ML19331D149
| ML19331D149 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 08/11/1980 |
| From: | Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| IEB-80-06, IEB-80-6, NUDOCS 8008270379 | |
| Download: ML19331D149 (3) | |
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
I ~,"'kcHITTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 374ot 400 Chestnut Street Tower II
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' 15 e 8: 59 August 11, 1980 Mb James P. O'Reilly, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II - Suite 3100 101 Marietta Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
OFFICE O M97 E_ INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN 80 RII:JPO 260, -2962 Enclosed is progress report number 3 for work related to IE Bulletin 80-06 for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant. This report reflects the progress of work to date since our letter dated July 11, 1980, from J. L. Cross to you.
If you have any questions regarding this matter, please get in touch with Jim Domer at FTS 857-2014.
Very truly yours, h
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
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L. M. Mills, Nanager Nuclear Regulation and Safety SubscribedandswornJobefore me this /N day of /4 r4;fl980.
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Division of Reactor Operations Inspection Washington, DC 20555 i
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An Equal Opportunity Employer
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ENCLOSURE IE BULLETIN 80-06 PROGRESS REPORT NO. 3 BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1-3 (DOCKET NOS. 50-259, -260, -296) a In our progress report dated July 11, 1980, we reported that we had completed the drawing review for four systems.
In addition, the drawing review has been completed for the High Pressure Ccalant Injection (HPCI) and Reactor Coolant Isolation Cooling (RCIC) systems.
Those' items that can or will change mode upon reset of an ESF signal for each system reviewed are tabulated below.
A.
Primary Containment Isolation System With the exception of the Traversing Incore probe system these devices remain in their emergency mode upon reset of an ESF signal. The isolation valve asscciated with the probe tube can change state on containment isolation reset if the system is in the manual mode and the drive mechanism is in forward drive.
Evaluations regarding potential administrative, procedural, or equipment changes to resolve this situation are being conducted on an expedited basis. The results of these evaluations will be included in the next monthly report, to be submitted approximately September 10, 1980.
B.
Groups 2 and 3 pilot scram solencids for systems A and B (92 valves).
2.
Scram discharge volume vent t.nd drain pilot valve for systems A and B (2 valves).
3 Backup scram valve for systems A and B (2 valves).
Upon receipt of an ESF signal, the solenoids tabulated above move from their normal position causing the control rods to be rapidly inserted.
These solenoids return to their normal position upon.*dset of the ESF signal; however, the control rods remain in their inserted position.
Withdrawal of the control rods requires operator action on the reactor manual control system.
C.
Residual Heat Removal System
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i Valve 10-25A - (FCV-74-53) and valve 10-25B - (FCV-74-67) can change from emergency mode. However, we have determined that their changing does not constitute a safety problem.
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. D.
Core Spray System The core spray pumps can change modes under certain conditions.
It has been determined that if these devices change modes, it does not constitute a safety problem.
E.
High-Pressure Coolant Injection System The following valves could change state on reset of signal:
1.
Valve 23-25 (FCV-73-30) 2.
Valve 23-57 (FCV-73-27) 3 Valve 23-58 (FCV-73-26) 4.
Valve 23 17 (FCV-73-40)
The following items will change state on reset:
1.
Turbine trip solenoid (PCV-73-18B) 2.
HPCI gland seal condenser blower 3
HPCI turbine auxiliary oil pu=p The changing state of these devices has been reviewed by TVA. It has been concluded that if these devices change modes it does not constitute a safety problem.
F.
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Systems Two devices could change the state upon reset of signal.
1.
Valve 13-27 (FCV-71-34) 2.
Turbine trip solenoid (XY-71-9) i The changing state of these two devices has been reviewed by TVA.
It has been concluded that if these devices change modes, it does l
not constitute a safety problem.
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