurred in the Service Water Pump Room which required manual fire fighting capabilities, fire hydrant HT-2 was operable, is located near the Intake Structure, and suf-ficient 2 " fire hose was in the immediate area to reach from HT-2 to the room.

This occurrence presented no adverse consequences from the stand-point of public health and safety.

Corrective Action:

Immediate action upon identification of the occurrence was to inspect the hydrant to determine why it was inoperable. The in-spection revealed the stem top section was broken and had become sarsrated from the stem. The broken stem top section was removed a a a new stem top section was installed immediately (within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />). To prevent recurrence, personnel have been instructed to avoid using unnecessary force when closing the hydrant.

Sincerely, W

  • L. C. Lessor Station Superintendent Cooper Nuclear Station LCL:cg Attach.

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