ML19332G265

Proposed Tech Specs Re Primary Containment Isolation & Primary Containment Leakage Test Penetrations

ML19332G265
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	12/11/1989
From:	COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML19332G259	List: ML19332G258 ML19332G265
References
NUDOCS 8912200414
Download: ML19332G265 (10)

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QUAD-CITIES i OPR-30 TABLE 3.7-1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION Valve Number Number of Maximum for Power-Operated Operating Normal Action on Isolation Valve Units Valves Time Operating Initiating Group Identification 1 and 2 Inboard Outboard (sec) Position Signal Main Steam Isolation 1 Main steam '

isolation A0-203-1A, 4 valve 18, 1C, 10 31T(5 0 GC l l

1 Main steam isolation A0-203-2A 4 valve 2B, 2C, 2D 31T(5 0 GC t 1 Main steam drain MO-220-1 1 <35

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valve 1 Main steam drain MO-220-2 1 <35 C SC isolation valve Sampling

1. Recirculating sample valve A0-220-44 1 <5

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0 GC 1 Recirculation sample valve .AO-220-45 1 ~

(5 0 GC (NOTE: Valve can be reopened after isolation for sampling)

RHR 2 RHR discharge to radwaste MO-1001-20 1 125 C SC 2 RHR discharge -

to radwaste MO-1001-21 1 125 C SC 2396H 3.7/4.7-20

Q QUAD-CITIES OPR-30 TABLE 3.7-1 (Cont'd)

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION Valve Number Number of Maximum for Power-Operated Operating Normal Action on Isolation Valve Units Valves Time Operating Initiating Group Identification 1 and 2 Inboard Outboard (sec) Position Signal 2 Reactor shutdown cooling supply MO-1001-47 1, 140 C SC 2 Reactor ,

shutdown cooling supply H0-1001-50 1 140 C SC Pressure Suppression 2 Drywell purge valve A0-1601-21 1 110 C SC 2 Vent valve Ao-1601-22 1 10 1 C SC 2 Drywell vent valve A0-1601-23 1 10 1 C SC 2 Vent to rea: tor building exhaust system A0-1601-24 1 110 C SC 2 Nitrogen purge A0-1601-55 1 101 0 GC 2 Torus purge valve A0-1601-56 1 101 0 GC 2 Makeup valve H0-1601-57 1 115 0 GC 2 Torus makeup valve A0-1601-58 1 115 C SC 2396H 3.7/4.7 20a

6 QUAD-CITIES DPR-30 t .

TABLE 3.7-1 (Cont'd)

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION Valve Number Number of Maximum for Power-Operated Operating Normal Action on Isolation Valve Units Valves Time Operating Initiating Group Identification I and 2 Inboard Outboard (sec) Position Signal 2 Drywell makeup valve A0-1601-59 1 115 0 GC 2 Torus vent valve A0-1601-60 1 <10

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C SC 2 Torus 2-inch vent relief. A0-1601-61 1 (15

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C SC 2 Drywell 2-inch vent relief A0-1601-62 1 <15

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C SC 2 Vent to SGT system A0-1601-63 1 110 C SC 2 Drywell pneumatic A0-4720 2 110 0 GC Supply isolation A0-4721 2396H 3.7/4.7-20b

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DPR-29 ,

TABLE 3.7-2 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE TEST PENETRATIONS ,

Double-Gasketed Seals X-1 Equipnent hatch i X-2 Personnel air lock i X-6 Control rod drive hatch i X-35A through G TIP drives X-4 Drywell head access hatch i X-200A & B Suppression chamber access hatch s

I through 8 Drywell head shear lug (inspection hatch) ,

Pipe Penetrations .

X-7A through D Main steam ,

X-8 Main steamline drain X-9A & B Feedwater '

X-10 Reactor core isolation cooling '

X-Il High-pressure coolant injection X-12 Residual heat removal X-13A & B Residual heat removal X-14 Reactor coolant cleanup X-16A & B Core spray X-23 & 24 Reactor building closed cooling water I X-25 & 26 Drywell ventilation X-47 Standby liquid control l Electrical Penetrations '

X-1008, C, E F, & G  ;

X-101A, B & D '

X-1028 X-103  :

X-104A through D & F  !

X-105C X-106A & B X-107A & B  :

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Delete: "(min)" from MSIV operating time requirement. l Delete Reactor head spray valves MO-1001-60 and MO-1001-63 l l

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l ATIACRP!NfL3 DESCR1tIIDH_Ri1LEASIS_E0lLAliENLtiENI_REQUESI Current Technical Specifications 3.7.D.2 requires that all Isolation Valves contained in Table 3.7-1 be operable during recctor power operation.

Table 3.7-1 contains a description and associated requirements for operating position and operating time for reactor head spray valves MO-1001-60 and MO-1001-63. Table 3.7-1 currently includes "(min.)" with the Main Steam Isolation valve operating time. In addition. Table 3.7-2 describes the Primary Containment Leakage Test Penetrations which includes penetrations for the reactor vessel head spray and CRD return lines.

The proposed Technical Specification deletes the reference to the reactor vessel head spray from Table 3.7-1 and 3.7-2 and CRD return lines from Table 3.7-2 as a result of the removal of these lines. The proposed amendment also removes the term (min) from the MSIV operating time.

The modification to the reactor vessel head spray and CRD return lines is currently planned as part of the Station's Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking mitigation program, as put forth in the response to Generic Letter 88-01. The piping was determined to be unnecessary and susceptible to IGSCC. The Modification is currently scheduled to be performed during the upcoming Unit 2 Refueling Outage.

The head spray system provides a means to augment reactor cooldown and reduction of pressure following a shutdown. The head spray system is part of the Residual Heat Removal system and allows water to be diverted to a spray nozzle in the steam dome of the vessel. The operation of the head spray system during reactor shutdown is optional. The system is not used to mitigate accidents or during normal reactor operation.

The CRD return line was previously removed from service to prevent thermal stresses on the reactor vessel, due to temperature differential caused by the return of cooler CRD water. The CRD return line provided a return flowpath to the reactor vessel following CRD movement. The current return flowpath is reverse flow through the exhaust header and return to the vessel through the CRD seals. Since the return line was capped, the piping was not utilized during any mode of operation.

As a result of the removal of the !!ead Spray piping, valves MO-1001-60 and MO-1001-63 will be eliminated. These valves provide for containment isolation and are normally closed. The valves receive a close signal during a Group 11 initiation signal (low reactor water level, high drywell pressure, or high drywell radiation levels). The remaining piping (reactor side) will be blind flanged which provides for isolation of the pressure boundary. The blind flange provides the same or greater level of reactor pressure boundary as the removed isolation valve.

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1 The removal of the CRD return line and head spref piping results in )

the closure of two drywell penetrations which are listed on Table 3-7.2. This Table delineates the penetrations which require Type C local leak rate testing. A welded cap will be installed on the interior side of primary containment. The 20" head spray and 8" CRD return lino penetiation caps will serve as the primary containment boundary. The integrity of the penetration closure will be tested during containment integrated leak rate test. The closure of the penetrations eliminate possible leakage path from containment.

The penetration cap was designed to be consistent with containtment design pressures and temperature.

The removal of the term (min.) from MSIV operating times appears to be an error. MSIV closure times, as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report and Technical Specifications bases, require MSIV to close within 5 seconds (not minutes) timeframe to ensure that 10 CFR 100 guidelines are not exceeded. The 3 second closure time minimizes the pressure spike experienced by the reactor, thereby proventing fuel damage as a result of rapid void collapse. The 3 second closure time minimizes the pressure spike experienced by the reactor, thereby preventing fuel damage as a result of rapid void collapse. The term "(min)" is, therefore, inappropriate and should be removed. This change is adminstrative in nature since the MSIV operating time is based on 3-5 second closure time.

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ATIACIMDfI_A EASIS FOILROJLGli1ELCtdiLIIAZARDS_.DEIMINAILDR As discussed in the Description of the Proposed Amendment Request, the proposed change revises the current Technical Specification listing for the primary containment isolation valves and primary containment leakage test penetration.

The changes have been reviewed by Conunonwealt h Edison. 11ased on this review, Commonwealth Edison does not believe the changes present a Significant flazards Consideration. The banis for the determination is documented below.

Conenonwealth Edison has evaluated this proposed amendment and determined that the changes does not involve a significant hazards consideration. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.92(c):

1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated.

The probability of a pipe leak and/or break due to intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) is reduced by the removal of the llead Spray and Control Rod Drive return lines. The removal of the llead Spray line reduces the consequences of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) due to the elimina-tion of a vessel leakage path. The hydrostatic test of the vessel, performed each cycle, will assure the integrity of the installed blind flange.

The probability of an accident is not offected by the closure of the penetrations. The consequences of an accident is reduced since the closed penetrations will not be available as a possible Primary Containment l 1eakage path. The leak tightness of the penetrations will be verified by the integrated leak rate test (ILRT). The penetration cap is designed to ,

withstand containment design pressures and temperatures.

Finally, since neither the CRD return line nor the llead Spray system are utilized to mitigate any accident scenario, the elimination of the llead Spray system and the CRD return line does not increase the probability or l consequences of any accident previously evaluated. I l \

The removal of the term "(min)" is administrative in nature and does not affect the probability or consequence of an accident. A maximum MSIV 1 l

closure time of 5 sesonds is specified to assure 10 CFR 100 limits are maintained. The minimum closure time of 3 seconds minimizes the pressure 4 spike to assure fuel damage does not occur due to the collapse of voids. l l This change will assure clarity to closure time requirements.  !

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2. 'The proposed change will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

No new interfaces with safety-related equipment, systems or structures or any new systems subject to failure-ur malfunction have been introduced.-

The proposed change does not introduce any new operational modes. The flead Spray system and CRD Return Line were not used for accidsnt mitiga-tion, normal operation or shutdown (use of IIcad Spray during a shutdown is optional). Consequently, the removal will not result on the use of other systems in new or unanalyzed methods. No new or different kinds or accidents from any previously evaluated is therefore created. ,

The removal of the term "(min)" does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident. The removal of the term is administrative in nature and provides clarity. MSIV closure times are reflected in seconds and not (min) as indicated on the present Technical Specification Tabic. -

3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The margin of safety is unchanged as a result of the removal of three

, possible pathways for leakage. The possibility of failure due to IGSCO in the removed piping systems is eliminated as is the possibility of leakage through the llead Spray Containment Isolation Valves. The current configuration of the blind flange (reactor side) and pipe cap-(RilR side) provides for an adequate isolation of the piping. Reactor vessel hydrostatic testing will ensure integrity of the current configuration.

Closing the penetrations in the drywell also reduces the possibility of Primary Contair mnt leakage through these paths. Penetration closure integrity is - o died using ILRT.

The removal or the term (min) does not affect the margin of safety. The margin of safety is unaffected since the accurate units for MSIV operating limits is seconds not minutes.

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